Political development of the Hungarian opposition parties in the interwar
Czechoslovak Republic
Milan Olejník, Centrum spoločenských a psychologických vied SAV, Spoločenskovedný
ústav Košice, [email protected]
OLEJNÍK, Milan. Political development of theHungarian opposition parties in the interwar Czechoslovak
Republic. Individualand Society, 2016, Vol. 19, No. 2.
The paper dealswith the basic issues of political development of Hungarian opposition partiesduring the
period of the First Czechoslovak Republic (CSR). Within the frame ofa parliamentary democracy in CSR
the whole array of political parties was active,including political associations based on the ethnic
principle. Among theHungarian community the primary role was played by the Provincial ChristianSocial
Party (PChSP) and the Hungarian National Party (HNP). Eventually, eventhough they were representing
primarily interests of the Hungarian population,they differed in their confessional orientation, but also in
their ability togain support of voters outside the Hungarian community. PChSP, whichrepresented itself
as the strictly Catholic Party, was able to attractpreferences of a segment of Slovak Catholics. On the
other side, the HungarianNational Party could count on votes of certain number of members of the
Jewishminority. The both parties differentiated also in their approach to rulingcoalition. Whereas MNS
was pursuing a policy of opposition in somecircumstances it was open to cooperation with government if
its demands aimedat improvement of the status of Hungarian community would be met, the PChSP wasa
priori against any cooperation with government. Till their unification bothHungarian opposition parties
were active as autonomous political associations.A dramatic development of political situation at the
close of 1938 resulted ina radical change of the status of the Hungarian political opposition as well
asHungarian population. On the basis of Vienna Arbitrage from 2 November 1938, asizeable part of the
Southern Slovakia, where the majority of members of theHungarian minority lived was annexed by
Hungary.
Hungarian minority. Hungarian oposition parties. Political relations. Czechoslovakian Republic.
After demise of theAustro-Hungarian Empire, the Hungarian Kingdom became a victim of an
internaldissentions and geopolitical changes which resulted in loss of two thirds ofits territory. As a
result of these developments, a region of the SouthernSlovakia became an integral part of the newly
established state – theCzechoslovak Republic (CSR). A sizeable part of dwellers of the SouthernSlovakia
were ethnic Hungarians. A majority of Hungarians viewed inclusion ofthis territory into Czechoslovakia
as an injustice, which was done withouttheir consent and against their will. Furthermore, there were
severalconsequences, which in judgement of Hungarian minority members resulted inworsening of their
status in political, economic, cultural and social spheres. TheCzechoslovakian Republic was built as a
national state, in which Czechs andSlovaks had in many aspects a privileged position. Consequently,
thisarrangement left ethnic minorities in a secondary position and limit theirminority rights. This became
a constant source of complaints by Hungarianpoliticians and cultural activists. However, due to the
Czechoslovak Constitutionadopted on February 29 1929, a broad array of political parties could be
founded,including political subjects established on ethnic basis. In a relatively shorttime period, several
Hungarian political subjects were formed, among which atwo parties assumed a leading role in the
Hungarian community – the ProvincialChristian Socialist Party (PChSP) and the Hungarian National
Party (HNP).Although both parties were representing Hungarian community, theydifferentiated in
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Človek a spoločnosť - Individual and Society, 2016, 19(2)
several significant aspects. The leadership of the ChristianSocialists aspired to be a political
representative also of non-Hungariansegments of population living in Slovakia. PChSP comprised
predominantly ofadherents to the Catholic Christian Church and an influential position in itshierarchy
was held by the Catholic clerisy. Ideologically, a program ofHungarian Christian Socialists was based on
Vatican encyclics Rerum Novarum and Quadragesimo Anno, which accentuated principles of a
Christiansolidarity in an economic life of society. In regard to the politicalestablishment of CSR, the
Christian Socialists were pronouncedly critical to itand during existence of CSR stayed in an opposition.
Even though, as its nameindicates, the Hungarian National Party was a political subject, representing
primarilythe Hungarian community, it attracted also a number of Jewish voters. HNP hadalso a close ties
with the Sepes German Party (SGP) which had a dominantpolitical influence among the German
population living in the region of Sepes. TheSepes Germans, who were thoroughly magyarized during the
last decades of the Austro-HungarianEmpire, persisted in their pro-Hungarian orientation and SGP
during existenceof CSR was closely allied with Hungarian opposition parties.[1]
As was noted, theProvincial Christian Socialist Party endeavored to broaden its politicalinfluence into
Slovak society, arguing that all Catholics living in Slovakia shouldbe united regardless of their ethnic
origin. With an aim to overcome a languagebarrier and atract also Slovaks who did not speak Hungarian,
the ChristianSocialists published a periodical in Slovak language named the Vôľa ľudu (Will of People).[2]
This strategy was partly successful and approximately 10 % of PChSPorganizations were composed of
Slovak members.[3]
The Czechoslovakstate and security organs were viewing the Christian Socialists with suspicion.Members
of PChSP were perceived by state agencies as hostile to the CzechoslovakRepublic and were under
constant monitoring. Paradoxically, the main source ofinformation about activities of Hungarian
opposition is derived fromsituational reports, analysis and elaborations prepared by security agencies.[4]
Despite factthat both Hungarian opposition parties were predominantly oriented onrepresentation of
Hungarian minority, they differed in several importantaspects and relations between them were
occassionally stormy. The main dividewas an approach to government which was composed of
Czechoslovak and Germanactivistic[5]political subjects in dependence on results of election to the
NationalAssembly. Whereas the Hungarian Christian Socialists were staunch critics of a rulingregime,
arguing that policies of the Czechoslovak government are pernicious towell being of Hungarian minority,
representatives of the Hungarian NationalParty were willing to cooperate with ruling coalition on
condition that its demandswill be met.
However, in itsattitude to anti-government opposition, even leadership of the Provincial ChristianSocialist
Party was not always unanimous. In the middle of twenties a fractionled by Jenő Lelley was convinced
that the Christian Socialists should consider arapprochement with a ruling coalition. Lelley´s policy of
less stringentapproach to ruling coalition resulted in an infighting between his adherentsand strictly
anti-government fraction. According to a pro-government periodicalthe Slovenský deník (Slovak
Daily)crisis in PChSP was becoming highly dangerous to its unity.[6]Also the Vôľa ľudu admitted that
asizeable segment of local organizations was revolting against Jenő Lelley.[7]The dissention in the
Provincial Christian Socialist Party led to a clashbetween Jenő Lelley and Géza Szüllő, who strictly
refused any accommodationwith Czechoslovak parties. Because a majority of the Christian Socialists
sidedwith Szüllő, Lelley´s supporters founded a new political subject – the West-SlovakChristian Social
Party. The Police Directory (PD) in Košice reported, wrongly, thatLeleys´s fraction had a good chance to
gain supporters also in the EasternSlovakia.[8]
If had Hungarianopposition any chance to make a mark in a complex political scene of the
CzechoslovakRepublic, it must gain a trust of Hungarian electorate and secure its votes.Therefore, as the
elections to the National Assembly in year 1925 wereapproaching, Hungarian opposition was focusing on
issues vital to thewell-being of Hungarian population – on improvement of its economic situationand on
respect for minority rights in sphere of education and use of Hungarianlanguage in an official conduct.
For the Christian Socialists it was a singularlyimportant to overcome dissention caused by Lelley and his
supporters.
As the electionresults showed, the National Christan Socialist Party was successful inovercoming crisis
and attracting votes of the Hungarian minority members.[9]The West-Slovakian Christian Social Party led
by J. Lelley suffered a grievousdefeat and after elections disappeared from Czechoslovak political scene.
As asuccess valued results of elections also chairman of the Hungarian NationalParty, Jószef Szent-Ivány.
[10]
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Milan Olejník, Political development of the Hungarian opposition parties in the interwar Czechoslovak Republic
The PoliceDirectory in Bratislava acknowledged that the Hungarian National Party managedgain a
significant support of Hungarian voters. Allegedly, it was a result ofproperly chosed strategy on part of
HNP.[11]
The chairman of theProvincial Christian Socialist Party, G. Szüllő, was pursuing a strictopposition policy.
