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ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Death with dignity
Peter Allmark
.............................................................................................................................
J Med Ethics 2002;28:255–257
Correspondence to
Dr P Allmark, Samuel Fox
House, Northern General
Hospital, Sheffield
S5 7AU, UK;
[email protected]
Revised version received
11 December 2001
Accepted for publication
12 December 2001
.......................
The purpose of this article is to develop a conception of death with dignity and to examine whether it
is vulnerable to the sort of criticisms that have been made of other conceptions. In this conception
“death” is taken to apply to the process of dying; “dignity” is taken to be something that attaches to
people because of their personal qualities. In particular, someone lives with dignity if they live well (in
accordance with reason, as Aristotle would see it). It follows that health care professionals cannot confer on patients either dignity or death with dignity. They can, however, attempt to ensure that the patient
dies without indignity. Indignities are affronts to human dignity, and include such things as serious pain
and the exclusion of patients from involvement in decisions about their lives and deaths. This fairly
modest conception of death with dignity avoids the traps of being overly subjective or of viewing the
sick and helpless as “undignified”.
I
t is commonly said that health care professionals should
seek to ensure that terminally ill people in their care should
die with dignity. This seems to involve two claims. The first
is that lives without dignity should be ended. This might be by
the withdrawal or withholding of life-preserving treatment, or
by the direct administration of some life-ending treatment.
Those who advocate non-voluntary euthanasia for the severely
handicapped may endorse such a view, although it is unclear
how death, either induced or natural, adds dignity to an
“undignified” life. The second claim is that people should be
allowed to make the choices necessary to procure a death with
dignity. This second claim is the one more commonly used,
often by those advocating assisted suicide or voluntary euthanasia. The idea seems to be that certain conditions are such
that palliative treatment is insufficient to ensure a death with
dignity and that therefore euthanasia should be used.
The phrase is not a transparent one, however, and its use has
been attacked. Perhaps death itself is by definition undignified; or perhaps the word “dignity” is not one that can possibly apply to death. The main purpose of this article is to defend
a conception of death with dignity. I begin with an examination of the words “dignity” and “death” and of the phrase
“death with dignity”. I then turn to criticisms made of the
application of this phrase in health care. Finally, I set out a
conception of death with dignity that attempts to capture the
meaning people give to it whilst avoiding some of the
problems. The key element of this conception is that dignity is
largely something that someone brings to death; it is not
something that health care professionals can confer.
DEATH, DIGNITY, AND DEATH WITH DIGNITY
The word “dignity” is derived from the Latin, dignitas, meaning
worthiness and nobility. It may be attributed to a broad range
of things. In the first place, it may be attributed to humans,
animals and, even, objects; hence one might speak of the dignity of a ballet dancer, or an old soldier, of a swan, and of a
work of art. The term may also be attributed to actions; hence
one might speak of someone conducting herself in a dignified
way (often in the face of indignities, as I hope to show). The
dignity of some people seems all-pervasive. For example, we
might think of Jesus, Gandhi, and Mandela as possessing a
dignity that belongs to them as a whole, rather than to them
in a specific role, as it does to a ballet dancer or soldier.
“Dignity” appears to have two words that function as opposites, “undignified” and “indignity”. One important aspect in
these two words, neither of which seem to function as a pure
antonym, is the sense that they can convey of some type of
insult or affront. This is true particularly of the latter term; we
speak of “indignities” being inflicted on people or things. Such
an affront will usually be imposed by another, such as when a
swan is put into human clothes for an advertisement, or when
Christ had the ironic term “INRI” nailed above his head on the
cross.1 You might affront your own dignity, however, where
that dignity attaches to you as part of a role, rather than to you
as a person. For example, a ballet dancer who uses her skills to
make money as a lap-dancer might be said to affront her own
dignity.
Let us turn now to the term “death” and then the phrase
“death with dignity”. Kass suggests that the discussion of
death with dignity conceals four senses of the term “death”.2
1. Non-being—the rather mysterious state of being dead;
2. Transition—the point at which one moves from being to
non-being;
3. Process—the period leading to death. This is not entirely
straightforward as we are in this process from the moment of
conception. In practice it usually means a period in which
there is an awareness of what will end a particular person’s life
and, roughly, when.
