Lessons of the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan, Relevant to a Future NATO Withdrawal Introduction As NATO and Coalition Forces plan the transition to a new post‐combat phase in the Afghan Campaign, it would be most unwise to assume that the withdrawal of military forces from Afghanistan and the transfer of power to the Afghan Government and security forces will go smoothly. Despite the many differences in the situation, there are nevertheless certain similarities between the situation faced by the withdrawing Soviets and that facing NATO in the coming months. Consequently, a brief review of lessons to be drawn from the Soviet experience of two decades ago may be worth studying. Background Not long after the 1979 invasion, the Soviet military became disillusioned with supporting an unpopular, corrupt Afghan government and recommended withdrawal. However, weak leadership in the Kremlin resulted in a policy of drift until a new, dynamic leader emerged in March 1985. Gorbachev demanded results from the military approach within a year and authorized a mini ‘surge’ to help achieve them. While achieving some success, the Soviet Army failed to break the back of the Mujahideen resistance and Gorbachev, prioritizing domestic reforms, was no longer willing to pay the internal and external price of increased military effort. In February 1986, Gorbachev announced the decision to withdraw, simultaneously laying out plans for ‘Afghanization’ of the conflict as part of a withdrawal strategy. He also embarked on lengthy diplomatic efforts with a wide range of interested countries to extricate the USSR from Afghanistan. But he would not allow negotiation with the Mujahideen and insisted on support for Najibullah’s government, despite the latter’s lack of popular legitimacy. Planning the withdrawal There is a widespread misconception that the Soviets were defeated in Afghanistan and fled precipitately. In fact, they left in a well‐prepared, co‐ordinated fashion, leaving behind a functioning government, a tolerable military situation and a serious advisory team to disburse military and economic aid and provide practical assistance to ensure that the Najibullah government could continue. The intensive planning process for the withdrawal started in Jan 1987. Gen Boris Gromov was appointed to command 40th Army and plan and implement the withdrawal. He set up a large planning staff of extremely well qualified officers who remained in place until the withdrawal was complete, thus ensuring competence, continuity and accountability. Gromov is now Governor of the Greater Moscow Region and could be approached for his advice on a NATO withdrawal. Starting in 1987, great efforts were made to ensure that a stable Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) Government with effective military and security forces would be able to continue functioning after the withdrawal. A Soviet General Staff Operational Group (a high‐level team of extremely 1 competent, well‐trained staff officers) was set up under General Varennikov to this end (See endnote 1). Increased resources were poured into civil infrastructure projects. The Soviet‐appointed Afghan leader Najibullah instituted a broad reform of the state system and introduced a reconciliation and re‐integration programme. (See endnote 2) Implementing the withdrawal The two‐phase withdrawal order was issued in April 1988. Phase 1 ran from 15 May to 15 August, withdrawing smaller and outlying garrisons into larger garrison areas, ceasing to patrol many areas, preparing garrisons for handover to Afghan control. Phase 2 was planned for November 1988 to January 1989 but pushed back by a month, with a final withdrawal deadline set for 15th February. Withdrawal was by rolling up Soviet garrisons from South to North on two axes to a defended lager area on the Soviet border. The Soviet main force crossed back into the USSR between 11‐14 February. (see endnote 3) The Soviet priorities prior to and during the withdrawal 1. Increasing the effectiveness of the Afghan Government so that (a) it could contribute to a stable security situation permitting a peaceful Soviet withdrawal, and (b) survive the withdrawal of Soviet Forces and maintain the Najibullah Government in power. (The government was beset with competing factions and the Afghan military forces had been split between different ministries to ensure a balance of power). 2. Ensuring that the Afghan Government possessed an effective military force to ensure its own defence and the survival of the state.(see endnote 4) 3. Handing over garrisons intact to the Afghans, with good, functioning equipment. 4. Frustrating the Mujahideen efforts to exploit the withdrawal and filling the vacuum created by the departing Soviet troops. The Mujahideen tried to forestall Afghan Army units and prevent their moving in smoothly to replace Soviet units in garrisons, where they would have time to build their competence and capacity for independent action. 