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Table of Contents
Welcome Note from the Executive Board
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Executive Board Biographies
4
Introduction to the Committee
5
Mandate of the Committee
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Topic A: Safeguards and Prevention Against the Utilization of Biological Weaponry
Topic B: Management of Nuclear Waste Material
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Position Paper Requirements
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Bibliography
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Welcome Note from the Executive Board
Dear delegates,
It is a pleasure to welcome you to NTUMUN 2017 as part of the Disarmament and
International Security Committee. As one of the six Main Committees of the UN General Assembly,
it is a primary organ of the UN dealing with global challenges to the international security agenda
and disarmament policies, with a focus on arms control and the update and positioning of existing
key international treaties such as the Biological weapons convention, or the Nuclear nonproliferation Treaty including issues relating to membership, international security architecture
counterterrorism.
In this simulation of the committee we will explore topics that touch on a wide range of
issues that extend far beyond the security frameworks of individual member states; these are
complex issues that often touch on both economic, humanitarian and security aspects of a
challenge. Thus, do approach these topics with regard to the wider significance and impact that
your solutions may pose. In this iteration, we will ponder important questions relating to the UN’s
efforts in systemising nuclear management frameworks and the monitoring and prohibition of
biological weapons, as well as the efforts of member states in facilitating collective action in
furthering these efforts.
Thus as you get involved in your substantive preparation for DISEC, do remember that your
study guides are meant to be your guide to understanding the preliminaries of the issues we are
debating.The real pillars in your understanding and argumentation of the issues at hand and must
inarguably stem from actual committee debate, for which we hope that everyone of you shows
enthusiasm for. These are real-world issues, and your arguments and solutions must display a
level of respect for the very real concerns of those you are taking the podium for. Please get as
involved and as excited as possible and please don’t hesitate to contact us if you have questions.
We are all looking forward to meeting you all!
Regards,
The Dias
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Executive Board Biographies
Head Chairperson
Divya is a third year student at the National University of Singapore reading Economics
with a second major in Political Science. Having been part of the MUN circuit since 2009, this
conference will mark her 29th MUN conference and 10th time as chair. Divya has served as the
Under Secretary General for Singapore Model United Nations 2016 and has represented the
National University of Singapore as Head Delegate at World Model United Nations 2016, winning
Best Delegate. She is particularly interested in areas of foreign policy and security and is always
up for a good debate.
In her free time, Divya loves a good read and and has a weakness for good films- she
particularly enjoys the works of Ayn Rand, her favourite author.
She may be contacted at [email protected].
Assistant Chairpersons
Gautam is currently serving National Service as a mechanic/storeman. A fun loving
individual Gautam has taken part in several Model United Nation conferences as a delegate,
chairperson and member of secretariat since his start in 2013. As a chair he looks forward to
productive and interesting debate which would allow all the delegates to have a fruitful experience.
In his free time, Gautam spends his time doing varied activities which include but are not limited to
computer gaming, videography/photography, watching anime and model kit building.
He may be contacted at [email protected].
Timothy is currently a Year 5 student at Hwa Chong Institution. Timothy is a long-time
Model United Nations participant and has attended more than 15 conferences since he started in
2013, bagging some awards throughout his journey. Having attended conferences in the capacities
of a delegate, chair and secretariat member, he served as Deputy Secretary General of The Hague
International Model United Nations Singapore in 2015. He also currently serves as Director
(Academics) at YNC-APMUN 2017. Besides MUN, Timothy attempts surviving the school week,
binge watches Greys Anatomy and plays tennis.
He may be contacted at [email protected].
Sean is 19 years old this year, and currently unraveling one of the great mysteries of life
called National Service. From being a trained guard, sentry, soldier, cleaner -especially cleaning
the floor and bunks- to reading and keeping abreast with all the latest developments in the
diplomatic, scientific and political spheres; cues “WRONG”, he cannot wait to see what else life has
in store for him. Playful and and full of excuses, he cannot wait to hear the intellectual discourse
about pertinent issues from young and youthful individuals like him.
He may be contacted at [email protected].
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Introduction to the Committee
The Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) is also known as the First
General Assembly (GA) committee. Along with five other GA committees, DISEC was conceived
along with the formation of the United Nations (UN) in 1945, as part of the Allied forces’ post-WWII
peace restoration plan. In essence, the issues that are discussed in DISEC pertains to
“disarmament, global challenges, and threats to peace that affect the international community and
seeks out solutions to the challenges in the international security regime
Over the past 71 years that DISEC was in operation, multiple reviews have been made to
change the agenda of the GA and to further improve the institution and its functioning mechanisms.
