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Institute of Leadership and Good Governance
Parliamentary Oversight and Its Role in Ensuring Constitutional
Accountability: The Case of „Caffee‟ Oromia
______________________________________________________________
A Thesis submitted to the Institute of Leadership and Good Governance,
Ethiopian Civil Service University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Masters of Arts Degree in Leadership and Good Governance
By
Addisu Legas Duresso
Advisor
Ato Zerihun Yimer (LLB,MA)
July, 2013
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
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Ethiopian Civil Service University
Institute of Leadership and Good Governance
Parliamentary Oversight and Its Role in Ensuring Constitutional Accountability:
The Case of ‘Caffee’ Oromiaa
By
Addisu Legas
Advisor
Ato Zerihun Yimer (LLB, MA)
July, 2013
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
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DECLARATION
This thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other
university and that all sources of materials used for the thesis have been duly
acknowledged. It has been submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
advanced MA degree in Leadership and Good Governance at the Ethiopian Civil Service
University. Quotations from this thesis are allowed without any permission provided that
appropriate acknowledgment of source is made. In all other cases, however, permission
must be obtained from the author.
Name: Addisu Legas Duresso
Signature: _________
Place: Ethiopian Civil Service University, Institute of Leadership and Good Governance
Date of Submission: _________________________
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Approval Sheet of Thesis
School of Graduate Studies
Ethiopian Civil Service University
As members of the Examining Board of the Final MA Open Defense, we certify that we
have read and evaluated the thesis prepared by: Addisu Legas Duresso entitled:
Parliamentary Oversight and Its Role in Ensuring Constitutional Accountability: The case
of „Cafffee‟ Oromia and we recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the thesis
requirement for the degree of advanced MA in Leadership & Good Governance.
_________________________
Name of Chairman
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Name of Major Advisor
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Name of Internal Examiner
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Name of External Examiner
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Signature
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Signature
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Signature
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Signature
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Date
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Date
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Date
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Final approval and acceptance of the thesis is contingent upon the submission of the final
copy of the thesis to the Council of Graduate Studies (CGS) through the Institute
Graduate Committee of the Institute of Leadership and Good Governance.
I hereby certify that I have read this thesis prepared under my direction and recommend
that it be accepted as fulfillment of the thesis requirement.
_________________________
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Name of Thesis Advisor
Signature
Date
ii
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Thanks to Glorious God which enabled me to start and finish my university study. One
could do nothing to God except heartfelt thanks. I can say nothing more, but really thanks
and ever thanks.
My heartfelt gratitude also goes to my advisor Ato Zerihun Yimer, who has minutely
read the draft and made very valuable and constructive comment from the very beginning
of my thesis up to its completion. I am indeed very lucky working with him.
My thanks also goes to my beloved wife W/ro Tenagne Girma, my son Mahider Addisu,
Amanuel Addisu and my daughter Firaol Addisu who have been sharing my worries and
have been source of encouragement and morale support. My friends in and out of the
Institute of Leadership and Good Governance, your support and encouragement in one
way or the other were awesome.
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Table of Contents
Title
Pages
Declaration…………………………………………………………………………….….ii
Approval Sheet …………………………………………………………………………...i
Acknowledgement ……………………………………………………………………….iii
Table of Contents………………………………………………………………….….….iv
List of Tables…………………………………………………………….……………...viii
Acronyms………………………………………………………………….…………..….ix
List of Figures……………………………………………………………………….…….x
Abstract………………………………………………………………………….…….….xi
CHAPTER ONE ................................................................................................................. 1
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1
1.1 Background of the Study .............................................................................................. 1
1.2 Statement of the Problem .............................................................................................. 3
1.3 Purpose of the Study ..................................................................................................... 5
1.4 Objectives of the Study ................................................................................................. 5
1.4.1 General Objective .............................................................................................. 5
1.4.2. Specific Objectives ............................................................................................ 5
1.5. Research Question ....................................................................................................... 6
1.6. Scope/Delimitation of the Research ............................................................................ 6
1.7. Limitations of the Research ......................................................................................... 6
1.8. Significance of the Research........................................................................................ 7
1.9 Operational Definitions of Variables ............................................................................ 7
CHAPTER TWO ................................................................................................................ 9
REVIEW OF LITERATURE ............................................................................................. 9
2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 9
2.2 Empirical Literature ...................................................................................................... 9
2.2.1 Some Notes on Forms of Government ............................................................... 9
2.2.2. Parliamentary Oversight and Its Role in Ensuring Constitutional
Accountability ........................................................................................................... 11
2.2.3. Defining Parliamentary Oversight ................................................................. 12
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2.3. Purpose of Parliamentary Oversight .......................................................................... 14
2.4. Accountability and Parliamentary Oversight ............................................................. 15
2.5. Mechanisms of Parliamentary Oversight ................................................................... 18
2.6 Factors Against an Effective Parliamentary Oversight ............................................ 22
2.7 Conceptual Framework………………………………………………………………25
CHAPTER THREE .......................................................................................................... 27
METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................................... 27
3.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................ 27
3.2. Background of the Study Area................................................................................... 27
3.2.1. General Background ....................................................................................... 27
3.2.2. The Size and Shape of the Region ................................................................... 27
3.2.3. Population ....................................................................................................... 28
3.2.4 Overview of the „Caffee‟ Oromia ..................................................................... 28
3.3 Research Methodology or Design............................................................................... 29
3.4 Sampling Design ......................................................................................................... 29
3.4.1 Population ........................................................................................................ 29
3.4.2 Sampling Technique ........................................................................................ 30
3.4.3 Sample Size ...................................................................................................... 31
3.5 Data Collection Instruments ....................................................................................... 32
3.5.1 Questionnaire ................................................................................................... 33
3.5.2 Interview ......................................................................................................... 33
3.6 Data Collection Procedures ........................................................................................ 33
3.7 Methods of Data Organization and Analysis .............................................................. 33
CHAPTER FOUR ............................................................................................................. 34
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION ...................................................................................... 34
4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 34
4.2 Results ......................................................................................................................... 34
4.2.1 Response Rate .................................................................................................. 34
4.2.2 Demographic Data........................................................................................... 35
4.2.2.1 Sex and Age of Respondents ....................................................................... 35
4.2.2.2 Educational Background of Respondents ................................................... 36
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4.2.2.3 Job title and Service Year of Respondents .................................................. 38
4.2.2.3.1.Job title of Respondents ........................................................................ 38
4.2.2.3.2.Service Year of Respondents ................................................................. 39
4.3 Findings .............................................................................................................. 40
4.3.1 Available Tools of Oversight ......................................................................... 40
4.3.2 Effectiveness of tools of Oversight as Perceived by Standing Committees
and Executive Organs .............................................................................................. 41
4.3.3Perceptions on the Role of Oversight in Ensuring Constitutional Accountability
as Viewed by Executive Organ ................................................................................. 43
4.4 Factors Affecting the Oversight function of „Caffee‟ Oromia ................................... 44
4.4.1 Factors Relating to Organizational Structure ................................................. 45
4.4.2 Factors Relating to Lack of Capacity .............................................................. 45
4.4.3 Factors Relating to Lack of Resource .............................................................. 46
4.4.4 Unavailability of Standing Committee Members in their Office ..................... 46
4.5 Discussion and Interpretation
47
4.5.1 Analysis of Demographic Data ........................................................................ 47
4.5.1.1 Sex and Age category .................................................................................. 48
4.5.1.2 Educational Background of Respondents ................................................... 48
4.5.1.3 Job Title and Service Year of Respondents ................................................. 48
4.6 Constitutional Oversight Mandate of „Caffee‟ Oromia .............................................. 49
4.7 Perceptions on the Role of Oversight in Ensuring Constitutional Accountability ..... 50
4.8 Factors Affecting the Effectiveness of „Caffee‟s Tools of oversight as Perceived by
Standing Committee and Executive Organ ....................................................................... 51
4.8.1 Lack of Capacity of Standing Committees ........................................................... 51
4.8.2 Partisanship ......................................................................................................... 52
4.8.3 Weak Implementation of the Audit Findings of the Regional Auditor General ... 54
4.8.4 Other Factors Affecting Oversight functions of „Caffee‟ Oromia ........................ 58
4.8.4.1 Factor Relating to Organizational Structure ................................................ 58
4.8.4.2 Lack of Resource ......................................................................................... 59
4.8.4.3 Unavailability of Standing Committees on Regular basis on Committee ... 59
Works ..................................................................................................................... 59
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CHAPTER FIVE .............................................................................................................. 61
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION ................................................................ 61
5.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 61
5.2 Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 61
5.3 Recommendations……………………………………………………………………65
Bibliography
Appendices
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List of Tables
Tables
Pages
Table 3.1: Summary of Participants of the Study ............................................................. 32
Table 4.1: Summary of Response rate .............................................................................. 35
Table 4.2: Sex and Age category of Respondents ............................................................ 36
Table 4.3: Service Years of Respondents ......................................................................... 39
Table 4.4: Effectiveness of Tools of Oversight as Perceived by the Standing ................. 42
Table 4.5: Perceptions on the Role of Oversight functions of „Caffee‟ in ensuring
Constitutional Accountability as Viewed by Executive Organs ............ 44
Table 4.6: Factors Relating to Organizational Structure .................................................. 45
Table 4.7: Factors Relating to Lack of Capacity .............................................................. 45
Table 4.8: Factors Relating to Lack of Resource .............................................................. 46
Table 4.9: Factors Relating to Unavailability of Standing Committee members in ......... 47
their Office on Regular basis as viewed by standing committees, ................................... 47
advisors and Experts ......................................................................................................... 47
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List of Figures
Figures
Pages
Figure 1.1: Conceptual framework ................................................................................... 26
Figure 3.1 Geographical Location of Oromia Regional State .......................................... 28
Figure 4.1: Educational background of Standing Committees and their advisors ............ 37
Figure 4.2: Educational background of Executive Organ Heads and Experts .................. 38
Figure 4.3: Job Title of Respondents from the standing committee and advisors ............ 38
Figure 4.4: Job Title of Respondents from the Executive organ ...................................... 39
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LIST OF ACRONYMS/ABBREVIATIONS
BoFED
Bureau of Finance and Economic Development
CSA
Central Statistics Agency
EPRDF
Ethiopian People Revolutionary
ONRS
Oromia National Regional State
OPDO
Oromo Peoples‟ Democratic Organization
UNDP
United Nations Development Fund
(N.d)
No Date
IPU
Inter Parliamentarian Union
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Democratic Front
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ABSTRACT
It is obvious that effective legislatures contribute to effective governance by performing
important functions necessary to sustain democracy in complex and diverse societies.
Democratic societies need the arena for the airing of societal differences provided by
representative assemblies with vital ties to the populace. They need institutions that are
capable of writing good laws in both the political sense of getting agreement from public
at large, and in the technical sense of achieving the intended purposes. Though there is a
variation among states the generic role of the legislative organ is enacting laws,
representing the public and exercising oversight. Among others, oversight is the roles of
the legislative organ by which it makes the executive and its agencies accountable for
their acts and decision. When we see the practice in Ethiopia in general and the Oromia
National Regional State in particular, though such function plays an important role in
ensuring
constitutional accountability, its effectiveness is not as such encouraging
because of various factors. Hence, the main objective of this thesis is to assess the extent
of the effectiveness of oversight function of the „Caffee‟ Oromia over the executive organs
of the region. More specifically, the possible tools of parliamentary oversight available to
the „Caffee‟ Oromia and factors adversely affecting such function of the „Caffee are
issues under discussion. In conducting the study, the researcher tries to employ three
major data collection instruments: Questionnaires, interviews and analysis of legislations
and other relevant documents. The findings of the thesis depicts that various factors, such
as lack of commitment, partisanship within the committees charged with oversight, weak
implementation of audit report findings, lack of capacity, lack of sufficient resource and
poor organizational structure are among the challenges that contribute to the
ineffectiveness of this function of the „Caffee‟ Oromia.
Key words: „Caffee‟, Oromia, Oversight, Parliament,
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background of the Study
In any nations of our globe, legislatures of some sort are found. Literatures reveal that
nearly all political regimes find it useful to have some sort of nominally representative
institution to legitimate their lawmaking by discussing and ratifying public policies
(Johnson and Nakamura 1996:6). While legislatures range from ornamental (and often
disposable) to significant governing partners, they have some common characteristics
which scholars use to define them. These include: a claim on legitimacy based on
representing the public or publics, some power (formal or symbolic) over lawmaking,
nominal equality of membership, and processes for collective decision-making.
Even though there is considerable variation among legislatures of the various nations of
the world, the generic and major functions of such legislative body is representing the
public/electorate, in making laws, and exercising oversight (Johnson and Nakamura,
1999:6).
The notion of good governance requires states to be capable, account-able and
responsive, placing legislatures at the core of the governance debate. Under this
framework, improving domestic accountability is said to be strongly connected with
building government capability to be responsive to the burgeoning needs of its citizens
(DFID, 2007:14). Legislative representation is premised on the idea that citizens are
involved in the decision-making process through their representatives and the legislative
process provides the very avenue for people participation. This perception upholds the
view that the legislature is the most representative institution that operates with greater
transparency than the other branches of government. Promoting the interest of
constituencies is presumably on top of a legislator„s agenda; thus, the locus of legislative
interest would be the executive department„s policy implementation since this directly
affects the people as the intended beneficiaries of government services.
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Three factors are argued to be relevant in explaining the nature of oversight in political
system (Desposato, and Scott W. 2004). The first one refers to the formal institutional
framework that grants the legal mandate for legislative oversight and provides the
authority to challenge the executive„s programs/policies. The second factor involves the
informal institutional incentives for using that authority. The latter is quite complex
because it is typically motivated by the preferences of the electorate and the electoral
system such as the extent to which the political environment is programmatic or
clientelistic (Abellera, E, (n.d).
Moreover, the structure of the legislature and the broader political spectrum in which it
operates evidently impinges on the manner of accomplishing their roles. The existence of
a vibrant committee is also identified in aiding robust oversight therefore the
composition, technical competence; behavior and discipline of its members would be a
vital determinant for pursuing effective oversight.
When we look at the Ethiopian situation, the current FDRE constitution was formulated
and ratified in 1994 and came into force in August 1995. The constitution establishes
Ethiopia as a federal republic with a parliamentary form of government under article 45
of the constitution. This constitution also provides the establishment of 9 regional states
and two City administrations forming the federation under Article 47 and both the
Federal and regional governments shall have the legislative, executive and judicial
power. The House of Peoples‟ Representative at federal level and the council of each
regional state at regional level is the highest organ of government as per article 50 (3) of
the Federal Constitution. Oromia National Regional State is among the regional states
established and reinforces similar form of government with the Federal government
having legislative, executive and judicial power over the affairs of the region.
In this juncture, the researcher under his research topic would like to assess the role and
effectiveness of the institution of the legislature in ensuring constitutional accountability
with special reference to the „Caffee‟ Oromia based on the power and duties vested to it
by the Region‟s Constitution and other relevant legislation. Hence, the main objective of
this research is to look at the generic role of the legislator and its Oversight function,
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particularly, in ensuring constitutional accountability and its challenges with special
reference to the Oromia National Regional State Council (usually known as „Caffee‟)
1.2 Statement of the Problem
Good governance on a continuing basis requires an effective institutional infrastructure
and that functioning legislatures have proven their worth as part of the set of core
institutions. A further assumption is that good governance and some level of functioning
democracy are related. Democratic government is characterized by transparency and
accountability (Johnson and Nakamura, 1999).
The primary responsibility in this regard falls on the shoulder of the parliament. Effective
legislatures help to sustain democracy where it exists and elsewhere help to democratize
by fulfilling the promise inherent in the public's right to be represented. Capable
representative institutions connect people to their government by giving them a place
where their needs can be articulated, by giving them a say in shaping the rules that
govern them, by providing them with recourse if governmental power is abused, and by
contributing to the procedures and values that sustain a democratic culture.
In discharging their power and duties all legislatures experience difficulties in performing
some of their functions, and newly developed legislatures are likely to experience
difficulties with all of them. Some of these problems may be related with lack of clear
legal framework, lack of institutional structure or capacity, and the others may be related
with political environment in which the legislature discharges its responsibility.
Moreover, the problem may be related with tools the legislature employ its oversight
function. Like any other country‟s legislative body, the federal and regional legislative
bodies in Ethiopia in general and Oromia in particular, face many challenges in
discharging their role accorded to them by law.
