The Moral Force of Political Obligations
Author(s): George Klosko
Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 84, No. 4 (Dec., 1990), pp. 1235-1250
Published by: American Political Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1963261 .
Accessed: 20/05/2014 18:43
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
.
American Political Science Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
The American Political Science Review.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 128.143.23.241 on Tue, 20 May 2014 18:43:33 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE MORALFORCEOF
POLITICALOBLIGATIONS
GEORGEKLOSKO
Universityof Virginia
Political obligationsvary in force. Thoughwe have strong
obligationsto obey certainlaws, our obligationsto obey othersappearto be considerably weaker. Because the weakness of the obligations to obey certain laws has been
employedas an argumentagainst the existenceof general primafacie political obligations, an adequatetheory of politicalobligationmustaccountfor this. By employingthe
obligationto keeppromisesas a model, I sort out the factorsthat contributeto the force
of primafacie politicalobligations. Theirvaryingforce can be explainedaccordingto a
general theory of political obligationfounded on the principleof fairness.
A
numberof
scholarshave arguedin recentyears that
there are no prima face political obligations. Typically, these scholars proceed
by puncturingthe traditionaltheories of
obligation. When none is found to hold,
the existenceof primafacie political obligationsis placedin doubt (Pateman1979;
Raz 1979, chap. 12; Raz 1986; Simmons
1979; Smith 1973). In addition to arguments along these lines, certain scholars
have found more direct evidence in the
very natureof political obligations.I will
focus on argumentsof this sort. In particular, I will look into the fact that political
obligations appear to vary in force and
the problemthat this poses for theoriesof
politicalobligation. I will then attemptto
show how a theory of politicalobligation
rooted in the principleof fairnessis able
to accountfor this.
The Varying Force of
Political Obligations
We can beginby pointingout two main
features of prima fade political obligations. First, obligations (as the term is
commonly used) are construed on the
model of promises. They are distinguished from other moral requirements
because of their specificity: they are
created by specific voluntary actions or
performances,owed to particularindividuals, and dischargedthroughthe performance of specific actions. However, in discussions of political obligation a wider
usage is preferable.The currentdemand
for an adequatetheory of politicalobligation would be satisfiedif one could bring
forthgood reasonsfor complyingwith the
injunctionsof one's government,whether
or not these reasons stem from specific
voluntary actions. Thus, I will discuss
political obligation in the broad sense.I
Second,primafacie obligations(as the
term has been used since its introduction
by Ross) are defeasible.Obligations,like
other moral requirements,are subject to
being overriddenby conflicting requirements (Ross 1930, 18-20). Under certain
circumstancespromise p can be overridden by considerationsq and in fact ought
not to be complied with. However, in
such a case p does not cease eitherto be a
promise or to have generatedan obligation.2 By saying that p generatesa prima
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
VOLUME 84 NO. 4 DECEMBER1990
This content downloaded from 128.143.23.241 on Tue, 20 May 2014 18:43:33 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
American Political Science Review Vol. 84
facie obligation, we distinguish this
obligation from what we can call conclusive obligations, which express what we
ought to do when all relevantmoral considerationshave been taken into account.
The languageof primafacie obligations
is helpful in remindingus that political
obligations are of limited force. But this
realizationraisesanotherproblem,namely, to ensure that they are sufficiently
strong. Because modem states exercise
their authority through the rule of law,
questions of political obligation can be
construedas questions about the obligation to obey the law. We can assumethat
an adequate account of political obligation will explainour obligationto obey all
laws that are passedby legitimateauthorities. In orderto distinguishpolitical obligations per se from other moral requirements to obey the law, we can say that
A's political obligation is his or her obligation to obey the law becauseit has been
passed by the proper authorities rather
than for other reasons. The immediate
problem is that our obligations to obey
certainlaws areweak. We can get a rough
idea of the force of a particularobligation
by consideringthe censurethat would follow the discoveryof its violation.According to this standard,the obligationto stop
at a red light on a deserted road in the
middle of the night is not very strong, as
A would probablyface only mild censure
(if that) if he were discoverednot to have
stopped. On similar grounds we would
say that the obligation to stay within the
speed limit is also frequentlyweak.
The fact that certain of our political
obligations are so weak has been
employedas an argumentagainstthe existence of prima facie political obligations.