A particular notable addition that historically changed the mandate of the committee occurred in
1950, where Resolution A/RES/377 A, the “Uniting for Peace Resolution” was adopted. The
passing of this resolution changed the GA from one that was generally lacking in enforcement
powers with respect to most issues to one that could act to implement measures to maintain peace
when the UN Security Council fails to resolve issues.
Mandate of the Committee
As one of the six Main Committees of the UN General Assembly, The Disarmament and
International Security Committee (DISEC) is a primary organ of the UN dealing with is promoting
and enforcing the principles of disarmament and the non-proliferation of weapons in the
international community. Its mandate enforces the primary function of the United Nations in
ensuring security, minimising conflict, preventing escalation, and promoting peace and stability.
DISEC is also only Committee of the UN entitled to verbatim records coverage, pursuant to Rule
58(a) of the Rules of the General Assembly.
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Topic A: Safeguards and Prevention Against the
Utilization of Biological Weaponry
Statement of Problem
The question of preventing the utilization, development or procurement of biological
weapons has never been more urgent than the present. Developing conflicts in the Middle East,
especially in areas with as yet undetected stockpiles, coupled with increasing ease of access to
biotechnologies and reduced barriers to entry have all pushed this matter into a vital part of global
security discourses.
For the sake of clarity of discussion, it is essential that a universal definition of biological
weapons is established. The Biological Weapons Convention( to be discussed in greater detail in
part (d)) serves as the overarching legal framework for the discourse around biological weaponry.
The Convention defines such weapons to be complex systems that disseminate disease-causing
organisms or toxins to harm or kill humans, animals or plants.
The current view of bioweaponry, has, ironically also set the conditions for its proliferation.
The existing international narrative emphasizes the “effectiveness” of bioweaponry on the
battlefront, from ease of orchestrating mass civilian deaths to the repeated focus on the ease of
attaining and developing a tenable bioweapons program. Bioweapons program lack the stiff,
prohibitive technical and logistical challenges present in the field of nuclear weapons. Nuclear
weapons require the use of fissile technology, with limited civilian access and easily traceable
footprints of procurement and logistical flows, whereas bioweapons development programs draw
on matter readily available to the masses, with little ability to trace or regulate logistical flows. Thus,
this fundamental difference throws into flux our current international security framework that
predominantly conflates nuclear and bioweapons defense program structures.
In the era of modernization and globalization, the world enjoys an unprecedented access to
information and communication. Recent advances in biotechnology have served to rapidly lower
the technological threshold and reducing the difficulties surrounding weaponization and dispersion
of lethal bioagents. These are often consequences of unintended trends - from public
documentation of bioresearch on widely available academic journals to the ease of replicating
these discoveries through the relative ease of setting up bioresearch facilities. Recent
advancements such as MITs “BioBricks” projects, whist intended to function as a “library of
biological parts to develop synthetic biological symtoms” have also raised fears about the ease of
weaponizing this research in developing new, untreatable illnesses. In addition, recent epidemic
outbreaks such as Ebola have also posed questions about bio weaponization, since the ease of
procuring viruses, as well as the knowledge of handling and dispersing viral agents have been
brought to the mainstream consciousness.
History and Discussion of problem
At the turn of the 21st Century, the world encountered its first bio attack in the globalized
age in the form of the Anthrax Attacks of October 2011 in the United States. The attacks were
carried out on the backdrop of the September 11 World Trade Centre Bombings, and served to
drive the new reality of bioweapons attacks: those perpetuated by terror organizations and nonstate actors, often within no reach regulatory oversight or intelligence networks. Anthrax refers to
an infectious disease caused by exposure to spores of the bacterium Bacillus Anthracis. This
bacteria is highly resistant to inactivation and medication, and is readily available in nature. The
2001 incident involved the use of highly refined anthrax agents that were dispersed across the
United States through postal delivery systems, masked in the form of letters. This form of attack, at
the time, raised important questions. It first brought to light the ease with which deadly bioagents
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like B. Anthracis could be developed and refined, being able to be found readily in nature.
