BALKAN CROSSROADS
Historical Dialogue between Scholars
in Southeast Europe
March 2017
Published by the Institute for the Study of Human Rights at Columbia
University in the City of New York in cooperation with Panteion University
in Athens and Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje.
March 2017
BALKAN CROSSROADS
Table of Contents
Foreword ....................................................................................................................................... 4
Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 5
Abstracts (in alphabetical order) ............................................................................................... 7
Sponsoring Institutions ............................................................................................................. 9
“Judges as Historians: The Macedonian Trials in the Early 1990’s”, by Yannis
Aggelakis (Panteion University) .............................................................................................. 11
“Blind Sides of National Histories: Reconciliation between Macedonia and Greece”,
by Sara Al-Bander (Ss. Cyril and Methodius University) .................................................... 28
“The Treatment of the Refugee Crisis from the Middle East in the Media”, by Vaska
Bojadji (Ss. Cyril and Methodius University) ........................................................................ 38
“The Name Issue and the Media”, by Jelena Cvetkovikj (Ss. Cyril and Methodius
University) .................................................................................................................................. 52
“Albanian Immigrants in Greece and Their Perceptions and Views on the
Macedonian Issue”, by Detjon Gjocaj (Panteion University) ............................................. 70
“From Millet to Nation: Building on a Wrong Foundation?”, by Ivan Ivanov (Ss. Cyril
and Methodius University) ...................................................................................................... 75
“Broadcast Yourself: The Village Fairs of Slavic Speakers of Greek Macedonia on
YouTube”, by Anna Krinaki (Panteion University) ............................................................ 87
“Refugees of the Greek Civil War in Yugoslav Macedonia and the Contribution of
‘Aegean Macedonians’ in its Nation Building Project”, by Georgios Limantzakis
(Panteion University) .............................................................................................................. 104
“The Status of Minorities in Macedonia and Greece”, by Ivana Popchev (Ss. Cyril and
Methodius University) ............................................................................................................ 116
“The Old Calendarists and the Macedonian Issue”, by Dimitra Tsourou (Panteion
University) ................................................................................................................................ 134
Edited by Lambros Baltsiotis (Course Director at History Faculty, Department of Political Science
and History, Panteion University); Ivanka Dodovska (Assistant Professor of History of Law and
History of Diplomacy, Faculty of Law "Iustinianus Primus", Ss. Cyril and Methodius University);
and Dalibor Jovanovski (Professor of Modern Balkan History, Faculty of Philosophy, Ss. Cyril
and Methodius University).
Foreword
Balkan Crossroads is a compilation of essays by graduate students and post-doctoral candidates
at Panteion University (Athens) and Ss. Cyril and Methodius University (Skopje). The
publication is part of a shared history project involving students and faculty from both countries.
After a series of meetings convened by Columbia with faculty supervisers from Panteion and Ss
Cyril and Methodius, students and faculty met at Panteion University on 21 October 2016. They
presented papers and engaged in a dialogue on research and publication topics. Beyond the
exchanging information on academic topics, project participants spent time together in Athens
and Skopje exploring shared interests, future cooperation, and building enduring personal
bonds.
Balkan Crossroads is part of a broader project undertaken by the Program on Peace-building and
Rights at Columbia University’s Institute for the Study of Human Rights. The “Southeast
Europe Dialogue Project” fosters contact, communication, and cooperation between officials,
politicians, journalists, environmentalists, educators, and students in Southeast Europe. The
Project motivates civil society to work together. It also seeks to create an improved climate for
resolution of bilateral issues.
An abstract of each paper is presented as a summary. The full-length papers are published later
in this booklet. I commend the authors for their contributions. I also want to express appreciation
to Panteion University and Ss. Cyril and Methodius University for acting as co-publishers.
History can be divisive and a source of conflict. Alternatively, historical dialogue can enhance
understanding, foster empathy, and shed light on historical events as the basis for future
reconciliation.
We hope this publication advances the common goals of mutual understanding based on
historical and scholarly dialogue.
Sincerely,
David L. Phillips
Director, Program on Peace-building and Rights Institute for the Study of Human
Rights Columbia University
4
Introduction
The Balkan Peninsula, or the Balkans, in Eastern and Southeastern Europe is a cradle of
European civilization currently comprising different nations, cultures, religions and traditions.
Balkan Crossroads is a shared history project that explores differences and commonalities as the
basis for dialogue and reconciliation.
Historical dialogue is not new among the peoples of Southeast Europe. Historians have
interacted through the Balkan Society for Pedagogy and Education, Aristotle University,
UNESCO and the Georg Eckert Institute. The 1998 Thessaloniki conference considered “The
image of the other/the Neighbour in the School textbooks of the Balkan countries.” That year,
the Centre for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe (CDRSEE) was founded in
Thessaloniki. In 1999, it launched a joint historical project focused on the teaching of history in
the region. Professor Christina Koulouri edited an important volume, emphasizing that
"national history to be taught in schools should not be nationalistic history.”
According to Koulouri, “[t]he concept of a new Balkan community emerged as a counterweight
to new aggressive and defensive nationalisms”. The consequent idea to promote a common
history of the region was launched. She emphasized that this new conception of history should
not replace national histories. It would rather be a new interpretation of national pasts based on
a common Balkan cultural and institutional heritage, and in this way promote the
understanding that “[s]hared history is a counterweight to ethnocentric or nationalistic
historical narratives”.
Rephrasing Maria Todorova’s quote, history is not “an attempt to depict the Balkan people as
innocent victims, to encourage ‘a sense of aggrieved primal innocence’ ”. Shared history should
oppose these perceptions, often linked to ethnocentric and nationalistic narratives.
The collapse of Yugoslavia in 1991, and the emergence of its republics as independent and
sovereign states rekindled disputes with neighbouring countries over questions related to the
history of the wider region of Macedonia as well as the legitimacy of using the Macedonian
name and state symbols. Some Greeks blamed Macedonia for appropriating, falsifying and
distorting its history.
During the past two decades, the “name issue” has dominated bilateral relations. The situation
was managed through the 1995 Interim Accord, whereby Greece formally recognized the
independence of the Macedonian state under the provisional reference “the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia” and lifted its embargo.
While we are simply scholars, we welcomed recent discussions between the governments in
Skopje and Athens on various approaches to normalizing relations between the two countries.
After 11 years, the Greek foreign minister paid a working visit on 24 June 2015. Eleven specific
measures were agreed as confidence building measures (CBMs) in areas of mutual interest.
5
CBMs included work in the fields of education and culture.
In this context, faculty from Ss Cyril and Methodius University and Panteion University held a
series of meetings under the auspices of Columbia University to consider academic cooperation.
After workshops in Thessaloniki in October 2015 and in February 2016, we joined Columbia’s
University Partnership Program as a platform for working together. We sought the participation
of graduate and post-doctoral students from our universities as participants in the shared
history project. We commend their good work and the good will they demonstrated to one
another.
The project is important and necessary for the future of younger generations in the region. For
this reason we decided to edit the publication of this volume. We believe this publication can
make a significant contribution towards reconciliation by demonstrating the benefits of dialogue
and cooperation. The result of our efforts is on these pages.
Lambros Baltsiotis (Course Director at History Faculty, Department of Political Science and
History, Panteion University)
Ivanka Dodovska (Assistant Professor of History of Law and History of Diplomacy, Faculty of
Law "Iustinianus Primus", Ss. Cyril and Methodius University)
Dalibor Jovanovski (Professor of Modern Balkan History, Faculty of Philosophy, Ss. Cyril and
Methodius University)
1 March 2017
6
Abstracts (in alphabetical order)
Author: Yannis Aggelakis (Panteion University)
Topic: “Judges as Historians: The Macedonian Trials in the Early 1990’s”
Abstract: Examines three Macedonian trials in the 1990’s prosecuting members of left-wing
political groups for distributing a poster, a book, and a leaflet respectively. It looks at the minutes
of the trials and the testimony of expert witnesses, including left-wing members of parliament
and noted historians. The paper considers how the interpretation of history influenced criminal
prosecutions.
Author: Sara Al-Bander (Ss. Cyril and Methodius University)
Topic: “Blind Sides of National Histories: Reconciliation between Macedonia and Greece”
Abstract: Explores the relationship between national identity, national conflicts and genocide. It
examines how national myths created conditions for genocide, looking at the myth of “Heavenly
Serbia” that contributed to wars in the former Yugoslavia, and the “Protocols of the Elders of
Zion,” which perpetuate myths of betrayal. The paper also addresses the history of relations
between ethnic Macedonians and Greeks.
Author: Vaska Bojadji (Ss. Cyril and Methodius University)
Topic: “The Treatment of the Refugee Crisis from the Middle East in the Media”
Abstract: Presents a comparative analysis of the treatment by the media in Greece and
Macedonia of the refugee crisis and the Balkan human corridor. It looks at how the media in
both countries portrays the situation along with the measures taken by the respective
governments to manage refugee flows. The paper considers the influence of the media on public
opinion and its effect on bilateral relations.
Author: Jelena Cvetkovikj (Ss. Cyril and Methodius University)
Title: “The Name Issue and the Media”
Abstract: Examines the relationship between the name dispute and the media with a focus on
the media coverage before and after the 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest. It evaluates the
media’s role in (de)mystifying the name issue; providing (dis)information about proposals for
the resolution of the issue; the polarization of public opinion; and how the name issue has
contributed to (re)defining national identity.
Author: Detjon Gjocaj (Panteion University)
Title: “Albanian Immigrants in Greece and Their Perceptions and Views on the Macedonian
Issue”
Abstract: Assesses the attitudes of Albanians on the Macedonian issue and the disputes between
the Greek and the Macedonian states based on a survey of eight Albanian immigrants. The
paper traces the influence of Albanian and Greek nationalism and the extent to which Albanian
immigrants are affected by Greek nationalistic discourse, and vice versa.
7
Author: Ivan Ivanov (Ss. Cyril and Methodius University)
Title: “From Millet to Nation: Building on a Wrong Foundation?”
Abstract: Considers the Millet system during the Ottoman period, as a basis for coexistence and
religious tolerance between different religious groups. The paper discusses the historical
systems of nation building in Greece and Macedonia and explores how derivatives of the Millet
system could be a model for inclusion in European societies, with the aim of integrating
migrants and refugees.
Author: Anna Krinaki (Panteion University)
Title: “Broadcast Yourself: Village Fairs of Slavic Speakers of Greek Macedonia on YouTube”
Abstract: Studies folk songs sung in the Slavic language at village fairs in Greek Macedonia
through analysis of YouTube clips. Based on this footage, the paper assesses national identity
and the impact of language suppression by the Greek state. Some groups omit the Slavic lyrics
because they are trying to integrate these songs into the Greek tradition, while other groups seek
to highlight their Macedonian identity through these songs.
Author: Georgios Limantzakis (Panteion University)
Title: “Refugees of the Greek Civil War in Yugoslav Macedonia and the Contribution of ‘Aegean
Macedonians’ in its Nation Building Project”
Abstract: Examines the period during the Greek Civil War (1946-1949) when approximately
70,000 Greek and so-called Slavic Macedonians were forced to leave Greece, seeking refuge in
neighboring Yugoslavia and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. The paper explains the military
rationale for the deportation, tracing how this primarily humanitarian issue evolved into a
political issue. The paper also explores the relationship between refugees and Slavic Macedonian
Diaspora organizations in Australia, Canada and elsewhere, and their influence on the political
discourse on the Republic of Macedonia when it was part of Yugoslavia.
Author: Ivana Popchev (Ss. Cyril and Methodius University)
Topic: “The Status of Minorities in Macedonia and Greece”
Abstract: Considers relations between Macedonia and Greece within the context of minorities
in both countries. After defining “minority”, the paper outlines international legal instruments
on minority rights and the extent to which measures to protect and promote minority rights
have been adopted by both countries. It also analyzes the treatment of minority rights in the
constitutions and legislation of both countries, with emphasis on matters of ethnicity, religious
freedom, political participation and education.
Author: Dimitra Tsourou (Panteion University)
Title: “The Old Calendarists and the Macedonian Issue”
Abstract: Discusses the history and influence of the so-called Old Calendarists, a religious
minority in Greece that refused to comply with the Gregorian calendar. The paper looks at how
they were condemned by both the state church and the political authority in Greece. It explores
the link between the Old Calendarists and the Macedonian issue, as well as their persecution by
the Greek state beginning in the 1930’s and continuing through the Cold War.
8
Sponsoring Institutions
Institute for the Study of Human Rights (ISHR), Columbia University, New York, NY
Columbia University is one of the top academic and research institutions in the world,
conducting path- breaking research in medicine, science, the arts, and the humanities. It includes
three undergraduate schools, thirteen graduate and professional schools, and a school of
continuing education. Founded in 1754, it is the oldest institution of higher learning in the state
of New York and the fifth oldest in the United States. ISHR was the first academic center in the
world founded on an interdisciplinary commitment to the study of human rights. ISHR is also
renowned for bridging the study and practice of human rights on both a national and
international level. ISHR’s Program on Peace-building and Human Rights is an applied research
endeavor taking a comprehensive approach to peace-building through humanitarian assistance,
human rights, economic development, and political participation. Activities involve dialogue
initiatives, educational exchanges and curriculum reforms that reduce hostile perceptions, as
well as cooperative projects with practical social and economic benefits.
Ss. Cyril and Methodius University, Skopje, Republic of Macedonia
Ss. Cyril and Methodius University is the first state university in the Republic of Macedonia,
founded in 1949. The University is the largest and the highest rated in the Republic of
Macedonia. The University represents a functional community of 23 faculties, five research
institutes, four public scientific institutions, and associate members. The Ss. Cyril and Methodius
University develops study programmes in all scientific fields – natural sciences and
mathematics, technical and technological sciences, medical sciences and health, biotechnical
sciences, social sciences, humanities and arts. Research work also is carried out in the
independent research institutes as an integral part of the University. The Ss. Cyril and
Methodius University is determined to achieve the European norms and standards in all spheres
of its activities.
KENI (Research Center for Modern History), Athens, Greece
KENI belongs to the Political Science and History Department of Panteion University of Social
and Political Sciences. Its goals include the undertaking of historical research projects in
collaboration with other academic institutions in Greece and abroad, the organizing of relevant
conferences and lectures and the assembling of archive collections, both hard copy and digital.
Within the Centre operate four units: the Documentation and Study of Greek War of
Independence; the Study of Historical Culture; the Ottoman, colonial and post-colonial Studies;
the Documentation and Study of the Greek Press from the late 18th century and the History of
migrant and refugee movements. Panteion University bears the honor of being the oldest
University of Social and Political Sciences in Greece, founded in 1927, with a great contribution
to fostering and developing the social and political sciences in Greece.
9
Papers (In alphabetical order, without editing by Columbia University)
10
“Judges as Historians: The Macedonian Trials in the Early 1990’s”
By Yannis Aggelakis (Panteion University)
Abstract
The relation between historiography and the law has a historical background itself and has led to
heated debates among historians recently. A significant question emerges: Can a penal court
make a judgment on a historical issue? In a nationalist climate that dominated Greek society in
1991-1993 about the so-called “Macedonian issue”, three emblematic trials were held against
members of left-wing political groups for distributing a poster, a book and a leaflet respectively.
Their discourse, based on the notion of proletarian internationalism, questioned the official public
discourse of the Greek state, the vast majority of intellectual elite and the mass media and even
the “national historical truth and narration.” The aim of this paper is a brief examination of these
trials. The research is based on the study of the minutes of the court decisions. In all three cases,
the defendants were accused of committing three offences among which “dissemination of false or
erroneous information” and “inciting citizens towards acts of civil violence”. Among the defense
witnesses were left-wing members of parliament and known historians, who testified as expert
witnesses. History and the past were debated in the penal procedures: Was Macedonia “only one
and Greek”? Did the people of the neighboring country have the right of self-determination about
their name? If, as it is said, “Every juridical archive opens a window in the society of its time”,
the above trials are indicative of the exacerbation of nationalism that questioned the freedom of
expression.
Key words: Law and history, freedom of expression, Macedonian issue, left and national issue,
nationalism/internationalism
Prologue: Historians and judges
The relation between historiography and the law has been very close and has a historical
background itself. There are two different aspects of this extremely interesting issue, with various
strands that intersect: First the issue is going to be examined from the historian’s perspective:
i) The historian as a judge: Back in 1769, Griffet compared the historian to a judge that
examines carefully evidence and testimonies. The epistemological and methodological
similarities are obvious: the search for “facts as they really happened” (according to the famous
phrase by Ranke), is based on the evaluation and verification of clues, testimonies and above all
evidence. [1]
As the celebrated historian Carlo Ginsbourg, who has written the book “The Judge and the
Historian”, has put it: “evidence, like clue or proof, is a crucial word for both of them”. [2] Their
submission to the search of truth leads to another common characteristic: the need for
impartiality. Thus, for a long time, the historian passed for a sort of judge who had the duty to
impose moral judgments, either praises or convictions, upon dead protagonists of the past. This
“judicial” model in historiography was profoundly challenged by the Annales School and
especially its cofounder Marc Bloch, who pointed out the major difference that lies in their
purpose: the judge aims to make a decision, while the historian aims to understand and interpret.
[3] As Benjamin Stora says: “a historian looks for the explanation of historic events, a procedure that
11
never ends… He is not a judge with the jurisdiction to input in society an irrevocable judgment about the
past”. [4] 1
ii) The historian as an expert witness: In certain cases, historians are called by the court,
the prosecution or the defence to testify as expert witnesses in court proceedings, in order to
provide specialized knowledge on the historical context and fulfill the court’s need for
background information. In a well known case, the famous historian Richard Evans testified as
an expert witness in the trial of the Holocaust denier David Irving, who had brought a libel action
against professor Deborah Lipstand and her publisher for her book “Denying the Holocaust: The
growing assault on truth and memory”). Evans made a profoundly detailed research preparing his
testimony, that offered the ground for his book ”Telling lies about Hitler”, of which the first
chapter had the title “History on trial”. [5] Nevertheless, this task has also faced epistemological
critique, which has to do with elementary differences between the two disciplines: legal
categories such as innocence, guilt, perpetrator, victim or bystander, are more or less alien to
historians. In addition, legal rules of evidence and standards of proof are often rather different in
law and in history. The French historian Henry Rousso refused to serve as an expert witness in
the trial of Maurice Papon, a senior civil servant under the Vichy Regime who was accused for
ordering the imprisonment and deportation of Jews, with a similar reasoning: the historian’s
expertise is difficult to be accustomed to the rules and objectives of a judicial proceeding [6]
iii) The historian as a defendant: Historians, in a greater extent than might be expected,
find themselves ending up in the court with charges that have to do with their professional work.
A charge that they often face is that of defamation. [7] The issue in general is connected with the
freedom of expression, in its specific form of freedom of historical research.
Recently the issue was seriously debated in the Greek public discourse, historical and legal as
well, because of the trial of the German historian Heinz Richter about his book “Operation
Mercury: the invasion of Crete” on the battle of Crete in May 1941, on the grounds that he denied
the crimes of Nazism against the Cretan people with derogatory content. [8] He was accused of
violating a law that criminalized the denial not only of the Holocaust, but generally of genocides,
war crimes and crimes against humanity, provided that they were recognized as such by
international courts or the Greek parliament. This legislation had caused, when being introduced
in the parliament for vote, the reactions of many Greek historians who warned that it could lead
to the prosecution of scholars on their scientific work. Richter was finally cleared of the charges,
as the court acquitted him considering the above law as unconstitutional.
On the other hand, the relation between historiography and the law can be examined from
the judge’s perspective:
i) The judge as a historian: Luigi Ferrajoli epitomized this aspect of the issue, making an
extremely vivid analogy: “Every trial is a unique case of historiographic experiment”. During the
procedure that takes place in the courtroom, we see the sources acting de vivo while they are
cross examined. The judge who examines defendants and witnesses, acts like a historian who
cross examines evidence. [9]
See also B. Croce: “Those who, on the plea of narrating history, bustle about as judges, condemning here and
giving absolution there, because they think that this is the office of history…are devoid of historical sense”, cited in
E.H Carr, What is history (Middlesex: Penguin books, 1987): 77
1
12
ii) Memory laws: In the last two decades, there is a growing tendency of passing a
legislation on history and memory – the so called “memory laws”, which must be applied by
judges. The most significant example are the laws that criminalize the denial of the Holocaust.
There is also a recent tendency in some countries to criminalize the denial of violent acts that have
been characterized by the official historiography or the parliament as “genocides”. Often, this
legislation is dictated by a political use of history.
A series of “memory laws” has been legislated in France, already since 1990, with a law
that punished the denial of the Holocaust of the European Jews, along with other crimes against
humanity defined by the 1945 Nuremberg Tribunal. In 2001 the French Republic recognized the
genocide of Armenians and with another law recognized slavery as a crime against humanity. In
2005 a law prescribed that school curricula should recognize the “positive role” played by the
French presence overseas and especially in North Africa. [10]
In 2008, a severe critique against this legislative tendency was voiced by Eric Hobsbawm, Jacques
Le Goff, Pierre Nora and other prominent historians who signed the “Appel de Blois”, arguing
that “it is not the business of any political authority to define historical truth and to restrict the liberty of
the historian by penal sanctions.” [11]
This tendency of “judicialization of history” brings us before dramatic and at the same
time political questions: Who will decide which historical events count as genocides, crimes
against humanity or war crimes? As Evans asks: “Once the law starts dictating what may and what
may not be said about the past, who knows where the process of interference with history and historians
may end? ” [12]
iii) “Trials on history”: There are trials, whose objective is exclusively the memory of the
past, and finally history itself. The Nuremberg trial was described as “the greatest history seminar
ever held in the history of the world” [13]. In the 1980’s and 1990’s three significant “Holocaust trials”
were held in France (Klaus Barbie, Paul Touvier, Maurice Papon), whose objective was the Vichy
Regime and its contribution to the persecution of French Jews.
The most notable example in Greece is the recent decision of the Supreme Court (Areios Pagos)
to repeat the historic trial of the six political and military leaders who were considered as
responsible for the defeat of the Greek Army in Asia Minor and had been executed back in 1922.
In 2010 the Supreme Court acquitted them. [14] Justifiably this decision posed a significant
question in the public discourse: Could justice substitute the historian’s task? [15]
Thus, during such trials, whose - direct or indirect - objective is history, the judge has to evaluate
extra-judicial (historical in those cases) evidence, in order to decide on historical issues. In all the
above cases, significant issues emerge: First of all, can a historical debate or dispute become a
subject of legal interest and be introduced before a court? Can a penal court make a decision about
a historical issue? What is the judge’s attitude towards historical evidence? In what way is he
influenced by the political, ideological, social context of the timing during which the trial takes
place? Is the testimony of a historian as an expert witness important or even necessary for the
court?
In the trials on the “Macedonian issue”, that were held in Greece in the beginning of the
1990’s, many of the above aspects of the relation between history and law appeared : the direct
or implied objective of the trials was in a great degree history, judges had to decide on historical
issues, historians testified as expert witnesses, historical documents and books were presented to
13
the court by the defense solicitors, and in the most notable case (OSE’s trial), a book with a
historical, to a certain extent, content was in fact prosecuted.
The aim of this paper is a brief examination of these trials, whose objective was the
prosecution of expression of opinions that questioned the “national historical truth and
narration”. The research is based on the study of the minutes of the court’s decisions. 2
Introduction
The declaration of the independence of the Republic of Macedonia in 1991 triggered severe
reactions in Greece. For the next two years an almost Macarthian climate of nationalist hysteria
dominated Greek society about the so called “Macedonian issue” [16]. In February and in March
of 1992, hundreds of thousands of Greeks demonstrated, not only in Greece but also throughout
Europe, North America and Australia, against the recognition of the “Republic of Macedonia”
under this name by the European Communities. The public sphere was barraged with slogans
that proclaimed the greekness of Macedonia, such as “Macedonia was, is and will always be Greek”,
“Macedonia is Greece”, “No recognition of the Republic of Skopje under the Hellenic name Macedonia”.
Other slogans, such as «They steal our history”, “no to the falsification of history”, “learn history”,
depicted a notion of “crystallized history”, that should not be doubted, as it was considered a non
negotiable part of the national historical narrative [17].
In political terms, in those days the policy of the Greek right-wing government of “Nea
Demokratia Party” consisted of an ideological mix of neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism. [18]
The main party of the opposition, social-democratic “PASOK”, also fully supported the foreign
policy of the government on the Macedonian issue. The press reproduced the dominant
discourse, in absolute alignment with the policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to
the dominant political discourse, social conflicts and struggles, as well as different political
strategies, should be tossed aside, in the name of national unity towards the “national threat”.
Anyone (group or individual) who attempted to doubt this discourse, was excluded from the
public sphere (especially mass media), and the moral allegation of “traitor of the nation” was
attributed to them. As Skoulariki epitomizes the social and political developments of those days:
“The Macedonian issue was the symptom and, at the very same moment, the vehicle of the conservative
turn of the Greek society after 1989.” [19]
The reactions in the legal field
At first, an emblematic case was brought in Greek courts in the field of civil law: court decisions
in all degrees rejected the application of persons self-identified as members of the “Macedonian”
minority in Greek western Macedonia, to recognize their association under the name “Center for
the Macedonian culture”. Finally, the plaintiffs brought the case before the European Court of
Human Rights, which convicted Greece for violation of the freedom of association. The figure of
We must point out a problem, from a methodological aspect, which every researcher comes up with,
when studying juridicial archives and minutes of court decisions specifically: given that the minutes are
not recorded by tape, but handwritten by the court-clerk, what is finally written down is only what the
court-clerk considered as important. Thus, the research of such documents should be combined with
study of supplementary sources, such as the press.
2
14
the “judge as an historian” made its more illustrative appearance in the decision of the Appeals
Court of Thessaloniki in 1991: the judges devoted the larger part of their decision to a detailed
account of the Greek nationalist position on the Macedonian issue, based on the standard sources
of Greek historiography (mainly Andriotis, Kofos, and Sakellariou). The decision also included
references to Drousen’s “History of Alexander the Great”, Lemerle’s “Philippe et la macédoine
orientale” and even Polybius’ “Historias”. The court concluded that the Slav-Macedonian minority
in Greece did not exist “ethnologically” and should be denounced historically, so it rejected the
application of the association, considering it a vehicle for “spreading Slavic propaganda”. Thus,
the court, by referring to twenty-four titles of historical books which were proving the “greekness
of Macedonia”, had accepted that it was an “indisputable fact, known to everybody”. [20]
A series of criminal prosecutions against political groups and individuals that dissented
from the above “indisputable fact” was to follow. During 1992, penal procedures were held
against members of three far left-wing political groups and two more were held against
individuals. In all of them, the defendants had questioned the official public discourse on the
Macedonian issue – the discourse of the Greek state, as well as of the vast majority of intellectual
elite and the mass media. The three trials of the political groups were in fact “political trials” and
it was not a coincidence that members of left wing groups landed on the dock: a part of the Left,
mainly extra-parliamentary groups, was the only organized part of the political system that
dissented from the official public discourse. The parliamentary left did not dissociate itself that
loudly from the dominant nationalist discourse – especially the euro-communist party
Synaspismos. [21] This political strategy can be understood only in the light of the “trauma” that
had been caused to the leadership and the supporters of the left by the accusation “traitors of the
nation”, that was attributed to them since the Interwar Era. The position of the Communist Party
of Greece during the period 1924-1935 was based on the political strategy of Third International
(Comintern) and was epitomized with the slogan “unified and independent Macedonia and
Thrace”. 3 In the Greek Civil War (1946-1949), thousands of Slav-Macedonians participated on the
side of Democratic Army of Greece against the national Greek army, a fact that was exploited by
the propagandistic discourse of the other side. As a consequence, a severe legislation from 1947
until 1974 had outlawed the Communist Party of Greece, with the accusation, among others, of
organizing an attempt to detach a part of the Greek territory, namely Macedonia and Thrace.
The above trials had in fact to do with “offences” that in the legal theory are considered
as “opinion crimes”. What was more interesting about those penal procedures for the purposes
of this paper was that, in a great degree, history was on debate: Was Macedonia “only one and
Greek”, as the widespread and predominant in the public discourse, slogan claimed during those
turbulent days? Did the people of the neighboring state have the right of self-determination on
the name of their country, or did this right have limits? Was there a “Macedonian” minority in
Greece?
The charges were the same in all cases: by publishing their opinions by a poster, a book
and a leaflet respectively, the defendants were accused of committing three offences: exposing of
For the most balanced account of this heated issue from the perspective of the left see Papapanagiotou
Alekos, The Macedonian issue and the Balkan communist movement 1918-1939 (in Greek), (Athens: Themelio,
1992). For the opposite side, the national historiography’s perspective of the issue, see Kofos Evangelos,
Nationalism and communism in Macedonia, (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan studies, 1964)
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the international relations of the Greek state to danger (article 141 of Greek Penal Code), inciting
citizens towards acts of civil violence (article 192 of Penal Code) and disseminating false or
erroneous information, capable of causing concern or fear to civilians (article 191 of Penal Code).
The last one is the most interesting, from the aspect of legal theory, as it is argued by distinguished
law academics that “information” is not to include historical facts, because they belong to the
past. [22] All the above offences are considered to belong in the so called “political penal law”,
due to their potentially political dimension [23]. Thus, in the following “Macedonian trials”, the
prosecution was based on a part of the already existing “penal law arsenal.” There was no
application of any “memory law” or other legislation that would criminalize the denial of the
“greekness of Macedonia” - though that was the actual but indirect outcome in some of these
trials, as we will see. 4
The trials of the three political groups
1) The OAKKE Poster trial
In the first case, the defendants were members of the leftist political party named “Organization
for the reconstruction of the Communist Party of Greece” (OAKKE in Greek). The party had a
Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist political background, with additional theoretical references to Mao
Zedong. They were arrested in January 1992, for posting a poster in the streets of the centre of
Athens, with the slogans “No to chauvinism - Slavic Macedonia must be recognized”. The content of
the poster went on as following:
“[The government and the opposition] aim, to an alliance with irredentist Serbia, against Slavic
Macedonia. In every international encyclopedia and valid historiographic essay, we will find our
neighboring country to be named as Macedonia or Slavic Macedonia, or former Yugoslav Macedonia. The
people of that small country for centuries name themselves Macedonians and speak a distinguished
language, which they name Macedonian. At the same time, their leaders refuse any relation with ancient
Greek Macedonia and their constitution rejects any territorial claim against Greece. The demand of the
Greek bourgeoisie to change the name of that country is outrageous, fascist and warlike.”
After their arrest, the members of the group were immediately prosecuted in a trial, with
the three above mentioned charges, along with using offensive speech against the authorities and
also illicit posting. It is indicative of the circumstances in which the trial took place, that the
defense counsels made a request for the adjournment of the hearing because “the climate outside
the courtroom did not allow the orderly proceeding of the trial” – a request that was not granted by the
court. The defendants submitted to the court a written statement, in which they claimed that their
position for the recognition of the neighboring country under the name that its people want, was
dictated by the need for peace and democracy in the area. As such, their stance was deeply
patriotic - combined as it was, with their position that the Greek borders are beyond doubt and
they would defend them against any offensive. They concluded by “reminding the court that the
It should be noted though, that books with a content which is profoundly contrary to the dominant
discourse are published and circulate without any legal restriction. The most notable example is
Lithoxoou’s “Anti-Macedonian Struggle”, which even by its title doubts the celebrated by Greek national
historiography “Macedonian Struggle” of the beginning of the 20th century, reversing it to “AntiMacedonian”.
4
16
accusation ‘traitors of the nation’ that was attributed to communists is historically bankrupt, as it has been
proved by their participation in all the significant struggles for the social and national liberation of the
country.” 5
In the procedure, the international law professor Christos Rozakis was called by the court
to testify as an expert witness. He said that “we are ready to recognize Skopje if they withdraw the
Greek name... but admitted that “the term Macedonia was accepted, as part of the Yugoslav federation”.
Among the defense witnesses, were two left-wing Members of the European parliament: Michalis
Papagiannakis stressed the fact that, as several writers have argued, an alliance between Balkan
peoples would be fruitful. Also that the recognition of the neighboring country as “Yugoslav
Macedonia” would be a positive reconciliation, as even the Greek prime minister had referred to
it as ”Macedonia of Skopje”. Dimitris Dessylas claimed that the chauvinism of “our bourgeoisie”
should be denounced and that the right of the peoples of Yugoslavia to self-determination should
be respected. He emphasized the political content of the poster, and said that, as such, it should
be considered as expressing political criticism, which is protected by the freedom of speech.
The well-known left-wing historian and writer Angelos Elephantis claimed that the trial
was purely political, adding that in Europe no political group is brought to a court for expressing
its opinion and, referring to Voltaire’s famous phrase, said that although he disagrees with the
political opinions of the defendants, he would do anything to defend their right to express them.
He stressed the right of the neighboring people to name their country as they want, reminding
the court that “Macedonia of Skopje” was named “Macedonia” as a part of the Yugoslav
Federation and that in Europe, this country is already referred under this name, for instance in
the French newspaper “Liberation”. Yannis Tzanetakos, a known journalist of a centre-right
background, also said that “we had accepted the use of the name Macedonia, as long as it was a Yugoslav
republic”.
The documents that were presented to the court by the defense counsels included mostly
articles on the Macedonian issue by the Greek press, and also one historical book on Macedonia
and a Geography school book.
A defense counsel pointed out as a lesson from history, that political decisions and
strategies which, in some historical period were considered as “beneficiary for the Greek nation”,
were proved harmful and caused traumatic national disasters. He mentioned as examples, the ill
fated Asia Minor military campaign of 1919 that led to the “Catastrophe” of 1922 and the coup in
Cyprus in 1974 that led to the military intervention of Turkey. [24]
Finally, the court acquitted the six defendants for the other charges, but convicted them
for “attempt of inciting citizens towards acts of civil violence”, an offence that they committed
“in their attempt to achieve the aim of recognition of the region of the Yugoslav state that is inhabited by
‘Skopjians’ as an independent state under the name ‘Slavic Macedonia’ ” [the latter name is in quotation
marks]. The court’s decision, without references on historical evidence, focused on the use of the
name of Macedonia by “Skopje” (as it calls the newly independent country), the “appropriation”
of the name of a region of the Greek territory and the “confusion” it causes, about the “entitled
owner” of the name of Macedonia. In order to establish the defendants’ intention to commit the
For all the following see Athens First Instance Court, decision 7731A/1992. The minutes of the decision
are 121 pages long.
5
17
offence, the decision argues that: “The defendants, in their attempt to convince Greek citizens to show
solidarity to ‘Slavic Macedonia’, they develop a solid argumentation, since they mention that ‘In any
international encyclopedia, valid historiographic essays, we will find our neighboring country to be named
Macedonia or Slavic Macedonia, or formerly Yugoslav Macedonia’. The development of this argument is a
proof of their persistent attempt to achieve the purpose of the recognition of ‘Slavic Macedonia’.”
Thus, the reference of the poster to international encyclopedias and valid historiographic
essays on Macedonia – even though they are not named – provided for the court proof of the
defendant’s intention to commit the offense. Also, it must be pointed out that the court’s decision
uses quotation marks in the term Slavic Macedonia - contrary to the poster, where the term is
used without them – in order to delegitimize “Macedonian claims”. 6
It should be noted though that one of the judges had the opinion that they should be
cleared of the charge, referring to the ideology of the political group which was for peace and for
the right of the peoples to self-determination, concluding that they could not have the intention
to commit the offence as it was attributed to them. The defendant’s statement that they would
fight against any offensive “of Skopje” (as the judge names the neighboring country) against
Greece also contributed to the formation of his opinion.
2) The OSE’s book trial
In the second case, the defendants were members of a leftist political party named “Organization
for the Socialist Revolution” (OSE in Greek). They were prosecuted for writing and distributing
a book under the title “Crisis in Balkans, the Macedonian issue and the working class”. 7 The
members of the party were prosecuted in March 1992. The party had its political and theoretical
references to Leon Trotsky, and the book was written under the perspective of proletarian
internationalism, influenced by the political doctrine that the working class of each country
should fight against the bourgeoisie of “its own” country. The articles included in the book were
full of historical references, and even their titles were indicative of their author’s ideological
perspective: “National or class strategy?”, “No to chauvinism”, “Macedonian Issue: a new chauvinist
campaign”. Also, the book included an article written by Leon Trotsky back in 1910 on the First
Congress of the social-democratic parties of Southeastern Europe and its declared aim of the
foundation of a “Balkan Federative Republic”. An article by Pantelis Pouliopoulos, an intellectual
and former secretary of the Communist Party of Greece, written under the same perspective on
the “national issue” in 1928, was included too.8
For such a use of quotation marks see Danforth Loring, The Macedonian conflict (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1995): 32-33.
7 See OSE, Crisis in Balkans, the Macedonian issue and the working class, (in Greek) (Athens: Ergatiki
Dimokratia, 1992)
8 Pantelis Pouliopoulos was a defendant himself, among other leaders of the Communist Party of Greece
(KKE), in a famous trial back in 1925, charged with the offence of “attempt to detach a part of Greek
territory”. Though he himself disagreed with the position of his party that was epitomized with the slogan
“unified and independent Macedonia and Thrace”, he defended it standing on the dock in the courtroom,
during his plea, considering it as his revolutionary duty to defend publicly the party’s policy even though
he thought it was wrong. See Livieratos Dimitris, Social Struggles in Greece (1927-1931) (in Greek), (Athens:
Commune, 1987), 36.
6
18
Among the articles of the book, the following abstracts were considered by the public
Prosecutor as offensive: “The government’s foreign policy continues the partition of Macedonia after the
Balkan wars. There is a Macedonian minority, inside and outside of today’s Greek borders [...] The minority
in western Greek Macedonia is battered for decades by the oppression of the Greek state and their forced
hellenization as they are denied to speak their language [….] In the Balkan wars Macedonia was shared
between Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece. To what extent was the area of Macedonia, that was conquered by the
Greek army, ‘Greek’? 9 [Figures from 1906 and 1912 censuses follow] The policy that says that there is
no Macedonian nation, there is no Macedonian language, no Macedonian state, is like the policy of Turkish
generals that name Kurds as ‘mountain Turks’ […] The republic of Macedonia is not a fiction of Tito.”
The general prosecutor at first ordered an inquiry, by “examining competent servants of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, scientists, politicians, journalists, and even civilians, on the issue of the greekness of
Macedonia.” Nikolaos Martis, an ex right wing minister of Northern Greece and writer of a book
under the title “The falsification of Macedonian history”, testified that “Macedonian nation never
existed neither exists now, consequently neither a Macedonian minority in Greece. There was no partition
of Macedonia in 1913, Skopje never belonged to ancient Macedonia”. During the inquiry, Konstantinos
Plevris, ex leader of a neo-fascist group named “4th of August”, and Panayotis Psomiades, a
populist right-wing politician, were also summoned to testify as experts. Finally, a defendant
submitted a written statement, in which he claimed that the book is a critical review of the history
of the relations between Balkan countries and Greece and thus the charge against him was about
the expression of a political opinion.
The trial took place one year after, in May 1993 and the defendants faced the same as in
the above OAKKE trial charges of exposing the international relations of the Greek state to
danger, inciting citizens towards acts of civil violence and disseminating false or erroneous
information, capable of causing concern or fear to civilians. In the proceedings, a police officer
testified, that “Whatever the legitimate authorities of the state say, that is the [historical] truth”. 10
Among the defense witnesses, Nikos Alivizatos, a prominent professor of constitutional law, said
that “it is a historical book […] [it] belongs to an old political tradition, History has proved they were right
in their analysis […] It has been written by European historians that Macedonia was a salad [….] the
linguistic idiom and the linguistic minority in western Macedonia are objective facts [...] The mistreatment
of the minority took place in the Interwar era.”
Left-wing politicians such as Fotis Kouvelis, a member of parliament and Yannis Banias,
as well as liberal journalists such as Richardos Someritis and Yannis Tzanetakos, also testified
that the book had profound historical references, based on historical sources and that in Greek
Western Macedonia there was a linguistic minority. Dimitris Lithoxoou (an author of many books
and articles on the history of the area, though not a professional historian) referred to Greek Prime
Minister Harilaos Trikoupi’s statement back in 1880’s that “whoever dominates by arms Macedonia,
will make it ‘his own’, either Greek, or Bulgarian” and also to the 1903 Illinden uprising. Traianos
Passois, self-identified as a member of the Macedonian minority, testified about the
discriminations of the Greek state against the minority. Dimitris Livieratos, an author of a multiAccording to the indictment of the case (no 84147/1992), the authors, by using the quotation marks in the
term “Greek”, questioned the greekness of Macedonia.
10 For all the following, see Athens First Instance Court, decision 38098/1993. The minutes of the decision
are 102 pages long.
9
19
volume history of the working class in Greece, though not a professional historian, testified that
“the book is based on historical data […] the defendants gathered articles even from the Interwar era […]
they come from an old political tradition.”
One of the defendants in his plea, read in the court abstracts of the work of the famous
Marxist historian Giannis Kordatos and argued that there are historical references about the
minority, by the Greek Macedonian-fighter Konstantinos Mazarakis – Ainian.
The documents that were presented by the defense included a number of published
Censuses of the population in Macedonia, from the Ottoman era until the Greek state period, and
a famous work of Greek literature - Stratis Mirivilis’ celebrated novel “Life in the tomb” which
contains references on the issue. A copy of the primer “ABECEDAR” was also presented to the
court: it was a schoolbook written in Slavic and printed by the Greek state in 1925 for the Slavicspeaking members of the minority but was withdrawn soon after its circulation. Further on, a
biography of Paulos Melas who was a celebrated hero during the “Greek Struggle for Macedonia”
era and the famous Greek Encyclopedia “Pyrsos” of 1930’s which contained an entry on
Macedonia were presented to the court by the defense.
Finally, the court acquitted the defendants of all charges. According to the court’s decision
“by using the term Macedonian minority the defendants imply the existence of a group of Slavic-speaking
Greek citizens in western Macedonia that use several linguistic idioms (a mix of Bulgarian and Serbian,
with many Albanian, Turkish and Greek words)[…] Naming the Slavic-speaking Greek citizens as a
Macedonian minority is a product of the defendants’ false opinion and fanaticism […] The existence of a
group of Slavic-speaking Greek citizens in western Macedonia is assured by many historians in several
essays and by Greek encyclopedias, as well as by an official document of 1982 by the Ministry of Public
Order (a report in which it was mentioned that “the linguistic idiom of Skopje is broadly used by native
residents of the area of Florina and Edessa, even by civil servants, […] in many occasions they perform
dances publicly and sing songs in the idiom and music of Skopje …”).
The court’s decision concluded on the charge of dissemination of false information: “Τhe
fact that the ‘Macedonian minority’ is oppressed, is officially repeated for decades even from political parties
in the Greek parliament […] All these do not consist of ‘information neither rumors’, but facts of the past.“
Concerning the result of the court’s decision, we should point out the importance of timing: the
trial took place in May 1993, when the political and ideological conditions in Greek society had
changed to some extent. For example, Virginia Tsouderou, under-secretary of the ministry of
Foreign Affairs had claimed in an interview, that the prosecution was a mistake, due to the
supererogation of a police officer. What was even more important perhaps is that a movement of
solidarity to the defendants, not only in Greece but also abroad, had grown 11 : famous academics
and writers such as Noam Chomsky, Benedict Anderson, Ralph Milliband, Paul Sweezy, Harry
Magdoff, James Petras, Alex Callinicos and members of the British House of Commons such as
Tony Benn, Jeremy Corbin had signed, among others, several petitions in favor of the defendants
and the book was published in English. [25]
The public Prosecutor appealed the court’s decision, but the appeal was never brought in the
The main defense counsel in the trial Dimitris Zotos pointed out the importance of the solidarity
movement (interview to the author of the paper, 18-10-2016).
11
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courtroom, because of a law that ceased the prosecution for crimes committed through press.
3) The AAS leaflet trial
In the third case, four members of the Antiwar Antinationalist Group (AAS in Greek) were
prosecuted in April 1992 on the same as above charges. The group had been founded earlier that
year by already existing leftist and Trotskyite groups and individuals, in order to express
politically their opposition to Greek nationalism. [26] They were arrested for distributing in the
centre of Athens a political leaflet with the title “Neighboring peoples are not enemies – say no to
nationalism and to war”. The leaflet had the following content:
“No to the warlike atmosphere with Former Yugoslav Macedonia. The aggressive and racist attitude
towards the neighboring people - under the excuse of its name, which they have used for half a century must stop. These people have the right to their national self-determination. It’s a shame to accept the
continuing economic embargo of the neighboring country, as well as several militant voices that call for a
military invasion in it [….] We should not accept any territorial expansion proposed by the chauvinist
headquarters, in any country might they be. They want us to get furious when somebody in Skopje makes
nationalist statements, but at the same time to applaud when even worse declarations are made in Athens
and Thessaloniki [….] It’s a shame to oppress and batter the minorities, in the name of national unity and
purity. We refuse to accept the ridiculous ‘national argument’ that all nationalists are outside Greece, and
in our country there are only patriots”.
The trial took place a few days after their arrest. Among the defense witnesses was the
well known professor of history Antonis Liakos, who testified that the content of the leaflet is
based on a perception of cooperation with the neighboring Balkan peoples and is an expression
of criticism that should be protected by the freedom of speech. 12 Tasos Kostopoulos, a journalist
and writer who has been engaged with the issue for many years, pointed out that the whole leaflet
is the opposite of the alleged “exposing of the international relations of the Greek state to danger”
and also that it does not contain any “false information”.
Other defense witnesses included two left wing politicians, Fotis Kouvelis, a member of
Parliament and Dimitris Dessylas, a member of European parliament, who also testified in the
aforementioned trials and they emphasized to the right to political criticism. The latter stressed
the fact that “there are four ‘Macedonias’ one of them being Greek”, referring to the Treaty of
Bucharest in 1913. Another defense witness was Giorgos Papandreou, a prominent member of
the social-democratic opposition party PASOK, who was to become a prime minister in 2009, who
referred to Voltaire and the right to disagree. He added that it is difficult to say what is true on
this issue and that in the cafes of the countryside people sometimes express their opinion on the
issue using a harsher language, in comparison to the content of the leaflet.