In view of the Police Directory in Košice, Szüllő was a swornenemy of CSR and in his speeches which he
made during public gatherings and conferenceshe was expressing “anti-state and irredetist attitude.”[12]
Because theiropposition program, Christian Socialists were not interested to coopertate withpolitical
parties of a ruling coalition. Therefore, they were exploring a possibilityto develop closer relations with
the Hungarian National Party. However, at thattime J. Szent-Ivány was reluctant to engage into
negotiations with ChristianSlocialists, because he hoped to conclude some kind of agreement with the
rulingcoalition. These expectations were based on adoption of so called the Lex DérerLaw,[13]in the
National Assembly, on the basis of which thousands of statelessHungarians living in Slovakia would
obtain state citizenship.[14]
Another issue, whichwas of high political and economic relevance, was protection of the
Czechoslovakmarket with agricultural products threatened by Hungarian imports. TheHungarian
National Party supported the Agrarian Party in its endeavor to raisecustom duty on Hungarian
agricultural imports. On the other side, the ChristianSocialists sharply criticized decision of the
Hungarian National Party tosupport policy of the Agrarian Party[15]aimed at stopping of importation of
agricultural products from Hungary. The ChristianSocialists accused the Hungarian National Party of
subservient attitude to theAgrarian Party. This would have, in their judgement, a negatively impact
oneconomic well-being of the Hungarian community in Slovakia.[16]
Interest of the HungarianNational Party to find some accommodation with governmet was registered also
bythe Police Department in Košice, according to whom the HNP held talks withgovernment
representatives willing to support a ruling coalition if itsrequerements will be fulfilled. Representatives of
HNP approved this policy duringthe provincial congress held on February 1 and 2 1927 in Levice.
According to thePolice Department in Košice, Szent-Ivány defended the policy of accommodationwith
government as a necessary tool for protection of interest of Hungariancommunity.[17]
But, thepossibility of more forthcoming relations between the Hungarian National Partyand government
came to nothing. The main reason was an administrative reform,which resulted in creation of a central
administrative authority in Slovakia –the Provincial Office. The establishment of the Provincial office,
according toHungarian opposition leaders, would negatively impact regions distanced fromBratislava,
among them also a region of the Southern Slovakia, where a majorityof Hungarians lived.
Expectations of theHungarian National Party to receive some consideration from government inregard to
its demand were also not fulfilled. There was no political will onpart of ruling coalition to make any
concessions to HNP. According to the PoliceDepartment in Košice this resulted in disappointment among
members of HNP,especially from ranks of landless agricultural workers who were bypassed in theland
reform.
According to thePolice Department in Košice, leaders of HNP decided to practise a “sharpestopposition”
and were contemplating to establish with the Christian Socialists a“united civic block”.[18]Assumption of
usually well informed Košice Police Directory was confirmed. Duringmeeting held in Lučenec on
September 2 1927, representatives of Hungarianopposition parties agreed to establish a committee,
which would coordinateactivities of both political subjects. The chairman of the newly createdinstitution
became G. Szüllő.[19]
One of thesensitive issues was question of relation of Hungarian opposition to governmentin Budapest. As
information gained by security agencies from “reliable” sourcesindicates, the Hungarian opposition
parties were subsided by Budapest, eventhough details of financial support were secret. By means of its
financialsupport, Hungarian government was able to influence political activities of Hungarianopposition
in CSR. One of the regional periodicals representing views of the AgrarianParty, the Republikán župy
podtatranskej,accused the Hungarian National Party of submission to pressure of government inBudapest,
who allegedly demanded that HNP will persist in its policy ofopposition against ruling coalition.[20]
According to thePolice Directory in Košice wrote that during the first half of 1928 thecooperation
between the Christian Socialists and the Hungarian Nationa Partywas not developing satisfactorily.
Namely J. Szent-Ivány was hesitant to pursuea close cooperation with the Christian Socialists, which
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Človek a spoločnosť - Individual and Society, 2016, 19(2)
would close doors on possibilityto come to some agreement with government. The factor was also a
negativeattitude of a Jewish segment of the Hungarian National Party voters, who wereagainst a close
association with the Christian Socialists, perceived by them asanti-Semitic.[21] The oneof the periodicals
owned by the Agrarian Party, Slovenský deník wrote that this was probably a reason that
somerepresentatives of the Jewish community initiated an independent political association.[22]On the
other side, Szent-Ivány must have taken into consideration wishes ofHungarian government, which had
been insisting on establishment of coordinatedpolicy of Hungarian opposition parties. Therefore, J.
Szent-Ivány was unwillingto decide which direction he will take. So, HNP was moderate in regard
topursuing an opposition course but also not overly active in its activisticpolicy.[23]But, despite lack of
success Szent-Ivány did not give up hope to eventuallystrike some deal with government. Allegedly,he
tried to negotiate with government representatives using help of Karoly Zay,a determined enemy of the
Christian Socialists and especially of G. Szülö.[24]However, there is not factual evidence that he was able
to attract attention ofgovernment coalition parties.
As was alreadymentioned, a political situation in Slovakia was profoundly impacted by anadministrative
reform. On July 14 1927 district offices were replaced by acentral administrave institution – the
Provincial Office, which was seated inBratislava. The establishment of the Provincial Office had been
demanded by thestrongest opposition party in Slovakia – the Hlinka´s Slovak Peoples Party(HSPP) as a
condition for joining a ruling coalition. Leadership of Hlinka´sParty, rather naively, supposed that by
establishment of the Provincial Office theywill gain a greater authority in Slovakia. However, this did not
materialize,because the Provincial Office was subordinated to the central government.[25]Hlinka´s Party,
which attracted political preferences of a sizeable segment of theSlovak population and profited from its
image as determined fighter for autonomy,was not able to explain to its voters reasons for this radical
and surprisingturn-around of its policy. HSPP eventually terminated cooperation with
governmentcoalition using as a pretext sentencing one of its representatives – Béla Tuka,to an
exceptionally harsh punishmet of 15 years of imprisonment on charges ofespionage.
HSPP gained nothingby implementation of the administrative reform. Also status of Hungarians
inSlovakia did not improve. Consequently, the oppositition sentiments of the HungarianNational Party
became prevalent.
During thesession of the HNP held on January 8 1929 in Stary Smokovec, it was decideddecided to take
an oppositition pasture and look for deepening cooperation withthe Christian Socialists.[26]But, as was
already noted, Szent-Ivány harbored reservations against closerelations with the Christian Socialists.
Allegedly, he declared to activistic Hungarianpolitician Karoly Zay that the idea of unification of the
Hungarian NationalParty with the Christian Socialists has no real chance to be materialized.[27]Despite
his reluctance to cooperate closely with the Christian Socialists, a growingnumber of HNP members were
for deepening ties with the Christian Socialists.
As the end ofyear 1929 was approaching, political activities in Czechoslovakia wereconcentrated on
oncoming elections to the National Assembly. Besides periodicalpress, the most important way how
political parties could gain potential voters,were public gatherings. With an aim to make sure that public
meetings will becarried out in an orderly fashion, security agencies excercised a close controlover their
course. The highest regulatory competence over public gatherings inSlovakia had the Provincial Office.
Local state authorities were obliged todispatch to each public meeting an official who was monitoring a
course of undertating and dissolve it in caseswhen speakers attacked the political system of CSR,
recoursed to personalinsults aimed at political opponents or enticed violence. Participation ofyoung
people who did not yet reached a legal age was prohibited.[28]County offices were also obliged to
monitor content of articles published byperiodical press, content of booklets and leaflets. The Provincial
Office instructedcounty offices, that any inscription or visual expression of insulting nature exhibitedon
public places must be eliminated.[29]
Leaders of bothHungarian opposition parties decided to participate on elections to the NationalAssembly
as a unified political subject. The coalition was joined also by the SepesGerman Party. Pro-government
press criticized decision of the HungarianNational Party to adhere to an opposition program of the
Christian Socialists. Theregional periodical Slovenský východpredicted that Hungarian National Party by
its adherence to the ChristanSocialist will loose support of moderate members of Hungarian minority and
therewas also a possibility that Szent-Ivány will resign his post.[30]The periodical Slovenská krajina
accusedSzent-Ivány that he was not able to prevent falling the Hungarian NationalParty “under dictate”
of the Christian Socialists.[31]
Despite gloomypredictions expressed by the pro-government periodicals, results of electionsproved that
4
Milan Olejník, Political development of the Hungarian opposition parties in the interwar Czechoslovak Republic
establishment of coalition of NChSP, HNP and the Sepes German Partywas a sound idea. The coalition
gained 9 seats in the House of Representativesand 6 mandates in the Senate.[32]
Change ofpolitical orientation of the Hungarian National Party resulted also in a changeof the party
hierarchy. Whereas influence of Szent-Ivány decreased, importantpositions assumed József Törköly,
Andor Jaross a Béla Szillásy.
Positive electionresults of Hungarian opposition parties, however, had no impact whatsoever uponthe
situation of Hungarian population in Slovakia. On the state level thepolitical power shifted to the left and
in direction to more national orientedsegmenrs of political spectrum. Chairman of Slovak social
democrats, Ivan Dérerclassified results of election as a “Victory of adherents to the Czechoslovakidea”.
[33]
In an existingpolitical environment the chance that the Hungarian National Party will joinruling coalition
was non existent. As an alternative emerged a possibility toestablish relations with the Hlinka´s Party.