4. The fact of mortality—death as a universal truth that attaches
to us all.
“Dignity” is not a term that would apply to the first sense.
One would hardly talk of the indignity heaped upon
Shakespeare each year he carries on being dead, for example.
The term might apply to the fourth sense if one were to say (in
a quasi-existentialist way) that death is the indignity that
makes life absurd, for example. But it is not clear what this
would mean and it is obviously not the sense in which the
term is usually applied in health care. Thus it would seem that
the more common use of the phrase “death with dignity”
attaches to the second and third senses of death. If this is so
then we appear to mean dying with dignity when we use the
phrase. This will be assumed in the rest of my discussion.
CRITICISMS OF “DEATH WITH DIGNITY”
The application of the phrase “death with dignity” in health
care has been attacked. Ramsey suggests that death is an
indignity, an affront to life, and that the phrase is, therefore, an
oxymoron.3 His argument, however, makes two errors. The
first is that it confuses the different senses of “death”. Ramsey
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moves from the quasi-existentialist belief that death is an
indignity for all people, to the view that every person’s process
of dying is undignified. This is not a justified move. The second
error is that it mistakenly assumes that being subject to an
indignity undermines one’s dignity. This is also unjustified, as
I shall argue presently.
Coope has a far more robust critique.4 He suggests that it is
not clear that the notion makes any sense at all. One can die in
undignified circumstances (such as with trousers down in a
brothel), but he questions whether one can die with dignity
any more than one can be born or breathe with dignity.
He considers a common reply to this question: that dying
with dignity is whatever the dying person thinks it is.
Hence—for example, if someone thinks it is undignified to die
in a confused state, or incontinent, or heavily dependent on
others, then it is undignified for him. Coope suggests that the
problem with this is that:
if no one understands the phrase “death with dignity” we
likewise do not understand the sentence: “Smith thinks
that this is a death without dignity”.5
This is slightly cryptic. The point seems to be, however, that
this subjective notion of dignity cannot do any useful work in
discussions about dignified death. For example, if we were to
say that assisted suicide should be an option for all people to
ensure they had (subjectively) dignified deaths, we would
have to provide that option to anyone who felt their current
situation required it to maintain their dignity. Hence, someone
who felt that impotence, or hay fever, undermined their
dignity would have the same right to assisted suicide as someone who felt that way about a terminal, wasting disease.
Coope goes on to ask whether there may be any more objective notion of death with dignity. He suggests that, in so far as
there is, it is a disturbing one. In particular, it seems to be
thought that being “ministered to as helpless” is undignified.
Hence, the weak and the injured are subject to Nietzchian
contempt for living lives beneath or without human dignity.
He concludes that, whilst it might be possible to construct a
satisfactory notion of death with dignity along these lines
there seems to be no good reason to do so. Talk of death with
dignity adds nothing to the discussion of how best to treat
people who are dying, or living lives of poor quality.
DEATH WITHOUT INDIGNITY AND DEATH WITH
DIGNITY
Coope’s criticism is a powerful one. None the less, the phrase
“death with dignity” is in common currency; it has meaning
for many people, most of whom would agree on the necessity
of avoiding both the overly subjective and the Nietzchian
objective interpretations. Is it possible to construct a
conception of death with dignity that captures the sort of
views people have whilst avoiding these two, unacceptable,
polar positions?
When working as a care assistant I once looked after someone dying of lung cancer. He was on, what we called at the
time, the “danger list”. This was an odd phrase as death in the
short term was a certainty, not a danger. The quality of care on
this particular ward was poor; in particular, pain control was
badly managed. The routine was that the staff would wait for
the pain to begin before giving inadequate amounts of
morphine. Therefore, the man was frequently in severe pain. I
recall him screaming. But each time the morphine took the
edge off his pain he would make a great effort to get up, walk
round, talk to other patients and staff, and eat at the dinner
table with everyone else. Perhaps he should have been more
angry (as I should have been)—but my memory is of someone
fighting hard to maintain his dignity all the way to his death.