Accordingto M.B.E. Smith, in order for
theoriesof obligationto be worthy of serious consideration, the obligations that
they establish must be substantial(1973,
970-76).3However, as our red light-example shows, the obligation to obey certain
laws does not meet this test. Smith sug-
gests, then, that even if the existenceof a
prima facie obligation to obey the law
could be established,it is not clear that it
would merit much attention.
While Smith's approach indicates that
political obligations are not sufficiently
strong, a differentanalysis raises a problem of the oppositesort. In arguingfor the
moral authority of law (which I view as
coextensivewith a prima facie obligation
to obey the law), John Finnis appeals to
the wide range of benefits that the legal
systemconfersand to theirgreatcomplexity. These considerations establish a
strongobligationto obey all laws, as presumably, all laws are implicated in the
supply of benefits.In Finnis'swords, "The
law presents itself as a seamless web"
(1984, 120). However, if the law actually
were a seamlessweb so that our failureto
obey any given law affectedall laws, our
obligations to obey all laws would be of
significantforce. But this conclusionconflicts with the fact that obligations attachedto particularlaws, for instance,the
trafficexample, are of only slight force.
An obvious way aroundthe arguments
of both Smithand Finnisis to suggestthat
political obligations vary in force.
Thoughsome areweak and so not worthy
of much consideration, others are
strongerand more important.To the extent that the varying force of obligations
has been noted, it appears to have been
used as an argumentagainstthe existence
of generalpolitical obligations(Raz1984,
145-49). But this can be shown to be consistentwith at least one theory of political
obligation.
Intuitively,it seems clear that our obligations to obey differentlaws are of different moral force. Legal scholars frequently distinguishbetween actions that
are inherentlywrong (mala in se) and actions that arewrong only becausethey are
illegal (mala prohibita. There are obvious moral reasonsnot to performactions
of the first sort, especially actions that
directlyharm other people. If it is against
1236
This content downloaded from 128.143.23.241 on Tue, 20 May 2014 18:43:33 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
PoliticalObligations
the law to kill other people and Janekills
Dick, she would obviously face strong
censure.It is also clear that violations of
laws of this sort would meet with censure
of varying intensities. Jane'scondemnation for murdering Dick would be far
greater than for shoplifting. In these
cases, however, it is not clear how much
of the censurewould stemfromJane'sviolation of her obligation to obey the law
and how much from committingacts that
are inherentlywrong.
The force of Jane'sobligation to obey
the law (becauseit is the law) can be seen
more clearlyin cases of the second kind.4
Acts that if not for legal prohibitions
would not be wrong includeviolations of
various trafficlaws, (such as the red light
example) and certain tax laws. Now,
violations of different laws of this sort
will also give rise to censureof varyingintensities,though it is more difficultto explainwherethis variationcomesfrom. As
noted above, minor traffic violations
would meet with little condemnation.But
other acts would give rise to strong censure even though they cause negligible
harmat most. The U.S. governmenthas a
budget of hundredsof billions of dollars.
A few thousanddollarsmore or less from
Jane would make a negligible or imperceptibledifference.Yet the discoverythat
Janehad not paid her incometaxeswould
likely lead to widespread censure,
whereas the discovery that she had violated minor traffic laws would probably
be ignored. Thus, it must be explained
why some violations of laws are regarded
as more severe than others even though
their consequencesappearto be similar.
It strikesme that an adequatetheory of
politicalobligationshould be expectedto
explainhow obligationsto obey different
laws vary in force. If theory X construes
all obligations as of the force of minor
traffic regulations, the resulting obligations would appearto be too weak to account for more onerous political requirements, like the requirementto pay one's
taxes.On theotherhand,if theoryY construesobligationsalong the lines of tax
laws, the resultingobligationswouldappearto be too strongto accountfor the
limitedforceof minortrafficlaws.To be
consistentwith our intuitionsan account
shouldpresentobligationsof varyingintensities.
The Force of Promissory
Obligations
On an intuitivelevelit appearsthatthe
strengthof politicalobligationsshoulddependlargelyon theconsequences
of obeying or disobeyingdifferentlaws. In general,therightnessor wrongfulness
of any
actionwill-bejudgedlargelyin termsof its
consequences(howeverthese are determined). Act-utilitarians, of course,
employthis standardexclusively.As we
saw in the last section,Smithemploysa
consequentialistanalysis in examining
politicalobligations.Becauseviolations
of minortrafficregulationsare liableto
have only slight consequences,he concludesthat primaface politicalobligations are of little concern (1973, 970-76).