Hungarian opposition parties werenegotiating with an aim to create so called autonomistic block. The
officialnewspaper of Hlinka´s Party, the Slovák,expressed an opinion that this iniciative should be
welcomed, because it couldhelp HSPP in its struggle for autonomy.[34]
An event, whichhad a deep political impact on political scene in Slovakia, was initiated bygovernment at
the close of 1930. It was a census of population intended to gaininformation in regard to an ethnic
composition, state citizenship andconfession of people living in Slovakia. The representatives of the
Hungarianopposition, aware of impact which results of census would have upon a status ofHungarian
community, set-up a committee led by József Törköly, authorized tomonitor a course of its realization.
According to a circular issued by the Ministryof Interior on October 25 1930, officials authorized by
collecting of datashould by chosen primarily from ranks of “active state employees”. Thismeasure,
inevitably, considerably reduced a number of Hungarian minoritymembers who would be qualified to
participate on collecting of data.
Leaders ofHungarian opposition, dissatisfied with way how census was to be carried out,submitted on 18
November of 1930 to the Leauge of Nations a petition in whichcriticized government approach to
realization of the census.[35]
The results ofthe censuswere indicated a sizeable decrease of number of Hungarians living
inCzechoslovakia. This roused a wave of accusations voiced by Hungarian oppositionleaders, who argued
that census was skewed in favor of a Slovak majority andtherefore misleading. Because a large decrease
of Hungarian minority members sincelast census in 1919 in some localities could not be reliably
explained, the ProvincialOffice instructed county offices to make sure that all complains will be
investigatedand discrepancies reported.[36]
That accusationswere not baseless, testify a summary report of the Statistical Office sent to theProvincial
Office. According to report, in several cases the decrease of ethnicHungarians was hardly realistic, such
as, for example, in localities of StaráDaľa, Parkan, Želiezovce and Levice. The Statistical Office admitted
that theseaberrations from a real situation were caused by “exceeding zealousness” andacts “of artificial
re-Slovakization” committed by officials who were executigcensus.[37]
The StatisticalOffice expressed reservations in regard to way how census was realized and initiateda
revision of results, arguing that decrease of approximately hundred thousandethnic Hungarians is too
large to be taken at face value. The Provincial Officeinstructed county offices to make sure that results,
which were criticized asuntrustworthy, will be investigated.[38]According to the final report published by
the Statistical Office, 691 923ethnic Hungarians were living in Slovakia in year 1930.[39]
During thefollowing years the results of census of 1930 became hotly contested by the
Hungarianminority representation as well as by Hungrain governments. On the contrary,Czechoslovak
leaders defended census as correct, mirroring demographic changesin Czechoslovakia which took place
since the establishment of the Republic.
Without anypossibility to participate on political development after elections into the NationalAssembly in
1929, the Hungarian opposition renewed its endeavor to establish analliance with HSPP. The leading
person pursuing this policy was chairman of theNational Socialists G. Szüllő. He tried to establish an
alliance of Hungarian,German and Slovak opposition parties. But A. Hlinka was not wholly inclined to
enterinto a close relationship with the Christan Socialists, because their relationswith Budapest. There
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Človek a spoločnosť - Individual and Society, 2016, 19(2)
was also possibility that the Hlinka´s Party would beaccused by parties of government coalition of
disloyalty to the Republic.
Despite Hlinka´sreservations, a conference of the Hungarian opposition held in Žilina onSeptember 1931,
was joined also by representatives of HSPP. The topic of the meetingwas to determine a strategy for
achieving the autonomy of Slovakia. Emissariesof of Hlinka´s Party were promised equality of
Hungarians with the Slovak majorityand assurance that they will not be excluded from the struggle for
autonomy.
To rumours thatHungarian government intends to commence negotiations with CzechoslovakiaSzüllő
reacted negatively. He was afraid that improved relations between Hungaryand Czechoslovakia will be
detrimental to a status of Hungarian community. The CzechoslovakEmbassy in Budapest informed the
Ministry of Interior in Prague, that Szüllődispatched to Budapest a memorandum in which he requested
presence ofrepresentatives of Hungarin opposition during Czechoslovak - Hungariannegotiations, if such
negotiations would be enacted. In that case Szüllődemanded that preliminary consultations between
Hungarian opposition leadersand members of the Hungarian government would be realized.[40]
According to the Police Directory in Košice, Szüllő´s demands were perceived bythe Hungarian
government as an affront. Szüllő was invited to Budapest andinformed that he has no authority to
interfere with decisions of the Hungariangovernment. Another consequence of Budapest displeasure with
Szüllő, accordingto the Police Directory in Košice, was termination of financial support fromBudapest.
Therefore, itwas surprising that despite not overly cordial relations between Szent-Iványand Szüllő
during session of Hungarian opposition parties held on April 17 1932,Szent-Ivány proclaimed, that the
Hungarian National Party is supporting Szüllőand it is in the agreement with the policy of the Christian
Socialists.[41]In his speech Szüllő asserted that his foremost goal is to work for well-beingof Hungarians
in Slovakia, but admitted that this task is complicated byinsufficient support from the Hungarian
government. It was decided that acatastrophic economic situation in the Southern Slovakia, should be
made knownabroad. Participants of meeting decided that statistical data, documenting the
unsustainablesituation of Hungarian population, should be collected and dispatched toBudapest and to
the League of Nations.[42]
The probabilityof achieving autonomy of Slovakia was debated during a session of
Hungarianparliamentary deputies on June 1932. According to Szüllő there was only a slimpossibity to
reach this goal. Only in case that ruling coalition would changeits policy and became more forthcoming to
the ethnic minorities, would bepossible to negotiate some sort of autonomy. In judgement of Szüllő, it
such acase, some form cultural autonomy coud be achieved.[43]
Also cultivationof closer relations with the Hlinka´s Party was not abandoned by the Hungarianopposition
parties. Leaders of the Hungarian National Party were willing tosupport Hlinka´s Party if party will
pursue a strict opposition policy and willrefuse any form of cooperation with political subjects of ruling
coalition.[44]
It is not clear,what were the primary reasons that Szüllő decided to resign from the post ofchairman of
PChSP. He announced his resignation during the session of Hungarianopposition parties in Kežmarok on
August 23 1932. Szüllő declared that hisdecision was influenced by a combination of several factors – his
worsenedrelations with the Hungarian government after resigantion of the Prime MinisterIstván Bethlen
and negative attitude of A. Hlinka to Szüllő. Allegedly, Hlinkawas not willing to conclude any agreement
with the Christian Socialists tillSzüllő will remain the chairman of the party.[45]
On August 31 1932representatives of the Christian Socialists congregated in Žilina with the aim tofind a
solution of existing situation. There was no unity among representativesas to what reaction to Szüllő´s
resignation should be taken and who should behis successor. Eventually it was decided that no new
charman will be electedand leadership of party was temporarily delegated to János Dobránsky.
According to thePolice Directory in Bratislava, the greatest chance to become a new chairman ofPChSP
had János Esterházy or Lászlo Franciscy.
Election of thenew chairman was a main subject of V. Congress of PChSP held in Nové Zámky
onNovember 30 1932. Even there delegates did not elected a new chairman, insteada five member
committee was nominated with a task to elect a new chairman tillthe end of the year.[46]Eventually, as
the new chairman of PChSP was elected János Esterházy.[47]
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Milan Olejník, Political development of the Hungarian opposition parties in the interwar Czechoslovak Republic
Because A.Hlinka refused to cooperate with the Hungarian opposition parties, its leadersdecided to
bypass him and try to someone more willing to negotiaie with them.They contacted one of the influential
members of HSPP Jozef Sivák. He seemed tobe a proper person, being known as an uncompromising
fighter for autonomy ofSlovakia, who on several occasions proclaimed that he is willing to worktogether
with Hungarians.[48]But no member of PChPP could accomplish anything without consent of A. Hlinka.
There was,however, one issue which united Hlinka´s Party and the Christian Socialists. Itwas a
resistance against government schools policy. Slovak Catholics with a growingresentment witnessed
latent, but occasionally also open denigration of religiosityof Slovak population exhibited by some Czech
teachers. Hostility to Czechteachers were adroitly used by Hlinka´s Party in its fight against the
centralgovernment. An explosive issue became a plan to reform Slovak elementaryschools, whose
foremost proponent was the Minister of Schools and National EnlightenmentIvan Dérer. Similarly hostile
to reform was the Christian Socialists. One ofthe HSPP periodicals, the SlovenskáPravda, wrote that the
Hlinka´s Party is ready to work together with the ChristianSocialists in defence of the Christian
elementary schools.[49]
Despite hisabdication from the post of chairman of PChSP, Szüllő remained the mostinfluential
personality in the party. During meeting of the parliamentary clubof Hungarian opposition parties held
on April 25 1933, Szüllő informed aboutpotentially dangerous initiave of the Agrarian Party toward HSPP.