What is interesting is that the events in this man’s death bear
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Allmark
few hallmarks of what many think of as a dignified
death—and yet it seems to me to have been so. I think that, in
order to understand this, it is useful to draw a distinction
between death without indignity and death with dignity.
1. Death without indignity
We have seen that “indignity” conveys the idea of an affront.
Hence, a death without indignity would be one in which no
such affronts occur. What would such affronts be? In the first
place, there may be specific affronts, such as playing loud rap
music to someone who loves only classical music, or jeering at
someone who is incontinent, or using “baby names” to an old
General. But there may be things that affront all people, in the
way that lap-dancing affronts all ballet dancers, and dressing
up, all swans. To understand this one would need to ask
whether there is a dignity that all humans possess simply
because of being human and, if so, how is it affronted?
A potential answer to this draws on an Aristotelian idea.6
The unique and essential feature distinguishing humans from
other animals is rationality, the ability to reason and to act
upon reasons. Human dignity would, therefore, arise from this
feature. We would affront such dignity by failing to acknowledge this in an individual; instead treating them as an object
or an animal. For example, if one were to engage in euthanasia without consent (“involuntary euthanasia”) then this
would look like an affront to someone’s dignity (even if he
would have chosen that option had it been offered); it looks as
though one has “put someone down” like a dog. Another
example of an affront to human dignity would be failing to tell
someone of his terminal diagnosis in order to avoid upsetting
him. This is an affront because it removes the ability for him to
make choices about his own life. In more Kantian terms, we
would be failing to recognise this person as an end in his or
her own right. Not all affronts to human dignity will be
imposed by human agents, however; disease processes that
take away an individual’s ability to reason might also be seen
in this way. A death without indignity will be one in which
these types of affront do not occur.
On this account, dignity may be seen as a continuum. There
is a basic level of dignity that all humans possess simply by
virtue of being a member of a rational species. Some people,
however, exercise their reason in better ways than others. They
can be said to be living good lives. It is these people who possess the greatest degree of dignity; these are the people we
admire and view as possessing dignity (or dignity to a high
degree). What, then, can this account make of the notion of
“death with dignity”?
2. Death with dignity
Whilst inflicting indignity on others is a moral failure, a failure to recognise their human dignity, it does not remove their
dignity either in its minimal or fullest sense. If someone is
subject to involuntary euthanasia, or lied to about his diagnosis, then he is wronged, affronted; but he may still live his life,
and die his death, with (greater or lesser) dignity in the face of
that indignity. Christ (and other martyrs) suffered great
indignities but, none the less, died with dignity. Mohammed
Ali is sometimes praised for the dignity with which he faces
his Parkinson’s disease. People die with dignity because of
their personal qualities, their virtues, whatever the circumstances in which they die: indignity is suffered; dignity is
earned.
It follows that a dignified death will be something earned.
Someone who lives a good life, lives virtuously, will die in that
way. For the rest of us, death with dignity will be, like life with
dignity, something to aim for but only partially to achieve. The
potential for dying with dignity may also be lost in those who
lose their reasoning capacities—for example, through
dementia-inducing illnesses. Similarly, unbearable (and uncontrollable) pain or other suffering may undermine someone’s ability to reason and to choose and, hence, to die with
dignity.
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Death with dignity
It seems, then, that health care professionals cannot ensure
that someone dies with dignity. They can, on the other hand,
contribute to a death without indignity. This will involve
ensuring that, as far as possible, they respect people’s
autonomy and use of human reason. It will also involve
removing barriers to dignity that can be removed, such as
(controllable) pain. On these occasions, health care professionals are making an indirect contribution to death with dignity. To return to my earlier example of the man dying in great
pain, health care professionals could and should have removed
indignities; in doing so they would have helped him to die
without indignity. In the end, however, his strength of character was such that he had a dignified death; in other words, he
had a death with dignity in the face of indignity. Indeed, perversely the indignities enabled him to demonstrate his dignity
(J Gilbert, personal communication, 2001).
Does this account of death with dignity capture the sense
people have of it? And does it do so whilst overcoming Coope’s
criticisms? As to the first question, a recent “discourse analysis” (which included interviews with terminally ill patients
and their relatives) showed that for them “death with dignity”
does often signify simply a death without indignity.7 Even
such things as dying in a decrepit room were of relevance here.