The documents that were presented to the court by the defense counsels included mostly
articles on the Macedonian issue by the Greek press, and also a historical book on Macedonia that
was distributed by the Ministry of Education in schools all over Greece in 1992.
In a book he wrote later, Liakos mentioned that it was said in the courtroom by the judges or the
prosecutor that “history is one and only”, (this was not written down in the minutes of the court’s decision,
a problem that we pointed out above). See Liakos Antonis, “The Balkan crisis and nationalism”,
Elephantis A. et. al, The Janus of nationalism and Greek policy on Balkans (in Greek), (Athens: Vivliorama,
2007): 25.
12
21
Finally, the court found the defendants guilty for all three charges. The court’s decision
did not contain any specific reasoning, but simply reproduced the indictment with the standard
phrase: ”the facts were proven”. 13
The trials of individuals:
4) The Sidiropoulos and Boulis’ interview case
Christos Sidiropoulos and Tassos Boulis, members of the minority in Greek western Macedonia,
were prosecuted for an interview in a magazine in March 1992, where they claimed, among
others, that “they are not Greeks but Macedonians and they have a Macedonian national consciousness”.
The charges against them were two: dissemination of false information and inciting citizens
towards acts of civil violence.
In the trial, the defense presented to the court Stratis Mirivilis’ novel “Life in the tomb”
and a book about Paulos Melas. Among the defense witnesses was the known historian Aggelos
Elephantis, who referred to the precise figures of the population of Greek Macedonia stated in
the official censuses of the Greek state in 1928 and in 1951. He also stressed the severe measures
that the Greek state took against the Slav-speaking minority. In his plea the first defendant said
that “the minority did not aim at the creation of a separate state” and the second claimed that the
only reason for which he was brought to the court is that he was a Macedonian.
The court found them guilty on “disseminating false information about the non- greekness of
Macedonia and the existence of a Macedonian minority that has not been recognized.“ 14 The trial took
place in an atmosphere of fear, due to reactions of far-right extremists, as the defense counsel
Ioanna Kourtovik recalls in a well-documented article on the attitude of the Greek judicial system
towards the minorities in Greece. [27]
5) The M.P’s leaflet case
M.P., a young student, was arrested while distributing leaflets during the demonstration in favor
of “the greekness of Macedonia” that took place in Athens in December 10, 1992. In the leaflets it
was written: “Don’t consume nationalism. Alexander the Great was a war criminal. Macedonia belongs
to its peoples. There are no nations, we are all of mixed descent”
According to the indictment, their content was against the nation (“anti-Greek”, a post
Civil-war term that belongs to a “penal law of the enemy”). In the trial, the prosecution witness
(a civilian that arrested the defendant) testified “I don’t know if Alexander the great killed peoples, in
my school history I didn’t learn that he was a war criminal.” Nevertheless, he added – probably
answering to a defense counsel’s question – that “every historian has the right to express his opinion”.
In this trial there were no historians or politicians as expert witnesses. A defendant’s friend,
testifying as a defense witness, emphasized to the fact that the content of the leaflet cannot be
penalized. The defendant claimed in his plea that the leaflets were antinationalist and their
content was historical, referring to the peoples that were subject to the rule of Alexander the
Great. The student was convicted for inciting citizens towards acts of civil violence… 15
Athens First Instance Court, decision 36303/1992. The minutes of the decision are 27 pages long.
Athens First Instance Court, decision 27745/1993.
15 Athens First Instance Court, decision 93130/1992
13
14
22
Interlude on “Looking glass nationalisms” 16 and internationalism
One of the decisive factors that influenced and even triggered the above penal procedures was
the broadly nationalist ideological atmosphere that dominated Greek political system and the
vast majority of the Greek society. It has been argued on solid ground though, that opposite
nationalisms in general tend to feed and fuel each other and the Macedonian issue was not an
exception. The campaign for the “greekness of Macedonia”, focused as it was on the legacy of
antiquity, contributed to a great extent to the outbreak of the opposite nationalism.[28]
Nationalist declarations made in Skopje after the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008 seem to
justify a posteriori Athens’ choices, almost in terms of a self-fulfilling prophecy. [29] As a result,
a climate of nationalist hysteria dominated the political system in Republic of Macedonia/Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia too, especially through the construction of monuments of
Alexander the Great and Philip and by giving their names in cities, streets and airports. [30] Even
more recently, the “Skopje 2014 project” has drawn reasonable criticism, since it fabricates a new
Macedonian identity through the construction of monuments that give prominence to a Christian,
western-European, baroque city, excluding at the same time any trace of Muslim and communist
presence. [31]
As Eric Hobsbawm already back in 1992 pointed out, the past is an essential element,
probably the essential element in nationalist ideologies. Referring specifically to the dispute over
the Macedonian issue, he stressed that the ideological abuse of history, based on anachronism,
became a common locus for both sides. [32] The anthropologist Loring Danforth in his work on
the Macedonian conflict discusses the issue in terms of examining the conflicting claims to
“Macedonian” identity and history (including the name “Macedonia” itself, symbols, ancient
heroes etc). He emphasizes especially on the dispute over the meaning: who will control the
meaning of the word “Macedonian”? By presenting accounts of Greek and Macedonian positions
on the Macedonian question, he deconstructs both nationalist versions of Macedonian history,
pointing out the paradox of them being very much alike in significant ways: they both depict
“their” nations as “natural, homogeneous and bounded entities that posses unique and mutually exclusive
identities, cultures, histories and territories.” [33]
By examining the above penal cases, we derive the conclusion that it was no coincidence
that members of left wing political groups were prosecuted. A part of the left, mainly extraparliamentary, was the only part of the organized political scene that intervened in the public
space and raised its voice against the nationalism of “its own” country, doubting national unity
and national consensus. These political groups stood for the right of the neighboring people to
self-determination, as well as for the defense of the minority rights in Greek western Macedonia.
This political position had its origins in the political doctrine and strategy of internationalism,
from the perspective and in defense of the proletariat’s interests. [34] In the Balkans radical
federalism goes back in the nineteenth century. In 1865 a “Democratic Oriental Federation” was
founded in Belgrade, in the line of Saint Simon’s federalism and influenced by the socialist ideas
According to the term that Karakasidou uses, naming the different national narratives on the
Macedonian issue as "looking glass histories" , pointing out that "the arguments of national elites in the
FYROM are often no less essentialist or primordial than Greek, Bulgarian, or Serbian counter-claims",
see Karakasidou Anastasia, Fields of wheat, hills of blood, (Chicago and London: university of Chicago press,
1997): 14, 17
16
23
of Karl Marx and Mikhail Bakunin, followed by the foundation in 1894 of the “League for the
Balkan Confederation”. In 1910 the First Congress of the social-democratic parties of Southeastern
Europe was held in Belgrade, in which delegations from Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey,
Montenegro and Macedonia participated. Its declared political aim was the foundation of a
“Balkan Federative Republic” that would ensure the right of every population to its political and
national unity, in a multicultural and multinational society, against the class exploitation of the
ruling Balkan bourgeoisies. [35]
The above Congress was the subject of Leon Trotsky’s article that was reproduced in the
book, which in fact had been the “defendant” in the above examined OSE trial. All those political
ideas, as well as the doctrine that the duty of each country’s working class is to fight against the
nationalism of “its own” bourgeois class, were part of the “old political tradition” that some
defense witnesses spoke of in the OSE trial. 17
Conclusion
The most obvious legal dimension of the above trials was the extraordinary violation of the
freedom of expression. It was the first time in Greece, after the fall of the colonel’s dictatorship in
1974, the fundamental and protected by the Greek constitution, freedom of expression was
endangered to such an extent. [36] In July 1993, the Helsinki Watch published a report under the
title “Free speech on trial”, referring to the above cases [37]. What was especially significant from
the legal aspect, is that an extremely negative precedent against the freedom of expression was
established [38]. Its specific dimension that is crucial for historians was the violation of the
freedom of expressing an alternative interpretation of historical facts and questioning the “truth
of the national historiography”. These historical issues were the history of Macedonia, the name
of the neighboring country, the minority in Greek western Macedonia.
Another significant characteristic of the aforementioned trials is the use and evaluation of
historical evidence. If, as it has been said, «Every trial is a unique case of historiographic experiment»,
this was almost actual in some of the above cases. In order to form a judgment, in the above cases,
the court evaluated historical documents that were presented by defense solicitors and the
testimonies of historians as expert witnesses. The defense witnesses included left-wing
politicians, as the political dimension of the trials was obvious, and also historians and authors
of historical books. The extent to which this extra-judicial historical evidence was used by defense
and evaluated by the court was different in each case: significant in the OSE trial, noteworthy in
OAKKE trial, minimal in ΑΑS and Sidiropoulos/Boulis case and non-existing in M.P case.
Finally, there was also an “opposite” historical dimension of the trials : the judge’s
influence by timing: The research of court decisions often reveals their historical dimension, in
the specific aspect of their influence by - and even dependence on - the historical context during
which the trial takes place. [39] Indeed, the above mentioned “Macedonian trials” are cases in
Given that one of the fundamental differences between the judge and the historian is that among the
tasks of the latter is to set questions rather than to make a decision, we can’t resist the temptation to wonder
if in a certain historical context, a book written by Trotskyites in the Republic of Macedonia/Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia against the nationalism of “their own” bourgeois class would be
prosecuted… Not to mention, if it was for a student distributing leaflets claiming that “Alexander the Great
was a war criminal” under the monument of Alexander in Skopje…
17
24
which the court decisions were not dictated so much by the text of the law, as by its interpretation
that was profoundly influenced by the political, social and ideological circumstances of the
certain era. It is indicative that the only court’s decision that acquitted the defendants (OSE case)
was in a trial that was held one year after the alleged act – when the climate of nationalist hysteria
had retreated to a certain extent (as Tsouderou’s statements indicated) and an international
movement of solidarity had grown.
The fact that the judges of the Supreme Court participated in the demonstrations in favor
of the greekness of Macedonia is indicative of the judge’s attitude on Macedonian issue in general.
Furthermore, the President of the Supreme Court on December 10, 1992 issued a circular asking
all the judges to adjourn the court sessions in that day, so that they, as well as the court-clerks,
could participate in the demonstration. [40] In that case, judges acted not as historians, but as
partisan advocates of the national historical truth, reproducing the dominant ideology.
As Pierre Bourdieu has written “justice is not the midwife but the registrar of history”. [41] If,
as it is said, “Every juridicial archive opens a window in the society of its time” [42], the prosecution of
the defendants and the above examined trials are ad hoc historical documents of the exacerbation
and the delirium of nationalism that dominated Greek society in those days.
Acknowledgements
I would like to express my gratitude to the historian Leonidas Embiricos for our long discussions
upon a vast variety of themes and to the attorney at law Dimitris Zotos, who was the main defense
counsel in the OSE trial and provided me access to the record of the case, in which the documents
of the inquiry were also included.
References
[1] Ginzburg Carlo, The judge and the historian (in Greek), (Athens: Nefeli, 2003) 21-24
[2] Ginzburg Carlo, “Checking the evidence: the judge and the historian”, Critical Inquiry. V. 18,
n. 1 (1991): 79
[3] Bloch Marc, The historian’s craft, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992) 114-119
[4] Cited in Kokkinos “The dynamics of memory and oblivion in the public sphere and the
memory laws in France”, in Kokkinos, Lemonidou, Agtzidis, Trauma and politics of memory, (in
Greek) (Athens: Taxideutis, 2010) 124
[5] Evans Richard, Telling lies about Hitler, (London-New York: Verso, 2002) 7-43
[6] Evans Richard, “History, memory and the law: the historian as expert witness”, History and
Theory 41, (October 2002):330-339
[7] De Baets Antoon, “Defamation cases against historians”, History and Theory 41, (October 2002):
346-366
[8] For the debate about Richter’s trial, see among others, Avdella Effie “Memory laws and the
historians: the European experience”, (in Greek), Avgi, 28-2-2016
[9] Ginzburg Carlo, The judge and the historian, (in Greek), (Athens: Nefeli, 2003): 28, 48
[10] Kokkinos, ibid. : 100-123
[11] Garton Ash Timothy, “The freedom of historical debate is under attack by the memory
police”, Guardian 16-10-2008, Avdella Effie, ibid
[12] Evans Richard, ibid: 342, 344
25
[13] Evans Richard, ibid: 331
[14] Supreme court (Areios Pagos), decision 1675/2010
[15] Ios (independent group of journalists), (in Greek) Eleftherotypia, 13-2-2010
[16] Kostopoulos Tasos, The forbidden language, (in Greek), (Athens, Vivliorama, 2008): 320-321
[17] Liakos Antonis, How the past becomes history? (in Greek),(Athens: Polis, 2007): 161-163
[18] Liakos Antonis, “Balkan crisis and nationalism”, Elephantis et al. Janus of nationalism and
Greek policy on Balkans, (in Greek), (Athens: Vivliorama, 2007): 22
[19] Skoulariki Athina, “The Macedonian crisis and the interaction of the nationalisms”, (in
Greek), Epohi, 25-10-2009
[20] Appeals Court of Thessaloniki, decision 1558/1991, Nomiko Vima 40 (1992):894-898. See also
Danforth Loring, The Macedonian conflict (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995) : 128-129
[21] Elephantis Aggelos, “The Macedonian issue: from the nationalist exacerbation to the
margin”, Elephantis A. et al., The Janus of nationalism and Greek policy on Balkans (in Greek) (Athens:
Vivliorama, 2007): 34-35
[22] Manoledakis Ioannis, Crimes against public order (in Greek), (Athens: Sakkoulas, 1992): 216217
[23] Papaharalambous Haris, “The structure of political penal institutions under Penal law and
Penal Code” (in Greek), in Poinika Chronika, v. MH (1998): 443
[24] “The oratories of the defense counsels”, (in Greek), Nea Anatoli, 156, 5-2-1992 [25] For an
account of the solidarity movement see OSE, Crisis in Balkans, the Macedonian issue and the working
class, (in Greek) (Athens: Ergatiki Dimokratia, 1992, 3rd edition): 70-78
[26] Vovou Sissy, ”The left in front of the Macedonian issue after 1989”, (in Greek), Epohi, 25-102009
[27] Kourtovik Ioanna, “Justice and minorities”, in Tsitselikis Konstantinos -Christopoulos
Dimitris (ed), The phenomenon of minorities in Greece, (in Greek) (Athens: Kritiki, 1997): 265
[28] Skoulariki Athina, “Macedonism and other demons”,(in Greek), Kyriakatiki Eleftherotypia, 163-2008.
[29] Skoulariki Athina, “The Macedonian crisis and the interaction of the nationalisms”, (in
Greek), Epohi, 25-10-2009
[30] Vasilev Kire, “Some data on Macedonian nationalism”, (in Greek), Epohi, 25-10-2009
[31] Mattioli Fabio, “Dreaming the privatized Skopje”, Nitsiakos Vassilis et al., Balkan Border
crossings, Third annual of the Konitsa Summer School (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2014):121-122
[32] Hobsbawm Eric, On history, (London: Abacus, 1998): 6-9
[33] Danforth Loring, The Macedonian conflict (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995): 4-6,
28-56
[34] For a history of the notion of internationalism, see Anderson Perry, “Internationalism: A
breviary”, New Left Review 14 (2002): 5-25
[35] Koutalis Vaggelis, “Internationalism as an alternative political strategy in recent Balkan
history”, (in Greek) (Paper presented at the Greek Social Forum, Thessaloniki, June 2003),
available in
http://www.okde.org/keimena/vag_kout_balkan_inter_0603_en.htm (date of access 17-10-2016)
[36] Kostopoulos Tasos, ibid: 19.
[37] Helsinki Watch, “Greece: Free speech on trial: government stifles dissent on Macedonia”(July
26
1993)
[38] Kourtovik Ioanna, ibid: 279
[39] Avdella Effie, “The court decisions as documents of their era”, (in Greek), paper presented
in
the
National
Faculty
of
Judges,
(April
2016)
available
in
http://www.esdi.gr/nex/images/stories/pdf/epimorfosi/2016/AvdelaDikastes%20kai%20istorikoi.pdf (date of access 17-10-2016)
[40] Kourtovik Ioanna, ibid: 272
[41] Bourdieu Pierre, “ The force of law: data for a sociology of the legal field”, (in Greek), The
Greek Review of Social Research, 72 (1989): 29
[42] Kousouris Dimitris, The Collaborators’ trials 1944-1949 (in Greek), (Athens: Polis, 2014): 29
27
“Blind Sides of National Histories: Reconciliation between Macedonia
and Greece”
By Sara Al-Bander (Ss. Cyril and Methodius University)
Abstract
This paper explores the nature of national conflicts, the nature of national identity and genocide.
It explains how Mankind evolved from Stateless societies to the Nation – state. Further, it shows
how the birth of Romantic nationalism, led to the theories about racial supremacy which were
the basis for the Holocaust over the Jews. The link between national myths and genocide is
explained. This is done by two examples. The first is the myth of Heavenly Serbia and how it led
to the wars in the areas of former Yugoslavia, and the second are the “Protocols of the Elders of
Zion” and the Stab – In – The – Back – Myths and their contribution for the most extreme genocide
in human history. The last part focuses on the history of the relations between ethnic
Macedonians and Greeks and the reconciliation between Macedonia and Greece.
Keywords: national conflict, national identity, city – state, Feudal state, national state, Nation –
state, Romantic Nationalism, genocide, Heavenly Serbia, Stab – In – The – Back – Myth, naming
dispute between Macedonia and Greece
1. Introduction
"Peace is not the absence of conflict, but the presence of creative alternatives for responding to conflict.'' Dorothy Thompson
This sentence sums up the whole concept of conflict, because it defines it but also it offers
a solution for it. Maybe it doesn’t give a universal definition of conflict but it describes the
relations of all Balkan states, because in the Balkan Peninsula there isn't a state which doesn't
have any conflicts with any of its neighbouring countries. Yes, Macedonia and Greece are not in
war with each other but the objective reality is that in their relations a deep conflict is rooted or
as Dorothy Thompson says there is an absence of creative alternatives for responding to conflict.
The Greek-Macedonian conflict has very in common with all other Balkan conflicts - it spans in
decades of time, both sides claim that they are 100% right, both sides have completely opposite
interpretation of all historic periods concerning their inter-relations, and most importantly like in
all other Balkan conflicts the only thing that is harder than solving the problem is answering the
question - when and why this conflict appeared in the first place? What is the root cause? Which
event in history triggered this conflict? Even the historians in the concerned countries don't have
a unanimous answer to these questions.
The reality with Macedonia and Greece is the same. The historic facts are not crucial in
the very process of conflict solving, but they are crucial for understanding the conflict – the only
true way of solving the conflict. If we try to get to the very core of this conflict it is easy to say
when was this conflict retriggered in modern times. In fact, one can’t say that this conflict even
stopped. It was just an ongoing silent conflict from the end of the Greek Civil War in 1949 until
1991 when Macedonia declared its independence from Yugoslavia.
If someone wants to find a solution not just to the Greek-Macedonian some complicated
28
question must answered. What makes people live, die and kill in the name of nations? What
makes people subjugate by the price of universal extinction to a concept of as Benedict Anderson
calls it an Imagined Community? Although Benedict Anderson himself could relate the roots of
nationalism as far as to the spreading of the printing press, the answers to these questions lay
mostly in the XVIII century when in Europe the most enduring legacy of Romanticism was born
– Romantic Nationalism.
2. The key concepts of national identity and nationalism
“In an anthropological spirit, then, I propose the following definition of the nation: it is an imagined
political community - and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is imagined because the
members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear
of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.”(Imagined Communities: Reflections
on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism – Benedict Anderson (1983), p.6)
Although when a classification of Anderson’s explanations and views of nationalism is
made it is clear that they can be classified as the Anti – colonial, this definition of the concept of
the Nation – State and its history is rather universal. That is because its premise is true – none
person from any nation can personally know every fellow – member from his or her nation and
yet some persons in any given period in history is willing to die and kill in the name of those
people which he or she have never heard about.
This leaves us with a seemingly unexplainable situation. How did the state evolved from
its birth in antiquity in its original formas a city state (Sumerian cities Uruk and Ur; Ancient
Egyptian city – states Thebes and Memphis; the Phoenician cities Tyre and Sidon; the poleis of
ancient Greece such as Athens, Sparta, Thebes and Corinth; the Roman Republic which grew
from a city – state to an empire; the Mayan and pre – Columbian Mesoamerica Chichen Itza, Tikal,
Monte Alban and Copan) to its current form a nation – state where the Westphalian sovereignty
based on territoriality is derived from the legitimacy based on the cultural entity of a nation.
2.1 From City – State to Nation – State – a brief history of the national identity phenomena
There is a big irony in the national identity phenomena. That irony is that even the concepts of
division of labour, customs and laws which preceded the concept of national identity are very
new for mankind.
“For 99.8 percent of human history people lived exclusively in autonomous bands and village” (Origins of
the State: The Anthropology of Political Evolution – Robert Carniero (1978), p.219)
That means that mankind has lived in “stateless societies” where there wasn’t a concentrated
authority that had political or economic power for 99.8 percent of its existence which leaves us
with the strange fact that the state actually had existed only 0.2 percent of the human history
(recorded and non recorded).
Out of those stateless societies and communities the first complex societies emerged.
According to the archaeological evidence this happened when agriculture developed and a quite
large population (tens of thousands of people) started living together in a certain territory. During
the Neolithic period human societies underwent major changes – sedentary agriculture
developed, property rights appeared, for the first time in history domestication of plants and
animals took place, and a more sophisticated division of labour appeared. But during this period
29
there wasn’t a state. Although complex societies and sedentary agriculture developed those
societies weren’t stratified and centralized - the purpose of their complex structure was defence
of the territory on which that tens of thousands of people practiced agriculture.
“A primary characteristic of Mesopotamian societal structure appears to have been the absence of
any non – economic status stratification, if one disregards the unique status of the king and excludes the
slave population that was at times rather small and in private hands.” (Ancient Mesopotamia – Portrait of
a Dead Civilization – A. Leo Oppenheim (1964), p.74)
Mesopotamia is the earliest civilization which had cities – states, almost fully developed
division of labour; certain concentration of wealth; division of its citizens according to classes;
trade; architecture and standardized forms of science, mathematics, art and literacy; and the first
laws.
The Mesopotamian civilizations did have a certain level of state organisation and a
centralized government that standardized literacy, science and art but they authority mainly
justified its legitimacy using religious myths and didn’t have clearly built political institutions.
The first time in history when a true state was built was in the period of classical antiquity. The
Greeks were one of the first civilizations that functioned around their city – states, but they were
the first civilization in history that had a state policy that wasn’t coming just from religious myths
and the so called divine rights of kings but originated from an explicitly formulated political
philosophy of the state which political institutions whose actions were justified through this
specific philosophy. But this wasn’t the only political innovation of classical antiquity which came
from the Greek city – states. The Greek city – states for the first time in human history guaranteed
citizen rights to the male free population. Athens went even further – beside the fact that they
granted they citizens citizenship rights they gave them the right to participate directly in the
Direct Democracy that was their form of governance. These concepts were taken over later by the
Roman Republic.
Although these ideas died out after the downfall of Greece and Rome and the subsequent
decline of Western civilization and Western thought during the Dark ages during the
Enlightenment era the concept of democracy and unalienable rights got their deserved afterlife,
which made the Western civilization the first civilization in human history that granted its
citizens rights and that had institutions which actions were grounded on a specific political
philosophy.
After the decline of Western civilization after the fall of Rome in 476 A.D Europe started
sinking in the Dark Ages. For 1000 years until the birth of the Renaissance in the 14 th century all
the states of Europe were based on feudalism. The political philosophy of Feudal society was
based on strict social hierarchy and on the relation king – lord – vassal. In the feudal states there
wasn’t a highly standardized national identity because the culture in Europe was not secular and
was strictly controlled by the Catholic church. The national identity of the states was not linked
with the specific cultural entity of a state but with religious identity.
When we analyze the history of the nation – state we see that it very easy to conclude two
things. Firstly, the concept of the nation – state is not the same with the concept of national states
and secondly although they are not the same the nation – state is a historical product of the
national state and of the printing press which for the first time in human history gave the
authorities a mean through which they will built a single cultural entity of the nation using the
30
mass media (in the birth of the national state and later in the nation – state this were primarily
newspapers, pamphlets and books). In fact, most historians agree that the birth of national
identity lies in the invention of the printing press by Johannes Gutenberg in 1440.This contributed
to the development of map – making, cartography, political geography, which gave means to the
states to establish determining of the state and the ethnic borders. The growing number of
editions that were printed in Europe (20000000 books in Europe by 1500)was leading to a situation
where the market had to be opened to readers which weren’t bilingual (didn’t speak Latin). Latin
was slowly dying out of the intellectual stage of Europe which led to two major developments.
Firstly the Catholic Church lost its last remaining monopoly of knowledge in a situation when it
had already party lost the control over science and through the Reformation of Martin Luther it
lost the religious monopoly it held with centuries over Western Europe. And secondly this cleared
the space for the rise of national languages which prior to this were considered as inferior to Latin.
This played an important role from the 16th century until the 19th century when most European
countries accepted the French model of a nation – state. Before the French Revolution in 1789
states in Europe were multi-ethnic empires –Kingdom of France, the Russian Empire, the
Ottoman Empire – that were ruled by a emperor, king or a sultan. The importance of the French
Revolution is in its sparking of nationalism across Europe and the creation of the modern French
nation - state. This was preceded by several significant historic events – the printing press which
strengthened the cultural entity of the nations and helped in the breaking of the monopoly over
knowledge that the Catholic Church held in Europe for centuries and most important enabled to
most people that until that point lived in small villages and didn’t cared for anything beyond
their village to become literate and by that to become a part of the cultural life of their nations; in
1485 Henry VII won the War of the Roses in England, began the Tudor dynasty and started the
growth of the English nation – state; in 1648 the Peace of Westphalia cemented the characteristics
of the sovereignty and the legal status of the nation – state. Although the nation – state gave birth
to nationalism which was one of the primary causes for many military and non – military conflicts
it gave at least one crucial development for nations – it helped society to rise up from the tribal
level of thinking by creating a standardized cultural entity and by spurring innovations and
bigger participation in advancements for technology as more Nation States fought for control of
more territory in the 18th and the 19th century. But because it did this by using nationalism it had
deadly effects for the states of the 20th century.
2.2 How romantic nationalism cemented the concept of national identity and created a new
kind of nationalism?
Romanticism was one of the most contradictory intellectual movements in European cultural
history. It united liberalism and radicalism. Its most positive feature was its liberalism –the
glorification of liberty and the importance of one’s individual liberties and place in history. It
broke one of the most successful products of the Middle Ages – marriage. If the Renaissance and
humanism proved that for our Earthly life the centre of our universe should be us humans and
that we as conscious beings should take control over our lives, Romanticism broke the millennia
old concept that marriage is linked with practical gains. For the first time in modern history one’s
feelings were more important than the practical aspect of a relationship which highly advanced
the concepts of individual liberty. But the most troubling part of romanticism is its radical part.
31
A significant part of the Romantic ideology was the glorifying of war, glorifying the Middle Ages
when war was everyday life and knights were dying gloriously in battles during the Crusades,
yearning for something that will never be back – the past when people were living in the village,
were melted with nature and didn’t had to live in the city which didn’t allow the people to live
in the only appropriate way – rustically. But if we observe Romanticism as a reaction to the era
of the Enlightenment when almost all of the European states became secular which brought an
end to the abuses the church made thanks to its singularity with the state, they introduced
religious tolerance and introduced the concepts of inalienable rights - denouncing the so called
divine rights of the king, which led to constitutional government. The world of the Enlightenment
had a completely new setting that was never before seen in human history and that jump from
complete theocracy and religious dominance to reason, religious tolerance and secularism left a
void in the European political and intellectual spectrum. That void was filled by Romantic
nationalism which was characterized with nostalgia for the Middle Ages, glorifying not of
secularism, science, religious and inter - national tolerance but of folklore, language, customs.
Romantic nationalism had two major problems. The first one was the opinion that in the social
organization the divine right of kings and the strict hierarchy of the Middle Ages should be
reintroduced. The second problem of Romantic nationalism was that although it enabled self –
determination to smaller nations (especially to Balkan nations which were under Ottoman
occupation for more than four centuries), it had a high degree of incompatibility with religious
and national tolerance because its ideologists claimed that someone can belong to a nation not by
accepting of its customs, laws and culture but only if someone was born in that nation. This led
to polemics about racial superiority.
3. Blind sides of national histories
Gregory H. Stanton, the president of Genocide Watch in his 1996 paper says that all genocides
are done in eight stages.
1. Classification
2. Symbolization
3. Dehumanization
4. Organization
5. Polarization
6. Preparation
7. Extermination
8. Denial
We can easily confirm that nationalism, especially ultra – nationalism can lead to genocide when
from these eight stages five are directly linked to it – classification, symbolization,
dehumanization, polarization and most importantly denial. Gregory H. Stanton explains:
All cultures have categories to distinguish people into “us and them” by ethnicity, race, religion,
or nationality: German and Jew, Hutu and Tutsi. Bipolar societies that lack mixed categories, such as
Rwanda and Burundi, are the most likely to have genocide. The main preventive measure at this early stage
is to develop universalistic institutions that transcend ethnic or racial divisions, that actively promote
tolerance and understanding, and that promote classifications that transcend the divisions. The Catholic
Church could have played this role in Rwanda, had it not been driven by the same ethnic cleavages as
32
Rwandan society. Promotion of a common language in countries like Tanzania has also promoted
transcendent national identity. This search for common ground is vital to early prevention of genocide.
(http://www.genocidewatch.org/genocide/8stagesofgenocide.html)
This is directly linked to Romantic nationalism whose ideologists claimed that one can’t
belong to a culture by accepting its customs and laws but only if he/she was born within that
culture which strengthened the road towards theories about racial supremacy. Almost all
European states gained their independence with some help by Romantic Nationalism or almost
entirely with it. That is why, when we analyse nationalism it is easy to conclude that Romantic
Nationalism was the most dangerous kind of nationalism. Not only did it opened the gates for
racial supremacy theories and anti – Semitism using resurrected national myths, but it
contributed to the most deadly conflicts in human history - WWI and the rise of National –
Socialism in Germany which was followed by WWII.
In this paper I will explore how the revival of two national myths partly or completely
through the ideology of Romantic Nationalism – the myth of “Heavenly Serbia” and the myths
of “Jewish World Conspiracy” and the German post – WWI “Stab – in – the – back” myth – led
to specific acts of genocide.
3.1 Heavenly Serbia – how the revival of a national myth caused the first genocide on European
soil after WWII?
“After the dictator – king Aleksandar Karadjordjević was assassinated in 1934, the editor of a Belgrade
newspaper wrote that “Aleksandar chose the heavenly kingdom in order to secure the future of Yugoslavia.”
(Heavenly Serbia: from myth to genocide – BranimirAnzulovic (1999), p.5)
“Heavenly Serbia” is one of the key myths in Serbian nationalism. This myth is the belief
that after the defeat in 1389 at the Battle of Kosovo all the Serbs that died there, although defeated,
won because they went to the place where all Serbs who gave they life for Orthodox Christianity
and for Kosovo go – Heavenly Serbia. After the reconstitution of the Serbian state in the 19th
century this myth came to the daylight again. Major significance in the instalment of the myth
had the intellectuals like Vuk Karadzic who was influenced by Romantic Nationalism and was a
proponent of the Pan – Serbian ideology which denied that any of the neighbouring countries of
Serbia had its own nationality. This time the myth was used by the church and by the state as an
argument that Serbia is the most superior Balkan state, and as a consequence to that Serbia should
be the dominant state in the Balkan Peninsula. After the expulsion of the Ottoman Empire from
its last remaining stronghold in the Balkans – Macedonia- the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes was formed, which denied the national rights of Macedonians and Montenegrins whose
territories were put in this state without a referendum. But this went even further. The
primeminister of this complex multi – national and multi - religious state with two terms was
Nikola Pasic who belonged to the Serbian Radical Party which was the main proponent of these
national myths. After WWII and the formation of Yugoslavia (a state that didn’t allowed to its
republic the right of self – determination and the right of independence) these myths were put to
rest, but were revived again with the rebirth of nationalism in the ‘80s. Slobodan Milosevic, a
Serbian nationalist came to power in 1989 using the 600th anniversary from the Battle of Kosovo
and the myths of Heavenly Serbia and Serbian superiority. By using these myths (and the
preservation of Yugoslavia) he started invading all the countries that decided to become
33
independent from Yugoslavia except Macedonia. By the revival of these centuries old myths he
caused the first genocide on European soil after WWII and some of the greatest humanitarian
disasters in the 20th century: the Genocide of Srebrenica, the Siege and persecution of the civil
population of Vukovar, the Siege of Dubrovnik, the Siege of Sarajevo and etc. The case of the
myth of Heavenly Serbia is very specific, because it clearly shows that national myths are not
based on great truths but on great irrationalities. How would otherwise be possible for Milosevic
to believe that with his military actions he is fighting against Western imperialism, when in reality
it is his actions that were based on imperialism, or at least a provincial Balkan version of
imperialism.
3.2 From “The Protocols of the Elders of Zion” to the Holocaust
The history of the Holocaust is much simpler than the previous myth. This is because the ethical
side, and the questions about who bares the ultimate responsibility about the Holocaust – the
Nazis or the voters that gave their vote for them are very complex although historians do agree
on one thing - the guilt belongs to the Nazis, and the responsibility can be traced even
millenniums ago when anti – Semitism began to gain roots in European institutions, for example
the Catholic Church. But the very process of conducting the genocide over the Jews and the
election of the National – Socialistic Party was triggered by two conspiracy theories – the so called
“Protocols of the Elders of Zion” and the Stab – in – the – Back – Theory. Adolf Hitler used the
economic crisis in Germany and anti – Semitic rhetoric and in the 1932 elections won 6,042,000
votes or almost 40% of the electorate. The National – Socialistic party was ultra – nationalistic and
he used the “Protocols of the Elders of Zion” (a forgery from the Russian secret service) a book
that was widely used by the Nazis as a “proof” that the Jews wanted to rule the world and an
argument for their extermination. The – Stab – in – the – Back – Theory which developed quickly
after the end of WWI and claimed that the Jews were to blame for the German defeat. This
example clearly shows that ultra – nationalism and nationalism prepares the space for genocide
or as it was in the German example it is the first stage of genocide.
4. Reconciliation between Macedonia and Greece
4.1 A brief history of Macedonian – Greek relations
When we speak about the history of Macedonia it is inevitable to count the four geographical and
historical settings of Macedonia.
1. Ancient Macedon
2. The Roman province of Macedonia
3. Byzantine province (situated much further east than previous)
4. Ottoman period
Today, the name Macedonia refers to two things: the region of Macedonia in Greece and the
Republic of Macedonia. The Republic of Macedonia is predominantly inhabited by Macedonians
who are a South Slavic ethnic group that speaks a South Slavic language and that settled there
during the invasion of the Balkan Peninsula by Slavic tribes in the 5th, 6thand 7th century. Its
territory spans of the ancient Kingdom of Paeonia whose south neighbour was Ancient
Macedonia. But, after the Roman conquest of Greece and Macedonia in 168 BC the Romans
created a large administrative district whose name was Macedonia. This district united all of
34
Greece and Paeonia. The present day conflicts of Macedonia and Greece are coming from the
period that followed the fall of Rome. In this period in the 5th, 6th and 7th century all the Balkan
territories were invaded by Slavic tribes which previously had inhabited the areas behind the
river Danube. These tribes before their permanent settlement in the areas of present day Slovenia,
Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Bulgaria occasionally crossed the river Danube to rob the native
inhabitants of the Balkans and when they finished these raids returned again behind the river
Danube. The Byzantine Empire (although today all orthodox countries have Byzantine heritage
the Byzantine Empire was predominantly governed by the Greeks) saw them as barbarians. This
label survived even after the Slavs were Christianised and were put under Byzantine cultural
governance. It took centuries until the Byzantine Empire realised that the Slavic nations that were
part of this empire had the right to use their native language, not Greek in the educational
institutions and in the churches. The clashes between the Macedonian Slavs, the other Slavic
tribes and the Greeks continued until the fall of Macedonia under Ottoman Governance in 1371
after the Battle of Maritsa. The Byzantine Empire lasted until 1453 when it fell under Ottoman
rule. Now both Macedonia and Greece were in the administrative district of Rumelia. In the
Ottoman empire the power over Orthodox Christians fell under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical
Patriarch of Istanbul. But, the patriarchy remained loyal to the Sultan. It used its influence (which
was granted by the Sultan) to put the Greek language in use in the educational institutions and
in the churches. This was a great loss for the Macedonian population. Archbishopric of Ohrid lost
its independence from the Constantinople patriarchy under the influence of the Patriarch and of
the Sultan. Under the influence of the Patriarch it was abolished in 1767. With this, the only
institution that organized the Macedonian defiance against the Ottoman rule (especially during
the Karpos Uprising in 1689) ceased to exist. After this, especially in the 19 th century the Greeks
struggled for the reinforcement of the Greek language in the schools, and in the churches. In 1830
the Greeks gained independence from the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Greece was
established. Macedonia was under Ottoman occupation until the First Balkan War in 1912. After
the Second Balkan War the territory where the Ethnic Macedonians lived was officially divided
between Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia (on that territory is the present Republic of Macedonia) and the
newly formed Albania. The present day territory of Republic of Macedonia was a part of South
Serbia from 1913 until 1941. The biggest worsening of relations between Greeks and ethnic
Macedonians was during the rule of Joannis Metaxas a fascist dictator that ruled with Greece in
the period 1936 – 1941. He strictly forbid the use of the Macedonian language and introduced
strict punishments for everyone who spoke Macedonian no matter whether someone spoke it in
the public or in the tightest family circle.
From 1941 until 1944 in Macedonia the Liberation War was fought and on 2 August 1944
the assembly of the people constituted the Macedonian state within the framework of the future
Yugoslav federation. The Greek government expressed concerns about this until the revolutions
from 1989. Macedonia declared independence from Yugoslavia on 8 September 1991. The
objection of Greece was that Macedonia had territorial claims against it because of the region
Macedonia in Northern Greece. Macedonia couldn’t enter the UN, and on 7 April 1993 the UN
Security Council endorsed the admission of the republic in United Nations Security Council
Resolution 817 under the appellation “former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” – a provisional
term to be used until the dispute was resolved. On 13 September 1995, the two countries signed
35
the Interim Accord, whereby Greece recognized the Republic of Macedonia under its provisional
reference.
4.2 Reconciliation between Macedonia and Greece
In 2005, Matthew Nimetz, UN special Representative suggested using “Republika Makedonija –
Skopje”. Prime Minister Vlado Buckovski rejected this proposal and proposed a “double name
formula” where the international community uses “Republic of Macedonia” and Greece uses
“former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”. In 2008 Nimetz limited the proposal to three names:
 “Republic of Upper Macedonia”
 “New Republic of Macedonia” or “Republic of New Macedonia”
 “Republic of Macedonia – Skopje”
The full proposal before the NATO summit was:
 The constitutional name, in Cyrillic (Republika Makedonija) could be used for internal
purposes
 “Republic of Macedonia (Skopje)” would be used for international relations
 For bilateral relations, “Republic of Macedonia (Skopje)” is suggested but the countries
would not be forced to use this name
 The terms “Macedonia” and “Macedonian” would be able to be used Freely by both
countries
In 2011 the International Court of Justice stated that Greece had violated the Interim Accord by
objection to the admission of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
In this dispute the solution will probably be found in some of the proposals by Nimetz, in that
moment when the governments of both states will give up their nationalistic rhetoric and actions
and will truly try to find a solution that won’t do any harm to the history of both states.
But when the true reconciliation between these two states out of which both want to be a
part of Western Civilization begin?Firstly it will begin in the moment when the historians of both
countries will start to write history with objectivity and arguments and not with their current
nationalistic and chauvinistic mindset. The strongest bridge to reconciliation will be built when
both countries realize that although they had numerous conflicts and atrocities between them,
they share a common cultural heritage – the heritage of the Byzantine Empire the Eastern part of
Western Civilization.
But true reconciliation will be complete when both sides will be able to say about the
darkest moments in the history of their “enemy” the thing that Dorothy Thompson, a German
reporter said about the Jews during WWII: "We Americans of German descent raise our voices in
denunciation of the Hitler policy of cold-blooded extermination of the Jews of Europe and against the
barbarities committed by the Nazis against all other innocent peoples under their sway. These horrors ...
are, in particular, a challenge to those who, like ourselves are descendants of the Germany that once stood
in the foremost ranks of civilization. ... We utterly repudiate every thought and deed of Hitler and his Nazis
... [and urge Germany] to overthrow a regime which is in the infamy of German history.” (Jewish Stories
from Heaven and Earth: Inspiring Tales to Nourish the Heart – Elkins Peretz (2008), p. 146)
5. Conclusion
Humanity in just 0.2 percent of its existence evolved from a species that lived in stateless societies,
36
in unorganized villages and bounds to the city state in late antiquity, the medieval feudal state,
the national state and most importantly the nation – state. With the help of the printing press
governments formed a homogenous cultural entity, that although later gave birth to nationalism
- one of the greatest evils of the 20th and the 21st century – it helped for the European countries to
rise above the tribal mentality. In just several centuries it transformed Europeans from people
that lived in villages and didn’t cared about anything beyond them to people that participated
actively in the culture of the nation in which they were born.
But, when Romantic nationalism took over, it restored old Medieval myths and helped
governments in their struggle for dominance to pursue discriminatory policies against minorities
or in most extreme cases genocide (like in cases of Serbia in the mid 1990s, or the most extreme
case Nazi Germany in the 1930s and 1940s).
The naming dispute of Macedonia and Greece is a part of nationalistic policies. The Greek
government broke the Interim accord by placing a veto on the Macedonian attempt to enter
NATO and EU in 2008, and the Macedonian government with some moves (the naming of the
Skopje Airport Alexander the Great) proved that it also has some nationalistic world views. The
reconciliation between Macedonia and Greece should be through international mediation and
through polemics between the historians of both countries out of which a common ground will
be found about the historic relations between these two nations that both have similar historical
heritage.
References
[1] Anderson, Benedict R. O'G. (1991). Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and
spread of nationalism (Revised and extended. ed.). London: Verso
[2] Carneiro, Robert L. 1970. "A Theory of the Origin of the State." Science 169(August)
[3] Carniero, Robert L. 1978.Origins of the State: The Anthropology of Political Evolution
[4] Oppenheim,A. Leo. (1964) Ancient Mesopotamia: Portrait of a Dead Civilization. revised
edition 1976
[5] [25.05.2016],http://www.genocidewatch.org/genocide/8stagesofgenocide.html
[6] Anzulovic, Branimir. Serbia: from myth to genocide. NYU Press; 1St Edition edition (March 1,
1999)
[7]http://www.bbc.co.uk/schools/gcsebitesize/history/tch_wjec/germany19291947/1hitlerchancel
lor1.shtml
[8] Greece and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia – Interim Accord (with related letters
and translations of the Interim Accord in the languages of the Contracting Parties. Signed at New
York on 13 September 1995
[9] Peretz, Elkins.Jewish Stories from Heaven and Earth: Inspiring Tales to Nourish the Heart.
Jewish Lights Publishing, 2008
37
“The Treatment of the Refugee Crisis from the Middle East in the
Media”
By Vaska Bojadji (Ss. Cyril and Methodius University)
Abstract
While in the beginning of the summer 2015, the EU was struggling in the process of adopting
mutual solution for the unprecedented influx of non-regional migrants and refugees, Macedonia
and Greece, as the frontline countries of the most frequently used route, had no choice but to
establish cooperation regarding the crisis management, besides the existing problems. The goal
of this thesis is to analyze how the media in both of the countries portrayed the situation and
measures taken by the governments, their influence on the public opinion, as well as the longterm effect on the bilateral relations.
Keywords: Refugee crisis, media, Macedonia, Greece
Migrations have been a fundamental element in the history of the Balkans, accompanying its stormy events
and obviously continuing to do so. (CorradoBonifazi and MarijaMamolo - Past and Current Trends of
Balkan Migrations)
Introduction
The history of the Balkan countries is undoubtedly characterized by massive population
movements that have resulted with various demographic trends. ”Since the arrival of the Slav
populations in the 7th century, the Ottoman expansion, the extension of the Hapsburg domain,
the rise and growth of national states, the two World Wars and the ethnic wars of the past
decades, there have been numerous population movements caused more or less directly by
political and military events.”1 While in the recent period, the path towards better education
opportunities, broader job market, as well as economic prosperity has enhanced the labor flows
in which the Balkan countries serve mainly as sending countries, while the European are in the
position of receiving counties. The latter, is an additional verification of the statement that,
massive population movements cannot be classified as Balkan “history”, but rather as a
continuous ongoing process.