Government agencies, not for the first time, were deeply aware of the impossibility in tracking down
a perpetrator, with the United States’ FBI investigation failing to reach an adequate threshold of
proof against a single perpetuator at the end of a decades-long investigation. The Anthrax attacks
also had a profound impact in pushing the terror of bioweapons into the global consciousness- its
reliance on globally connected postal delivery systems made every country a possible target,
instilling the deep awareness of vulnerability enabled by exposure to globalized networks.
The Anthrax attacks of 2001 were the most recent iteration of its use, but its status as a
potential bioweapon was compounded through its use across history. Bioweapons are not unique
to modern warfare, or our conceptions of futuristic battlegrounds. History is littered with instances
of the use of biological weapons to perpetuate massive, heinous crimes against civilizations and
humanity. The Imperial Japanese Army’s indiscriminate use of bioweapons is still etched in the
historical memories of the East Asian experiences of World War II. The Japanese developed an
extensive program for Weapons of Mass Destruction, amongst them was Unit 731, a research and
development unit that was responsible for heinous human experimentation for bioweapons delivery
systems that drove the Japanese biological warfare efforts. The Japanese employed aerial military
spraying to diffuse the bubonic plague amongst the chinese populace to cripple the resistance
efforts and further entrench Japanese strategic military goals. The Japanese also employed the
use of lethal bioweapons such as anthrax to destroy crop cultivation and force massive
populations to starvation as part of their strategy to consolidate surrender by eroding the will of
resistance.
Past UN and International Action
The international legal architecture for bioweapons is rooted in two main documents: the
Biological Weapons Convention and the Geneva Protocol of 1925.
The Biological Weapons Convention(BWC in short, but also known as the Convention on
the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and
Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction) entered into force in 1975, and was the first multilateral
treaty addressing biological warfare. As of 4th November 2016, 177 states have ratified the treaty.
The Convention, broadly, is predominantly preoccupied with establishing the moral argument for
banning biological warfare as a tool of war, and sets about through its various clauses, a binding
and persuasive moral framework for states to abide by, and in so doing, establishing that projects
of biological warfare shall be terms of exclusion from the international community of states. Below
are crucial, key clauses from the treaty:
(Article I.3) The Conference reaffirms that the use by the States Parties, in any way and
under any circumstances of microbial or other biological agents or toxins, that is not consistent with
prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes, is effectively a violation of Article I. The
Conference reaffirms the undertaking in Article I never in any circumstances to develop, produce,
stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain weapons, equipment, or means of delivery designed to use
such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict in order to exclude completely and
forever the possibility of their use. The Conference affirms the determination of States Parties to
condemn any use of biological agents or toxins other than for peaceful purposes, by anyone at any
time.
(Article IV.1c) ensure the safety and security of microbial or other biological agents or toxins
in laboratories, facilities, and during transportation, to prevent unauthorized access to and removal
of such agents or toxins.
(Article VI.29) The Conference invites the Security Council:
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a. to consider immediately any complaint lodged under this Article and to initiate any
measures it considers necessary for the investigation of the complaint in
accordance with the Charter;
b. to request, if it deems necessary and in accordance with its Resolution 620 of 1988,
the United Nations Secretary-General to investigate the allegation of use, using the
technical guidelines and procedures contained in Annex I of United Nations
Document A/44/561;
c. to inform each State Party of the results of any investigation initiated under this
Article and to consider promptly any appropriate further action which may be
necessary.
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases,
and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, or the Geneva Protocol in short, is a treaty prohibiting
the use of biological or chemical weapons in warfare. In the aftermath of WWI, where the
widespread use of dangerous chemical agents such as chlorine gas lead to vast civilian casualties
and suffering, the idea of banning the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons was proposed
and first codified into customary international law through this protocol.
Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous
liquids, materials or devices, has been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized
world; and
Whereas the prohibition of such use has been declared in Treaties to which the majority of
Powers of the World are Parties; and
To the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of International Law, binding
alike the conscience and the practice of nations;
That the High Contracting Parties, so far as they are not already Parties to Treaties
prohibiting such use, accept this prohibition, agree to extend this prohibition to the use of
bacteriological methods of warfare and agree to be bound as between themselves according to the
terms of this declaration.