But deeper notions of dignity were also a factor in people’s
ideas of death with dignity. Self determination was a major
theme; so was the idea that dignity was something that developed through one’s life through interpersonal relationships.
The Aristotelian conception I have offered here seems to capture both the importance of minimising indignity, and the
deeper sense in which dignity is something that belongs to
someone and has developed with him or her.
Turning to the second question, it seems clear that the conception avoids being overly subjective. On an Aristotelian
account, if someone is still capable of living an active reasoned
life then he is capable of living with dignity. Therefore, someone who claimed that impotence or hay fever undermined his
dignity would be in error. Contrariwise, it might be reasonable
to claim that someone suffering uncontrollable pain, or
depression, has had his dignity undermined to some extent.
However, this takes us onto the question of whether the
conception could be guilty of Nietzchian contempt for the sick
and injured. I do not think it could; the reason is that any
“contempt” or criticism of people that is compatible with this
conception of death with dignity is only for what is in their
control. People will often not die with dignity. In many of these
cases the lack of dignity arises from within; it is a character
fault. In other cases it arises externally, as with dementia
inducing illnesses. Only the former are to be criticised; they
could have died with dignity but did not. (Perhaps also it is
possible for someone who has not lived well to die with some
dignity. The death of James Cagney’s gangster character,
Rocky Sullivan, in the film, Angels with Dirty Faces, offers a fictional example of this. Rocky Sullivan acts like a coward in the
face of the electric chair in order to prevent his becoming a role
model to local youths.)
257
Whatever the case, health care professionals cannot ensure
that people die with dignity. They can, on the other hand, try
to ensure people die without indignity, in two ways. The first is
by not imposing indignities—for example, taking choices
away from people at the end of their lives. The second is by
acting so as to minimise indignities, such as pain. But there
would never be cause to criticise people who suffer such
indignities, nor hold them in “contempt”, because they are not
in control of whether or not they suffer them.
CONCLUSION
In the conception of death with dignity outlined, the term
“death” has been taken to apply to the process of dying, and
the term “dignity” has been taken to apply roughly to
someone who lives well (in the Aristotelian sense of living in
accordance with reason). It follows from this that dignity is a
function of someone’s personal qualities and that a death with
dignity is a personal achievement; it is not something that can
be conferred by others, such as health care professionals. By
contrast, indignities are affronts to personal dignity. They are
things that prevent or impede someone from living with dignity, mainly because they prevent him from taking an active,
reasoned part in his own life. Health care professionals have a
twin role here; the first is not to impose such indignities, the
second is to minimise them, wherever possible
Does this conception imply anything for the euthanasia
debate (where the phrase is so often used)? It would seem to
offer prima facie support for voluntary euthanasia. For example, someone might choose to end his life now whilst he is still
capable of living and dying with dignity rather than suffer an
illness that removes that possibility. But this support for
euthanasia is fairly weak. It is clear that no matter how good
someone’s character is, bad luck can remove his dignity. If this
happens, it is far from obvious that suicide or euthanasia will
rescue it. Furthermore, opting for euthanasia without good
reason could presumably itself constitute an affront to human
dignity.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This paper has benefited from the comments of the two JME
reviewers.
REFERENCES
1 See for example, Holy Bible. Matthew xxvii, 37; Mark xv, 26.
2 Kass L. Averting one’s eyes or facing the music?—on dignity in death.
Hastings Center studies 1974;2:67–80.
3 Ramsey P. The indignity of “death with dignity”. Hastings Center Studies
1974;2:47–62.
4 Coope C. “Death with dignity”. Hastings Center Report 1997;27:37–8.
5 See reference 4: 37.
6 Aristotle. Nicomachean ethics [translated by Crisp R]. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2000.
7 Street A, Kissane D. Constructions of dignity in end-of-life care. Journal
of Palliative Care 2001;17:93–101.
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Death with dignity
Peter Allmark
J Med Ethics 2002 28: 255-257
doi: 10.1136/jme.28.4.255
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