Various literatures reveal that the parliament or legislature holds the executive
accountable and responsible for their action. Parliamentary oversight is one of the means
by which the parliament holds the executive accountable.Oversight in parliamentary
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system of government depends on legislative-executive relationship which creates a
fusion of power between executive and legislative (Awel, 2011:6).
When we look at the power relation between legislative and executive organs of the
state, subject to Federal Constitution, „Caffee‟ (the legislative organ) is constitutionally
declared to be the highest political authority with full powers in the affairs of the region
(Revised ONRS constitution Proc. No 46/2001 Art.49 (3). Hence, „Caffee‟ Oromia is
mandated and empowered to check whether the laws, policies and strategies are
implemented by the executive according to their intention and desire. The same
Constitution mandates the „Caffee‟ with the power of calling and questioning the
President and other regional officials and investigates performances of the Regional
Administrative Council -the executive branch of the government, (ONRS constitution
Art.49 (3).
Furthermore, the same constitution provides that the regional government affairs shall be
conducted in a transparent way and any public official or elected representative shall be
accountable for any failure in his duties of office (See article 12) of the above mentioned
proclamation. In this regard, besides their being accountable for the Constitution and to
their conscience, the primary responsibility to make public officials accountable resides
on the „Caffee‟ by conducting effective oversight.
However, there is an argument that „Caffee‟ is ineffective in Oversight the activities of
the executive organ because of various reasons. According to current practices, „Caffee‟
faces many challenges in discharging its power and duties to properly undertake
oversight functions. The members of the „Caffee‟ and some individuals argue that the
problem is related with the lack of political will and institutional consciousness. Unless
some key members are concerned about legislative power and the legislature as an
institution, it is unlikely to improve. Other individuals argue that there is also a fusion of
power between the legislative and the executive which may affect the effectiveness of
„Caffee‟ in discharging its power and duties.
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In addition to these challenges, parliamentary oversight is neglected area of research in
many jurisdictions and therefore there is very limited discussion on the area (Awel,
2011). The situation in Ethiopia in general and in Oromia in particular is not exception in
this regard; and hence it needs further assessment to check upon the effectiveness of such
task of the parliament. Hence, the main objective of this research is mainly to evaluate
the extent of the effectiveness of oversight functions of the „Caffee‟ over the executive
organ of the region to ensure constitutional accountability; and its challenges in
discharging such duty.
1.3 Purpose of the Study
The main purpose of this study is to assess the role of parliamentary oversight in ensuring
constitutional accountability and forwarding possible recommendations based on the
findings of the study.
1.4 Objectives of the Study
1.4.1
General Objective
The main objective of this research is to evaluate the extent of the effectiveness of
oversight functions of „Caffee‟ over the executive organs of the ONRS to ensure
constitutional accountability and its challenges in discharging such duty.
1.4.2. Specific Objectives
The specific objectives of the study are the following:
To identify tools that „Caffee‟ utilize and the effectiveness of such tools in
conducting oversight functions;
To assess the perception of both the „Caffee‟ staffs and the executive organs on
the role of „Caffee‟ oversight function in ensuring constitutional accountability;
To find out the factors (Institutional, financial, legal and others) that are adversely
affecting the Oversight functions of „Caffee‟ Oromia;
To provide an additional research based information/knowledge on the topic at
hand which may contribute to the effective oversight by members of „Caffee‟ and
an additional knowledge for further researchers on similar topic;
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1.5. Research Question
The study was conducted to find answer for the following major questions.
 Do members of the „Caffee‟ (specifically the standing committees) have focused
concern for the power and development of the legislature?
 What tools do the „Caffee‟utilize to undertake its oversight functions?
 How do „Caffee‟ discharge its power and duties entrusted to it by law?
 What factors (Institutional, economic, Legal, and other factors) affect the
effectiveness of the oversight functions of the „Caffee‟?
1.6.
Scope/Delimitation of the Research
The purpose of demarcating a study is to make it more manageable and to this end, this
research was only limited to the oversight function of „Caffee‟ over the executive organ
of the region at regional level. To this end, it was only the ONRS Constitution and other
relevant regional laws were under discussion. The study however, did not cover the
parliamentary oversight conducted on the judicial organ of the region. The oversight
functions of the council at district level were also beyond the scope of the study.
1.7.
Limitations of the Research
With regard to the limitations of this study, the major limitations to conduct this research
were scarce time and resource. It was only two or three months that was given to conduct
this research. The second limitation was unavailability of respondents, particularly, the
top leaders. These respondents were not available at required place and time because of
various national and regional meetings which requires their personal presence. The other
major limitation was the respondents were not respond genuinely because of various
reasons. The researcher has tried to solve such problems that to resolve limitations
relating to shortage of time an attempt was made to use available time efficiently. With
regard to unavailability of respondents much efforts has been made to contact them
through telephone and email addresses.
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1.8. Significance of the Research
The findings of this research establish the extent of parliamentary oversight towards
ensuring constitutional accountability. While writing this thesis there were many gaps
identified that affect the oversight functions of „Caffee‟ Oromia and the writer forwards
possible recommendations to avert the identified gaps. In this case the thesis contribute
much in making effective the oversight function of „Caffee‟ Oromia and its standing
Committee.
It also helps the members of „Caffee‟ to understand the importance of parliamentary
oversight and to take their responsibility crucial in ensuring constitutional accountability.
It further enables the reader to understand the basic features of oversight and its
relationship with constitutional accountability in general.
1.9 Operational Definitions of Variables
The researcher has tried to asses variables (independent, dependent) in relation to the role
of parliamentary oversight in ensuring government accountability. Accordingly, the
following are some of the operational definitions of variables used in the course of the
research. Unless the context requires otherwise in this research:
1.9.1. Oversight: shall mean an interaction between the parliament and the executive
and
other administrative
agencies
...that
encourages
compliance
with
the constitutional obligation on the executive and other administration to ensure
delivery on agreed-to objectives for the achievement of government priorities.
1.9.2. Standing Committee: shall mean committees established in the Office of the
Speaker and „Caffee‟ Oromia from the members of the „Caffee‟ based on the
„Caffee‟ needs and preferences to act on behalf of this body. They have the power
and duty given to them by established rules and procedures to oversight
government agencies to check whether they comply or not with the government
priorities, particularly over the executive organ;
1.9.3. Parliamentary Oversight: it is an act of watching over the performances and
other decisions of the executive organ by the parliament or legislative body
using various mechanisms of oversight.
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1.9.4. Accountability: A social relationship where an actor (an individual or an agency
feels an obligation to explain and justify his or her conduct to some significant
other (the accountability forum, accountee, specific person or agency); for the
purpose of this study the executive organ shall have a duty to explain and justify
the actions it taken in discharging its power and duty.
1.9.5. Mechanisms of Oversight: Tools or mechanisms by which a legislative
/parliamentary body undertakes oversight activity; these tools may be an
established committee, questions plenary session, motions for agenda.
Moreover, it can be report submitted by the executive organ. Furthermore, it can
be any tangible information which can be obtained from democratic institutions
such as the institution of Ethics and Anti Corruption institution.
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CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
2.1
Introduction
This chapter will address the conceptual framework on the importance of parliamentary
oversight in ensuring government accountability. It also deals how form of government in
a given country affects the relationship between the legislative and executive organ of the
government. The role of parliamentary oversight in ensuring good governance, definition
and purpose of parliamentary oversight is another issue to be addressed under this
chapter. Moreover, the relationship between accountability and parliamentary oversight,
mechanisms and factors against effective parliamentary oversight will be addressed from
empirical literatures.
2.2 Empirical Literature
2.2.1
Some Notes on Forms of Government
Though most legislatures have the power to hold the government accountable for its
actions and policies, differences in the form of government and other constitutional
arrangements create considerable variation in the tools they use to perform their oversight
function. As noted in various literatures, as opposed to the authoritarian type of
government that limits the participation of citizens, there are two widely known forms of
government, namely the presidential and the parliamentary form of government. While
United States of America is known with presidential form of government, parliamentary
form of government first emerged in Great Britain and it is practiced till today in most
Europe, the Caribbean, Canada, India, and many countries in Africa and Asia often in the
former colonies of Great Britain (J. A.G. Griffith 1989:15).
In presidential form of government, the three branches of the government (the legislative,
executive and the judiciary) are independent of each other. However, it was designed in
way that allows the three organs of the government share some sort of power. For
instance, Congress may pass laws, but the president can veto them; the president
nominates certain public officials, but Congress must approve the appointments; and laws
passed by Congress as well as executive actions are subject to judicial review. Thus, the
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separation of powers is offset by what are sometimes called checks and balances
(Bartholomew.c.Paul (N.d).
The President is both the chief executive and the head of state in the presidential form of
government and unique in that she/he is elected independently of the Legislature directly
by the people (Ameller,M. 1996: 268). From this, one can understand that, in the
presidential form of government, the Legislature has no role in the election of the head of
government unlike that of parliamentary form of government in which the parliament or
the legislature is actively involved in the appointment and approval of the head of the
government.
Awel, (2011), further illustrates that the legislature may override the President's veto if
they can muster enough votes, especially where the party of the president could not win
the majority seat of the parliament. The prominent example with the presidential form of
government is the United States of America (IPU, 1986:805)
In the presidential form of government, (Awel, 2011:11-12), states that the power of the
president includes administrative and political affairs and he is the symbol of the
sovereign states and execute government policy. Furthermore, the president has the
power to receive and appoint diplomatic invoices, to conclude international treaties, to
declare war, conclude peace and commissioning all officials, civil and military and also
empowered to appoint the members of his cabinet and some other government officials.
As clearly indicated above the president‟s power is shared by the Congress as it requires
a congressional endorsement (George, B.Gallovlary, 1961:25). The president enjoys
ultimate power decision and, therefore, has complete political responsibility for all
executive actions. It is therefore, one can ultimately conclude that, members of the
cabinet are expected to carry out the policies of the executive and legislative branches at
the satisfaction of the president who is the head of government. Consequently, the control
function over the members of the executive resides on both the president and the
legislature since they are directly elected by the people.
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The other form of government is the parliamentary form of government in which
executive authority emerged from, and is responsible to the legislative authority unlike
the presidential form of government. The prime minister is chosen by members of the
legislature (Parliament) from among their own member and in practice, she/he is the
leader of the majority party in the legislature. The cabinet members must also belong to
the legislature, where they are subject to the same kind of questioning that the prime
minister faces representing the executive organ. If the prime minister loses the support of
the majority in the legislature on a significant vote, he or she must resign, and elections
are called immediately. Thus, where as in the presidential form of government, elections
are held at fixed intervals, election may occur at any time in the parliamentary form of
government. A typical example for the former is the United States and
Britain for the latter (Awel, 2011).
When we look at the legislative-executive relation in the parliamentary form of
government, there is a rigid legislative executive relation. Parliament, especially, the low
house (House of People‟s Representative for Ethiopian case), controls the executive.
Hence, the legitimacy of the executive depends on the will of the parliament, (Awe, A.
2013).
2.2.2. Parliamentary Oversight and Its Role in Ensuring Constitutional
Accountability
Parliament, which is the highest representative body collectively and individually, is
accountable to the people. Parliament must be reflective of public and social concerns if
it is to retain public legitimacy and to ensure Constitutional accountability. Parliaments,
by reference of their mandates in constitutions, have the responsibility to ensure
accountability and openness of government. They do this by overseeing activities of the
executive and its auxiliary bodies to help curb corruption and effect good practices in
government. It is therefore important that parliamentary staff is strengthened in their
oversight capacity and able to strengthen their duties as nonpartisan repositories of
information and can assist parliament in achieving its constitutional functions and
accountability. Parliamentary staff therefore helps ensure accountability of government.
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Parliamentary oversight primarily represents the power of the representative body to
affect and have control over the executive and its agencies. In a democracy, this is a
means of ensuring the accountability of the executive and other institutions as applicable.
In this particular case, accountability would mean that the administration and its agencies
also have the obligation to account for what they have and have not done (Awel, 2011:2).
For a parliament, oversight is a means for holding the executive accountable for its
actions and for ensuring that it implements policies in an effective manner. The robust
monitoring of the executive by the parliament is an indicator of good governance.
Besides the parliament‟s legislative function, it is through oversight that the parliament
can ensure a balance of power and assert its role as the defender of people‟s interests
(IPU, 1986:805).
2.2.3. Defining Parliamentary Oversight
Before going into the details of the subject matter one has to get highlight information
about what do parliamentary oversight mean. In this regard, it is necessary to put some
sort of definition about the term “Legislative/Parliamentary Oversight”. In this writing
the writer tries to use the term “Legislature” and “Parliament” interchangeably as both
constitute the legislative organ of the government, though the latter is used in
parliamentary form of government.
The origin of legislative oversight can be traced back to ancient Greece, centuries before the
first European parliaments were formed. Aristotle was the first to highlight the necessity of
protecting public funds. During the days of the feudal regimes, the king‟s need for the
authorization of the representatives of the upper classes played an important part in the
formation of modern parliaments and in the development of their oversight role (Friedberg
and Hazan, 2012). The concept “Legislative oversight” interested thinkers already
centuries ago. In the 18th century, Montesquieu (1748) determined that the legislative
branch in a free country should have the option to scrutinize in what way its laws were
indeed being implemented. More than a century later, John Stuart Mill emphasized that
the legislative branch‟s job was primarily to oversee the government. Montesquieu and
Mill recognized, therefore, the basic objectives behind legislative oversight: transparency
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and accountability – to shed light on the government‟s actions and to hold it accountable
to the legislature and through it to the citizens (Friedberg and Hazan,2012).
Nevertheless, the term is defined in a way that conveys various approaches to its
meaning. Accordingly, contemporary definition of the term relies mainly on the
definition of Mill and Montesquieu. They reflect a varied approach to the term, and
demonstrate more than anything else its ambiguity. The most widespread definition was
coined by Ogul (1976:11), an American researcher who studied the oversight function and its
implementation in the United States Congress. To Ogul, oversight is, “behavior by legislators
and their staffs, individually or collectively, which results in an impact, intended or not, on
bureaucratic behavior”. This wide definition, which has been adopted by many scholars,
defines legislative oversight as an integral part of the legislature‟s operation (Friedberg and
Hazan,2012).
Furthermore, oversight activities, which can be carried out overtly but also covertly, are
reflected in the wide range of words used in English to describe oversight: scrutinize,
criticize, censure, review, challenge, inspect, question, control, examine, supervise,
check, verify, watch and call for account (Friedberg and Hazan,2012). The term oversight
is also defined in different literatures. For instance, a working paper produced by the
Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, defined it as: “a constitutionally mandated
function of legislative organs of state to scrutinize and oversee executive action and any
organ of state” (Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, (n.d:8)
Parliamentary oversight in its “strongest” sense is by definition political oversight; it is
built into the parliamentary system and is inseparable from it. The significance of this is
that the government emerges from within the legislative body, needs its confidence in
order to stay in office, and can fall in a vote of no-confidence should a majority in
parliament withdraw support. “Weak” parliamentary, oversight on the other hand, is by
definition administrative oversight, and it includes all those regular and never-ending
actions of investigation, examination, questioning and calls to account from the executive
branch through varied parliamentary tools: committees; parliamentary questions;
correspondence with ministers; and debates (Parliament of the Republic of South Africa,
(n.d:8)
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More importantly, parliamentary oversight is the main role of the legislative organ of the
government. It is an integral part of the system of check and balance. For instance, in US
political system, „congressional oversight of the executive branch is taken as an integral
part of the system of checks and balance, and as such, is derived from the implied powers
of the constitution of the United States (McGrath, J.,2011).
McGrath further states that „the proper office of a representative assembly is to watch
and control, the government; to throw the light of publicity on its acts; to compel a full
exposition and justification of all of them which any one considers questionable; to
censure them if found condemnable, and if the men who compose the government abuse
their trust, to expel them from office and either expressly or virtually appoint their
successors (McGrath, J., 2011).
Form this one can understand that a representative assembly has a responsibility to
watch the government its agencies and to require full exposition and justifications of
their act, even to make them questionable and expel them from office in case where its
founds necessary.
Many writers put the importance of oversight in governance that legislative oversight
„quite as important as legislation is vigilant of administration‟ (Wilson‟s study cited in
McGrath, 2011:5). McGrath further states that accountability and transparency is
ensured, and a link between policy and the will of the people can only be existed if there
is an effective oversight.