Major Stakeholders
Countries with previous history of bioweapons development programs
History is inundated with examples of biological warfare employed, however, for the sake of
clarity, this section will address countries with a recent histories of bioweapons programs, from the
times of WWI and onwards. The Allied forces, under Churchill, would weaponize mass stocks of
anthrax, brucellosis and botulism, though never used. Japan, as discussed above, had an
extensive bioweapons program during WWII. The Cold War era also saw considerable research
and effort dedicated by the US, UK and USSR into further weaponization of biological agents and
bio weapons delivery systems. However, the conclusion of the Cold War brought a renewed focus
towards a strengthened rights discourse, and many of these states would go on to be enthusiastic
supporters of global frameworks to prohibit the use of bioweaponry.
Countries that have yet accede of fully satisfy the requirements of key treaties.
The Biological Weapons Convention is regarded as a key pillar of the structural framework of
international law. In the disciplines of international relations and diplomacy, it served two very
crucial purposes. Firstly, it poses as a litmus test of sorts for the international community to assess
if states, especially newer states, fledgeling democracies or just-won authoritarian states, have
fully absorbed and acceded to the norms of the international community. Hence, for many, the
convention presents itself as a crucial precondition for welcome to the international community of
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states by indicating that a country has agreed to abide by international rules and norms. 13 states,
including Chad, Israel, Djibouti and South Sudan, have not ratified, nor signed the treaty, whilst
states like Egypt, Syria and Somalia have signed but not ratified the treaty. These pose worrying
questions, especially in light of the fact that most of these states exist in close proximity to conflict
areas or have shown histories of unrest and war. These states continue to operate in a grey area
where international laws protecting their civilians from harm of biological warfare have little legal
strength.
For many of these countries however, accession or ratification requires immense political
will and considerable resources that must be drawn away from more pressing developmental
agendas. Thus,as articulated by states like Djibouti and South Sudan, the Convention features on
its list of international priorities and obligations, but constraints around its development budget and
lack of expertise hamper movements forward, whilst the lack of a vibrant civil society to push the
issue of biological warfare onto the national political agenda further compounds this.
There of course, also is the question of states like Israel, whose non-ratification of the
Convention is part of a wider doctrine of ambiguity towards international policies for
nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As some states continue to view Israel’s nonratification to be born out of political expediency, these perceptions, regardless of truth, cast doubt
on the strength of the international framework, and act to incentivize non-accession. Whilst Israel’s
offensive capabilities, if any, are unknown, ratification of the convention is the sole path to ensuring
complete, reliable information- without which, misinformation and mistrust further add to the
region’s security dilemma- exacerbating regional instability.
Questions a Resolution Must Answer (QARMA)
• How can outdated international legislation and interpretive frameworks match the pace of
rapid scientific developments?
• How can the international community identify at-risk research areas for weaponization?
• How can mandatory access and the regulation of national facilities be addressed? Are these
desirable outcomes?
• How can regulatory oversight over the scientific community be extended?
• Have we achieved primary prevention through establishing strong norms for rejecting
biological weapons?
• How can early detection systems and prompt treatment be extended universally?
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Topic B: Management of Nuclear Waste Material
Statement of Problem
As nuclear energy continues to remain a crucial pillar of the world’s energy sources, the
growing dependence on nuclear technology has raised concerns about the management of nuclear
waste. Radioactive material has widespread applications in industrial development- from medical
uses to agriculture and indeed power plants. This poses several concerns to global security.
As states increasingly look towards nuclear technology as viable source to spearhead
industrial development, an acceptable international structural framework is needed to handle the
question of countries with different capabilities and resources. The reasons for this are two-fold.
Firstly, it remains the duty of the international community to prevent disasters similar to
Chernobyl and Fukushima(to be discussed in deeper detail in section 2). Newer, less equipped
states chasing the nuclear goal must possess federal programs that reflect a strong, standardized
international framework. This is especially important in light of the widespread applicability of
radioactive materials in industries like healthcare and agriculture( wholly independent of nuclear
energy programs). Thus, it is a matter of ensuring civilian safety in states with nuclear-associated
industries.
Secondly, the management of nuclear waste material is vital in light of the modern global
security landscape. As terrorism continues to pose a global threat to state safety, the nuclear terror
threat is now at the deepest fears of the international community. A secure, transparent process of
international nuclear waste management is crucial in ensuring that the nuclear chain, at any point,
does not become susceptible to theft. Terror analysts have long spoken about the fears of a “dirty
bomb” being released into metropolitan areas, endangering massive civilian life and threatening
the stability of our cities.