5. Ensuring the security of Soviet troops during the withdrawal process. This was understood as a fighting withdrawal and was a very serious concern. Mujahideen attacks were deterred where possible by bribing local warlords and militias, or defeated by the application of overwhelming firepower with a complete disregard for civilian casualties. Villages along the withdrawal route were frequently subjected to carpet bombing. 6. Coping with the serious problems presented by the winter weather. 7. Ensuring favourable foreign and domestic press coverage 2 8. Maintaining a strict timetable for the withdrawal. This was seen both as a political necessity by Gorbachev and as a military necessity by General Gromov. As a result, no flexibility was included to take account of the needs of the Afghan Government or of circumstances changing during the withdrawal, and the stages of the withdrawal were not tied to any political conditions being fulfilled. With hindsight, this was seen to be a serious error. 9. Achieving the release / repatriation of 315 Soviet soldiers believed to be held prisoner by the Mujahideen. (15 were eventually returned) Evaluation of the Soviet withdrawal From a purely military perspective the withdrawal was excellently planned, very well led, successfully executed under difficult conditions. Concern for Afghan civilian casualties did not feature high in the Soviet commander’s considerations. From a Soviet political perspective it was considered initially to be as good as could be expected under the circumstances. The National Reconciliation Policy and reforms of the army, especially the co‐option of ethnic militias, combined with the Mujahideen’s weaknesses to enable the Najibullah regime to survive and even go on the counter‐offensive (politically as well as militarily). By the end of 1990, Soviet advisors could feel some pride in real, if fragile, local achievements. However, the regime in Kabul was increasingly undermined by internal divisions, by the economic condition of the country, by the fragmentation of effort springing from the divisive effects of the government’s tribal and ethnic policies and, fatally, by the ending of Soviet aid in 1991. The new Russia, desperately trying to survive further break‐up or even civil war, could not and would not continue support. Nevertheless, Najibullah lasted until spring 1992, when Dostum’s defection ruined the military situation. The tactical, military‐professional lessons of the Soviet withdrawal and transition to Afghan rule are interesting and instructive. But the political lessons of the impact on the Soviet Government and people are the ones of real strategic importance, and highly relevant to today’s situation. The Soviet leadership grossly underestimated the impact on Soviet society of the sense of national failure and shame, of the burden of casualties‐especially the disabled‐ and of the influence of returning troops on popular attitude, destroying confidence and trust in the Government and the ruling Party. This significantly contributed to the speed and thoroughness of the disintegration of the USSR. It would be unfortunate if NATO were similarly to underestimate the impact that a difficult withdrawal might have. The Soviets had made a massive financial and political investment in building a viable Afghan Government and ensuring that it had effective military forces. A great deal of investment was put into civilian infrastructure before withdrawal. But what the Soviets had built during their time in Afghanistan was a state system in the image of their own, originally intending it to remain a client state instead of accepting for it to evolve into a state suitable for running Afghanistan as it was, rather than as the Politburo would have liked it to be. As a result, as long as Soviet financial subsidies, civilian supplies and military weapons and support flowed into Afghanistan, the 3 Government could succeed in remaining in power and pushing back the Mujahideen. When this support dried up, despite the reforms instigated by Najibullah before the withdrawal had begun, the system gradually failed. Commentary The reasons for the Soviet failure need not be repeated today. There are many similarities in conditions today, but also some significant differences. The Soviet Army had been immeasurably more brutal and destructive than the Allied forces have been. The Afghan Government they set up was a Soviet‐style repressive state. This repression was quite effective at enforcing stability as long as the tools of repression could be maintained. But the nature of the state meant that it could get no real help from the international community when Soviet support failed, despite the decentralising reforms introduced by Najibullah. By refusing to engage with the Mujahideen and with neighbouring countries with influence and vital interests in Afghanistan, the Soviets ensured that their reconciliation and re‐integration process would be fatally undermined, both by internal power struggles and external interference. Above all, the Soviet failure to consult with, listen to and understand the Afghan peoples meant that the