2.3. Purpose of Parliamentary Oversight
Various literatures reveal that oversight in governance has multifaceted purposes. The
main purpose and goals for legislative oversight are to see that the policy is implemented
in accordance with intent and to determine whether policy is effective; to evaluate its
impact in accordance with legislative standards. More importantly, it is to prevent waste
and dishonesty and to assure efficiency and to prevent discretionary abuse of power by
the executive organ of government and to represent the public interest by monitoring
and constraining agency-clientele group relations (Friedberg and Hazan, 2012).
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Furthermore parliamentary oversight addresses various objectives if implemented in a
proper manner. It ensures transparency and openness of executives. By transparency and
openness it is to mean that the parliament shed light on the operations of government by
providing a public arena in which the policies and actions of government are debated,
scrutinized, and subjected to public opinion. Parliamentary oversight is also a means to
make executives accountable for the actions they take. Through its Oversight power, the
parliament scrutinizes whether the government‟s policies have been implemented and
whether they are having the desired impact or not.
Furthermore, Parliamentary oversight establishes financial accountability. Financial
accountability is ensured through approval and scrutinizing government spending by
highlighting waste within publicly funded services with a view to improve the economy,
efficiency and effectiveness of government expenditure. Above all, parliamentary
oversight uphold rule of law. The parliament should exercise its function properly to
protect the rights of citizens by monitoring policies and examining potential abuse of
power, arbitrary behavior, and illegal or unconstitutional conduct by the government and
its agencies (Elsa, 2013: 12).
2.4.
Accountability and Parliamentary Oversight
In dealing with idea of accountability and parliamentary oversight one has to get an
understanding of accountability in general. Though various literatures define it in
different ways, accountability can be broadly defined as -a social relationship where an
actor (be it an individual or an agency) feels an obligation to explain and justify his or her
conduct to some significant other (the accountability forum, accountee, specific person or
agency) (Ghutto, et al., 2007).
Accountability is the hallmark of modern democratic governance. Democracy remains
clichéd /done to death/ if those in power cannot be held accountable in public for their
acts or omissions, for their decisions, their expenditure or policies. Historically, the
concept of accountability was closely linked to accounting in the financial sense. It has
however moved far beyond its origins and has become a symbol of good governance both
in the public and private sectors. Accountability refers to institutionalized practices of
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giving account of how assigned responsibilities are carried out (Parliament of Republic of
South Africa (n.d). Furthermore, accountability is a concept in ethics and governance
with several meanings. It is often used synonymously with such concepts as
responsibility, answerability, blameworthiness, liability and other terms associated with
the expectation of account –giving (The Free encyclopedia).
As an aspect of governance, it has been central to discussions related to problems in the
public sector, nonprofit and private (corporate) worlds. Accountability cannot exist
without proper accounting practices; in other words, an absence of accounting means an
absence of accountability. Accountability ensures actions and decisions taken by public
officials are subject to oversight so as to guarantee that government initiatives meet their
stated objectives and respond to the needs of the community they are meant to be
benefiting, thereby contributing to better governance and poverty reeducation (The free
Encyclopedia).
Exercising public authority may result in arbitrariness if not exercised in a responsible
way. More over it results in loss of public trust. Particularly, public accountability, in the
sense of transparency, responsiveness, and answerability, is meant to assure public
confidence in government and to bridge the gap between citizens and representatives and
between governed and government (Aucoin and Heintzman, 2000: 45-55).
Accountability can also help to bring a disastrous act to an end because it can offer a
platform for the victims to voice their grievances, and for the real or reputed perpetrators
to account for themselves and to justify or excuse their conduct. It can be effect of
parliamentary inquiries, official investigations, or public hearings. Public account giving
is even more important as a mechanism to collectively identify and address injustices and
obligations, in order to take corrective measures to heal and put things right (Braithwaite,
1997: 305-361).
Public processes of calling public officials be it those elected or
appointed by the legislative body to account create the opportunity for penitence,
reparation, and forgiveness, and can thus provide social or political closure [emphasis
added].
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The people, who are the primary principals in a democracy, have transferred their
sovereignty to popular representatives, who, in turn, have transferred the drafting and
enforcement of laws and policy to the government. The executives subsequently entrust
the execution of their tasks to the many thousands of public servants at the executives
(Przeworski et al., 1999). Accountability mechanisms can also serve as a tool to induce
reflection and learning, as feedback mechanisms that can make and keep governments,
agencies and individual officials effective in delivering on their promises. It can induce
the executive branch to learn and to improve its performance, because it also provides
external feedback about the intended and unintended effects of its policies (Behn, 2001).
Moreover, the public nature of accountability process teaches others in similar positions
what is expected of them, what works and what doesn‟t. According to Argyris and Schon
(1978) it is an institutionalized capacity to learn.
Although the “Westminster model‟ tends to be viewed as the prototype, (Alter, n.d) states
that there is no single model of accountable government or indeed method of calculating
the precise extent of the accountability of the executive to the legislature (Alter, n.d).
This indicates that accountability depends on the existing circumstances and other factors
in which it operates. Answerability and the requirement on governments to inform,
explain and justify and enforceability or the capacity of the accounting agency
(parliament) to impose sanctions are broad consensus that accountable government
involves (Friedberg and Hazan, 2012).
The idea of making government answerable and the requirement governments to inform,
explain and justify their acts is reinforced (Power and Brazier, 2001:554) that the
“parliament should provide a permanent monitor of the work of the government,
regularly call ministers to explain their actions and, where necessary, seek remedial
action. From this one can grasp that the parliament is expected not only to watch and
follow the acts of executive, but also to take corrective measures on the executive to
ensure accountability in case of mal-administration and corrupt practices.
Here, one can think of the direct relationship between accountability and oversight
activities. McGrath, in his doctoral dissertation puts that „accountability and transparency
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in policy implementation does much to convey sense of legitimacy to the process itself
and to individual policy programs. This is further explained by McGrath that „legitimacy
means, that the power exercised by government agencies is generally recognized by their
principles and the community at large as acceptable.
2.5. Mechanisms of Parliamentary Oversight
In both long-established and new democracies, the parliament is given the power to
oversee the government through a number of tools and mechanisms. Typically, these
tools and mechanisms are outlined in the constitution and/or other regulatory texts such
as the parliamentary bylaws and/or internal procedures. The specifics of how a
parliament can manipulate its oversight prerogative depend upon the existence of a legal
framework, which consolidates the position of the parliament as an oversight institution
and guarantees its powers and independence within the political system. Thus, while
reforming the structure of the political system to increase a parliament‟s constitutionally
given oversight capacities may not always be feasible, in some instances, parliaments can
improve their oversight capacities by reforming their own rules. For example, a good
practice for committee systems is to assign a single committee to each government
ministry.
Though the powers and modes of inquiry vary among various government systems, in a
constitutional or parliamentary democracy, the Executive is accountable to Parliament as
the elected representative institution. It is Parliament‟s duty to deliberate on and pass
laws, to scrutinize government program and expenditure and to make the Executive
accountable. Parliament performs its oversight role by scrutinizing government policies,
program, and expenditure plans. This is done, among other things, by making inputs into,
approving and monitoring the national budget (Zovoma, 2010).
Various literatures show that there are a variety of mechanisms or tools available to the
legislature for parliamentary oversight of the executive branch. The most common of
these are to be found in three arenas:
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a) The committee arena – this can be classified as permanent committees, subcommittees, ad-hoc committees and committees of inquiry established based on
the need of the legislature;
b) The plenary arena – questions, interpellations and motions for the agenda;
c) Other arenas – the audit and the budget committee (Friedberg and Hazan,
2012). Under the following discussions let‟s see each one by one.
1) The committee arena
This is the main tool employed by the legislature where ongoing legislative oversight takes
place through committees established in the institution of the legislature based on the need of
the legislature and different social, political and economic aspects the legislative body is
expected to address. It is in the committees, rather than in the plenary, where more efficient
and serious work is possible. The committee structure is usually derived from the
parliament‟s rules of procedure and these committees act on behalf of the parliament, under
its authority and according to the responsibilities given to them by the working rules and
procedures of the legislative institution.
Parliamentary committees have evolved over the years in different ways and under
different names. Some are quite universal (with certain variations), while others are
unique to one parliament or another. It is common to classify them into two main types:
Permanent committees and ad-hoc committees (Friedberg and Hazan, 2012). Permanent
committees exist in most parliaments, particularly, in western democracies. Their
responsibilities, roles and size are usually determined in advance, and most of them deal
both with legislation and with the examination of the government‟s activities. As to their
number, in a large majority of the cases parliaments have a single permanent committee
that parallels each government ministry; in a minority of countries, the numbers of
committees and government ministries do not match (Friedberg and Hazan, 2012).
Ad-hoc committees are appointed to examine issues of interest that are on the public
agenda and that members of parliament deem worthy of particular examination. The
responsibilities of ad-hoc committees are defined by the legislature itself, and they
disband when their task is completed or at the end of a legislature‟s term of office prior to
an election (Friedberg and Hazan, 2012). Among these committees, when it comes to
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legislative oversight, committees of inquiry stand out the most as they are appointed for a
limited time in order to examine a failure connected with governmental action, or an
action by one of its officials, and they are disbanded immediately after completing their
task. In some legislatures, these committees have the authority to subpoena witnesses and
to compel them to show any requested documents. Another type of ad-hoc committee is
the special committee. The structure of such committees and the regulations regarding
their establishment are different from the committees described above, although their task
is relatively similar – examining issues of public interest rather than governmental
misconduct (Friedberg and Hazan, 2012). Fried and Hazan (2012) further suggest that in
parliamentary democracies ongoing oversight of the government and the public
administration takes place in the permanent committee arena, but its effectiveness varies
between countries.
2) The Plenary arena
The plenary tool has two subdivisions under it and these are questions and motion of the
agenda.
a) Questions
Questions (and their more demanding form – interpellations) are another common
oversight tool used by the legislature. The motives for posing parliamentary questions to
the government and its agencies
are many and varied, and include: a request for
information; pressure for action to be taken; a demand for information from ministers
regarding controversial policy areas; attacking ministers in a difficult political situation;
demonstrating concern for constituents‟ interests; building a reputation on certain issues;
forcing a compromise on the government; stalling government actions; creating an
element of legislative excitement and drama; and advancing personal notoriety.
Questions demand that the respondent provide official and valid information on
government actions, they can enrich the opposition members‟ knowledge and can
ultimately contribute to the government‟s accountability both to parliament and to the
public (Cole, 1985: 75-101).
Most legislatures in parliamentary democracies use parliamentary questions extensively.
Parliamentary questions also serve as a tool for relieving pressure and “releasing steam” in
the political system. However, it should be noted that the techniques and procedures for
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implementing this oversight tool differ from country to country (Bruyneel 1978; Chester and
Bowring 1962; Damgaard 1994; Franklin and Norton 1993; Martin 2011; Mattson 1994;
Rasch 1994; Russo and Wiberg 2010; Wiberg 1995 cited in Friedberg and Hazan).
b) Motions for the agenda
Motions for the agenda is the second sub-class of plenary arena and they are tool used by
members of parliament in order to initiate a discussion in the legislature on an issue of
public interest that requires a reaction from ministers, parties or members of parliament.
A motion for the agenda is defined as a formal motion submitted by a member of
parliament (MP) during a parliament plenary discussion; it deals with the topic being
discussed, and it demands action by a minister or by MPs (Robert, 1976).
The process for motions for the agenda exists in different European legislatures, but the
nature of the process, its objectives, and the procedures it entails are quite different across
countries. In Israel, for example, proposing a motion for the agenda is a process that can
be used by an MP in order to raise a discussion that is not connected to legislation, and is
defined as “a request to include in the parliament‟s agenda a certain topic”. Therefore, it
can be seen as either a means for criticizing the government or for publicly voicing an
opinion (Friedberg and Hazan, 2012).
3) Other Arenas
a) State audit
The state audit is the most professional of the parliament‟s oversight tools over the
executive branch. It is a managerial function at the highest level of the state
administration, with the main task of assuring accountability for the spending of public
funds to the legislature as well as to the general public.
Friedberg and Hazan (2012:11) suggested that accountability and transparency are essential
foundations of a democratic regime, and therefore the state audit institutions contribute
significantly to these principles of government responsibility because they are very familiar
with the government‟s actions and they have unobstructed access to data, documents and
officials in government offices. This free access enables them to provide the legislature
with reliable and objective information concerning the government‟s ongoing activities,
as well as the government‟s plans and initiatives that have already been implemented.
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Moreover, the key to continuous, ongoing and objective oversight by the state audit
institutions is independence from and non-reliance on the executive branch – the body to
be audited. And, indeed, in many countries efforts have been made to ensure the statutory
independence of state audit through a series of legislations.
b) State budget
The state budget is one of the most important oversight focal points in a democratic
regime. The state budget determines the financial framework for the government‟s
operations, and regulates, for a defined period, the state‟s revenue sources and
expenditures.
The basic principle of the state budget is limiting government activity to the amounts and
needs set and authorized by the legislature. However, in a parliamentary democracy the
legislature does not take upon itself the preparation of the budget. This task is entrusted to
the executive organ and the only option the legislature can do is approving the budget
proposal and overseeing its implementation through designed tools of oversight
(Friedberg and Hazan, 2012).
A study conducted by the World Bank and the Inter-Parliamentary Union in 83 countries
showed that legislatures in parliamentary democracies are involved mainly in approving
the budget, and are much less involved in its preparation (Olson et al, 2004). As it is
indicated in the above study Britain, Canada, New Zealand and Singapore are countries
that are characterized by approving government budgets with only limited involvement in
their preparation with their parliament, while the German and Swedish parliaments can
be an instance having involvement in budget design and approval due to the reforms they
made in this field in the 1990 (Olson et al, 2004)
2.6 Factors Against an Effective Parliamentary Oversight
Many Literatures indicate that parliaments are the indispensable institutions of
representative democracies around the world. Whatever their country-specific rules, their
role remains the same: to represent the people and ensure that public policy is informed
by the citizens on whose lives they impact. Parliamentary (oversight) is the crucial role of
the legislatures in monitoring and reviewing the actions of the executive organ of the
government. While it is a relatively simple concept to understand, proves difficult for
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many Parliaments and Legislatures to practice effectively. Based on the individual
context of any country, without having an effective parliament, one could not expect the
government and its agencies would respond to the needs of the citizen. Because, in case
where there is a failure from the side of the government and its agencies, the ultimate
responsibility to correct the maladministration resides on the parliament. Parliaments
shape policies and laws which respond to the needs of citizens, and support sustainable
and equitable development (Power and Shoot, 2012)
As mentioned earlier, in addition to playing a representative role the parliament has an
Oversight role over the executive organ. In discharging this power and responsibility
parliaments, particularly parliaments in developing countries are ineffective (Hudson,
2007:5).
Various factors contribute for the parliamentarians‟ ineffective performance. Among
these the following are the major factors against effective parliamentary oversight. The
following are the major factors affecting parliamentary oversight. These are:
 Legislative-Executive relationship is another factor which determines the
effectiveness of parliamentary oversight. A government with a Legislature lacking
the capacity to effectively oversee the executive or influence policy and that exists
solely to “rubber stamp” executive‟s decisions cannot be deemed democratic in
the modern sense (Awel, 2011). It is very common in most African countries,
which have parliamentary government, where the democracy is emerging and
inexperienced parliament. In such countries the executive is dominant and the
Legislatures are there only to approve without any rigorous debate and criticism.
As a result, individual legislators are under significant pressure to vote with their
party leaders, who are usually the very individuals selected to constitute the
executive. This adversely affects the oversight functions of parliaments
 In most African countries, which have parliamentary government, where the
democracy is emerging and inexperienced parliament. In such countries the
executive is dominant and the Legislatures are there only to approve without any
rigorous debate and criticism over the proposed bills and policy. As a result,
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individual legislators are under significant pressure to vote with their party
leaders, who are usually the very individuals selected to constitute the executive;
 When we look this in the parliamentary form of government, government is
formed from a political party or a coalition of political parties. The leader of party
which has won the majority seat in the parliament will constitute government. In
this case the
 Lack of knowledge and skills to do their jobs effectively; in some instances
instead of holding the executive accountable they may prefer to retain their seat or
if they do seek to strongly hold the executive to account they may find that they
lose their seat before long.