Starting from 2015, the Balkan countries, alongside with Greece and Macedonia on the
frontline, became the most frequently used route for the unprecedented influx of non-regional
migrants and refugees that had fled the Middle East and Africa, risking their lives on their way
to the western European countries. “This influx was mainly evoked by conflicts and civil wars in
the Middle East and the political turmoil in Africa resulting in disintegrated, barely functional or
destructed states, incapable of securing security and prosperity for its own citizens.”2Syrians
BonifaziCorrado, MamoloMarija: Past and Current Trends of Balkan Migrations,Espace populations
societies, 2004, pp.519
2Josifovic Ivica: European Union Migration/Refugee Crisis: Opening the Pandora’s Box?, Publication of
papers of the International scientific conference "The global refugee crisis - challenges and
perspectives",2016, pp.145
1
38
fleeing their country's ongoing civil war (35 percent) and Afghans looking to escape the ongoing
war with Taliban rebels (15 percent)made up the first and second largest groups of migrants,
respectively. Deteriorating security and grinding poverty in Iraq, Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia,
Eritrea, and Morocco have also contributed to the migrant influx.3
Due to the proximity to the Mediterranean See,Greece, precisely its islands Lesbos, Chios
and Samos served as one of the main points of entry for migrants and refugees arriving from the
Turkish coast. By July 2015, Greece had become thepreferred Mediterranean entry point, with
Frontex reporting 132,240 illegal EU border crossings for the first half of 2015.4 From there,
refugees and migrants continued their route to Central Europe, through the territory of the
Republic of Macedonia, what later became known as the Western Balkan corridor.
“Although it is not unique in its reasons, the current crisis became highly intensive
political issue, on one side, generating political and public debates, while on the other side
evoking tensions among EU member-states on how to cope with the constant flow of migrants,
refugees and asylum-seekers, thus aggravating previous weaknesses in Europe’s immigration
system.”5 Moreover, the surge caused polarization of the European policy makers between two
opposing viewpoints. “One is best presented by the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and the
other Hungary’s Prime Minister Victor Orban. For Orban, there was no influx of refugees, but an
invasion of illegal immigrants”6, while Merkel was firmly holding to the “open-doors policy”.
In a situation where on the one hand, the EU was struggling in the process of adopting
mutual and consistent solution, and the security treat by the emerging and uncontrolled refugee
crises, on the other hand, the bilateral cooperation between the neighboring countries Macedonia and Greece was not a question of choice, but rather, a question of need. The crisis had
clearly exposed the fragility of the relations among the two countries. Besides, the complicated
internal domestic political crises that both of the countries were faced with, “the cooperation
between Republic of Macedonia and Greece was limited by the long running and illogical dispute
over the constitutional name of the former.”7 “Migration represents both an opportunity and a
challenge.”8 It was evident that the way the countries would approach these events, would either
result with even more deteriorated political relations or it would lead to bolstering the
cooperation and trust building. The media, reporting the fast evolving events, and the measures
taken by both of the counties had undoubtedly an outstanding role in portraying the situation
and the shaping of the public opinion.
The developments at the border between Greece and the Republic of Macedonia were
Frontex - Western Balkans Annual Risk Analysis 2016, pp. 20
Ibid, pp. 32
5Josifovic, quoted work, pp.145
6Kerdis Dimitris: The surge of migrants and refugees: cause, origins and data, Balkan human corridor,
Essays on the Refugee and Migrant Crisis from Scholars and Opinion Leaders in Southeast Europe,
Columbia University of New York, USA,2016, pp. 8
7JovanovskiDalibor, DodovskaIvanka: Refugee Crisis and its Impact upon the Greek – Macedonian
Relationship, Publication of papers of the International scientific conference "The global refugee crisis challenges and perspectives", PravniFakultetTravnik, 2016, pp.32
8FarguesPhilippe, FandrichChristine: The European Response to the Syrian Refugee Crisis What Next?,
Robert Schuman Centre for advanced studies, 2012, pp.1
3
4
39
greatly influenced by the decisions taken in the region. 18 June 2015 can be regarded as a very
important date, as it was the day when the Macedonian Parliament amended the Law on Asylum
and temporary protection, in order to provide a legal transit for the detected migrants expressing
the intention to claim asylum with documents, allowing them 72 hours to freely move within the
country as well as to use the public transportation. The media in both of the countries broadcasted
the positive news that led to decreasing the pressure on the border due to the numerous migrants
located in the neutral zone between Greece and Macedonia, waiting to enter the Macedonian
territory. When reporting the situation the Greek newspaper “Protothema”9 quoted the
Macedonian President Ivanov’s statement "We share the fate of these people that were forced to
leave their countries because of war. We shall help them and provide them with everything
necessary."
Following the increase of the flow, organizing onwards transportation became a necessity,
and the media proactively reported on the intensive transportation of the migrants from the south
to the north border of Macedonia.10 “These developments were amongst the first in a series of
factors which accelerated the migratory flow. More exactly, migrants took advantage of the legal
travel opportunities in the Republic of Macedonia and accelerated their transit in order to reach
the desired EU Member States.”11
The meeting between the Greek foreign minister Nikos Kotzias and his Macedonian counterpart
Nikola Poposki, held in Skopje at the end of June, was widely perceived as an initial positive shift
in the bilateral cooperation. By determining “confidence building” as a key step in the process of
settling the existing issues and restoration of good neighborliness, the ministers announced
eleven Confidence Building Measures in the areas of culture, trade, investment and education.
Explaining, the overall objectives of the introduced measures, Mr. Kozias highlighted “History
does not matter, it shall be considered as a school, not a prison, and we shall learn from it. For
now we have learned that we need development, security and stability in the Balkans, and to
achieve that we have to cooperate.”12
While the Greek media recognized the importance of this meeting “held in a good
atmosphere…and aiming to open a trust path… as well as to restart the bilateral relations”13, the
Macedonian media demonstrated astonishment from the obviously changed rhetoric of the Greek
minister, and his statements that “every problem has a solution…Macedonia is a gift to the
Balkans and Greece is happy because of its existence...that he would like our country to accelerate
its EU integration process and that Greece is willing to help with its previous experience and
expertise.”14 Moreover, the newspaper “Utrinski” comments, “The Greek foreign minister Nikos
[20.09.2016],http://www.protothema.gr/world/article/493733/pgdm-stratos-kai-astunomia-sta-sunorame-tin-ellada-gia-n-adimetopisoun-tis-ordes-metanaston/
10[20.09.2016],http://sitel.com.mk/migrantite-intenzivno-se-prenesuvaat-od-juzhnata-granica-kontabanovce
11Frontex - Western Balkans Annual Risk Analysis 2016, pp. 15
12[20.09.2016],http://www.utrinski.mk/default.asp?ItemID=74BC2EE30630D64F9E4C730A5E8FD670
13[20.09.2016],http://www.kathimerini.gr/820615/article/epikairothta/politikh/symfwnh8hkan-endekamoe-me-ta-skopia
14[20.09.2016],http://www.utrinski.mk/default.asp?ItemID=37F34897D7C71A49BE9E40FEEE35E2AA
9
40
Kozias has wrecked the mountain of mistrust in Macedonia. Although it is too early to predict
the outcome, because of the previous promising episodes in the relations with Greece that did
not change anything, the tone and the messages promoted, sounded exceptionally new and
dramatically different from what we have heard until now.”15
The great influx of the refugees and migrants at the border induced Macedonian government to
temporary close the border and to declare state of emergency in August 2015.16Even thought, the
respective Macedonian institutions have pointed out that the closing of the border is not a
permanent measure, this act initiated negative reactions in the Greek media, due to the reasonable
concerns of its implication on the Greek territory. In regards to this, the Greek newspaper
“Kathimerini” writes: “If the closing continues, the pressure will be transferred to the Greek side,
as the continuing flow of migrants to the border would result with formation of great crowds and
would cause a headache to the Greek authorities that will be responsible for providing help to
thousands of wretched people in unbearable heat conditions.”17
On the other side, the Macedonian media were openly criticizing the Greek authorities for
the lack of capacity and lack of diligence in the process of registration of the migrants, resulting
with uncontrolled and unsynchronized groups approaching the Macedonian border. The
Macedonian newspaper “Vecher”18 underscores “The closing of the illegal crossings, the
declaration of state of emergency and the engagement of the special police forces and the Army,
finally dragged the attention of the European and the worldwide public towards the imposed
problem that our country is facing with – thousands of Syrian refugees arriving in Gevgelija on a
daily level. If a few days ago silence was the only EU solution, now it is openly spoken that our
country needs concrete help and solution for this problem”. Furthermore, the newspaper had
acquired information that “the Greek authorities, besides the political crises and the technical
government, for the first time in a few years contacted the Macedonian police…with the aim to
manage the migrants flow.”
The obvious conclusion that the challenges arising from the refugee crises could not be
resolved through unilateral national actions initiated the “Meeting on the Western Balkans
Migration Route” held in Brussels in October 2015, with the purpose of establishing cooperation
among the countries on the Balkan route based on cross-border approach. The heads of states and
heads of governments present at the meeting, including representatives from Macedonia and
Greece agreed on 17-point plan of action19 proposed by the European Commission President JeanClaude Juncker. The plan was constrained of pragmatic and operational measures regarding
permanent exchange of information, limiting secondary movements, supporting refugees and
providing shelter and rest, mutual border management and management of the migration flows,
actions against migrant smuggling and trafficking, information on the rights and obligations of
Ibid
[25.09.2016],_http://www.cuk.gov.mk/images/mesecni_bilteni/2015-mesecni-bilteni/8-Avgust-2015bilten-CUK%20/8-AVGUST-BILTEN-CUK-8.pdf
17[20.09.2016],http://www.kathimerini.gr/827825/article/epikairothta/ellada/se-katastash-ektakthsanagkhs-ta-synora-twn-skopiwn
18[20.09.2016],_http://vecer.mk/makedonija/eu-konechno-prizna-kriza-ima-i-na-makedonija-mora-da-i-sepomogne
19[28.09.2016],http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5904_en.htm
15
16
41
refugees and migrants, as well as monitoring. It was expected that “this agreement will terminate
the current practice - refugees to be put on a train and transported to the neighboring states soon
as possible”20 without prior coordination.
In November the Greek newspaper “Protothema” announced that the Greek government
had finally agreed "the Frontex Agency to expand its activities on the Greek border with the
Republic of Macedonia, where the organization will assist with the registration of migrants.”21,
that was basically one of the conclusions reached at the Meeting that the county refused to
implement with the explanation that the “protection of the borders is an exclusive national
responsibility”22. “Protothema” also quoted the comment of the Macedonian Foreign Minister
Nikola Poposki". The development of Frontex in the two countries' border is a positive sign. After
some time, I believe that this development will be helpful for overcoming the tensions that have
occurred in the previous period. In this way we can finally improve our cooperation with the
Greek authorities, as the presence of Frontex will help both in recording and in determining the
further migrant selection process.”23
Unfortunately, the expectations of the Macedonian Foreign Minister were not completely
met, having into account the subsequent events on the border in November 2015. “The attempts
of the Macedonian authorities for filtering the flow (i.e. allowing entry only to migrants
originating from conflict areas, specifically Syrians, Afghans and Iraqis starting from 19
November), apart from being difficult to implement due to a lack of screeners and facilities,
resulted in the refused migrants accumulating on the Greek side of the border. On several
occasions groups of migrants tried to force their way through the border”24resulting with injured
policeman and army members. “In his interview for the influential Athens daily newspaper
“Kathimerini”, the Macedonian foreign minister stated that…greater effort from Greece in the
registration is needed…and also, expressed his dissatisfaction with the attack of migrants on
Macedonian border guard from Greek territory without any measures to stop them as they
attempt to force their way into Macedonia.”25In response to this situation, the Macedonian
authorities had a protective wire fence built in the most critical places along the border with
Greece (covering roughly 30 kilometers in total). This fence was designed to prevent chaotic
crossings and stream-line the flow through designated points where orderly checks could be
performed. "Things become dangerous and now with the fence it’s even worse. Thousands of
people arrive and are forced to sleep in tents in the rain and cold. The checks should be made in
Athens and here only refugees should arrive and not economic migrants" stated the mayor of
Paionia, Mr. Chrisos Gkoutenoudis for ANA MPA.26 “Kathimerini” expressed concerns that “as
the Balkan corridor closes slowly from north to south with barbed wire stretching until Idomeni,
[28.09.2016],http://www.utrinski.mk/default.asp?ItemID=E523BA2559033E48AE0D447784E7C21D
[28.09.2016], http://www.protothema.gr/greece/article/532969/sumfonia-elladas-frontex-gia-apostolivoitheias-sta-sunora-me-ti-pgdm/
22 Ibid
23 Ibid
24Frontex - Western Balkans Annual Risk Analysis 2016, pp. 15
25Jovanovski, Dodovska, quoted work, pp. 39
26[01.10.2016],http://www.news.gr/politikh/exoterikh-politikh/article/246077/h-fyrom-htizei-frahth-stasynora-me-thn-ellada.html
20
21
42
Greece threatens to turn into vast "lake" of refugees.”27
Reciprocating the visit of the Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Kotzias in Skopje at the end
of June 2015, his Macedonian counterpart Nikola Poposki paid an official visit to Athens in
December. As the Greek newspaper “To Vima” has stated the meeting in Athens was a result of
the “efforts to improve bilateral Greek-Macedonian relations”28. With an enlarged agenda, not
focused only on the usual topic – the name issue, the ministers had the opportunity to assert
important questions that both of the countries share, including the latest events on the borderline
and the management of the migration flow. During the joint press conference with Nikola
Poposki, Nikos Kotzias emphasized that they "discussed based on the proposal for initiatives in
order to enrich the cooperation in different fields such as economy, tourism, European prospects
of Macedonia, to a series of reforms throughout the region for the purposes to fight organized
crime"29. While the Greek media restrained of comments for the significance of this meeting, the
Macedonian newspaper “Nova Makedonija” added “The visit of the Macedonian Foreign
Minister to Athens could be described as historic beginning of a new chapter in the bilateral
relations between the two neighboring countries.The thaw began in June with Kotzias' trip to
Skopje, proceed with the proposed confidence-building measures, and now culminates with the
meetings of Poposki in Athens.”30 In the same line is the newspaper “Utrinski” adding “The
framework for cooperation between Skopje and Athens has apparently been set and all that is
need now, is [that framework] to be filled with sincerity and substance….However, it is an
illusion that it will be easy, but at least it is heading towards normalization of the relations,
otherwise significant damage will be caused internally in Macedonia and Greece.”31
“At the end of 2015, we could conclude that the cooperation between Republic of
Macedonia and Greece has been improved. A communication between Macedonian and Greek
border guard has been established. In addition, there were contacts between ministers from both
countries.”32
On the initiative of the Director of the Macedonian police - Goranco Savovski a working
meeting was held with his Greek counterpart Kostas Suvalas in February 2016 in Thessaloniki.
The main topics were - exchange of information concerning the Balkan route of refugees and joint
approach in the fight against organized crime. In his interview for the Macedonian television
“Kanal 5” Goranco Savovski stated“this meeting is particularly important for us, having in
consideration that it is the first on the level of the police administration sinceMacedonia's
independence….as soon as possible after this meeting mutual Macedonian-Greek cooperation
groups will be formed, that will be responsible for the implementation of actions against
organized crime and smuggling of refugees”33 These meeting was subsequently followed by
[01.10.2016],http://www.kathimerini.gr/839095/article/epikairothta/ellada/h-pgdm-yywnei-fraxth-stasynora-me-thn-ellada
28[05.10.2016],http://www.tovima.gr/politics/article/?aid=762650
29Ibid
30[06.10.2016],_http://www.novamakedonija.com.mk/NewsDetal.asp?vest=121715912401&id=9&setIzdani
e=23640
31[06.10.2016], http://www.utrinski.mk/default.asp?ItemID=C537DE4C2FC7EC4E9DC8DB8E85C4768D
32Jovanovski, Dodovska, quoted work, pp.40
33[08.10.2016],http://kanal5.com.mk/vesti_detail.asp?ID=91221
27
43
routine meeting between the representatives of the police from both of the countries.
The alleviation of the severe situation was obviously of a temporary character. Starting
from midst February, the tensions flared once again as the unease regarding the potential closing
of border with Macedonia grew in the Greek media. The newspaper “Kathimerini”, stressed out
that the governments of Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Slovakia
and Macedonia are considering closure of their national borders as a possible solution. If this
scenario is being implemented the pressure of the steaming surge would ultimately reach its peak
on the Greek border with Macedonia. That would result “with a few hundreds of thousands of
refugees trapped [at the border] by next spring”, as “Kathimerini” indicated.34 For the purposes
of clarifying the Macedonian positions in relation to the ongoing crises and the questions raised
by the media, the Macedonian ambassador in Athens – DarkoAngelov hosted an informal
meeting with representatives of the major media in Greece. During the meeting he explained that
“Macedonia is not solely responsible for the decision making, and it is firmly guided by the EU
policies regarding the refugee problem…Macedonia is always the last to implement the decisions
coming from north…there is need for incensement of the cooperation between the Macedonian
and the Greek ministries of defense.”35 However, the Greek media concluded – “The diplomat
from the neighboring country reiterates emphatically that Skopje does not want closed borders,
but the anxiety in the tone of his voice is evident.”36
As expected, “the Vishegrad Group countries (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and
Slovakia) joined by Austria and Slovenia decided to close the Balkans human corridor, which
prompted Macedonia to close its border with Greece.”37 By March 2016, the Western Balkan route
was completely shut down. This action caused a flurry of accusations from both sides. In his
interviews for the Greek TV channel “Star”, the Greek newspaper “To Vima” and the German
tabloid “Bild”, Macedonian President Gjorge Ivanov qualified “the closure of the border as an
expected step”38 and he stressed out that “Greece directly jeopardized the Macedonian national
security by allowing establishment of improvised camps on the very border line, which in turn
encouraged migrants to use illegal crossings”39, as a result of which the country had to cope with
around 100 attempts for illegal entry on a daily level. Besides the lack of coordination in the
management of the refugee flow, the President expressed his dissatisfaction from the
unwillingness for diplomatic communication of his counterpart – the Greek President
Pavlopoulos, emphasizing that disputes can be overcome only though dialogue. Nevertheless,
he acknowledged the positive outcome of the Confidence Building Measures and the previous
meetings with the Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Kotzias.
[08.10.2016] http://www.kathimerini.gr/849424/article/epikairothta/ellada/h-epomenh-mera-an-kleisoynta-voreia-synora
35[08.10.2016],http://www.kanal5.com.mk/vesti_detail.asp?ID=90091
36[08.10.2016],http://www.kathimerini.gr/849424/article/epikairothta/ellada/h-epomenh-mera-an-kleisoynta-voreia-synora
37Ilievski Zoran, Serbos Sotiris: EU perceptions of the crisis and their impact on relations between Greece,
Macedonia and other Balkan, Balkan human corridor, Essays on the Refugee and Migrant Crisis from
Scholars and Opinion Leaders in Southeast Europe, Columbia University of New York, USA,2016, pp.55
38[10.10.2016],http://kanal5.com.mk/vesti_detail.asp?ID=93327
39[10.10.2016],http://www.tovima.gr/politics/article/?aid=789519
34
44
President Ivanov’s approach triggered an instant response form the Greek Foreign
Ministry. Namely, Konstatinos Kutras declared that the President was misinformed about the
relations between the two countries, adding that the “Greek government is not responsible for
providing information to the President.”40
When reporting this exchange of words, the Macedonian news agency “Meta” made the
following comment “Such reactions from both sides, and the ping-pong match between Ivanov
and Pavlopoulos, who uses every occasion for criticizing Macedonia, accompanied by harsh
accusations, seems that one again create burdens in the relations between the two countries that
went upward through the frequent meetings between Macedonian and Greek Foreign Ministers
and the conversations on Confidence Building Measures.”41
The closure of the Western Balkan corridor was followed by the “EU – Turkey deal aiming
to address the overwhelming flow of smuggled migrants and asylum seekers traveling across the
Aegean from Turkey to the Greek islands by allowing Greece to return to Turkey “all new
irregular migrants” arriving after March 20. In exchange, EU Member States agreed to increase
resettlement of Syrian refugees residing in Turkey, accelerate visa liberalization for Turkish
nationals, and boost existing financial support for Turkey’s refugee population.”42 “When this
plan went into effect, arrivals to Greece dropped by 90 percent in April 2016.”43
Scenes of hundreds of migrants trying to break through the fence at the border in Idomeni, used
tear gas by the Macedonian police forces as a prevention of the organized attempt and injured
police officers, additionally strained the tense relations between the counties. The attempt of
crossing the border that took place on 10 April 2016 was a result of a rumor that the corridor was
about to be re-opened.
This event became a source of discord and a cause for the new episode of undiplomatic
trade of words between Macedonia and Greece. “Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras said
Macedonia had "shamed" Europe by its actions while President ProkopisPavlopoulos went a step
further, arguing such "incomprehensible" behavior showed Macedonia had "no place" in the EU
or NATO.”44 “The avalanche followed a statement by George Kiricis, a spokesman of the
coordinating body for dealing with the refugee crisis, who called on Macedonian authorities to
refrain from excessive use of force against migrants, because according to him in the clash with
them the police used tear gas, stun grenades and rubber bullets, although our [the Macedonian]
Ministry of Interior claimed that only tear gas was used.”45 The Greek Deputy Foreign Minister
Yiannis Amandatidis, addressed the situation as well, “saying that the incident in Idomeni
showed the need for strengthening cooperation between Macedonia and Greece over the issue,
[11.10.2016],http://www.skai.gr/news/greece/article/311490/upex-de-ftaiei-i-ellada-pou-o-proedros-tispgdm-einai-anenimerotos-gia-tis-dimereis-sheseis/
41[12.10.2016],http://meta.mk/tag/konstantinos-kutras/
42[11.10.2016],http://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/paradox-eu-turkey-refugee-deal
43Bozinovski Vladimir: Elite and popular perception in Macedonia of the refugee and migrant crisis,
Balkan human corridor, Essays on the Refugee and Migrant Crisis from Scholars and Opinion Leaders in
Southeast Europe, Columbia University of New York, USA,2016,pp.70
44[11.10.2016],http://www.ekathimerini.com/207946/article/ekathimerini/news/migrant-row-fuels-discordbetween-greece-and-the-former-yugoslav-republic-of-macedonia
45[12.10.2016] , http://www.utrinski.mk/default.asp?ItemID=B0AEDE8A37764E459F49DA577574DE3A
40
45
without skipping to condemn the use of force”46 “Macedonian President Gjorge Ivanov shot back
that it was Greece's job to prevent migrant incursions on its soil, a task he said Athens has
repeatedly failed to live up to.”47
The Macedonian newspaper “Utrinski” depicted the situation writing: “If it was not tragic, it
would have been funny because this scenario is repeated a second time, and meanwhile the two
countries have not taken any measures in order to coordinate situations like these, when it is
obvious that the nervousness among migrants stuck on Greek territory is growing.”48
The culmination was reached when Ambassador Theoharis Lalakos, made two official
severe demarches regarding the incidents that took place in Idomeni. As indicated on the website49 of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ambassador made it clear in the most
categorical manner that the use of violence in no way whatsoever contributes to the resolution of
the refugee problem and is in direct conflict with the relevant provisions of international and
humanitarian law. Furthermore, he called on the Macedonian authorities to rise to the occasion
and exhibit the proper responsibility, self-restraint and seriousness.
Both the Macedonian and the Greek media broadly reported on the demarches, as well as
on the reaction from the Macedonian Ministry of Interior. The Greek newspaper “Real”50
informed that in accordance to the announcement of the Macedonian Ministry of Interior,
Macedonian security forces were attacked with stones and other objects by refugees and migrants
in the illegal attempt for crossing the border, resulting with 23 injured members of the
Macedonian security forces (14 police officers and 9 soldiers) and caused material damage to three
police and five military vehicles. The Macedonian media added: “the "inhuman attitude",
according to the Greek authorities, was denied with the statement that the police did not use
anything other than tear gas, and their physical strength, pointing out the argument that none of
the migrants has been injured, although 300 sought medical help mainly because of wheezing.”51
The evident conclusion that the absence of coordination and cooperation produces
security risks for all the neighboring countries on the Balkan route, led to the summit on the
refugee crisis in Thessaloniki, hosted by the Greek foreign ministry in the period of April 21 April 22. The summit brought together Greece’s Foreign Minister Nikos Kotzias, Macedonia’s
Nikola Poposki, Bulgaria’s Daniel Mitovand Albania’s Ditmir Bushati. “The gathering spawned
further meetings, with agreement to hold further quadrilateral meetings every six months and, if
necessary, special meetings All four foreign ministries issued statements on the various meetings,
collective and bilateral.”52 Asked about the topics of the bilateral meeting with his Geek
Ibid
[13.10.2016],_http://www.ekathimerini.com/207946/article/ekathimerini/news/migrant-row-fuelsdiscord-between-greece-and-the-former-yugoslav-republic-of-macedonia
48[11.10.2016],http://www.utrinski.mk/default.asp?ItemID=B0AEDE8A37764E459F49DA577574DE3A
49[11.10.2016],_http://www.mfa.gr/en/current-affairs/statements-speeches/foreign-ministryannouncement-on-the-demarches-made-by-the-head-of-greeces-liaison-office-in-fyrom-with-regard-tothe-violent-incidents-in-idomeni.html
50[13.10.2016],http://www.real.gr/DefaultArthro.aspx?page=arthro&id=499632&catID=1
51[14.10.2016],http://www.utrinski.mk/default.asp?ItemID=B0AEDE8A37764E459F49DA577574DE3A
52[15.10.2016],http://sofiaglobe.com/2016/04/23/in-thessaloniki-foreign-ministers-pursue-solutions-tomigrant-crisis/
46
47
46
counterpart, the foreign minister Nikola Poposki stated for the Macedonian TV “Kanal 5”: “we
discussed issues concerning bilateral political and economic relations, the course of the
implementation of the Confidence-Building Measures and political consultations, as well as the
problems of the region”53. He explained that “the two ministers expressed willingness to continue
the co-operation related to the refugee crisis and migration as well as all other areas of mutual
interest, especially in the area of border control and prevention of border incidents…. In 2016 we
have moved in a situation where we do have cooperation. However, we have to be conscious that
still today activists, NGOs and human smugglers are co-operating across borders in an easier
manner than state institutions do.”54 The Geek foreign minister stressed out that the name issue
was not on the table. Furthermore, he underlined the need of further communication and more
frequent clarifications, announcing the upcoming bilateral meeting in Skopje.
Mr. Kotzias’s visit to Skopje on August 24 was in the spotlight of the Greek and the
Macedonian media. Despite his meeting with Nikola Poposki, he attended the on-going
Ambassadors’ council and had the opportunity to speak before the Macedonian diplomats. The
Greek newspaper “Avgi” noted “In a particularly turbulent political era for Macedonia, the
relations between Athens and Skopje, despite their occasional variability, are perhaps passing
through their best phase. That is at least what it seemed like from yesterday's visit of the Foreign
Minister Nikos Kotzias and his statements made after the meeting with his counterpart Nikola
Poposki.”55Under the title “Satisfaction of the implementation of CBM” it is further explained that
during the meeting, the two Foreign Ministers focused on reviewing of the progress of CBM and
cooperation in the fields of energy, infrastructure and education, and discussed the refugee crises.
The name issue was once again omitted from the agenda. Emphasising that a short-term
resolution of the name issue cannot be expected, the ministers sent a message that confidence
building will be the highest priority in the following period. MrKotzias added “as the confidence
is increasing, the problems become easier to resolve, and the framework for their resolution is
expanding.”56 Mr Poposki evaluated the meeting saying “Such steps have been taken, that in the
past we couldn’t even imagine to realize.”57During his stay in Skopje Mr Kotzias met as well the
President Gjorgje Ivanov and the Prime Minister Emil Dimitriev.
The refugee crisis has certainly not reached its end. “It is well understood that the inflow
of refugees and migrants is likely to continue for years and probably decades.”58Based on
unofficial information, in September the total number of refugees on the territory of Macedonia
was around 200, while the number of the refugees in Greece was estimated 59 50559. It can be
concluded that “the pressure from the refugee and migrant crisis, which Macedonia [as well as
[14.10.2016],http://www.kanal5.mk/vesti_detail.asp?ID=95709
Ibid
55[15.10.2016],http://www.avgi.gr/article/10845/7387043/ikanopoiese-gia-ten-ylopoiese-ton-moe#
56[17.10.2016],http://sitel.com.mk/kodzias-poposki-merkite-treba-da-ja-vratat-doverbata-sporot-za-imetokje-se-reshava-podocna
57[17.10.2016],http://sitel.com.mk/diplomatski-sovet-i-poseta-na-kodzijas-imeto-vo-senka-na-merkite-zagradenje-doverba
58[17.10.2016],http://carnegieeurope.eu/2016/02/04/how-refugee-crisis-will-reshape-eu/itj7
59[17.10.2016],http://kanal5.com.mk/vesti_detail.asp?ID=105192
53
54
47
Greece] experienced during the last year, has eased considerably.”60 However, in the light of the
uncertain outcome of the EU – Turkey agreement, the countries are not in a position to loosen
their focus on the refugee crises.
Certainly, the warning of the German Chancellor Angela Merkel “that closing Germany’s
borders to refugees could result in military clashes in the Western Balkans”61 “was an
overstatement”62. However, the fact that both Macedonia and Greece were unprepared to meet a
crisis of these dimensions, the existing national issues, the lack of capacity and the legacy of the
bilateral political disputes, at the beginning of the crises resulted with breakdowns of
coordination and exchanges of accusations. Their ultimate effect was a strain on the relations
between the countries. As the events were evolving, both of the countries started becoming more
aware that they cannot rely only on the decisions of the vulnerable and divided EU, but they
should take the helm of the essential part of the crises management, which was the first step
towards the measures for enhancement of the coordination. The frequent meetings served as the
most viable way for transformation of the damaging effects of the crises into a platform for
cooperation. Unlike the practice in the past, the focus on the meetings was shifted from the topics
that divide the countries to questions of mutual interest.
The significance of the media in the international relations and diplomacy can be viewed
through three main aspects: “1) when media manage to change foreign policy or international
relations agenda; 2) when media provoke actions/reactions by participants in the foreign policy
process or by actors in international relations; 3) when media initiate a distinct and firm change
in the public opinion about a decision, event or process in international affairs or foreign policy.”63
In regards to the refugee crises, and the relations between Macedonia and Greece, the role of the
media has been especially vital in portraying of the ongoing developments on the border, as well
as in the reporting and analysing the meetings between the state officials. By maintaining its
transparency, accuracy and objectivity, the media has the capacity to attain its role in reshaping
the public opinion in both of the countries. A positive public opinion towards the development
of the bilateral relations, free of prejudices and nationalism is undoubtedly a precondition for
further conduction of the confidence building measures.
However, the extraordinary complexity of the relations and the amplitude of their
variation shall keep the expectations of the public realistic. Certainly, the approach of the
countries towards the refugee crises resulted with creation of a firm foundation for future
cooperation. Will these positive steps lead to renewed bilateral relations, heavily depends on
numerous factors, among which the existence of political willingness is of utmost importance.
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49
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50
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51
“The Name Issue and the Media”
By Jelena Cvetkovikj (Ss. Cyril and Methodius University)
Abstract
This article is an micro picture about name dispute and the media highligting the thin line
between information and disinformation not only about name dispute, but also about episodes
with a serious consequences over the neighbor’s relations which are already complicated. It also
consider main roles of the media regarding the name issue: (de)mystification of the name issue,
(dis)information about proposals of solution of the issue of the name, creating the image of
external enemy, polarization of the public and (re)defining of identity. Since this dispute is
controversonal in many aspects and since it has important meaning not only in foreign policy of
Greece and Macedonia, as well in internal political constellation in both countries, it has been
interest subject for many journalists over the world because of its uniqueness in the history of
disputes that hinder not only bilateral but also multilateral relation, more or less for both
countries. The name dispute probably has a longest history of actuality in the media in both
countries and has been subject of many debates, projects, analytics, columns, interviews,
simulation of negotiations, statements from high-profile politicians and is a part of informative
news almost on a daily basis in a different context. Taking into consideration that the attitude of
the Macedonian media towards name issue deserves an extensive study, this article will present
just an brief overview of media coverage before and after NATO Summit in Bucharest
2008consideringit as a key-event not only about the name issue but also about the role of the
media towards this issue. Since this issue is the most exploited topic in the Macedonian media it
has been placed at the intersection of commercial interest of the media, the public/national
interest and confronted with responsibility of (dis)information due to high-sensitive issues of
identity and collective fear of possible implications in a case of change of the constitutional name.
Keywords: Macedonia, Republic of Macedonia, Greece, Hellenic Republic, media, name issue,
identity, European Union (EU), United Nations (UN), The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), media, journalism, public opinion, antiquisation.
Introduction
The name dispute is a constant topic in the media and it is mainly due to its long duration1, so the
More about the history of this dispute: Hristijan Ivanovski, The Macedonia-Greece dispute/differences
over the name issue: mitigating the inherently unsolvable, New Balkan Politics, Issue 14, 2013, p.48-80;
Името на Македонија: Зошто е важен спорот и како да се разреши МКГ – Извештај за Балканот Бр.
122, 10 декември 2001; Бриф за спорот со името: поранешни, безимени или..., НВО Инфоцентар,
Македонски центар за високо образование, Скопје, јули 2010; Спорот за името меѓу Македонија и
Грција, студентски проект, редактори: Светомир Шкариќ, Димитар Апасиев, Владимир Патчев, ЈП
Службен весник на Р.М., Скопје, 2008; Сашо Клековски, Спорот за името Македонија (ставови на
јавноста во Македонија), МЦМС, ИДСЦС, Скопје, 2011; The Macedonian-Greek Conflict: The Age Long
Conflict
between
the
Greeks
and
the
Macedonians,
[06.06.2016]http://www.historyofmacedonia.org/MacedonianGreekConflict/conflict.html;
1
52
Macedonia-Greece naming dispute seems as if it is set to join an infamous category of
international relations - that of the world‘s chronic unsolvable issues.2 The permanent relevance
of the negotiations, notes about importance of resolving the dispute in the annual reports of the
European Commission and notes about progress in EU integration, which is strategic
commitment of the country, and as well its central place in the foreign policy of the country. One
of the main reasons of constant actuality of this topic in the media and constant public interest
about it is the fact that from the outcome of the dispute also depends the strategic integration in
international organizations of the country, so the occupation of all the media, both print and
electronic, is more than evident.
When it comes to the name issue and reporting on that subject by the media, we are facing
episodes and examples that go beyond the issue of authenticity of the information as such and it
is in a close relation to, as it is known in theory, a classic propaganda3, defocusing the public with
speculation and spins4, while keeping a constant highlight of everything which is in a relation of
the issue in any from and context.5 The main aim of the media is to deliver the information,
investigate and actualize all the matters in the interest of public and in the case of Macedonian
media and its general attitude towards the name issue; we are witnessing the obsessive media
coverage of almost everything about the name dispute. Taking into consideration such an attitude
we estimate that the topic about media and the name issue deserves an extended study and this
article will present only few main roles of the media in Republic of Macedonia with special
observances of the media before and after 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest.
The NATO Summit in Bucharest 2008is the key-event when name issue got a complete
fame by the media and in the media, because before and after the summit the general interest of
the public about the name issue has increased as a consequences of the fact that the name issue
and its solution couldn’t be postponed anymore because its solution became additional criteria
for formal membership in international organization, causing even further dispute between the
countries to International Court of Justice6 which led this topic almost on a daily basis on a front
page in newspapers, got a primetime in almost every electronic media and was commented by
almost everyone in the country.7
Hristijan Ivanovski, The Macedonia-Greece dispute/differences over the name issue: mitigating the
inherently unsolvable, New Balkan Politics, Issue 14, 2013, p.48.
3See more about explanations and examples about propaganda model function in mass media: Noam
Chomsky, Edward S. Herman, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media,
Pantheon, 2002.
4 Жанета Трајковска: Спин-стратегии и политичко влијание врз новинарското известување: Спорот
за името како најшпекулативна вест во македонските медиуми, Политичка мисла:
Делиберализација во јавниот и медиумскиот простор, Година 13, број 49, март, Скопје 2015. стр. 1131.
5 Мониторинг на медиумите во Република Македонија, Медиумите и спорот за името, НВО
Инфоцентар, декември 2009; Мониторинг на медиуми: Во име на датумот, НВО Инфоцентар,
Македонски центар за европско образование, септември-ноември, 2012.
6Source: Unofficial Press Release of International Court of Justice about its judgment in the case concerning
Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995,
[06.06.2016]http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/142/16841.pdf
7More about the media and so-called Hague Process: Медиумско огледало 2011: Медиумите и „процесот
2
53
To present the role which media have in reports about the name issue and to encompass
their multiperspective reflectiveness towards the public, we will present a brief overview about
the typical roles of the media regarding the name issue:
- The role of the media in (de)mystification of the name issue;
- The role of the media in (dis)informing the public when reporting about the proposals of UN
mediator for resolving the name dispute;
- The role of the media in the creation of collective fear and portrayal of an external enemy
when reporting about the name dispute with a special emphasis on the role of media and hate
speech in the public;
- The role of the media in the polarization of the public: the division of traitors and patriots
about the name dispute; and
- The role of media in the (re)definition of Macedonian identity8 due to the name dispute.
The Role of the Media in (De)mystification of the Name Dispute in Macedonian Public
The Night before NATO Summit in Bucharest 2008
When in 2004 United States of America recognized the constitutional name of the Republic of
Macedonia9 and in the same year under the auspices of the United States the Adriatic Group was
formed by signing the Declaration of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership and Cooperation between
Republic of Macedonia, Republic of Albania and Republic of Croatia10 whose objective was to
create conditions for full membership to NATO of the signatories of the Declaration, the media
began to publish more information about possible barriers for Republic of Macedonia and its
NATO membership. Simultaneously with these political events, which have huge importance for
the country’s foreign policy and strategic aspirations, was actualized the name dispute with
Hellenic Republic, when the media as main instrument for informing subtly prevailed with news
and statements announcing both pessimism and optimism over the possible obstruction of
Republic of Macedonia’s membership in NATO, and in the future in EU as well. Until then the
Macedonian public was not familiar with all the details, aspects and reasons about the name
dispute and so began the phase of (de)mystification of the name dispute by the media to
Macedonian public.
Especially important milestone in the history of the dispute and its actualization in the
media happened after recognition of constitutional name of Republic of Macedonia by United
States of America and this event and all that followed have received unprecedented media and
public attention. As reported by daily newspaper Dnevnik “Macedonian state leadership and
almost all political leaders, both from government and opposition and all the people in the
во Хаг“, НВО Инфоцентар, Македонски центар за европско образование, декември 2011.
8The author of this article will use the constitutional names and adjectives derived from a constitutional
names of the countries which will be mentioned in this article considering it as a most appropriate
approach. The author of this paper refers to a principle of self-determination as core principle of
international law and reject in advance any suspicions about provocations due to existence of the
differences over the constitutional name of Republic of Macedonia.
9[06.06.2016] http://vecer.mk/makedonija/sad-ja-priznaa-makedonija-pod-ustavnoto-ime
10[06.06.2016] http://bit.ly/1S6aBkk
54
country have welcomed the USA’s decision”11, but even greater interest for the public and media
was attracted after a reactions from Greek politicians and Greek local media reported that “media
interrupted the program to announce the news about the recognition of Skopje by its
constitutional name by the USA”12 and “they urgently broadcast a statement by Greek Minister
of Foreign Affairs Molyviatis who delivered demarche to Washington.”13 News about recognition
from United States of America marked a new stage in the mystification of the dispute and spill a
speculations in the media that Hellenic Republic was faced with the recognition of the United
States of America and will change some positions in negotiations, which was proved to be a
classic disinformation for the public by the media and then appeared some other motives for
USA’s recognition of the constitutional name which further polarized the public and has denied
the media speculation that Hellenic Republic will succumb to pressure from USA. Ahead of the
NATO Summit in 2008 has reached an official confirmation from Athens which totally denied the
previously mentioned speculation about changes in Greek positions when Minister for Foreign
Affairs Dora Bakoyannis stressed that “Washington’s decision to recognize the constitutional
name was wrong and this decision in some circles in Skopje left the impression that Greek side
may derogate from discussion within the United Nations about the name of the state. She believes
that the authorities in Skopje have understood that Athens is committed to resolve the name
dispute before the NATO Summit in April.”14
As previously mentioned, despite the recognition of the constitutional name by United
States of America a key event in the dispute had the NATO Summit in Bucharest 2008. Ahead of
the summit the dispute has occupied most of the media which were dedicated to reporting about
preparation of Macedonian and Greek authorities over lobbying for their positions and
intensified diplomatic activities. The media actually made an atmosphere in the public as in ahead
of final match assuming the possible outcome and cheering for the team. The media reported as
about an auction for possible Greek veto, spectacularly presented the statements of foreign
diplomats who had favorably attitude about position of Republic of Macedonia and filled the
media space with news related to the dispute, (in)correct positions of the Greek side supported
by (not)justified statements of interlocutors as headlines in the press and headlines on television.
The public with great interest followed reports from reporters of Macedonian media in Hellenic
Republic, which just like their colleagues, informed in details about the reports in Greek media
regarding the name dispute. So again, there was an atmosphere with emotional charge and
excitement about further steps. Digital media, especially social networks and then currently
dominant forums were overwhelmed with endless discussions between citizens with attitudes
varied in a spectrum of ultra-radical to ultra-liberal.
So there was a phase of collective obsession with the name dispute, what is actually
dispute about with Greece and began a process in which is difficult to determine whether the
media mystify or demystify the dispute into the public eye accompanied by fierce debates over
whether the parties negotiate only about the name of the state for bilateral or international use
and/or also about the name of identity components of the people. This collective confusion came
[06.06.2016] http://star.dnevnik.com.mk/?pBroj=2601&stID=42977
[06.06.2016] Ibid.
13[06.06.2016] Ibid.
14[06.06.2016] http://vecer.mk/makedonija/bakojani-sad-zgreshi-shto-ja-prizna-makedonija
11
12
55
from media reports early before 2008. For example during 2006 media citied statements by Nikola
Dimitrov, a special envoy for negotiation about differences over name with Hellenic Republic
who claimed that “we discuss with Greece only for name for bilateral use”, excluding that there
is no opportunity to discuss the possibility for the name for international use citing the Resolution
917 of UN Security Council “which said that there will be talks between two sides to resolve
differences over the name and no implies or produces a result that we are talking about
international use of our name”. But when in 2006 appeared a statement in the media by Minister
for Foreign Affairs Dora Bakoyannis that “the name dispute is not a bilateral but an international
issue because about this case we are conducting negotiations in New York under the auspices of
the United Nations”. In the same statement for the BBC Bakoyannis stressed that “the Greek
Parliament, regardless of its composition, will never ratify the admission of the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia in European Union and NATO unless the name issue is
resolved...”.Therefore, the dispute has experienced a new phase in media mystification of the
dispute because the public was faced with another confusion regarding Greek positions about
accusation for territorial claims over its own northern province of Macedonia and security risks
for Greece and, among other things, it will hamper Euro-Atlantic integration of Republic of
Macedonia. This confusion came from the fact that Interim Accord guarantee territorial integrity,
so these accusations were briefly rejected as act of unsubstantiated accusation.
Breaking the Spirit of Confusion
Once it became clear that Greece has a decisive position to insist on resolving the issue before
formal membership of Republic of Macedonia in NATO an in the future in European Union, the
media began to exploit the topics about possible solution. Particularly interesting for the media
and with a great amount of sensationalism were presented statements which give views, ideas
and positions for (un)resolving the dispute, including the most prevalent theses that is possible
to negotiate about country’s name, but the solution must not jeopardize the identity of the people.
The public was especially interested (once again!) in whether dual name formula is still
impossible to be negotiated or there are only negotiations about name for general/international
use, because media had reported that dual formula has been rejected by Hellenic Republic and it
became a clear Greek position after NATO Summit in Bucharest 2008. And thereby media had
reported that Hellenic Republic put forward a position called erga omnes (towards everyone, in
relation to everyone).
Journalistic interest in these position contributed to the further mystification of the
dispute, so media had covered and reported about the means of this position and it came to the
point when it was clear that negotiations have been aggravated since it included components of
identity and a name for international use. А particular role in this context was leaded by the
media by actualizing the alternative policies and solutions about name dispute since it was also
clear that both countries have their own red lines which are irreconcilable and it means that there
is negotiation deadlock. As example, media have published many articles about (not) possible
alternatives which in their opinion would lead to overcome a negotiation deadlock. In such
articles few alternatives were suggested: implementation of judgment decision of International
Court of Justice which means that Hellenic Republic should act in a relation to the Interim Accord
and not obstructing the membership of Republic in Macedonia “in international, multilateral and
56
regional organizations and institutions of which the Party of the First Part is member”15 which
will means that Hellenic Republic violate the Interim Accord; Nimetz to initiate a resolution in
the Security Council that the dispute couldn’t be resolved which will lead to another resolution
and the dispute would be dealt at the higher level in United Nation; UN General Assembly voting
for joining the UN once again but not by provisional reference of the state; Secretary-General of
the UN Ban Ki-moon to be directly involved in negotiations in order to put pressure on leadership
from both countries reach a solution of the dispute by each side making concessions; putting
negotiations on hold and diplomatic lobbying.16 In parallel to this, media has forced one more
confusion and additionally mystify the dispute in the public by rejecting the dispute with Hellenic
Republic and insisting the dispute is only with United Nations so the solution should be sought
there.17
The Thin Line of Mystification and Demystification of the Name Dispute by the Media
Does the name of the country means also change of adjectives used to mark identity components?
Since the media have published articles that the change of the name of the state would lead also
a change of identity, it came to reaction from majority of citizens supported by the media and
some NGOs with some actions with dominant disagreement position towards change of
constitutional name. In that sense, few actions and protests had a great publicity and strong
support by the media, especially after Council of Europe’s documents which suggested that the
state should be called Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (usage of the acronym FYROM),
and the people, language and culture – Slavic Macedonian(s). Such campaign was organized by
Macedonian Centre for International Collaboration using the slogans Do not FYROM me! and Say
Macedonia! with main purpose, as it has been said by the organizer “to stimulate and organize
broad public action, in terms of supporting the affirmation and official use of the constitutional
name of the Republic of Macedonia on international level… the first part of the campaign was
directed towards the decree of the Council of Europe as of March 2, 2004, stipulating use of
inappropriate names for the state, the citizens as well as the national identity, culture and
language of ethnic Macedonians. During the campaign, 200.000 postcards were printed and
distributed with the message Say Macedonia, with an appeal to the citizens to send the postcards
to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg or the local office of the CoE in Skopje. The postcards were
distributed in cooperation with the leading daily newspapers in the country, which also provided
extensive media coverage and visibility of the action.”18 The aim of this campaign was “to
strongly oppose the causes that have led the drafting of the directive of Council of Europe, to
Article 11, section 1 of Interim Accord between Hellenic Republic and Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, 13 September 1995, Document 95-27886, United Nations.