There are different types of nuclear waste, as outlined below.
Low-level waste( LLW): This level of waste accounts for 90% of all nuclear waste generated
but only 1% of its radioactivity. It is generated from medical and industrial applications, as well as
the nuclear fuel cycle, it includes materials like paper, tooks and clothing that contain small
amounts of short-lived radioactivity. Hence, at this level, shielding when handling and transporting
is not required. It is thus eligible for shallow land burial.
Intermediate-level waste( ILW) : Waste at this level is generally generated from reactors
and industries, and consists of fuel cladding, chemical sludge and contaminated materials from
nuclear reactor decommissioning and handling. As its radioactive decay generates little heat, heatmitigating conditions need not be equipped in storage and disposal facilities.
High-level Waste: HLW accounts for 90% of all radioactive waste, with both short and longlived components. HLW is generated from the burning of uranium fuel in a nuclear reactor and
consists of fission products generated at the reactor core. Thus, it requires cooling and shielding as
it is highly radioactive and hot due to decay.
The nuclear industry as a whole has managed to pursue an effective waste generation
policy, with the nuclear energy industry generating, comparatively, the least amount of waste in
relation to industries like coal.
The current methods for handling nuclear waste are outlined below:
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(A) Concentrate and Contain
This strategy is largely employed for low-level waste, which is processed and buried in
contained shallow garbage burial sites within normal civil waste disposal systems or
housed in separate repositories.
(B) Dilute and Diffuse
Under the dilute-and-diffuse process, low-level nuclear waste is diluted to acceptable levels
and discharged into the environment at minimal health or environmental risks. Nuclear
power stations and reprocessing plants release minimal levels of radioactive gases with
short half-lives into the atmosphere. Examples of such material include iodine-131,
krypton-85 and xenon-133. Prone to rapid decay and chemically inert, the net effect on
radiation levels is often too minimal to be discernible.
(C) Delay and Decay
This form of waste disposal is unique to the nuclear industry. Since radioactive materials
have lifespans and continue to decay and lose fission as they age, some facilities, such as
CLAB in Sweden, function as repositories for intermediate-level and sometimes high-level
waste to decay, making it easier and safer for handling and then, in some cases, to
progress to the next stages of waste disposal.
(D) Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing
Whilst controversial, some countries like China, Russia and India have chose to embark on
programs to reprocess nuclear fuel, sometimes for harvesting material for weaponization
programs.
History and Discussion of Problem
Nuclear waste management has been a constant worry for governments since the advent
of the age of nuclear technology. As states increasingly sought nuclear technology as their
answers to energy constraints, the problem of waste management has weighed heavily on both
political authorities and the general public since the first nuclear reactors were built in the 1950s. In
analyzing this issue, it is important to note that the safety records of nuclear plants have been
questionable at best.
As Sovacool writes, in the years between 1952-2009, there have been 99 serious nuclear
incidents, with 56 out of 99 incidents occurring within the United States. This calls into question the
conventional idea that significant technological advancement and trained expertise with industry
oversight can effectively mitigate the occurrence of nuclear accidents. In addition, empirical
evidence indicates that industrial advancements have failed to mitigate and instate successful
contingency plans in nuclear handling and disposal, with 57 serious accidents occurring after the
Chernobyl Disaster.
The recent history of nuclear technology has seen many accidents deeply etched into the
experiences of modern society with regards to nuclear warfare, amongst them are the Chernobyl
Disaster, Three-Mile Island Accident, and the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster. Whilst these
incidents serve critically in understanding the orientation of public discourse surrounding the
dangers of nuclear technology, the distinctions between nuclear reactor meltdowns and accidents
surrounding nuclear waste management must be clearly understood. In effectively tackling the
issue of ensuring safe nuclear waste management, it is vital for discourse to be aimed at analyzing
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the failures and gaps in waste management chains whilst still drawing on the experiences of wider
nuclear-related accidents and disasters.
Hence, this section will seek to analyse significant failures in the handling of nuclear-related
radioactive material and nuclear waste management through the Kyshtym disaster.