 Moreover, the institution lacks institutional capacity and resource (both human
and material) which they need (Hudson, 2007).
 Lack of training and poor organizational structure is another factor for poor
performance of parliamentarians;
 The infrastructure, and quality of technical support provided by Parliamentary
staff are crucial for successful oversight as consideration given to political and soc
ial factors (Godi NT, n.d: 2)
 Hence, the parliament is there only for formality purpose that the executive is
dominant over the Legislative organ; proposed bills and policy documents were
approved without strong debate by the representative. Consequently, members of
the legislature were under strong pressure to properly debate over the proposed
bills and policy issues (Awel‟s study cited in Elsa, 2013: 15).
The dynamics of political parties is another challenge to implement an effective
oversight. In the dynamics of the political parties two factors shape the Oversight
process, namely, political party majority and party cohesion, (Wehner‟s study cited in
Stanphurt.Rand Alandu,M, (n.d): 8-9). Stanphurt and Alandu further put that government
party majority guarantee that the predictability of voting outcomes. They argue that
without stable majorities in parliament the executive is required to negotiate with the
minority and forge mutually beneficial compromises (Sthanphurt and Alandu, (n.d):8-9).
From this one can understand that, the executive will have to make concession - and the
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minority is able to extract compromises that are otherwise inadmissible and this strengthens
the oversight process, (Wehner‟s study cited in Stanphurt.Rand Alandu.M, (n.d):9). In
general, some of these factors relate to internal factors relating the capacity of the
standing committees and others are external factors.
2.7 Conceptual Framework
Parliamentary oversight function aims to ensure that the government and its agents use
their powers and available resources appropriately and with probity, in way that respond
to the needs and interests of all members of the society. Parliamentary Oversight can help
guarantee that the decisions and actions of the government stay within the bounds of the
law, thereby strengthening an open and transparent democracy. Ultimately, oversight
enhances public confidence in the integrity of the government‟s activities and encourages
all groups in the community to accept the policies of the executive branch.
Over the past decades, many parliaments have evolved to take on greater legislative and
oversight powers. The challenge today is for parliaments to use their oversight
responsibilities – particularly through the budget process and legislative power – to
ensure that the needs of all citizens are heard and met through the delivery of welldesigned programs and services and, at the same time, that mis-use of public funds is
minimized. In practice however, many parliaments are ineffective and lack the capacity
and/or resources to carry out their role.
In this regard, the main purpose of this research is to identify the extent parliamentary
oversight ensures constitutional accountability with particular reference to „Caffee‟ Oromiya
based on the Constitution of the region and other relevant laws. The research attempts also to
investigate the tools that the „Caffee‟employ in its Oversight function over the executive
branch of government with a view to explore whether it is effective or not and finally give
possible recommendations. Furthermore, the research tries to identify what (economic, legal,
institutional and political) factors affect „Caffee‟ in undertaking its Oversight functions over
the executive organ of the Region.
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Effects
Ineffective and
inefficient service
delivery
Main problem
Misuse of Public
fund
Absence of
accountability and
transparency
Ineffectiveness of Parliamentary Oversight
Lackofof
Lack
Capacity
Capacity
Capacity
Partisanship
Lack of
Commitment
Causes
Lack of
effective
Leadership
Poor Organizational
Structure and Office
Infrastructure
Lack of
Resource
Figure 1.1: Conceptual framework
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CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY
3.1. Introduction
Under this chapter, the research methodology such as sampling design, sampling
technique, sample size, the kind of data collection instruments and data collection
procedures, methods of data organization and analysis will be addressed. Moreover,
highlight information about the study area will be given.
3.2.
Background of the Study Area
3.2.1. General Background
ONRS is one of the Regional States in the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
established as per article 47 (4) of the FDRE constitution. Geographically, the Region
extends from 3o24'20"– 10o23'26"N latitudes and 34o07'37"-42o58'51"E longitudes. It
shares borderlines with all the Regional States in the Federal Democratic Republic of
Ethiopia, except Tigray. It also shares international borderlines with the Republic of the
Sudan (with 66 km borderline) in the west and Kenya Republic (with 521km) in the south
(BoFED: 2008). Finfinne/Addis Ababa/ is the capital city of the region as per
Proclamation No 94/2005, article 2 (3) of the Revised Constitution of Oromia.
3.2.2. The Size and Shape of the Region
The region is the largest Regional state of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.
The total area of the Region is 363,136 km2, accounting for about 34.3 percent of the total
area of the country. Administratively, the Region is divided into 19 administrative zones,
304 woredas (out of which 39 are towns structured with the level of woredas and 265 rural
woredas), more than 6,342 farmer and 482 urban dwellers Kebeles (BoFED, 2008). The
region has elongated shape, extending from the Kenyan border in the south to the south east,
across central Ethiopia and to the Sudan border in the West. It has a total border length of
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about 5700km (about 600km international borderlines with Kenya and the Sudan, and 5100km
with other National Regional States (BoFED, 2008).
Oromia
National
Regional
State
Figure 3.1 Geographical Location of Oromia Regional State
Source: (http://www.pcdp.gov.et/Oromia Profile.pdf accessed on 20 April, 2013)
3.2.3. Population
With regard to the population, according to the population and housing census report of
CSA (2007), the total population of the region is 27, 158,471million, which accounted
36.7% of the total country‟s population. Among this 23,788,431 is the rural population
and represents 87.8% of the total population of the region, while the urban population is
3,858,567, which accounts 12.2%. Of the total population of the region, women
constitute about 49.6%, while men constitute 50.4%. According to CSA (2007), the
annual population growth rate of the national regional state is 2.9 (BoFED, 2008).
3.2.4
Overview of the „Caffee‟ Oromia
Though the 1995 FDRE Constitution establishes three organs of government, until
2001there was no separation among the legislative, executive and judicial organ of the
government at states level. Hence, the regional president was the chief executive and
head of the regional government and the presiding person of the legislative body. The
Oromia National Regional State practice was not exception in this regard. There was a
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fusion of power among the three organs of the government (Tsegaye Regassa, (n.d). After
1991 like other members states of the Federal Democrtatic Republic of Ethiopia, the
Oromia National Regional State Constitution Proclamation 1/1995 was revised by the
2001 Constitution Proclamation No 46/2001 with a view to solve the irregularities in the
1995 constitution.
As a departure from its predecessors the 2001revised Constitution provides for the three
branches of the regional government: the legislative, executive and the judiciary. While
the legislative power resides on the „Caffe‟, the power to enforce laws resides on the
executive branches of the region. The judicial power resides on courts. Recently,
„Caffee‟ has about 537 seats and all seats are occupied by the ruling party of the region,
the OPDO/EPRDF. According to article 49 (1) and (2) of the Revised 2001 Constitution
„Caffee‟ has a legislative power and subject to the provisions of the Federal constitution.
„Caffee‟ is the supreme political organ of the region with the full powers on the affairs of
the region. In relation to the thesis at hand among others, „Caffee‟ shall have the power
and duty to call and question the President and other Regional officials; investigate
performances of the Regional Administrative Council as per article 49(3)(q) of the
revised 2001 constitution.
3.3 Research Methodology or Design
This research was conducted by interviewing the „Caffee‟ members, experts of „Caffee‟
and executive organ at regional level. In addition, questionnaire was distributed from
selected heads of executive organ, process owners and experts of the selected executive
organ and the Office of the Speaker and Secretariat of „Caffee‟.
3.4 Sampling Design
3.4.1
Population
The participants (Population) of the study were institutions and individuals which are
relevant to conduct the research. Accordingly, relevant data was collected from
institutions and individuals who have a direct relationship with the topic at hand and have
the major role in the oversight functions of the „Caffee‟. Participants of the study who are
selected by the researcher were primarily Office of the Speaker and the Secretariat of
„Caffee‟ and the chairpersons of Standing Committee. According to the data found from
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the Office of the Speaker and the Secrtariate of the „Caffee, the total number of the
members of such committee is about 48. Except some of the members of the standing
committee, majority of the members are found at 19 different Zones of the region, so that
it is difficult to consult all committee members within a short period of time to conduct
the research. As a result, the researcher opts to involve standing committees chairpersons.
Secondly, chairpersons of the standing committee have better information than the other
members as they work regularly in the office of the speaker and the Secretariat of
„Caffee‟. Moreover, senior advisors for the standing committees were the participants of
the research. The other participants were Bureaus which are members of the Regional
Administrative Council (the cabinet). The regional Office of Auditor General and the
Ethics and Anti Corruption Commission were the other major participants of the
research. The Office of the Regional Auditor is directly accountable to the „Caffee‟and
the findings of audit report from such institution is crucial for the members of the
„Caffee‟ and its standing committee in controlling mis-use of public fund.
The regional Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission is the other critical institution
selected in conducting this research. This institution plays an indispensable role
particularly in case where certain corruption cases require legal measures. In general, an
attempt was made to include government organs that provide relevant data to conduct the
research.
3.4.2 Sampling Technique
The sampling technique employed was purposive sampling technique. This kind of
sampling technique is based on the interest of the one who conduct the research (Vibute
and Filipos, 2009:160). Accordingly, when the researcher deliberately or purposively
selects certain units for study from the population, it is known as purposive selection. In
this type of selection the choice of the researcher is supreme and nothing is left to chance.
It is more useful especially when some of the units are very important and, in the opinion
of the researcher, must be included in the sample.
Hence, in this research using purposive sampling method the Speaker of the „Cafffee‟, the
chairperson of the Standing Committees, advisors of the Office of the Speaker and the
Secretariat of „Caffee‟ were selected purposely. Heads of the Bureaus which are the
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members of the Regional Administrative Council (the Regional Cabinet) and process
owners and experts working in the Department of Planning in the Bureau which are
members of the cabinet were the major participants. Furthermore, the office of the
Regional Auditor General and the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission are the other
major participants of the research which are purposely selected.
Especially, the Office of the Regional Auditor General was selected, because the Office
plays a pivotal role in supporting the „Caffee‟ and its standing committees so as to control
the utilization of public funds. Accordingly, the total Population is about 104.
3.4.3
Sample Size
There are various approaches to determine sample size among the given total population.
In determining sample size one can employ census if the total population is very small. A
Census is a kind of sample size determination mechanism by which the entire population
is taken as a sample. It is possible to imitate sample size which is used for similar studies.
Using published tables and applying established formula is another available approach to
determine a sample size. The most appropriate sample size determination for small
population is using census. This approach is the most attractive technique if the
population is very small, (Israel, 1992:2). A census has some advantages such as it
eliminates sampling errors and provides data on all the individuals in the total population.
Hence, the respondents of the study were 104.
In the sample size, the speaker of Office of the Speaker and the „Caffee‟ and 7 senior
advisors, Chairpersons of the 8 standing Committees, one from each standing
committees, 1 Process owner and 4 experts working in the Department of the „Caffee‟
member‟s Capacity Building at the Office of the Speaker and the Secretariat of the
„Caffee‟ were the major respondents. Moreover, Heads of 17 Bureaus at Regional Level
which are also members of the Regional cabinet, 17 Process owners and 46 experts
working at the Department of Planning in 17 Bureaus were the main participants.
Furthermore, the Head of Regional Auditor General and the Head of the Ethics and Anticorruption Commission were the major participants. The details of the participants of the
research were indicated in the following table.
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Table 3.1: Summary of Participants of the Study
Types of data collecting instrument
S.N
Condition/status of persons
1.
2.
The Speaker or Vice Speaker
Chairpersons of the
Standing
Committees
Advisors of the Office of the
Speaker
and
the
Standing
Committees
Head of the Office of the Auditor
General
Commissioner of Ethics and
Anticorruption Commission
Heads of the 17 Executive organs at
Regional Level which are members
of the Regional cabinet
Process owners and experts working
in the Department of the „Caffee‟
members Capacity Building at the
Office of the Speaker and „Caffee‟
Oromia.
Process owners and experts working
at the Department of Planning in the
17 executive organs at regional level
which are members of the Regional
Cabinet including the Office of the
President
TOTAL
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Questionnaire
Interview
1
Total
1
8
7
-
7
-
1
1
-
1
1
16
1
17
5
-
5
8
64
100
Rema
rk
64
4
104
3.5 Data Collection Instruments
Generally three major data collection methods and instruments have been utilized in the
study. These were questionnaire; interviews, analysis of legislations and other relevant
documents. The primary instruments were interviews. Analysis of legislations was and
the questionnaires were used to collect preliminary data.
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3.5.1 Questionnaire
A questionnaire was prepared to gather perceptions both the standing committees and
their advisors; and executive organs with a view to achieve the objectives of the study
and to answer the research questions. As to the content validity of the questionnaire the
„Caffee standing committees and their advisors, heads of executive organs and experts
working in the planning department of such organs were made to use them as an input.
3.5.2 Interview
An interview was prepared to inquire the relevant subject groups about the role of
parliamentary oversight in ensuring constitutional accountability, to identify what tools
the „Caffee‟ utilize to conduct its oversight functions and to assess factors adversely
affecting such functions.
3.6 Data Collection Procedures
Before collecting relevant data prior correspondence have been undertaken with Office of
the Speaker and the Secretariat of the „Caffee‟ with a view to get permission and
cooperation to gather the data. After completing such prior correspondence, the data was
collected in two phases. Accordingly, in the first phase questionnaire was administered.
The questionnaire was distributed to the chairpersons of the standing committees, bureaus
from the executive organs at regional level, senior advisors of the standing committees of
the „Caffee‟, experts both from „Caffee‟ and the executive organ indicated in the sample
size. In the second phase, interviews have been conducted with key informants from the
Office of the Speaker and Secretariat of the „Caffee‟, the regional Auditor General,
regional Justice Bureau and Regional Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission. Side by
side, some documents relating to the topic have been viewed and analyzed. Accordingly,
all sample populations were selected.
3.7 Methods of Data Organization and Analysis
The methods of data analysis utilized have been a descriptive one and both quantitative
and qualitative method of data analysis was employed. More specifically, frequency,
percentages and mean scores have been used to analyze the results obtained from the
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questionnaires. With regard to the data collected through interviews, the results have been
analyzed qualitatively.
CHAPTER FOUR
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
4.1 Introduction
This chapter deals with the findings, discussions and interpretations of the results of data
collected through the data collection instruments employed in the research. More
particularly, the chapter contains data presentations relating to demographic data, detail
analysis and interpretation of the collected data in a way that can address the objective of
the research and the research questions.
4.2 Results
4.2.1 Response Rate
In conducting this research 100 questionnaires were distributed for standing committee
chairpersons, their advisors, experts working in the department of capacity building of the
office of the Speaker and the Secretariat of the „Caffee‟, heads of executives organs
which are members of the regional cabinet and experts working in department of
planning. Out of 100 questinareies 20 of them were distributed for standing committee
chairpersons and their advisors, and the remaining 80 were distributed for executive
organs heads and experts. Out of 20 questionnaires which were distributed for standing
committee chairpersons, their advisors and experts 20 (100%)
questionnaires were
returned and from 80 questionnaires which were distributed for executives organs 78
(97.5%) of them were returned. The remaining 2(2.5%) questionnaires which were
distributed for executive organs and their experts were not returned.
In addition to information gathered through questionnaires, interview was conducted with
the key informants selected from the Office of the Speaker and the Secretariat of the
„Caffee‟, regional Justice Bureau, regional Auditor General and the regional Ethics and
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Anti Corruption Commission. Moreover, an attempt was made to asses some documents
such as laws, regulations and auditor‟s report relating to the topic at hand.
Table 4.1: Summary of Response rate
Types of
Respondents
Sample
Questionnaires
Questionnaires
Population
size
Distributed
Collected
20
20
20
20
Percentage
Interview
100%
1
Standing
committee
chairpersons,
advisors
and
experts
Executive
organs
heads and experts
Total
3
80
80
80
78
100
100
100
98
97.5%
98.75
(average
Source: Own computation from primary data source (June, 2013)
4.2.2
Demographic Data
Under this subtitle demographic information of respondents from both the standing
committees and executive organs will be addressed in terms of sex, age, educational
background, job title and wok experience.
4.2.2.1
Sex and Age of Respondents
Among the respondents participated in this research from the standing committees and
their advisors 19 (100%) of the respondents were males. From the data we can
understand that almost all respondents were males. It was expected that the at least
Women and Children‟s Affairs Standing Committee Chairperson is a woman and
unfortunately it was impossible to get female respondent from the standing committees
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and their advisors. With regard to the respondents from the executive organs while 60
(92.3%) of them were males, the remaining 5 (7.7%) of them were females.