Agrarianswere allegedly offering Hlinka´s Party a possibility to join a ruling coalitionif it gave up its
struggle for autonomy. This, argued Szüllő, will diminishplans of Hungarian opposition to form a united
front of all opposition parties inSlovakia. In such a case Hungarian opposition parties would have no
option butto pursue a policy of revision, that is a policy of annexation of Slovakia toHungary.[50]
According to thePolice Directory in Košice, Hungarian Consul in Bratislava informed Szüllőabout policy of
Hungarian government in regard to revision. Allegedly, thisgoal was to be achieved in two phases. The
first step would be annexation ofregions of the Southern Slovakia where a majority of Hungarians was
settled, thesecond step would be occupation of the whole Slovakia. The first phase was tobe achieved
strictly by non violent means and Hungarian opposition leaders shouldprevent any form of conflict with
the Czechoslovak government.
Concentration ofHungarian opposition politicians on economc issues was presented during thepublic
gathering in Levice on May 15 1933. In resolution, adopted at the closeof the meeting, a moratorium on
taxes which heavily burdened farmers wasdemanded, also long overdue reform of railrod tariffs and
regulation ofinterest rates were requested.[51]
Besides economichardships, the situation of Hungarian community in Slovakia worsened as aresult of
external factors. After Nazi usurpation of power in Germany situationin the Central Europe begun to
change dramatically. Adolf Hitler initiated anumber of radical changes in the sphere of politics, economy
and education and starteda massive build-up of the German Army, which was in a clear violation of the
Treatyof Versailles. Reforms in a relatively short period of time transferred Germanyinto a totalitarian
state. Hitler never pretended that he will accept a statusquo in Europe. He openly asserted that to
impose a German geopoliticaldominance, he will not hesitate to use violent means.
The bellicose rhethoricof Nazi potentates and implementation of measures, which were turning
Germanyinto a military power, alerted Czechoslovak authorities to danger which Germanywas posing to
Czechoslovakia.
With the aim toincrease security of the Republic, the National Assembly adopted several lawswhich
enabled state and security agencies to suppress activities of oppositionparties with a greater severity.[52]
Also military expeditures were increased dramatically and compulsory militaryservice was estended from
eighteen months to two years.[53]
Hungary, whichmade no secrets that present situation in the Central Europe is unsustainable,was viewed
by Czechoslovak authorities also as potentional aggressor.Consequently, Hungarian opposition in
Slovakia was exposed to increasinglyrestrictive measures. Hungarian periodical press was affected by a
morestringent censure and frequently confiscated. The target of restrictivemeasures was namely an
official paper of the Hungarian opposition, the periodicalPrágai Magyar Hírlap, Szüllőcriticized frequent
confiscations of the PrágaiMagyar Hírlap on floor of the House of Representatives, arguing that
therewere no valid reasons for such drastic measures.[54]
Restrictive measuresimposed by Czechoslovak state authorities, led to increase of
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Človek a spoločnosť - Individual and Society, 2016, 19(2)
anti-governmentsentiments among Hungarians living in Slovakia. Government agencies werecognizant
about a growing dissatisfaction. According to the Police Directory inKošice, the Hungarian population
was “extremely enraged” but was afraid of openconflict with the state”.[55]
Decision toenhance security measures resulted in a close monitoring of activities ofopposition parties. In
cases that they were perceived as a threat to theRepublic, state agencies were authorized to terminate
their legal status. This actuallyhappened when the German National Party and the German National
SocialistWorkers´s Party were officially dissolved in November 1933. Leaders of the ProvincialChristian
Socialist Party and the Hungarian National Party were afraid that theirpolitical subjects will be also
dissolved. Representatives of the Hungarianopposition contemplated what measures should they take to
prevent such apossibility. It was suggested that Szüllő and Szent-Ivány should be replaced bysome less
controvesional politicians at the helm of PChSP and HNP. The Hungariangovernment, on the contrary,
viewed above mentioned threat as an opportunity tojustify hostile campaign against Czechoslovakia and
advised leaders of bothparties to prepare for working in illegality.[56]However, a threat of dissolution of
Hungarian opposition parties did notmaterialized.
During firsthalf of 1935 political doings in Czechoslovakia were dominated by presidentialelections and
elections to the National Assembly. Already a year ago, on April24 1934, the Christian Socialists and
Hungarian national Party held a meetingduring which a strategy of both parties in regard to presidential
election wasdiscussed. According to the Police Directory in Košice, Szüllő suggested that theHungarian
opposition should ignore elections, arguing that it will be mere“manifestation” and participation of
Hungarians on elections could be judgedabroad as expression of loyalty to the regime by Hungarians
living in Slovakia.On the contrary, chairman of the Sepes German Party, A. Nitsch, was againstproposal.
Nitsch declared that refusal to participate on presidentian electionscould have a negative impact upon
status of Hungarian minority members. Also Dobránskycautioned that ignoring elections will be judged
as a “provocation against the Republic”and will result in an increase of repressive measures against
Hungarianpopulation.[57]
Similarly as inyear 1935, both parties participated on elections as an unified politicalsubject.
It is necessaryto point to the fact, that Hungarian opposition parties were not only politicalsubjests
representing the Hungarian community. Besides the Communist Party,which was able attract a sizeable
number of Hungarian voters, also the SocialDemocratic Party and the Agrarian Party were voted by
Hungarians. Inagricultural regions of the Southern Slovakia, especially the Agriarian Partywas partially
successful in getting Hungarian votes. Pro-government presspresented Hungarian activists as a political
rising force to the detriment ofHungarian opposition.[58]
Czechoslovakauthorities carefully watched for any violation of law during electioncampaign. The
Provincial Office demanded detailed reports from subordinatedauthorities about “forms, intensity and
means of agitation, about attitudes ofvoters and events which had an impact on election campaign, or
about eventswhich could jeopardise state interests and a lawful course of elections.”[59]Security
authorities also tried to determine a source of financing used byHungarian opposition parties to cover
costs of election campaign. If it could beproven that finances came from Budapest, which would be a
violation ofCzechoslovak law, recipients of money from abroad would face a seriousconsequences. But,
according to the Police Directory in Košice, this wasvirtually impossible to prove, because only Szüllő
most likely had knowledgeabout financial support coming from Budapest.[60]
The elections tothe National Assembly[61]resulted in a major surprise. The Sudeten German party (SGP)
got over a millionvotes and became the strongest political association in Czechoslovakia. Thiswas a clear
signal that political situation in Czechoslovakia was changing.Also Hungarian opposition parties
presented results of elections as a success.Altogether they gained almost 300 000 votes to the House of
Representativesand over 250 000 votes to the Senate.[62]
The main agenda, whichdominated relations of both Hungarian parties at the close of 1935, was
theirunification. The establishment of unified Hungarian opposition party wasdemanded by Hungarian
government circles, because separation of the Hungarianopposition in Slovakia into two independed
political subjects, weakend their abilityto execute political aims of Budapest.
But, as the periodicalSlovenský východ wrote, for the HungarianNational Party a fusion with the
Christian Socialists could cause problems. TheSlovenský východ pointed that HNP,which could count on
number of Jewis votes, risked that by unification with theChristian Socialists these votes would be lost.
Also unification would mostlikely radicalize opposition course of the Hungarian National Party and could
8
Milan Olejník, Political development of the Hungarian opposition parties in the interwar Czechoslovak Republic
resultin dissatistaction of more moderate members of the party.[63]
In a short periodof time citizens of Czechoslovakia were voting again. This time it was the electionthe
President of the Republic. T. G. Masaryk, was ailing and on December 121935 he resign. The only
candidate to presidential office was Minister ofForeign Affaires E. Beneš. Beneš fought hard to obtain a
majority of votes alsofrom opposition parties in Slovakia. Three days before elections Beneš heldtalks
with Esterházy and allegedly promised to fulfill demands of Hungarianpolitical representation.[64]
On March 12 1935 asession of Hungarian opposition parties was held in Bratislava with a task toprepare
statutes of a new united party. According to the Police Directory inKošice, during meeting were analysed
various suggestions in regard to leadingpositions in a newly established political subject but a consensus
was not achieved.It was decided that a final decision will have Budapest.[65]
Differences wereironed-out during the congress held on June 21 1936 in Nové Zámky. An agreementwas
reached to establish the United Hungarian Party (UHP). However, reluctance HNPand PChSP to gave-up
their identity was noticeable in the official name of anew political subject – the Unified Provincial
Christian Socialist and the HungarianNational Party. Discrepances also arised when hierarchy of the
leadingpositions was discussed in newly established political subject.[66]
A surprisingvictory of the Sudeten German Party in elections of 1935 its aggressive policy,placed the
United Hungarian Party into a dilemmatic position. In Slovakia, the KarpathianGerman Party (KGP),
which participated on elections of 1935 as a part of SGP, demandedthat UHP will stop supporting the
Sepes German Party. The Sepes German Partywas at that time in a grave crisis anyway, because young
Sepes Germans werejoining ranks of the Karpathian German Party. Young Germans were educated
inGerman minority schools and the Pan-German ideology was much more attractive tothem then
Hungaristic sentiments of their fathers. An important factor was an arrivalof teachers and cultural
activists from the Sudetenland to region of Sepesafter establishment of Czechoslovakia. These young
enthususiastic people wereunder influence of Pan-German ideology and were successfuly in
inseminatingideas of German superiority in German schools in Slovakia.