Classified as Level 6 on the International Nuclear Event Scale, the Kyshtym disaster of
1956 is the third most serious nuclear accident ever recorded, ranking behind the disasters in
Chernobyl and Fukushima. Constructed in the height of the nuclear arms race during the Cold War,
the facility was constructed to satisfy the Soviet Union’s thirst for sufficient weapons-grade uranium
and plutonium to further its nuclear program. Constrained by a lack of information and technical
expertise in handling nuclear material, the facility and its waste disposal systems paid little heed to
ideal environmental conditions, with toxic nuclear waste material being disposed of into water
systems, severely contaminating and polluting vital water bodies, and endangering resident
populations accessing these water bodies. A separate storage facility for radioactive waste was
finally constructed a year later, on 1953, but its cooling systems lacked lacked sufficient monitoring
systems and repair protocols. Despite cooling systems failure in a tank housing approximately 80
tons of radioactive waste a year before, repairs were failed to be conducted, resulting in an
explosion on September 1957. A radioactive plume spanning 300-350 kilometers called for the
evacuation of 22 villages, with nearly 18,00 square kilometers of land being severely contaminated.
Whilst technological progress and information-sharing networks have progressed vastly from the
days of the Cold War, these incidents pose critical learning points to the modern nuclear industry.
They exemplify the need to maintain industry-standards for nuclear waste disposal and treatment
as a key means of protecting at-risk civilian populations.
Moving on from the question of accidents relating to nuclear waste disposal, the other key
facet of the world’s key problems of nuclear waste management lies in the growing demand of
nuclear energy that has resulted in a proliferation of nuclear waste material. With the use of
nuclear power projected to grow in the coming decades as states increasingly seek energy
alternatives, long term approaches to the management of spent fuels and High-Level Radioactive
wastes must be considered with greater depth. Newcomer countries must consider “Cradle-toGrave” programs, where all stages of nuclear material management are carefully planned and
accounted for.
Whilst existing conventional thought places a clear moral and ethical obligation on states to
assume responsibility for safe disposal and management of self-generated nuclear waste,
increasing nuclear ambitions and wider accessibility of nuclear programs have caused for
projected constraints in effective, geologically safe sites for repositories. Hence, several proposals
have been offered to the international community to mitigate such a situation.
(A) International Repositories
Recognizing that not all countries pursuing nuclear energy sources may have appropriate
geological conditions for safe disposal or possess the considerable resources to construct
facilities for this purpose, the IAEA has called for the establishment of multinational or
international repositories. International collaboration and facilities sharing already occur for
reprocessing nuclear wastes, with the United Kingdom regularly reprocessing used fuel at
request, often for countries with smaller nuclear programs. The possibility of regional
repositories have been explored by the European Union, whilst Australia has considered
the option of establishing an internationally accessible waste management system and
repository to complement its Nuclear industry.
(B) Fuel Leasing
Nuclear fuel leasing is envisioned as a bundle service that combines the provision of
nuclear fuel to power plants with the subsequent recovery of the spent fuel, after which the
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original leasing company assumes responsibility for the disposition of waste material to
long-term cooling sites. Nuclear fuel-leasing, when handled by new, developed and
sophisticated nuclear utilities providers, is said to better address nonproliferation
considerations and environmental concerns. For less able, resource-constrained newcomer
states, this solution may prove to enhance access to safe, sustainable nuclear programs
whilst neutralizing the possibility of enrichment attempts or unsafe mismanagement of
nuclear waste.
Past UN Actions
(A) The Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and other
Matter is enacted in 1972 to control marine pollution by prohibiting the dumping of
hazardous materials at sea, including nuclear waste.
Article 1: Contracting Parties shall individually and collectively promote the effective
control of all sources of pollution of the marine environment, and pledge themselves
especially to take all practicable steps to prevent the pollution of the sea by the dumping of
waste and other matter that is liable to create hazards to human health, to harm living
resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses of
the sea.
(B) Joint Convention on Nuclear Safety places an obligation on member-states to act in
accordance to the IAEA’s Fundamental Safety Principles and consider the assessment of
safety and management procedures.
(C)The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of
Radioactive Waste Management was enacted in 1997 as the first legally binding document
placing mandatory obligations on states to address the issue of nuclear waste
management. It forced states to articulate and pursue comprehensive spent fuel
management policies, and for the first time, brought waste management to the global
nuclear discourse.
Article 4 : Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that at
all stages of spent fuel management, individuals, society and the environment are
adequately protected against radiological hazards.