Regarding the age category of the respondents from the standing committees 4 (20%) of
the respondents were less than 20 years, 5(25%) of them were 20-30 years, 8(40%) of
them were 31-40 years, and the remaining 3(15%) of the respondents were more than 40
years. Age category of respondents from the executive is treated separately. Accordingly,
1(1.3%) of the respondent was less than 20, 21 (28%) were 20-30 years, 22(29.3) were
31-40, and the remaining 31(41.3%) of the respondents were above 40 years. From this
data one can understand that all category of age of respondents is fairly distributed and
this enables the researcher to gather information from persons in different category of age
with different experiences.
Table 4.2: Sex and Age category of Respondents
Variables
Responses
Standing Committee and their
Executive Organs
advisors
Frequency
Percentage
Valid
percent
Frequency
Percentage
Valid
Percent
19
95.0
100.0
60
76.9
92.3
-
-
-
5
6.4
7.7
-
1
5.0
13
16.7
Total
20
100.0
78
100.0
100.0
Less than
20 years
20-30
4
20.0
20.0
1
1.3
1.3
5
25.0
25.0
21
26.9
28.0
31-40
8
40.0
40.0
22
28.2
29.3
> 40
3
15.0
15.0
31
39.7
41.3
Missing
-
-
-
3
3.8
-
20
100.0
100.0
78
100.0
100.0
Male
Sex
Female
Missing
Age
Category
Total
Source: Own Computation from primary Data Source (Jun, 2013)
4.2.2.2 Educational Background of Respondents
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With regard to educational background of the respondents from the standing committees
and their advisors 8(40%) were diploma holders, 10 (50%) of them were degree holders,
and the remaining 2 (10%) were masters and above.
Figure 4.1: Educational background of Standing Committees and their advisors
Source: Own survey from Primary Data Source, June, 2013
From 78 executive organ heads and experts, 20 (26.3%) of the respondents were diploma
graduates, 41(53.9%) of the respondents were degree holders and the remaining
15(19.7%) were masters graduates and above. Two of the respondents missed filling their
educational status.
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Figure 4.2: Educational background of Executive Organ Heads and Experts
Source: Own Computation from Primary Data Source, June, 2013
4.2.2.3 Job title and Service Year of Respondents
4.2.2.3.1. Job title of Respondents
From 15 respondents of the standing committee, their advisors and experts 4 (26.7%) of
them were standing committee Chairpersons, 8 (53.3%) were experts, 2 (13.3%) were
senior experts, and the remaining 1(6.7%) is a process owner. Regarding the respondents
from the executive organ, out of 69 respondents 2 (2.9%) of them were Bureau heads, 29
(42%) were experts, 26 (37.7%) were senior experts, and the remaining 12 (17.4%)
respondents were process owners.
Figure 4.3: Job Title of Respondents from the standing committee and advisors
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Source: Own Survey from primary Data Source (Jun, 2013)
Figure 4.4: Job Title of Respondents from the Executive organ
Source: Own Computation from primary Data Source (Jun, 2013)
4.2.2.3.2. Service Year of Respondents
With regard to service years of the respondents from the standing committees, their
advisors and experts 3 (15%) of them have served for less than 1 year, 8 (40%) of them
have served for 1-5 years, 5(25%) were 6-10 years, and the remaining 4 (20%) of the
respondents have served for more than 10 years service. From 71 respondents of the
executive organ heads and experts 1 (1.4) have served for less 1 year service, 21 (29.6%)
of them have served for 1-5 years,19 (26.8%) have served for 6-10 years, 30 (42.3%) of
the respondents have served for more than 10 years. The remaining 7 respondents have
missed to fill their year of service.
Table 4.3: Service Years of Respondents
Standing Committee
Options
Frequency
Percent
Executives
Valid
Frequency
Percent
Percent
Valid
Percent
Less than 1 year
3
15
15
1
1.3
1.4
1-5 years
8
40
40
21
26.9
29.6
6-10 years
5
25
25
19
24.4
26.8
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>10 years
4
20
Missing
-
-
20
100
Total
20
100
30
38.5
7
9.0
78
100.0
42.3
100.0
Source: Own Computation from primary Data, June, 2013
4.3 Findings
4.3.1 Available Tools of Oversight
The parliament is empowered to oversee the government through a number of tools and
mechanisms (Zovoma, 2010). Typically, these tools and mechanisms are outlined in the
constitution or other statutes or parliamentary bylaws and/or internal procedures.
Particulars of how the parliament can manipulate its oversight prerogative depends upon
the existence of a legal framework. Committees system is one of the tools utilized by the
legislative body to watch upon the acts and administrative decisions of the executive
organ in general and its agencies in particular (Friedberg and Hazan,2012). From the data
collected the major oversight tools available in the „Caffee‟ Oromia are the following:
a) Committee system /Standing and Ad-hoc committees/ based on the preference
and need of the „Caffee‟;
b) Performance report : submitted at the general assembly of the „Caffee‟ Oromia
by executive organs of the region;
c) The Regional Auditor General audit Report: which helps as an input in
monitoring and evaluating the utilization of public funds and implementation of
project plans;
d) Information and suggestions: which is being given by the general public to
each standing committees and members of the „Caffee‟ when they join with the
electorate from where they were being elected to use it as an input for Oversight
function.
According to Regulation No./2009, A Regulation to Define the Organization, Duties,
Ethics of the Members, and Determine the Meeting Procedures of „Caffee‟ Members art.
41 (1), about eight Standing Committees were established. These are: the Legal and
Administrative Affairs, Rural Development Affairs, Urban and Industry Development
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Affairs, Budget and Finance Affairs; Social Affairs, Women‟s and Children Affairs,
Capacity Building Affairs and Public Accounts Affairs;
Literatures reveal that questions, interpellations and motions for agenda are other tools of
oversight. Questions are the most commonly used oversight tool by the parliament when
the parliament needs urgent response from government and its agencies (Cole, 1985:75101). The motives for posing parliamentary question to the government and its agencies
are many and varied. Among others it may include a request for information for certain
hot issue, pressure for action to be taken, a demand from ministries regarding
controversial policy area (Cole,1985).
Motions of agenda is another tool of mechanism in which members of parliament initiate a
discussion in the parliament on issues of public interest that require a reaction from
government agencies, parties or members of parliament (Robert, 1976). Literatures reveal
that the more the number of tools of oversight, the better the level of democracy and
accountability (Yamamoto, 2007). From the survey conducted nothing has been said
whether „Caffee‟ Oromia utilizes questions and motions agenda as tools of oversight. In
practice even though there are various controversial issues to be addressed by concerned
government organ, there is a tendency to wait for a regular meeting of the „Caffe‟ Oromia
unless in exceptional cases „Caffee‟s extraordinary meeting is called. According to the
interview conducted and the response of the participants of the study from the Standing
Committee Chairpersons, the oversight tools employed by „Caffee‟ Oromia is limited to
Standing Committee, performance report submitted to „Caffee‟s biannual assembly,
auditor‟s report and suggestions and information given from the public for members of
parliament. Hence, the „Caffee‟ should extend its tools of oversight to encourage more
debate and ensure accountability.
4.3.2 Effectiveness of tools of Oversight as Perceived by Standing Committees and
Executive Organs
As it is indicated in chapter one, the main objective of this research is to identify tools
that „Caffee‟ utilize to oversee the activities of the executive organ and its effectiveness
in discharging its oversight function. Having this objective in mind, the researcher tried
to get the opinion of Standing Committee Chairpersons, their advisors and experts who
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work closely with the standing committee chairpersons and the executive organ heads.
Out of 20 respondents from the standing committee chairpersons, advisors and experts
who respond whether the effectiveness of tools of oversight utilized by the „Caffee‟ and
its standing committee are very low or not, 5 (25%) of them respond it is moderate, 12
(60%) agree that it is very low and the remaining 3 (15%) strongly agree that it is very
low. The other additional question forwarded for the standing committees, their advisors
and experts is that whether the degree of partisanship within the standing committees
charged with oversight is very high. Accordingly, out of 20 respondents, 9 (45%) of them
respond moderately. While 9 (45%) of the respondents reply by saying agree, the
remaining 2 (10%) respond that they strongly agree that the extent of partisanship is very
high.
Another question forwarded for both the standing committees and the executive organ in
relation to the effectiveness of the Oversight tools, particularly, to the Standing
Committees, was that, whether such committees are effective in finding out corrupt
practices and other mal administration in their oversight function. Accordingly, out of 20
respondents from the standing committees 1(5%) respondent strongly disagree, 3(15%)
respond that they disagree, 6 (30%) of them respond that they are moderate, 8(40%)
respond saying agree, and the remaining 2(10%) respond saying strongly agree. The same
question is forwarded to the executive organs and out of 76 respondents 8(10.5%) of
them respond that they strongly disagree with this idea, 18(23.7%) disagree that the
standing committees are effective to find out corrupt practices, 29(38.2%) of them
respond the standing committees are moderate in this regard, 16(21.1%) of the
respondent agree with the above idea, the remaining 5(6.6%) of the respondents strongly
agree that the standing committees are effective in finding corrupt practices and other
maladministration.
In order to assess the existing practice regarding the degree of partisanship within the
standing committees whether it is high or not 11 (55%) agree and strongly agree that the
degree of partisanship within the standing committees is high. The remaining 9(45%)
respond that the degree of partisanship is medium.
Table 4.4: Effectiveness of Tools of Oversight as Perceived by the Standing
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Committees, their Advisors and Executive Organ
The effectiveness
Valid %
Percent
Frequency
Moderate
5
25
25
-
-
-
Agree
12
60
60
-
-
-
Strongly agree
3
15
15
-
-
-
(Question 2.3)
Total
20
100
100.0
The degree of
partisanship
within
the standing committees
charged with oversight is
very high; (Question 2.5)
Moderate
9
45.0
45.0
-
-
-
Agree
9
45.0
45.0
-
-
-
Strongly agree
2
10.0
10.0
-
-
-
-
-
-
tools
of
of
Executive Organ
Valid %
Options
Percent
Questions
Frequency
Standing Committees
Oversight
employed by „Caffee‟
Oromia
is
very
low
Standing committees of
„Caffee‟ are effective in
finding
out
corrupt
practices and other mal
administrations in their
Oversight activities
Over
the
executive
organ.
.
How do you rate extent
of accountability in your
institution?
Total
20
100.0
100.0
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree
Moderate
Agree
Strongly
Agree
Missing
Total
Very low
Low
Moderate
High
Very high
1
5
5
8
10.3
10.5
3
6
8
2
15
30
40
10
15
30
40
10
18
29
16
5
23.1
37.2
20.5
6.4
23.7
38.2
21.1
6.6
20
-
100.0
-
100.0
-
2
78
6
13
18
34
7
2.6
100.0
7.7
16.7
23.1
43.6
9.0
100.0
7.7
16.7
23.1
43.6
9.0
78
100.0
100.0
Total
Source: Own Computation from primary Data, June, 2013
4.3.3
Perceptions on the Role of Oversight in Ensuring Constitutional Ac
countability as Viewed by Executive Organ
With an objective of assessing the current perceptions of the executive organs on the role
of the „Caffee‟s oversight function, the researcher tries to forward how do the executive
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organ evaluate the oversight function of „Caffee‟ in ensuring accountability. Accordingly,
out of 78 respondents 8(10.3%) of them respond it is very low; 11(14.1%) respond that it
is low; 14(17.9%) respondents say that it is moderate; 20(25.6%) of respondents say that
it is high; the remaining 25(32.1%) of them respond that the role of oversight in ensuring
accountability is very high. An assessment was conducted also whether parliamentary
oversight will help to indicate some mistakes that will occur in due course. Accordingly,
from the following table one can see that, out of 77 respondents from the executive
organ, only 2(2.6%) of the respondents disagree with the above proposition. While
11(14.3%) say agree with idea moderately, 20(26%) and 44(57.1%) agree and strongly
agree with proposition that parliamentary oversight indicate mistakes that may occur in
the executive organ.
Table 4.5: Perceptions on the Role of Oversight functions of ‘Caffee’ in ensuring
Constitutional Accountability as Viewed by Executive Organs
Questions
Option
Frequency
Percent
How do you evaluate the Oversight functions of
„Caffee‟ in assisting Constitutional Accountability;
Very low
Low
Moderate
High
8
11
14
20
10.3
14.1
17.9
25.6
Valid
Percent
10.3
14.1
17.9
25.6
Very high
25
32.1
32.1
Total
78
100.0
100.0
Disagree
Moderatel
y
Agree
Strongly
agree
Missing
Total
2
11
2.6
14.1
2.6
14.3
20
44
25.6
56.4
26.o
57.1
1
78
1.3
100.0
100.0
The oversight function of „Caffee‟ Oromia over the
executive organ of the region is important in
indicating maladministration that will occur in the
executive organ.
Source: Own Computation from primary Data, (June, 2013)
4.4 Factors Affecting the Oversight function of ‘Caffee’ Oromia
In this sub title the researcher tries to discuss factors affecting the oversight function of
the „Caffee‟ as this is one of the objectives of this research. With the aim of addressing
this specific objective an attempt was made to gather data in this regard and it is dealt in
the following sections.
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4.4.1 Factors Relating to Organizational Structure
According to the data collected whether organizational structure is a factor affecting the
oversight function of the „Caffee‟ or not, out of 20 respondents from the standing
committees, advisors and experts, 5(26.3%) strongly agree, 1(5.3%) of the respondents
respond by saying agree, 8(42.1%) of the respondents reply that such factor is moderate,
3(15.8%) disagree with preposition that organizational structure is a factor affecting
oversight function of the „Caffee‟; and the remaining 2(10.5%) of the respondents
strongly disagree with idea. The data shows that with the scale of 1-5, when 5 is strongly
agree and 1 is strongly disagree, the mean value is 3.21. From the data one can see that
the organizational structure of the Office of the Speaker and the „Caffee‟ is one of the
major factor affecting the effectiveness of „Caffee‟ and its Standing Committees in their
oversight function.
Table 4.6: Factors Relating to Organizational Structure
Questions
Option
Frequency
Percent
There is problem
relating
to
organizational
structure
of
Office
the
Secretariat
of
„Caffee‟
Strongly agree
5
25
Valid
Percent
26.3
Agree
1
5
5.3
Moderate
8
40
42.1
Disagree
3
15
15.8
Strongly disagree
2
10
10.5
Missing
Total
1
20
5
100.00
100.0
Mean
Value
3.21
Source: Own Computation from primary Data, (June, 2013)
4.4.2
Factors Relating to Lack of Capacity
In relation to lack of capacity of the standing committee in undertaking effective
oversight, out of 20 respondents from the standing committees, advisors and experts
1(26.3%) respondent agree that the committees have capacity in conducting oversight,
8(57.9%) respondents say that the committees are moderate, and the remaining 3(15.8%)
disagree with the proposition that the committees have capacity in conducting effective
oversight.
Table 4.7: Factors Relating to Lack of Capacity
Questions
Option
Frequency
45
Percent
Valid
Percen
Mean
Value
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Members of the standing
committee and other „Caffee‟
members have the capacity
to
conduct
effective
oversight
Agree
Moderate
Disagree
Missing
1
8
3
1
5
40
15
5
Total
20
100.00
t
26.3
57.9
15.8
-
2.89
100.0
Source: Own Computation from primary Data, (June, 2013)
4.4.3
Factors Relating to Lack of Resource
From the survey conducted whether there is sufficient resource or not which enables the
„Caffee‟ and its standing committees to conduct effective oversight, out of 19
respondents, 3(15%) said that they strongly disagree with a question that there is a lack of
sufficient resource which enables the „Caffee‟ and its standing committees to conduct
effective oversight. 6(31.6%) reply that they disagree to the above question, 4(21.1%)
said moderate that lack of resource is somewhat a medium factor to affect oversight
functions of the „Caffee‟ and its standing committee. The remaining 4(21.1%) and
2(10.5%) agree and strongly agree that there is lack of resource, both human and material
is a factor which affects effective oversight.
