The Violent
Consequences of the
Nation: Nationalism
and the Initiation of
Interstate War
Journal of Conflict Resolution
56(5) 825-852
ª The Author(s) 2012
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DOI: 10.1177/0022002712438354
http://jcr.sagepub.com
Gretchen Schrock-Jacobson1
Abstract
Many scholars assume that nationalism is inherently aggressive without systematically exploring the relationship between nationalism and interstate war initiation.
Thus, many questions are unanswered. Does nationalism increase the risk of war
and if so, how? Which types of nationalism are most likely to trigger warfare? The
author argues that nationalist persuasion campaigns produce several mechanisms
that encourage conflict. Nationalism provokes ‘‘national enemies’’ and their foreign
allies, generates biased strategic assumptions, creates domestic interest groups that
favor war, permits the suppression of opposition groups, and promotes ‘‘nationalist
bidding wars.’’ When these processes exist, nationalism should increase the probability of war initiation. But, different forms of nationalism may not have similar
effects. Using original data on the existence and type of state-level nationalism from
1816 to 1997, the author finds that nationalism significantly increases the probability
of interstate war initiation. However, not all forms of nationalism are created equal
in this regard.
Keywords
nationalism, violent conflict, nationalism, and war initiation
1
Department of Political Science, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA, USA
Corresponding Author:
Gretchen Schrock-Jacobson, Department of Political Science, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 16802, USA
Email: [email protected]
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The wars following Nazi Germany’s quest for lebensraum, the Vietnamese
independence movement, and communism’s collapse in Yugoslavia suggest that
nationalism plays a role in the instigation of international conflict. Many scholars and laypeople alike believe that nationalism can potentially promote aggression (Kedourie 1971, 1993). Yet, there has been little systematic exploration of
the relationship between nationalism and interstate war initiation (Cederman
2002; Van Evera 1994). Consequently, many questions are left unanswered.
Does nationalism generally increase the risk of war? If so, which types of
nationalism are most likely to affect warfare and how? Which domestic and
international processes lead to belligerent nationalism? Under what conditions
is nationalism the most dangerous? This study considers the first two questions
because answers to them will address the international conflict literature’s limitations and suggest answers to the latter ones.
Expanding upon J. Snyder’s (2000) theory of nationalist conflict under democratization, I argue that political elites use nationalism to obtain mass cooperation for
the achievement of their goals. But, the construction and diffusion of nationalism has
serious consequences. Successful nationalist persuasion campaigns can produce several mechanisms that encourage international conflict. Nationalism can provoke the
wrath of ‘‘national enemies’’ and their foreign allies, lead to biased strategic assumptions, create domestic interest groups that favor aggressive foreign policies, permit
the suppression of domestic opposition groups, and provide the necessary conditions
for ‘‘nationalist bidding wars.’’ When one or more of these processes exist, nationalism should increase the probability that a state will initiate an interstate war. But,
different forms of nationalism may not similarly affect the propensity for international conflict.
This study has three objectives. First, I seek to build upon the rich qualitative literature on nationalism and construct a theoretical framework that explains how
nationalism increases the probability of international conflict. Second, I want to
determine whether the popular belief that nationalism and warfare go hand in hand
is accurate. Third, I propose to move beyond the nonrandom sample of case studies
that has characterized hypothesis testing in regard to nationalism and war initiation
and onset. I test my expectations using data I collected on the existence and type of
state-level nationalism from 1816 to 1997.
I find that nationalism significantly increases the probability that a state will initiate
an interstate war. This relationship occurs among democratizing and nondemocratizing
regimes. But, its consistency across time remains ambiguous. I also find that all forms of
nationalism are not created equal. Ethnic nationalism significantly and substantially
increases the probability of war, while civic, revolutionary, and counterrevolutionary
nationalism do not. Ethnic nationalism even promotes war to a greater extent than more
traditional correlates of war, justifying its stigmatization as a destructive ideology. This
unexpected result leads to some conceptual and theoretical questions, which I attempt to
answer. Yet, I conclude that, following conventional wisdom, nationalism breeds international conflict.
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These findings are noteworthy for two reasons. First, they indicate the theoretical
and empirical importance of nationalism in understanding interstate war initiation.
Researchers must not ignore nationalism’s role when constructing their models of
international conflict behavior. Second, these results suggest that scholars should
think further about whether and how other cultural and ideological variables influence international conflict’s dynamics as they constitute the social and political context in which other correlates of war operate.
This article is organized as follows. The first section describes the state of the literature pertaining to nationalism and international conflict. The second section uses
this knowledge to develop a more complete model of nationalist conflict. The third
section disaggregates nationalism into its permutations and explains why the probability of war depends on the form of nationalism articulated by the state. The fourth
section describes the data set, the variables’ operationalization, and the statistical
models. The fifth section presents the results of the statistical analyses and discusses
the findings.
The State of the Literature
The literature on nationalism and violent conflict concludes that nationalism leads to
a greater incidence of interstate war. Unfortunately, this conclusion is based on a
nonrandom sample of case studies. For example, Gagnon (1994) focuses on ethnic
nationalism’s destructive consequences in post–World War II Serbia, while
Pavković (2000) considers the role of competing nationalisms in Yugoslavia’s brutal
fragmentation. Fousek (2000), Hixson (2008), and Lieven (2004) outline how
nationalism has increased the US propensity to engage in international conflict. Considering only one form of interstate conflict, Saideman and Ayres (2008) look at
nationalism’s role in the prevalence of irredentism in five formerly communist countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. J. Snyder (2000) carries out a
broader assessment by briefly examining the relationship between nationalism and
conflict in twelve democratizing states. Woodwell (2007) provides a quantitative
analysis of nationalism’s violent consequences and three case studies, but he only
considers nationalism among transborder nationalities. Despite these studies’ theoretical insights, they beg the question of generalizability. Does nationalism generally
increase the probability of interstate war? To answer this question, a large-N quantitative analysis of nationalism is necessary.
Yet, the literature provides some theories as to why nationalism might provoke
international conflict. For Hixson (2008), violence against external enemies may
be integral to the myths and ideologies of many nationalisms, not just that of the
United States. Nationalism’s content is also important for Saideman and Ayres
(2008), because it shapes attitudes toward kin in neighboring countries and influences the elites’ propensity to engage in irredentist behavior. Taking an instrumentalist approach, Gagnon (1994) contends that ethnic nationalism is associated with
international conflict because it provides a means through which endangered elites
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can deter domestic challengers in a shifting political and economic structure.
A limitation of Gagnon’s argument is that it is confined to conflict along ethnic
cleavages. ‘‘Enemy-others’’ can be juxtaposed to the ‘‘national family’’ not just
in terms of culture and language but also in terms of political ideology or traditional institutions. Mansfield and Snyder (2005) and J. Snyder (2000) develop
a more generalizable theory than Gagnon, as they apply it to many forms of
nationalist conflict (e.g., wars between a revolutionary nationalist state and its
enemies). However, they restrict their argument to democratizing states.
A thorough reading of history, in contrast, implies that all regime types have the
potential for violent nationalist conflict at home and abroad. Hixson (2008) demonstrates this point by showing how Americans have engaged in militant foreign policies from the founding of the colonies to the war on terrorism as a means of
reaffirming and renewing their national identity during periods of psychic crisis. The
mechanisms through which nationalism causes war could theoretically operate in
most political systems, not just democratizing ones. I gauge this theoretical extension’s appropriateness in the empirical analysis by demonstrating that the relationship connecting nationalism and interstate war initiation is the same in terms of
coefficient direction and statistical significance in the sample of democratizing
states, the sample of nondemocratizing states, and the full sample of states. Therefore, I can broaden J. Snyder’s (2000) theory of violent nationalist conflict and the
hypotheses derived from it to explain how nationalism generally increases the probability of interstate war.