In so doing, each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to:
(i) ensure that criticality and removal of residual heat generated during spent fuel
management are adequately addressed;
(ii) ensure that the generation of radioactive waste associated with spent fuel
management is kept to the minimum practicable, consistent with the type of fuel
cycle policy adopted;
(iii) take into account interdependencies among the different steps in spent fuel
management;
(iv) provide for effective protection of individuals, society and the environment, by
applying at the national level suitable protective methods as approved by the
regulatory body, in the framework of its national legislation which has due regard to
internationally endorsed criteria and standards;
(v) take into account the biological, chemical and other hazards that may be
associated with spent fuel management;
(vi) strive to avoid actions that impose reasonably predictable impacts on future
generations greater than those permitted for the current generation;
(vii) aim to avoid imposing undue burdens on future generations.
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Bloc Positions
States with advanced nuclear programs
States possessing advanced nuclear expertise and industry knowledge share a duty to
contribute to the international structural framework for waste disposal, and many have actively
directed their technical experts to engage with International organizations such as the IAEA.
Sweden, for example, has sought to aid in knowledge-sharing of nuclear waste disposal systems
after the construction of its successful CLAB.(see introduction). Moreover, many of these states
also possess sophisticated nuclear utilities programs, with many acting as suppliers of nuclear
material for nuclear power plants. Thus, states like Russia and the United States have articulated
support for programs like fuel-leasing, with these countries already pursuing smaller iterations of
this policy in varying degrees. Russia, to skirt armament and enrichment concerns, required
repatriation of spent fuel for disposal and reprocessing from Iran and India. The United States
proposed the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, which called for deepened interaction in the
international community to forge a global approach to managing nuclear material and guaranteeing
access to nuclear fuel.
Newcomer States or developing states seeking nuclear energy
Newcomer states and small states face considerable barriers to entry in crafting successful
nuclear programs and the “cradle-to-grave” approach poses prohibitive challenges to their nuclear
aspirations. Thus, these states often look to their more advanced counterparts for technical
expertise and knowledge-sharing. Moreover, newly proposed, alternate management strategies
have all sought to ensure nuclear access to these states, like the recent IAEA and UNEP proposals
for multilateral repositories. In addition, these states often face the challenge of ensuring safe
frameworks to protect radioactive assets against theft and the prospect of a terror threat. Hence,
there is a large scope and need for involvement and engagement with newcomer states.
Questions a Resolution Must Answer (QARMA)
• Is ease of access to nuclear power a desirable goal?
• Weighing the various policies put forth, how can the question of scarcity of suitable
locations be overcome?
• Understanding the nexus between the obligations put forth by the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty(NPT) and the The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and
on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, how can the question of responsibility
over the prohibition of enrichment be addressed when considering alternate arrangements
like fuel-leasing and international repositories?
• How can existing conventions be strengthened to address the evolving landscape of
nuclear states,especially as nuclear energy becomes increasingly more attractive?
• How can states best deal with the terror threat and mitigate theft and mishandling in their
nuclear process?
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Position Paper Requirements
All delegates are required to submit a position paper detailing their background research,
country’s stance as well proposed solutions. This background research is to be additional to the
study guide content, so as to avoid repeating information. Only a single document is required for
the delegate, which should content research, stances as well as solutions for both topics, with a
maximum of three pages (maximum of 1.5 pages per topic). Please submit this document
in .word or .pdf format.
All position papers should state their country’s position in relation to the topics to be
discussed in the council, to be supported by any additional background information they have
researched. If your country does not have a specific stance, your position paper may be written
from a neutral perspective. The background information ought to be useful for your stance as well
as proposed solutions in the later part of the paper. Solutions should be reasonable and feasible
for the council, as well as from your country’s stance.
Position papers should be in Arial (font size 12), single spaced and justified. All
references must be cited in either the MLA or Chicago style. Your committee, country, and name
should be included in the position paper as well. Please avoid using images unless necessary,
even state symbols and flags, so as not to clutter up the paper. Your country’s stance and
proposed solutions ought to be the main focus.
No plagiarism is tolerated, and any delegate found to be plagiarising will automatically be
disqualified from any and all awards. Please avoid submitting late without a valid reason, as this
may also lead to award disqualification. Any extensions with valid reasons are to be requested by
contacting your chairpersons.
The Position Paper is due 12th February, 2017.
Bibliography
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