Table 4.8: Factors Relating to Lack of Resource
Questions
There is a lack of
sufficient resource
which
enables
„Caffee‟ and its
standing
committee
to
conduct effective
oversight;
Options
Strongly
disagree
Disagree
Moderate
Agree
Strongly
agree
Missing
Total
Frequency
Percent
3
15
Valid
Percent
15.8
6
4
4
2
30
20
20
10
31.6
21.1
21.1
10.5
1
5
-
20
100.00
100.0
Source: Own Computation from primary Data, (June, 2013)
4.4.4
Unavailability of Standing Committee Members in their Office
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Mean
Value
3.06
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As indicated in the following table for a question whether all the Standing Committee
members are available or not on regular basis in the Office of the Speaker and the
Secretariat of Caffee 1(5%) respondent reply positively and the remaining 19(95%)
respondents reply that members of the Standing Committees are not available in the
Office of the Speaker and the Secretariat of the„Caffee‟. Another question forwarded was
whether the standing committee conduct regular meeting or not and 3(17.6%)
respondents said that the committees conduct meeting weekly, 2(11.0%) say once in a
month, and the remaining 12(60%) respond that there is a meeting on quarterly basis.
Table 4.9: Factors Relating to Unavailability of Standing Committee members in
their Office on Regular basis as viewed by standing committees,
advisors and Experts
Questions
Do all the Standing Committees
members are available in the
Office of the Speaker and the
„Caffee‟?
Do the standing committees
conduct regular meeting?
Options
Yes
No
Total
Yes
No
Missing
Total
If your response is „Yes‟ how Weekly
often they meet?
Monthly
Quarterly
Missing
Total
Frequency
Percent
1
19
20
5.0
95.0
100.0
Valid
percent
5.0
95.0
100.0
18
1
1
20
3
2
12
3
20
90.0
5.0
5.0
100.0
15.0
10.0
60.0
15.0
100.0
94.7
5.3
100.0
17.6
11.8
70.6
100.0
Source: Own Computation from primary Data, (June, 2013)
4.5 Discussion and Interpretation
Under this subtitle the discussion and interpretation of data will be made with a view to
provide the general overview of the findings of the study based on the data gathered
through data collections instruments employed in the study, such as questionnaires,
interviews. Moreover, an attempt will be made to see some related documents such as
audit reports and laws which are relevant with the topic at hand.
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4.5.1 Analysis of Demographic Data
4.5.1.1 Sex and Age category
Fair distribution of all sex is necessary in any research to avoid biases which may be
occurring. As it is indicated in the preceding discussion under Table 4.2 among the
respondents participated in this research from the standing committees and their advisors
19 (100%) of the respondents were male and 1(5%) is missing. From the data we can
understand that almost all respondents were males. With regard to the respondents from
the executive organ heads and experts while 60 (92.3%) of them were males, the
remaining 5 (7.7%) of them were females. This data also shows that male respondents
have a greater number than the female respondents.
With regard to age category of respondents from the Standing Committees, there is a fair
distribution from all categories of age. 34(28.5%) respondents were more than 40 years,
30(34.65%) respondents were 31-40 years, and 26 (25.5%) respondents were 20-30
years, the remaining 5(10.65%) were less than 20 years. Hence, there is fair distribution
from all categories of age. (See Table 4.2)
4.5.1.2 Educational Background of Respondents
As indicated in the finding section, all respondents have an educational status of diploma
to masters‟ degree. When we look at the educational background of the standing
committees 40% of them are diploma holder, 50% first degree and 10% masters‟ degree
holders. Regarding respondents from the executive organ 26.3% are diploma, 53.9% are
first degree, and the remaining 10% are masters‟ degree holders. From the data, we can
see that there is participation of individuals with different educational background.
Hence, it was an opportunity for the researcher to get persons with various level of
educational background that helps to fetch ample information which may help the
researcher to conduct the research with sufficient inputs (See Figure4.1 and 4.2).
4.5.1.3 Job Title and Service Year of Respondents
As indicated in figure 4.3 and 4.4 regarding job title of the respondents, 6(14.8%) of the
respondents were standing committee chairpersons and Bureau heads, 37(47.65%) were
experts, 28(25.5%) were senior experts and 13(12.65%) were process owners. From the
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data we can see that there is a participation of individuals from top leaders to experts.
With regard to the service year of the respondents from both standing committees and the
executive organs 34(31.15%) of them have more than 10 years work experience. This
helps the researcher to get more information from these experienced individuals.
4.6 Constitutional Oversight Mandate of ‘Caffee’ Oromia
In Ethiopia, oversight and accountability are constitutionally mandated functions of
legislatures both at federal and at regional level to scrutinize and oversee executive action
and any organ of state. Oversight entails the informal and formal, watchful, strategic and
structured scrutiny exercised by legislatures, in respect of the implementation of laws, the
application of the budget, and the strict observance of statutes and the Constitution. In
addition, and most importantly, it entails overseeing the effective management of
government departments by individual members of the relevant executive authority in
pursuit of improved service delivery for the achievement of a better quality of life for all
people.
When we look at the situation in Oromia National Regional State, „Caffee‟ Oromia is
mandated to conduct oversight over the government organ of the region. In terms of the
provisions of the region‟s Constitution, „Caffee‟ is required to maintain oversight of all
organs of the region. There are constitutional provisions and other legislations which
empower „Caffee‟ and its standing committee to watch, monitor and evaluate the
implementation of policies, strategies and laws. Article 49 (3) (q) of the revised
Constitution clearly provides that the „Caffee‟ shall call and question the president and
other regional officials, investigate performance of the regional administrative council
(the cabinet). In addition to this constitutional provision, there are laws that refer directly
the oversight function of the institution of the „Caffee‟. For instance, article 42 and the
following provisions of Regulation No 3/2009, A Regulation to Define the Organization,
and Determining the Meeting Procedure of „Caffee‟ Members deals with the objectives
and matters of oversight. Particularly, article 42 of the above regulation puts the objective
of oversight as follows:
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“… is to check whether government and public resources
and properties are properly and equitably utilized, works
are being carried out in accordance with rules and
regulations…”
Moreover, article 43 of the same regulation provides that proper implementation of
policies strategies, plans, laws and programs of the region, effective and efficient
utilization of budget and other resources are matters of oversight. Government organs at
regional level, branches of the regional government organ and internal organs
accountable to the „Caffee‟ are subject to „Caffee‟‟s oversight. In general, „Caffee‟ has
constitutional mandate to oversee the government organs of the region.
4.7 Perceptions on the Role of Oversight in Ensuring Constitutional Accountability
As indicated in the review of literature parliamentary oversight primarily represents the
power of the representative body to affect and have control over the executive organ and
its agencies. In democratic governance, it is a means of ensuring the accountability of the
executive and other administrative agencies. Accountability would mean that the
administration and its agencies also have the obligation to be accountable for what they
have done and have not done (Awel, 2011:2).
In order to undertake effective oversight institutional consciousness of both members of
the parliament and other government organ is crucial. An institutional consciousness of
members of parliament may be weak or non-existent, and unless some key members are
concerned for the power and development of their legislature.
With an objective of assessing the current perceptions of the executive organs on the role
of „Caffee‟s oversight function, the researcher tries to forward how do the executive
organ evaluate oversight function of „Caffee‟ Oromia in ensuring accountability. As
shown under Table 4.5 majority of respondents 55.7% reply that parliamentary oversight
has a great role in ensuring accountability if implemented in a proper way.
An assessment was also conducted whether parliamentary oversight will help to indicate
some errors that will occur in due course. Accordingly, as it is indicated in Table 4.6 in
the finding part one can see that, out of 77 respondents from the executive organ, only
2(2.6%) of the respondents disagree with the above proposition. The remaining
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75(97.4%) agree that parliamentary oversight indicate mistakes that may occur in the
executive organ. However, respondents for the qualitative data argue that the problem is
not the perception on the role of parliamentary oversight in ensuring government
accountability; rather the problem is weak implementation of laws and regulations.
Hence, standing committees should have to have a greater concern for the development
of their institution with an objective of protecting public interest by making government
and its agencies accountable according to the established rules and regulations. The
standing committees should have to undertake continuous follow up and monitoring
whether their recommendations are implemented or not. Furthermore, they have to
establish a discussion forum with the all concerned organs as to the implementation of
their recommendations to take further measure for improvement.
4.8 Factors Affecting the Effectiveness of ‘Caffee’s Tools of oversight as Perceived
by Standing Committee and Executive Organ
As it is indicated in chapter one, the main objective of this research is to assess the
effectiveness of oversight tools in discharging its oversight function. Having this
objective in mind the researcher tried to get the opinion of the standing committee
chairpersons, their advisors and experts who work closely with the standing committee
chairpersons and the executive organ heads. In assessing the effectiveness of tools of
oversight currently available, questions were forwarded to Standing Committees, their
advisors and experts working with the committee. Accordingly, the following are the
major factors affecting the effectiveness of „Caffee‟ oversight function.
4.8.1 Lack of Capacity of Standing Committees
Since the most commonly used oversight tool is committee system, the researcher opted
primarily to assess the effectiveness of standing committees. Standing committees are
described as the „engines of parliament‟ in its oversight function. As it can be seen from
the survey report, majority (75%) of the respondents from the standing committee reply
that it is not effective because of various reasons. The first reason for the ineffectiness of
the standing committees is lack of capacity. Standing committee members have no
technical capacity in detecting fraud and other mal-administration. Most of the
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monitoring and evaluation activities conducted by the standing committee members are
mainly focus on field visit and physical observation.
In order to conduct oversight and perform other duties entrusted to them,
parliamentarians may lack the knowledge and skill. In some instances lack of awareness
and required skill results the members to retain their seat instead of holding the executive
accountable or they assume that if they do seek to strongly hold the executive to account
they may find that they lose their seat before long.
As indicated under Table 4.7 majority of respondents (84.2%) confirmed that lack of
capacity is a critical problem rating next to organizational structure with a mean value of
2.89. The researcher also conduct an interview with some key informants whether the
standing committees lack capacity and their response was absolutely true though some
efforts have been made to capacitate them through training and by availing advisors for
each standing committees. Respondents forward that currently there are senior advisors
who support the standing committees though there is lack of required capacity.
Respondents add that the existing advisors are not foresighted and there is a limitation in
supporting the standing committees in their over sight functions at the required level. The
current practice shows that majority advisor are from individuals who were retired
members of „Caffee‟ and so that they are not in a position to provide advisory support to
the standing committee at required level unless some exceptional individuals are
assigned. In addition to lack of capacity, poor infrastructure relating to information
technology is another critical challenge.
As per article 91 of Regulation No 3/2009, „Caffee‟ shall have a responsibility to deliver
capacity building training for its members to capacitate members to the extent of its
capacity and in a manner relevant to their works. In addition, members have the right to
get library and internet service, counseling, and other services to capacitate themselves;
because, poor information technology infrastructure is one of the critical factor affecting
the capacity of parliamentarians. Data collected qualitatively also supports the above idea
that, in the first place, there is no as such deep investigation of the acts and decisions of
executive organs. It is simply physical evaluation that is undertaken. Secondly, in the
process of monitoring and evaluating construction projects, the Standing Committees are
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not supported by professionals who have technical capacity in this regard. The
monitoring and evaluation process mainly focuses on physical observation. Moreover, an
interview conducted with the key informants reveal that since the majority of the
Standing Committees are from the executive organ, there is a fusion of power so that it is
difficult to conduct genuine monitoring and evaluation.
4.8.2 Partisanship
One of the gaps in oversight function is the degree of partisanship within the committee
charged with oversight which affects adversely the effectiveness of oversight function.
An assessment conducted through field survey shows that, the degree of partisanship at
committee level is high. About 55% of respondents agree that there is high degree of
partisanship, thereby encouraging a more collegial atmosphere for deliberation (See
Table 4.4). At committee level some respondents thought that personal interest is
supreme and members of committee are oriented towards achieving personal interest or
parochial party interest instead of public interest. Informants add that they thought that
standing committee members from the executives are political assignee and even though
they observe some maladministration there is a situation in which members opted to keep
silent because of party discipline. Party discipline means the guiding rules that each party
member is obliged to confirm with (Awel, 2011). Awel further states that, party discipline
limits the capacity of the members of the party not to go out of the party‟s agenda and
programs.
Respondents thought that the landslide victory of the ruling party of the region, the
OPDO have an effect on the „Caffe‟s competence though some progresses have been seen
currently. Party discipline is the ability of a parliamentary group of a political party to get
its members to support the policies of their party leadership. When we look at the current
practices in the „Caffee‟s oversight function since almost all of the elected members of
„Caffee‟are from the ruling party there is a tendency towards not to go out of the ruling
parties agenda.
As indicated under article 31 Proclamation No 153/2009 Proclamation No153/2009(as
amended) A Proclamation to Provide the Organization, Duties, Conducts and Meeting
Procedures of „Caffee‟ Members, the monitoring and evaluation conducted by the
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„Caffee‟ and its Standing Committees have the objective of checking whether
government and public resources are utilized properly. It has also an objective to ensure
whether works are carried out in accordance with rules and regulations. Above all, as
stated under the same proclamation article 31(4) it has an objective to ensure democracy
and good governance. With aim of addressing this objective the Standing Committees are
empowered among others, subject to the purpose of their establishment, to conduct study
and supervise the effective implementation of laws, policies, and strategies. They are
mandated with the power to supervise and investigate genuinely government bodies
assigned to them as per article 75(9) of Regulation No 3/2009. Despite all this legal
ground, majority of the Standing Committees are not willing to go into the detail.
Consequently, though such Committees are mandated to conduct oversight in strict sense,
there is a gap in practice.
In addition, there is lack of commitment from the standing committees to work for the
development of the institution of „Caffee‟. From this, one can understand that the
standing committees are not in a position to discharge their duty at required level. This
requires much effort in order to make effective the institution of „Caffee‟ and its standing
committee through training and research with a view to make effective the standing
committee‟s oversight function.
4.8.3 Weak Implementation of the Audit Findings of the Regional Auditor General
Institution of Auditor General is one of the external tools which help the parliament in its
oversight function. It plays an important role in oversight process. Its main task is
assuring accountability for the spending of public funds. As Friedberg and Hazan
(2012:11) suggests accountability and transparency are essential foundations of a
democratic regime; and therefore, the audit institutions contribute significantly to these
principles of government responsibility; because they are very familiar with the
government‟s actions and they have un obstructed access to data, documents and officials
in government offices. This free access enables them to provide the legislature with
reliable and objective information concerning government‟s ongoing actions. Moreover,
one of the importance of audit institution is its independence from and non-reliance on
the executive branch-the body to be audited.
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In this regard, the Oromia National Regional State Auditor General is one of the public
institutions established by Proclamation No154/2010. According to Article 4(2) of this
proclamation the office is directly accountable to „Caffee‟. Among others, as per the
above proclamation, the Office has the following power and duties:
 Carry out or cause to be carried out an audit on the account of government offices
and public enterprises so as to ensure that the resources of the government and
the public general be utilized only for the benefits of the public and that it brings
about the required result;
 It shall follow up the implementation of audit report findings and report the result
to the concerned body;
 Where the outcome of the audit findings as the case may be results administrative
accountability, shall report the case to Public Account Committee Affairs
standing committee and concerned body so as to take corrective measures; it
shall also have the power its implementation;
 Where the findings of the audit report results in criminal and civil liability it shall
refer to those having the power to investigate and prosecute; follow up its
implementation;
Based on the power and duty entrusted to it the Auditor General is closely working with
the Office of the „Caffee‟ and its Standing Committee particularly, with the Public
Account Committee (PAC).
With regard to current practices in supporting the Office of „Caffee‟ and its standing
committee key informants reply that since 2002 E.C, there is a progress that the office is
primarily working on awareness creation. Various trainings have been delivered to create
awareness on financial laws and regulations and administration, utilization and
management of government properties since the major source of mis-utilization of
government fund is due to lack of awareness on financial laws and regulations.
As the data from the interview shows, the major problem is lack of awareness from both
the civil servants and members of the „Caffee‟. Majority of interviewees argue that it is
mandatory to create awareness to bring about required attitudinal change towards the
utilization of public fund. Sometimes the mis-use of public fund is created knowingly or
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unknowingly. That is to mean, there is lack of capacity/awareness on what the law says.
Respondents thought that also there is no political commitment. Individuals who
embezzled public fund were even assigned to another better position despite the fact that
they utilize public fund for their personal interest. Therefore, we need to work first on
attitudinal change.