Theory of Nationalist Conflict
Political elites are often in need of mass cooperation to achieve their goals. For
example, they may want to acquire neighboring territory, control a natural resource’s
supply, or protect domestic companies from globalization’s pressures. To obtain
such support, they may embed these goals and their related policies in nationalist
rhetoric and images. They portray these objectives as essential to the nation’s continued existence and power and as reflective of the ‘‘national character.’’ The interpretation of these objectives must, however, be consistent with the nation’s
traditions, myths, history, memories, symbols, beliefs, or its ‘‘usable past’’ to gain
acceptance. Therefore, my theory fits within the modernist paradigm of nationalism
because it views nationalism as instrumental for elites in their pursuit of self-interest
(see Anderson [1983], Breuilly[1993], Gellner [1983], Hobsbawm [1990], and Nairn
[1981] for classic modernist accounts).1
When political elites successfully spread nationalism among the masses in this
way, the domestic population will eventually acquire the common desire to protect
its state through whatever policies and actions are deemed necessary. This desire is
predicated on the notion that, in theory, all nations have the right to territorial selfdetermination, and due to this right, the state should express and ensure the nation’s
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829
unique cultural, historical, institutional, and/or ideological characteristics. If it does
so, defending the nation means defending the state.2
In addition to influencing mass aspirations, nationalism gives the populace a
sense of shared beliefs and attitudes regarding the processes and outcomes of international relations. The need to protect national sovereignty, for instance, may entail
a realist view of global politics and skepticism of international cooperation.
This conformity of ideas and interests and the mobilization of popular energies to
the state’s nationalist projects are attractive to political elites. If they can effectively
construct and diffuse an amenable form of nationalism, they may be more likely to
achieve their objectives. However, nationalism’s creation and dissemination is not
without serious consequences. Even though these ‘‘nationalist persuasion campaigns’’ can result in a greater sense of national unity (a potentially positive development), they can also produce several mechanisms that promote interstate war
(J. Snyder 2000, 66–69).
First, nationalism’s propagation can only succeed if there is a clear delineation of
the ‘‘other,’’ that is, those who are excluded from national membership. The nation
cannot be constructed and maintained without a sense of who does not belong.
According to Smith (2004, 221), ‘‘‘who we are’ is determined by our relations with
the ‘outsider,’ the other who is marked off from ‘us’ by not sharing in our distinctive
character, our individuality.’’
But, the identification of certain groups as ‘‘enemies of the nation’’ can easily
lead to their discrimination, disarmament, powerlessness, and/or expulsion. If these
‘‘national enemies’’ and/or their foreign allies can resist the nationalist state’s
demands, the likelihood of war should increase (J. Snyder 2000, 66–67). The Palestinians are considered a constant threat to the integrity of the Israeli nation-state and
therefore are politically marginalized. Unfortunately for Israel, the Palestinians have
some means of resistance and relatively powerful regional allies, and thus, the conflict continues.
Second, nationalism promotes the portrayal of other nations as more threatening,
more obstinate, and more liable for historical transgressions, but more easily
defeated than they really are (J. Snyder 2000, 67). Nationalist leaders tend to construct a dichotomy between the weak and evil ‘‘them’’ and the strong and inherently
good ‘‘us.’’ Even when the nation’s enemies are objectively strong in military and
economic terms and nationalist leaders recognize this fact, the latter emphasize that
their material capabilities are superior in some way to those of their enemies, which,
along with their greater moral virtues, predispose them toward victory. The combination of distrust, insecurity, and increased optimism about victory inclines nationalist states to provoke conflict. Though one may contend that this argument about
biased strategic assumptions can be generalized beyond the context of nationalist
conflict, the myths and prejudices inherent in nationalism render its components
more persuasive. Political elites can reinforce the image of the enemy as extremely
threatening by claiming that it will undermine the state’s physical integrity and
sovereignty and destroy their unique national identity.
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American nationalism’s role in war initiation is instructive in this regard.
American national identity is predicated, in part, upon the myth of Americans’
manliness, innate innocence, and providential destiny compared to the weakness, culpability, and decadence of ‘‘enemy-others’’ (e.g., the Native Americans
and communists). Therefore, Americans view their political values and
institutions as inherently superior (Lieven 2004; Pei 2003). This conviction
imbues Americans with a widespread missionary spirit. They believe that their
exceptional qualities imply their right to exert their power in the world, so as to
spread the ‘‘universal values’’ of democracy and capitalism (McCartney 2002).
This conception of American national identity drives a continuous militant
foreign policy (Hixson 2008).
Third, nationalism creates interests inside and outside the government that wish
to maintain the belligerent nationalist rhetoric and its attendant foreign policies for
their own benefit. The military–industrial complex is a notable example. It, like
many other nationalist groups, may wield so much political influence that war
becomes likely. If defense contractors convince the government that ‘‘national
security’’ can be achieved through elaborate weapons systems, not only do they
increase their revenue, but other states may feel threatened and adopt a more militaristic posture. If two or more nationalist groups join together in a political coalition
and logrolling occurs, the combination of policies may render war even more likely.
The German ‘‘iron and rye’’ coalition prior to World War I embroiled the state in
conflict by giving a fleet-building program to the industrialists, high agricultural
tariffs to the aristocratic landowners, and an offensive war plan to the army. The
first policy alienated Britain, the second angered grain-exporting Russia, and the
last threatened all of Germany’s neighbors (Feuchtwanger 2001; J. Snyder 2000,
67–68).
Fourth, nationalism allows elites to undermine any opposition to their foreign
policies by depicting it as a national threat. Characterizing the opposition as outside the realm of the ‘‘nation’’ and thus untrustworthy renders it less attractive
to the public as participants or leaders in the government. The opposition
becomes a smaller menace to the integrity of the state’s nationalist projects and
its military agenda, as it cannot credibly question the nation’s construction and
the wisdom of particular policies. The state obtains a greater freedom of action
internationally, especially given the appearance of overwhelming public support
for any state aggressiveness. Adolf Hitler was able to initiate and continue his
military policies, in part, because he used nationalism to justify the silencing
of liberals, Jews, and socialists, whom he portrayed as against the German volk
(Benz 2006, 113; Mansfield and Snyder 2005, 26).
Finally, nationalism creates the conditions for ‘‘nationalist bidding wars’’ among
elites and/or between elites and the masses (J. Snyder 2000, 68–69). Competing
elites try to outbid each other to gain greater nationalist prestige, more popular support, and further political power, leading to more belligerent policies than any of
them initially desired. The masses may internalize the nationalist rhetoric, believing
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that their national identity, reputation, and self-rule are endangered by ‘‘others’’ and
can only survive through military action. They push their leaders to initiate or continue aggressive foreign policies so as to achieve the ‘‘national objectives.’’ In this
process of internalization and lobbying, the populace becomes desensitized to the
costs of war, allowing leaders to pursue more risk-acceptant military strategies. During and after the collapse of Soviet authority, Armenian politicians engaged in nationalistic outbidding over the issue of Nagorno Karabakh in response to mass
nationalist sentiment (Melander 2001; Saideman and Ayres 2008, 97). Communist
Party officials in Armenia had to increasingly respond to the strident nationalism
of the Karabakh Committee (later the Armenian Nationalist Movement), the Krunk
pressure group, and the Dashnak party in Nagorno Karabakh. ‘‘The fate of Nagorno
Karabakh and the ensuing confrontation with Azerbaijan was the dominant factor
determining the behaviour of all social groups and political activists in Armenia,’’
despite the costs of the escalating violence (Rutland 1994, 839).