Leaders of theUnited Hungarian Party approved cooperation with the Sudeten German Party
duringmeeting held on April 15 1937. J. Esterházy and representatives of the SudetenGerman party K. H.
Frank and G. Peters, concluded a plan of cooperation in theNational Assembly and agreed to coordinate
their political activities.
But thecooperation with Germans was accepted by opposition Hungarian politiciansrather a matter of
necessity. On one side, only Germany could change existinggeopolitical situation in the Central Europe,
which was also in the interest ofHungary and therefore also of Hungarian minority opposition leaders, on
theother side, German expansionism could be dangerous for Hungary. Namely Szüllőwas keenly aware
how dangerous was aggressive policy of Nazi Germany tosecurity of the whole Europe. On the other side,
rumours that Hungary iscontemplating improving relations with states of the Little Entente, that is,also
with Czechoslovakia worried Szüllő, because he was afraid of negativeconsequences upon status of
Hungarians in Slovakia.[67]
Also Czechoslovak representatives,regardless of their political orientation, were aware of growing danger
fromGermany. These worries were exacerbated by fact, that more than three millions ofGerman minority
members lived in Czechoslovakia and since elections of 1935 agrowing majority of them was joiningranks
of Sudeten German Party. Since theGreat Depression Germans in CSR were increasingly dissatisfied with
theirdeplorable economic situation and blamed for their plight policies of the Czechoslovakgovernment.
Therefore with an intention to placate ethnic minorities,especially Germans and Hungarians, the House
of Representatives on December 41937 adopted measures according to which a principle of proportional
emloymentof ethnic minorities in the state administration was to be secured and financingof minority
schools and cultural associacions increased. These measures,however, made only very limited impression
on the Sudeten German Party and didnot changed its anti Czechoslovak attitude. The main reason of
refusal ofHenlein to accept any form of agreement with Czechoslovak government was hisunsverwing
loyalty to Hitler. Despite supreme power which K. Henlein had over theSudeten Garman, he was only an
obedient excutioner of Hitler´s intentions. AndHitler´s directives to Henlein were uambiguous – keep on
negotiating with theCzechoslovak government but refuse any offer, which would led to solvin thestatus of
German community in CSR
Situation was significantlydiffered not only in regard to nature of demands of the Hungarian
oppositionbut also the very nature of political character of Hungarian opposition. Leaderhipof Hungarian
9
Človek a spoločnosť - Individual and Society, 2016, 19(2)
opposition was far more independent in its political decisions.Unlike the Sudeten German Party, where
Konrád Henlein held a position ofunchalledged leader, the United Hungarian Party was a political subject
characterizedby diversity of views and offered a considerable room for opinions of membersto be voiced
and discussed. Also the perception that political exponents ofHungarian minority were mere executors of
will of Hungarian government iswrong. Especially Szüllő frequently criticized policies of
Hungariangovernment, for its disregard of interest of Hungarian community in Slovakiaand for haughty
attitude of Budapest to Hungarian minority representatives. Szüllő,who due to his international renome
considered himself to be a principalpersonality in the political representation of Hungarian minority, was
indignantwhen a financial support provided by Hungarian government was given to J.Esterházy and A.
Jaross instead to him.[68]When the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affaires requested that Szüllő
moderatetone of his declarations and even demanded that he will submit concepts of his speeechesto
Budapest before he will make them public, he openly revolted. He refusedthis request and proclaimed
that he would rather terminate his public activitys.Szüllő went even further. During his visit in Budapest
he announced that hewill gave-up his mandate in the National Assembly in Prague and will
announcepublicly reasons for his decision. According to the Police Directory in Košice,only after a
pressure from Budapest he revoked this threat and promised to cooperatewith the Hungarian Ministry of
Foreign Affaires.[69]
Tense relationsintensified between the United Hungarian Party and the Sepes German Party. Aswas
noted, leaders of the UHP were accepting necessity to sacrifice the SepesGerman Party so the close
relations with the Sudeten German Party could becultivated. But A. Nitsch, despite his hopeless position,
persisted in hisanti-Nazi attitude and refused to cooperate in any way with branch of SDP, theKarpathen
German Party.[70]
Determination ofGermany to use aggression in pursuance of her goals documented the Anschluss
ofAustria. On March 12 1938 the German Army without warning invaded Austria. Itwas a shocking
surprise to all European countries including Czechoslovakia andHungary.
Despite a negativeimpact, which Anschluss of Austria had upon a security of Czechoslovakia,official
reaction of government in Prague was calm and optimistic.
Also Hungarianpoliticians publicly not admitted their anxiety, but nevertheless were aware thatthe
Anschluss deepened danger posed by Germany to all European states. Accordingto a Miloš Kobr, the
Czechoslovak Ambassador in Budapest, also members of the Hungariangovernment were taken by
surprise. Even though they expected a growinginterference of Germany into Austrian internal affaires,
they were surprised,as K. Kánya declared, by “a brutal way of its execution“. Kobr informed theMinistry
of Foreign Affaires in Prague about exposé elaborated by Kálmán Kányaon March 24 1938, in which
Kánya declared that occupation of Austria willresult in destabilization of the whole Central European
region. Kánya expressedhis conviction that Hungary must react to the changed situation by increasing
strengthof her army. He also acknowledged his mistrust of Italy. Allegedly, it was a bitterdisappointment
for Kánya, that Italian dictator Benito Mussoliny, traditionallyan ally of Austria and Hungary and
guarantor of their independence, declaredhis approval of German occupation of Austria.
In regard tosituation in Czechoslovakia, a former Prime Minister István Bethlen assertedthat because a
growing dominance of Germany in the Central Europe, a closecooperation of the United Hungarian Party
with the Sudeten German Party inSlovakia is necessary. This advice was given also to Szüllő, Esterházy
andJaross during their visit in Budapest in March 1938. In regard to a policy ofUHP toward Czechoslovak
government, it should remain in an opposition but shouldavoid any conflict with it. [71]
Besidescooperation with SGP, the United Hungarian Party tried also to establish a closercontact with
Hlinka´s Party. The Police Directory informed the Ministry ofInterior about session of Hlinka´s Party held
on March 3 1938, during which anissue of cooperation of the with German and Hungarian opposition
parties wasdiscussed. Hlinka allegedly proclaimed that the cooperation will depend onposition of
Czechoslovak government. If Prague will refuse to implement the PittsburghAgreement[72] intothe
Czechoslovak Constitution, the HSPP will form an alliance with the Germanand Hungarian opposition
parties. Also Esterházy tried to gain support of JozefTiso, an influential member of leadership of Hlinka´s
Party. He visited JozefTiso in his parish at Bánovce on March 27 1938 and was interested to know
whatwould be the status of Hungarian minority after Slovakia will gain autonomy.According to the Police
Directory in Bratislava, Tiso dodged a direct answerwith explanation that this issue was not determined
yet, but assured Esterházythat “Slovak people will respect rights of Hungarians and Hungarian
languagewill be acknowledged as the second official language.” Esterházy allegedlypromised full support
to the Hlinka´s Party in its struggle for autonomy ofSlovakia.[73]
10
Milan Olejník, Political development of the Hungarian opposition parties in the interwar Czechoslovak Republic
The Anschlusshad deep repercussions also upon the situation of the German activistic partiesin the
Sudetenland. K. Henlein presented the Sudeten German Party as the onlypolitical representative of all
Germans in the Republic and appealed to them tojoin SGP. His appeal was successful. German Agrarians
and Christian Socialistjoined SGP. Only German social democtats and the German Democratic
FreedomParty refused to join Sudeten German Party.
In face of an increasingnationalistic euphoria and growing demands of opposition political subjects
voicedduring public gatherings, government authorities decided, starting on April 11938, to prohibit all
public speeches and all articles in periodical press witha political content.[74]
The tenserelations between the Sudeten German Party and the Czechoslovak governmentworsened after
the Congres of SGP held in Karlové Vary on April 25 1938. Thedemands, formulated by K. Henlein, were
so radical and far reaching that in caseof their fulfillment, the Czechoslovak Republic would loose her
territorialintegrity and become practically defensless in case of an German invasion. Thesedemands were
in eyes of Czechoslovak leaders judged as scandalous and werecatogorically refused.
Collapse ofGerman activism and demands of the Sudeten German Party had inevitably animpact upon
Hungarian political scene.
Hungarianrepresentatives reacted to Henlein´s requirements during their meeting on May17 1938 in
Bratislava. Emboldened by demands of the Sudeten German Party,Szüllő declared that also Hungarians
and have right to be treated as equall withCzechs and Slovaks.