However, the survey data shows that there is a challenge in expanding audit service
coverage in terms of institutions and amount of budget audited. The informants claim that
there are various challenges to carry out its mandates; as a result it is always in arrears
with its audit reports to „Caffee‟. It has largely caught up with audit backlog. The major
challenges in this regard are the following:
 Lack of implementation of the findings of audit report;
 Lack of capacity and human resource which limits the coverage of audited
institutions;
 Weak control mechanism, particularly in the utilization of government
budget;
 Weak internal audit mechanism; internal auditors have no professional
independence, they are under the influence of their institutions to properly
discharge their duty‟
 Lack of professional guidance on the major construction projects; members
of the standing committee have no professional capacity to monitor and
evaluate the quality of projects under construction, some constructed
projects were nonexistent or under required quality;
 Lack of awareness among the leaders and performers;
In dealing with corruption cases uncovered through audit findings both the „Caffee‟ and
the Auditor General have no prosecutorial power, and they are obliged to refer the
corruption cases and other criminal cases relating to mis-use of public fund to Ethics and
Anti-corruption Commission or Regional Justice Bureau as the case may be. According to
the informants of this research there is a delay in those institutions that have the power to
investigate and prosecute such cases. There are no timely measures taken. Consequently,
the audit report findings were not implemented, because, „Caffee and the Office of the
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Auditor General rely on multiple agencies and channels for further action, including
Public Prosecution and investigation findings of Public prosecution Office and Police
Office.
In this particular case, majority of respondents express „Caffee‟ and its Standing
Committee as a „toothless dog which cannot beat”; because, they have no prosecutorial
power, so that it is up the Public Prosecution or Ethics and Anticorruption Commission to
decide on the cases as informants said. Informants recommend that Caffee should
continuously follow up its recommendations. Because the main gap in this regard is that
once the findings of the audit report is referred to the Prosecution or Ethics and
Anticorruption Commission, there is no continuous follow up for the implementation of
the findings of audit report.
In addition to field survey conducted analysis of the findings of the 2004 E.F.Y audit
report findings of the audit report in 2004 shows that the Regional Auditor General Office
audit coverage in terms of money was about 558,527,298.14 Eth birr. Out of this audited
money about 187,844,667.57 (34%) Eth birr was returned through administrative way and
the remaining 368, 230,194.89 (66%) Eth birr have not been returned, (The Regional
Auditor General audit Report,2004 E.C). From this data one can understand that how
government accountability is at stake. Therefore, it is imperative to work on this issue
with a view to realize accountability. The „Caffee‟ and concerned organs should work in
collaboration to curve this gap
According to interview conducted with key informants, the law states that those who
embezzle public fund have both administrative and criminal liability. However, the
practice shows that those individuals who return public money through administrative
procedure are not criminally charged. Informants claim that such individuals should have
to be liable criminally though they return the money they embezzled. Hence, the „Caffee‟
and the Auditor General, and other concerned body are expected to take corrective
measures in this regard through continuous follow up and supervision.
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4.8.4 Other Factors Affecting Oversight functions of „Caffee‟ Oromia
4.8.4.1 Factor Relating to Organizational Structure
As indicated in the review of literature parliaments are the indispensable institutions of
representative democracies around the world. They have a crucial role in monitoring and
reviewing the actions of the executive organ of the government through their oversight
functions. In discharging of this function, parliaments, particularly, parliaments in
developing countries are ineffective (Hudson, 2007:5). Various factors contribute for the
parliament‟s ineffective performance. One of the factors affecting oversight function of
the parliament is poor organizational structure. In this regard, an attempt was made to
asses factors affecting the oversight function of „Caffee‟ Oromia through data collection
instruments employed in this research.
As it is evident from the collected data, majority of respondents from the standing
committees, advisors and experts of the Office of the Speaker and the Secretariat of
„Caffee‟ 14(73.7%) replay that organizational structure of the Office is a major problem
affecting „Caffee‟s oversight function with a mean value of 3.21 in the scale of 1-5,
where 5 is strongly agree and 1 is strongly disagree (See Table 4.6). Respondents raise
various issues in relation to organizational structure of the Office of the Speaker and the
Secretariat of „Caffee‟ Oromia that the office‟s salary scale is not attractive so that there
is a staff turnover.
The data collected through interview also supports the above idea that organizational of
the Office is another factor affecting the oversight function of standing committees and
other „Caffee‟ members.
According to key informants the Office and its standing
Committee should be supported by advisors who have required capacity. Currently, since
the organizational structure of the Office is not attractive in terms salary, experts who
have required capacity may not stay for long. Moreover, the Office did not have a
research department which may help to conduct its oversight function with research and
professional guidance. Hence, the organizational structure of the Office should be
reexamined in a way that attracts capacitated professionals and the Office should have to
have a research department as a tool to make effective its oversight function.
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4.8.4.2 Lack of Resource
The survey data indicates that lack of resource is another critical factor affecting the
oversight functions of „Caffee‟ Oromia. From the data shown in Table 4.8 lack of
resource is the third major factor with a mean value of 2.79 next to lack of capacity of the
standing committees. Interviewee adds that lack of office is another observed problem
though there is an effort to solve the problem faced in this regard. The office have no its
own building until now since its establishment. It is in the rental building that delivers all
services for the last 19 and more years.
Moreover, lack of budget is a critical problem which exposes the office for the shortage
of human power. Therefore, this needs an urgent response from the government side in
order to capacitate the office with required resource both human and material. The
leadership of the office should work in collaboration with concerned organs to solve such
problems. As (Griffith, 2005) puts parliament alone cannot guarantee accountability
across the entire range of government activity.
4.8.4.3
Unavailability of Standing Committees on Regular basis on Committee
Works
Legislative engagement in oversight activities depends on the capacity of the legislature.
As Abellerera,E (n.d) states legislative capacity has at least three dimensions: the amount
of time legislatures spend on the job; the amount they compensated; and the size of the
legislature staff. Here, one can understand that the time legislature spends on their
oversight function has an impact on the effectiveness of oversight activity.
The survey data collected depicts that majority of the standing committee are not
performing their committee functions on regular basis. Majority of standing committee
members are called when there is an issue to be discussed. The researcher has tried to
assess reasons for the unavailability of all standing committee members. As one key
informant reply through an interview conducted, it is because of budget constraint that
only standing committee chairpersons are obliged to do their job on regular basis.
Proclamation No 153/2009 article 41 sub articles 4 provides that 3-5 members of the
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Standing Committees including the Chairpersons‟ are required to work regularly at the
Office of the Speaker and the Secretariat of the „Caffee‟.
Despite this legal provision, in reality it is only the chairperson of each Standing
Committee who is currently available at the office on regular basis. This shows that
majority of committee members are not working on regular basis. The „Caffee‟ being the
supreme organ of the region while approving necessary budget for other government
organs, it is in a critical problem as regards to its own case. From this we can understands
that unavailability of committee members at the office of the Speaker and the Secretariat
of „Caffee‟ is a critical problem that affects the committee‟s oversight activity.
Respondents thought that though the leadership of the Office is claiming for additional
budget there is response from the government. Much attention has not been given for the
Office from the executive organ in this regard. Therefore, the office of the Speaker and
the Secretariat of „Caffee‟ is expected to work to get necessary resources. The concerned
government organ on its part also should provide necessary resource to curve the
problem.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
5.1 Introduction
Under this chapter, conclusion and recommendations of the study will be dealt with.
While the conclusion was given based the whole discussion of the study, the
recommendation part was addressed based on the findings of the study.
5.2 Conclusion
It is generally accepted that the legislative body plays a primary role in democracies as it
gives a voice to the people through its elected representatives. The generic role of the
legislature is to represent the public, to make laws and to exercise oversight over the
organ of the government. Among other roles, oversight is one of the major roles of the
legislative through which the legislature make accountable the executive organs of
government. At this juncture, none of us would find fault if it is stated that oversight and
accountability lies at the very heart of democracy. It is obvious that true democracy
cannot be attained if these aspects are missing. The public who vote to have members
represent them in Parliament demand accountability of their governments through
vigilant oversight by the legislature.
In this particular case, it is clearly indicated in chapter one of the study that the main
objective of this study was that to evaluate the extent of the effectiveness of oversight
functions of the „Caffee‟ Oromia over the executive organ of the ONRS to ensure
constitutional accountability.
In this study, the researcher has tried to indicate how far a form of government and other
constitutional arrangements create variation in the tools utilized by parliaments to
exercise oversight function. The researcher has attempted to present the theoretical
underpinning to oversight and accountability in the democratic context before turning to
the current practices how „Caffee‟ Oromia conducts oversight and the extent of
accountability. Purpose of parliamentary oversight is also another point discussed in the
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study that it has multifaceted purposes. It helps the legislative body to watch over the
executive organ whether it executes the policies, strategies and laws in accordance with
the intended purposes. Mechanisms of oversight such as committee system, questions,
motions of agenda, state audit and state budget are another major points discussed in the
literature review part.
Factors against effective parliamentary oversight such as lack of knowledge and skill,
lack of resource, lack of training and poor infrastructure and quality of technical support
provided by parliamentary staff are among the factors against effective parliamentary
oversight.
When we come to the current practice in ONRS, „Caffee‟ is mandated to conducted
oversight over the government organ of the region. As per the terms of the region‟s
Constitution, „Caffee‟ is required to maintain oversight of the government organ of the
region as per article 49(3)(q). This article states that, „Caffee‟ is mandated to call and
question the president who is the head of the government and supreme leader of the
executive organ, and other regional officials; investigate performances of the regional
administrative council. Here, from the words of the Constitution, the need for oversight
has a constitutional ground with a view to make government acts and decisions
accountable.
Based on the above Constitutional provisions and other statutes mandating „Caffee‟ to
conduct oversight, an attempt has made to assess the tools currently utilized by „Caffee‟.
The findings of the study shows that the available tools of oversight are limited to
standing committee, performance report submitted by executive organs biannually to
„Caffee‟s general assembly, the Auditor General audit report, and suggestions and
information delivered to the individual members of „Caffee‟ by the electorate.
Literatures reveal that questions, interpellation and motions of agenda are other tools of
oversight. Utilizing various tools of oversight enables the parliament („Caffee‟ in Oromia
case) to initiate a discussion in the „Caffee‟s general assembly on issues of public interest.
The findings of the research shows that except the above mentioned tools questions,
interpellation and motions of agenda are not utilized as a tool of oversight. Even though
there are various issues to be addressed by concerned executive organ, there is more
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tendencies to wait for „Caffee‟s regular meeting unless in exceptional cases an
extraordinary meeting is called.
Assessment of the effectiveness of tools of oversight employed by „Caffee‟ Oromia was
another objective of this study. As the main tool of oversight available is the standing
committees, the primary concern was given to the effectiveness of such tool. From the
survey data it can be concluded that in their oversight function, the committees are not as
such effective. This is because, firstly, there is no deep investigation of acts and decisions
of executive organs. It is simply physical observation. Secondly, the Standing
Committees are not supported by professionals who have the required technical capacity,
particularly, in monitoring and evaluating construction projects under the jurisdiction of
the regional government.
The other gap identified in relation to effectiveness of the Standing Committees was that
the extent of partisanship within the committees charged with oversight function. The
findings f the research shows that the degree of partisanship is almost high. About 55% of
respondents agree that there is high degree of partisanship, thereby encouraging a more
collegial atmosphere for deliberation. Respondents thought that at committee level
personal interest is supreme and members of committee are oriented towards achieving
personal interest or parochial party interest instead of public interest. Furthermore, the
findings of this study shows that majority of the members of the standing committee were
from the executive organ and consequently, it is difficult to conduct genuine monitoring
and evaluation on the performance of the executive organ. This is because that there is a
fusion of power between the legislative organ and the executive organ.
Lack of commitment and awareness is another gap identified. Except some key members,
many of „Caffee‟ members lack awareness to work for the development of the institution
of „Caffee‟. Since the office has no research department, there is no opportunity in which
the standing committees are being supported by research based information.
The other tool of oversight available for „Caffee‟ is the audit report findings submitted by
the Regional Auditor Office. The Office is working closely with „Caffee‟ and its standing
Committees, particularly with Public Account Committee (PAC). The main problem in
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this regard is weak or no implementation of the findings of the audit report. Lack of
capacity and human resource which limits the coverage of audited institution is another
challenge. Weak control mechanism, particularly in the utilization of government budget,
weak internal audit mechanism was another major gaps identified by this thesis.
Especially, lack of professional independence of the internal auditors is the major
challenge which aggravates the problem.
Poor organizational structure was another challenge identified by this thesis. Many of the
respondents reply that the salary scale of the office of the Speaker and „Caffee‟ Oromia is
not attractive so that there is a continuous staff turnover. According to the findings of the
study experts with required capacity may not stay for long. In fact this needs further
investigation. Lack of capacity and necessary resource is another factor. Even though
there is an effort to capacitate members of standing committees through training, it needs
much to work on it.
With regard to lack of resource the office has no required staff and its own office. It has
no office of its own since its establishment. As a result, the Office encounters many
challenges even to effectetively discharges its overall duties. The survey data shows that
there is a problem in preserving some documents and to utilize IT infrastructures;
because they are moving here and there year after year for search of office facilities.
Moreover, respondents confirm that there is no sufficient office to handle the whole staff,
and consequently, majority of the staff thought that they are obliged to work in a small
room over crowdedly.
Unavailability of the standing committee members on regular basis in their office is
another critical factor which affects the „Caffee‟s oversight function. The problem in this
regard is lack of budget and necessary budget. As per article 41 sub article 4 of
Proclamation No153/2009 3-5 members of the Standing Committees are required to
perform on regular basis their committee works, However, because of lack of necessary
budget and shortage of office facility it was impossible to do so.
In general, it can be said that because of the above mentioned factors the Caffee‟ Oromia
is not conducting effective oversight on the executive organ of the region at required
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level. Consequently, the system of constitutional accountability that the parliamentary
oversight intends to bring is in question.
5.4 Recommendations
Based on the facts identified, the writer of this study would like to recommend the
following points.
1) Since one of the gap identified in the study is a limited use of tools of oversight,
the „Caffee‟ and its standing committee should use all available tools including
questions and motions of agenda to encourage more discussion and debate on
matters of public interest;
2) The members of „Caffee‟ and its standing committees charged with oversight
should be free of partisanship in order to encourage more debate on matters of
public interest. Moreover, parochial party interest should be avoided in order to
conduct genuine monitoring and evaluation of the executives acts and decisions to
defend public interest and ensure constitutional accountability;
3) One of the major problem in conducting effective parliamentary oversight is lack
of commitment from some „Caffee‟ members in general and its standing
committees in particular; High commitment should be developed in this regard;
„Caffee‟ members and its standing committees should work in full commitment;
they are expected towards working for public interest.
4) Lack of capacity is another critical challenge identified by this study; as indicated
above the findings of the study clearly indicates that majority of the oversight
function of „Caffee‟ was not supported by research and capacitated professionals.
Hence, the Office of the Speaker and the Secretariat of „Caffee‟ should work on
capacity building activities. While working on capacity building activities of
„Caffee‟ members and its standing committee, considerations should be given,
primarily, to the Office; because elected members of „Caffee‟ were changed every
five year except few returning members. In order to enable the Office to support
„Caffee‟ members and its standing committees on continuous basis the Office
should be strengthen both in human and material resources;
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5) The Office of the Regional Auditor General should be supported with required
human resource hiring capacitated experts to support „Caffee‟ and its standing
committee in its oversight function;
6) Internal auditors should be professionally independent to monitor and evaluate the
internal utilization of government fund and property before things become worse;
Hence, more attention should be given to preventing misuse of government
resource;
7) The „Caffee‟ and its standing committees should undertake continuous follow-up
and monitoring to check whether their recommendations and the findings of the
audit report is implemented by concerned organs and it should work with other
concerned organs such as Ethics and Anticorruption Commission and Justice
Bureau for the implementation of its recommendation in case where some
corruption cases are identified;
8) The Office of the Speaker and the Secretariat of „Caffee‟ should be provided with
necessary budget and office facility to curve problems in this regard; The Office
has to identify its budget needs and should submit it to the concerned organ;
9) The standing committees should work on regular basis with a view to discharge
their oversight function accorded to them by law;
10) The leadership of the office should work continuously on the development of the
institution;
11) Since one of the problems identified was poor organizational structure,
particularly, in terms of the scale of salary, which results in unattractiveness of the
office‟s structure, further investigation should be made in this regard.