Due to increased public support, the provocation of ‘‘national enemies’’ and their
foreign allies, biased strategic assumptions, nationalist interest groups, marginalized
political opponents, and ‘‘nationalist bidding wars,’’ nationalist states should be
more likely to initiate interstate wars than nonnationalist states. Not only does
nationalism convince the population that their state, the nation’s guardian, must
be defended against external threats. It also generates several processes that further
promote war. This expectation leads me to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Nationalism increases the probability that a state will initiate an
interstate war.
The Differentiation of Nationalism and Violent Conflict
Nationalism is neither homogenous nor unchanging. It has assumed many forms
since its birth, as political elites in different national contexts have altered it to promote their particular interests.3 Different nationalisms have defined the ‘‘nation,’’ its
goals, and its enemies differently, producing different nationalist dynamics. Recognizing that various forms of nationalism exist and may diversely affect domestic
political interactions, I expect them to have different implications for the elite’s ability to mobilize popular energies, identify ‘‘national enemies,’’ propagate biased strategic assumptions, satisfy nationalist interest groups, repress dissent, control
‘‘nationalist bidding wars,’’ and initiate international conflict.
One methodological problem in examining the effect of different types of nationalism on interstate war initiation is the array of classification schemes (see Breuilly
1993; Gellner 1983; Smith 2001; J. Smith 2000; L. Smith 1976). The chosen categorization must fairly test the relationship between nationalism and interstate war
initiation. While each classification scheme has its merits and scholars will disagree
about their comparative usefulness, I follow J. Snyder’s (2000, chap. 2) categories of
nationalism for two reasons. First, he explicitly hypothesizes about the relationship
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between different types of nationalism and war initiation, though in the context of
democratizing states. Since his theory and hypotheses inform my conceptualization
of the relationship between nationalism and war and I want to be consistent with his
expectations, I employ his classification scheme. Second, he includes civic and ethnic nationalism, which are often used in case studies to explain the incidence of violent conflict.
J. Snyder (2000, 69) divides nationalism into four categories on the basis of its
collective appeals and criteria for inclusion in the nation. The categories are civic,
ethnic, revolutionary, and counterrevolutionary nationalism. Table 1 lists their main
characteristics. According to Snyder, each type of nationalism influences warfare in
a distinct manner by producing different types of violent conflict and different
degrees and patterns of violence, which would affect when wars occur.
According to J. Snyder (2000, 80), civic nationalism leads to more prudent policies abroad. Civic nationalist states tend to be more sensitive to war’s potential
costs. They should only initiate those interstate wars that they believe they can win
quickly with minimal loss of life and materiel. The reasoning is that most mature
democracies either have civic nationalism (e.g., the United States) or have had their
historic nationalism tempered by civic features (e.g., post–WWII Germany). Since
mature democracies permit open criticism of government policies and politicians are
concerned about reelection, costly wars are likely to be avoided. Mature democracies are often associated with civic nationalism because it is inclusive within the
state boundaries and ‘‘seeks to accommodate all citizens within a nondiscrimatory
legal and institutional framework’’ (J. Snyder 2000, 80). These features inform the
perception that civic nationalism is ‘‘rational,’’ ‘‘benign,’’ and ‘‘desirable’’ (Brown
1999). I expect that civic nationalist states are less likely to initiate wars than other
kinds of nationalist states. However, civic nationalism still provides elites with the
opportunity to elicit public cooperation, identify ‘‘national enemies,’’ propagate
biased strategic assumptions, satisfy nationalist interest groups, suppress the opposition, and engage in ‘‘nationalist bidding wars.’’ It would lead to a higher probability of war than if there were no nationalism. The following hypothesis derives from
these expectations:
Hypothesis 2: Civic nationalism increases the probability of interstate war initiation relative to no nationalism, but less than other forms of nationalism.
Ethnic nationalism should render a state more war-prone than civic nationalism
because the ethnic nationalist state is less cost-conscious. War’s potential benefits
are seen to be greater than its potential costs. If the ethnic nationalist state is victorious, it may preserve its independence and distinctive national identity or acquire
control and possibly sovereignty over territories inhabited by ethnic kin (J. Snyder
2000, 82). In addition, ethnic nationalist states’ motivations for fighting often preclude the consideration of costs. Ethnic nationalism tends to entail issues of culture,
language, and religion, which are frequently seen as zero-sum issues and less
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833
Emphasis on loyalty to a set of political
ideas and institutions that are perceived
as just and effective. Inclusion depends
on birth or long-term residence within
nation’s territory.
Emphasis on common culture, language,
religion, shared historical experience,
and/or shared kinship. Inclusion depends
on these criteria.
Emphasis on the defense of a political
revolution that brings to power a regime
that governs for the nation. Inclusion
depends on support for the political
revolution.
Emphasis on resistance to internal factions
that seek to undermine the nation’s
traditional institutions. Any social
classes, religions, cultural groups, or
political ideological opponents that are
deemed ‘‘enemies of the nation’’ are
excluded.
Main characteristics
Slight increase
Moderate increase
Large increase
Large increase
High conflict until ethnic
homeland is dominated
Open-ended external
conflict
Open-ended external
conflict
Hypothesized effect on the probability
of interstate war initiation
Cost-conscious foreign
policy
Consequences for violent
conflict
Note: The descriptions of the variants of nationalisms and the proposed consequences for conflict are from J. Snyder (2000).
Counterrevolutionary
Revolutionary
Ethnic
Civic
Type of nationalism
Table 1. Relationship of the Different Types of Nationalism to Interstate War Initiation
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amenable to compromise. For example, it would be difficult for ethnic nationalists in
a homeland state to accept their ethnic kin’s assimilation to the dominant culture in a
neighboring state. To do so would mean the gradual erosion of their unique identity
and sense of belonging. Diplomacy and peaceful negotiation may become unacceptable. The only option is warfare, despite its costs.
However, ethnic nationalist states’ expansionism has natural limits. An ethnic
nationalist state should be less inclined to war once its goal of a homogenized state,
a sustainable pattern of domination, or security from ‘‘others’’ is achieved (J. Snyder
2000, 82). It should have little desire to conquer and rule over a large number of
‘‘foreigners’’ since their presence may threaten ‘‘the national family.’’ These assertions suggest the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Ethnic nationalism increases the probability of interstate war initiation relative to no nationalism and more so than civic nationalism.
In contrast to ethnic nationalism, revolutionary and counterrevolutionary nationalism’s military expansionism does not have natural limits, and states with these
types of nationalism should have the highest probability of interstate war initiation. Revolutionary nationalism has two characteristics that differentiate it from
other forms of nationalism and render the relevant states some of the most likely
to initiate wars. First, it seeks to protect the political revolution from its domestic and foreign enemies. Second, it is preoccupied with ‘‘the possibility of
spreading the benefits of political transformation to potential revolutionists
abroad’’ (J. Snyder 2000, 82).