16[06.06.2016] http://www.mkd.mk/makedonija/politika/igor-janev-kvazieksperti-i-defetisti-go-kochatreshavanjeto-na-problemot-soand
[06.06.2016] http://www.dnevnik.mk/default.asp?ItemID=7C9A9088155E7E448985BB471D34A7A2
17[06.06.2016] http://vecer.mk/makedonija/igor-janev-nemame-problem-so-grcija-tuku-so-obedinetitenacii
18[06.06.2016] http://mcms.org.mk/en/our-work/awareness-raising-and-campaigns/list-of-campaigns/328kazi-makedonija.html
15
57
prevent the circulation of similar documents in other international organizations.”19 Another
campaign which gain the media coverage was “Both NATO and Macedonia” that took place in
2008. As organizer of the campaign Macedonian Centre for International Collaboration explained
that “idea behind the campaign was affirmation of the endeavors made by Republic of Macedonia
for EU and NATO membership. Macedonia has been making significant progress in reforms and
development of its EU and NATO relations. Macedonia and its citizens have achieved agreement
on the need for its membership to EU and NATO. Macedonia, however, has the right for selfidentification which cannot be disputed.”20
In 2008 began the more intense reporting by the media about the essence of the dispute, namely
started another phase of the process of (de)mystification of the dispute to the public. This was
running into public reactions and as previously mentioned campaigns supported by the media,
а series of organized protest by NGO Mladite znaat(Youth know)had continued in Skopje and at
the front of Greek Liaison Office using the slogan Macedonia, Macedonian, Macedonians. The protest
was intensified after breaking the news that Macedonian state leadership discussed the proposal
of mediator Nimetz, before and after NATO Summit in 2008.21
The huge media attention continued and initiatives for organizing a public debates as well
interviews of a large number of people with different professional background. The public have
witnessed many statements, interviews and articles from pseudo-historians promoting flat-out
wrong explanations of historical background of the dispute, which additionally disappointed the
already disenchanted public. Pseudo-historians gained media publicity very easy because their
presentation of factual errors and bad assumptions were suitable for media sensationalism as a
commercial benefit. As a subject of critique for pointing about mystification of the dispute by the
media is the example when media reported about expiration of Treaty of Bucharest 1913 and
possible revision because as stressed by a president of political party TMRO22in his statement
“annex contains requirements which provide that if one of the occupied parts, as written in the
document, within 99 years become independent state then other states are obligated to return the
occupied territories. That part is lacking and wasn’t in the archive in Bucharest, according to the
source of TMRO annex is archived in London.”23 Since the public wasn’t fully aware of
untruthfulness of such a statements and claims by politicians and pseudo-historians and because
of media dedication for commercial benefit, such statements wasn’t treated with journalistic
practice of checking the reliability and get a confirmation by consulting other sources and it
resolve in deception of the public and additional mystification of the dispute.
However, fortunately not only these content with errors and disinformation gained media
attention. The public also have witnessed media contents which were credible and reliable to
consideration in a context of demystification of the dispute. As examples here we will mention
few debates, interviews and statements which are good examples for the purpose of brief
[06.06.2016] http://star.utrinski.com.mk/?pBroj=1427&stID=10693&pR=2
[06.06.2016] http://mcms.org.mk/en/our-work/awareness-raising-and-campaigns/list-of-campaigns/326i-makedonija-i-nato.html
21 [06.06.2016] http://bit.ly/1UGfwg7
22Non-parliamentary political party in Republic of Macedonia, Trajno makedonsko radikalno obedinuvanje
(TMRO), English: Permanent Macedonian Radical Reunion
23[08.06.2016] http://vecer.mk/makedonija/revizija-na-bukureshkiot-dogovor
19
20
58
overview of the role of media in demystification of the dispute in Macedonian public. Special
media interest attracted a public debate Negotiations about the name dispute with Greece –
demystification and output options held in May 2008 by the group of intellectuals. This debate
provided a chronology of the dispute and explained the challenges facing the Republic of
Macedonia if (not) resolve the dispute. The media reported about the views of Professor Ljubomir
D. Frchkoski24, trough whose statement completely demystified a public disagreement over
whether the dispute is a condition for Euro-Atlantic integration or not “after Bucharest we come
to the wall when inevitable outcome in negotiations is necessary if we want to join the EU and
NATO except the difference that now do not apply the same rules as in previous stage”25 At the
same debate in which focus among other thing was the demystification about red lines in
negotiations, the historian Todor Chepreganov26 stressed that “history cannot deny the fact of the
existence of the Macedonian people and nation, and if we talk about constitutional name we will
lose also that little dignity.”27
Aware of the impact that the media have in the name dispute many intellectuals accepted
the invitation from the media to speak clearly about the dispute and in to contribute to the correct
demystification of the problem, and thereby to reduce the hysteria in public due to media
obsessive briefings mostly with speculations. The media besides giving a space to irrelevant
interlocutors and pseudo historians also published some interviews with professional historians.
In that regard when historian Nade Proeva28 in her interview for daily newspaper Dnevnik was
asked whether the proof that modern Macedonians are descended from the ancient Macedonians
and might it be a requirement to defend the country’s name in the dispute with Greece has
pointed over the role of the media in the dispute, saying “I must tell you that journalists by
automatic transmission of news with statements from politicians and bureaucrats incorrectly
present this problem. In fact, we haven’t dispute with the name of our country, because it is
illogical for someone to have a dispute with their own name! There isn’t such an example in the
whole history of humankind! Greece is the one which have a dispute because of its problem to
face reality and its role in Macedonia in its recent history. So journalists as well as politicians once
and for always should stop with false labeling of this problem and should talk about “Greek
denial of our name”, but about a dispute with Greece over our name.29 In same manner, historian
Dalibor Jovanovski30 in his interview for weekly newspaper Republika was asked about the
Professor of International Law at Faculty of Law Iustinianus Primus – Skopje, former Minister of Interiora
and Minister of Foreign Affairs and a presidental candidate in 2009 elections.Seealso: Љубомир Данаилов
Фрчкоски, Карактерот на спорот за името меѓу Македонија и Грција, Промо ДСГ, 2009; Преговарање
во конфликт на идентитет. Темплум, 2007.
25[08.06.2016] http://www.utrinski.mk/?ItemID=777A8B725B2789408FEA6F7C8B5B4D32
26A retired doctor of historical sciences, scientific adviser and former Head of Institute of National History
in Skopje. See also: Nade Proeva, Savremeni makedonski mit kao odgovor na nacionalne mitove suseda:
albanski panilirizam, bugarski pantrakizam i grčki panhelenizam, Zgodowinski časopis, 64/1-2, 2010,
p.176-219.
27[08.06.2016] http://www.utrinski.mk/?ItemID=777A8B725B2789408FEA6F7C8B5B4D32
28Retired Professor of Ancient History at the Faculty of Philosophy – Institute of History – Skopje.
29[08.06.2016]http://www.dnevnik.mk/default.asp?ItemID=7332ED9AF38C3C4ABC8D7B6D5519CF75
30Associate Proffesor of Balkan History at the Faculty of Philosophy – Institute of History – Skopje
24
59
capacity of Greek science to accept the Macedonian reality said that “it takes time to change, and
perhaps we as generation would not be witnessing it. We should not delude our citizens that this
problem could be easily solved. Even if we achieve a solution with Greece which will not concern
our identity, it will take time for the Greeks to accept it.”31
The Role of the Media in (Dis)informing the Public when Reporting about the proposals of
UN mediator for resolving the name dispute
One of the most speculative roles of the media is reporting about the proposals of Special Envoy
of the United Nations Secretary-General on the name issue, Mr. Matthew Nimetz32 regarding
solution of the dispute, especially because possible solutions basically mean the closure of 24year-long dispute. The interest of the media for proposals and negotiation especially increased
before and after NATO Summit in Bucharest 2008 when it became clear that Greece is insisting
on erga omnes formula which include changes not only in the name of the state but also in
adjectives derived from the name of the state marking the components of identity.
In October 2005 Macedonian media had reported news about Nimetz proposals for
resolving the differences over the name between Hellenic Republic and Republic of Macedonia,
quoting the text of the proposal published in Greek newspaper Eleftherotypia.33 Media had
reported that “Nimetz proposal was presented on Friday night to both sides… and (the proposal)
was composed only of two words, Republic of Macedonia written in the Latin alphabet… This is
precisely the reason why Athens avoided engaging in talks about new proposal. Greek Ministry
for Foreign Affairs said yesterday that remains on their position – a requirement for negotiation
with Macedonia about the name dispute should be an earlier proposal by Nimitz. Athens
announced that new proposal will would be ignored as being very different from the previous
one and totally unacceptable.”34 Besides such reports from Greece, Macedonian media were
focused on reports about this proposal and reported “it creates and atmosphere in which it would
be possible that latest Nimetz’s proposal would be accepted. Namely, it would be counter attack
towards Greece for accusations of unconstructive approach from Macedonian side in negotiations
regarding the name dispute.”35This proposal gained wide publicity in the media especially after
the announcement that “an emergency session of the Government will be held and for the first
time attended by the President Branko Crvenkovski. The state leadership tonight will discuss
about Macedonian’s position regarding a new proposal by Nimetz, which was expressly rejected
by Greece yesterday.”36 After these announcements about emergency session of the Government
the media had initiated public debate about a new proposal and published many statements from
intellectuals that were perceived as precautions to the Government: “Macedonian Government
[08.06.2016]http://republika.mk/?p=26996
Matthew Nimetz is also a Personal Envoy of the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon.
[08.06.2016]http://www.un.org/undpa/en/europe/greece-fyrom
33Text of Document I: Proposed Statement by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General and
Document II: Main Points of Proposed Security Council Resolution
[08.06.2016]http://www.macedonian-heritage.gr/OfficialDocuments/Nimetz.html
34[08.06.2016]http://bit.ly/1WH6CSZ
35[08.06.2016] http://bit.ly/25Ooctw
36[08.06.2016] Ibid.
31
32
60
and its negotiator in New York should reject the latest Nimetz’s proposal because of prohibition
of use the adjective Macedonian because it is dangerous for Macedonian identity, culture and
history. Yesterday expert, intellectuals and academics have stressed these points on a debate
about the latest proposal.”37 This media interest had led to increased public pressure over the
state leadership and later it came to mutual accusation between the Government and the
President about rejection and acceptance of the proposal. So this first proposal from UN Mediator
resulted with speculations not about the proposal itself but about attitude of politicians towards
proposal. The public trough the media witnessed the classical political accusations based on
(dis)information in the media regarding acceptance and rejection of the proposal.
Second episode about (dis)informing the public through the media came along with
second proposal from UN Mediator in February 2008. Before official release of the second
proposal the media had speculated about possible content of the proposal with three names:
“composite name for Macedonia which would be used in a relations with Greece and
international organizations, the constitutional name for bilateral use in a relation with countries
that have recognized Macedonia’s constitutional name – was a draft proposal for a solution of the
name according the speculations in Greek media… but this proposal would be rejected because
Athens has already issued a statement in which advocate a name for Macedonia for general
use.”38Daily newspaper Dnevnik in February published an (dis)information based on quoted
diplomatic sources that “Bakoyannis on Thursday will try to take an advantage of personal
friendship with Condoleezza Rice in order to impose a Greek plan… Republic of New Macedonia
in English is a proposal about the new name of Republic of Macedonia forced by Greece.”39 Few
days later the media had published that Matthew Nimitz “gave a new proposal… but it will
remain secret until the governments in Skopje and Athens declare whether proposal is acceptable
for both countries.”40
According to diplomatic sources daily newspaper Dnevnik published an article with
details about new proposal by qualifying it as “scandalous proposal the mediator Matthew
Nimetz” and explaining the details of the proposal “Nimetz has proposed a new name that would
be used in all international organizations and would be included in the passports of Macedonian
citizens, and suggest to the countries that have recognized Macedonia under its constitutional
name to reconsider their decision… it indicates that he is advocating a name for domestic,
bilateral and international use… for that purpose Nimetz has suggested the following names:
Democratic Republic of Macedonia, New Republic of Macedonia, Independent Republic of
Macedonia and Constitutional Republic of Macedonia.”41The media has speculated about state
official positions regarding this proposal and as reported by Utrinski vesnik, according their
sources, “the answer would be that for Macedonian side in negotiations Independent Republic of
Macedonia and Democratic Republic of Macedonia are acceptable names and the chosen name
would have to be confirmed at a referendum by citizens”42 Such speculations were not confirmed
[08.06.2016] http://bit.ly/1UGfwg7
[08.06.2016] http://www.dnevnik.mk/default.asp?ItemID=D7490499AD700C4995C6F868B4B6625B
39[08.06.2016]http://www.dnevnik.mk/default.asp?ItemID=7D802C4BCD5EC148B2678B67B6331C66
40[08.06.2016]http://www.dnevnik.mk/default.asp?ItemID=7CEA6CAC08EA3D4A98FB2AE7EE889E72
41[08.06.2016]http://www.dnevnik.mk/default.asp?ItemID=4050F5542CB4954FA6489B762D49786F
42[08.06.2016]http://www.utrinski.mk/default.asp?ItemID=E68DC90B83757C47AA7FD84893691A5C
37
38
61
by state officials, but such speculations caused an public euphoria and contribute to the process
of polarization of the public regarding the name issue and proposals for its solutions broadly
discussed in continuation of this article.
Few days after such speculation in the media Utrinski vesnik and other media had reported
that “state leadership have not accepted Macedonia to be either “independent” or “democratic”,
although these two proposals from Matthew Nimetz by political statements in public were
assessed as the only acceptable proposals for compromise about name issue with Greece”.43 Such
media reports were additional reason for confusion in the public and one additional example of
media disinformation which resulted into public confusion about state official denials regarding
Nimetz’s proposals. Political statements and media reports have not answered, but have raised
questions: What is acceptable or what had been accepted by state officials?
Before announced proposal from March 2008, media had quoted some of their colleagues
from foreign media covering the meeting in Vienna between Macedonian and Greek negotiators
Vassilakis, Dimtriov and Nimetz and published an information about possible variants of the
name: Upper, New or Republic of Macedonia (Skopje).44Third proposal was announced in March
2008 – Republic of Macedonia (Skopje) and this proposal was integrally published in the media.45
As reported, the Republic of Macedonia will be a name for domestic use and Republic of
Macedonia (Skopje) is proposed as a name for international use which “will be used exclusively
among international institutions, while the more than 120 countries that have already recognized
Macedonia under its constitutional name would be advised to use the new name but will have
no obligation to do so”;46neither side will have exclusive right/use of the adjective
“Macedonian.”47 Immediately after the announcement of the new proposal, the media
highlighted it as a main topic and it became a focus of attention in the public. Media reports after
this proposal created a tense atmosphere in the public as a reflection of tense political
constellation since the President Crvenkovski and Prime Minister Gruevski had different views
regarding the proposal. According to anonymous sources from Prime Minister’s Office published
in the media these differences were confirmed and stressed that “it is difficult to hope for
harmonized position, because there are serious problems and differences among political
parties.”48
In June 2008, media speculated that the name “New Macedonia” would not be one of the
Nimetz’s proposals because “Macedonia already reject it as unacceptable.”49In August 2008 the
Macedonian media had quoted a Greek newspaper To Vimaand according to their diplomatic
sources the new proposal “Northern Macedonia” had already been presented to the authorities
in Athens and Skopje.50 According to unconfirmed information four variants of the name had
been proposed: “Republic of Northern Macedonia”, Republic of Macedonia (Northern)” and
[08.06.2016] http://www.utrinski.mk/default.asp?ItemID=8632D178E503FF4487811281F01D16B2
[08.06.2016] http://www.utrinski.mk/default.asp?ItemID=BCB5551FE36E594E92B43DC992B2F754
45[08.06.2016] http://www.utrinski.mk/default.asp?ItemID=C36FF2AD55744045834D380ABA4FDDD0
46[08.06.2016] http://www.utrinski.mk/default.asp?ItemID=C36FF2AD55744045834D380ABA4FDDD0
47[08.06.2016] Ibid.
48[09.06.2016] http://www.utrinski.mk/default.asp?ItemID=1E10F8337830FC4A9B1BD4EE96B5EE59
49[09.06.2016] http://www.dnevnik.mk/default.asp?ItemID=ABCF9DC812FDAD4C9D03C7D53FC126A0
50[09.06.2016] http://www.dnevnik.mk/default.asp?ItemID=FEBCD9EB8F118A4DBE78F89CF4AE4BE5
43
44
62
“Northern Republic of Macedonia”.51
Such speculations had not been confirmed or denied by the UN Mediator Matthew
Nimetz, so in his statement after meeting with Greek and Macedonian negotiator he stressed “I
have presented some ideas in the past, now I presented some revised ideas in front of both
delegations and asked them for serious consideration as a framework for the solution of the
issue.52In October 2008 Macedonian newspaper Dnevnik published an integral version of the
proposal which include a change of constitutional name (Republic of North Macedonia), i.e. name
for domestic and international use, non-exclusive right for use of noun “Macedonia” and
adjective “Macedonian(s)”.53
The role of the media in the polarization of the public: the division of traitors and patriots
about the name dispute
The media reports about UN Mediator’s proposals for resolving the name issue have contributed
to fiery debate in the media. The process of polarization of the public began with a polarization
of political scene and has also impacted the polarization of the entire society. At the time before
and after NATO Summit in Bucharest 2008 a cohabitation existed between VMRO-DPMNE and
SDSM, represented by the Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski and by the President of the Republic
of Macedonia Branko Crvenkovski that additionally complicated the already complicated
internal political constellation.
The beginning of polarization of the public is closely related to meetings for coordination of state
leadership regarding proposals of UN Mediator Matthew Nimetz. The media had reported about
different attitudes of the President Branko Crvenkovski and the Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski
pointing out as the main reason for the impossibility to coordinate the state positions over the
Nimetz’s proposals which was confirmed by the statement of the President Crvenkovski “In
several occasions I said that it is happening that we have differences increasingly being from a
tactical nature, in terms of tactics, but at the end we have ultimate goals and no differences, so we
have harmonized positions.”54
The media had reported about “ping pong accusation and counter-accusation in a
relationship of Prime Minister – President about issue with Greece”55 and “Gruevski had
requested from Crvenkovski to come up with a plan for resolving the name issue… Mr.
Crvenkovski had avoided to answer the question about how he is planning to resolve the
issue…”56 Such accusation have developed into main political topic for political benefit between
ruling coalition parties and oppositional parties.
The public had witnessed through the media such accusations during political campaigns
on a relation between ruling parties and opposition. The media had reported about rude political
rhetoric which had been used in the statements of high-profile politicians. For example, Mr.
Gruevski as Prime Minister once stressed that “It is impossible to sell something that has already
[09.06.2016] Ibid.
[09.06.2016] http://www.utrinski.mk/default.asp?ItemID=D2295DE4C8525D44A6685AA9828DB22D
53[09.06.2016] http://www.dnevnik.mk/default.asp?ItemID=9CE7EEBB4F0F6841AA320398A021C61E
54[09.06.2016] http://www.bbc.co.uk/macedonian/news/story/2008/03/080321_zlatko21.shtml
55[09.06.2016] http://utrinski.mk/?ItemID=4D3278DAF807144FB05BBEA1C3BBA38F
56[09.06.2016] Ibid.
51
52
63
been sold by Branko Crvenkovski in 1995. In EU, NATO and United nation we are FYROM
because Branko made such decision without asking the citizens for their opinion. Now we are
fighting to regain the name Macedonia”57; “The price paid by Macedonia with Gruevski in
Bucharest was double zero. He went to Bucharest with agreement for changed name, and return
without NATO invitation.”58 These examples are only quoted to illustrate the type of rhetoric
which had been used, and unfortunately is still in use by Macedonian politicians but with reduced
intensity. Such a rhetoric was promoted and actualized through the media profiling politicians,
public opinion makers and intellectuals as pro-government or pro-opposition and drew a line,
which differs their positions towards the name issue.
Such statements and accusations among politicians had influenced and resulted as polarization
of the entire society which reflected in the media. The polarization of the public could be marked
by two contrasting positions: pro and cons compromise about the name issue or traitors and patriots.
These position also affected the attitude of the public toward strategic priorities of the country
reflected into binary positions: NATO or the name, EU or the name.
The polarization had been affected by the media and reached the extreme points,
especially at the so called new media (social media and platforms as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube,
etc.), using general inappropriate and stereotyped language.
The role of media in the (re)definition of Macedonian identity due to the name dispute
Тhe polarization of the public appeared and grew out debates over the proposals to resolve the
name issue slightly changed into process of (re)defining of Macedonian identity supported by the
media. This process started with actualizing the question of the origins of the nation and ethno
genesis of the modern Macedonian nation and this process had driven by defensiveness over
problematizing of the identity occurs in a parallel of the name issue.59
A central question in a context of (re)definition of the identity which was represented in
the media was about the dominant component of ancient Macedonians or Slavs. The media begin
to publish articles about denial of some historical facts and affirm some problematic thesis not
confirmed by historiography or any other scientific field. For example, а migration of Slavs was
denied due to sensational articles in the media claiming that “Slavs went from the fringes of the
Carpathians never arrived in Macedonia.”60 Such claims based on pseudoscience and published
in the media raised the public interest and increased the polarization which already existed. A
redefinition of identity and polarization of the public was strengthened not only about pseudo
based debates over the ethno genesis of modern Macedonians, but also because of the Skopje 2014
Project that is an irrational response to an irrational denial of identity.
To describing the atmosphere of redefinition of identity the journalist Zoran Ivanov says:
“The government’s political and propaganda machine very strongly imposed to the Macedonian
public a psychosis of an alleged loss of national identity. It so much that frustrates, it was so
[09.06.2016] http://www.zurnal.mk/content/?id=20133684031
[09.06.2016] http://www.utrinski.mk/default-mk.asp?ItemID=65485D1B427CAD478F1387DFBB9B01E8
59See more: Anastas Vangeli, Antiquity Musing: Reflections on the Greco-Macedonian Symbolic Contest
over theNarratives of the Ancient Past, Budapest, Hungary, 2009.
[09.06.2016] www.etd.ceu.hu/2009/vangeli_anastas.pdf
60[09.06.2016] http://dnevnik.mk/default.asp?ItemID=ABDB8D731BB8314990C095C14580969A
57
58
64
heavily that scared journalists, professors, columnists, analysts, artists and all others from public
profession that gives them the ability, and so a personal integrity and credibility, to be a
correctives of political processes.”61
According to Natasha Ilievska-Tanevski and her thesis about reconstruction of characteristic of
the Macedonian national identity and important role of the media in that process, states that there
are several projects supported and promoted through the media and influence the reconstruction
of national identity, as: Project Skopje 2014; The Macedonia Timeless; The Natality; Attitude
towards the EU and NATO; Attitude towards neighboring countries (Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia,
Albania); Attitude towards sport, archeology and history.62
The so-called antiquisation is a term favored by the media to describe the process of
reactions about irrational denial of identity and many Macedonian media had contributed in that
process by promoting quasi-scientific doctrines in a manner that threatens to put aside all the
scientific knowledge and standpoints of Macedonian historiography63 and related scientific fields
regarding Macedonian identity. The media had created an artificial atmosphere and imposed the
theme about redefinition of identity by questioning the historiography and other relevant
scientific fields; such atmosphere resulted in uninformed and manipulated public, promoting
sensational statements by incompetent interlocutors and abuse of history for political gain.
What was lost, but was very easy to get media attention was the fact that a territory that belongs
to the Republic of Macedonia has its cultural and historical heritage even from ancient times and
“Alexander was in fact Macedonian, in a sense of that word that's long dead.”64
Conclusion
To sum up, the role of the media in (de)mystification of the dispute has several main features,
including:
- Expression of interest and giving a space for explanation of the dispute by (i)relevant
interlocutors with a motive to demystify the issue to the public;
- Giving a media space and transmit almost all statements by politicians of any profile and seek
for the opinion of intellectuals, encouraging a public debates about the subjects of
negotiations and thus mystify the dispute in the public;
- Because of actualization of the dispute by and in the media the pubic becomes more informed.
Also the media and NGOs initiated campaigns to preserve the change of constitutional name;
- Because of actualization of the dispute in the media, the public became more interested in
public debates and polemics encouraged by the media, primarily because after the Greek veto,
[09.06.2016] http://proverkanafakti.mk/identitetot-stravot-i-atrofiranata-politichka-i-intelektualna-misla/
Наташа Илиевска-Таневски, Редефинирање на културната меморија на националниот идентитет
– а бре, Македонче vs ÜberMacedonische, 3(4), Култура, Скопје, стр. 153-162.
61
62
As example, Macedonian media had failed to put in focus in order to inform the public about one of the
key articles that analyze the corrosion of science versus pseudoscience, see: Војислав Саракински,
Дискретна смрт на методологијата, Историја, 42.1-2, 2006, стр. 165-177.
64[09.06.2016]
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/jun/25/macedonia-greece-balkanstereotype
63
65
at the NATO Summit in Bucharest 2008, it was clear that the solution of the name dispute
became an additional requirement for formal membership in NATO and additional
requirement for starting of negotiations with the EU, which demystified the position that the
dispute is a precondition for Euro-Atlantic integration.
The main result from still ongoing process of (de)mystification of the name dispute was almost
constant collective fear and public curiosity over the dispute, as well as fear for possible resolution
of the dispute involving changes in adjectives that mark components of identity. Therefore, the
media were constantly dedicated to all details about name proposals for resolving the name
dispute as discussed broadly in previous part of this article. Also this role of the media left a
collective perception that the dispute is unsolvable because of negotiation deadlock that could
not be exceeded since both countries have strong so called red lines and are not willing to cross
them.
Regarding the role of the media in (dis)informing the public when reporting about the proposals
of UN mediator for resolving the name dispute this article briefly reconstruct the media reports
about the proposals which had gained enormous public and as well media attention. Those
proposals and the lack of information about official state positions were main reasons for media
to speculate about possible acceptable proposal(s) due to confidential character of the meetings
for coordination about official state positions. Some leaks from those meetings and not carefully
formulated political statements, were used by the media in order to satisfy the interest of the
public about the positions of the Macedonian negotiation party. Those speculation and
disinformation, leaked in the media from some media’s sources, create a polarization of the
Macedonian public as a direct consequence of name issue. Such media speculations create an
atmosphere of spectacle reflecting in deterioration of the internal political constellation and a fiery
debate over the proposals in the media.
The role of the media in the polarization of the public could not be accurately determined
because there were examples when the media had contributed to polarization, but also there were
examples when the role of the media was only to transmit the information. The fine line that
could not determine the role of media arises and lies between freedom of the press and the
apparent (ab)use of that concept as an excuse for media irresponsibility that affecting such public
polarization.
To reconstruct the role of the media in redefinition of Macedonian identity there should be briefly
consider few more characteristic roles of the media in this process:
- Putting history to the question, especially historiography through reports and
sensationalizing the statements of pseudo historians;
- Uncritical transmission of information about components of identity;
- Creating uncertainty and distrust of the public towards scientists, especially to historians;
- Encouraging further polarization of the public regarding identity;
- Using inappropriate language and stereotyped rhetoric, when informing about the name
issue, etc.
However, it is interesting to note that, unfortunately, Macedonian media were faced with
many critics not only about reports and their behavior towards the name issue, but also about
their general condition and attitude. The media in Republic of Macedonia have been placed at the
center of acute political instability and linked into broader social context as well. Besides that, this
66
article intended to divide the important and significant roles of the Macedonian media regarding
name issue and the author stands at the position mentioned before: the media and name issue
deserves an extended study, so this article is only a micro picture about this subject and basic
inspiration for further research, which besides the aspects reviewed in this article, should analyze
the role of the media towards the name issue in internal politics and especially in political
campaigns during the elections.
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68
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69
“Albanian Immigrants in Greece and Their Perceptions and Views on
the Macedonian Issue”
By Detjon Gjocaj (Panteion University)
Abstract
In this short presentation, we will try to outline the attitudes of the second largest population
group living in Greece, namely Albanians, on the Macedonian issue and the disputes between
the Greek and the Macedonian state. We will trace their discourse, perceptions and views on the
main topics of dispute and disagreement, as they are expressed in the official discourse and
adopted by the vast majority of the population in the two countries. The aim of this work is
through the examination of the attitudes of the Albanian immigrants residing in Greece on the
Macedonian issue, to trace influences of Albanian and Greek nationalism in their discourse. The
result could be used as an initial indication of their identity and the strategies immigrants
develop in the host societies. Further on we try to illustrate if they are affected by the Greek
nationalistic discourse or by the Albanian one, or by both and to what extent.
Keywords: Albanian immigrants, Macedonian issue, nationalism, nationalistic discourse.
Introduction
The Greek – Albanian relations began after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the demise of
communism in Albania at the beginning of the 1990s. It is estimated that between 1991 and 1996
about 600,000 irregular immigrants came to Greece, around 35 % of whom were Albanians. In
2001 foreigners in Greece were 762,000, the majority of whom, as many as 56 % were Albanians.
However, it is estimated by some researchers that between 2009 and 2013 approximately 110,000
Albanians returned to Albania from Greece as a result of becoming unemployed due to the
economic crisis. A considerable number of Albanians remained in Greece, per their narration,
because of their children who attended Greek schools1. In any case, there are more than 400,000
Albanian citizens holding a residence permit in Greece, while a few thousands have already been
granted the Greek citizenship. In fact, in these figures we should add ca. 200,000 Albanian citizens
residing in Greece who are classified by the Greek state as “of Greek origin”. Most of them have
granted Greek citizenship, or hold special residence permits.2 As they strongly identify
themselves as Greeks, they were not included in our research.
We will see in this survey how some immigrants may reject their own ethnic or/and
national identity, others may insist on their homeland national narration and some others can
combine the nationalistic discourse of both countries3.
Artur Adamczyk. '' Albanian immigrants in Greece : from unwanted to tolerated ? '', Institute for Research and
European Studies – Bitola, June 15, 2016. 2 – 8. Accessed October 25, 2016. url : http://ejlia.com/papers/5_4.pdf
2For all the above see Lambros Baltsiotis, “Immigration and data recording”, Chronos, 20, 2014, Accessed
October 25, 2016, url: http://chronosmag.eu/index.php/l-baltsiotis-immigration-and-data-recording.html.
3Jean S. Phinney, Gabriel Horenczyk, Karmela Liebkind, Paul Vedder, '' Ethnic identity, Immigration, and
Well – being : An interactional Perspective '' , Researchgate, January, 2001. 494 – 495, Accessed October 25,
1
70
The survey was based on a questionnaire with ten open questions. In this survey were
interviewed eight people aged from 19 to 56 years old. One of the few common features of the
participants in this research was the fact that they were all emigrated to Greece in the late 1990s,
that means they reside in the country for more than 15 years. Obviously, the sample is too small
to reach any conclusions, but still the answers are quite characteristic and permit us to assume
that they “fit” to general trends.
Survey
At this point I will attempt to analyze the answers given by the respondents in this
survey. With the first question (“What are the first words that come to your mind when you hear the
word Macedonia?”), I pursue to locate the first spontaneous thought that Albanian immigrants
make when they hear such a debated term for the Greeks as “Macedonia”.
The first thoughts are connected initially with historical figures like Alexander the Great
and then with the name issue. The connection with significant historical persons like Alexander
the Great could be considered reasonable if we consider the fact that all persons participated in
this research have either studied in Greek educational system or live in Greece for a long time.
The answers seem to remind us the importance of the educational system of providing a person
with narrations on the past independently of his/her ethnic or national identity. This is the case
with many immigrant communities that have studied in the educational system of their “new”
nation state4. A typical example is the response of Ingli, 19 years old5. “The first word which comes
in my mind when I hear the word Macedonia are Alexander the Great and generally the glorious past of
Macedonia.”
As to the geographical location of Macedonia the younger participants who are either
born or have studied in Greece define it as Northern Greece. Unlike older immigrants such as
Martin 56 years old who told us6 : “Macedonia is in the geographical area of Macedonian state, which
was created after the fall of United Yugoslavia.”
On the third question (what do you know about the state of Macedonia?) almost all
participants seem to know the demographic/ethnic composition of Macedonia and claim that the
Albanian population is almost 40% of the total population of the country, showing us a much
bigger percentage than the real one. A typical example is that of Nick 27 years old who told us7 :
“Macedonia is a poor country with no significant historical persons, I also know that Albanians are the
second in population after Bulgarians.”
We could say that the answer of Nick give us a very important fact. Albanian and Greek
nationalisms use the argument that in Macedonia live Bulgarians and Albanians, only to
dismantle the existence of a Macedonian nation. An argument connected with the Albanian
ancient and indigenous origin which seems to be a very strong belief within the Albanian national
discourse. In the above answer one might see a co-existence of Greek and Albanian national
2016, url : https://www.researchgate.net/publication/50894480_Ethnic_Identity_Immigration_and_WellBeing_An_Interactional_Perspective
4Ibid.
5Ingli 19 years old, interviewed by Detjon Gjocaj, September 7, 2016.
6Martin 56 years old, interviewed by Detjon Gjocaj, August 8, 2016.
7Nick 27 years old, interviewed by Detjon Gjocaj, August 8, 2016.
71
discourse. Additionally, this answer reassures the fact that some immigrants emphasize on their
ethnic identity as a response to integration process in the new society8.
A different understanding about Macedonia was that of Agim, 48 years old, who claimed
that the powerful countries created the Macedonian state. He also supported that Macedonia is
an “in-existent country” concerning its historical past,9 once more reaffirming the significance of
origin and antiquity in most of the Balkan nationalisms.
On the question about the name issue most participants argue that there is a
differentiation between Albanians residing in Greece and Greeks, a confrontation which affect
them. They support that Albanians usually use the term Macedonia referring to the Macedonian
state (the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia). However, they avoid to use the term
Macedonia when they talk with Greeks wishing to avoid tensions. The use of two different terms
depending on who is the other person provide us the conjecture that many immigrants use the
term “Skopje” or FYROM only to avoid conflicts. A typical example is the answer of Nick 27 years
old: “Albanians name it Macedonia, especially when they talk to each other. Personally, I use both terms,
when I talk with Greeks I use the term Skopje. However, sometimes I use the term Macedonia when I talk
with Albanians.”
It is worth mentioning that in the interviews which took place in Albanian language the
participants usually used the term Macedonia referring to the Macedonian state. On the other
hand, when the procedure took place in Greek language most participants shifted to the terms
“Skopje” or FYROM.
Another important fact is that one participant declined to comment on the name issue,10
probably due to a self-censorship procedure, as the acceptance of the name Macedonia for the
state might label one in Greece as “anti-Greek”.
Concerning the confrontation between Greece and Macedonia (FYROM) I highlighted two
main views. The younger participants supported that Greece's views are the right ones. A typical
example of this is the answer of Kristina 21 years old11 : “I think that Greece is partly right, in my
opinion is a duty of every nation to safeguard its cultural history from falsification.”
On the other hand, the older participants as Martin 56 years old supported that Macedonia
(FYROM) “is right”, because all the other countries name it Macedonia. He also said that the term
“Skopje” is used only in Greece, confirming my strong belief that even though older immigrants
have lived in Greece for many years, they are still connected with homeland's life. In my opinion
one of the reasons for that connection is the short distance between Greece and Albania which
allows frequent visits to the homeland and therefore influences by the Albanian discourse.
On allegations of Greece on the Macedonian issue, almost all the participants support that
behind the Greek fear for their historical heritage lies the fear of Greeks for their territorial
integrity. They also believe that Greece has nothing to be afraid of, because Macedonia is a poor
Jean S. Phinney, Gabriel Horenczyk, Karmela Liebkind, Paul Vedder, '' Ethnic identity, Immigration, and
Well – being : An interactional Perspective '' , Researchgate, January, 2001. 494 – 495, Accessed October 25,
2016. url : https://www.researchgate.net/publication/50894480_Ethnic_Identity_Immigration_and_WellBeing_An_Interactional_Perspective
9Agim 48 years old, interviewed by Detjon Gjocaj, September 24, 2016.
10Sofia 26 years old, interviewed by Detjon Gjocaj, September 13, 2016.
11Kristina 21 years old, interviewed by Detjon Gjocaj, September 9, 2016.
8
72
and weak country, hiding, once more, a form of subversion for the Macedonians. A typical
answer is the one of Elvis 26 years old:12 “Greece is afraid of losing Northern Greece. Personally, I do
not think there is such a risk, Skopje is a poor country and cannot accomplish [such visions].”
Finally, it is worth mentioning the opinion of Albanian immigrants in Greece for ethnic
Albanians in Macedonia (FYROM). All the participants in the research claimed that Albanians in
Macedonia are mistreated by the state, its mechanisms and other extremist groups acting in the
country. According to them, the fact that Albanians in Macedonia live as an oppressed minority
has made them warm supporters of Albania which seems to be welcomed by some interviewed
persons like Nick 27 years old. “I have never met any Albanian from FYROM. I know that they face
problems because of their origin. I also know that they are patriots, they support the Albanian football
national team in every game.”
They also maintain the view that Albania should support ethnic Albanians in Macedonia
(FYROM). According to their answers, Albanians must help them to overcome the difficulties
created by the fact that they consist a minority. A typical opinion about that is the position of
Martin, 56 years old, who told us : “Albania has to help them to keep their contact with homeland. They
should cooperate with political parties of ethnic Albanians in FYROM to safeguard the rights of the
Albanian minority.”
Some persons strongly claimed that Albania has to promote the Albanian language and
culture in the Macedonian state. A fact which shows us that some Albanian immigrants do not
know that schools in which the curriculum is taught in Albanian language exist in the country or
the fact that Albanian language is recognized as the second official language in the Macedonian
state, providing once again that the information many persons usually have about a minority is
connected to political views and national perceptions.
Another important finding is that some participants claimed that Macedonian state has to
respect the rights of Albanian minority as indeed does Albania with minority groups living in
Albanian territory. Providing once again the opinion that “We do everything they want and they still
mistreat us”, a common belief in Albania.
Conclusion
Based on the findings one could argue that Albanian immigrants in Greece are quite aware of the
Macedonian issue. We observed that they are better informed about the internal affairs of the
Macedonian state than the average Greek, due to the information they get by Albanian mass
media and consequently the dominant political views in Albania on Macedonia (FYROM).
However, younger immigrants who have grown up and studied in Greece are aware of the name
issue and most of them claim that the Greek side is the right one. The right of the Greek side is
documented for them primarily thanks to historical arguments and criteria, which means that we
can hardly distinguish between Greek and Albanian influences in this perception as in both
countries historical arguments of the far past are of significant importance in the national
narrations.
Elvis 26 years old, interviewed by Detjon Gjocaj, September 7, 2016.
12
73
References
[1] Adamczyk Artur. '' Albanian immigrants in Greece : from unwanted to tolerated ? '', Institute for
Research and European Studies – Bitola, June 15, 2016. 2 – 8. Accessed October 25, 2016. url : http://ejlia.com/papers/5_4.pdf
[2] Baltsiotis Lambros, “Immigration and data recording”, Chronos, 20, 2014. Accessed October
25, 2016, url: http://chronosmag.eu/index.php/l-baltsiotis-immigration-and-data-recording.html.
[3] Phinney Jean S., Gabriel Horenczyk, Karmela Liebkind, Paul Vedder, '' Ethnic identity,
Immigration, and Well – being : An interactional Perspective '', Researchgate, January, 2001. 494 – 504.
Accessed
October
25,
2016,
url:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/50894480_Ethnic_Identity_Immigration_and_WellBeing_An_Interactional_Perspective
Interviews
1. Martin 56 years old, interview by Detjon Gjocaj, August 8, 2016.
2. Nick 27 years old, interview by Detjon Gjocaj, August 8, 2016.
3. Ingli 19 years old, interview by Detjon Gjocaj, September 7, 2016.
4. Elvis 26 years old, interview by Detjon Gjocaj, September 7, 2016.
5.Kristina 21 years old, interview by Detjon Gjocaj, September 9, 2016.
6. Sofia 26 years old, interview by Detjon Gjocaj, September 13, 2016.
7. Agim 48 years old, interview by Detjon Gjocaj, September 24, 2016
8. Nexhmije, 51 years old, interview by Detjon Gjocaj, September 29, 2016
74
“From Millet to Nation: Building on a Wrong Foundation?”
By Ivan Ivanov (Ss. Cyril and Methodius University)
Abstract
The challenges of living in the XXI century remain as a result of unresolved issues of the XX
century. We are witnessing a social complexity, which stems from societies that are becoming
increasingly multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic and multi-religious. These conditions are provoked by
major migrant waves and movements, which are at their inception. This paper aims to elaborate
issues considered as not sufficiently explored and issues that are a possible reason for ethnic
conflicts because of the failure of nation states (Westphalian model) to integrate all those
particularities of the complexity inherent to the multi-ethnic empires. One of the historical forms
of coexistence and religious tolerance between different religious groups is the so-called Millet
system from the Ottoman period. Although it is perceived from a purely historical aspect and
represents a legacy or even better a relic from the past, it may serve as a guidance for the present
and future times. This model, or rather the positive experiences derived from it, might be useful
for the creation of inclusive models in European societies with an aim to integrate migrants.
However, there are obvious differences between the respective integration models in Macedonia
and Greece, whose implications can be felt even today. Greece based its model of nation building
on integration through assimilation, whereas Macedonia persists on its model of integration
without assimilation. However, today we can finally note that the pre-conditions have been
created for us to stop observing the world through the limited prism of categories such as nations,
states, territory and vertical models of governance, enabling us to finally try to accomplish this
“thought experiment” by transformation of our individual sovereignty into cosmopolitan
sovereignty.
Keywords: Millet System, Nation, Ottoman Empire, Macedonia, Greece, Sovereignty
Introduction
The years ahead will be years of dangerous and precarious living. The world today is faced with
a new reality - one shaped by the challenges and issues stemming from phenomenon as which
we have the extraordinary opportunity to witness in the current and attainable moment. Many
issues in the world as we know it are being raised in front of our very eyes - some of them, as an
immediate result of the migrant crisis, among other phenomena. Therefore, the subject of
acceptance and management of diversity will inevitably be central, along with the attempts to
build coexistence among different religions, cultures and civilizations. The current prevailing
perceptions lead to new conflicts and wars solicited by the understandings of the clash of
civilizations, the former being a reflection of realpolitik. However, both past and today’s science
should strive to offer solutions and seek for models and paradigms which aim towards peace,
prosperity and civilizational order that will be stable and functional, thus reshaping our sense of
conflict resolution which is obviously a result of (one might argue) reading the wrong authors
and theories this entire time.1 As a civilization, we are entering an era in which frozen conflicts
1
“Have we, under the 400-year-old spell of national sovereignty, unwisely neglected other sectors of
75
from the past are being thawed - a process accompanied by a lot of violence, oppression, abuse
of new technologies and weapons for mass destruction. Advanced means of communication have
brought about virtual and cyber wars. Stereotypes and prejudices inherited from the past
represent an impediment for the world to be seen with different eyes. History has known periods
of coexistence of different religions, identities, and a variety of groups. Those were namely
periods governed by systems that as a matter of fact were not democratic in terms of form, liberal
or pro-western, but still offered life of peace and prosperity. Living in the time of empires created
a completely different and complex way of functioning of everyday life whose positive
experiences and examples can be applied today in order to overcome impatience, animosity,
xenophobia and exclusion.
One of the historical forms of coexistence and religious tolerance between different
religious groups is the so-called Millet system from the Ottoman period. Although it is perceived
from a purely historical point of view and represents a legacy or even better a relic from the past,
it may serve as a guidance for the present and future times. One must bear in mind that our times
are not only ones when we are faced with migrants from the battlefields and hotspots, but rather
with a major movement of peoples who, while going toward the western countries, carry with
them their culture, tradition, religion, specificities and particularities, as well as their way of
living. Evidently, the current European models of assimilation, melting end exclusion are not
yielding results. Observing and drawing on the positive experiences and examples from the
historic model of the millet system can be used for finding solutions for issues which at a first
glance seem unsolvable and insurmountable.
The Millet system - a brief overview
The Ottoman Empire is known for its tolerant relations, or better said, respect for diversity which
is a higher philosophy than the idea of tolerance. This is based on the fact that the Ottomans, and
more precisely the Sultan, respected peoples first and foremost as religious groups. Although the
Ottoman Empire was an overall Muslim community, they respected the other peoples who were
in the “Book” - namely, the Jews and the Christians. Every millet had its own leader known as
Millet-Bashi. The history of the millet system states that the first millet-basha was the one
responsible for Rumelia, covering the orthodox Christians from Byzantium. The Sultan, having
also taken the title of the Byzantine Empire, proclaiming himself as Emperor, gave the same right
to form a millet community to the Jews led by a Rabbi in order for them to also become citizens
in a religious way. Same goes for the Armenians who were led by the Gregorian calendar and
who also acquired their own millet.