But critics of act-utilitarianism have
shown that factors other than consequences should be brought to bear in
assessingthe rightnessof actions and that
act-utilitarians have especially severe
problemsin explainingobligations(Brock
1973; Griffin 1982). For instance, there
are clear cases in which promisesshould
be complied with even if breakingthem
would have morebeneficialresults.Thus,
though analysis in terms of consequences
can help to explain how political obligations vary in force, other factors should
be invoked as well.
We can gain some insightinto the range
of factors at work in political obligations
by examiningthe factors that contribute
to the moral forces of promises. Before
proceeding,I should make clear that my
analysis of promisesdoes not rest on any
1237
This content downloaded from 128.143.23.241 on Tue, 20 May 2014 18:43:33 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
American Political Science Review Vol. 84
specificmoral theory and should be consistent with different construals of the
moral basis for the obligation to keep
them.5One view in conflictwith my analysis is act-utilitarianism,due to its problems explainingcases in which promises
should be kept, though the consequences
of breakingthem would be better. Thus,
in additionto the consequencesof keeping
or breakinga given promise,somethingof
its moral force appearsto derivefrom the
promiseitself.
The significanceof the act of promising-and of similar performances in
regard to other obligations-has been
analyzedby H. L. A. Hart. Accordingto
Hart, in addition to stemming from
specific performancesand being owed to
specific people, promises,like other obligations, are characterizedby "independence of content."The obligationto keep
a promise does not arise from the nature
of the promisedactionbut from the promise itself (Hart1958, 102; cf. Brandt1964,
386-87). If JamespromisesHenry that he
will do p and p is independentlythe sort
of action that he should perform,James's
particular obligation to do p does not
stem from its independentmoral desirability. Actions q, r, s, and so on, can be
equally desirable,yet Jameswill have no
obligationsto do them over and above his
general moral duty to perform morally
desirable actions. The fact that James
promises to do p separates it from the
generalclass of morally desirableactions
and createsan obligation in regardto it.
Contrariwise,if t is a morally wrong action, James'spromisestill createsan obligation for him to do it-though there are
complexities here that will be explored
below. In this case the obligationis obviously independentof the nature of the
promisedaction.
Though independenceof content appears to capture important features of
promises, Hart's account can be elaborated upon. Hart'sdiscussionof independence of content appears to be in refer-
ence to the existence of obligations. A
promise is a certain kind of performance
that createsa particularobligation, without regardto what the promise is about.
The obligation is createdby the performance and does not otherwiseexist. But the
force of a promise is affected by what is
promised. To capture this additional
aspectof promises(and other obligations)
we can distinguishbetween the performance that creates an obligation and the
content of the obligation. In the case of a
promise, as long as A utterssome appropriate verbal formula (or otherwise invokes the conventions of promisingthat
exist in A's society)A can make a promise
to B regardlessof what is promised. In
this sense independenceof content holds.
But the contentof the obligationaffects
its force. If Jackpromisesto do something
that is morally wrong, under many circumstances his promise should not be
complied with. He would be subject to,
greatercensure if he committed a severe
crime after promisingto do so than if he
broke his promiseand did not commit it.
In a case of this sort, it appearsthat the
obligationcreatedby the promiseis overridden by the wrongfulness of what is
promised.In orderto facilitatediscussion,
we can referto the value of an obligation.
In assessingreasonsfor and against complying with a given obligation, those in
favor of compliancecan be said to have
positive value, and those against, negative value. I will assumethat the values of
differentaspects of an obligation can be
added and subtractedto yield its cumulative value, or the overall strengthof the
considerationsin favor of complying (or
not complying)with it. By analogy with
the concept of "truth-value,"we can say
that if an obligation should be complied
with when all relevant moral concerns
have been taken into account, it has positive value. An obligation that is overridden by conflictingfactors can be said
to have negative value. Employing this
terminology, we can say that in certain
1238
This content downloaded from 128.143.23.241 on Tue, 20 May 2014 18:43:33 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Political Obligations
cases carrying out a promise can have
wrong, and he would be subject to cennegativevalue, becausethe negativevalue
sure. As the consequencesof his breaking
of the promised action outweighs the
the promise varied, the degree of his
value of the transaction through which wrongdoing would vary accordingly. If
the promisecomes into existence.