In the eyes of revolutionary nationalists, the revolution is precarious. The popular
energy that it unleashes creates a long-term threat to neighboring states. The latter
may try to kill the revolution, especially in its infancy, through preventive aggression to shield themselves from domestic revolution. Due to this potential military
intervention, revolutionary nationalists believe that spreading the revolution to other
countries, as in the military campaigns of Napoleonic France, will obtain the security
necessary for a successful revolution. ‘‘The revolutionary state’s goals for conquest
are not necessarily limited to a finite set of historic or cultural objectives but are
spurred by a more open-ended competition for security’’ (J. Snyder 2000, 82). The
tense relations between revolutionary nationalist states and their enemies supply the
context in which the likelihood of conflict increases.
Unlike the politically transformative basis of revolutionary nationalism, counterrevolutionary nationalism arises when threatened elites attempt to fend off internal
change by unifying the nation against its external foes. These elites may also try to
preserve traditional institutions and their place in them through the exclusion of the
nation’s putative class, ideological, religious, and cultural enemies (J. Snyder 2000,
83). In the 1870s, German chancellor Otto von Bismarck and his fellow ruling elites
feared a working-class revolution and demands for a full-fledged democracy. Therefore, they appealed to the Protestant middle classes, while labeling the working
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class, the socialists, the Catholics, and the Poles as the ‘‘true’’ German nation’s
enemies (Blackbourn 2003, 195–203; Lerman 2008; J. Snyder 2000, 93–94).
This strategy may not only prevent or reverse any domestic change by silencing
revolutionary voices but also enhance the state’s ability to foster national
unification. The marginalization of menacing groups would decrease the amount
of opposition to the elite conceptualization of the nation and the resulting policies,
providing the semblance of unanimity. In such a context, aggressive foreign policies
are more likely to be formulated and implemented.
Furthermore, like revolutionary nationalism, counterrevolutionary nationalism
perpetually needs external enemies to serve as internal unifiers. Since counterrevolutionary nationalism is defined by its opposition to any group that wants to
undermine the nation’s traditional institutions, its impetus for internal unification comes from the desire to preserve the status quo. In contrast, revolutionary
nationalism seeks internal unification through the political revolution’s preservation. Yet, the constant construction of threatening ‘‘others’’ in both forms of
nationalism provides leaders with more opportunities to bring the people
together through war.
Due to these dynamics, states with these types of nationalism lack inherent limits
on the number and extent of rivalries they provoke with other states. Both forms of
nationalism are likely to produce higher levels of open-ended conflict than other
types of nationalism. These features of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary
nationalism suggest the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: Revolutionary and counterrevolutionary nationalism increases
the probability of interstate war relative to no nationalism and more so than
civic and ethnic nationalism.
I have no a priori expectation of a substantial difference between revolutionary and counterrevolutionary nationalism’s effects. Both depend on the continuous identification of external enemies for the maintenance of internal
cohesion, which precludes them from having inherent constraints on their
expansionism. The primary difference between revolutionary and counterrevolutionary nationalism is their bases for national unification. I perceive no theoretical reason why this distinction should cause either nationalism to have a
greater impact on interstate war initiation than the other, especially given their
similarities.
The theory of nationalist conflict outlined above suggests that nationalism should
increase the probability of interstate war initiation through a series of mechanisms.
However, some forms of nationalism should have a higher likelihood of causing war
than others. If my hypotheses receive empirical support, it will indicate the theoretical importance of nationalism in understanding interstate war initiation. It would
also suggest that the potential influence of other cultural and ideological variables
should be considered.
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Data and Methods
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable Initiation equals 1 if the country initiated an interstate war
in year t and 0 otherwise. The unit of analysis is the monad year. While it prevents
my coding of the democratic peace as an alternative explanation, I chose a monadic
research design for two reasons. First, I faced significant time and resource constraints on my collection of the nationalism data. Second, I am interested in whether
nationalism compels a state to initiate a war in general, not whether it affects its decision to initiate one against a specific target.
I am analyzing rare events because there are much fewer initiations than noninitiations. Because rare events are often difficult to explain and predict, I follow King
and Zeng’s (2001a, 2001b) and Lemke and Reed’s (2001) advice and eschew commonly used, though grossly inefficient, data collection strategies in favor of retrospective sampling. By doing so, it is easier to understand the relationship between
nationalism and interstate war initiation.
The primary benefit of retrospective sampling is that I avoid spending precious
data collection resources by forgoing a very large number of observations and focus
on the inclusion of more informative and meaningful variables of nationalism. If I
had aimed to gather the thousands of observations commonly found in quantitative
international conflict studies, I would have had to use possibly inaccurate proxy variables for nationalism. Instead, I collected data on the nationalism of all the initiators
the year prior to their wars and a small random sample of noninitiators. This strategy
does not cause a loss of consistency or much efficiency relative to the full sample
(King and Zeng 2001a, 694). Many of the ‘‘zeros’’ may contain little substantive
information regarding conflict initiation. States like Palau or Andorra most likely
will not provide much insight into the relationship under study.
Based upon this logic, I collected data on nationalism and other variables for 164
noninitiator years and all 85 initiator years, for a total of 249 country-year observations. The noninitiator years were randomly drawn from all country years in which
the country in question had participated in at least one interstate war between 1816
and 1997, according to the Correlates of War (COW) Project, minus those country
years in which the country initiated an interstate war (Sarkees 2000). The data on
war initiation are from the COW Project, though with World War II, the Vietnam
War, and the Persian Gulf War disaggregated, following Slantchev (2004).
Independent Variables
General Nationalism Variable
As there is no preexisting data set on the incidence of nationalism or its permutations, I constructed my own variables and collected my own data. I consulted
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national histories and reference works on nationalism, governments, and political
parties that addressed in detail the country and temporal period in question.
But, before operationalization and quantification can begin, nationalism must be
defined. Unfortunately, the term nationalism has acquired a range of meanings, rendering it difficult to explain the nationalist phenomenon’s exact nature. The most
important usages are (1) a process of national formation, (2) a sentiment or consciousness of belonging to the nation, (3) a language and symbolism of the nation,
(4) a social and political movement on behalf of the nation, and (5) a doctrine and/or
ideology of the nation (Smith 2001, 5–6). However, an adequate description of
nationalism must refer to the quest for political autonomy or independence to differentiate it from ethnic politics. Combining this component with the elements of sentiment and ideology in the above definitions, I characterize nationalism, following
J. Snyder (2000, 23), as
the doctrine that a people who see themselves as distinct in their origins, culture, history, institutions, or principles should rule themselves in a political system that
expresses and protects those distinctive characteristics.
The benefit of this definition is that it expands Gellner’s (1983) standard conceptualization of nationalism as the doctrine that the state and the nation should be congruent, as well as Hechter’s (2000, 7) definition of nationalism as ‘‘collective action
designed to render the boundaries of the nation congruent with those of its governance unit.’’ It allows nations to be organized around characteristics other than ethnicity and culture, and, like Harri’s (2009, 5) description, it does not confine
nationalism’s goal to political independence.