In regard to cooperationwith the Hlinka´s Party, Hungarian opposition perceived a growing nationalismof
young Slovaks and their anti-Hungarian attitude as the main obstacle. However,unlike extreme demands
of the Sudeten German Party, which would gravely damagesecurity of CSR, requirements of the United
Hungarian Party were centeredprimarily on improvement of status of Hungarian population in areas of
economyand culture. According to the Police Directory in Košice, Szüllő, Esterházy and Jarosswere
during their visit in Budapest adviced by the Prime Minister Béla Imrédyto moderate their demands and
tried to conclude some acceptable agreement withCzechoslovak political representation. Imrédy,
allegedly, also advised membersof Hungarian delegation not to establish very close relations with the
SudetenGerman Party.
A way to diffusea growing dissatisfaction of ethnic minorities, in judgement of President E.Beneš and
Prime Minister M. Hodža, was to elaborate a complex legal reformregulating all aspects of status of
minorities.This collection of laws wasnamed the Nationality Statute. A decision to prepare the Nationality
Statutewas announced by Hodža in a radio broadcast aired on March 28 1938.[75]Hodža explained the
purpose of the Nationality Statute during a press interviewheld on May 20 1938. The Nationality Statute,
declared Hodža, will satisfy all requestsof minorities in economic, cultural, educational and social sphere,
but in noway jeopardize a territorial integrity of the Republic.[76]
In spite oftheir frequent proclamations of good relations to Germany, members of Hungariangovernment,
notably Horthy, Imrédy and Kánya, were reluctant to accept anunconditional support of the Nazi
Germany. This ambivalent attitude wasdocumented during a visit of Regent Horthy, Imrédy and Kánia in
Berlin onAugust 21 1938. The expectations of Hitler, that Hungary will join him in caseof military
aggression against Czechoslovakia came to nothing. Horthy refusedto agree to such a proposal on the
grounds of insufficient military readinessof the Hungarian Army. Horthy declained also Hitler´s offer to
help to assistin rearming of the Hungarian Army if Hungary will join Germans in attack onCSR. Similarly
reluctant to agree with parcipitation of Hungary on aggressionagainst CSR were Imrédy and Kánia who
refused advances of the German Ministerof Foreign Affaires Joachim von Ribbentrop.[77]
An insight intocourse of negotiations of Hungarian delegation in Berlin brought CzechoslovakAmbassador
in Budapest M. Kobr. In his report sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairesin Prague, Kobr informed about
his discussion with Hungarian Foreign MinisterK. Kánya. According to Kánya, there existed two groups of
proponents of foreignpolicy in Germany, differing in regard to a war in Europe – doves, who preferreda
peace and a hawks for whom a war would be welcomed solution to realization ofGerman interests in
Europe. Kánya expressed an opinion that the oucome will bedecided by Hitler.
A fear ofGermany was a most likely reason that Hungary entered into negotiations withstates of the Little
Entente. At the end of meeting in Bleda on August 23 1938,delegates of Romania, Yugoslavia and
Czechoslovakia issued a communique inwhich they announced that they will abstain from any use of force
betweenstates of the Little Entente and Hungary.[78]
11
Človek a spoločnosť - Individual and Society, 2016, 19(2)
However, unlikea positive development in Czechoslovak – Hungarian relations, internalpolitical situation
was getting worse. The Sudeten German Party refused alladvances enacted by Czechoslovak government
to achieve a mulutally acceptableagreement in regard to the Nationality Statute. More moderate in their
demandswere representatives of the United Hungarian Party during meeting with Hodža heldon June 29
1939. Hodža assured them that Hungarian community will be entitledto same improvements in its status
as other ethnic minorities. Leaders of the UnitedHungarian Party obtained draft of the National Statute
on July 26 1938. Becausethe proposal did not contain provisions which would acknowledge
anestablishment of Hungarian self-government, the United Hungarian Partty refusedit.[79]
The mainobstacle in reaching an agreement with the Sudeten German Party was a resolveof Hitler to use
Sudeten Germans as pretence to justify his aggression againstCzechoslovakia. In his speeches Hitler
constantly declared his determination to“free Sudeten Germans from Czech oppression”. The German
Dictator bulliedFrance, who was a Czechoslovak ally, to press CSR to be more forthcoming andaccept
German demands. Also Great Britain, which had no a treaty with CzechRepublic, but declared that in
case of unprovoked German attack will be obligedto help Czechoslovakia, was under pressure from
Germany. British government ina desperate effort to prevent war, dispatched on August 3 1938 Lord
WalterRunciman to Prague. Runciman acted officially as a private observer notconnected to the British
government in any way, whose mission was to help finda way for some kind of compromise between the
Sudeten German Party and the Czechoslovakgovernment. But, it was clear from the beginning that
Runciman, a personalfriend of Chamberlain, is pursuing a policy of the British Prime Minister.
Leaders of the UnitedHungarian Party viewed Runciman as an influential person who can beinstrumental
in fulfillment of Hungarian demands. Therefore, Esterházy metRunciman in Prague on August 10 and
then again on 11 1938. Esterházy submittedto Runciman the memorandum named “Situation of the
Hungarian Minority inCzechoslovakia”, which contained a list of grievances summed up
byrepresentatives of the Hungarian opposition.[80]
Unlike Hitler,neither the Hungarian opposition in Slovakia, nor the Hungarian government, hadan
intention attack Czechoslovakia. Hitler, hovever, made clear that either theCzechoslovak government will
agree with annexation of Sudeten territories byGermany, or will face German invasion. The final stage of
drama was reachedwhen, after Hitler´s speech during the Congress of the Nazi Party at Nurembergon
September 12 1938, erupted an uprising in Sudeten territories. Thoughdisturbances were suppressed,
negotiations between the Czechoslovak governmentand leaders of Sudeten German Party ended. K.
Henlein escaped to Germany anddeclared on the German radio that further coexistence between Sudeten
Germansand Czechs is impossible. Then Chamberlain, desperate to avert a war, suggestedthat he will
visit Hitler in Germany. Chamberlain´s negotiations with Hitler inBerchtesgaden and Bad Godesberg
prepared a way for the Munich Conference duringwhich plenipotentiaries of Germany, Great Britain,
France and Italy sealed thefate of Czechoslovakia. The Munich Agreement resulted in weakening of
Czechoslovakiabeyond repair. In a short period of time the whole political system undervent aradical
change. The Munich Agreement had also momentous consquences affecting amajority of Hungarians
living in CSR. A “settlement”of a German issue was in asimilar fashion solved in regard to status of
Hungarian community in Slovakia. OnNovember 2 1938, as a result of the Vienna Arbitrage, a large part
of theregion of Southern Slovakia, where a great majority of Hungarian minoritymembers lived, was
annexed by Hungary.
Sources and literature
Archives
Archiv Ministerstvazahraničních věcí České republiky (Archive of Ministry Foreign Affaires ofCzech
Republic), Sekce MZV 1918 – 1939, (Section MZV 1918 – 1939)
· fund VIII/1 Zastupitelský úřadv Budapešti, (Representative Office in Budapest)
Národní archiv (NationalArchive in Prague)
· fund Prezídium ministerské rady (Presidiumof the Council of Ministers)
Slovenský národnýarchiv (Slovak National Archive)
· fund Policajné riaditeľstvo (Policedirectory), Bratislava
12
Milan Olejník, Political development of the Hungarian opposition parties in the interwar Czechoslovak Republic
Štátny archív (State Archive) Košice
· fund Košická župa (Košice County)
Štátny archív (State Archive) Banská Bystrica, branch Rimavská Sobota
· fund Okresný úrad (County Office) Šafárikovo
Štátny archív (StateArchive) Košice, branch Rožňava
· fund Okresný úrad (County Office) Rožňava
Štátny archive (StateArchive) Nitra, branch Bojnice
· fund Okresný úrad (County Office) NováBaňa
Publishedsources
Československástatistika – svazek 70. Řada I. (Volby sešit 42) Volby doposlanecké sněmovny v říjnu 1929.
Praha : Státní úřad statistický, 1930.
Zprávyštátneho úradu štatistického republiky Československej. RočníkXIV. (1933) Číslo 195.
Sbírkazákonů a nařízení státu československého. Ročník 1933,1934.
Poslanecká sněmovna, Tisky III. volebné období. 8. zasedání, 9. zasedání.
Volby do poslanecké sněmovny v květnu 1935. Praha : Státní úřad statistický v komisi knihkupectví
Bursika Kohout v Praze Knihtiskárna Melantrich, 1936.
Periodicals
Republikán župy podtatranskej, 1927.
Robotnícke noviny,1938.
Slovák, 1930.
Slovenskákrajina, 1929.
Slovenskápolitika, 1938.
Slovenskápravda, 1933.
Slovenský deník,1925, 1928.
Slovenskývýchod, 1929, 1936.
Vôľa ľudu, 1925.
Literature
BENEŠ, Edvard.Mnichovské dny. Paměti. Praha : SVOBODA 1968, pp. 33-34.
DERÉR, Ivan. Slovenský vývoj a ľudácka zrada. Praha: Kvasnička a Hampl, 1946, s. 252.