Bob called Susanas she was beginningto
In any given case it appears that the
go into labor to informher that he was no
value of an obligationdependson a comlonger available, the censure would be
plex interplay between the performance strong, especiallyif his behavior,seriously
through which it is created and its coninconveniencedher at this difficult time.
tent. Content here centers largely on the
Bob'sviolation of his promiseundersuch
consequencesof performingor not per- circumstances would be considerably
formingthe promisedaction. The content worse than if he notified Susan in adof a promisehas positive value if the convance-and the farther in advance, the
sequencesof keeping it will be beneficial less the censure.If he notifiedSusansuffiand negative value if they will be harm- ciently far in advance to allow her easily
ful.6 Thoughit is difficultto determinethe
to make other arrangements,his wrong
precisevalues of the differentaspectsof a
would be relatively slight. As this examgiven promise, a rough approximationis
ple shows, as the consequencesof nonprovided by the simple formula that the
compliancewith a given promisechange,
positive value createdby the transaction the force of the obligation to keep the
throughwhich the promisecomes into expromisechangesas well.
istence will be increased by the positive
Additional factors play a role in detervalue of beneficialconsequencesand de- mining the strengthof promises. Though
creased(and possibly overridden)by the
all transactionsperformedin accordance
negative value of harmfulconsequences. with the conventions of A's society will
Thus, if keepingsome promisewould give
constitute promises that are of some
rise to greatgood, A's obligationto com- moral force, the value of promises will
ply with it would be strongerthan if the vary as the transactionsthemselvesvary.
consequenceswere less beneficial. Along A solemn oath is of greaterforce than a
similarlines, if A promisesB to commita
promise made more casually. The incrime,then even thoughthe promiseitself creased force that particularverbal forhas some moral force, its value will be
mulascreateis clearlyunderstoodby chilcounteractedby the negativevalue of the
dren who demand that certain promises
crime. In many cases these negative fac- be reinforced with "Cross your heart
tors will overridethe positive value of the
and hope to die" and the like. Along
promiseitself, and it should not be com- similarlines, promisesmade in particular
plied with.
circumstancesare of special force. The
Confirmation of the role that conse- most notable examples are deathbed
quences play is that a promise's value
promises, which are widely viewed as
will vary as we vary the consequencesof
especially binding. Of course, there are
complying with or breaking it. Let us
cases in which even solemn oaths and
assume that Susan is about to have a
deathbed promises should not be combaby. She already has a young child, plied with, for instance if compliance
June, who must be cared for when she would be inherentlywrong. But because
goes into the hospital to give birth. Bob transactions of these sorts imbue the
promises Susan that he will take care of
promisedaction with considerablevalue,
June. If Bob breaks this promise (which the conditions under which they should
we will assume he does for no pressing not be kept will be moredifficultto satisfy
reason), his behavior would be clearly than for other promises.
1239
This content downloaded from 128.143.23.241 on Tue, 20 May 2014 18:43:33 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
AmericanPolitical Science Review Vol. 84
Becausepromisingis a complexinstitution, the elementsthat we have discussed
could well interactdifferentlyin different
cases. It is not possible to say in the abstract exactly how different elements
shouldbe weighedin particularcases. But
the analysishere should contributeto the
assessmentof specificpromisesin making
clearthe factorsinvolved. It seemssafe to
say that in generalthe value of a promise
will depend on the interactionof (1) elementsbearingon the transactionthrough
which it arises (e.g., its solemnityand its
circumstances)and (2) its content, expressed in terms of the consequencesof
complianceor noncompliance.
severely criticizedby many scholars and
are generally viewed as fatally flawed,
they can be set aside.7
At first sightit mightappearthat a consequentialisttheory of obligation, for example, one based on act-utilitarianism,
would be more promising. Roughly, on
this analysis, the force of an obligationto
obey a specificlaw would dependon the
consequences of obedience or disobedience. This might explain why relatively
trivial laws (such as that in the red light
example) are of slight force, while more
importantlaws (such as those concerned
with paying taxes) possess greaterforce.