Nationalism exists in a state in year t – 1 if there is evidence that the government
attempted to demonstrate and/or protect the nation’s distinctive characteristics in
that year. Such evidence may be one or more of the following events. First, a politically relevant nationalist party is present. A party is politically relevant if it achieves
a victory in a presidential election, a majority of seats in the national legislature,
control of the most prominent cabinet positions, or the ability to affect coalition
building. Second, the state has laws limiting the rights, freedoms, and activities of
groups not considered part of the ‘‘nation.’’ Such laws could be restrictions on citizenship rights, use of a native language, membership in cultural or religious organizations, and/or political participation. Third, the government engages in behaviors
that disproportionately benefit the national group with an eye toward defending and
reinforcing national distinctiveness. Fourth, there is significant internal or external
conflict short of war which the state justifies by arguing that the nation’s existence,
identity, and/or traditions are threatened. Fifth, the state takes other military actions
that it contends will protect the ‘‘nation’’ and its interests (e.g., the militarization of
disputed territory). Nationalism is coded as 1 if the state had nationalism at t – 1 and
0 otherwise.4 There are 131 nationalist country-years and 118 nonnationalist
country-years.
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Specific Nationalism Variables
Since nationalisms differ in their myths, symbols, memories, values, rhetoric, rituals,
traditions, and politics, I disaggregate the general nationalism variable into separate
variables representing civic, ethnic, revolutionary, and counterrevolutionary nationalism. Definitions for these nationalisms are derived from J. Snyder (2000, 70) and
are based on the criteria for national membership and the nature of collective
appeals.
Civic nationalism emphasizes loyalty to a set of political ideas and institutions that
promotes justice, tolerance, and the rule of law and includes in the nation anyone born or
who has lived for a long time within the national territory (J. Snyder 2000, 70). It is the
most inclusive nationalism as its requirements for national membership are easily fulfilled. Civic nationalism often occurs in democracies and might be a proxy for democracy. I coded a state as civic nationalist if citizenship was based on birth or a process of
naturalization, if the rule of law and fair political institutions were prominent in national
life, and if there was a national desire to ensure liberty, tolerance, individual rights, and
equal justice under the law. Civic is coded as 1 if the state had civic nationalism at t – 1
and 0 otherwise. Though an extreme political right has existed throughout postrevolutionary France’s history, France remains a civic nationalist state. Its nationalism views
the nation as composed of free and equal individuals who are protected by the law, committed to secularism, and faithful to the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen
(McHale 1983; L. Snyder 1990).
Ethnic nationalism stresses the importance of common culture, language, religion,
historical memory, and/or kinship in constructing and maintaining the nation. It
excludes anyone who does not have the necessary cultural, linguistic, religious, and/
or ethnic attributes (Smith 2004, 41–42; J. Snyder 2000, 70). If the government favored
one culture, language, religion, and/or ethnicity through laws, educational opportunities, business contracts, patronage, and/or other means, that country may be ethnic
nationalist. However, the historical record must also indicate that national membership
depended on cultural, linguistic, religious, and/or ethnic criteria and the political elite
emphasized the associated group’s superiority and uniqueness. Ethnic is coded as 1
if the state was ethnic nationalist at t – 1 and 0 otherwise. Nazi Germany displayed ethnic
nationalism. The Nazis restricted voting to those of German or ‘‘racially similar blood,’’
excluded the Jews from public office and citizenship, asserted the German Aryan race’s
superiority, sought the territories of ‘‘inferior races,’’ and eventually exterminated
‘‘threatening others’’ (McHale 1983; J. Snyder 2000).
Revolutionary nationalism frames national defense and self-rule in terms of protecting a revolutionary political regime. To be a member of the national family and
obtain the resulting rights and privileges, one must support the regime’s ideology,
objectives, methods, and organization. Anyone who threatens the regime’s stability
is excluded from national membership (J. Snyder 2000, 70). I coded a state as revolutionary nationalist if it denied national membership to any group that it believed
was trying to undermine the revolution and if it implemented discriminatory laws or
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instigated violence against these groups to preserve the regime. A state resulting
from a revolutionary victory is more likely to be revolutionary nationalist than other
states. Revolutionary equals 1 if the state was revolutionary nationalist at t – 1 and
0 otherwise. After reunification in 1975, the Vietnamese government attempted to
preserve the communist revolution and national independence in two ways. First,
it purged certain categories of people (e.g., critics of the regime’s economic management) from the Communist Party, painting them as enemies of the revolution and the
Vietnamese national project. Second, suspicious of China’s intentions, the government deemed the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam as potential opponents to socialism’s
expansion (along with intellectuals, Buddhists, and Catholics), moved them to ‘‘new
economic zones’’ in the countryside, froze their assets to rapidly socialize the economy, and abolished their special-category status to integrate them into the national
community (SarDesai 1992, 2005, 183–84). Therefore, postwar Vietnam was revolutionary nationalist.
Counterrevolutionary nationalism perceives national well-being as primarily
served by resistance to internal factions and external foes seeking to weaken traditional political, social, and/or economic institutions. It excludes from national
membership any social classes, religions, cultural groups, and adherents to ‘‘alternative’’ political ideologies that might change the status quo (J. Snyder 2000, 70).
I coded a state as counterrevolutionary nationalist if the political elites described
the nation with reference to the past, traditional institutions, the status quo, and/or
social convention and formulated their policies with this conceptualization of
the nation in mind. But, for a state to be counterrevolutionary nationalist, the
elite had to employ nationalism in an attempt to maintain their dominant positions,
forestall change, and/or protect the nation from ‘‘revolutionary’’ ideologies. The
exclusion from the nation of anyone who opposed the establishment also indicated
counterrevolutionary nationalism. Counterrevolutionary equals 1 if the state was
counterrevolutionary nationalist at t – 1 and 0 otherwise. Counterrevolutionary
nationalism defined Spain under Miguel Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship (1923–
30). His regime was predicated upon the following beliefs: (1) the nation’s body
had been contaminated with anti-Spanish elements (e.g., liberals, communists, and
regional nationalists), which had to be eradicated; (2) the ‘‘real’’ Spain was defined
by Catholic and monarchical values; and (3) authoritarianism and a program
for the ‘‘nationalization of the masses’’ would prevent national disintegration,
regenerate the ‘‘Spanish race,’’ and solve the ‘‘regionalist question’’ (Balfour and
Quiroga 2007; Quiroga 2007).
A ‘‘no nationalism’’ variable is the base category in the empirical analysis.5 The
four variables of nationalism and the categories of nationalism they represent are
exhaustive. However, I must emphasize that their coding is not always unambiguous, and many cases required a judgment call. A cross-tabulation shows that, while
most country-years do not possess nationalism (118 observations), ethnic nationalism is the most frequent type of nationalism (45 observations) and revolutionary
nationalism is the least frequent one (12 observations).
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If the historical record indicated a state evinced multiple types of nationalism,
I used the most prominent and influential one in coding that state’s nationalism. If
more references were made to the characteristics of one type of nationalism than
to those of another and/or one type was reinforced with claims from another, the
country was coded as having the former nationalism.6
After the Russian Revolution, the Soviet Union possessed revolutionary nationalism, as it eliminated from the ‘‘pays legal’’ the propertied classes and the clergy.
In the 1922 constitution, it disenfranchised propertied society, people who hired
labor, kulaks, priests, and WHITE ARMY officers (Suny 1997, 146). The emphasis
on the communist revolution’s protection from the capitalist powers as the Soviet
people’s primary goal continued throughout the first half of the twentieth century.
However, Soviet leaders sometimes employed ethnic nationalist rhetoric and imagery to mobilize the citizens to communism’s defense. From 1936 to 1938, Josef
Stalin purged the minority nationalities because he saw the Russian people as the
true guardians of Marxism (L. Snyder 1976, 216). Because Soviet leaders inconsistently used Russian ethnic nationalism as a means of securing communism, I coded
the Soviet Union as revolutionary nationalist, not ethnic nationalist.