solutions they imposed could never be appropriate and sustainable. The Soviet Union could only think of Afghanistan as a single, centralised state. Najibullah could only undo that basic design to a limited extent. Given the problem of ethnicity in the USSR, and the fact that the Soviet state survived only by supressing national/tribal identity, the Soviet approach is perhaps not surprising. But it would be unforgivable if the Allies were to make the same mistake today. Unfortunately, the international community in general finds it difficult to contemplate the break‐up of states objectively. For whatever reason, it has a long track‐record of trying to keep non‐viable states in one piece long after their sell‐by date. Ironically, the USSR had a good number of people, including a significant Afghan diaspora in Moscow, who really understood Afghan society and could perhaps have devised and contributed to alternative, more appropriate models for an Afghan state. But their advice was not sought. Furthermore, the non‐military elements of the Soviet state could not or did not make the necessary contribution to a solution. The Soviet military so dominated the Soviet effort in Afghanistan that military requirements consistently prevailed over all others, even during the withdrawal, despite the fact that the Soviet Army had acknowledged that there was no long term military solution. NATO member nations also have a great many people who really understand Afghanistan. There is a considerable Afghan diaspora ready to lend its hand in a solution. However, no effort is being made to harness their abilities. Nor has the West attempted to harness its considerable intellectual and economic resources to find solutions to the problem. The Taliban today are nowhere near as popular in Afghanistan as the Mujihadeen were twenty years ago, nor so numerous and well‐armed as the Mujahideen ultimately were. It is clear from where they are drawing their support. Unlike the USSR, the Allies today are not failing states, despite their financial concerns. They have levers they could use against states supporting the Taliban, should they choose to do so. 4 The most important lesson, however, is that the Najibullah regime did survive, and indeed functioned quite well, until Soviet support dried up. From that moment, Afghanistan gradually slipped back into becoming once again an ungoverned space where toxic problems could fester. The same is quite likely to happen again unless NATO can stay the course and provide long‐term support until a governance system can evolve which satisfies all the Afghan people’s needs. Acknowledgements I would like to acknowledge my debt to the expert work of Charles Dick, formerly head of the Army’s Conflict Studies Research Centre; Col. Les Grau, of the US Army’s Foreign Military Studies Office; and, Anthony Fitzherbert, Fellow of the Institute for Statecraft. All responsibility for errors or omissions is entirely mine. Endnotes Endnote 1. The job of securing a stable Afghanistan in the course and wake of withdrawal belonged to an operational group (OG) of the General Staff under V I Varennikov, which worked in theatre from Jan 1987 to Feb 1989 (Varennikov had concluded as early as late 1984 that only a political solution would end the war). The OG’s task was: to provide operational oversight at the combined pol‐mil strategic level; to unify the actions of the various agencies engaged; to provide a coordination function at the political level between the ruling Party and the Soviet leadership in Moscow; to raise the efficiency of the DRA forces and bring about greater unity of effort. The OG also played a major role in pursuing ceasefires with and encouraging defections from the Mujahideen. Endnote 2. Shortly after Najibullah took over as head of government at the end of 1986, he repealed most communist reforms and introduced an Islamisation of the legal system. He changed the constitution to broaden support. He also introduced a National Reconciliation Policy (NRP) in early 1987, a strategy designed to open negotiations with opposition figures and create a more pluralistic, coalition government. These changes were approved by a Loya Jirga towards the end of 1987. NRP principles were: ‐ immediate cessation of hostilities; ‐ meeting of local leaders from all sides round the table; ‐ creation of a transitional government; ‐ holding of a free general election. The NRP, decisively influenced by the Soviet decision to withdraw, changed both the “ COIN” policy and the state‐building process. Efforts to build a centralized state and socialist economy were replaced by notions of a decentralized state with a great deal of local autonomy being granted in return for local ceasefires. Ethnic minorities (which eventually became the basis of the Northern Alliance) were empowered and became allies of the Government; Dostum’s Uzbek militia (40000 strong) was to become the most effective fighting force of the government. 