Because we do not require that an account of political obligationbe based on
obligations in the strict sense and so do
GeneralizedConsequenceAnalysis not
requirethe existence of specific pera consequentialist account
formances,
If we construe political obligations on
would not be vulnerableon this ground.
the model of promises, we must locate a
featurecorrespondingto the performance However, consequentialist theories encountergrave difficultiesin certainof the
throughwhich a promisecomes into exisimportantcases with which political
most
tence. The force of the politicalobligation
philosophersdeal, namely those involvcould then be assessed.by combiningthe
ing coordinating the activities of large
value of the performanceand the value of
of citizens. Many of the crucial
numbers
complyingwith a given-law,expressedin
benefits
that
governmentsprovide are of
terms of the consequencesof compliance
or noncompliance.This sort of analysis this sort. Clear examples are national
would account for the fact that political defense, the rule of law, and protection
obligationsvary in strength,as obedience from natural disasters and threats to
to differentlaws involves differentconse- publichealth. Benefitssuch as these, commonly referred to as public goods, are
quences. However, there are problemsin
assessing the content of political obliga- characterizedby nonexcludability. It is
difficultto provide them to certainmemtions in termsof consequences,while it is
of a given societywhile denyingthem
bers
of
also difficultto identify aspects political obligationscorrespondingto the per- to other members. Under most circumstancesthey must be providedto all memformancesthat give rise to promises.
if they are providedat all.8Otherimbers
According to one account of political
benefits that governments proportant
in
obligations, the difficulties construing
them on the model of promisesare rela- vide are also public goods, for instance,
many publichealthmeasures.In addition,
tively slight. According to theories of
obligation based on consent, A's obliga- though such componentsof a societal intion to obey the law stems from an actual frastructureas roads, bridges, harbors,
promise,whetherexpressor tacit. On this and airports are not necessarily public
account, the factors discussedin the last goods since their use could be limited to
section would seem clearly relevant in particular individuals (e.g., those who
assessingthe force of politicalobligations. pay userfees), such limitationswould freButbecausetheoriesof consenthave been quently involve severe practicaldifficul1240
This content downloaded from 128.143.23.241 on Tue, 20 May 2014 18:43:33 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Political Obligations
ties, so that they too can be regardedas
public goods.
A second crucialfeatureof the benefits
under discussion is that their provision
generallyrequiresthe cooperationof large
numbers of people. The rule of law in
society X requires general.adherenceto
X'slegal code. Thoughthe cooperationof
all X-ites is not necessary, social order
dependson the acquiescenceof a high percentageof X-ites. Thoughthe precisepercentageneeded (commonlyreferredto as
a threshold)is difficultto specify, at some
point a widespread lack of cooperation
would underminethe sanctityof the legal
code, thereby threateningthe security of
all. The case is similar with national
defense and other governmentalservices
financedwith tax revenues. Though universal compliance with tax laws is not
necessary,at some point widespreadfailure to obey them would jeopardizethe
government'sabilityto provideimportant
services, thereby threatening societal
functioningand the well-being of all inhabitants.
Becauseimportantbenefitsthatgovernmentsprovide(1) arepublicgoods and (2)
requirelarge-scalecooperation,theirprovision is beset by a troublingpattern of
analysis, commonly referred'to as the
prisoner'sdilemma.9In many cases it is
difficult to justify requiringa given individual (or a relativelysmallgroupof individuals) to cooperatein the provision of
suchbenefitson consequentialistgrounds.
For instance, by paying her taxes Shelly
contributes imperceptiblyto the public
good. If she did not pay, the amount she
contributes would scarcely be missed.
However, Shelly's tax payments make a
considerabledifferenceto her. If she did
not pay she would have more money to
lavish on herselfand her friends,perhaps
to contributeto worthy causes. Since her
tax money could make a perceptibledifferenceif it were spent in these ways, it is
not clearthat the consequencesof her not
paying would actually be worse for soci-
ety than if she paid. Similarly,by serving
in the armedforcesSeanwould contribute
imperceptiblyto the security of X. But
becausehe would be far happierif he did
not serve and his contributionwould not
be missed, it is not clear that his military
servicewould actuallyrendersociety better off. Similarexamplescould be multiplied. What they have in common is the
fact that in a large society in which the
cooperationof most but not all members
is required to provide some important
public good, it is difficultto demonstrate
that society actually benefits from the
cooperationof any given individual."0
The prisoner'sdilemmais damagingto
consequentialistaccountsof politicalobligation. On consequentialistgrounds, A
shouldobey the law becausesociety benefits from his doing so. But thereis a range
of importantcases in which it is not clear
that his obedience is actually beneficial.