Control Variables
To estimate accurately the effect of nationalism and its variants on interstate war
initiation, I include five control variables in the analyses, all measured at t – 1.
Democracy uses POLITY IV’s ‘‘institutionalized democracy’’ score to classify
democracies (Marshall and Jaggers 2009). It ranges from 0 to 10, but I employ a
dummy variable version that equals 1 if the score was greater than or equal to 6, and
0 otherwise. Democracies should be less likely than autocracies to initiate wars
because democratic leaders are inclined to be more selective in their foreign aggression. They tend to initiate wars that they think their armies can win quickly with minimal casualties to avoid public backlash and ensure their political survival (Bueno de
Mesquita et al. 2003; Reiter and Stam 2002).
Major Power equals 1 if the state was a major power and 0 otherwise. Major
powers should be more disposed toward international conflict than are other states
because distance does not constrain them as much. Their extensive capabilities allow
them to more easily project their military power globally.
Neighbors is the total number of direct contiguities (by land or sea) for each state.
The COW Project’s Direct Contiguity Data Set (Stinnett et al. 2002) provides this
information. The more immediate neighbors a state has, the more likely that it has
unresolved disagreements over territorial settlements. Because irredentism is often
a component of nationalist discourse, it is important to control for potential territorial disputes.
Conflict equals 1 if the state participated in an intrastate or extrastate war,
according to the COW Project’s Extra-State War and Intra-State War data sets, and
0 otherwise (Sarkees 2000). A state may be less inclined to instigate another conflict
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if it is already engaged in one. Doing so would risk stretching military resources to
their breaking point and losing public support as economic resources are diverted to
the war effort and casualties mount.
Rivalry equals 1 if the state had an enduring rival and 0 otherwise. The data come
from Diehl and Goertz’s (2000) list of enduring rivalries. A state with an enduring
rival should be more prone to interstate conflict because aspects of their previous
crises and wars are probable causes of future ones. Furthermore, this state may have
‘‘learned’’ over time that military force is acceptable in the context of this competitive relationship.
Statistical Models
One would normally use a logit regression model when the dependent variable is
dichotomous. However, I employ a rare-events logit regression model to avoid
biased coefficients and estimates of event probabilities that are too small, as often
happen in finite samples of rare-events data (King and Zeng 2001a, 2001b; Tomz
et al. 1999). Because my research design is choice based, I use the prior correction
method to ensure that my estimates, especially that of b0, are consistent and efficient. Without a good estimate of b0, I would likely have biased estimates of event
probabilities. This procedure corrects the logit coefficients based on external information about the fraction of events in the population, t, and the observed fraction of
events in the sample, y (King and Zeng 2001a, 700). The population fraction in this
case is easily derived. I divided the number of country years in which a war was initiated (85) by the total number of country years as calculated using the EUGene program, version 3.204 (13,596; Bennett and Stam 2000). The population fraction is
0.006. The observed fraction is the number of country years in which a war was initiated (85) divided by the total number of country-years in my sample (249), which
equals 0.337. Then, instead of the intercept produced by the computer, I follow King
and Zeng (2001a, 2001b) and use the following formula:
^ ln
b
0
y
1t
:
1 y
t
First, I estimate a rare-events logit regression model with the general nationalism
variable. Second, to determine whether particular forms of nationalism increase the
probability of interstate war more than others, I estimate a model with the variables
Civic, Ethnic, Revolutionary, and Counterrevolutionary.
Results
A cross-tabulation (not shown) indicates that nationalism and interstate war initiation are significantly associated (p ¼ .000). Approximately 48 percent of nationalist
states in the sample initiated wars, compared with roughly 19 percent of nonnationalist states. This difference in percentages is substantial, suggesting that nationalist
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Table 2. The Effect of Nationalism on Interstate War Initiation, Model 1
Coefficient (SE)
Nationalism
Democracy
Neighbors
Major Power
Conflict
Rivalry
Constant
N
0.903*** (0.344)
0.890*** (0.359)
0.014 (0.042)
0.527* (0.359)
0.389 (0.406)
0.803*** (0.343)
6.123*** (0.332)
245
Note. One-tailed tests. *p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
states are more likely to instigate international conflict. However, these results do
not tell us anything definitive about the relationship’s direction.
The rare-events logit regression model in Table 2 provides such information. It
indicates that nationalist states have a higher probability of interstate war initiation
than nonnationalist states, holding all other variables constant. This finding is significant at the .01 level in a one-tailed test and confirms Hypothesis 1.7 It is plausible
that the mechanisms leading from nationalism to international conflict that my theory outlines are operative. That is, nationalism galvanizes public support for state
policies, provokes ‘‘national enemies’’ and their foreign allies, fosters biased strategic assumptions, encourages nationalist interest groups, marginalizes political opponents, and promotes ‘‘nationalist bidding wars.’’
Three control variables behave as expected. Democracies are significantly less
inclined to initiate interstate wars than are autocracies. Major powers are more disposed to initiate international conflict, compared to minor powers. But, this finding
barely obtains significance. States embroiled in a rivalry are significantly more
likely to initiate interstate wars than those that are not. However, the number of
immediate neighbors and current involvement in another conflict have no relationship to interstate war initiation.
Table 3 shows the relative magnitude of the significant variables’ effects on the
predicted probability of interstate war initiation. The change from a nonnationalist
state to a nationalist one increases the predicted probability of international conflict
by 0.00335. This increase is larger than the absolute changes in the predicted probability caused by changes in democracy, major power status, and rivalry. It can be
argued that nationalism more greatly affects the instigation of interstate war than
more traditional correlates of war, especially given the insignificance of the number
of immediate neighbors.
When the sample is restricted to democratizing or nondemocratizing states to
account for J. Snyder’s (2000) argument that belligerent nationalism occurs primarily in democratizing states, the positive relationship between nationalism and interstate war initiation remains. A state is democratizing if its political regime
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Table 3. The Change in the Probability of Interstate War Initiation Given Changes in the
Explanatory Variables, Model 1
Explanatory variable
Change
Nationalism
Democracy
Major Power
Rivalry
0 to
0 to
0 to
0 to
1
1
1
1
Change in probability
0.00335
0.00134
0.00173
0.00281
Note. The baseline probability is 0.00237 when Nationalism, Democracy, Major Power, Conflict,
and Rivalry are set at 0 and Neighbors is set at its mean.
demonstrated any movement in a more democratic direction on Polity IV’s ‘‘institutionalized democracy’’ scale from t – 10 to t – 1. Thirty-two percent of nationalist
democratizing states initiated wars, compared with nine percent of nonnationalist
democratizing states. Forty-nine percent of nationalist nondemocratizing states initiated wars, compared with 23 percent of nonnationalist nondemocratizing states.
However, these relationships are weaker in significance terms after accounting for
the control variables (results not shown). Their significance is also smaller than that
of the nationalism–war initiation relationship using the full sample of country years.
Nevertheless, I conclude that, despite regime type, nationalist states are more prone
to international conflict than nonnationalist states and that my extension of Snyder’s
theory to include all regime types is appropriate.
It may also be questioned whether the assumption of case homogeneity can be
upheld for almost two centuries. While the French Revolution and the Napoleonic
Wars introduced nationalism into international relations with the establishment of
the mass army (Posen 1993), it may not be safely assumed that the mechanisms triggering warfare immediately changed and remained stable. Nationalism may not consistently increase the probability of international conflict throughout the sample
period, especially given that the potential for elite nationalism did not reach most
areas of the world until after decolonization. Therefore, nationalism could exert its
greatest influence upon interstate war initiation during the twentieth century, and
this temporally limited relationship could be driving the previous findings.