ĎURKOVSKÁ,Mária. Spolupráca Spišskonemeckej strany s maďarskými politickými stranami vregióne
Spiša začiatkom dvadsiatych rokov a koncom tridsiatych rokov 20.storočia. In Človek a spoločnosť,2010,
Vol. 13, Issue 2, pp. 10-25. ISSN 1335-3608
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any-s-madarskymi-politickymi-stranami-v-regione-spisa-zaciatkom-dvadsiatych-rokov-a-koncom-tridsiatyc
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h-rokov-20-storocia/
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archívnych dokumentov. In Človeka spoločnosť, 2013, Vol. 16, Issue 3, pp. 52-60. ISSN 1335-3608.
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SAV,2010, pp. 107-118.
HORTHY, Nicholas. Memoirs. New York : Robert Speller andSons, 1957.
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SIMON, Attila. The Hungarians of Slovakia in 1938. NewYork : Columbia University Press, 2012.
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(eds.). Slovensko v Československu (1918 –1939). Bratislava : VEDA, 2004.
[1] More to theissue of relation between the Sepes German Party and Parties of Hungarianopposition see
ĎURKOVSKÁ, Mária. Spolupráca Spišskonemeckej strany s maďarskýmipolitickými stranami v regióne
Spiša začiatkom dvadsiatych rokov a koncomtridsiatych rokov 20. storočia. In Človeka spoločnosť, 2010,
Vol. 13, Issue 2, pp. 10-25. ISSN 1335-3608.
Available
on
the
Internet:
http://www.clovekaspolocnost.sk/sk/rocnik-13-rok-2010/2/studie-a-clanky/spolupraca-spisskonemeckej-str
any-s-madarskymi-politickymi-stranami-v-regione-spisa-zaciatkom-dvadsiatych-rokov-a-koncom-tridsiatyc
h-rokov-20-storocia/
[2] Vôľaľudu as a periodical of Slovak section of NChSP was published in Nitra andKošice.
[3] MAREK, Pavel. Politickéstrany maďarské menšiny. In MALÍŘ, Jiří – MAREK, Pavel (eds.). Politické
strany. Vývoj politických strán ahnutí v českých zemích s Československu 1861 – 2004. I. Díl: Období
1861 –1938. Brno : Nakladatelství Doplněk, 2005, p. 928.
[4] The most importantagencies delegated to monitor activities of political opposition on territoryof
Slovakia were Police Directories seated in Slovak capital Bratislava andKošice.
[5] Politicalparties representing ethnic minorities which cooperate with a ruling coalitionwere
characterized as activistic.
[6] Slovenský deník, 4. IV. 1925, Vol. 3, Issue 77. Kríza medzi Maďarmi. (Acrisis among Hungarians).
[7] Vôľa ľudu, 10. V. 1925, Vol. 4, Issue 19. K sporuKresťansko-sociálnej strany. (To the issue of
disagreement in Christian SocialParty).
14
Milan Olejník, Political development of the Hungarian opposition parties in the interwar Czechoslovak Republic
[8] Štátny archív (StateArchive; hereinafter referred only as ŠA) Košice, fund (f.) Košická župa
(KošiceCounty; hereinafter referred only as KŽ), carton (c.) 68, Opozičný blokmaďarských strán
Slovenska a Podkarpatskej Rusi.
[9] Candidates of ChristanSocialists received 98 383 votes to the House of Representatives and85 777
votes to the Senate. Volby doposlanecké sněmovny v listopadu 1925. Praha : Státní úřad statistický– v
komisi knihkupectví Bursík a Kohout, 1926, p. 9.
[10] ŠA Košice, f. KŽ,c. 110, Maďarská strana národní – činnost, 16.2.1926.
[11] Slovenský národnýarchiv (Slovak national Archive, hereinafter referred only as SNA) Bratislava,f.
Policajné riaditeľstvo (Police Directory, hereinafter referred only to as PR),carton (c.) 750, Pravidelní
situační správa, 31.12.1925.
[12] ŠA Košice, f.KŽ, c. 263, Situační správa za IV. čtvrtletí 1926, 31.12. 1926.
[13] Named afterchairmen of Slovak social democrats Ivan Dérer, who proposed it.
[14] GABZDILOVÁ,Soňa. Maďarská menšina a štátne občianstvo Československej republiky (1918 –1926)
In BENKO, Juraj a kol. Občan a štát vmoderrných dejinách Slovenska. Bratislava : Historický ústav SAV,
2010, pp. 107-118.
[15] Oficial namewas Republikánska strana zemědělského a malorolníckeho lidu (RepublicanParty of
Farmers and Peasnts).
[16] ŠA Košice, f.KŽ, c. 238, Křesťasko-sociální strana – činnost, 4.4.1929.
[17] ŠA Košice, f.KŽ, c. 226, Maďarská národná strana – činnosť, 4.4.1928.
[18] ŠA Košice, f.KŽ, c. 226, Maďarská národná strana – činnosť, 4.4.1928.
[19] However, both partiesshould respect agreements concluded before creation of united institution.
Alsoorganizational autonomy of both parties was left intact. ŠA Košice, f.KŽ, c. 226.
[20] Republikan župy podtatranskej, 1. X. 1927.Koniec začiatkov. (The end of beginnings).
[21] ŠA Košice, f. KŽ, c.226. Maďarská národní strana – činnost, 19.9.1927.
[22] Slovenský deník, 28. IV. 1928, Vol. 11, Issue 100. Kríza maďarskejstrany národnej. (Acrisis of
Hungarian National Party).
[23] So calledactivism was a political course pursuing cooperation with governmentcoalition.
[24] Národní archiv Českérepubliky, Praha (National Archive of Czech Republic; hereinafter referred
onlyto as NA ČR), f. Prezídium ministerské rady (Presidium of the Council ofMinisters; hereinafter
referred to only as PMR), c. 575, Maďarskákřesťansko-sociální strana – informace.
15
Človek a spoločnosť - Individual and Society, 2016, 19(2)
[25] ŠUCHOVÁ,Xénia. Župné zriadenie na Slovensku (1923 – 1928). In ZEMKO, Milan –
BYSTRICKÝ,Valerián (eds.). Slovensko v Československu (1918 – 1939). Bratislava : VEDA, 2004,s. 112.
[26] NA ČR, f. PMR, c. 575,Hlásenie Policajného riaditeľstva v Košiciach Krajinskému úradu v
Bratislave14.2.1929.
[27] NA ČR, f. PMR, c. 575,Správa Policajného riaditeľstva v Košiciach (nedatovaný
document/undateddocument).
[28] Štátny archív (StateArchive; hereinafter referred only as ŠA) Banská Bystrica, branch (b.)
RimavskáSobota, f. Okresný úrad (County Office, hereinafter referred to only as OÚ)Šafárikovo, c. 5,
Účasť školskej mládeže na verejných zhromaždeniach,Bratislava, 1.10.1929.
[29] ŠA Košice, b.Rožňava, f. OÚ Rožňava, c. 14, Predpisy tlačiové, týkajúce sa volieb – úprava,3.10.1929.
[30] Slovenský východ, 20. X. 1929, Vol. 11, Issue 241. Szent-Ivány chceopustiť politickú arénu.
(Szent-Ivány wants to leave political scene).
[31] Slovenská krajina, 11. X. 1929, Vol. 29, Issue 129.Čo nového? (What is new?).
[32] Československá statistika – svazek 70. Řada I.(Volby sešit 42). Volby do poslanecké sněmovny v říjnu
1929. Praha :Státní úřad statistický, 1930. Tab. No. 1, p. 9
[33] DERÉR, Ivan. Slovenský vývoj a ľudácka zrada. Praha: Kvasnička a Hampl, 1946, s. 252.
[34] Slovák, 20. IX. 1930, Vol. 12, Issue 107. Slovenskí Maďari zaautonomistický blok. (Slovak
Hungarians are for autonomistic block).
[35] Archiv Ministerstvazahraničných věcí České republiky, (Archive of Ministry Foreign Affaires ofCzech
Republic, hereinafter referred only as AMZV ČR) Praha, II. sekce 1918 –1939 SN, (II. Section 1918 –
1939 SN), f. III. řada (III. row), c. 706, Petíciaposlancov maďarských strán, odoslaná Spoločnosti národov
18.12.1930.
[36] ŠA Košice, b. Rožňava,f. OÚ Rožňava, c. 24, Sčítanie ľudu 1930, správy časopisov, 17.12.1930.
[37] ŠA Košice, b.Rožňava, f. OÚ Rožňava, c. 24. Sčítanie ľudu 1930, data o národnosti naSlovensku,
6.6.1937.
[38] ŠA Košice, b.Rožňava, f. OÚ Rožňava, c. 24, Sčítanie ľudu 1930, data o národnosti naSlovensku,
6.6.1937.
[39] Zprávy štátneho úradu štatistického republikyČeskoslovenskej. 1933.Ročník XIV. Číslo 195; SIMON,
Attila. The Hungarians of Slovakia in 1938. NewYork : Columbia University Press, 2012.