“Millet” is basically a Persian word which means nation - however, in the Islamic world,
the idea of ethnos was never based on ethnic grounds when building the concept of nation - its
foundation was rather of religious nature. Religion represented a nation, and therefore Islam was
Western thought . . . Should we devise an alternative curriculum in political thought that would stress
Althusius over Bodin, Montesquieu over Rousseau, Gierke over Hegel, Karl Renner and Otto Bauer over
Marx and Engels? In short, have we been studying the wrong thinkers, and even the wrong countries”
Hueglin O., Thomas, Early Modern Concepts for a Late Modern World - Althusius on Community and
Federalism, Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1999, pp. 21
76
considered as nation. The progress within the hierarchy of the empire derived from religion
rather than from equality and fairness. There were no individual rights but collective ones. The
affiliation to a particular millet was а collective right that ensured protection. “Their use of the
words millet and milli, translated typically as “nation” and “national,” did not yet signal a clear
ethno national agenda”.2
The Orthodox millet under the patronage of the Greek Patriarch located in
Constantinople, was the largest after the Muslim Millet, including Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians,
Romanians, Vlach, and some Albanians. Through this functionally established system, the Sultan
was able to manage and maintain the order by endowing religious leaders with the assignment
to collect taxes, as well as to exercise control over the judicial authorities in the communities
where Muslims were not involved. “The millet system enabled the Sultan to run the Empire on
the cheap, by entrusting religious leaders with the collection of taxes, maintenance of order and
judicial functions where Muslims were not involved. In return for a wide-ranging autonomy in
religious matters and local affairs, the millet leaders were obliged to enjoy in obedience to
Ottoman authority among their flocks. This included payment of taxes to the state, to landlords
and to one’s own church; for non-Muslims, who were deemed unsuitable for military service,
there was a special head-tax, the cizye, in lieu. Despite the exemption from the army it was not
uncommon for local armed militias, or armatoles, to be formed from the Christian population”.3
In the millet system, although certain groups had their communities based on religion,
they were still not entitled to a territory, so they were non-territorial communities. The Ottoman
Empire and its millet system were deeply conservative and patriarchal, actually representing a
federation of theocracies. Although this system was not a liberal one, yet was a guardian and
guarantor of collective rights. Kymlicka argues that the idea behind this system was generally
humane, because it was based on tolerance of differences, but still it was not a liberal society, “for
it did not recognize any principle of individual freedom of conscience. Since each religious
community was self-governing, there was no external obstacle to basing this self-government on
religious principles, including the enforcement of religious orthodoxy. Hence there was little or
no scope for individual dissent within each religious community, and little or no freedom to
change one's faith. While the Muslims did not try to suppress the Jews, or vice versa, they did
suppress heretics within their own community. Heresy (questioning the orthodox interpretation
of Muslim doctrine) and apostasy (abandoning one's religious faith) were punishable crimes
within the Muslim community. Restrictions on individual freedom of conscience also existed in
the Jewish and Christian communities”.4
The Ottoman Empire, in the period pre-nationalism, was not familiar with the modern
understanding of the concept of nations. The whole organization within the Ottoman empire was
similar to the one of its predecessor Byzantium, upon religious grounds. The raison d’être of the
millet system, and in line with that, the cause behind the formalization of religious communities
Reynolds, A., Michael, Shattering Empires - The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman and Russian Empire
1908-1918, Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 256
3 Armour, D., Ian, A History of Eastern Europe 1740-1918 - Empires, Nations and Modernisation,
Bloomsbury Academic, 2013, pp. 79
4 Kymlicka, Will, Multicultural Citizenship - A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, Oxford University
Press, 1995, pp. 157
2
77
was in fact the dualistic character of the Empire present from its very beginnings - its need for
full control of the territory on one hand, and its awareness that it could only be achieved through
allowing a certain degree of autonomy on the other. One must note though, that religious
affiliation as a basis for communities within the frames of pre-national societies was a feature not
only of the Ottoman Empire. This given the historical fact that citizens of multinational empires
from ancient times were given a certain part of autonomy esteemed as beneficial for the diversity
of communities. It should nevertheless be noted that Ottomans went a step further by introducing
new aspects to this approach, reflected in the form of a state system with clearly established rules
that represent an integral part of the state structure.
The millets in the Ottoman Empire started to transform themselves into nations, or more
precisely nation-states under the influence of the liberal ideas from Western Europe at the
beginning of XIX century. Processes within the Balkan provinces were managed local notables
who were mainly Christians. There was relative peace among millets, whereby every attempt for
a change was intercepted by the army. It is important to emphasize the fact that this system, based
upon such principles, held the religious groups outside the trends which spread across Europe at
that time - such as renaissance, monarchies and the Enlightenment. With such structure, the
system succeeded in dwelling for four centuries before being disturbed by the uprisings for
national liberation of Balkan Countries.5
The first ones to start this transformation were the Serbs with their uprising in 1804;
however, they were defeated, and they did not have their autonomy up until 1815 when they get
one small part of Serbia (the so-called Belgrade Pashadom). Major European powers did not show
their interest until after the Greek uprising in 1821 when the wave of solidarity in Europe began.
The creation of the Greek national state was relatively simple because of the fact that the Greek
territory of Greece was almost marked (land owned by the Greek monasteries). The situation was
quite different, though, in the other parts of South East Europe, where peoples were more
intertwined. The mixed ethnic composition of the population made it possible for intellectual
elites of the Balkan peoples to develop visions and aspirations of possible larger areas inhabited
by members of the former millets. Тhat is how the projects of “Great Serbia”, “Great Bulgaria”,
“Great Greece”, “Great Albania” and “Great Romania”, actually arose.6 (Moravian Wallachia had
its insurrection between 1856 and 1859, Bulgaria 1878 and Albania in 1919.)
Macedonia - a case explained
In order to explain the heterogeneity of Macedonia we should refer to Mazower. While describing
the strategic position and unclear borders combined with a mixed population, bordering with
states that were recently formed (Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria), Macedonia “became the focus for their
expansionist ambitions at the century’s close. Its ethnography, however, posed a challenge for
the most ardent Balkan nationalist and had changed out of all recognition since the days of
Alexander the Great. The peasantry of the region were predominantly Orthodox, and mostly
Cuisenier Jean, Ethnologie de l’Europe, Presses Universitaires de France, pp. 1990
Dodovska, Vasilevska, Ivanka, The Versailles System from 1919 (The Mechanisms of Voluntary
Exchange of Populations and Their Influence on the Macedonian Question in the First Half of the XX
Century), ResPublica Institute, Skopje, 2016. pp. 253
5
6
78
Slavs; Greek speakers fringed coastal areas and inhabited the towns”.7 Тhis region’s strategic and
trade importance was the focus of interest of not only neighboring countries whose minorities
lived within Macedonian borders, but also of the greater countries that closely followed the
political circumstances in Macedonia. With Treaty of San-Stefano (1878), Macedonia became
again the target of Bulgarian aspirations for territorial expansion, and again it became a
battleground for conflicts between Greek, Bulgarian and Serbian policies but also Greek,
Bulgarian and Serbian gangs. Being the last Ottoman territory in the Balkans, every threat that
could result in the possible loss of this region, was frightening and intimidating for Ottoman
Muslims and Jews.8 However, in order to understand the societal complexity of the region,
Mazower concludes: “The capital, Salonika, which one commentator called the “coveted city,”
was a typical polyglot Ottoman port whose bootblacks could make themselves understood in half
a dozen languages, but it had one unique feature: of the ethnic kaleidoscope that made up its
population, the largest single group were not Greeks, Turks, Albanians or Slavs but Sephardic
Jews. Inside and outside the city, no single ethnic group prevailed. Nationalism could offer a basis
for rule over such a land only with the aid of extreme violence and a good deal of wishful
thinking.”9
In 1872 in Istanbul, Bulgarian poet Ivan Vazov who was often referred to as “Patriarch of
Bulgarian literature”, wrote one of his most significant poems. “In front of your view, they appear
and cross incomprehensible: the good-natured Muslim, The proud and cunning Greek, and the
timid Bulgarian, and the Macedonian fair and honest, and the hard-working Armenian, and the
educated Frenchman, and the Anadolian rough and simple, and sullied bad Arnaut, and the
speculator Jew, and the black Arabian with a flat nose etc.”
The poem makes it rather easy to determine the heterogeneity that existed in the cradle of
the Ottoman Empire and more importantly, it can serve as an illustration of the different
minorities that coexisted in the capital. Fact is that Macedonia did not use the necessary tools to
create its nation as a political community based on the approach of exclusion. The idea to preserve
coexistence and inclusion was nevertheless more important than creating a model, which would
assimilate, as it was the case with the other Balkan states. Continuity of the Millet system in
Macedonia is present even today. Even in the uprisings and within all forms and mechanisms
that lead to the point of creating its own Devlet (State), one can identify the presence of the
consciousness of coexistence and acceptance of diversity in all spheres of social life - even in the
times of uprisings. The Krushevo Manifesto written after the uprising in Krushevo, and
establishing the first Republic in the Balkans, that lasted only ten days, calls, inter alia, other
communities and population who were not only Orthodox, to join the liberation movement:
“Fellow countrymen and dear neighbors! We, your perennial neighbors, friends and
acquaintances from beautiful Krushevo and its pretty villages, regardless of faith, nationality, sex
or conviction, not being able to endure any more the tyranny of bloodthirsty murtats who hungry
for human flesh, would like to lead both you and us to slaughter, to reduce both you and us to
poverty, and to turn our dear and wealthy land of Macedonia into a wasteland, we have today
raised our heads and decided to defend ourselves with rifles in our hands from our and your
Mazower, Mark, The Balkans - A Short History, The Modern Library, pp. 165
İhsanoğlu, Ekmeleddin, History of Ottoman State; Society and Civilization, 2001, pp. 109
9 Mazower, Mark, The Balkans - A Short History, The Modern Library, pp. 165
7
8
79
enemies, and obtain freedom”.
We might conclude that there is a clear emphasis on the point that even Muslims are being
called to contribute to the uprising. The Manifesto and its motives to fight the Ottomans was
widely accepted and welcomed by local villagers and Muslim population. This tradition which
draws roots from the Millet system is present today even in sovereign and independent Republic
of Macedonia. The Macedonian National Assembly remains a heterogeneous ground for political
battles of parties from different kinds of ethnic affiliation.10
Greece - a case of opposite
Unlike in the case of Macedonia, one of the most decisive factors in the shaping of Greek
national consciousness and ideology, was the widespread presence of the Greek element in the
Mediterranean and the influence of Greek groups who were situated in Western Europe because
of trade reasons. Thanks to trade and due to the commercial exchange with Western Europe,
Greeks were the first ones from the Balkans to have a bourgeoisie. It is evident that the Greek
uprising for independence emerged from the dissatisfaction of the Greek independence
organization and gangs, but even more important contribution came from abroad. The Slavs on
the other hand, unlike Greece, implemented their national ambitions and actions through
domestic organizations rather than by support from Russia and Western Europe.11 The influence
of the Great powers over Balkan nationalism is the main reason for distancing of the Balkan
peoples.12
As for cultural life, unlike other Balkan countries, the impacts of Western Europe that
caused problems and difficulties were obvious in the case of Greece. This especially for the Greek
intellectual milieu from the 18th and 19th century who had an awareness of belonging to a country
and people who were at the source of European civilization. One example of this state of
consciousness was the rejection of the vernacular language Dimotiki (δημοτική) for literacy - a
language which contained many Slavic, Turkish, Arabic and Persian words and idioms. Modern
Greek language Katharevousa (Καθαρεύουσα) which was linked and identified with Greek past,
bore many inconsistencies. Namely, the orthography of that language did not comply with the
existing pronunciation or daily use of the language, as was the case with the Ottoman language
and Turks. Although this linguistic division causes cultural as well as political problems that are
traced even today, it did not prevent that language to be preserved as a literary language. Societal
life in Greece as well as global development were prevented and under control of the Greek
Church which was considered as a untouchable national institution.
Greek ethnic sense was preserved for a long time within the Orthodox Millet, and was
particularly notable in wealthy Greek Phanariots in Istanbul who were in charge of high-profile
functions and positions of political as well as financial power within the Ottoman empire. The
rapid expansion of Greek trading colonies and progress of Greek traders abroad brought the
Greeks closer to the European spirit and lifestyle which resulted in the rise of both intellectual
and political leaders who were responsible for proliferation of revolutionary ideas of nationalism
and independence.13 Napoleon had remarked, in one of his conversations at St. Helena on the
www.sobranie.mk
Ортајли, Илберт, Најдолгиот Век на Империјата, Скопје, 2009, pp. 85
12 Ibid. pp. 91-92
13 Hammer, von, Joseph, Historija Turskog (Osmanskog) Carstva, Zagreb, 1979, pp. 308
10
11
80
subject of the East, that the Sultans had committed a great fault in allowing so large mass of
Christians of the same race to collect together, and in such numerical preponderance above their
masters, as in Greece; and he predicted that “sooner or later this fault will bring on the fall of the
Ottomans”.14 Territorialization of identities in Greece was a mistake not because it led to
independence and forming of a national state or that it was one of the reasons for the collapse of
the Ottoman empire, but because it interrupted the tradition of millet as a concept of coexistence
that should have been present in the newly formed Greek state. The burden of that
territorialization can be felt even today.15 Its consequences included major evictions, expulsions
and exchange of population in order to create a clean ethnic national state which was, in itself,
pretty much artificial. However, it was typical for the imperial ways of governance to resolve
issues that were a matter of diversity with non-territorial mechanisms, in conditions of
coexistence of different communities on a common territory.
“The Macedonian question raised its bloodstained head after 1870, the idea that the
various nationalities living on this territory should be distinguished by their language, was the
last of many to strike that the states of Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria and the Sublime Porte which
contended for it. The inhabitants of Macedonia had been distinguished by their religion, or else
claims to this or that part of it had been based on the history ranging from the medieval to the
ancient, or else on ethnological arguments about common customs and ritual practices.
Macedonia did not become a battlefield for Slav philologists until the twentieth century, when
the Greeks, who could not compete on this terrain, compensated by stressing an imaginary
ethnicity”.16 The clarification of these matters might lead us back to Constantine Paparrigopoulos,
who is considered by many sources as the founder of modern Greek historiography and to whom
Johan Gustav Droysen “offered one of the key concepts of the newly born Greek national
historical school: the concept of Hellenism”.17 In his Textbook of General history in 1849,
Paparrigopoulos made a clear distinction: “the Macedonian nation accomplished, in the general
history (of civilization), a different mission from that of Hellenic nation”.18
The concept of nation - building on wrong foundations?
National movements across the Balkans built their identity not only by confronting the Empire
which was a political creation imposed by the Ottomans, but also by confronting the enemies, the
Turks and their way of life. They thought that they would find their identities within the newly
formed states, or in other words political creations on ethnic postulates. The dismissal of the
imperialistic regime which was the main contribution of Turks in the Balkans, encountered in the
19th century a new reality that would pave the way for another European order full of uncertain
Creasy, S., E., History of The Ottoman Turks - From the Beginning of the Empire to the Present Time,
pp. 399
15 Jovanovski, Dalibor, Grcka Balkanska Politika i Makedonija (1830-1881 god.), BATO DIVAJN
Corporation Graphic Center, Skopje, 2005. pp. 25
16 Hobsbawm, J., Eric, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 - Programme, Myth, Reality, Cambridge
University Press, 1992, pp. 107
17 Ricks, David, Beaton Roderick, ed. The Making of Modern Greece - Nationalism, Romanticism and the
Uses of the Past (1797-1896), pp. 60
18 Ibid. pp. 59
14
81
alternatives and challenges.
In our attempt to define nation, we might encounter two conflicting standpoints. Scholars
who support the first aspect, among whom we find Rousseau, perceive nation as a political
community. Rousseau especially emphasizes the idea of general will, which was the source and
the exhortation for the French Revolution. Provoked by democracy and the ideal of political
liberty, nations, and moreover their national impulse, resulted in the creation of the idea of nation
as a political community. The second aspect departs from ethnic reality, tolerance, loyalty and
the tradition of respecting diversity. This approach perceives nation as a cultural community and
deals with matters that are touch upon general patrimony. Hence this is a result of federal and
feudal experiences and federal models where life is regulated at the level of local communities
rather than on state or imperialistic level and where the state is seen as a necessity. The latter can
be found in the French model which implies centralization and absolutism. On the other hand,
the federal model represents a community constituted by different communities, consociations
that lead to cultural, linguistic and religious closeness at the national level, or the concept of
societal federalism which can be traced in the German tradition. The accomplishment of this
model requires horizontal integration to unite the communities. In the feudal period, individuals
were divided in different vocational communities. Craftsmen, artisans, as well as merchants had
their separate guilds; religious and the clergy had their sects, as well as the rest of the population
who had their communities with related interests. Each of them branched on local, regional and
state level. The essence was that they were not one above the other (vertical hierarchy), but in a
wide horizontal unification, while all of them were part of a wider community or the state, as
community of all communities. The religious analogy to this in the Ottoman Empire, was in fact
manifested through the millet system. Every religion had its own millet, and the empire was a
community of all of them.
The core idea of a nation as a cultural community can be traced back to the works of
Herder and Fichte. Herder based his argument on a particular form of culturalism which claims
that the very essence of the character of every national group is ultimately determined by its
“natural environment, climate and physical geography, which shaped the lifestyle, working
habits, attitudes and creative propensities of a people. Above all, he emphasized the importance
of language, which he believed was the embodiment of a people’s distinctive traditions and
historical memories. In his view, each nation thus possesses a Volksgeist, which reveals itself in
songs, myths and legends, and provides a nation with its source of creativity. Herder’s
nationalism therefore amounts to a form of culturalism that emphasizes an awareness and
appreciation of national traditions and collective memories instead of an overtly political quest
for statehood”.19
Contrary to this understanding, Anderson perceives the existence of nations as “imagined
communities”. He argues that the imaging of a nation can emerge only when the ancient cultural
conceptions lose their axiomatic grip on men’s mind. Anderson notes three conceptions. Firstly,
he states that a particular script language offers privileged access to ontological truth, precisely
because it is an inseparable part of that truth. It was this idea that called into being the great
transcontinental sodalities of Christendom, the Islamic Ummah, and the rest. Second was the
19
Heywood, Andrew, Politics, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, pp. 108
82
belief that society was naturally organized around and under high centres — monarchs who were
persons apart from other human beings and who ruled by some form of cosmological (divine)
dispensation. Human loyalties were necessarily hierarchical and centripetal because the ruler,
like the sacred script, was a node of access to being and inherent in it. Third was a conception of
temporality in which cosmology and history were indistinguishable, the origins of the world and
of men essentially identical. Combined, these ideas rooted human lives firmly in the very nature
of things, giving certain meaning to the everyday fatalities of existence (above all death, loss, and
servitude) and offering, in various ways, redemption from them.20
The process of creating of nations in the Balkans, Middle East and Caucasus took place
via a transformation from religious to national community. But the newly established nations
failed to comply with the tradition of the millet, and attempted to create the system of nations
through assimilation rather than through tolerance and respect of diversity. Hence, the newly
formed nations were created forcibly. They created national language, national institutions,
ethnically based nations which are difficult to sustain bearing in mind that a certain part of the
population (most notably migrants), did not accept ethnic identity as a basis for nation, but rather
see religion as a basis. György Konrád argues that national states model after World War I proved
itself as an inadequate, coarse, unilateral solution which contended our ethnic relations. Under
this burden, peace had to succumb. Тhe outbreak of World War II was provoked to some extent
by the fact that state borders did not correspond to ethnic reality. Indeed, one might argue that it
will perhaps never be feasible for European countries to create a political map that will fully
correspond to the ethnic map. Hence while accepting the state frames as given, we need to elevate
the ethnic reality to the level of cultural reality which can be observed in the context of the history
of the entire Central European space.21
Empires that were based on religion, as the Ottoman based on Islam, the AustroHungarian based on Catholicism and the Russian based on Orthodox Christianity, had a
multiethnic, multilingual and multicultural substratum and with their complexity created
civilizations, cultural communities with cultural identities, rather than nations. In the case of
Austro-Hungary these were the so-called cultural autonomies, whereas in the Ottoman Empire
these were personal autonomies on religious bases. Nation states established following the peace
agreements, laid their borders artificially on the territory once governed by the empires, and
conducted their rules, territory, autonomy and sovereignty on ethnic bases. Lines of divisions
and clefts today are stretching on the points where empires bordered and had contact. Hence
Balkan, Middle East and Caucasus are the points which create the “Bermuda Triangle” of
European politics, with conflicts which arose due to the inability of European national states to
transpose the lessons and experience of the empires and in particular the millet system and its
inclusiveness that goes against a states exclusiveness. The possible revival of the millet system
should be understood as a model which has the ability to suppress the conflicts in European
nations which do not have Islam. The spark of these conflicts stems from the territorialization of
identities.
20
21
Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities, Verso, 2006, pp. 36
Конрад, Ѓерѓ, Антиполитички Предизвик, Култура, Скопје, 1992
83
Conclusion: The Millet system revived?
The Millet system is not applicable in todays conditions because it represents a historical model
but could be empowering for scholars and politicians who are faced with challenges brought by
the new reality of thinking outside of the categories which were dominant in the Western political
thought such as nation, national state, state-nation, ethnic nations, homogeneous nations etc. The
religious wars in Europe resulted in the setting up of their own models of secularization. Тhe
religion was set apart from public life and became a private matter. This approach built states
which in their very essence contained secularism, but nowadays the revival of the millet system
becomes a basis for survival of the communities which do not belong to the political nation within
the framework of secular states. In Germany the Turkish population remains Turkish, not because
they do not speak the German language or they are not integrated in German society, but rather
because they belong to a different religion, with different specificities, particularities, customs
and habits which simply can not be melted. Assimilation imposed by the secular states could not
affect the primordial loyalty that an individual has to their own ethnos. But Germany was not
familiar with the tradition of millet and mutual respect of diversity of different ethnic minorities,
and so they were ghettoized, as it was the case of the quarter of Molenbeek in Brussels. However,
with the significant development of technology, Internet and social media, all these groups can
connect with each other non-territorially. As Christians used to be in the Ottoman Empire, today
Muslims can be part of their non-territorial virtual communities. We are facing a complex
situation within European states that could not be a matter only of ethnic affiliation. There are
Bulgarians in Romania, Albanians in Greece, Greeks in Ukraine, Croats in Montenegro, Catholics
in Albania. Hence, without understanding the millet system, the West made terrible mistakes
while drawing maps based on imagined ethnic bases that did not actually exist.
Our cultures have been impacted by many different time layers. To a certain extent, we
are still linked to our rural past. We can still feel the leftovers of what has remained of traditional
cordiality and quality. Green Europe has not been completely destroyed. There is still a chance to
save what has already been sunken in the developed West and is making life desolate and sad.
Konrád boldly concludes that we are not in hurry to get rid of our history. The one who has past
is more sensitive. Technological avant-garde is not sensitive. Not even the extent of modern
means for mass destruction or computerization can not determine our national self-esteem.22 Our
societies are everything but one dimensional. We still do not have a rational overview and still
have not identified ourselves with our institutions meaning we are not boringly
unproblematically identical with our own semblance.23 “Think of the future world as roughly
resembling the millet system of the old Ottoman Empire: a “network of geographically
intermingled communities,” in Toynbee’s words, rather than a “patchwork of … segregated
parochial states.” Each relationship will affect the others as never before.”24
Karl Schmidt had the impression that the modern state became a huge industrial plant,
that very thing that/what did Max Weber foresaw. General acceptance of political ideas will occur
only when the economic interests are being achieved only for personal benefit by certain
Ibid.
Ibid.
24 Kaplan, D., Robert, The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells us About Coming Conflicts and the
Battle Against Fate, Random House Trade Paperbacks, New York, pp. 345.
22
23
84
identified groups - meaning that when the political gets lost in the economic or the technical and
organizational aspect оn the other hand, the political would have been “melted” into the
everlasting debate on the cultural and philosophical-historical trivialities.25 If we presumed that
politics is nothing more than masked economy, and that international relations are based not on
permanent love or permanent hate but rather permanent interest, we might understand the
rhetoric of different layers of political actors including the highest instances. But especially in the
Balkan countries, we are still servants to certain elements of the ideas from XIX and XX century.
It appears that the concepts and ideas brought by the huge dynamic that the new world order
introduced, were not sufficiently absorbed. We can not build world order without respect,
honesty and responsibility, first between neighbors and after that with the whole world.
Individuals have to be aware of the responsibilities and obligations which they have not only
towards their national state and issues which belong under its legal power, but also towards the
whole world or even better, towards the entire cosmopolitan community.
In his remarkable work “Imagined Communities”, Benedict Anderson writes about three
paradoxes about the nation, that bother the scholars of nationalism. The first paradox (which
touches upon many elements contained in this paper) is concerned with the “objective modernity
of nations to the historian's eye vs. their subjective antiquity in the eyes of nationalists”. We can
not understand the complexity of our modern nations through the lens of only one of our states.
We should put different lenses to find the truth. As the Greek poet Dionysios Solomos said:
“every nation should consider as its own the history that is based on the truth”.
References
Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities, Verso, 2006
Armour, D., Ian, A History of Eastern Europe 1740-1918 - Empires, Nations and Modernisation,
Bloomsbury Academic, 2013
Creasy, S., E., History of The Ottoman Turks - From the Beginning of the Empire to the Present
Time
Cuisenier Jean, Ethnologie de l’Europe, Presses Universitaires de France
Dodovska, Vasilevska, Ivanka, The Versailles System from 1919 (The Mechanisms of Voluntary
Exchange of Populations and Their Influence on the Macedonian Question in the First Half of the
XX Century), ResPublica Institute, Skopje, 2016
Hammer, von, Joseph, Historija Turskog (Osmanskog) Carstva, Zagreb, 1979
Heywood, Andrew, Politics, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002
Hueglin O., Thomas, Early Modern Concepts for a Late Modern World - Althusius on
Community and Federalism, Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1999
Hobsbawm, J., Eric, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 - Programme, Myth, Reality, Cambridge
University Press, 1992
İhsanoğlu, Ekmeleddin, History of Ottoman State; Society and Civilization, 2001
Jovanovski, Dalibor, Grcka Balkanska Politika i Makedonija (1830-1881 god.), BATO DIVAJN
Corporation Graphic Center, Skopje, 2005
Schmitt, Carl, Political Theology - Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, The MIT Press, 1985,
pp. 65
25
85
Kaplan, D., Robert, The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells us About Coming Conflicts
and the Battle Against Fate, Random House Trade Paperbacks, New York
Kymlicka, Will, Multicultural Citizenship - A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, Oxford
University Press, 1995
Конрад, Ѓерѓ, Антиполитички Предизвик, Култура, Скопје
Mazower, Mark, The Balkans - A Short History, The Modern Library
Ортајли, Илберт, Најдолгиот Век на Империјата, Скопје, 2009
Reynolds, A., Michael, Shattering Empires - The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman and Russian
Empire 1908-1918, Cambridge University Press, 2011
Ricks, David, Beaton Roderick, ed. The Making of Modern Greece - Nationalism, Romanticism
and the Uses of the Past (1797-1896)
Schmitt, Carl, Political Theology - Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, The MIT Press,
1985
www.sobranie.mk
86
“Broadcast Yourself: The Village Fairs of Slavic Speakers of Greek
Macedonia on YouTube”
By Anna Krinaki (Panteion University)
Abstract
This paper aims to examine the presence of folk songs in the Slavic language from the village fairs
of Greek Macedonia, where the great majority of the Slavic speaking population of
Greece is gathered, through Youtube. The current dispersion of these songs in the villages of
Northern Greece is a challenging issue, given that performing these songs in local fairs has
stimulated the language suppression mechanisms that the Greek administration has
implemented in the past. By watching a series of videos on YouTube one can notice that the local
folk songs have not been performed in the same way in all the different villages. Therefore, the
act of singing them seems to carry different semantics; that is, in some villages the local folk songs
are performed instrumentally in village fairs, while in others, which are fewer, they are sang with
their lyrics in Slavic. It seems that some groups omit the Slavic lyrics because they are trying to
integrate these songs in the Greek tradition. In this way, they are stating that they do not wish to
rupture the cohesion and homogeneity of the Greek nation-state. On the other hand, some other
groups want to emphasize through these songs their Macedonian identity. But could we say that
in this statement a secessional attitude can be detected?
Keywords: Slavic speakers, minority languages, village fairs, language suppression, YouTube.
Introduction
From 2009 onwards1 the village fairs of the Slavic speaking communities of Greek Macedonia
have evolved from a local situation to a global affair, from an element of the so-called ‘popular
culture’ to ‘mass culture’. The choice of individuals or local folklore associations to upload
recorded moments of these fairs in the extremely popular website YouTube has played the role
of the fairs’ entry ticket to the pop culture of the web.2
This paper examines the uploading of recorded village fairs to YouTube as a collective
statement, as a social action and practice. Uploading these fairs on YouTube results in a change
of the character of this communal ritual. By this I mean that this particular communal practice
This starting date should rather be related to the diffusion of the technological medium in the Greek
audience than to be seen as a marker of a supposed refreshed interest of the inhabitants of those regions in
their local tradition. Of course, this does not prevent the uploading of videos recorded in previous years
(Annex: Β12).
2 Indicatively, for September of 2016 the ranking of Alexa’s Web analytics places YouTube in the second
position of the most visited websites both worldwide and in Greece. Respectively, the SimilarWeb’s
ranking places it in the third position worldwide and in Greece. See ‘The top 500 sites on the web’, Alexa,
last accessed: Sept. 16, 2016, <alexa.com/topsites>; ‘Top Sites in Greece’, Alexa, last accessed: Sept. 16, 2016,
<alexa.com/topsites/GR>; ‘Top sites for all categories in the world’, SimilarWeb, last accessed: Sept. 16, 2016,
<similarweb.com/top-websites>; ‘Top sites for all categories in Greece’, SimilarWeb, last accessed: Sept. 16,
2016, <similarweb.com/top-web/gr>.
1
87
ceases to need the first person experience, the physical presence, and ceases to act only as a means
of mutual identification – from here on it seeks to act as a means of greater recognition among a
global community. In this analysis the musical elements of the songs, such as the melody, are not
taken into consideration.3 Besides, the low visual quality of the amateurish video shooting neither
serves nor seems to aim at the transmission of the local traditional music and dances, as much as
to communicate the praxis itself, to declare the existence of the Slavic speakers of Greek
Macedonia domestically and abroad.
A sum of 467 videos* were watched from May to November 2016. The annex of the paper
contains a catalog of the most representative videos ordered by the region of Greek Macedonia
that the recorded village fairs took place.** The additional info includes: the particular village, the
uploader, the date of the event along with it’s upload date on YouTube and the view count up to
the last access date (30th November 2016).
The Slavic speakers’ village festivities ‘ante portas’: the Greek nation-state in action
The singularity of the Slavic speaking areas of Northern Greece,4 which were already the object
The Slavic songs of Greek Macedonia have not systematically been recorded and studied. The existing
recordings are limited to the instrumental versions of the traditional songs with the exception of those of
Kostas Novakis and Xiropotamos’ folklore association («Μορφωτικός εκπολιτιστικός Σύλλογος
Ξηροποτάμου»), as well as several unregulated recordings of local bands’ performances in village fairs of
Slavic speaking regions, which include songs performed in their Slavic lyrics, mostly in proper Macedonian
language. The recording itself poses problems as there is not a patented alphabet for the Macedo-Bulgarian
dialects spoken in Greece. See more Theodora Gourani, “Προβληματισμοί σχετικά με την καταγραφή
και μελέτη των τοπικών τραγουδιών των σλαβόφωνων κατοίκων των περιοχών Έδεσσας και
Αλμωπίας,” in Ετερότητες & μουσική στα Βαλκάνια. Τα κείμενα, Ημερίδα του Τμήματος Λαϊκής &
Παραδοσιακής Μουσικής ΤΕΙ Ηπείρου με τη συνεργασία Κέντρου Ερευνών Μειονοτικών Ομάδων (31
Μαΐου 2008) (Arta: Εκδόσεις του Τμήματος Λαϊκής & Παραδοσιακής Μουσικής ΤΕΙ Ηπείρου, 2008), 3346.
* For two reasons this number should not be considered an indicator of the vast variety of video content.
Firstly, the whole duration of each village fair is usually split into smaller videos. Secondly, the dance and
song repertoire generally was repeated.
** The study excludes the video recordings of events organized by the local folklore associations in private
closed space (e.g. entertainments venues), firstly because these kind of events aim at a limited target group
and secondly, due to the lack of a public character enjoying the ritual of the village fairs.
4 According to Baltsiotis, in the early 20th century the line that frames today’s Greek Macedonia regions of
Argos Orestiko (Kastoria) – Ptolemaida (Kozani) – Veria (Imathia) – Thessaloniki – Nigrita (Serres) –
Alistrati (Serres) – Drama – Stavroupoli (Xanthi) defined roughly the concentration of Greek speakers at
the South and respectively, the Slavic speakers at the North. Of course, it’s a conventional depiction of the
linguistic distribution, as across the above-mentioned regions a Turkish speaking population was
dispersed. Again, according to Baltsiotis’ data, in 2007 the Eastern South Slavic dialects were still spoken
in a large part of the prefectures Florina, Pella and Kastoria, in the region of Naousa of the prefecture
Imathia, in many villages of the prefectures Thessaloniki and Serres, and last, in a few villages of the
prefectures of Kilkis and Drama. See Lambros Baltsiotis, Γλωσσική ετερότητα στην Ελλάδα, Πρόγραμμα
Εκπαίδευσης Μουσουλμανοπαίδων «Κλειδιά και Αντικλείδια» (ΥΠΕΠΘ/ Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών,
2007) 31, 32. For population estimation of Slavic speaking residents of the geographical area that defines
today’s Greek Macedonia before and after the Balkan Wars, as well as for the population estimation up
3
88
of a simultaneous claim from the Greek, the Serbian and the Bulgarian nationalism before the
Balkan Wars, as well as from the Macedonian nationalism mostly after the end of the Second
World War,5 is strongly connected to the politically charged, newly-formed scientific discipline
of linguistics, that contributed to making the linguistic otherness a bone of contention and
therefore, a non-acceptable condition for the Greek state [1].6
For the Greek state, minorities —with the exception of the recognized Muslim minority of
Thrace— is a «non-issue», in the sense that their existence belongs to a hidden agenda, whose
issues are secretly managed by each government and therefore these issues neither are made
public nor are inspected by other political or social parties [2]. Indicative of the obscurity into
which the Slavic speakers of Greek Macedonia have slid, is that at the interstate level a simple
mention of the existence of Macedonian/Bulgarian minorities in Greece by Yugoslavia or Bulgaria
was enough to stimulate the reflexes of the Greek state. In fact, referencing the existence of
Macedonian minorities was a means of manifesting their dissatisfaction by taking advantage of
the national oversensitivity of the Greek state [3], [4].
One of the examples that showcase this obsessive phobia of the Greek state towards the
local Slavic languages is the Interwar period, and more specifically the dictatorship of Metaxas,
during which mass deportations of Slavic speakers to Greek islands were ordered and speaking
in Slavic in Greek Macedonia was officially forbidden [5], although the Slavic speakers of these
regions were pressured to remove the local Slavic language from the public sphere at least since
1913 [6]. The local tradition of Slavic speaking communities was incorporated into the
ethnocentric Greek tradition through the promotion of local dances and costumes at the
established parades of the dictatorship [7].7 It is also worth mentioning the concealment of Slavic
names and lyrics in recordings of local musical productions from Greek Macedonia in the mid
1980’s [8] and the replacement of the original names of dances by their Greek names by cultural
agents, such as the Society for the Dissemination of National Music, the Theatre of Greek Folk
Dances «Dora Stratou», etc. [9]. Although these new names haven’t been established, even today
until the first post-civil war period in Greece (1951) see Tasos Kostopoulos, Η απαγορευμένη γλώσσα.
Κρατική καταστολή των σλαβικών διαλέκτων στην ελληνική Μακεδονία (Athens: Μαύρη Λίστα, 22000)
23-33, 222-4.
5 For a historical overview of the presence of Slavic-speaking populations in Macedonia from the late 19 th
century up to the Greek Civil war see Leonidas Embiricos, “Γλωσσικά όρια και πολιτικά σύνορα στα
τραγούδια των σλαβόφωνων στην Ελλάδα”, in Ετερότητες & μουσική στα Βαλκάνια. Τα κείμενα,
Ημερίδα του Τμήματος Λαϊκής & Παραδοσιακής Μουσικής ΤΕΙ Ηπείρου με τη συνεργασία Κέντρου
Ερευνών Μειονοτικών Ομάδων (31 Μαΐου 2008) (Arta: Εκδόσεις του Τμήματος Λαϊκής &
Παραδοσιακής Μουσικής ΤΕΙ Ηπείρου, 2008) 48-55; Marika Rombos-Levides, Επιτηρούμενες ζωές.
Μουσική, χορός και διαμόρφωση της υποκειμενικότητας στη Μακεδονία (Athens: Αλεξάνδρεια, 2016) 3951.
6 For the entangled with political purposes shiftings of Linguistics that have been observed during the 20th
century regarding the controversial issue of the language of the Slavic speakers of Greek Macedonia see
Tasos Kostopoulos, ibid., 33-45.
7 The ‘de-Slavization’ was not only limited to the gradual sidelining of the Slavic lyrics but also to the disuse
of musical instruments that strongly involved Bulgarian connotations, such as the ‘gaida’, the ‘glasnitsa’
(type of double flute), the ‘dayereh’ (type of tambourine) etc. See Leonidas Embiricos, ibid., 52; Marika
Rombos-Levides, ibid., 173-98.
89
they are still reproduced in the videos titles of YouTube; at least in the case of the local dance
«Πουστσένο» [Pushteno] which was renamed to «Λυτός» or «Λεβέντικος» (Annex: A10, B1, B2,
B3, B4). Thus, the local cultures are inscribed as various versions on the frame of a constructed,
or invented, tradition of the Greek nation. This national tradition is invented to legitimate and
preserve the political authority of the predominant product of Modernity, that is the Nationstate.8,9
The area where the state has strongly implemented the language suppression mechanism
was the village fairs of the Slavic speaking regions of Greek Macedonia. The “danger” was not
posed by the anyway popular practice of village fairs in Greece but by the performance of local
traditional pieces in the local Slavic language.10 The Slavic speaking political refugees who resort
to the People’s Republic of Macedonia during the Greek Civil War and the subsequent adoption
of the Slavic speakers’ local music by the Republic of Macedonia, along with its orchestration
according to the traditional music standards of the socialist regime, amplified even more the
suspicions of the Greek state towards the local music of it’s Slavic speaking residents [10], [11],
[12].11 Publicly singing in Slavic is criminalized even after the civil war in Greece [13], while cases
have been recorded of mass oath taking by Slavic speaking villagers in which they renounce the
so-called ‘cursed idiom’ [επάρατον ιδίωμα].12
For the nation-state as a product of Modernity see Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity
(Cambridge: Polity Press/ Blackwell Publishers, 1991) 6, 13, 14, 55-8.
9 For the functions that the ‘invented tradition’ serves within a nation-state see Eric Hobsbawm and Terence
Ranger eds. The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: CUP, 1983) 1-2, 9-10, 12, 264-7.
10 Concerning these regions, linguistically it is considered more accurate to refer to an Eastern South Slavic
dialect continuum and not to «Macedonian», «Bulgarian» or «Slav-Macedonian», as they include many
different but interrelated linguistic idioms, yet don’t subject to any standardisation. In the relevant to the
Slavic speakers of Greek Macedonia bibliography, the term «μακεδονοβουλγαρικά» [MacedonoBulgarian] is often used to denote the Eastern South Slavic languages. From that eastern group the official
Bulgarian language (based on dialects east of the Yat border) and the Macedonian language (based on
dialects west of the Yat border) derived. As far as Greece is concerned, it should be held that the Yat border
crosses in the east of the city Kilkis and in the west of the towns of Lete and Asvestochori in Thessaloniki.
The official Serbo-Croatian and Slovenian languages came from the Western South Slavic languages (see
Leonidas Embiricos, ibid., 58; Lambros Baltsiotis, ibid., 22). The Slavic speakers of these regions refer to
their language as Macedonian or Bulgarian when they speak in Greek,, while when they intend to prevent
any tensions, they refer to it as «ντόπια» or «ντόπικα» or «εντόπια» [the local one], or «παλιά» [the old
one], or «δικά μας» [our language] (see Thede Kahl, “Singing without words. Language and Identity Shift
among Slavic Macedonian Musicians in Greece.” Die Welt der Slaven LV (2010): 386; Tasos Kostopoulos,
ibid., 43; Lambros Baltsiotis, ibid., 33; Marika Rombos-Levides, ibid., 56-60). For a genealogy of the terms
used in Greek to identify the Slavic speaking residents of Greek Macedonia and their language see Marika
Rombos-Levides, ibid., 295-302.
11 Many of the songs performed reproduce the traditional songs of the Republic of Macedonia. Their
repertoire mainly include the subjects of love and rural life, e.g. the popular song of «Makedonsko devojče»
[Macedonian Girl] (Annex: A11) or «Ubava Kalina» [Beautiful Kalina] (Annex: B13).
12 This practice was implemented as a language supression mechanism in the summer of 1959 in Greek
Macedonia —specifically, in the villages of Kardia in Kozani prefecture (5 July 1959), Kria Nera in Kastoria
prefecture (2 Aug. 1959), Atrapos in Florina prefecture (8 Aug. 1959)— followed by a ‘from above’ language
shift. See more Tasos Kostopoulos, ibid., 234-43, 365.
8
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Despite the decriminalization after the end of the Junta (1974), during the government of the New
Democracy Party in the period of 1990-1993, a new wave of repression, stigmatization and
isolations of the Slavic speaking population of Greece took place under the coordination of the
judicial authorities and the mass media, reinforced by the Macedonian naming dispute [14].13
Indicative of the situation is the prefecture Florina (in Greek Western Macedonia) from the late
80’s to the early 90’s: recommendations of the local authorities regarding the admissible limits of
linguistic-cultural expression, the performance of festivities under the presence of police or even
their ban, and last, the incidents that occurred during the notorious annual fair of Prophet Elias
at Meliti village of Florina that symbolizes the Slavic threat for the national sovereignty due to its
correlation with the Ilinden uprising [15].
However, from the mid-90’s onwards –and after international pressures on Greece and
the subsequent change of the state attitude to a more democratic one towards the Slavic speakers
that resulted mainly as the product of a period of domestic security of the Greek state [16]– a new
modus vivendi prevails, by which the first part of the fair is conducted often at the central square
of the village in the presence of the local authorities accompanied by local dances and the
instrumental performance of the folk songs, and the second part follows at a nearby square where
the informal celebration is performed with songs in their Slavic lyrics [17].
It should not come as a surprise that the music traditions of minorities, –primary bearers
of ethnically competitive cultures, as Christopoulos notices [18]– were targeted by the
suppressive mechanism of official censorship, and that in turn gave birth to the self-moving
mechanism of self-censorship among the Slavic speakers, as the residents were driven by the fear,
the desire of self-defense and generally the avoidance of any problems that references to
controversial issues could provoke.14 Similarly, the promotion and the eventual dominance of
brass music (Annex: B9) as the representative local traditional music should certainly be
attributed to the limitations on the instrumental performing of the local traditional music [19],
[20], [21], [22], as Slavic speaking songs do not cease to be associated with national identity. When
the user ‘setomagr’ posted a sarcastic comment below a video with instrumental music at a
festivity in Kratero village of Florina saying: «Nice dance, very nice music: if it had also
lyrics…but these songs are probably mute» [«Ωραίος χορός, πολύ ωραία μουσική.: να ειχε και
λογια ......αλλα μαλλον ειναι μουγκα αυτα τα τραγουδια»], the video’s uploader responded
with a didactic tone that «It had lyrics when needed. It’s a village fair not an event against
Greece.» [«Eίχε και λόγια όταν επρεπε. Πανηγύρι είναι, δεν είναι ανθελληνική εκδήλωση.»]
For more about the Macedonian issue after the World War II and more specifically during the period
1950-1990 see Sotiris Walldén, “Εθνικισμός και εσωτερική πολιτική: Μακεδονικό και Βορειοηπειρωτικό
στη μεταπολεμική κομματική διαμάχη,” in Έθνος – Κράτος – Εθνικισμός. Επιστημονικό Συμπόσιο (21
και 22 Ιανουαρίου 1994) (Athens: Εταιρεία Σπουδών Νεοελληνικού Πολιτισμού και Γενικής Παιδείας
(Σχολή Μωραΐτη), 1995) 255-70.
14 The testimony of the Greek researcher Th. Gourani from her field ethnomusicological study in the
prefecture of Pella (Greek Central Macedonia) is indicative of the concern and fear of the Slavic speaking
residents even today regarding the association of singing of their traditional songs in Slavic with a
supposed “nationally secessional intention”. See Theodora Gourani, ibid., 35-6. Equally illuminating is the
experience of the Greek researcher M. Rombos-Levides in a local folklore association in the prefecture of
Serres (Greek Eastern Macedonia). See Marika Rombos-Levides, ibid., 151-5.
13
91
(Annex: A3).
To sum up, putting the blame on the official censorship indeed explains the linguistic
exclusion of the Slavic speakers of Northern Greece in the vertical structure of relations between
the state and its citizens. But could it be that in this way the notion of taboo is ignored, as a kind
of interpretative tool which is likely to penetrate horizontally the relations among the members
of the Greek society and to explain from another angle the linguistic marginalization of these
groups?15 Could it be that the concealment of the linguistic otherness of the national minorities is
planned by the shock, the disgrace and the fear of the solid Greek nation-state’s fellow citizens
themselves?
The performance of village fairs as shaper of trends and attitudes among the Slavic speakers
of Greek Macedonia
History communicates a past that is not a clear mirror of facts or the source of the unique and
absolute truth, as it is socially destined to be the ‘construction material’ of the self-image of each
collectivity at any given period of time [23]. But, what happens in cases where the predominant
model of reading the Past, like in the case of national historiography, marginalizes and/or
conceals this ‘construction material’ for certain groups? In which way are these groups willing to
claim their place in the Present given their parasitic position in national history? And mainly,
how do the groups themselves translate the action of this claim? As a rupture of the homogeneity
and cohesion of the Greek national narration or as an incorporation in the family of the leading
ethnic community?