Accounting for temporal effects leads to mixed results and tentative conclusions.
First, in the nineteenth century, 48 percent of nationalist states initiated wars, compared with 21 percent of nonnationalist states, a significant association (p ¼ .003). In
the twentieth century, 48 percent of nationalist states initiated wars, compared with
16 percent of nonnationalist states, a significant association (p ¼ .000). It appears
that nationalism and interstate war initiation are positively associated in both periods. However, when the sample is partitioned and separate regressions are estimated,
nationalism significantly increases the probability of interstate war initiation only in
the twentieth century (results not shown). I would be hesitant though to conclude that
nationalism’s effect is temporally limited. When I include an interaction between
Nationalism and year, the model suffers from such multicollinearity between
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Table 4. The Effect of Nationalism on Interstate War Initiation, Model 2
Coefficient (SE)
Civic
Ethnic
Revolutionary
Counterrevolutionary
Democracy
Neighbors
Major Power
Conflict
Rivalry
Constant
N
0.422 (0.635)
1.271*** (0.419)
0.530 (0.625)
0.894* (0.601)
0.696* (0.454)
0.001 (0.045)
0.684** (0.414)
0.424 (0.422)
0.820** (0.358)
6.075*** (0.342)
227
Note. One-tailed tests. *p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
Nationalism, year, and the interaction term that they all become insignificant, rendering any conclusions suspect. Nationalism’s temporal effects are thus ambiguous.
Disaggregating nationalism into its variants indicates that some forms of nationalism increase the probability of interstate war initiation, while others do not. In a
cross-tabulation not shown, only ethnic and counterrevolutionary nationalist states
are more likely to initiate war than not, although the percentage of nonnationalist
states initiating a war is significantly smaller than the percentage of states with any
form of nationalism initiating a war. Approximately 56 percent of ethnic nationalist
states and 56 percent of counterrevolutionary nationalist states initiated wars, while
37 percent of civic nationalist states and 50 percent of revolutionary nationalist
states did. Ethnic and counterrevolutionary nationalism may drive the positive relationship between nationalism and interstate war initiation found earlier.
A rare-events logit regression supports this assertion. Table 4 shows that ethnic
and counterrevolutionary nationalism increase interstate war’s likelihood. Hypothesis 3 and part of Hypothesis 4 find some support. However, the significance of
counterrevolutionary nationalism’s effect is weak so any conclusions made in that
regard are tentative.
Contrary to my expectations, neither civic nor revolutionary nationalism is significantly related to interstate war initiation, though their coefficients have the predicted direction. Hypothesis 2 is not supported at all, while Hypothesis 4 is
somewhat undermined. This latter finding may be due to the few cases of revolutionary nationalism in the data set (n ¼ 12), which may make it difficult to estimate any
significant results. Nevertheless, revolutionary and counterrevolutionary nationalism do not have similar international political dynamics and their effects on interstate conflict are different.
Table 5 shows the relative magnitude of the effects of the significant variables in
model 2 on the predicted probability of interstate war initiation. The change from a
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845
Table 5. The Change in the Probability of Interstate War Initiation Given Changes in the
Explanatory Variables, Model 2
Explanatory variable
Change
Ethnic
Counter
Democracy
Major Power
Rivalry
0 to
0 to
0 to
0 to
0 to
1
1
1
1
1
Change in probability
0.0058
0.0030
0.0010
0.0023
0.0029
Note. The baseline probability is 0.0023 when Civic, Ethnic, Revolutionary, Counterrevolutionary,
Democracy, Major Power, Conflict, and Rivalry are set at 0 and Neighbors is set at its mean.
nonnationalist state to an ethnic nationalist state increases the predicted probability
by .0058. This value is almost twice the size of the change in the predicted probability when a state becomes counterrevolutionary nationalist. This result suggests that
another component of Hypothesis 4 is inaccurate; that is, counterrevolutionary
nationalism does not increase the probability of interstate war initiation more than
ethnic nationalism. In fact, ethnic nationalism most greatly affects interstate war
initiation. Democracy, major power status, and rivalry have an absolute impact
smaller than ethnic nationalism.
Given ethnic nationalism’s strong effect on interstate war initiation and the relative unimportance of nationalism’s other forms, the question arises as to whether
nationalism as a whole matters or just ethnic nationalism. While counterrevolutionary nationalism’s significance is borderline, it is still difficult to completely dismiss
other variants of nationalism as inconsequential. However, the statistical analysis
indicates that ethnic nationalism is the most important form of nationalism. Ethnic
nationalism’s effects may then be driving the results of model 1.
If so, the consequences for violent conflict of the various forms of nationalism
and their hypothesized effects on interstate war initiation need to be modified. First,
civic nationalist states’ cost-consciousness and prudence in foreign relations may
override any desire by their leaders to elicit public cooperation through belligerent
nationalism, given its potentially violent consequences. Civic nationalism should
have little, if any, impact on war initiation. Smith (2004, 243) also argues that
‘‘‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ elements are closely intertwined in most nations and nationalisms, and that the confidence and tolerance of certain national communities rests as
much on the sense of common origins, history, and distinct culture of the dominant
ethnic community . . . as of any civic institutions and inclinations.’’ What matters
for international conflict behavior, given civic nationalism’s statistical insignificance and cost-consciousness, is the effect of these ‘‘ethnic elements.’’
Second, since revolutionary nationalism does not lead to ubiquitous external conflict, this form of nationalism could be discarded in the empirical study of international conflict. Furthermore, revolutionary nationalism’s ideology could be more
about the revolutionary regime’s protection than about the nation’s protection. If
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Journal of Conflict Resolution 56(5)
so, revolutionary nationalism’s effects would be more fruitfully studied in the
context of major political and social transformations.
Third, the counterrevolutionary nationalism category could be removed. Its statistical influence on international conflict is meager, and its emphasis on the nation’s
traditional institutions is reminiscent of ethnic nationalism’s emphasis on shared
memories, myths, customs, and religious practices. Ethnic and counterrevolutionary
nationalism could be combined by reconceptualizing the latter with an emphasis on
its connections to ethnicity. We might think of counterrevolutionary nationalism as a
form of ethnic nationalism, one that seeks to protect the ethnic nation, especially its
elites, from internal and external groups that wish to undermine its traditional institutions. So, only ethnic nationalism should have a large positive effect on interstate
war initiation.
Should the concept of nationalism then be defined in purely ethnic terms in conflict research? It might be appealing to describe nationalism this way, given the
empirical results and the arguments for ethnic nationalism’s inherent violence. One
could also claim that all nationalisms are predicated on some preexisting ethnic community (Yack 1999). If so, defining nationalism solely on the basis of these ethnic
foundations might not be controversial. Yet, there are cases, like the United States,
in which civic nationalism is quite influential in foreign policy.
It might behoove us to conceive of nationalism as a ‘‘hybrid’’ phenomenon. It
combines sometimes conflicting elements into a constantly evolving national narrative. Particular elements may become more prominent than others during periods of
crisis and may affect conflict more than others. We do not need to define nationalism
in purely ethnic terms; we must simply recognize that its ethnic elements are the
likely provocateurs of conflict.
Conclusion
This study’s theoretical argument, which extends J. Snyder’s (2000) theory of
nationalist conflict under democratization, begins with the assumption that nationalism is useful for political elites. When nationalist persuasion campaigns are successful, elites can more readily obtain mass cooperation for the realization of their goals.