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BIBILIOGRAPHY
1. List of Books and Articles
Abellera, E. Explaining legislative oversight in Philippines Sub national Governments:
Institutional Impediments in Good governance Governments.
Awel. A, 2011, Parliamentary Oversight and Its Role in Ensuring Constitutionalism and
Accountability
Under the FDRE Constitution, Unpublished, Faculty of
Law,AAU.
Ameller, M. (1996) Parliaments, A Comparative Study on the Structure and Functioning
of Representative Institutions in Fifty Five Countries; Asserting Parliament‟s
Oversight Role in Enhancing Democracy, Oversight and accountability
Model, The Parliament of the Republic of South Africa.
Aucoin, P. and R. Heintzman. (2000),The Dialectics of accountability for performance in
Public Management Reform., International Review of Administrative Sciences.
Argyris, C. & D. Schon, (1978), Organizational Learning; A Theory of Action
Perspective, Reading Mass; Addison Wesley.
Burns
and
Grove
S.K,
(1999), Understanding
Nursing
Research,(2ndEd).
Philadelphia: Saunders.
Braithwaite,J. (1997), „On Speaking Softly and Carrying Big Sticks: Neglected
Dimensions of a Republican
Separation of Powers‟, University of Toronto Law
Journal.
Behn, R. D. (2001), Rethinking Democratic Accountability, Washington,D.C.:
Brookings Institution Press.
C.R. Kothari, (2004), Research Methodology: Methods And Techniques, (2nd ed) .
Cole, M. (1985).“Accountability and Quasi-Government: The Role of Parliamentary
Questions.”Journal of Legislative Studies.
David Alter, From Parliamentary Control to Accountable Government; The Role of
Public Committee Hearings
Science vol.61
Issue 1.
in the Swedish Riksdag; Oxford Journal of Social
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Elsa, M, (2013), Role of Parliamentary Oversight in Ensuring Good Governance, ECSU
Library, Unpublished, Addis Ababa.
Fisher,
Elizabeth,
(2004),„The European Union in the Age of Accountability‟, Oxford
Journal of Legal Studies.
Friedberg,C and Hazan ,(2012)
“Parliaments in Changing Times”, Strengthening
Legislative Oversight in
Parliamentary Oversight, A Paper presented on
Inaugural General Conference of the ECPR Standing Group on Parliaments, The
Houses of the Oireachtas, Dublin, Ireland;
Ghutto S et al. (2007) Study commissioned by Parliament, A study on enhancing the
status, role, image And positioning of the Parliament of the Republic of South
Africa.
G. Power and A. Brazier,(1961), “Making Government Accountable”, Parliamentary
Affairs.
George, B.Gallovlary, The Legislative Process in Congress.
Israel, Glenn D. 1992. Sampling The Evidence Of Extension Program Impact, Program
Evaluation and Organizational Development, IFAS, University of Florida, PEOD6. November‟
Inter Parliamentary Union, Parliaments of their World: A Comparative Reference
Compendium (1986).
John K.Johnson and Robert T. Nakamura, (1999), Legislatures and Good Governance,
UNDP.
MR. Zovoma, (2010) A. International Conference of Inter-Parliamentary Union,
Conference held on the
Challenges Parliamentary Committees face in
Exercising Oversight function on the executive, Geneva.
Olson, D.M., Pelizzo, R. and Stapenhurst, R.,(2004).“Introduction.” In: Olson, D.M.,
Pelizzo, R. and Stapenhurst, R. (eds.) Trends in Parliamentary Oversight.
Washington, DC: World Bank Institute.
Oversight and accountability Model, Paper prepared on Asserting Parliament‟s Oversight
Role in Enhancing Democracy, The Parliament of the Republic of South Africa.
www.abyssinialaw.com
Przeworski, A., S. C. Stokes, and B. Manin(ed.), (1999), Democracy, Accountability, and
Representation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Robert, H.M. (1976). Robert‟s Rules of Order. Cutchogue, NY: Buccaneer Books
Stanphurt. R and Alandu. M, (n.d), The Accountability Function of the Parliament of
Ghana.
2. Internet Sources
Bartholomew.C.Paul, Checks and Balance, University of Notre Dame,[available at:
http://teacherscolasticnews last accessed on 7, April, 2013].General Profile of the
Oromiya
National
Regional
State
(2008),
Bureau
of
Finance
and Economic Development, ONRS,[available at: http://www.pcdp.gov.et/].
Desposato, Scott W. 2004. Explaining Patterns of Oversight in Brazilian Subnational Governments. In Pelizzo,R. Stapenhurst, R., and David Olson, Trends in
Parliamentary Oversight, World Bank Institute.[ available at http: //siteresources.
worldbank.org: Accessed in April 7, 2013.
DFID. 2007. Governance, Development and Democratic Politics: DFID„s Work
in Building More Effective States. [Available at: http://www.initiativefor peacebu
ilding.eu
Hon. NT Godi, The State of Oversight in Parliament and Provincial or Regional
Legislatures: Quality, capacity, Drivers, and Hinderances, Including Issues Pertai
ning to Public Finance, (available at: http://www.sals.gov.(Last Accessed on
April, 19, 2013) Free Encyclopedia, available at:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/, last
accessed on 8, April, 2013.
McGrath, J. (2011), Strategic Oversight and the Institutional Determinants of Legislative
policy Control, Doctoral Dissertation, University of Iowa, [available at:
http//ir,uiowa/etd. Last accessed on 9, April 2013]
www.abyssinialaw.com
3.
List of Laws
The 1995 FDRE Constitution, Addis Ababa;
The 2001 and 2005 Revised Constitution of Oromia National Regional State, Finfinne;
Proclamation No153/2009, A Proclamation to Define the Organization, Duties, Conducts
and Meeting Procedures of Caffee Members;
Regulation No 3/2009, A Regulation to Define the Organization, and Determining the
Meeting Procedure of “Caffee‟ Members;
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Appendices
Appendices I
Ethiopian Civil Service University
Institute of Leadership and Good Governance
Research
Topic
“Parliamentary
Oversight
and
Its
Role
in
Ensuring
Constitutional Accountability: The Case of the ‘Caffee’Oromia
A
Survey
Questionnaire
(for
standing
Committees
and
Advisors
of
‘Caffee’Oromia)
This is a questionnaire prepared to collect firsthand information to conduct a senior thesis
on the title entitled “Parliamentary Oversight and Its Role in Ensuring Constitutional
Accountability: The Case of „Caffee‟Oromia” for the partial fulfillment of Masters
degree in Leadership and Good Governance” at Ethiopian Civil Service University,
Institute of Leadership and Good Governance. The purpose of the study is to explore
your opinion on the role „Caffee‟Oromia play in ensuring constitutional accountability
and factors affecting the Oversight power and duties of such institution comparing it with
some national and international standards. Hence, I kindly request you to participate in
the study and share your experience. Your participation contribute high for the success of
my study on one hand; and helps an input for the effectiveness of the Oversight functions
of „Caffee‟Oromia on the other hand.
Once again, I want to assure you in advance that the information you put will be kept
confidential. All your opinion would be anonymous if you want and be sure that it cannot
be traced back to you in any way. I want to express my heartfelt gratitude for your
willingness to in filling this questionnaire. Please, use “X” filling the box
Thank you in advance for your cooperation; sincerely!!
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PART I
1. PERSONAL INFORMATION
1.1.
Age: A. Less than 20 years
B. 20-30
C. 31-40
More
than 40
1.2.
Sex:
A. Male
B Female
1.3.
Educational background A. Diploma
C. Degree Masters
D.
Above
1.4.
Year of Service in the institution
A. Less than one year
B. 1 -5 years
C. 5-10 Years
D. More than
C. Process owner
D. Head of
10 Years
1.5.
Your Title in the Institution
A. Expert
B. Senior Expert
Office/Committee
PART TWO
2. GENERAL INFORMATION
2.1.
How do you explain the legislative-executive relationship to make effective the
Oversight function of „Caffee‟Oromia?
2.2.
What tools of oversight are available currently for the „Caffee‟Oromia?
A. Established Standing Committees
B. Conducting ad-hoc committees
C. Plenary Session
D. Audit Institutions
E. Ethics and Anticorruption Institution
F. Ombudsperson Institution
G. Other tools, (if any)
2.3.
How do you evaluate the effectiveness of the above tools?
A. Very high
B. High
C. moderate
D. Low
Very low
2.4. Is the standing committees of „Caffee‟ are finding out corrupt practices and other mal
administrations in their Oversight activities over the executive organ?
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A. Strongly agree
B. Agree
C. Moderately
D. Disagree
E. Strongly Disagree
2.5. What measures do the standing committees take when they get incidents of corruption
and mal administration?
2.6. Do the standing committees conduct regular meeting?
Yes
No
2.7. If your response for question number 2.6 is “YES” how often they meet?
Weekly
Monthly
Quarterly
Every six months
2.8. Is there any parliamentary research service? YES
2.9.
Not at all
NO
If your response is “yes” for question number “2.8” do „Caffee‟ and its staffs use the
research service to assist them in their oversight? YES
NO
2.10. What factors (legal, economic, institutional, political and/or others) do you think that
affects the Oversight functions of the „Caffee‟Oromia? (Rate the level of each problem)
Category of Factors
5
4
3
2
1
Strongly
Agree
Moderately
Disagree
Strongly
agree
A.
Institutional
problems
relating
(Organizational structure
B.
Lack of capacity of „Caffee‟ members
and its standing committees
C.
D.
Lack clear legal framework
E.
Lack of access to information
F.
Lack of Resource
agree
disagrees
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2.11. Please would elaborate by putting some indicators for each of your response under
question
number “2.10”?
2.11.1 Problems relating to Organizational structure
2.11.2 Problems relating to Lack of capacity of „Caffee‟members and its standing
committee
2.11.3 Problems relating to Lack clear legal framework
2.11.4 Problems relating to Lack of access to information to the members of
„Caffee‟members and its standing Committees
2.11.5 Problems relating to Lack of resource (both human and material)
2.11.6 Other problems (if any)
2.12
What is your recommendation to curve the above problems and to make effective
the Oversight function of „Caffee‟Oromia?
2.13
Any additional comments
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Appendices II
Ethiopian Civil Service University
Institute of Leadership and Good Governance
Research
Topic
“Parliamentary
Oversight
and
Its
Role
in
Ensuring
Constitutional Accountability: The Case of the ‘Caffee’Oromia
A Survey Questionnaire ( for Executive organs)
This is a questionnaire prepared to collect firsthand information to conduct a senior thesis
on the title entitled “Parliamentary Oversight and Its Role in Ensuring Constitutional
Accountability: The Case of „Caffee‟Oromia” for the partial fulfillment of Masters
degree in Leadership and Good Governance” at Ethiopian Civil Service University,
Institute of Leadership and Good Governance. The purpose of the study is to explore
your opinion on the role „Caffee‟Oromia play in ensuring constitutional accountability
and factors affecting the Oversight power and duties of such institution comparing it with
some national and international standards. Hence, I kindly request you to participate in
the study and share your experience. Your participation contribute high for the success of
my study on one hand; and helps an input for the effectiveness of the Oversight functions
of „Caffee‟Oromia on the other hand.
Once again, I want to assure you in advance that the information you put will be kept
confidential. All your opinion would be anonymous if you want and be sure that it cannot
be traced back to you in any way. I want to express my heartfelt gratitude for your
willingness to in filling this questionnaire. Please, use “X” to fill the box
Thank you in advance for your cooperation; sincerely!!
PART I
1. PERSONAL INFORMATION
1.1. Age: A. Less than 20 years
B. 20-30
C. 31-40
More
than 40
1.2 Sex:
A. Male
B Female
1.3 Educational background A. Diploma
1.4 Year of Service in the institution
C. Degree Masters
D. Above
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A. Less than one year
B. 1 -5 years
C. 5-10 Years
D. More
than 10 Years
1.5 Your Title in the Institution
A. Expert
B. Senior Expert
C. Process owner
D. Head of
Office/Institution
PART II
2 GENERRAL INFORMATION
2.1. How do you explain the legislative-executive relationship to make effective the
Oversight function of „Caffee‟Oromia?
2.2 Do you know that „Caffee‟Oromia have the power and duty to oversight your
organization‟s plan, implementation and other administrative decisions?
Yes
No
2.3 Are the executive organs are interested in the process of Oversight while „Caffee‟
Oromia is conducting Oversight over the executive organ?
A. Strongly agree
B Agree
C. Moderately
D. Disagree
Strongly Disagree
2.4 How do you evaluate the Oversight functions of „Caffee‟in assisting constitutional
accountability in executive organ?
A. Very high
B. High
C. moderate
D. Low
Very low
2.5 Do you think that the Oversight functions of „Caffee‟Oromia over the executive
organ of the region is important in indicating errors that will occur in such organs?
A. Strongly agree
B Agree
C. Moderately
D. Disagree
E. Strongly Disagree
2.6 How do you rate the extent of accountability in your institution?
A.
Very high
B. High
C. moderate
D. Low
Very low
2.7. If your response for question 2.6 is very high and high, is it as a result of the
oversight conducted over the executives?
A. Strongly agree
Disagree
B. Agree
C. Moderately
D. Disagree
E. Strongly
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2.8. Is the standing committees of „Caffee‟are finding out corrupt practices and other
mal administrations in their Oversight activities over the executive organ?
B. Strongly agree
B. Agree
C. Moderately
D. Disagree
E. Strongly Disagree
2.9. Do you remember some instances that executive heads and other civil servants
questioned by the „Caffee‟Oromia based on the recommendations and suggestions
forwarded by „Caffee‟Oromia and its standing committees?
YES.
2.10.
NO
If your response for “Question 2.9” is “YES” what measure were taken?
A. Suspension from position
B. Demotion
C. Sentencing
D. Warning
E. Other
F. No corrective action is taken
2.11.
How do you explain the role of the Oversight functions of „Caffee‟Oromia in
ensuring constitutional accountability in relation to your respective institution?
2.12. What factors (legal, economic, institutional, political and/or others) do you think
that affects the Oversight functions of the „Caffee‟Oromia? (Rate the level of each
problem)
Category of Factors
1
Institutional problems relating
(Organizational structure
2
Lack of capacity of „Caffee‟ and its
standing committees
3
Lack clear legal framework
4
Lack of access to information
5
Lack of Resource
5
4
3
2
1
Strongly
agree
Agree
Moderately
agree
Disagree
Strongly
disagrees
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2.13 Please would you elaborate by putting some indicators relating to each of the
problems indicated in your response under question number “2.12”?
2.13.1 Problems relating to Organizational structure
2.13.2 Problems relating to Lack of capacity of „Caffee‟ and its standing committees
2.13.3 Problems relating to Lack clear legal framework
2.13.4 Problems relating to Lack of access to information to the members of
„Caffee‟members and its standing Committees
2.13.5 Problems relating to Lack of resource
2.13.6 Other problems
2.14 What is your recommendation to curve the above problems and to make effective
the Oversight function of „Caffee‟Oromia?
2.15 Any additional comments
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Appendices III
Interview Guiding Questions for the Hon. Speaker and Vice Speaker of ‘Caffee’
Oromia
1. How do you explain the legislative-executive relationship in general and in
Oromia region in particular?
2. It is obvious that one of the major power and duty of „Caffee‟is conducting
Oversight functions over the executive organ of the region. Do you believe that
such function is important in ensuring constitutional accountability? If your
response is “YES” how?
3. What is your opinion on the relationship between the Office of „Caffee‟Oromia
and the executive organ of the region? Are they supportive in the „„Caffee‟‟s
Oversight functions?
4. What mechanisms do you employ in conducting oversight?
5. Do you think that „Caffee‟Oromia is effective in its Oversight function? If not
what are the major challenges?
6. What do you recommend to curve such challenges?
7. Do you use auditor reports and Ethics and Anticorruption institutions in
conducting oversight? If so, is there any corrective measures taken based on the
reports? Please elaborate.
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Appendices V
Interview Guiding Questions for the Regional Office of Auditor General and
Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Heads of the Region
1. How do explain your institution‟s relation with „Caffee‟Oromia?
2. How do you support „Caffee‟Oromia in conducting its Oversight role over the
executive organ?
3. What is your opinion on „„Caffee‟‟‟s Oversight role in ensuring constitutional
accountability, particularly in the utilization of budget in relation to your
institution‟s power and duty?
4. What is the role of Public Account and budget Standing Committee in
ensuring financial accountability?