Different weight ought to be placed when specific cultural attributes have been chosen by
the subjects themselves as an object of ignoring or/and renunciation, and when they have been
chosen as badges of their distinctiveness [24]. The latter doesn’t mean that the chosen feature
penetrates all aspects of their social life; it could just be present at certain areas, like in this case
study the singing or not in the local Slavic language during the fairs. The reaction of the
participants to the interruption or to the ban of the village fairs and the sparse performance of
songs in Slavic challenge the cornerstone of the disciplinary society; that is, the identifying
process of classification and surveillance [25]. So, the state policy itself, as it has previously been
described, in combination with the existing geographical location of these regions in the modern
Greek state, far from its core and near the borders, seems to transform these regions into a kind
of in-between spaces [26]: These territories present a “spatial self” formed not by their exterior
attributes but by the deviant relation to the Other, represented by the State. Moreover, it is formed
by this relation so much so that it is identified by it. In this point of view, the autonomy comes
apart and these regions are transformed into spaces of transition from a subjectivity that must be
abandoned to another one that must be obtained, since the practice of performing songs in the
local language is deemed to be a threat towards the terms of reproduction of the Greek nationstate [27].
The music production is not only affected by the chosen political culture of a community
but reversely, it could also provide the necessary stimulus for the expression of a political culture
For more on the distinction between taboos and the censure or self-censure that has been invoked to
excuse the concealments of History see Marc Ferrο, Τα ταμπού της Ιστορίας [Les tabous de l’histoire], trans.
Aglaea Galanopoulou (Athens: Μεταίχμιο, 2003)13, 16-7.
15
92
[28]. And when this theoretical observation is accompanied by the past experience of the
governmental suppression mechanisms that have re-signified a daily routine practice by
interfering in it and embellishing it with a national content, as mentioned above in the example
of the Prophet Elias’ fair at Meliti village of Florina, the probability of a connection between the
local language and a Macedonian national identity seems very likely.16 However, the usual
performing of songs in their Slavic lyrics during the festivities does not need to be considered as
evidence that leads necessarily to a Macedonian national identification. Yet, a different
interpretation and attention ought to be given to those cases in which songs with content relative
to a Macedonian nationalism are performed in village fairs. The song «Egejki Majki» [Mothers of
the Aegean] [29], is heard in village fairs at Ampelies (Annex: B14), Vrita (Annex: B5) and Kerassia
(Annex: B19) of the prefecture Pella, as well as at Aetos (Annex: A14), Sitaria (Annex: A20) and
Lofoi (Annex: A21) of the prefecture Florina. The song «Lerin Kostur Raspejani» [Florina and
Kastoria sing] [30], is heard in village fairs at Ampelies of Pella (Annex: B15) and at Ptelea of the
prefecture Kastoria (Annex: A23). The song «Kade ste, Makedončinja?» [Where are you,
Macedonians?] [31] is heard in village fairs at Stavrodromi of Pella (Annex: B7). The song
«Lerinskite sela» [The Villages of Florina] [32], in village fairs again at Stavrodromi of Pella
(Annex: B6). The song «Ogan da go gori» [Fire to burn] is heard in village fairs at Ptelea of Kastoria
(Annex: A23), at Aetos of Florina (Annex: A12) and at Marina of the prefecture Imathia (Annex:
B25). The song «Pesna za Ovcharani» [The song of Meliti] [33] is heard in village fairs at Lefki
(Annex: A24) and Kefalari (Annex: A25) of Kastoria, at Papagiannis of Florina (Annex: A18) and
at Kopanos of Imathia (Annex: B27). The songs «Ah vratete se Makedonchi» [Come back
Macedonians] [34] and «Jas sum cisto Makedonche» [I am a pure Macedonian child] [35] are
heard in village fairs at Ampelies of Pella (Annex: B16, B17). The song «Aleksandar e car
Makedonski» [Alexander is the Macedonian Tsar] [36] is heard in village fairs at Meliti of Florina
(Annex: A16). The song «Vetar da podujne» [Wind to blow] is heard in village fairs at Aetos of
Florina (Annex: A15), at Perdikkas of the prefecture Kozani (Annex: A22), at Loutraki/ Pozar
(Annex: B20) and Theodoraki (Annex: B21) of Pella. The song «Koga padna na Pirina» [When he
fell at Pirin] [37] is heard in village fairs at Marina of Imathia (Annex: B26) and Sidirochori of
Kastoria (Annex: A26). The song «Krusevo aber pristigna» [Message arrived at Krushevo] [38] is
heard in village fairs at Kopanos of Imathia (Annex: B28). The songs «Ej majko moja/ Pesna za
Lerin» [Hey my mother/ The song of Florina] and «Imeto Makedonsko» [The Macedonian name]
are heard in village fairs at Agra of Pella (Annex: B23, B24). The song «Ordan Piperkata/ Son
sonila Ordanica» [Yordan Piperkata/ Yordanitsa dreamed a dream] [39] is heard in village fairs
at Meliti of Florina (Annex: A17). The song «Zapejte site angeli» [All the angels, sing] [40] is heard
in village fairs at Platani of Pella (Annex: B22). The song «Kambani bjat sred Banitsa» [The bells
are ringing in Vevi] is heard in village fairs at Vevi of Florina (Annex: A19). And last, the song
«Biser balkanski» [Pearl of the Balkans] [41], is heard in village fairs at Polipotamos (Annex: A5)
and Aetos (Annex: A13) of Florina, as well as at Stavrodromi (Annex: B6) and Margarita (Annex:
B18) of Pella. These kind of festivities constitute a ritual consisted of –among others– speech and
dance, that are able to transmit from generation to generation particular traits of a cultural group,
The Prophet Elias fair is strongly connected to the 1903 uprising in Ottoman Macedonia; The “Ilinden”
(The day of [Prophet] Elias) is incorporated as a Macedonian uprising in the national Macedonian
narration.
16
93
such as the language. This process besides its very important educational function —more so in
the absence of minority schools in these regions—17 carries out one more, and probably more
crucial, function, as it confirms as Present the collective experience and consciousness of the Past
[42]. Therefore, the performing of the song itself graves a border line emphasizing the
differentiation at least at the level of core – periphery, of national – local.
Any suspicions about political dimensions were confirmed when the MAKIBE, which was
founded back in 1991, run for elections for the European Parliament in June of 1994 under the
minority political party Rainbow, winning 7.623 votes [43]. The Rainbow Party, according to its
statement, claims the political representation of the nationally Macedonians of Northern Greece,
meaning the Slavic-speaking population with Macedonian national consciousness [44]. Although
the Rainbow Party continues today as a participant in the elections for the European Parliament,
the percentage of obtained votes has declined receiving 4.952 votes (0,08%) in 1999, 6.176 votes
(0,10%) in 2004, 4.530 votes (0,09%) in 2009 and 5.754 votes (0,10%) in 2014 [45].
However, the political vote for the European Parliament can’t provide us with safe
conclusions about the proportion of Slavic speakers of Greece who nationally determine
themselves as Macedonians, as many of them distance themselves from the secessional attitude
that the Rainbow Party represented or they could have just chosen another political party [46].
Moreover, the total number of votes can’t itself be a safe marker. Safer deductions could be drawn
from an electoral study that would include the electoral geography (the number of votes per
village) and a sociological analysis of voting which would take into consideration the national
and class formation both of the politicians and the electorate [47].
‘Festivities’ on YouTube: the national space of the participatory culture of new media
Thanks to the Media’s bibliographic production, YouTube is commonly conceptualized through
the participatory culture.18 The theory of the participatory culture, as described by Henry Jenkins
and Υochai Benkler, was introduced as a juxtaposition in contradistinction to the concept of the
consumer culture, since the individual not only consumes but at the same time produces (hence,
the neologisms ‘prosumer’ and ‘produser’) [48], and rather as an idealized hybrid model resulting
from the pre-industrial traditional culture and the mass culture of the industrialized societies
[49].19 So, the reason that the concept of participatory culture ought to be identified both with the
Despite the introduction (and the following withdrawal) of the Latin spelling book Abecedar (1926) into
the minority schools of the Aminteo’s region in the prefecture of Florina (Greek Western Macedonia)
during the dictatorship of Pangalos, the Slavic language was not taught in minority schools, mainly because
it’s linguistic roots have raised political as well as territorial claims both by Serbia and Bulgaria, and thus,
have raised the fears of the centralized administration of the Greek state. For the implemented educational
policy concerning the Slavic speaking minority of Northern Greece see George Kritikos, Εκπαίδευση και
έλεγχος του χώρου: Από το οθωμανικό μιλλέτ στο ελληνικό κράτος του Μεσοπολέμου (Athens: Εξάντας,
2010) 146-54. See more details on the spelling book Abecedar in Alexandra Ioannidou, “Das Abecedar,
philologisch betrachtet,” Die Slawischen Sprachen 46 (1995): 89-101; Tasos Kostopoulos, ibid., 94-105.
18 H. Jenkins’ conceptualization of the participatory culture is followed. See Henry Jenkins et al., Confronting
the Challenges of Participatory Culture. Media Education for the 21 st Century (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2009)
5-8.
19 For more details on the stages of the theoretical formation of the concept of participatory culture see
Aaron Delwiche and Jennifer Jacobs Henderson, “Introduction: What is Participatory Culture?” in The
17
94
practice of new media and the subsequent accessibility and democratization of the cultural
production —terms that disturb somehow the existing balance in the new media industry [50]—
20 lies on the technical function of these media; that is, the User-Generated Content sites.
A closer look at the operating patterns of YouTube could give us alternative pathways to
the signification of the ‘exit’ and the presence of the Slavic-speakers’ local village fairs in Greece
on YouTube. For instance, the recorded dances on videos operate as a kind of ‘how-to’ video, that
enable the initiation and the transmission of this dancing ritual to other community members or
to whoever wishes to be a communicant of the ritual without being associate with the daily life
(residents) or the lineage of the community (kinship bonds).
The current structure of YouTube supports the unfolding of a participatory culture also
from another perspective, expressed with reservations, that could be fruitful for the topic under
discussion: It juxtaposes the virtual space with the national space. YouTube is a space where
marginalized and local based forms of cultural production are able to become accessible [51]. The
national state structures of Greece do not provide it’s Slavic speaking population with the sense
of authority that YouTube provides them with, as users who can get involved and participate on
equal terms. The slogan of the website itself «Broadcast Yourself», until 2012 when it was retired
[52], emphatically promotes the expression of individuality, the broadcast of each ‘you’ to a
hypothetical audience. The existing restrictions of YouTube refer to general limit lines that protect
the copyrights and forbid spam and scams, as well as the projection of violent, harmful, sexual
and hateful content [53], and so far they seem to succumb more to the market conditions rather
than to (those of) each national state policy.21 The so-called virtual community is likely to
constitute eventually a less imagined community than that of the nation, as the feeling of
‘belonging-together’ and the idea of the simultaneous presence and action of it’s members aren’t
deposited on the conception and experience of the, according to Benjamin, ‘homogeneous, empty
time’ through the practices of the ‘print capitalism’ [54], but are confirmed by the simultaneity of
the post and the responses that take place in the virtual space – YouTube creates multiple
community-islets.
Τhe anonymity of web users22 isn’t very helpful in profiling the people for whom the
Participatory Cultures Handbook, eds. A. Delwiche and J. J. Henderson (New York/ London: Routledge Taylor
& Francis: 2013) 3-8.
20 For critical points made against YouTube as a participatory culture see Daniel Chamberlain, “Book
review: YouTube: Online Video and Participatory Culture,” Popular Communication 8, n. 1 (2010): 96-8; Janet
Wasko and Mary Erickson, “The Political Economy of YouTube,” in The YouTube Reader, eds. P. Snickars
and P. Vonderau (Stockholm: National Library of Sweden, 2009) 372-83; Paul McDonald, “Digital Discords
in the Online Media Economy: Advertising versus Content versus Copyright,” in The YouTube Reader, eds.
P. Snickars and P. Vonderau, (Stockholm: National Library of Sweden, 2009) 387-403; Toby Miller,
“Cybertarians of the World Unite: You Have Nothing to Lose but Your Tubes!” in The YouTube Reader, eds.
P. Snickars and P. Vonderau (Stockholm: National Library of Sweden, 2009) 427-30.
21 See the recent guidelines of YouTube (Sept. 2016) on the policy of advertising ads. ‘Advertiser-friendly
content guidelines’, YouTube, last accessed: Sept. 16, 2016, <advertiser-friendly content guidelines>.
22 See Brian Murchison, “Anonymous speech on the internet,” in Amateur Media. Social, cultural and legal
perspectives, eds. D. Hunter, R. Lobato, M. Richardson and J. Thomas (New York/ London: Routledge Taylor
& Francis, 2013) 187-203. Although the article refers to the legal framework of U.S.A. and it is structured so
that it advocates the judicial settlement and negatively charges the anonymity, yet it reveals the discourse
95
folklore music of Slavic speakers is of such high importance as to be uploaded on YouTube.
However, it is very often observed that the users posting the recorded videos from the festivities,
who can also be the organizers or official participants in the village fairs, are the local folklore
associations (Annex: A3, A4, A11, B2-B4, C3).23 According to the research of ChatzitakiKapsomenou on the Greek folklore associations, these associations are generally founded by
people feeling obliged both towards themselves and their children to pay tribute to their past by
preserving it and transferring it, and by people whose starting point is their need to connect the
past to the present that has been dictated by the invasion of a homogenized and outlandish
contemporary life style [55]. The above categorization by Chatzitaki-Kapsomenou outlines
something even more essential: the agents’ motivations, that, as it seems, is not the authentic
reproduction of the folk tradition, as the latter seems to be invented24 and to stray from the initial
aim of the folklore associations to highlight authenticity [56], but the grouping into an ensemble
that attempts to self-identify under the rule of an internal desire to maintain what has already
been lost or what is at stake to be lost [57].25
However, an attempt to study the web user as an agent through the concept of
participatory culture seems to be one-sided in the end, especially when we try to understand the
complicated relations between social and technological agencies given the involvement of the
emerging global web economy.26 And if we add to the above the factor of a more specialized
study subject, like in this case a group of users that has been chosen based on the video content
they upload and refers to a Greek national singularity, then drawing conclusions becomes more
challenging: Can we observe how the local slips into the global or vice versa instead of how they
juxtapose each other? What happens when in the relationship between a member of a minority
and the predominant ethnic group, the role of the web user in a global community that includes
the national-state entity is added? Clearly something is changing but it is rather soon to predict
on anonymous speech on the Web.
23 For a discussion on the embracing of local traditions by the folklore associations and the key role that
they have played in the folklorization and the commodification of tradition see Marika Rombos-Levides,
ibid., 158-68.
24 See the findings of the M. Rombos-Levides’ study on Greek Eastern Macedonia (Marika Rombos-Levides,
ibid., 131-9).
25 At this point, the experienced social acceleration in modern societies comes into play. As D. Harvey
indicates, «the greater the ephemerality, the more pressing the need to discover or manufacture some kind
of eternal truth that might lie therein» [David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity. An Enquiry into the
Origins of Cultural Change (Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 1990) 292]. This is where the emotional
motivation of demonstrating interest in the folklore, the tradition etc. lies: the curb of an accelerating —and
experienced as alienating— process towards the unknown can be accomplished through the pursuit of
familiar and recurrent actions that have happened in the past, and thus are predictable and can provide the
feeling of security as well as a sense of stability and control. See David Harvey, ibid., 202; Hartmut Rosa,
Social Acceleration. A new theory of modernity, trans. Jonathan Trejo-Mathys (New York: CUP, 2013) 63-71,
74-81, 151-9.
26 For the need of an interdisciplinary approach to the agency attributed to the users of new media that
includes the social, cultural, economic, technological and legal perspective of the UGC sites see José van
Dijck, “Users like you? Theorizing agency in user-generated content,” Media, Culture & Society 31, n. 1
(2009): 41-58.
96
if this change is able to soften or sharpen any national conflicts or even «change the way the world
changes», as the Time Magazine prefaced the choice of ‘you’ as Person of the Year 2006, referring
to the anonymous web users [58].
Conclusion
As the material collection resulted from the platform of YouTube and not from an anthropological
field research, it could not be accurate regarding the frequency or the ubiquitous or not presence
of the Slavic songs in the village fairs. For instance, one could notice the local differentiations only
under certain conditions through YouTube: in recorded scenes from a fair at Ano Ιdroussa village
of Florina (Annex: A6) songs in the local Slavic language are heard, while at the neighboring Kato
Ιdroussa village the Slavic lyrics have not only been omitted but they have been replaced by
Greek lyrics (Annex: A7). Through YouTube one could only confirm the choice of each user to
highlight the duration that for him represents the fair (for example, one might highlight the Slavic
lyrics or might conceal it by choosing to upload recorded scenes from instrumental folk music
and dances).
So, taking the above-mentioned limitations into consideration, the findings of this
research indicate:
Firstly, the number of uploads of the village fairs of the Western and the Central
Macedonia is excessively larger than that of the village fairs of Eastern Macedonia.
Secondly, the local Slavic language in the cases of Western and Central Macedonia seem
to have been liberated from the language taboo, as the Slavic lyrics at festivities show up more
frequently contrary to Eastern Macedonia that uploads fairs with instrumental pieces and absence
of lyrics (Annex: C1-C4). It’s worth mentioning that the uploads of festivities in Eastern
Macedonia exclude the Slavic language even from the videos’ title. Even in regions of Eastern
Macedonia with a significant amount of a Slavic speaking population, such as the Serres
prefecture, we cannot trace any ‘Slavicness’ unless we watch video recordings of local folklore
associations’ events (Annex: C3, C4). It should also be noted that for an interpretation of the
absence of the Slavic lyrics in Eastern Macedonia we should keep in mind that in these regions
the influence of the Bulgarian nationalism, as well as the observed language shift, was stronger,
at least in most cases.
Thirdly, the villages of Polipotamos, Aetos, Meliti, Vevi, Sitaria, Lofoi, Papagiannis,
Perdikkas, Ptelea, Lefki, Kefalari and Sidirochori of Western Macedonia, as well as the villages of
Ampelies, Vrita, Stavrodromi, Loutraki, Agra, Kerassia, Margarita, Theodoraki, Platani, Marina
and Kopanos of Central Macedonia seem to need to publicize not just songs in Slavic lyrics, but
songs with a patriotic content, originating from national Macedonian folklore. It should be
mentioned though that the number of villages uploading patriotic songs on YouTube is
significantly smaller compared to the total of Slavic-speaking villages in Greek Macedonia.
According to Baltsiotis’ research for Euromosaic Report, the total number villages in which a
considerable part of the population is Slav-speaking is estimated at 370 at least[59].
Finally, whether the promotion of the Slavic lyrics in folklore music through YouTube
from Western and Central Macedonia is equivalent to a statement about the linguistic or national
differentiation of a minority, or an action aiming at settling the local reality without this action
being part of a self-identification process and without implying some kind of differentiation from
97
the Greek nation, cannot be safely answered at least based on my available data. However, the
repeated performance of patriotic songs in certain villages is not to be overlooked and should
regarded as an act of national identification.
Acknowledgements
I would like to express my deep gratitude to the historian Leonidas Embiricos that provided me
with important bibliographic material and to Andreas Lyberatos, Assistant Professor at Panteion
University of Athens, that offered me his view on the final form of this paper.
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[5] Kostopoulos, Tasos. Η απαγορευμένη γλώσσα. Κρατική καταστολή των σλαβικών
διαλέκτων στην ελληνική Μακεδονία. Athens: Μαύρη Λίστα, 22000, 162-77.
[6] Embiricos, Leonidas. Ibid., 51.
[7] Kostopoulos, Tasos. Ibid., 356.
[8] Kahl, Thede. “Singing without words. Language and Identity Shift among Slavic Macedonian
Musicians in Greece.” Die Welt der Slaven LV (2010): 392-3.
[9] Kostopoulos, Tasos. Ibid., 360-1.
[10]
Gourani, Theodora. “Προβληματισμοί σχετικά με την καταγραφή και μελέτη των
τοπικών τραγουδιών των σλαβόφωνων κατοίκων των περιοχών Έδεσσας και
Αλμωπίας.” In Ετερότητες & μουσική στα Βαλκάνια. Τα κείμενα, Ημερίδα του Τμήματος
Λαϊκής & Παραδοσιακής Μουσικής ΤΕΙ Ηπείρου με τη συνεργασία Κέντρου Ερευνών
Μειονοτικών Ομάδων (31 Μαΐου 2008). Arta: Εκδόσεις του Τμήματος Λαϊκής &
Παραδοσιακής Μουσικής ΤΕΙ Ηπείρου, 2008, 42.
[11]
Kahl, Thede. Ibid., 396-7.
[12]
Kostopoulos, Tasos. Ibid., 356.
[13]
Ibid., 361-2, 371-3.
[14]
Ibid., 310, 319-22, 340-2, 362, 370-2.
[15]
Ibid., 319-20, 364-5, 367-8, 370-1.
[16]
Ibid., 315-7, 321, 329-34, 345, 348-54.
98
[17]
Ibid., 368.
[18]
Christopoulos, Dimitris. Ibid., 115.
[19]
Gourani, Theodora. Ibid., 42.
[20]
Embiricos, Leonidas. Ibid., 53.
[21]
Kahl, Thede. Ibid., 391.
[22]
Christopoulos, Dimitris. Ibid., 114.
[23]
Liakos, Antonis. Πώς το παρελθόν γίνεται ιστορία; Athens: Πόλις, 2007, 111-7.
[24]
Barth, Fredrick, ed. Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. The Social Organization of Culture
Difference. Boston: Little, Brown, 1969, 14.
[25]
Stavrides, Stavros. Μετέωροι χώροι της ετερότητας. Athens: Αλεξάνδρεια, 2010, 222.
[26]
Grosz, Elizabeth. Architecture from the Outside. Essays on Virtual and Real Space.
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2001, 91-105.
[27]
Stavrides, Stavros. Ibid., 45-7, 221-4.
[28]
Christopoulos, Dimitris. Ibid., 111.
[29]
‘Egejki majki’, Macedonian Folk Songs (Македонски народни песни), last accessed: Nov.
30, 2016, <pesna.org/song.php?id=973>.
[30]
‘ЛЕРИН КОСТУР РАСПЕЈАНИ - LERIN KOSTUR RASPEJANI - ΦΛΩΡΙΝΑ ΚΑΙ
ΚΑΣΤΟΡΙΑ ΤΡΑΓΟΥΔΟΥΝ’, Abecedar Абецедар, last accessed: Nov. 30, 2016,
<abecedar.blogspot.gr/2012/09/lerin-kostur-raspejani>.
[31]
‘Kade ste, Makedončinja [Kade ste,Makedončińa?(Каде сте, Македончиња?)]’, Lyrics
Translate, last accessed: Nov. 30, 2016, <lyricstranslate.com/el/kade-stemakedon>.
[32]
‘Lerinskite sela’, Macedonian Folk Songs (Македонски народни песни), last accessed:
Nov. 30, 2016, <pesna.org/song.php?id=1033>.
[33]
‘Pesna za Ovcharani’, Macedonian Folk Songs (Македонски народни песни), last
accessed: Nov. 30, 2016, <pesna.org/song.php?id=1098>.
[34]
‘Ah vratete se Makedonci Αχ γυρίστε Μακεδόνες’, World Wide chat, last accessed: Nov.
30, 2016, <worldwide.chat/Ah_Vratete_se_Makedonci_%C>.
[35]
‘Jas sum chisto Makedonche’, Macedonian Folk Songs (Македонски народни песни), last
accessed: Nov. 30, 2016, <pesna.org/song.php?id=1000>.
[36]
‘Сузана Спасовска - Александар е цар македl’, AllTheLyrics.com, last accessed: Nov.
30, 2016, <allthelyrics.com/forum/showthread.php?t=126824>.
[37]
‘When he fell at Pirin’, Macedonian Folk Songs (Македонски народни песни), last
accessed: Nov. 30, 2016, <pesna.org/song.php?id=463>.
[38]
‘Krushevo aber pristigna’, Macedonian Folk Songs (Македонски народни песни), last
accessed: Nov. 30, 2016, <pesna.org/song.php?id=485>.
[39]
‘Ordanitsa träumte einen Traum’, Macedonian Folk Songs (Македонски народни
песни), last accessed: Nov. 30, 2016, <pesna.org/song.php?id=73>.
[40]
‘Zapejte site angeli’, Macedonian Folk Songs (Македонски народни песни), last
accessed: Nov. 30, 2016, <pesna.org/song.php?id=1055>.
[41]
‘Pearl of Balkans’, Macedonian Folk Songs (Македонски народни песни), last accessed:
Nov. 30, 2016, <pesna.org/song.php?id=813>.
[42]
Ntantsi, Evangelia. “Λαϊκός πολιτισμός ή πολιτισμός των μαζών; Από το χρόνο της
αλληλοαναγνώρισης στο χρόνο της αναγνωρισιμότητας.” In Το παρόν του παρελθόντος.
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Ιστορία, Λαογραφία, Κοινωνική Ανθρωπολογία. Επιστημονικό Συμπόσιο (19-21 Απριλίου
2002). Athens: Εταιρεία Σπουδών Νεοελληνικού Πολιτισμού και Γενικής Παιδείας (Σχολή
Μωραΐτη), 2003, 79.
[43]
Kostopoulos, Tasos. Ibid., 324.
[44]
Ibid., 13-4.
[45]
<eklogika.gr/Sygkritika_Euroeklogwn.pdf>,
<eklogika.gr/euroekloges_2014>,
last
accessed: Nov. 30, 2016.
[46]
Baltsiotis, Lambros and Embiricos, Leonidas. “Speaking in tongues. The battle over
minority languages hots up.” Index on Censorship 30, n. 2 (2001): 146-7.
[47]
Nikolakopoulos, Elias. Η καχεκτική δημοκρατία. Κόμματα και εκλογές, 1946-1967.
Athens: Πατάκης, ⁷2010, 12-9.
[48]
Kelty, Christopher M. “From Participation to Power.” In The Participatory Cultures
Handbook, eds. A. Delwiche and J. J. Henderson. New York/ London: Routledge Taylor &
Francis, 2013, 23.
[49]
Burgess, Jean and Green, Joshua. YouTube: Online Video and Participatory Culture.
Cambridge (Η.Β.): Polity Press, 2009, 13-4.
[50]
Ibid., 10, 12.
[51]
Ibid., 75.
[52]
See ‘Logopedia YouTube’, Logopedia, last accessed: Sept. 16, 2016,
<http://logos.wikia.com/wiki/YouTube>.
[53]
See ‘Community Guidelines’, YouTube, last accessed: Sept. 16, 2016, <Community
Guidelines-YouTube>.
[54]
Anderson, Benedict. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London/ New York:
Verso, 2006 – rev. edition, 24-36.
[55]
Hatzitaki-Kapsomenou, Chrysoula. “Οι πολιτιστικοί σύλλογοι και η παράδοση: το
πρόβλημα της αυθεντικότητας.” In Το παρόν του παρελθόντος. Ιστορία, Λαογραφία,
Κοινωνική Ανθρωπολογία. Επιστημονικό Συμπόσιο (19-21 Απριλίου 2002). Athens: Εταιρεία
Σπουδών Νεοελληνικού Πολιτισμού και Γενικής Παιδείας (Σχολή Μωραΐτη), 2003, 376.
[56]
Ibid., 377-8.
[57]
Ibid., 373.
[58]
Dijck, José van. “Users like you? Theorizing agency in user-generated content.” Media,
Culture & Society 31, n. 1 (2009): 41.
[59]
Baltsiotis, Lambros. “Le [slavo]macédonien / bulgare en Grèce.” Euromosaic Report. 1996.
Last accessed: Nov. 30, 2016, <uoc.edu/euromosaic/web/homean>.
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- Abecedar Абецедар. Last accessed: Nov. 30, 2016. <http://abecedar.blogspot.gr/>.
- Μακεδονική
παράδοση
στην
Ελλάδα.
Last
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Nov.
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2016.
<http://aegeanmacedonianculture.gr/>.
- Macedonian Folk Songs (Македонски народни песни). Last accessed: Nov. 30, 2016.
<http://pesna.org/>.
- YouTube. Last accessed: Nov. 30, 2016. <https://www.youtube.com/>.
100
Annex
Α. Western Mecedonia
1. Festivity at Skopia village of Florina (Aug. 15, 2012), uploader: skopiaflorina, published: Aug.
17, 2012, views: 1.104, <youtube.com/watch?v=IWQlYsmbN4c>.
2. Festivity at Kratero village of Florina (July 6, 2010), uploader: nomosflorinas, published: July
7, 2010, views: 5.771, <youtube.com/watch?v=-_MIocyaqrk>.
3. Festivity at Polipotamos village of Florina (Aug. 15, 2015), uploader: GigenisMakedonas,
published: Aug. 18, 2015, views: 3.380, <youtube.com/watch?v=USv9w3c6VyE>.
4. Festivity at Polipotamos village of Florina (Aug. 15, 2015), uploader: Egejsko makedonsko
radio,
published:
Nov.
28,
2015,
views:
1.904,
<youtube.com/watch?v=AuzbBuhyeF4&t=2044s.
5. Festivity at Ano Idroussa village of Florina (2015), uploader: Konstantinos G, published: July
27, 2015, views:5.491, <youtube.com/watch?v=YpR39STbSOs>.
6. Festivity at Kato Idroussa village of Florina (2010), uploader: nomosflorinas, published: Aug.
14, 2010, views: 1.897, <youtube.com/watch?v=QvTXvd6KOJc>.
7. Festivity at Sitaria village of Florina (July 11, 2015), uploader: nomosflorinas, published: July
12, 2015, views: 275, <youtube.com/watch?v=bfG2Us_RoVo>.
8. Festivity at Sitaria village of Florina (July 13, 2014), uploader: nomosflorinas, published: July
21, 2014, views: 2.372, <youtube.com/watch?v=XkZ8lNzrTP8>.
9. Festivity at Sitaria village of Florina (July 13, 2014), uploader: nomosflorinas, published: July
22, 2014, views: 558, <youtube.com/watch?v=iM4yXlp6cWM>.
10. Festivity at Florina, n.d. [2010], uploader: nomosflorinas, published: Aug. 14, 2010, views:
99.771, <youtube.com/watch?v=iXCWKIubGcs>.
11. Festivity at Aetos village of Florina (July 11, 2015), uploader: Γιώργος Θάνου, published: July
13, 2015, views: 4.856, <youtube.com/watch?v=YCMI4yW-eWk>.
12. Festivity at Aetos village of Florina (July 11, 2015), uploader: Γιώργος Θάνου, published: July
14, 2015, views: 8.018, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_9>.
13. Festivity at Aetos village of Florina (July 11, 2015), uploader: Γιώργος Θάνου, published: July
12, 2015, views: 9.980, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C>.
14. Festivity at Aetos village of Florina (July 11, 2015), uploader: Γιώργος Θάνου, published: July
14, 2015, views: 1.629, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z>.
15. Festivity at Aetos village of Florina (July 11, 2015), uploader: Γιώργος Θάνου, published: July
13, 2015, views: 1.649, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g>.
16. Festivity at Meliti village of Florina (July 19, 2014), uploader: mkdvosrce, published: July 20,
2014, views: 10.836, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6>.
17. Festivity at Meliti village of Florina (2014), uploader: Toukasni Makedontsi, published: Nov.
16, 2014, views: 942, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T>.
18. Festivity at Papagiannis village of Florina (July 14, 2009), uploader: Popozhani, published:
Nov. 19, 2009, views: 7.299, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F>.
19. Festivity at Vevi village of Florina (Aug. 2, 2009), uploader: trasos2009, published: Oct. 22,
2009, views: 12.470, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qcZAuh>.
20. Festivity at Sitaria village of Florina (July 9, 2011), uploader: GigenisMakedonas, published:
Aug. 19, 2011, views: 13.176, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k>.
101
21. Festivity at Lofoi village of Florina (May 20, 2013), uploader: setomagr, published: May 24,
2013, views: 1.653, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qvqplnnfW>.
22. Festivity at Perdikkas village of Kozani (Sept. 12, 2015), uploader: Γιώργος Θάνου, published:
Sept. 22, 2015, views: 962, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-xDSygKAU9g>.
23. Festivity at Ptelea village of Kastoria (n.d), uploader: Agrotis Megas, published: May 26, 2012,
views: 1.464, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O2IxeLOD>.
24. Festivity at Lefki village of Kastoria (2012), uploader: Lerinsko Selo, published: Jan. 16, 2013,
views: 5.549, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B>.
25. Festivity at Kefalari village of Kastoria (June 15, 2013), uploader: arxigos1000, published: July
14, 2013, views: 1.756, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lx>.
26. Festivity at Sidirochori village of Kastoria (July 19, 2009), uploader: Televizija Sonce,
published: July 24, 2009, views: 15.435, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v>.
Β. Central Macedonia
1. Festivity at Mygdonia village of Thessaloniki (June 21, 2009), uploader: StanVet, published:
Aug. 19, 2009, views: 198.753, <youtube.com/watch?v=7Hh43Lyo9uc>.
2. Festivity at Angelochori village of Thessaloniki (Feb. 13, 2010), uploader: Agia Paraskevi,
published: Mar. 5, 2010, views: 145.788, <youtube.com/watch?v=iwNC-fXRu40>.
3. Festivity at Kalivia village of Pella (2015), uploader: Μ.Χ.Π.Σ. ΑΜΥΝΤΑΣ ΚΑΛΥΒΙΩΝ,
published: June 4, 2015, views: 887, <youtube.com/watch?v=CIc_XUuJi94>.
4. Festivity at Skidra village of Pella (Dec. 19, 2013), uploader: Μ.Π.Σ. Μαυροβουνίου Ν.
Πέλλας
“Ελπίδα”,
published:
Dec.
20,
2013,
views:
1.051,
<youtube.com/watch?v=N6LFQU4TxPo>.
5. Festivity at Vrita village of Pella (July 24, 2015), uploader: Γιώργος Θάνου, published: July
25, 2015, views: 4.964, <youtube.com/watch?v=DziTR122uuI>.
6. Festivity at Stavrodromi village of Pella (Aug. 16, 2014), uploader: Γιώργος Θάνου,
published: Aug. 27, 2014, views: 2.623, <youtube.com/watch?v=njgROtRJ098>.
7. Festivity at Stavrodromi village of Pella (Aug. 16, 2014), uploader: Γιώργος Θάνου,
published: Aug. 18, 2014, views: 2.129, <youtube.com/watch?v=NP>.
8. Festivity at Loutraki (Pozar) village of Pella (Aug. 28, 2016), uploader: Γιώργος Θάνου,
published: Sept. 20, 2016, views: 27, <youtube.com/watch?v=nMa-hspImQk>.
9. Festivity at Goumenissa village of Kilkis (Aug. 13, 2015), uploader: panos fokas, published:
Aug. 14, 2015, views: 60, <youtube.com/watch?v=eummb78mbiU>.
10. Festivity at Kopanos village of Imathia (Aug. 29, 2014), uploader: Γιώργος Θάνου, published:
Aug. 31, 2014, views: 6.398, <youtube.com/watch?v=T>.
11. Festivity at Yiannitsa of Pella (1986), uploader: Γιώργος Θάνου, published: Dec. 27, 2010,
views: 7.055, <youtube.com/watch?v=QUPFnjNPuvM>.
12. Festivity at Ampelies village of Pella (Apr. 28, 2012), uploader: Γιώργος Θάνου, published:
May 1, 2012, views: 30.656, <youtube.com/watch?v=jcsvJiMAu3w>.
13. Festivity at Ampelies village of Pella (Apr. 28, 2012), uploader: Γιώργος Θάνου, published:
Apr. 30, 2012, views: 32.378, <youtube.com/watch?v=d6kr999A41Y>.
14. Festivity at Ampelies village of Pella (Apr. 30, 2011), uploader: Γιώργος Θάνου, published:
May 23, 2011, views: 2.109, <youtube.com/watch?v=jR_wK4HIU4w>.
15. Festivity at Ampelies village of Pella (Apr. 29, 2011), uploader: Γιώργος Θάνου, published:
102
May 26, 2011, views: 3.343, <youtube.com/watch?v=QeFr7I_FPiU>.
16. Festivity at Ampelies village of Pella (May 1, 2015), uploader: Γιώργος Θάνου, published:
Apr. 23, 2016, views: 1.022, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_E>.
17. Festivity at Ampelies village of Pella (May 1, 2015), uploader: Γιώργος Θάνου, published:
Apr. 23, 2016, views: 629, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4e>.
18. Festivity at Margarita village of Pella (2013), uploader: TASOS SERAFIM, published: Sept. 1,
2013, views: 5.398, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bO>.
19. Festivity at Kerassia village of Pella (Aug. 26, 2015), uploader: Γιώργος Θάνου, published:
Aug. 26, 2015, views: 2.297, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yy>.
20. Festivity at Loutraki (Pozar) village of Pella (Aug. 26, 2016), uploader: Γιώργος Θάνου,
published: Oct. 7, 2016, views: 1.391, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O>.
21. Festivity at Theodoraki village of Pella (June 15, 2013), uploader: Toukasni Makedontsi,
published: Sept. 9, 2013, views: 8.651, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T>.
22. Festivity at Platani village of Pella (July 25, 2015), uploader: Γιώργος Θάνου, published: July
26, 2015, views: 3.620, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n>.
23. Festivity at Agra village of Pella (Sept. 6, 2013), uploader: Toukasni Makedontsi, published:
Sept. 8, 2013, views: 5.147, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q>.
24. Festivity at Agra village of Pella (Sept. 6, 2013), uploader: Toukasni Makedontsi, published:
Sept. 8, 2013, views: 9.671, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0g>.
25. Festivity at Marina village of Imathia (May 16, 2015), uploader: Γιώργος Θάνου, published:
May 23, 2015, views: 190, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fF>.
26. Festivity at Marina village of Imathia (July 15, 2015), uploader: Γιώργος Θάνου, published:
July 17, 2015, views: 12.219, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B>.
27. Festivity at Kopanos village of Imathia (Aug. 30, 2014), uploader: Toukasni Makedontsi,
published: Sept. 2, 2014, views: 1.645, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yLLBrkq6bGs>.
28. Festivity at Kopanos village of Imathia (Aug. 29, 2014), uploader: Γιώργος Θάνου, published:
Aug. 29, 2014, views: 3.426, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3l>.
C. Eastern Macedonia
1. Festivity at Xiropotamos village of Drama (July 19, 2014), uploader: Silogos Xiropotamou),
published: July 22, 2014, views: 607, <youtube.com/watch?v=Yl0-VlP2IcM>.
2. Festivity at Oreini village of Serres (Jan. 7, 2014), uploader: ΜΙΧΑΛΗΣ ΣΟΥΖΑΣ, published:
Mar. 5, 2014, views: 740, <youtube.com/watch?v=I8>.
3. First annual meeting of the folklore associations of “Ndopioi” of Serres prefecture at
Melenikitsi of Serres, n.d. [Dec. 17, 2011], uploader: Pantelis Voukantsis, published: Jan. 9,
2015, views: 4.310, <youtube.com/watch?v=Q>.
4. Third annual meeting of the folklore associations of “Ndopioi” of Serres prefecture at
Melenikitsi of Serres (Feb. 9, 2013), uploader: Athanasios Kotsoulas, published: Feb. 15, 2013,
views: 2.306, <youtube.com/watch?v=R1>.
103
“Refugees of the Greek Civil War in Yugoslav Macedonia and the
Contribution of ‘Aegean Macedonians’ in its Nation Building Project”
By Georgios Limantzakis (Panteion University)
Abstract
During the Greek Civil War (1946-1949) -and largely as a result of it- some 70,000 Greek and
Slavomacedonian political refugees left or were forced to leave Greece, seeking refuge in
neighboring Yugoslavia and other People’s Republics in Eastern Europe. This paper aims to
explain the military necessities behind this decision and the way this primarily humanitarian
issue evolved into a political one, as these children -soon accompanied by thousands of other
political refugees from Greece- were usually treated in Yugoslavia not as Greeks, but as “Aegean
Macedonian” refugees (also known as Egejci) who fled persecution for their identity and not for
their ideology. This misinterpretation often threatened to evolve into a major issue in bilateral
relations, as many among this disputed refugee population pursued a privileged relationship
with the centers of power in Belgrade and Skopje by promoting their exodus from Greece as a
central element of the new national Macedonian narrative. In this context, the present paper will
attempt to explore the relationship between refugees, historians and Slavomacedonian Diaspora
organizations in Australia, Canada and elsewhere, as well as the way they interacted and
influenced public discourse in Yugoslav Macedonia before independence (1991).
Keywords: Greek Civil War, Macedonia, Yugoslavia, refugees, identity, diaspora.
Introduction: An increasing need for conscripts evolves into a humanitarian issue
After the defeat of Nazi Germany in World War II, the Greek Government in exile returned to
Greece and attempted to assume power, which was also contested by EAM-ELAS, a major
resistance organization controlled by the Communist Party of Greece (KKE). Differences in
ideology and affiliation between the two parties soon evolved into a full scale Civil War, which
led to a significant loss of life during the next few years (1946-1949).1 By mid-1948, the
Communists seemed to be losing most of mainland Greece, having been territorially restricted to
some parts of Epirus, the mountain areas of Thessaly and a significant part of rural Macedonia.
Although the Communist leadership attempted to revamp its armed forces as the Democratic
Army of Greece (DSE),2 the latter failed to capture a major city in these areas, which was
considered a precondition by the Soviet Union and other Eastern-Bloc countries to recognize the
For more on this intriguing chapter of modern Greek history, see Christopher Montague Woodhouse,
Apple of Discord: A survey of recent Greek politics in the international setting, Hutchinson & Co., London, 1948,
and Dominique Eudes, The Kapetanios: Partisans and Civil War in Greece, Publisher NLB, 1972 (initially
published in French under the title Les kapetanios, La guerre civile grecque de 1943 à 1949, Fayard, Paris, 1970).
2 The Democratic Army of Greece (Δημοκρατικός Στρατός Ελλάδος) was founded by the Communist
Party of Greece on 28 October 1946 and named as such on 27 December 1946. According to the relevant
order of its General Command, it was “the people’s revolutionary army which wıll fight for national
independence and for true, People's Democracy [Λαοκρατία]”.
1
104
Greek Provisional Government.3
At the same time, the DSE was in dire need of new reserves. As its General Commander
Markos Vafiadis later admitted, voluntary conscription had fallen below 10% in 1947, creating an
expanding need to conscript forcibly men and women from the villages they controlled, and
many times even children as young as 14 or 13 years old.4 Attempting to accommodate this
problem, in early 1948 the Provisional Government conceived the idea of evacuating all children
aged 2 to 14 years old living under its control to neighboring People’s Republics, mainly
Yugoslavia and Albania. The main argument was that their parents could now fight undistracted,
while special care and education was provided to their children just across the border. Through
this policy, the DSE aimed to receive support and indirect recognition by most communist
countries, while at the same time increasing its military capabilities and indirectly limiting
desertions.5
As expected, the adoption of this policy created heated debate both within and outside
the borders of Greece. The government of Athens protested strongly this measure, claiming that
thousands of children were being forcibly taken from their parents, being used as hostages or
even as “a future reserve of Communist forces aiming to destabilize Greece”. The national
government even brought the issue to the United Nations in December 1946, complaining for the
interference of its northern neighbours in its internal affairs and asking for a special committee to
be founded with the purpose of investigating the means and extent of neighboring countries’
support to Greek Communists. However, the UN Security Council was unable to reach a decision
and the issue was handed over to the General Assembly, which decided to establish a Special
Committee that would investigate these allegations and provide additional support if requested.6
At the polarized conditions of the time, the policy adopted by the Communists and their
Provisional Government became known as Pedomazoma (Παιδομάζωμα, child-gathering), a term
used in the past to describe the odious Ottoman recruitment system known as Devşirme, whose
Cities such as Karpenisi, Lamia and Karditsa had been occupied by Communist forces for brief periods
during World War II and the early phases of the Civil War, but were soon abandoned under the pressure
of Nazi German and Italian forces. Similarly, after the departure of German troops from most of mainland
Greece Communist-led forces attempted to occupy cities such as Grevena, Konitsa and Metsovo, but were
repeatedly repulsed by the National Army (Εθνικός Στρατός), which was controlled by the government
of Athens and generously supplied by its western Allies.
4 Markos Vafiadis was elected into the Central Committee of the Communist Party in 1942, assumed the
General Command of the DSE in October 1946 and was appointed Prime Minister of the Provisional
Government about a year later (December 1947). However, his disagreement with the General Secretary
of KKE Nikos Zachariadis on issues of military doctrine led to his removal from the leadership of the DSE
in August 1948. He was ousted from the Party in October 1950, while being in exile in the Soviet Union.
5 Stathis Kalyvas, Nikos Marantzidis, Εμφύλια Πάθη (Civil War Passions), Εκδόσεις Μεταίχμιο, Athens,
2015, pp. 446-447.
6 Only nine out of the eleven members of the Security Council provided delegates for the Committee, as
the Soviet Union and Poland declined to participate. The Committee subsequently appointed observer
groups, but these were hampered in their work because Greece’s northern neighbours denied them
access. For more, see the official website of the Dutch Ministry of Defense, available at
https://www.defensie.nl/english/topics/historical-missions/contents/mission-overview/1947/unitednations-special-committee-on-the-balkans-unscob (last visit on 7.11.2016).
3
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aim was to supply the Janissaries corp (Yeniçeri) with able, young men.