However, the construction and dissemination of nationalism has domestic and international repercussions. Several mechanisms can arise that encourage the initiation of
international conflict. First, nationalism entails the identification and vilification of
‘‘others,’’ which can provoke violent responses if these ‘‘national enemies’’ and their
foreign allies can resist. Second, nationalism promotes the use of biased strategic
assumptions. Third, certain domestic interest groups may benefit from belligerent
nationalist foreign policies and lobby for their continuation and possible escalation.
Fourth, elites can more easily marginalize opposition groups by depicting them as
national threats. Finally, nationalism provides a favorable setting for ‘‘nationalist
bidding wars’’ among the elites and between them and the masses. When these
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processes are operative, nationalism should increase the probability of interstate war
initiation.
The results of the statistical analysis support this hypothesis, demonstrating that
the conventional wisdom about nationalism’s violent consequences is accurate.
Nationalism significantly increases the probability of interstate war initiation and
has a larger effect on the predicted probability of interstate war initiation than
democracy, major power status, and rivalry. This relationship occurs among both
democratizing and nondemocratizing states. However, its temporal consistency
remains unclear.
When nationalism is disaggregated into its variants, only ethnic and counterrevolutionary nationalism significantly increase the probability of interstate war initiation, though the latter is barely significant and has half the former’s impact on the
predicted probability of interstate war initiation. Therefore, ethnic nationalism is the
most important form of nationalism in the study of international conflict. This fact
raises a host of issues, including the advisability of ignoring other types of nationalism and the conceptualization of nationalism in purely ethnic terms. I have provided some initial thoughts, but the possible arguments and evidence must be
more thoroughly investigated. Regardless, it is clear that nationalism is theoretically
and empirically important to understanding interstate war initiation. Researchers
should allow for nationalism’s influence when developing their models of international conflict.
These findings also suggest that scholars should further consider whether and
how other cultural and ideological variables affect international conflict’s dynamics,
especially given the relative scarcity of such studies in international relations. If
nationalism is central to a comprehensive understanding of interstate war’s causes,
then it is possible that other cultural characteristics and political ideologies are
important as well. They provide part of the social and political context in which
other correlates of interstate war are embedded.
This study is the first that quantitatively measures nationalism and examines
its statistical relationship to a facet of interstate war. Future research may reveal
a different relationship between nationalism and interstate war initiation since
this analysis can be improved. One means of improvement would be the collection of more data on the existence of nationalism across state years to assess
more accurately the relationship between nationalism and war initiation. It might
also be useful to expand the purview of the analysis to include civil wars to
ascertain whether nationalism’s impact on conflict initiation is limited to the
international realm.
Investigating nationalism’s effects on military conflict is a research agenda
that merits further attention. The popular belief that nationalism is inherently
aggressive and a major cause of war will be scrutinized and a better understanding of why wars occur in the first place will be obtained. The international community may then be able to develop more effective policies that avoid war’s
destructiveness.
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Author’s Note
The author would like to thank Doug Lemke, Scott Bennett, Burt Monroe, the anonymous
reviewers, and the editor for their valuable comments. An earlier version of this article was
presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association in Montreal, Canada
(2011). Replication data and instructions and analyses discussed but not presented can be
found at http://jcr.sagepub.com.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship,
and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of
this article.
Notes
1. While I take an elite-driven perspective on nationalism and warfare, I do not dismiss ‘‘the
people’s’’ role in creating, maintaining, and transforming the nation and its nationalism.
The literature certainly criticizes such a top-down conceptualization of nations and nationalism. The construction and continuation of the nation and its associated ideologies is the
product of reciprocal interactions between the political elites, the intelligentsia, and the
masses. However, for the sake of theoretical simplicity and ease of operationalization in
this, the first empirical examination of the general relationship between nationalism and
war, I only consider the political elites’ impact. Future work will explore the effect of the
masses, the intelligentsia, and their interactions with the political elites on violent nationalism’s formation and dissemination.
2. One could object that there is such internal contention among domestic groups that it is
unlikely that the masses could converge on any policy or objective, including the state’s
protection. However, this divisiveness is less likely to be serious or occur at all in nationalist states. Nationalism can overcome social and political differences by elevating the
nation above all other groups and thereby promote the common desire to defend the state.
3. Greenfeld (1992) argues that the idea of the ‘‘nation’’ and nationalism emerged in
sixteenth-century-England and then spread across Europe, all the while transforming itself
to meet the political and social exigencies of each country. Smith (2004, 38) dates the birth
of nationalism, as a doctrine and ideological movement, in the eighteenth century.
4. I encountered several problematic cases while coding countries for their incidence of
nationalism. First, there were states with pan-nationalism. Pan-nationalism poses a coding
problem because states should be unlikely to back the pan-nationalist cause. It may challenge the existence of the state in which its proponents reside and, because the state does
not adequately represent the nation, pan-nationalism may render its citizens less likely to
support a conflict on behalf of state interest. Conversely, this form of nationalism may generate support for the state’s military policies if the masses unite behind the pan-nationalist
cause and perceive war initiation as a means of achieving its goals. Pan-nationalism could
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also produce the mechanisms that lead to interstate war as outlined in my theory. The two
cases of pan-nationalism were pan-Italianism and pan-Arabism. I coded a state as nationalist only if the political elites espoused pan-nationalist sentiment. No state was classified
as championing pan-Italianism because its major supporters were among the intelligentsia
and the masses. I considered Egypt prior to its wars with Israel in 1948 and 1969, Jordan in
the 1950s, and Iraq in the early 1990s as Arab nationalist, but coded them as having an
‘‘other’’ form of nationalism. Second, there were cases in which an official state nationalism competed with substate nationalisms. The question was whether the official state
nationalism had more influence upon domestic politics than the substate nationalisms.
In nineteenth century Belgium, a Belgian state nationalism, articulated through the French
language, contended with an increasingly popular Flemish nationalism (Cook 2002; Lamberts 1998; Vos 1998). But, the majority of Flemish nationalists saw Flanders and its history and culture as an integral, though neglected, part of the Belgian nation. So, the official
state nationalism was more prominent than the substate nationalism. Third, there were
cases in which national unity was threatened by religious, class, and/or other social divisions. It was difficult to determine whether widespread national sentiment was so hindered
by these divisions that state-level nationalism was unlikely. In the case of the Netherlands,
neither pillarization nor a unified national culture held absolute sway until the 1960s when
the former broke down (Blom 1998; Hooker 1999; Roegiers and van Sas 1998). I classify
the Netherlands as nonnationalist up until that point.
5. There were cases in which nationalism existed, but did not conform to the categories in my
typology. I coded them as having an ‘‘other’’ form of nationalism. Categorizing them as
nonnationalist would have resulted in inaccurate data in that these cases were clearly
instances of nationalism (e.g., anti-imperialist nationalism). I drop the states with ‘‘other
nationalism’’ from the empirical analysis of the relationship between the types of nationalism and interstate war initiation.
6. I do not estimate the effect of multiple state-level nationalisms on interstate war initiation
because of this phenomenon’s relative scarcity (eleven observations).
7. I ran a series of robustness checks to ensure that nationalism truly has a positive and significant effect. First, I estimated a logit regression model. Second, I included a measure of
national military capabilities with and without Major Power. Third, I substituted the number of rivalries in which a state is engaged for the dummy variable Rivalry. In all cases, the
direction and significance level of Nationalism remained the same.
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