5 Endnote 3. Combat actions were scaled back, being generally limited to defence of major cities and airfields and 40th Army’s Lines of Communication. The Mujahideen were effectively ceded control of over 80% of Afghanistan. As the withdrawal gathered pace, efforts to improve the capability of the Afghan forces intensified. This had to be carefully phased with consideration of what territory the Afghan Army could reasonably be expected to hold on its own. Scattering forces across the country was senseless and concentration on those areas that were indispensable for regime survival was the order of the day. Endnote 4. According to the Soviet General Staff Study, the claimed strength of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) armed forces during the war was 120‐150000. Actual strength of ground forces probably averaged 40‐50000 throughout the war, taking casualties and desertions into account; actual strength of air/air defence forces, 7000; Sarandoy (Interior Ministry) security forces probably about 50000 with rather more in the Khad (secret police); Border Guards approx. 4000. Equipment: 800 tanks, 130 BMPs, over 1,220 BTRs/BRDMs/BRMs, over 2,600 pieces of artillery (including mortars, MRLs), 300 aircraft and helicopters, 13000 trucks. In 1992, the DRA possessed: 930 tanks, 550 BMPs, 1,250 BTRs/BRDMs, over 2000 pieces of artillery, 30 MiG‐23, 80 Su‐17/20/22 and 80 MiG‐21. The Afghan High Command had problems in using weapons and equipment to their full effectiveness. There were difficulties in creating a repair/maintenance system (lack of qualified specialists, underdeveloped infrastructure); training of young specialists was ineffectual; tank and vehicle crews were generally understrength. Levels of training proved inadequate consequently, during the war, reforms were introduced to correct deficiencies. The higher officers’ course was lengthened from three to six months; in military academies courses went from 21 months to three years (save in the Combined Arms Academy). Officer and general teaching staff were required to pass an attestation board. Commanders’ training sessions were conducted two days per month, at half‐yearly commanders’ assemblies and during the course of the weekly training programme. The system was supposed to provide a qualified officer cadre but it had many deficiencies. Officers were not necessarily given appropriate postings, some were removed for no good military reason and others were given responsible jobs without appropriate experience and training (i.e., politics, nepotism and corruption intervened). The condition of the conscription system was poor — only about 65% of the numbers required were inducted. Conscripts accounted for over 70% of the personnel, the rest being volunteers. Basic training lasted one month and sergeant and specialist training lasted 3‐4 months. There were two training programmes for combat regiments and divisions, a seven day one for units about to enter combat and a 20 day one for units returning from combat or refitting. Training concentrated on combined arms, air assaults, actions of flanking and raiding detachments, breaching large minefields, clearing entrenched positions, and defence. The army had significant training shortcomings. The seven day programme was not always conducted prior to entering combat. Regt‐coy officers were poorly prepared for command in battle and in use of modern communications. Units/sub‐units were insufficiently trained for flanking 6 manoeuvres, ambushes and, especially, night fighting. Afghan units were generally unable to fight independently and constantly needed Soviet help. An aggravating factor was significant personnel shortages. On average, combat sub‐units were 25‐40% under‐manned‐an optimistic estimate‐ due mainly to desertion; every month, an average of 1500‐2000 men deserted. Territorial units, recruited from 1985, became important These comprised volunteers from former Mujahideen and separate tribes and fought only in their own localities. Volunteers served for at least three years and received regular army training. Each unit had a cadre of at least 30% assembled in barracks with the rest at home until called upon. Leaders were selected from lists of candidates proposed by tribal elders and former leaders of the opposition. Principal staff officers were regulars. The DRA army was supposed to take on the main burden of combat, working closely with the 40th Army. However, Soviet‐Afghan relations were often poor. DRA units were riddled with Mujahideen sympathizers who provided the enemy with invaluable intelligence. Naturally, the Soviets were reluctant to share information and plans with the DRA for fear of compromise. This led to mutual distrust and sometimes hostility. On the Soviet withdrawal, DRA Army morale was poor and the army near crippled by desertion; loss of specialists meant that much equipment was rendered unusable and military book‐keeping was riddled with corruption and inefficiency. The army lacked critical intelligence‐gathering assets and efficient logistics. Nevertheless, the DRA armed forces performed creditably for over two years after the last Soviet soldier left. 7