The Communist Party claimed in its defense that the evacuation was just “a temporary
measure for the children’s protection” and that “Not even one child has been taken to another country
contrary to the will of its parents”. Although this claim can be easily disputed, it is equally true that
some parents did give their consent.7 Some thought their children would be safe and better off in
nearby People’s Republics, while other sources suggest this happened because many of the
families affected were ethnic Macedonian and had more faith in the Yugoslav authorities than in
the Greek ones under the conditions of war.8 Although the areas held by DSE were home to a
significant Slavomacedonian population, this theory has been heavily disputed by official KKE
documents and statements made by political refugees some years later.9 On the contrary, one can
easily imagine how hard it must have been for parents to deliver their children without knowing
if and when they could ever see them again. Realizing how few parents had consented to give
their children away, the Provisional Government decided to enforce the measure in late 1948. As
a result, the flow of children from Greece to neighboring countries augmented rapidly within the
next few months, reaching a total of some 20 to 30 thousand children.10
The reception of Greek political refugees in Yugoslav Macedonia
Upon entering Yugoslavia, children brought from Greece were usually hosted in depopulated
villages along the border, and later relocated to larger cities such as Bitola and Skopje. There, they
joined thousands of other refugees and partisans, which were either still crossing the border to
fight along the DSE and its affiliated ethnic Macedonian organization NOF (Narodno Osloboditelen
Front) or allocated in other cities across Yugoslav Macedonia according to capabilities and
demand.11 At this point, one should note that the Yugoslav authorities had a strong interest in
For more on this measure, its effectiveness and the reactions it caused, see Irini Lagani, Το «παιδομάζωμα»
και οι ελληνογιουγκοσλαβικές σχέσεις 1949-1953 (“Child-gathering” and the Greek-Yugoslav Relations,
1949-1953), Εκδόσεις Σιδέρη, Athens, 1996.
8 Richard Frucht, Eastern Europe: An Introduction to the People, Lands and Culture, ABC-Clio, Santa Barbara,
California, 2005, p. 599.
9 When it comes to estimating the population of Slavomacedonians in northern Greece, one should keep in
mind that they constituted a significant part of the population in the areas held by the DSE (mainly in
western Macedonia), but a relatively small one when related to the overall population of Greek Macedonia.
For more on how they influenced and interacted with the DSE and the Communist Party before and during
the Civil War, see Anastasia Karakasidou, “Fellow travellers, separate roads: the KKE and the Macedonian
Question” in East European Quarterly, University of Colorado, Boulder, vol. 27, 1993, p. 12.
10 According to the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB), 28,296 children were
evacuated from Greece in 1948 and 1949, out of which some 11 to 12,000 were settled in Yugoslavia, and
the rest were dispersed in other Eastern countries. More specifically, 5,132 children were registered in
Romania in 1950, 4,148 in Czechoslovakia, 3,590 in Poland, 2,859 in Hungary and 672 in Bulgaria, while
smaller numbers were settled in Eastern Germany (DDR) and the Soviet Union (USSR). R. Frucht, Eastern
Europe, 2005, as above.
11 Yugoslav Partisans had long favored the creation of a distinct organization made up of ethnic
Macedonians within the ranks of the KKE-led EAM-ELAS, resulting to the creation of SNOF
(Slavijanomakedonski Narodno Osloboditelen Front, Slavomacedonian National Liberation Front) in October
1943. Although destined to serve and represent mainly the Slavomacedonians of Greek Macedonia, this
7
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assisting and settling these people in the territory of the People’s Republic of Macedonia (Narodna
Republika Makedonija), as the area had been depopulated as a result of the war and the uncertainty
that followed thereafter.12 However, the flow of refugees diminished rapidly after Yugoslavia
closed its border with Greece in August 1948, as a result of the expulsion of Yugoslavia from
COMECON and Tito’s decision to cease all assistance to Greek Communists for as long as they
aligned with Stalin and his policy. As a result, most refugees were now forced to flee to Albania,
although very few had the intension to stay there and in most cases soon left to seek refuge in
other People’s Republics. By the same time, there was a sharp rise in the age of incoming refugees,
as most were now adult fighters fleeing Greece to escape repression and retaliation. In total, more
than 50,000 civilians are estimated to have left Greece with the retreating DSE forces in 1949, with
most finding refuge in People’s Republics all over Eastern Europe, and the Communist Party of
Greece moving its headquarters to Tashkent, Uzbekistan, a Soviet republic at the time.13
By the end of the war, a significant population of political refugees from Greece had found
a new home in the Soviet Union and other People’s Republics, although many moved away from
the countries they were initially allocated. A big percentage of them chose to settle in Yugoslavia,
although their population was not concentrated only in the People’s Republic of Macedonia.
Significant numbers of refugees were also settled in the Serbian province of Vojvodina, in villages
such as Gakovo and Kruševlje, close to previous settlements such as Buljkes, Bela Crkva, Vršac,
Plandište, Šid and Ečka.14 Others were sent further north, as far as Osijek and Crkvenica in
Croatia, or even Kranj in Slovenia. A major reason for this allocation was that the People’s
Republic of Macedonia had limited housing capabilities at the early ’50s, a situation that the
authorities attempted to change by building new blocks of flats that would be allocated to
refugees.
In most cases, the language refugees spoke became the criterion of determining their
nationaliy (narodnost), and hence were often settled in distinct areas held for ethnic Greeks (Grci)
first organization was largely controlled by the EAM-ELAS. Consequently, the Yugoslav Partisans asked
the Greek Communists to give Slavomacedonians more of a free hand, which led to the reformation of this
organization and to dropping the ethnic adjective in April 1945, becoming hence known as NOF. In theory,
it was supposed to function as a liaison between the Communist parties of Yugoslavia and Greece, in
recognition of the special services offered by Slavomacedonians for the common cause. However, this
organization would prove more loyal to Tito and the vision of a “united Macedonia” (Obedineta Makedonija)
than to the ideals of Greek Communists, which soon attempted to eliminate its influence.
12 Most of its inhabitants had fled to Bulgaria, which decided to recognize a Macedonian minority in 1946
and treat it favorably until the Tito-Stalin split in 1948. Pressured by the Yugoslavs, Georgi Dimitrov even
consented to sending back some of them, although few had actually volunteered. Miladina Monova, “Οι
πρόσφυγες του ελληνικού εμφύλιου πολέμου στη Δημοκρατία της Μακεδονίας: διαδρομές, γενιές,
ταυτοποιήσεις” (Refugees of the Greek Civil War in the Republic of Macedonia: journeys, generations,
identifications) in Markou Aikaterini (ed.), Ανασυνθέσεις και νέες δυναμικές στις βαλκανικές κοινωνίες
μετά το 1990, Ηρόδοτος, Athens, 2011, p. 238.
13 Neil Simpson, Macedonia -Its Disputed History, Aristos Press, Victoria, 1994, pp. 101-102.
14 For more on the political and social life of these settlements and their relationship with the Greek
Communist Party, see Milan Ristović, “Експеримент Буљкес: «грчка република» у Југославији 1945–
1949” (Experiment Buljkes: The “Greek republic” in Yugoslavia 1945-1949), Годишњак за друштвену
историју, IV, св. 2-3, Beograd, 1997, pp. 179-201.
107
and others for ethnic Macedonians (Makedonci).15 Most of the latter were reasonably settled in the
People’s Republic of Macedonia, mainly in the cities of Skopje, Titov Veles, Bitola, Prilep, Štip,
Kočani, Strumica, Gevgelija, Negotino, Kavadarci, Kumanovo and Tetovo.16 One of the most
obvious reasons for the settlement of refugee populations there was that many among them
identified with the Slavic speaking population of this republic, although not all considered
themselves part of the Macedonian nation. Some had less of an identity motive and were mostly
keen in enjoying the same climate and cultural conditions as those in their birthplace across the
border, while others looked forward to returning to their homes in Greece some time soon.
Relations between refugees and the Yugoslav authorities
Since the beginning, Yugoslav authorities made significant efforts to provide refugees with
efficient housing in cities, villages and state farms. Those healthy among them were soon given a
job, while those considered old were accommodated in rest houses. Special care was provided to
children, which became known as Decata Begalci (Refugee Children). However, in most cases their
living conditions were poor. Many found work in the agricultural sector, while others worked as
unskilled factory workers. At the same time, many refugees were experiencing an ideological
consciousness crisis, finding it hard to believe that the DSE had been defeated and that they might
have to live the rest of their life in exile. Many were accusing Tito for their situation, while others
attempted to leave Yugoslavia and seek a better life elsewhere. As soon as Greek-Yugoslav
bilateral relations normalized in late 1950, many sought to return to their villages in Greece, while
others immigrated to Australia, Canada or the United States, especially so if they already had
family there.17
Nevertheless, Yugoslav authorities were not particularly willing to let the refugees leave,
thereby implying that they perceived their settlement in Yugoslavia as permanent. The refugees
had a hard time reconciling with the idea, as many continued to believe that conditions would
soon change and they would be allowed to return to Greece. Influenced by such ideas, most
refugees refused to apply for Yugoslav citizenship and by mid-1952 only 3 to 4 thousand refugees
had been registered as Yugoslav citizens.18 However, as time went by many started to realize that
M. Monova, “Refugees of the Greek Civil War in the Republic of Macedonia: journeys, generations,
identifications”, Athens, 2011, p. 243.
16 Most of the refugees that eventually settled in Yugoslav Macedonia arrived progressively over a period
of years, due to the poor housing capabilities described above. Slavomacedonian sources accounted less
than 8,500 refugees from Greece in the People’s Republic of Macedonia in 1945, whose number gradually
grew to 14,000 by the end of 1946 and some 22-25,000 refugees by 1950. For more on their exact distribution
throughout Yugoslav Macedonia, see Spyridon Sfetas and Iakovos Michaelides, «Πολιτικοί Πρόσφυγες
στη Γιουγκοσλαβία» (Political Refugees in Yugoslavia) in Georgios Antoniou, Stathis Kalyvas (eds.), Οι
Πολιτικοί Πρόσφυγες του Εμφυλίου Πολέμου, Κοινωνικές και Πολιτικές Προσεγγίσεις, Πανεπιστήμιο
Μακεδονίας, Thessaloniki, 2015, pp. 38-39.
17 As a matter of fact, some were even condemned for being “Cominformists” (spies of the COMINFORM
and the Soviet Union). For more, see Spyridon Sfetas and Iakovos Michaelides, «Πολιτικοί Πρόσφυγες
στη Γιουγκοσλαβία» (Political Refugees in Yugoslavia), 2015, pp. 48-49.
18 The Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia (Savezno Ministarstvo za Inostrane Poslove) estimated
that more than 25-30% of the refugees would return to Greece if Athens declared amnesty. Iakovos
15
108
the possibility of return was little, and therefore decided to conform to the reality of staying in
Yugoslavia. At the same time, many realized that the care provided by the Yugoslav authorities
in the People’s Republic of Macedonia was not selfless, but rather connected to the issue of
irredentism, which had gained a prominent role in relations between Yugoslavia and its
neighbors.19 In accordance with this policy, political refugees from Greece were most commonly
called “Egejci” (Aegean Macedonians) and not just “Makedonci” (Macedonians).20 This term was
used in order to underline the notion of a “united Macedonia” (Obedineta Makedonija) and the
existence of “enslaved brothers and sisters” in Greece and Bulgaria, “which could -and shouldbe united under the leadership of Yugoslav Communists”.21 Although many refugees didn’t
actually realize or care about the name given to them at the time, they gradually accepted and
used it broadly, as it offered them significant leverage in their relations with state institutions and
the local society, enhancing their social and political role in Yugoslav Macedonia.
By the early ’50s, some refugees had managed to use their origin as a tool to gain access
to the centers of power in Skopje and Belgrade, thereby influencing their decisions vis-à-vis
Greece and the refugee issue in general. Among these, Naum Pejov soon evolved into one of the
most prominent figures, while Ilias Dimakis, Vangel Ajanovski-Oce and Mihailo Keramidziev
also played a major role.22 However, most refugees continued to be isolated from such
developments, a situation that led the party leadership to decide to organize them politically and
“award” them with a union of their own. As a result of these fermentations, a union named
Zdryzenieto na Begalcite od Egejska Makedonija (Union of Refugees from the Aegean Macedonia)
was founded in Skopje in early 1950, with the purpose of incorporating all political refugees
originating from Greece, irrespective of the language they spoke. In theory, the union was
supposed to facilitate cooperation with state authorities and accommodate most of the social
problems the refugees faced, although its real purpose was to control efficiently -or even
strengthen- the national and ideological identity of refugees, making sure they became good
Macedonian Communists. The authorities also decided the union should have a newspaper of its
Michaelides, «Σλαβομακεδόνες Πολιτικοί Πρόσφυγες στη Γιουγκοσλαβική Μακεδονία»
(Slavomacedonian Political Refugees in Yugoslav Macedonia) in Vasilis Gounaris, Iakovos Michaelides
(eds.), Πρόσφυγες στα Βαλκάνια, Μνήμη και Ενσωμάτωση, Athens, 2004, p. 67.
19 One of the main reasons for that was that Yugoslavia had been partitioned along ethnic lines for most of
World War II (1941-1945), a situation that had forced Yugoslav Communists to become highly sensitive in
such issues. As a means of repelling these divisions of the past, Yugoslav Communists had adopted a policy
of reconciliation of the Yugoslav peoples, which was often propagated under the slogan “Brotherhood and
Unity” (Bratstvo i Jedinstvo).
20 To be precise, the exact term was “Makedonci od Egejskiot del na Makedonija” (Macedonians from the
Aegean part of Macedonia). M. Monova, “Οι πρόσφυγες του ελληνικού εμφύλιου πολέμου στη
Δημοκρατία της Μακεδονίας: διαδρομές, γενιές, ταυτοποιήσεις”, Athens, 2011, p. 236.
21 For more on how Yugoslav Communists sought and eventually managed to control the region that later
became the People’s Republic of Macedonia, see Dimitris Livanios, «Πολιτικές Εξελίξεις στη
Γιουγκοσλαβική Μακεδονία, 1941-1948» (Political Developments in Yugoslav Macedonia, 1941-1948),
Βαλκάνια: από τον διπολισμό στη νέα εποχή, Γνώση, β’ έκδοση, Athens, 1995, pp. 566-614.
22 Iakovos Michaelides, «Σλαβομακεδόνες Πολιτικοί Πρόσφυγες στη Γιουγκοσλαβική Μακεδονία»
(Slavomacedonian Political Refugees in Yugoslav Macedonia) in Vasilis Gounaris, Iakovos Michaelides
(eds.), Πρόσφυγες στα Βαλκάνια, Μνήμη και Ενσωμάτωση, Athens, 2004, p. 49.
109
own, which was called Glas na Egejcite (Voice of the Aegeans). The paper was used to propagate
the Party’s line among Aegean refugees and provide them with the necessary ideological
guidance, while cultivating a policy of open animosity against Greece and its Communist Party
(KKE).23 Both the union and its paper were vocal along this line up until 1953, when bilateral
relations between Greece and Yugoslavia ameliorated upon signing the Balkan Pact (28 February
1953).
Aegean Macedonians become an integral part of the national narrative
By the same time, a lot of Egejci had started gathering significant material from their life in
Northern Greece (such as photos, newspapers or other memorabilia), which was often published
in newspapers alongside related interviews or political statements. Given the fact that press was
state-controlled at the time, one could easily suggest that the aim of the leadership was to raise
awareness on the importance of this “unliberated” part of Macedonia and the humanitarian
drama of its people. Such initiatives were further promoted with the acceptance of prominent
figures from Aegean Macedonia as members of the National History Institute (Institut za Nacionalna
Istorija) in 1956, an institution founded by the communist authorities with the purpose of
promoting the state version of national history, as was typical in most of Eastern Europe. One of
the most renown among them was Todor Hristov Simoski, born in a village near Kilkis (Kukuš)
in 1924.24 Soon, many others joined him in rewriting the history of the region, leading to the
creation of a whole academic community with roots from Aegean Macedonia.
As a result of this work, ethnic Macedonians’ support to Greek Communists during the
Greek Civil War and the story of their flight from Greece was not only incorporated in the new
national narrative, but was given a prominent role within it, being connected with major events
in Macedonian history such as the Ilinden Uprising (Ilidensko Vostanie) of 1903.25 The purpose was
to create retroactively the notion of a continued struggle of Macedonian Slavs for their national
restoration, connecting significant yet “lost” fractions of the nation -such as the Egejci- with the
national tradition of their new homeland and its official narrative. Additionally, this
argumentation attempted to disassociate the Slavomacedonians of Greece from Bulgaria and its
people, attempting to revamp all Slavs of Greek Macedonia as ethnic Macedonians who had often
According to the proclamation made in its first issue, “The newspaper’s major duty is to show the road on
which we [the Aegeans] should walk, which is the road of Goce Delcev, Jane Sadanski, Lazo Terpovski and Irina
Ginova (Mirka). It also intends to resist the chauvinistic policy of the KKE and its leader, Nikos Zachariadis”. For
more on the paper’s policy, function and rhetoric, see Spyridon Sfetas and Iakovos Michaelides, «Πολιτικοί
Πρόσφυγες στη Γιουγκοσλαβία» (Political Refugees in Yugoslavia), Athens, 2015, pp. 55-58.
24 Some of his most famous books, published by the National History Institute (INI), were: Миграционите
движења и етничкиот состав на населението во Воденска околија 1912-1940 (Migration movements and the
ethnic composition of the area of Voden/Edessa, 1912-1940), 1969, Балканските војни и нивните реперкусии
врз етничката положба на Егејска Македонија (The Balkan Wars and their repercussions on the ethnic
composition of Aegean Macedonia), 1972, and Населените места во Егејска Македонија (Inhabited Places
in Aegean Macedonia), 1978.
25 For more on memoirs and comments of those who actually fought in it, see Liubomir Miletich, Materiali
za istoriata na makedonskoto osvoboditelno dzizhenie, Spomeni I materiali, vol. I-IX, Nauka i Izkustvo (1st
edition), P. Glushkov, Sofia, 1925-1927.
23
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been “misled” and “disoriented”. These politically driven assumptions would have little impact
on the majority of Slavomacedonians at the time, but still played an important role in
strengthening the national identity of refugees, portraying them as part of a broader national
narrative.
Aegean Macedonians as a link between Skopje and the Diaspora
At the same time, the influence of Aegean Macedonians in state institutions and the academic elite
allowed them to assume an important role in relations between state authorities and the
Slavomacedonian Diaspora. A major reason for that was that many refugees had played an active
role -or even led- the foundation of ethnic Macedonian organizations abroad, mainly in Canada
and Australia. As a matter of fact, the political organization of refugee children there had evolved
much faster than in Yugoslavia proper. Refugees from Florina (Lerin) and Kastoria (Koštur)
founded the “Macedonian-Australian People’s League” (Makedono-Avstraliski Naroden Sajuz) as
soon as 1946, although the organization had dissolved by 1957. Some years later, prominent
Aegean Macedonians founded the “Macedonian Aegean Association of Australia”, which still
functions as the main forum of this community in Australia today, numbering some 50,000
members.
Similarly, Aegean Macedonians in Canada founded the organization “United
Macedonians” (Organizacija Obedineti Makedonci) as soon as 1959, aiming to strengthen relations
between immigrants and their country of origin.26 A few years later, some of them also founded
the “Macedonian-Canadian Human Rights Committee”, an organization that aimed to further
promote the issue of ethnic Macedonians’ rights in Greece. Although refugees from Aegean
Macedonia played a prominent role in these organizations, their identity and affiliation should not
be taken for granted, as people from the broader area of Macedonia had been shifting allegiance
for decades. During the Interwar period, many had joined Greek diaspora organizations, while
others preferred Bulgarian ones, organized under the auspices of the Macedonian Patriotic
Organization (MPO).27
After World War II, most immigrants originating from Yugoslav Macedonia disputed the
legacy and identity of the previous generation, which they accused of being pro-Bulgarian. It was
relatively easy for them to prevail, as Communist Bulgaria had no interest in supporting the MPO,
which she viewed as an extension of the prewar fascist regime. Taking advantage of this conflict,
the authorities of the People’s Republic of Macedonia created Matica, a distinct organization that
would assist immigrants settling overseas and contribute in the creation of ethnic Macedonian
communities there.28 However, these communities and organizations would remain marginal
Keith Brown, «Τα παιδιά-παππούδες της Μακεδονίας: Διεθνικές Πολιτικές Μνήμης, εξορίας και
επιστροφής» (The children-grandfathers of Macedonia: Transnational Policies of Memory, Exile and
Return), in Vasilis Gounaris, Iakovos Michaelides (eds.), Πρόσφυγες στα Βαλκάνια, Μνήμη και
Ενσωμάτωση, Athens, 2004, p. 136.
27 Vlasis Vlasidis, «Το Μακεδονικό Ζήτημα και η Γιουγκοσλαβική Μακεδονία» (The Macedonian
Question and Yugoslav Macedonia), Μακεδονικό: Η περιπέτεια ενός ονόματος από το 1850 έως σήμερα,
Έψιλον Ιστορικά, Athens, 2011, p. 150.
28 In many cases, Matica would even send priests and teachers to those communities, with the aim of
promoting the Macedonian identity, belief and language, as it was normalized in Yugoslav Macedonia after
26
111
and have restricted audience for as long as Skopje did not have a voice of its own internationally.
The main reason for that was that the Yugoslav government did not really support such initiatives
(although it didn’t discourage them either), being reluctant to adopt new policies or initiatives
that might harm its relations with its southernmost neighbor, Greece.
Greece encourages political refugees “of Greek origin” to return
At the same time, political refugees with ethnic Greek identity continued to look for ways to
return to Greece, with some managing to do so as soon as 1955. Although the conditions back
home were not the best for those who had lost the war and were discreetly or openly supporters
of the Left, minor groups would continue to repatriate throughout most of the ’60s, and strangely- even during the military regime (1967-1974). The issue would gain new momentum in
the early ’80s, when the newly elected PASOK government in Greece decided to re-open the issue
of political refugees and acknowledge officially the right of potentially everybody still living
abroad to return. This important decision was connected to the new government’s position that
the struggle of left and right-wing organizations against the Nazis and their allies during World
War II was common, and to that end a policy on “national reconciliation” (Εθνική Συμφιλίωση)
was promoted.
As an extension of this policy, the cabinet issued a ministerial decision, according to which
“all Greek by descent (that is to say of Greek origin) who during the Civil War of 1946-1949 and because
of it have fled abroad as political refugees” had the right to repatriate, gain the Greek citizenship and
claim their land or obtain other property of the same value (Ministerial Decree 106841/1982).
However, that meant that political refugees who were identified as ethnic Macedonians either by
themselves or by the Greek state could not enjoy these rights, as the law explicitly provided them
only to “political refugees of Greek origin”, thereby deliberately excluding people of other ethnic
or national identity.29 Although not openly confessed, an obvious reason for that was that the
Greek government was not willing to receive people of with any other “origin” than Greek,
fearing they might raise the question of minority rights for Slavomacedonians in Northern
Greece.
Reactions and Implications ever since
As few might have predicted back then, the exclusion of ethnic Macedonians from those
acknowledged the right to return radicalized them even more, resulting to the formation of new
militant organizations among the Slavomacedonian Diaspora. Intensive contacts between these
organizations led to the idea of organizing an International Meeting of Refugee Children from
Aegean Macedonia (Sredba na Decata Begalci od Egejska Makedonija), which eventually took place
World War II.
29 For more on how Greek citizenship was deprived from ethnic Greeks and Slavomacedonians during and
after the Civil War, see Tasos Kostopoulos, «Αφαιρέσεις ιθαγένειας. Η σκοτεινή πλευρά της
Νεοελληνικής Ιστορίας, 1926-2003» (Stripping individuals off their citizenship, the dark side of Modern
Greek History, 1926-2003), Σύγχρονα θέματα, τευχ.83, 2003, 53-75, and Lambros Baltsiotis, «Η ιθαγένεια
στον Ψυχρό Πόλεμο» (Citizenship during the Cold War) in Michalis Tsapogas, Dimitris Christopoulos,
Τα δικαιώματα στην Ελλάδα 1953-2003, ΕΕΔΑ, Καστανιώτης, Athens, 2004, pp. 81-98.
112
in Skopje in 1988 (30 June-3 July).30 Although the conference didn’t gather much international
attention at the time, it was instrumental in bringing together thousands of people from Canada,
Australia, the United States and the Socialist Republic of Macedonia (still part of Yugoslavia at
the time), who were given the opportunity to exchange their personal stories and discuss
proposals on how to promote further their cause.31 An important element that many failed to see
back then was that many participants had received significant education in their new homelands,
and in most cases also enjoyed significant economic power, elements that would allow them to
assume an important role in Yugoslav Macedonia after independence (1991).
At the same time, such meetings encouraged further fermentations within the Diaspora,
where many looked for new arguments on their continued struggle against the respective Greek
organizations and their influence. Feeling “inferior” to the Greeks who rarely lost the opportunity
to praise their country’s glorious past, some Aegean Macedonians conceived the idea of claiming
the same ancient past as theirs, thereby fighting the “enemy” with his own means. The idea
sounded initially strange, as it contradicted not only the historical finds of archeological missions
in Macedonia proper,32 but also the official position adopted and propagated by the Skopje
leadership at the time. According to the later, the birth of the Macedonian nation dated back to
the Middle Ages and the work of the Saints Cyril and Methodius in the 9th century, but was now
dragged more than ten centuries earlier. Later events showed that achieving independence for
Yugoslav Macedonia was eventually easier than agreeing with Greece and Bulgaria on the
identity and the language of its people. No matter what one’s position on the name issue might
be, the conclusion remains that Aegean Macedonians played a significant role in this strange tug of
war, being both the victims and the perpetrators of this complex political game.
The government of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia was aware of the preparations years before the
event was actually held and even agreed to cover its expenses as part of its budget for 1988. However, the
federal government in Belgrade did not share this enthusiasm and pressured Skopje to cancel the meeting,
but eventually the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave its authorization under the condition that
officials participated as ordinary citizens. Katsanos Konstantinos, «Πρόσφυγες, Μνήμες και
Αλυτρωτισμός στην ΠΓΔΜ» (Refugees, Memories and Irredentism in FYROM) in Vasilis Gounaris,
Iakovos Michaelides (eds.), Πρόσφυγες στα Βαλκάνια, Μνήμη και Ενσωμάτωση, Athens, 2004, 177.
31 Some sources claim that refugee organizations originally planned to hold this conference in Greek
Macedonia, and particularly in the city of Edessa (Voden). However, the Greek authorities were not that
positive about the idea, which was abandoned soon after.
32 Several writers and politicians have claimed that modern Slavomacedonians can rightfully claim descent
from the ancient Macedonians, and equally numerous -if not more- have claimed the exact opposite.
Although the author of this paper claims no authority to determine who is right or wrong, the fact remains
that ancient Macedonians spoke and wrote in a dialect of Greek, believed in the same twelve Gods as the
city-states of southern Greece and participated in the Olympic Games, a right that Greeks withheld only
for people of the same origin and status. For more on the intriguing history of ancient Macedonia and
identity-related issues at the time, see Robert Malcolm Errington, A History of Macedonia, University of
California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1990, and Simon Hornblower, “Greek Identity in the Archaic
and Classical Periods” in Katerina Zacharia, Hellenisms, Ashgate Publishing Ltd., Aldershot, England, 2008,
pp. 55-58.
30
113
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Göçmenlerin Rolü: Demografik Değişikliklerden Sembolik Değişimlere Geçiş” (Refugees and the
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[6] Kalyvas Stathis (Καλύβας Στάθης), Marantzidis Nikos (Μαραντζίδης Νίκος), Εμφύλια
Πάθη, 23 Ερωτήσεις και Απαντήσεις για τον Εμφύλιο (Civil War Passions, 23 Questions and
Answers on the Civil War), Εκδόσεις Μεταίχμιο, Athens, 2015.
[7] Karakasidou Anastasia, “Fellow travellers, separate roads: the KKE and the Macedonian
Question” in East European Quarterly, vol. 27, University of Colorado, Boulder, 1993.
[8] Kostopoulos Tasos (Κωστόπουλος Tάσος), Η απαγορευμένη γλώσσα: Κρατική Καταστολή
των Σλαβικών Διαλέκτων στην Ελληνική Μακεδονία (The forbidden language: State Repression
of the Slavic dialects in Greek Macedonia), Βιβλιόραμα, Athens, 2008.
[9] by the same author, «Αφαιρέσεις ιθαγένειας. Η σκοτεινή πλευρά της Νεοελληνικής
Ιστορίας, 1926-2003» (Stripping individuals off their citizenship, the dark side of Modern Greek
History, 1926-2003), Σύγχρονα θέματα, τευχ. 83, Δεκ. 2003, Athens, pp. 53-75.
[10] Katsanos Konstantinos, «Πρόσφυγες, Μνήμες και Αλυτρωτισμός στην ΠΓΔΜ» (Refugees,
Memories and Irredentism in FYROM) in Vasilis Gounaris, Iakovos Michaelides (eds.),
Πρόσφυγες στα Βαλκάνια, Μνήμη και Ενσωμάτωση, Athens, 2004, pp. 164-212.
[11] Lagani Irini (Λαγάνη Ειρήνη), Το «παιδομάζωμα» και οι ελληνογιουγκοσλαβικές σχέσεις
1949-1953 (“Child-gathering” and the Greek-Yugoslav Relations, 1949-1953), Εκδόσεις Σιδέρη,
Athens, 1996.
[12] Livanios Dimitris (Δημήτρης Λιβάνιος), «Πολιτικές Εξελίξεις στη Γιουγκοσλαβική
Μακεδονία, 1941-1948» (Political Developments in Yugoslav Macedonia, 1941-1948), Βαλκάνια:
από τον διπολισμό στη νέα εποχή, Γνώση, β’ έκδοση, Athens, 1995, pp. 566-614.
[13] Macridge Peter, Yannakakis Eleni (eds.), Ourselves and Others: The Development of a Greek
Macedonian Cultural Identity Since 1912, Berg Publishers, Oxford and New York, 1997.
[14] Michaelides Iakovos (Μιχαηλίδης Ιάκωβος), «Σλαβομακεδόνες Πολιτικοί Πρόσφυγες στη
Γιουγκοσλαβική Μακεδονία» (Slavomacedonian Political Refugees in Yugoslav Macedonia) in
Vasilis Gounaris, Iakovos Michaelides (eds.), Πρόσφυγες στα Βαλκάνια, Μνήμη και
Ενσωμάτωση, Athens, 2004.
[15] Miletich Liubomir, Materiali za istoriata na makedonskoto osvoboditelno dzizhenie, Spomeni I
materiali, vol. I-IX, Nauka i Izkustvo (1st edition), P. Glushkov, Sofia, 1925-1927.
114
[16] Monova Miladina, “Οι πρόσφυγες του ελληνικού εμφύλιου πολέμου στη Δημοκρατία της
Μακεδονίας: διαδρομές, γενιές, ταυτοποιήσεις” (Refugees of the Greek Civil War in the
Republic of Macedonia: journeys, generations, identifications) in Markou Aikaterini (ed.),
Ανασυνθέσεις και νέες δυναμικές στις βαλκανικές κοινωνίες μετά το 1990, Ηρόδοτος, Athens,
2011, pp. 233-262.
[17] Poulton Hugh, Who are the Macedonians?, C. Hurst & Co., 2nd edition, London, 2002.
[18] Ristović Milan, Ένα μακρύ ταξίδι: Τα παιδιά του «παιδομαζώματος» στη Γιουγκοσλαβία
1948-1960, Εκδόσεις Επίκεντρο, Thessaloniki, 2008.
[19] Sfetas Spyridon, Michaelides Iakovos (Σφέτας Σπυρίδων, Μιχαηλίδης Ιάκωβος),
«Πολιτικοί Πρόσφυγες στη Γιουγκοσλαβία» (Political Refugees in Yugoslavia) in Georgios
Antoniou, Stathis Kalyvas (eds.), Οι Πολιτικοί Πρόσφυγες του Εμφυλίου Πολέμου,
Πανεπιστήμιο Μακεδονίας, Thessaloniki, 2015, pp. 37-64.
[20] Simpson Neil, Macedonia -Its Disputed History, Aristos Press, Victoria, 1994.
[21] Tamis Anastasios, “Macedonian Organizations, the Macedonian Issue and Greek Foreign
Policy in the Diaspora” at Ioannis Stefanidis, Vlasis Vlasidis, Evangelos Kofos (eds.), Macedonian
Identities through Time, Interdisciplinary Approaches, Athens, 2010.
[22] Valden Sotiris (Βαλντέν Σωτήρης), Ελλάδα-Γιουγκοσλαβία: Γέννηση και Εξέλιξη μιας
Κρίσης, Εκδόσεις Θεμέλιο, Athens, 1991.
[23] Vlasidis Vlasis (Βλάσης Βλασίδης), “Macedonia and the Great Powers” at Ioannis
Koliopoulos (ed.), The History of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, 2007, pp. 327-354.
[24] by the same author, «Το Μακεδονικό Ζήτημα και η Γιουγκοσλαβική Μακεδονία» (The
Macedonian Question and Yugoslav Macedonia), Μακεδονικό: Η περιπέτεια ενός ονόματος από
το 1850 έως σήμερα, Έψιλον Ιστορικά, Athens, 2011, pp. 129-156.
[25] Voutira Eftichia (Βουτυρά Ευτυχία), Vasilis Dalkavoukis (Βασίλης Δαλκαβούκης), Nikos
Marantzidis (Νίκος Μαραντζίδης), Maria Bondila (Μαρία Μποντίλα) (eds.), Το όπλο παρά
πόδα: Οι πολιτικοί πρόσφυγες του ελληνικού εμφυλίου πολέμου στην Ανατολική Ευρώπη
(Order Arms: Political Refugees of the Greek Civil War in Eastern Europe), Εκδόσεις
Πανεπιστημίου Μακεδονίας, Thessaloniki, 2005.
115
“The Status of Minorities in Macedonia and Greece”
By Ivana Popchev (Ss. Cyril and Methodius University)
Abstract
In an era of constant effort by the international community to protect and enhance the rights of
minorities vis-à-vis the relentless reports of minority rights being neglected and breached in
different societies, the issue of minorities is an important indicator in any analysis of how states
and societies function. When analyzing the relations between Macedonia and Greece, it is
necessary to address status of the minorities in both countries, especially since the existence of a
Macedonian minority in Greece is one of the central issues of debate. After providing an overview
of the existing definitions of the term “minority”, this paper will firstly examine the international
legal documents on minority rights and their ratification and implementation (or lack of) by both
countries in question. Furthermore, the paper will focus on analyzing the Constitutions and laws
of both countries in order to illustrate the framework under which minority rights are protected
and enhanced in each country. Additionally, focus will be put on official state records, as well
records published by other sources regarding the demographic characteristics of the countries.
Furthermore, in terms of the minorities in both countries, the paper will examine the issue of
ethnicity, religious freedom, political participation and education.
Keywords: identity, ethnicity, minority, minority rights, collective rights, Constitution, religious
freedom, political participation, education, Census, international instruments, international
reports
Introduction
In an era of constant effort by the international community to protect and enhance the rights of
minorities vis-à-vis the relentless reports of minority rights being neglected and breached in
different societies, the issue of minorities is an important indicator in any analysis of how states
and societies function. When analyzing the relations between Macedonia and Greece, it is
necessary to address the issue of the treatment of minorities in both countries.
Few issues in the history of the modern state have proved more vexing than the
relationship between majorities and minorities.1 Even the very attempt for attaining a universally
accepted definition of the term “minority” is being constantly opposed for various different
reasons. Acknowledging the fact that the lack of a universally accepted definition of the term
“minority” plays a significant role in any analysis of the status of minorities, this paper firstly
addresses the existing definitions of minorities given by renowned experts and widely used in
discussions on this matter, in order to set a certain defining frame of the topic of analysis.
Additionally, before examining the existing situation in both countries, the paper will provide an
overview of the international legal documents on minority rights in order to provide an
illustration of the international framework for the protection of minorities. Furthermore, it will
focus on analyzing the Constitutions and laws of both countries in order to illustrate the
Wippman, David, The Evolution and Implementation of Minority Rights, 1997, pp. 597
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol66/iss2/10, accessed on September 10, 2016
1
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framework under which minority rights are protected and enhanced in each country. Accent will
also be placed on defining the demographic characteristics in terms of minorities in both countries
both from official state records as well as reports from international experts and will further
continue to outline and analyses the issues with which minorities are faced and the policies that
have been implemented in this area. Following the analysis, the paper will provide a summary
regarding the status of minorities in both countries, with focus on issues and areas that need to
be improved.
Definitions of the term “minority”
The modern nation-state model, especially on the European continent, was characterized by
efforts for unification of the population in terms of national belonging, language, symbols, culture
etc. The attempts to construct unified, linguistically and culturally homogeneous states, which
started with the French Revolution in 1789, were modeled based on national unity and a
centralized government, and unity of the state was envisioned to reflect unity of the nation as
well as unity of the language and culture. However, as is very rare for a nation to be entirely
homogenous by any of the aforementioned characteristics, efforts by non-dominant groups
directed at preserving their culture, religion, language and ethnicity emerged in parallel with the
creation of the nation states. Almost all states have one or more minority groups within their
national territories, characterized by their own ethnic, linguistic or religious identity, which
differs from that of the majority population.2 In fact, of the more than 191 officially defined states
around the globe, over 175 are multi-ethnic.3 The vexing issue of the relationship between
majorities and minorities has been one of the central concerns on international level, and the
principles and practices needed to address and protect minority groups in national systems have
become a principal point in the global discourse.
The relationship between majorities and minorities is among the most challenging issues,
which exasperates the international community ever since the establishment of nation states. In
addition to the various models of arranging the coexistence of majorities and minorities living
within the same state, what makes this issue even more problematic is the lack of a universally
accepted definition of what constitutes a minority. Even the definition of minorities is contested
so much so that most contemporary international legal instruments dealing with minority rights
fail to include a definition of the rights holders.4 In terms of defining minorities, theorists have
different approaches, which mainly differ in the characteristics used when defining a minority,
ranging from objective indicators such as race, religion or language to subjective indicators such
as belief in common descent or possession of a shared culture. It is important to note more than
a century of discussions have not resulted in a legally binding definition of “minority”. However,
since offering a definition of the object of analysis is essential for the issues observed in this paper,
in this case it is most adequate to take into consideration the definitions provided by the UN
Fact Sheet No.18 (Rev.1), Minority Rights, pp. 1
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet18rev.1en.pdf, accessed on 10 August, 2016
3 Vijapur, Abdulrahim P., International Protection of Minority Rights, Vol 43, Issue 4, pp. 367-368
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/002088170604300402, accessed on 10 August, 2016
4 Packer, John, On the Definition of Minorities, in Myntti, Kristian; Packer, John (eds.) The Protection of Ethnic
and Linguistic Minorities in Europe, Åbo Akademi: Åbo/Turku, 1996, pp. 23
2
117
Special Rapporteur Francesco Capotorti, the Permanent Court of International Justice, the
Canadian judge Jules Deschênes and the American sociologist Louis Wirth.
One of the acknowledged definitions of minority is the definition coined by UN Special
Rapporteur Francesco Capotorti. Capotorti defines a minority as “a group numerically inferior to
the rest of the population, in a non-dominant position, consisting of nationals of the State,
possessing distinct ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics and showing a sense of solidarity
aimed at preserving those characteristics.”5 This definition takes into consideration both the
objective and the subjective characteristics of the groups which constitute a minority in a certain
state and is widely applicable. Another definition adequate for the analysis of the issues
addressed in this paper is the definition given by the Permanent Court of International Justice,
which defines minority as “a group of persons living in a given country or locality having a race,
religion, language and tradition in a sentiment of solidarity, with a view to preserving their
traditions, maintaining their form of worship, ensuring the instruction and upbringing of their
children in accordance with the spirit and tradition of their race and mutually assisting one
another”6. This definition of what constitutes a minority was included in the advisory opinion
reached on the 18th advisory session of the Permanent Court of International Justice, which was
specifically dedicated to the Interpretation of the Convention between Greece and Bulgaria
Respecting Reciprocal Emigration. Furthermore, Jules Deschênes defines minority as “a group of
citizens of a State, constituting a numerical minority and in a non-dominant position in that State,
endowed with ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics which differ from those of the majority
of the population, having a sense of solidarity with one another, motivated, if only implicitly, by
a collective will to survive and whose aim is to achieve equality with the majority in fact and in
law”7. According to the definition of Louis Wirth, a minority group is "a group of people who,
because of their physical or cultural characteristics, are singled out from the others in the society
in which they live for differential and unequal treatment, and who therefore regard themselves
as objects of collective discrimination"8. This definition, as all aforementioned definitions,
includes both objective and subjective criteria, which are taken into consideration when defining
a minority.
The lack of a definition for the term minority has been troubling the international scene
for over a century, dividing scientists even in regards to the question whether a universally
accepted definition of this term is actually necessary. Some experts argue that “it is probably
worthwhile to look for an alternative to a comprehensive and globally applicable definition”9 and
Capotorti, Francesco, Study on the Rights of Persons belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic
Minorities,
Geneva UN Center for Human Rights, 1991, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Add.1-7.
6
Interpretation of the Convention Between Greece and Bulgaria Respecting Reciprocal Emigration,
Advisory Opinion, PCIJ (1930), Series B, No. 17.33 in Publications of the Permanent Court of International
Justice Series B - No. 17; Collection of Advisory Opinions, A.W. Sijthoff’s Publishing Company, Leyden, 1930
7 Proposal Concerning a Definition of the Term 'Minority submitted by Jules Deschênes, 1985
UN Document E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/31
8 Wirth, Louis, The Problem of Minority Groups, pp. 347 in Linton, Ralph (ed.), The Science of Man in the World
Crisis, Columbia University Press, New York, 1945
9 Alfredsson, Gudmundur, Report on Equality and non-discrimination: minority rights on the 7 th International
5
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that “it is wise to have either no definition of the term minority or else a minimum definition” 10.
In contrast, other experts argue that “definition of the term minority is not a question of only
theoretical and academic importance, but also a practical one”11 and that “the lack of a definition
gives states an excuse to refuse the existence of minorities in their own territory”12. The events of
the last century most certainly support the claim of the latter.
Regardless of a definition of what constitutes a minority, theorists agree that the defining
characteristics of minorities are sufficient "to set the group apart" from others both in the eyes of
the particular minority and in the rights of others. History has shown that when two or more
groups coexist on the same territory, their perceptions of the existing differences often trigger
conflict on various levels. This perception of difference lends itself to political mobilization,
whether on behalf of minorities or against them, and therein lays the central difficulty of
minority-majority relations.13It is precisely these difficulties, which motivated the international
community to regulate the treatment of minorities with international instruments. Prior to
offering an analysis of the minorities living in Greece in Macedonia, it is necessary to provide an
overview of the current and former international instruments, which regulate the protection of
minorities in the international law, as, will be offered in the following part.
International legal instruments for the protection of minority rights
The Macedonian and the Greek governments’ obligations to respect the rights of the minorities,
which live on their territory, including its right to a nationality and ethnic, cultural, religious and
linguistic identity, are well established under international law. The rights of the members of
national minorities, as mentioned before, have been in the focus of the international discourse
along with the formation of the nation states, leading to numerous international conventions,
resolutions, and declarations, which aim to recognize and protect these rights. For the purpose of
this paper, the following main international documents will be observed: UN International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities and the Council of Europe’s
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM).
Article 27 of the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 14
stipulates that minority group members “shall not be denied the right, in community with the
Colloquy on the European Convention on Human Rights, Council of Europe, Strasbourg 1990 H/Coll (90)6 Pp.12
in Åkermark, Athanasia Spiliopoulou, Justifications of Minority Protection in International Law, Kluwer Law
International, 1997, The Hague, pp. 86
10 Ibid
11 Sohn, Louis B., The Rights of Minorities in Henkin, Louis(ed), The International Bill of Rights: The Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, Columbia University Press, 1981, pp. 20
12 Åkermark, Athanasia Spiliopoulou, pp. 86
13 Wippman, David, pp. 597
14 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is a multilateral treaty adopted by the
UN General Assembly on December 16, 1966, and in force from March 23, 1976
Chapter IV, Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, New York, 16 December
1966 https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-4.en.pdf accessed on
September 16, 2016
119
other members of their own group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own
religion, or to use their own language.” Greece acceded to the ICCPR on May 5, 1997, whereas
Macedonia acceded to the ICCPR on January 18, 199415.
The U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious
and Linguistic Minorities,16 adopted on December 18, 1992, although lacking the binding legal
force of a treaty, represents an authoritative document with universally accepted norms
protecting the rights of minorities. The declaration mandates that states “protect the existence
and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity of minorities within their
respective territories and shall encourage conditions for the promotion of that identity.”17
Furthermore, it stipulates that members of minorities have “the right to enjoy their own culture,
to profess and practice their own religion, and to use their own language, in private and in public,
freely and without interference or any form of discrimination”18. Additionally it addresses
minorities’ “right to establish and maintain their own associations”19, as well as the “right to
establish and maintain, without any discrimination, free and peaceful contacts across frontiers
with citizens of other States to whom they are related by national or ethnic, religious or linguistic
ties”20. It also mandates that “states should take appropriate measures so that, whenever possible,
persons belonging to minorities may have adequate opportunities to learn their mother tongue
or to have instruction on their mother tongue”21.