[40] AMZV ČR, Sekce MZV 1918– 1939, f. VIII/1 Zastupitelský úřad v Budapešti (Representative Office
inBudapest; hereinafter referred to only as ZÚB), c. 20. 25 of January 1932, Maďarskákřesťansko-sociální
strana – informace, 25.1.1932.
16
Milan Olejník, Political development of the Hungarian opposition parties in the interwar Czechoslovak Republic
[41] AMZV ČR, SekceMZV 1918 – 1939, f. VIII/1 ZÚB, c. 278, Maďarské opoziční strany,
zasedáníspolečného parlamentního klubu v Košicích dne 17.4.1932.
[42] AMZV ČR, SekceMZV 1918 – 1939, f. VIII/1 ZÚB, c. 278, Maďarské opoziční strany,
zasedáníspolečného parlamentního klubu v Košicích dne 17.4.1932.
[43] NA ČR, f.PMR, c. 575, Maďarská křesťansko-sociální strana, informace, 1.6.1932.
[44] AMZV ČR, II.sekce 1918 – 1939, III. řada, b. 278, Maďarská křesťansko-sociální strana,činnost,
7.7.1932.
[45] NA ČR, f.PMR, c. 575, Maďarská křesťansko-sociální strana – činnost, 13.9.1932.
[46] NA ČR, f. PMR,c. 575, Maďarská křesťansko-sociální strana, kongres v Nových Zámcích,6.12.1932.
[47] NA ČR, f. PMR,c. 575, Maďarská křesťansko-sociální strana, činnost. Volba předsedy
strany,27.12.1932.
[48] NA ČR, f.PMR, c. 575, Maďarská křesťansko-sociální strana, činnost, 27.4.1933.
[49] Slovenská pravda, 22. I. 1933, Vol. 14, Issue 4. Spojíme sa proti dr.Dérerovi nielen s Maďarmi, ale
ešte aj s katolíkmi zamoravskými. (Wewill unite against Dr. Dérer notonly with Hungarians but also with
Catholics trans-Moravian).
[50] NA ČR, f. PMR, c. 575, Maďarskákřesťansko-sociální strana, činnost, 23.5.1933.
[51] NA ČR, f. PMR,c. 575, Maďarská strana národní, veřejné shromáždení, konané 14.5.1933 vLevicích.
[52] For example on 10 of July1933 zákon na ochranu republiky č. 50 (the Law no. 50 „For the Protection
ofthe Republic“) was novelized. Sbírkazákonů a nařízení státu československého. Ročník 1933. Čiastka
44,vydaná dňa 15.7.1933, s. 513 (part 44, published on 15.7.1933, p. 513).
[53] Sbírka zákonů a nařízení státu československého. Ročník 1934.Částka 56. Vydána dne 16. července
1933, s. 1033 (part 56, published on16.7.1933, p. 1033).
[54] Poslanecká sněmovna, Tisky III. voleb. obd., 8. zasedání,2211/VI (The House of Representatives, Pres
III. election period, 8. sesoin,2211/VI). Interpelácia poslanca dra Szüllőaa druhov celej vláde o krivdivej
praxi cenzúry, o častomzabavovaní listu Prágai Magyar Hírlapa pláne vlády, že chce založiť maďarský list.
(Interpelationof deputy Dr. Szüllő and colleagues to the whole government in regard tounjustful practice
of censure and frequent confiscation of periodical Prágai Magyar Hírlap and about a plan ofgovernment
to found a Hungarian newspaper). Predseda vlády v odpovediuviedol, že „Všechna v interpelaciuvedená
zabavení časopisu »Prágai Magyar Hírlap«, zařízená státnímzastupitelstvím v Praze byla soudem
přezkoumana a potvrzena“.(The Prime Minister in his answer stated that “All confiscations of periodical
»Prágai Magyar Hírlap«, mentioned ininterpelation and ordered by state procurator were analysed and
confirmed bycourt.” Poslaněcká sněmovna, Tisky III. volebné období, 9. zasedání, 23557/X(původní
znění). 14. XII. 1933. (The House of Representatives, Pres III. election period,9. sesoin, 23557/X). 14. XII.
1933.
[55] Slovenský národnýarchiv (Slovak National Archive, hereinafter referred only as SNA) Bratislava.
17
Človek a spoločnosť - Individual and Society, 2016, 19(2)
f.VS-K, c. 2, Situácia na Slovensku – hlásenie. 6.10.1933.
[56] NA ČR, f. PMR, c. 575,Správa o činnosti maďarských opozičných strán, 12.2.1934.
[57] NA ČR, f.PMR, c. 575, Maďarská křesťansko-sociální strana, informace o činnosti,17.11.1933.
[58] For example the Slovenský deník informed about delegation of Hungarian farmers to PrimeMinister
M. Hodža, who wanted to join the Agrarian Party because its „justfulminority policy“. Slovenský deník,25.
apríla 1935. Maďarskí roľníci opúšťajú Esterházyho a Szent-Iványho. (Hungarian farmers areleaving
Esterházy and Szent-Ivány.)
[59] ŠA Nitra, b. Bojnice,f. OÚ Nová Baňa, c. 12, Rozširovanie správ o plebiscite v prospech
Maďarska,25.3.1935.
[60] SNA Bratislava, f. Policajnériaditeľstvo (Police directory, hereinafter referred only as PR), c.
253,Politické strany na Slovensku a Podkarpatskej Rusi s autonomistickým programom,ich finančná
podpora (nedatovaný document/undated document).
[61] Volby do poslanecké sněmovny v květnu 1935, p. 9.
[62] Volby do poslanecké sněmovny v květnu 1935, p. 9.
[63] Slovenský východ, 11. I. 1936, Vol. 18, Issue 9. O sústredeniemaďarských politických strán. (In
regard to concentration of Hungarianpolitical parties).
[64] KLIMEK, Antonín. Velkédějiny zemí Koruny české. Svazek XIV.1929 – 1938. Praha Litomyšl : Paseka,
2002.
[65] NA ČR, f.PMR, c. 575, Maďarská křesťansko-sociální strana, informace (nedatovanýdokument,
undatet document).
[66] NA ČR, f.PMR, c. 575, Maďarská křesťansko-sociální strana, informace, 21.6.1935.
[67] AMZV ČR,Sekce MZV 1918 – 1939, f. VIII/1 ZÚB, Odezva čs. vládního prohlášenív Maďarsku
(nedatovaný dokument, undated document).
[68] SIMON, Attila. The Hungarians of Slovakia in 1938, pp.112-113.
[69] NA ČR, f.PMR, c. 575, Spojená maďarsko-křesťanská sociální a maďarská strananárodní, informace,
4.1.1938.
[70] More to theissue of relation between the Sepes German Party, Karpathen German Party andUnited
Hungarian Party see: ĎURKOVSKÁ, Mária. Maďarské menšinové strany naSlovensku v tridsiatych rokoch
20. storočia v obraze archívnych dokumentov. In Človek a spoločnosť, 2013, Vol. 16,Issue 3, pp. 52-60.
ISSN
1335-3608.
Available
on
the
Internet:
http://www.clovekaspolocnost.sk/sk/rocnik-16-rok-2013/3/studie-a-clanky/madarske-mensinove-strany-naslovensku-v-tridsiatych-rokoch-20-storocia-v-obraze-archivnych-dokumentov/
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Milan Olejník, Political development of the Hungarian opposition parties in the interwar Czechoslovak Republic
[71] AMZV ČR,Sekce MZV 1918 – 1939, f. VIII/1., c 27, Spojená maďarsko-křesťanská sociálnía maďarská
strana národní, informace, marec 1938.
[72] The PittburghAgreement, signed by Slovak representation and also later president Masaryk inUSA,
stated than Slovaks will have an independent parliament, judiciary andschools after establishment of the
Czechoslovak Republic.
[73] NA ČR, f. PMR, c. 575.
[74] ŠA Levoča, b.Levoča, f. OÚ Levoča, c. 48, Zákaz verejných schôdzí a prejavov s politickýmobsahom,
1.4.1938.
[75] BENEŠ, Edvard. Mnichovské dny. Paměti. Praha : SVOBODA 1968, pp. 33-34.
[76] Robotnícke noviny, 25.V.1938, Vol. 35, Issue 119. Hodža začalvyjednávať s Henleinom. (Hodža began
negotiate with Henlein.)
[77] HORTHY, Nicholas. Memoirs. New York : Robert Speller andSons Publishers, 1957, p. 162.
[78] Slovenská politika, 25.VIII.1938, Vol. 19, Issue 194.Uzmierenie v dunajskej kotline: Dohoda s
Maďarskom.(Rapprochement in the Danubehollow:The Agreement with Hungary); HORTHY, N. Memoirs,
p. 162.
[79] SIMON, A. The Hungarians of Slovakia, p. 178.
[80] SIMON, A. The Hungarians of Slovakia, p. 190.
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