Similar protections of minority rights are included in the Framework Convention for the
Protection of National Minorities22, the Council of Europe’s most comprehensive text for
protecting the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, which is the first legally binding
multilateral instrument devoted to the protection of national minorities worldwide. Article 3 of
the Convention stipulates that “every person belonging to a national minority shall have the right
freely to choose to be treated or not to be treated as such and no disadvantage shall result from
this choice or from the exercise of the rights which are connected to that choice” and that “persons
belonging to national minorities may exercise the rights and enjoy the freedoms flowing from the
principles enshrined in the present framework Convention individually as well as in community
with others”. Article 4 stipulates the “guarantee to persons belonging to national minorities the
right of equality before the law and of equal protection of the law”, thus prohibiting
discrimination based on belonging to a national minority. Furthermore, it envisions adequate
Ibid
U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic
Minorities, adopted by the UN General Assembly with Resolution 47/135 of December 18, 1992
http://www.un-documents.net/a47r135.htm accessed on September 16, 2016
17 Ibid, Article 1
18 Ibid, Article 2
19 Ibid
20 Ibid
21 Ibid, Article 4
22 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM), adopted on November 10,
1994 by the Committee of Ministers and entered into effect in 1998
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=0900001680
0c10cf accessed on September 16, 2016
15
16
120
measures in order to promote, in all areas of economic, social, political and cultural life, full and
effective equality between persons belonging to a national minority and those belonging to the
majority. Similarly, Article 5 stipulates promotion of the “conditions necessary for persons
belonging to national minorities to maintain and develop their culture, and to preserve the
essential elements of their identity, namely their religion, language, traditions and cultural
heritage”, and it prohibits from policies or practices aimed at assimilation. Furthermore, Article
6 encourages “a spirit of tolerance and intercultural dialogue and effective measures to promote
mutual respect and understanding and co-operation”. Article 7 ensures “respect for the right of
every person belonging to a national minority to freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of
association, freedom of expression (further regulated in Article 9), and freedom of thought,
conscience and religion(further regulated in Article 8). Article 8 recognizes that “every person
belonging to a national minority has the right to manifest his or her religion or belief and to
establish religious institutions, organizations and associations”. Article 10 recognizes that
“”every person belonging to a national minority has the right to use freely and without
interference his or her minority language, in private and in public, orally and in writing.” Article
12 stipulates “measures in the fields of education and research to foster knowledge of the culture,
history, language and religion of their national minorities and of the majority” and promoting
“equal opportunities for access to education at all levels for persons belonging to national
minorities”, whereas Article 13 recognizes that minorities have “the right to set up and to manage
their own private educational and training establishments”. Article 14 recognizes that “every
person belonging to a national minority has the right to learn his or her minority language” and
that in areas traditionally inhabited by minorities or in substantial numbers “adequate
opportunities for being taught the minority language or for receiving instruction in this
language”. Greece signed the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities
on September 22, 1997, but has yet to ratify it, whereas Macedonia signed it on June 25, 1996,
ratified it on April 10, 1997 and it entered into force on February 1, 199823.
Further documents which should be observed when analyzing international instruments
for protection of the right of minority groups, among others, include: the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, the European Convention on Nationality, the European Convention on Human
Rights, the European Social Charter, the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages,
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European
Convention), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, etc.
The status of minorities in Greece
Merriam Webster dictionary defines the term “constitution” as “the mode in which a state or
society is organized; especially the manner in which sovereign power is distributed” and “the
basic principles and laws of a nation, state, or social group that determine the powers and duties
of the government and guarantee certain rights to the people in it”24. When analyzing the rights
of the people in certain countries, and in this case the rights of the minorities in the observed
http://www.coe.int/en/web/minorities/country-specific-monitoring, accessed on September 17, 2016
"constitution."Merriam-Webster.com. 2011.https://www.merriam-webster.com accessed on September
17, 2016
23
24
121
countries, the Constitutions are the primary documents which should be initially examined in
order to portray the general framework regarding the status of the minorities, which are further
on regulated with additional laws and procedures. Consequently, in analyzing the status of the
minorities in Greece and in Macedonia, this paper will initially examine the Constitutions of both
countries. A comparative analysis of the degree of recognition and respecting of the minority
rights in the Balkan constitutions requires an examination of such questions as the statutes and
the degree of organization in the country’s political, economic and social life, their right of
representation in the state legislative and executive organs, the right for their education in their
mother tongue, for the preservation of traditions and national culture, the right for the use of
national symbols and of their own language in juridical processes, etc.25
When analyzing the Constitution of Greece, the primary observation is that it does not
recognize any national or ethnic minorities. According to official records, Greece is mainly a
homogenous state, with more than 90percent of the population identifying themselves as Greek.
The universal principles of the international rights on minorities have been inserted in all the
constitutions of the Balkan countries, excluding Greece.26 The right to free self-identification is the
cornerstone of minority rights, as could be observed in the overview of the international legal
instruments given above. Self-identification begins with the free decision of the individual,
which, if no justification exists to the contrary, is to be the basis of any personal identification.27
Although the Greek government recognized an individual’s right to self-identification, many
individuals who defined themselves as members of a minority groups are faced with difficulties
in expressing their identity freely and are continuously and systematically denied as a minority
group. Greece fails to recognize self-identification as a collective right of the minority groups
living on its territory, which is explicitly specified in the country reports published by various
international institutions and experts in the field of minority rights and for which the country has
been constantly criticized by the international community.
Denying the existence of ethnic minorities on its territory does not correspond either to
the historical or the contemporary reality of the ethnic composition of the population living in
Greece. Greece is no exception from the early Balkan general phenomenon of ethnic mass
movements from one country to another for various motives and factors.28 The kaleidoscope of
ethnicities living in each Balkan state, which have resulted from these mass movements, is also
observed in Greece even nowadays, albeit significantly diminished as a result of the assimilative
politics of the Greek government and the Greek Orthodox Church. Since the recognition of its
autonomy from the Ottoman Empire to the present day, “in Greece there has been a discrepancy
between the official attitude towards the existence of ethnic minorities and the self-identity of the
Milo, Paskal, The Constitutional Rights and Minorities in the Balkans: A Comparative Analysis, pp. 1
http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/PASKAL-MILO.pdf accessed on September 18, 2016
26 Ibid
27The Framework Convention: A Key tool to Managing Diversity through Minority Rights, Thematic commentary
No. 4 The scope of application of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities,
adopted on May 27, 2016 by the Council of Europe
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=0900001680
6a8fe8 accessed on September 18, 2016
28 Milo, Paskal, The Constitutional Rights and Minorities in the Balkans: A Comparative Analysis, pp. 2
25
122
people involved”29. Numerous historians, such as Mavrokordatos, claim that “in Greece almost
all the minorities, in one way or another, have been subject to discrimination, either by the Greek
Orthodox majority, or by the Greek state, which has limited their rights and is exercising severe
persecutions against them”30.
The denying of the right to free self-identification is most clearly visible through the fact
that Greece does not collect data on ethnicity. There are no official data or records regarding
national or ethnic minorities. Being partial in interpreting historical facts and the ethnic affiliation
of numerous people living on its territory, the official position of the state, as mentioned above,
is that Greece is ethnically homogenous, with a certain single digit percentage of migrants living
on its territory. Neither the latest census in 2011, nor the censuses conducted in the last seven
decades, includes data regarding the ethnic affiliation of the population. There is not any official
information for the size of the ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities because asking the
population questions pertaining to the topic have been abolished since 1951.31 The state policy of
collection of statistical data remains the same, counting only the immigrants of non-Greek origin
as percentage of the population that is not Greek. The estimated number of minority groups in
Greece, which will be discussed further on, are given in other sources, such as country reports
and evaluations. The practice of denying the existence of minorities, as stated above, has been
criticized by the international community, the latest example being the Concluding
Observations32 on Greece of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(CERD) from August 26, 2016. The Concluding Observations expressed concerns regarding the
treatment reserved to ethnic minorities in the country, namely “the lack of statistical data on the
enjoyment of the Convention rights by all ethnic groups and religious minorities in the State
party”33, recommending that “the State party diversify its data collection activities, on the basis
of anonymity and self-identification of persons and groups, to provide an adequate empirical
basis for policies to enhance the equal enjoyment by all of the rights enshrined in the
Convention”34. Furthermore, as stated in the document, “notwithstanding the explanation
provided by the State party that ethnic groups are not considered as minorities, the Committee
believes that in a multi-ethnic society recognition of ethnic groups of smaller size may help them
to protect their existence and their identity”35.
It is with absolute truthfulness that scholars observe Greek nationalistic politics and official
Pollis, Adamantia, Greek National Identity: Religious, Minorities Rights and European Norms, Journal of
Modern Greek Studies, Volume 10, No. 2, October 1992, pp. 188.
30Dhimitras, PanayoteElie, Minorities linguistiques en Greece, Les Minorities en Europe. Droitlinguistiques et
droits de l’homme sous la Henri Giordan, Paris, 1992, pp. 313, cited in Milo, Paskal, pp. 2
31Fassmann, Heinz; Reeger, Ursula; Sievers, Wiebke, Statistics and Reality: Concepts and Measurements of
Migration in Europe, Amsterdam University Press, 2009, pp. 237
32 Concluding observations on the twentieth to twenty-second periodic reports of Greece of the UN
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=CERD/C/GRC/CO/20-22&Lang=E
accessed
on
September 28, 2016
33 Ibid, Point 8
34 Ibid, Point 9
35 Ibid, Point 11
29
123
attitude, which deny minorities basic rights guaranteed under international law and flagrantly
breach international law. Though Greece, like other countries of Central and Eastern Europe
declares that it enjoys a democratic regime it does not at all fulfill the criteria, which allow the
free affirmation of these minorities36.
As previously stated, no official records exist regarding the ethnic minorities in Greece
since censuses do not collect data on ethnicity or nationality. According to the official 2011 census,
the population of Greece is 10,816,286, out of which the total number of permanent residents of
Greece with foreign citizenship and of residents with unknown or undefined citizenship is
911,29937. Data regarding the estimated number of minority groups in Greece are given in other
sources, such as country reports and evaluations. According to the Minority Rights Group
International, minorities in Greece include, Albanians estimated at 443,550 (4.05percent); Roma
estimated at 160,000-250,000 (1.5-2.28percent); Vlachs (Aromanians) estimated at 200,000
(1.82percent); Ethnic Macedonians estimated at 100,000-200,000 (0.91-1.82percent); Arvanites
estimated at 95,000 (0.87percent); Turks estimated at 90,000 (0.82percent); and Pomaks estimated
at 35,000 (0.32percent).38 The number of people belonging to minority groups living in Greece
varies from source to source, especially in regards to the Macedonia minority. Nevertheless, the
existence of minority groups living on Greek territory, regardless of the lack of official recognition
by Greece, is a generally accepted fact by the entire international community.
Minorities in Greece are faced with numerous challenges even nowadays. From acts of
discrimination to limited rights, numerous reports point out to the need of significant
improvement of the rights of the minorities in Greece. According to the Freedom in the World
2016 report published by Freedom House, Freedoms of assembly and association are guaranteed
by the Constitution and the government generally protects these rights in practice, though there
are some limits on groups representing ethnic minorities.39 However, there have been a number
of reports regarding the breach of these rights, such as the case of the arbitrary detention for a
night and expulsion from Greece of Mr. Mustafa Kaymakçı, the President of the organization
“Rhodes, Kos and the Dodecanese Turks Culture and Solidarity Association”.40
Dhimitras, PanayoteElie, pp. 308, cited in Milo, Paskal, pp. 8
Demographic and social characteristics of the Resident Population of Greece according to the 2011
Population - Housing Census revision of 20/3/2014, Hellenic Statistical Authority, Piraeus, September 12,
2014
http://www.statistics.gr/documents/20181/1215267/A1602_SAM01_DT_DC_00_2011_03_F_EN.pdf/cb10bb
9f-6413-4129-b847-f1def334e05e accessed on September 28, 2016
38http://minorityrights.org/country/greece/ accessed on September 28, 2016
39 Freedom House’s annual report on political rights and civil liberties, 2016
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/greece accessed on October 25, 2016
40 The International Secretariat of the World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT), after being informed
by the Greek Helsinki Monitor (GHM), a member of OMCT SOS-Torture network, about acts of harassment
against defenders working on the rights of minorities in Greece, including the arbitrary detention for a
night and expulsion from Greece of Mr. Mustafa Kaymakçı, President of the organisation “Rhodes, Kos
and the Dodecanese Turks Culture and Solidarity Association”, requests urgent intervention upon the
events
Greece: Acts of harassment against defenders working on the rights of minorities in Greece, including the
arbitrary detention for a night and expulsion from Greece of Mr. Mustafa Kaymakçı, Case GRE 261016
36
37
124
The Greek state officially recognizes the existence of only one minority, the Muslim community
in the province of Thrace. According to the United States Department of State, the Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, data show that the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne created an
officially recognized “Muslim minority,” which consists of an estimated 140,000 to 150,000
individuals (approximately 1.3percentof the Greek population) residing in Thrace.41 According
to the 1991 census, it numbers approximately 98,000, composed of three ethnic groups: 50percent
of the minority is of Turkish origin, 35percent are Pomaks and 15percent are Roma.42 Even though
it is officially recognized as a religious minority, they cannot fully enjoy their minority rights.
According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, which is mainly concerned with the status
of the Turkish Minority in Western Trace, the members of this minority face the following
problems: denial of ethnic identity, problems in the field of education, restrictions in the field of
freedom of religion, problems regarding land and acquisition of immovable properties, problems
regarding minority foundations, deprivation of Greek citizenship, problems regarding political
representation of the minority etc.43The aforementioned issues are faced by all minorities living
in Greece.
In terms of denial of the ethnic identity, Greek state refuses to recognize the existence of
a Turkish minority, claiming that the Muslim minority in Western Trace is a religious, and not an
ethnic minority. Tourkos and Tourkikos (Turk and Turkish) are prohibited in the titles of
organizations, although individuals may legally call themselves Tourkos.44 Similarly, the
Government officials and courts denied requests by Slavic groups to use the term Macedonian in
identifying themselves, stating that more than two million ethnically (and linguistically) Greek
citizens also used the term Macedonian in their self-identification.45 Even more complicated than
the situation with the Turkish minority, the negation of Macedonian identity in Greek nationalist
ideology is trilateral; it denies the existence of a Macedonian nation, a Macedonian language, and
a Macedonian minority in Greece.
Regarding political participation of minorities, Greece’s largest minority population, the
Muslim community of Western Thrace is the only minority which is allowed full political rights
and has four representatives in parliament after the latest election.46 In terms of registered political
parties representing the interests of the minorities living in Greece, there is the Party of
http://www.omct.org/human-rights-defenders/urgent-interventions/greece/2016/10/d24016/#_ftn1
accessed on October 15, 2016
41 International Religious Freedom Report for 2011, United States Department of State, Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/193027.pdf accessed on November 30, 2016
42 The Muslim Minority of Greek Thrace, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece
http://www.hri.org/MFA/foreign/musminen.htm accessed on October 29, 2016
43 Turkish Minority of Western Thrace and the Turkish Community in the Dodecanese, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Turkey
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkish-minority-of-western-thrace.en.mfa accessed on October 30, 2016
44 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015, United States Department of State, Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, pp. 27
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/253065.pdf accessed on November 1, 2016
45 Ibid
46 Freedom House’s annual report on political rights and civil liberties, 2016
125
Friendship, Equality and Peace, which represents the interests of a part of the Turkish minority
of Greece, as well as the political party Rainbow, which is concerned with the rights of the
Macedonia minority, but does not have, or have had to this day, any representatives in the Greek
parliament. The latter was faced with numerous problems in particular, including discrimination,
violence and assault. According to the 2006 US Department of State Report, the European Court
of Human Rights ordered the Greek government to pay 35,245 euros to the Rainbow Party for
violations of two ECHR articles: the right to a fair hearing and the right to freedom of assembly
and association, referring to the failure of the Greek police to prevent, or at least contain, violence
during a 1995 demonstration instigated by the town council and local priests, during which
Rainbow Party members were assaulted and the party offices were destroyed after the group
hung a sign written in both Greek and the Macedonian language outside party headquarters.47
When analyzing the freedom of religion, it should be noted that the Greek government,
with the exception of the Muslim minority of Western Trace, does not keep statistics on religious
groups. According to Article 3 of the Greek Constitution, the Orthodox religion is a state religion
and it has become synonymous to Greek ethnos.48 Greek sources claim that an estimated
98percent of the population identifies itself as Greek Orthodox Christians. These numbers have
been challenged by other sources, who claim that the percentage of the Muslim population is
higher. In addition to the estimated 150.000 Muslims of Western Trace, NGOs estimate that
between 500,000 and 700,000 Muslims reside in Attica as a result of longstanding migration from
Albania and a recent influx of illegal immigrants and refugees from Afghanistan, Pakistan, North
Africa, and South Asia.49 The remaining population is composed of Roman Catholics, Protestants,
Jews, Old Calendarist Orthodox, Jehovah’s Witnesses, members of The Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Scientologists, Baha’is, Hare Krishna devotees, and followers of
polytheistic Hellenic religions. Unofficial sources confirm that about 10percent of the Greek
population belongs to religious beliefs other than that of the Greek Orthodox Church. Numbers
regarding the percentage of Orthodox Christians vary from 88percent-98percent, with the most
recent Pew report of 2010 claiming a percentage of 88.1percent.50
Article 13 of the Constitution stipulates religious freedom for “recognized religions” and
prohibits proselytizing, two items which have been criticized by the international community.
According to the Freedom in the World 2016 report published by Freedom House, the
Constitution guarantees freedom of religion, though the Greek Orthodox Church receives
government subsidies and is considered the “prevailing” faith of the country and members of
some minority religions face discrimination and legal barriers, such as permit requirements to
open houses of worship and restrictions on inheriting property51. The Orthodox Church, Jews,
http://minorityrights.org/minorities/macedonians-3/ accessed on November 1, 2016
International Religious Freedom Report for 2011, United States Department of State, Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor
49 Ibid
50 The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050, Pew Research Center, April 2,
2015, pp. 237
http://www.pewforum.org/files/2015/03/PF_15.04.02_ProjectionsFullReport.pdf accessed on November 2,
2016
51 Freedom House’s annual report on political rights and civil liberties, 2016
47
48
126
and Muslims are the only religious groups the government recognizes as “legal entities of public
law,” entitled to own, bequeath, and inherit property and appear in court under their own
names.52 Privileges and legal prerogatives granted to the Orthodox Church are not extended
routinely to other religious groups.53 Leaders of non-Orthodox religious groups state that taxes
on their organizations are discriminatory because the government subsidizes Orthodox Church
activities and does not tax the Orthodox Church’s property revenues and members of many
religious groups have stated that the government should tax and subsidize all religious entities
on the same basis.54
The ruling position of the Orthodox Church and its dominant role in the life of Greek
society has contributed to the creation of an isolating and negative spirit and practice for every
religious minority in Greece, to a drastic restriction of the rights in this field and according to
some officials of the Greek Orthodox Church, religious minority freedom endangers the integrity
and purity of the Greek nation and state.55 Survey shows that these positions have drastic impact
on the public opinion, in a negative connotation. According to the results of the Spring 2016
Global Attitude Survey56, which asked respondents about their views of Muslims, Jews and Roma
in their country, in Greece, 81percent of people who place themselves on the right of the
ideological scale have a negative opinion of Muslims, while 50percent of people on the left say
the same. The survey also showed that Greece is among the top four European countries in
negative attitude for the Roma population. Furthermore, in terms of the Jewish population,
Greece was the major exception in comparison other European countries, with a 55percent
majority of Greeks having a negative opinion of Jews.
In terms of education, only the Muslim minority of Western Trace has certain rights
regarding education in their mother tongue. In Thrace the government operates secular bilingual
schools and two Islamic religious schools. The government gives special consideration to Muslim
minority students from Thrace for admission to universities and technical institutes, setting aside
0.5 percent of the total number of places for them annually and implementing a program during
university entrance exams that accepts lower scores.57 While other minorities, such as the
Macedonia minority, have requested the government for education in their mother tongue, not
other cases if education in a minority language have been recorded in Greece.
The status of minorities in Macedonia
In comparison to the status of the minorities in Greece where the existence of minorities, with the
exception of the Muslim minority of Western Trace, is denied, Macedonia is established as “a
International Religious Freedom Report for 2011, United States Department of State, Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor
53 Ibid
54 Ibid
55Pollis, Adamantia, pp. 179
56Wike, Richardl Stokes, Bruce; Simmons, Kattie, Negative views of minorities, refugees common in EU
http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/07/11/negative-views-of-minorities-refugees-common-in-eu/ accessed on
November 2, 2016
57 International Religious Freedom Report for 2011, United States Department of State, Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor
52
127
national state of the Macedonian people, in which full equality as citizens and permanent coexistence with the Macedonian people is provided for Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Romanies and
other nationalities living in the Republic of Macedonia”58. With the constitutional amendment
following the Ohrid Framework Agreement, the preamble was extended to include, in addition
to the Albanians, Turks, Vlachs and Roma, the Serbian and Bosniak minority as well. The milieu
of different ethnicities, cultures and customs is a distinctive marker of the Macedonian society,
and measures for the protection of minority rights have been included in the Constitution and
different laws and procedures which regulate various aspects both in political and in social
context in order to foster and promote peaceful coexistence and prevent discrimination. The
Constitution, having a civic concept, by way of special provisions pertaining to national
minorities, creates the framework for their effective equality based on the protection of their
ethnic, cultural and religious identity.59 In addition to these minorities, there are 26 minor
ethnicities living on its territory, which undoubtedly legitimizes the French expression “La salade
Macedonie”. The free expression of national identity is the fundamental value of the
constitutional order of the Republic of Macedonia.60 According to the official statistics of the 2002
Census, there are 1,297,981 Macedonians (64.2percent); 509,083 Albanians (25percent); 77,959
Turks (3.9percent); Roma61 53,879 (2.66percent); Vlachs 9,695 (0.48percent), Serbs 35,939
(1.78percent); Bosniaks 17,018 (0.84percent); and other 20,993 (1.04percent).62
In terms of political representation, Macedonia is a democracy where registration of
political parties is without restrictions63 free for all citizens and the Law for Political Parties does
not include prohibitive clauses for formation and registering of parties in terms of ethnic,
religious or other affiliation. There are many political parties in Macedonia that protect and
promote the rights of the minorities. Among the parties that protect and promote the rights of the
minorities in Macedonia are: the Democratic Union for Integration, the Democratic Party of
Albanians, the Movement Besa, National Democratic Revival and the Party for Democratic
Prosperity, which are Albanian ethnic parties; the Democratic Party of Turks, the Turkish
Progressive Party and the Movement for Turkish National Union, which are Turkish ethnic
Preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/mk/mk014en.pdf, accessed on September 8, 2016
59Gaber-Damjanovska, Natasha and Jovevska, Aneta, BAROMETER, Political Parties in the Republic of
Macedonia, Institute for Sociological, Political and Juridical Research, Issue N.1, June 2008, pp. 8
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/skopje/05321/barometer01-2001.pdf accessed on November 7, 2016
60 Article 8 of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia
61 Other sources estimate the Roma population at 200,000
http://minorityrights.org/country/macedonia/ accessed on October 15, 2016
62 Table 3: Total population of the Republic of Macedonia according the ethnic affiliation, Census of
Population, Households and Dwellings in the Republic of Macedonia, 2002, Book XIII, pp. 34
http://www.stat.gov.mk/Publikacii/knigaXIII.pdf accessed on October 15, 2016
63 Article 20 of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia stipulates that "citizens may freely establish
ssociations of citizens and political parties, join them or resign from them.”. The only restrictions that are
included are also in Article 20 of the Constitution, where in paragraph 3 it is stated that “the programs and
activities of citizen's associations and political parties may not be directed at the violent destruction of the
Constitutional order of the republic or at encouragement or incitement to military aggression or stirring up
ethnic, racial or religious hatred or intolerance”.
58
128
parties; the Democratic League of Bosniaks, which is a Bosniak ethnic party; the Party for the Full
Emancipation of the Roma of Macedonia and the United Party of Romas in Macedonia, which are
Roma ethnic parties; the Democratic Party of Serbs in Macedonia, which is a Serbian ethnic party
etc. The governing coalitions of the previous two decades include political parties of the
minorities, thus granting minorities significant participation in the political life in Macedonia.
There are some recommendations from international institutions regarding the political
representation of the minor ethnic groups, such as those included in the Fourth Opinion on “the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” of the Advisory Committee on the Framework
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.64 The report expressed concerns that the
“legislative framework pertaining to the protection of national minorities accords rights only to
persons belonging to the six minorities who are explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, thereby
in practice excluding persons belonging to the various other and numerically smaller
communities”65 and hope that the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, which is
undergoing a comprehensive review process, will “lead to a new approach towards the formation
of an integrated society that is based on the rule of law and respect for individual rights, including
minority rights, for all persons belonging to national minorities”66. It is important to mention that,
with the constitutional amendments, just and proportional representation of all communities in
state agencies and institutions of public life was introduced on local and state level. Consensual
decision-making on issues of special interest for minority communities was also introduced with
the constitutional amendments.
In terms of freedom of religion, right to express one's faith freely and publicly,
individually or with others is guaranteed with Article 19 of the Constitution, according to which
“the Macedonian Orthodox Church and other religious communities and groups are separate
from the state and equal before the law”67.
In terms of education, minorities in Macedonia are constitutionally guaranteed “the
protection of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of the nationalities”68. Article 48
of the Constitution states that “members of the nationalities have the right to establish institutions
for culture and art, as well as scholarly and other associations for the expression, fostering and
development of their identity”69 and that “members of the nationalities have the right to
instruction in their language in primary and secondary education, as determined by law”70. This
Fourth Opinion on “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” of the Advisory Committee on the
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Strasbourg, December 20, 2016, Pp. 1
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=0900001680
6d23e3 accessed on December 30, 2016
65 Ibid, pp. 1
66Ibid, pp. 2.
67 Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia
Religious issues are further regulated with the Law on the Legal Status of a Church, Religious Community
and a Religious Group
68 Ibid, pp. 7
69 Ibid
70 Ibid
Primary and secondary education are further regulated in details with the Law on Primary Education and
the Law on Secondary Education
64
129
right is exercised in full by the Albanian and Turkish minority, and in some instances, when
satisfying certain criteria, the Roma and Serbian minority also receive primary and secondary
education in their native language. When it comes to higher education, minority rights are
exercised through affirmative actions, such as defined quota for each minority at the state
universities. There is also an obligation for financing university education in languages spoken
by at least 20percent of the population. This refers to universities in Albanian language, the South
East European University and State University of Tetovo.
In terms of language, minority rights have also been given to the minorities living in
Macedonia. In addition to the Macedonian language and the Cyrillic script, the language and
script spoken and written by persons belonging to minorities which exceed 20percent of the total
population of the Republic of Macedonia have also become official, thus making the Albanian
language official language since Albanians constitute more than 20percent of the total population.
Identity documents can be bilingual and in addition to the Macedonia language, also can we
written in the language and script of the minority. The same solution is introduced on the local
level as well71.
Conclusion
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and
conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.72 The right to free selfidentification is the cornerstone of minority rights, as could be observed in the overview of the
international legal instruments given above. It should be the primary concern of every state to
enable its citizens the right to identify themselves according to their belief regarding their ethnic,
national, religious and cultural belonging.
As examined above, Greece has failed to recognize the existence of minority groups, with
the exception of the Muslim minority of Western Trace, for which it has encountered significant
criticism by the international community. Regardless of the several improvements which have
been made in the past two decades by the Greek government, minorities in Greece continue to
face numerous substantive problems, which stem from the government’s attitude that these
minorities as somehow alien to Greece and are observed as an outside threat that must be
minimized or isolated. Instead of observing minorities as constituent groups of the Greek society,
the Greek state policy is directed towards denying the ethnic identity of the minorities living on
its territory, forcing upon them the Greek ethnic identity, which is contrary to their personal selfidentification. As Panayote Elie Dhimitras concludes, “if Greece accepts the idea of transforming
into a multicultural society, there is no reason why it should be frightened to recognize all its
minorities and to grant them all the rights for which they are aspiring, rights which have been
defined in various documents of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and of
the Council of Europe.73 Further recommendations come from the Committee on the Elimination
of Racial Discrimination in their Concluding observations on the twentieth to twenty-second
The use of national minorities languages has been regulated in detail in the Law on Local SelfGovernment
72 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 1
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ accessed on September 10, 2016
73Dhimitras, PanayoteElie, Pp. 317 in Milo, Paskal, pp. 8
71
130
periodic reports of Greece, where it is stated that “notwithstanding the explanation provided by
the State party that ethnic groups are not considered as minorities, the Committee believes that
in a multi-ethnic society recognition of ethnic groups of smaller size may help them to protect
their existence and their identity.74
Macedonia, on the other hand, even with all the challenges and issues that require further
improvement, is constituted in a manner that grants minorities full rights for self-identification,
supplemented with collective right for the minorities granted by the Constitution and other laws
and regulations, as observed above.
Finally, at the dawn of the third millennium, faced with the possibility of tectonic changes
within the current system of existing nation states which is brought by the ascending migrant and
refugee crisis, it is more than necessary for all countries, including Macedonia and Greece, to
accept the existence of minorities on their territories and address the issues of minorities in a
positive manner.
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133
“The Old Calendarists and the Macedonian Issue”
By Dimitra Tsourou (Panteion University)
“Any change in the calendar will cause confusion among the ignorant and introduce a division into the
Church” The Emperor Andronikos II Palaiologos (1324).
Abstract
The Macedonian issue refers to the national land use problem, established after the Treaty of
Berlin in the 19th century, at the Balkan peninsula, namely, at the Macedonian region. The
countries, which disputed over the Macedonian region were Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and
Ottoman Empire. More specifically, at the beginning of 19th century, when the Ottoman Empire
started decaying, the Montenegrin, the Greek, the Romanian, the Serbian and the Bulgarian
nationalism had already manifested. As a result, new national states were established into the
territory of the Ottoman Empire, each of them claiming for more and more regions from the
Empire, relying on irredentist policy. Analytically, they claimed these regions for their minorities
which used to live in the remaining European Ottoman area and they followed policies which
pursued to incorporate those regions with the ones their minorities stayed in. The Macedonian
issue is considered to be a part of the Eastern Issue, which although seems to have ended at the
end of World War I, it comes into view once again at the end of the World War II, among Bulgaria,
Yugoslavia and Greece. The Old Calendarists, were a religious minority in Greece, split from the
State Church in 1924, by refusing to accept the new Gregorian calendar because they saw this as
acquiescence to the Catholic Pope and the West. They were consequently condemned by the
Greek Church and the political authority of Greece for being in favor of Serbia, Bulgaria and
Slavic-speaking minorities of the Greek region of Macedonia, because the Christian Orthodox
churches of Serbia and Bulgaria had tenaciously held on the Julian Calendar. Therefore, the Greek
State denounced the Old Calendarists as a national danger and believed this group was being
used skillfully by Serbia to benefit the Slavic-speaking minority in Greece.
Keywords: Old Calendarists, Calendar change, Julian Calendar, Gregorian Calendar, Communist
party, Holy Synod, Holy Mountain, Slavic-speaking minorities, Macedonia issue, State Church,
Ecumenical Patriarchate.
Introduction: A dispute about thirteen days?
In 1923/24 when the calendar change was announced, the Greek state and Church were both in a
troubled and uneasy situation. The past nine years had proved a divisive and traumatic period,
mainly because of “The National Schism” between the Royalists and the Venizelists. Moreover,
the military defeat in Asia Minor, in 1922, with its tragic aftermath of institutionalized ethnic
cleansing, exacerbated problems. After that, there was established a revolutionary government.
Inevitably, these events had an impact on Church life.
In March 1923, Chrysostomos [Papadopoulos] had been appointed Archbishop by the
revolutionary government, under vague circumstances, in order to announce the introduction of
the New Calendar. On 3 March 1924, Chysostomos, Archbishop of Athens (1868-1938),
134
dispatched a telegram to all diocesan bishops of the Church of Greece. In this he announced that
the Church of Greece, which hitherto had followed the Old Style Calendar or Julian Calendar,
would now change to the New Style Calendar (Gregorian Calendar), which had already been
adopted by the Greek civil authorities in February of the previous year. In the words of
Archbishop’s telegram: “The Church of Greece, in accordance with the decision of the Holy
Synod, has accepted the correction of the Julian Calendar as specified by the Ecumenical
Patriarchate, whereby 10 March in the Church Calendar will be reckoned as 23 March.”
Neither the Archbishop, nor anyone else could believe that the introduction of the New
Calendar in 1924 would cause a deep and lasting schism within the Greek Orthodox Church.
The naysayers of the Gregorian Calendar rejected the authority of the established Church and
formed their own parallel hierarchy and their own monasteries and nunneries. More specifically,
a part of the clergy and especially the leadership of the Old Calendarists became independent.
This independent group extended to a large part of the population in the north and south Greece.
Old Calendarists had their own bishops, parishes and monasteries that were totally independent
and isolated from the New Calendar society of the State Church. They called themselves “True
Orthodox Christians” of the Greek land. They formed a quasi-religious minority that was for a
long time subjected to persecutions for various reasons.1
The issue of the Old Calendarists and social divisions came into view during the interwar
period (1923-1939) and the first postwar years (1946-1949). The division, apart from the
ecclesiastical dimension, included social and political aspects. Opponents of the Julian Calendar
declared that they rejected any reform or innovation which might “threaten” the tradition of
Orthodoxy.2 However, the Old Calendarists were stigmatized by both of the political authority
of Greece and State Church, as they connected the “apostasy” of the Old Calendarists with
“national interest” issues.
Calendar Controversies. The emergence of the “ national danger”.
What, really, causes surprise is the association of the Old Calendarists issue with a national issue,
the so called Macedonian issue. The preservation of Julian Calendar by the Orthodox Churches
of Serbia and Bulgaria, caused the State Church of Greece to condemn the Greek followers of
Julian Calendar. The State Church of Greece believed that Greek Old Calendarists favored the
Slavic-speaking minorities in the region of Macedonia that was a part of the Greek state.3
The connection between the Old Calendarists and the minority of Slavic-speakers of
Macedonia enabled the State Church to manifest against the Old Calendarists. The complaints
and the denouncements grew concerning the national danger, caused by Old Calendarists: “The
Old Calendarists issue was used skillfully by Serbia in order to trigger demands that would
benefit the Slavic-speaking minority”. 4
Kallistos Ware, “ Old Calendarists “, in Minorities in Greece, Aspects of a plural Society, edited by Richard
Clogg, 1-24,London: Hurst and Company, 2002.
2 Dimitris Malesis, “The Old Calendar issue, options of political and cultural conflicts at the interwar and
postwar period”, ( To palaiohmerologitiko zitima), Mnimon, 22, 2000, 135-169.
3 Ibid.
4 George Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic, Social Coalitions and Party Strategies in Greece 1922-1936,
Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1983, 247 – 250.
1
135
At the same time, Archbishop Chrisostomos and the Ecumenical Patriarchate sent a letter
to the Patriarch of Serbia, Dimitrios, to accept the calendar change. Both Dimitrios and the
embassy of Yugoslavia in Athens expressed the opinion that because of the short notice of the
announcement of the calendar change, it was not feasible. However, the Patriarch of Serbia and
the embassy confirmed that the Gregorian calendar would be ratified after the conference of the
Archbishops. However, the Greek Old Calendarists disapproved of actions by the Church of
Serbia, accusing it siding with Archbishop Chrisostomos. According to the thesis of
Christodoulos Paraskevaidis, who was the Archbishop of Athens and of the whole state from
1998 to 2008, the Church of Serbia did not intend to concede to the calendar change.5
The “danger” was recognized through the voice of the Metropolitan of Demetriada,
Joachim in 1933: “ We should encourage the Slavic-speakers of [Greek] Macedonia to create a
kind of Bulgarian schism due to diffusion of the Old Calendarists motivation. We must reinforce
the tribal moral of all foreign language speakers comprising Christian minorities in New Lands.”
6 The term “New Lands” refers to those lands were annexed to Greece during the Balkans wars.
In the same era, an important statement was issued in the Official Journal of State Church
of Greece, called Ekklhsia: “ The Old Calendarists at Thessaloniki, expressing their disgust at the
temples of the State Church of Greece, moved towards the Serbian temple, where religious
ceremonies were conducted according to the Julian Calendar. In their turn, the Serbian priests
photographed their churches in order to show off their congregation, with ultimate goal the
political emergence of the issue regarding the Serbian minority in Thessaloniki”.7 The article
pointed out that this event evinced a serious national danger.
The Official State Orthodox Church also published denouncements focusing on the
monks of Holy Mountain, who were followers of Julian Calendar. The Holy Community of
Mount Athos, the Holy Mountain, continued to follow the Julian Calendar. Some monks, such as
“Zilotes” who interrupted the memorial service of Ecumenical Patriarch were also involved into
the Calendar issue. It was alleged that they were under the spiritual jurisdiction of the
Patriarchate of Serbia. This assertion was refuted by the Official Concerts of Monasteries.8
The Old Calendarists issue even troubled the Greek state as evidenced by articles
published in newspapers, emphasizing on the national dimension of the issue. For example, in
1932 the General Administrator of (Greek) Macedonia, Filippos Dragoumis warned the Greek
Ministry of Education that many national risks and perils could result from the Old Calendarists
issue.9 Such dangers came into view through the voice of an influential political journalist of
Florina, named Yiannis Modis. He mentioned that some villages of Florina adhered to the Julian
Calendar due to “family” bonds or “kinship” with neighbors of “ the frontier Serbian zone”.10
Christodoulos Paraskevaidhs, . “Historical and normal conception of the Old Calensarist issue”,
(Historiki kai kanoniki theorisi toy palaioimerologitikou zitimatos), Phd thesis, National and Kapodistrian
University of Athens, Greece, 1985, 35.
6 See the speech of Joachim Metropolitan of Demetriada in 1933, “The Old calendar issue within Greece”,
in Dimitris Malesis, loc. cit., note 114, p. 164.
7 Journal Ekklhsia, no, 113, April 3, 1933.
8 Journal Ekklhsia, no 9, June 2, 1934.
9 Journal, Eleuthero Vima, May 28, 1935.
10Journal, Eleuthero Vima, June 3, 1935
5
136
At same time, many bishops, who were supporters of the Gregorian Calendar pointed out not
only the dangers derived from the Old Calendarists, but also the concomitant consequences.
About half the priests in this region were Slavic-speakers, secessionists as well, who were not
replaced by Greek speakers in 1912. 11
The “national danger” continued after the World War II as the Greek authorities pointed
to the deep connection between the Old Calendarists and the Macedonian issue. In fact, during
the Greek Civil War (1946 – 1949) between the Greek Military and the Democratic Military, which
was under the control of the Communist Party and the significant fact that Slavic-speakers of
Western Greek Macedonia identified with the Communist Party alarmed the Greek
administration and the State Church. The Federal state of People’s Republic of Macedonia was
created in Yugoslavia (1946) with Western Greek Macedonia being a left -wing guerilla
strongholds. During 1946-1949, the Democratic Military of Greece were primarily Slavicspeakers. Moreover, the Communist Party of Greece, which controlled the military units, planned
to make the Greek segment of Macedonia independent.
Then, the State Church called the
Old Calendarists “puppets and pawns of Communism. “ It was considered that the disciples of
the Old Calendarists were manipulated by Skopje, Belgrade and Moscow and by the Exarchate
of Bulgaria”. What is more, the State Church regarded the Old Calendarists as culprits of
divisions within Greece.12
Dorotheous, Metropolitan of Larissa (1888-1957) addressed the Holy Synod in 1948:
“Serbia has recommended to all Slavic-speaking populations to maintain the Julian Calendar,
exerting intense propaganda”.13 The scholar Spyros Melas, a columnist for the authoritative and
widely circulation newspaper Acropolis, remarked that the main reason for the Old Calendarist
problem was external propaganda, employed by the Serbian Church to advance its self. 14
In the same era, the first Panhellenic Conference of Old Calendarists was carried out.
Metropolitan Chrysostomos of Florina, (1870-1955) a strong follower of Julian Calendar and
participant of the Conference said: “ For the Church, the issue of the calendar is not merely a
question of chronology and dating, but it is a question of ecclesiastical unity and concord in
matters relating to faith and divine worship. Every deviation from the Julian Calendar, of
whatever kind, introduces confusion and destruction into the whole system of church order and
of proper rhythm that governs the expression of Orthodox divine worship”. 15
During the Cold War period (after 1949), following the Greek Civil War, the Greek State
and the State Church persecuted the Old Calendarists, regarding them as “nationals dangers”,
too. Archbishop of Athens, Spiridon (1873-1956) said in 1949: “As Communism acted as the
precursor and the bridgehead of Slavism through the enslavement of Greece, likewise the
motivation of Old Calendarists might be used as a bridge”.16
Christine Vardas, “Options of the political assimilation in West Macedonia at the interwar period”,
(Opseis tis politikis afomiwsis sthin Ditiki Makedonia kata ton Mesopolemo), Istorika, 1993, 151-170
12Journal, Ekklhsia, no. 12, March 15, 1951.
13 Journal Ekklhsia, no, 213, June 2, 1948.
14 Journal, Acropolis, October 18, 1950.
15 Greece. Athens. Panhellenic Religious and national Orthodox society, The Fist Panhellenic Conference
of the proponents of the Julian Calendar, Assented to 23 April 1947. p. 16, 44.
16 Dimitris Malesis, loc cit., 167-168.
11
137
As a consequence, a connection was established between the Macedonian and the Old
Calendarists issue. However, it is not clear if the Old Calendarists combined their struggle with
goals of Slavic–speakers. This coalition is unconfirmed. Besides, the leadership of the Old
Calendarists used to rule out any connection with the issue of the Slavic-speakers by adopting an
extreme Greek nationalist position. But a connection might exist in the minds of local Slavicspeaking communities.
Chrisostomos himself, the Archbishop of the Old Calendarists, did
not allow that the Old Calendarists served “antinational purposes”.17 Not only did he refute these
rumors, but he also turned them against his accusers. His arguments are on par with the idea that
the new Calendar represented the fear that Greek Orthodoxy might be surrendered to Slavism.
18 In the denouncement of the State Church against church attendance by Greek Macedonians in
Serbian temples, Archbishop Chrisostomos, replied that people moving to Serbian churches and
celebrating according to Old Calendar, were influenced by the milk of faith. Under no
circumstances, should the role of Old Calendarists be considered a threat to the nation. The
Calendar change poses a national threat instead.19 According to Archbishop Chrisostomos, Slavicspeaking villagers are Greeks in spirit and in soul”.20 He also explained that attendance in Serbian
churches is attributed to their Orthodox consciousness. Furthermore, he cited the national and
patriotic behavior of Old Calendarists during the Bulgarian occupation in Macedonia and in
Thrace, when the followers of new Calendar, on account of their lack of faith in the ideal of
orthodox and national ideology, resorted to violence. However, he pointed out that the Old
Calendarists priests preferred the exile and the imprisonment rather than the “obligation” to
memorialize the Primate of Bulgarian Exarchate.21 Leadership of the Old Calendarists tried to
refute any denunciation as propaganda from “north neighbors”.
The abandonment of the Julian Calendar, according to the Old Calendarists, has been
accompanied by a broader abandonment of the Orthodox tradition as a whole through
involvement in the ecumenical movement. According to Professor Dimitris Kitsikis of Ottawa, a
New Calendarist sympathetic to the Old Calendarist position, this constitutes “the essence of the
conflict”.22 The Calendar change, writes the Old Calendarist Metropolitan Kyprianos of Oropos
and Fili, “is not simply part of an extensive religious and ecclesiastical reformation, but it is one
with ecumenism, which aspires to the assimilation of Orthodox by heretics and the submission
of Orthodoxy to the Papacy. Our adherence to the traditional church calendar is first and foremost
bound up with the struggle against the heresy of ecumenism”.23
Greece. Athens. Panhellenic Religious and national Orthodox society, The Fist Panhellenic Conference
of the proponents of the Julian Calendar, Assented to 23 April 1947. p. 18.
18 Dimitris Malesis, loc cit., p.166
19 Chrisostomos, the bishop of Florina. “Precise option of Old Calendarist issue”, (Akrivis opsi tou
palaioimeologitikou zhthmatos), The volume of Orthodoxy, Athens 1959, 54-55,.
20 Ibid.
21 Dimitris Malesis, loc cit., 166-167.
22 Dimitris Kitsikis, The Old Calendarists and the Rise of Religious Conservatism in Greece, translated by
Novice Patrick and Bishop Chrysostomos of Etna (Center for Traditionalist Orthodox Studies, Etna, CA,
1995), 14; for the original French text of this article, see Cabiers d’ etudes sur la Mediterranee orientale et le
monde turcoiranien, XVII (1994), 17-51.
23 In Bishop Chrysostomos, Bishop Auxentios and Bishop Ambrose, The Old Calendar Church of Greece (4th
17
138
Conclusion
It’s an irrefutable fact that minorities in many parts of the world have encountered, and continue
to encounter, disabilities of various kinds. It’s no surprise, therefore, that the lot of minority
groups in Greece, such as Old Calendarists, has by no means been an easy one, but there has been
exaggerated criticism of the treatment by the Greek state of its minority populations.
We shall not begin to understand the viewpoint of the Old Calendarists unless we
recognize that for them Julian Calendar possessed a profound symbolical significance.
Exaggeration on behalf of the State Church of Greece and a part of political leadership against
Old Calendarists revealed ignorance about the issues. Any statement reported by the State
Church was influenced by the conflict between the State Church and the Old Calendarists. In the
beginning, the Old Calendarists did not embrace any ideology out of the mainstream national
narrative. They expressed a conservative view towards a preexisting dispute, rejected any
western conception. They equated themselves with the anti-western side and therefore adopted
an attitude against papacy, according to their aspect. In few words, they rejected any innovation
or collaboration with “Franks”.
Therefore, the Old Calendarists could not be considered as a “national threat”; that’s why
the Greek state had a tolerant attitude until the interwar years. However, the approach to Old
Calendarists changed for fear of loss of territory and insurrection by minority groups. So, the
policy of the Greek State towards the Old Calendarists changes a great deal during the Greek civil
war.
References
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period”, (Opseis tis politikis afomiwsis sthin Ditiki Makedonia kata ton Mesopolemo), Istorika, 1993.
[2] Chrisostomos, the bishop of Florina. “Precise option of Old Calendarist issue”, (Akrivis opsi
tou palaioimeologitikou zhthmatos), The volume of Orthodoxy, p.p. 54-55, Athens 1959.
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Conference of the proponents of the Julian Calendar, Assented to 23 April 1947.
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[2] Journal Ekklhsia, no, 113, April 3, 1933.
[3] Journal Ekklhsia, no 9, June 2, 1934.
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140
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