Consequentialismencounterssimilardifficulties in explaininghow political obligations vary in force. We have noted that
the obligation to pay one's taxes appears
to be far strongerthan the obligation to
stop at a red light on a desertedroad. But
in a large society, under many circumstances the consequences of disobeying
the two laws would be similar. Because
Shelly'stax paymentswould makeno perceptible difference to her government's
ability to pay its bills, it is not clear why
her failure to pay is more harmful than
her failureto obey minor trafficlaws.
A more promisingapproachrelies on a
particular variant of consequentialism.
Thoughtherewould be no detectableconsequencesif Sean refusedto pay his taxes
or serve in the armedforces or if he violated various other laws, the situation
would be markedlydifferentif everyone
(or an unspecified,largenumberof X-ites,
to which, for convenience,I will referas
everyoneor all X-ites)behavedsimilarly.I
will referto an analysis that relies on the
consequencesof largenumbersof individuals behavingin a certainway as a gener-
1241
This content downloaded from 128.143.23.241 on Tue, 20 May 2014 18:43:33 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
American Political Science Review Vol. 84
than everyone's violating minor traffic
alized consequenceanalysis.
In speakingof generalizedconsequence laws. Similarly,in times of nationalemergency, the consequences of wholesale
analysis, I must make clear that I am not
arguingaccordingto a strictlyconsequen- avoidance of conscriptionlaws would be
tialist moral view, such as utilitarian disastrous.Thus, it is not surprisingthat
individuals who are convicted of desergeneralization. Roughly, according to
tion or of dodgingthe draftare subjectto
utilitariangeneralization,a given act is
severecensure.Thoughassessmentsalong
rightundersome circumstancesif the consequencesof its performanceby everyone these lines are necessarilyrough, I believe
that further examples would support a
(who is able to do so) would be at least as
good as those of the generalperformance roughcorrelationbetweenthe force of the
of any otheract. Utilitariangeneralization obligation to obey a given law and the
generalized consequences of obeying or
is a controversial moral view that has
disobeyingit.
been severely criticized;the claims that I
A generalizedconsequenceanalysis is
make do not rest on its distinctive
features." As was true of my discussion also supported by connections that are
of obligations to keep promises, my
frequentlydrawnbetweenthe behaviorof
A and of all other X-ites. When we conaccount of the force of obligations to
obey the law does not rest on a specific sidercases of disobeyinglaws, a common
moral theory. The generalized conse- reproachthat A is likely to meet if he is
quence analysis is necessary to capture found not to have paid his taxes is, 'What
one aspect of our intuitionsabout politi- if everyone did the same?"12In the first
cal obligations, namely, that their force recorded set of arguments for political
correlates(roughly) with the generalized obligation in the Western tradition,
consequences of obeying or disobeying in Plato's Crito, the personifiedLaws of
given laws. Regardless of the specific Athens reply along theselines to Socrates'
moral theory to which we referto explain proposed willingness to escape from
this, it should not strike us as surprising. prison and avoid his death sentence:"Tell
We can assume that laws are ordinarily me, Socrates, what are you intendingto
do? Do you not, by this actionyou are atmade to serve the public interest, with
tempting, intend to destroy us, the laws,
general obedience as their intended oband indeed the whole city, as far as you
ject. Explainingour intuitions about the
force of political obligations is logically are concerned?Or do you think it is posdistinctfrom explainingthe moral princi- sible for a city not to be destroyedif the
ple (or principles)from which the obliga- verdictsof its courtshave no forcebut are
tions stem, though an adequate account nullifiedand set at naughtby privateindiof the origin of obligations should con- viduals?" (50a-b [Grube 1978]). Thus,
tributeto explainingthe variancein their Socrates should not escape because his
doing so would destroy the laws of
force.
Athens.
The generalizedconsequenceanalysisis
Though cases like these are frequently
immediatelymore plausible than a view
that relieson the consequencesof individ- encountered,they raise a severe problem
ual actions. We have seen that the obliga- for a generalconsequenceanalysis.To the
tion to pay one's taxes is stronger than Laws'question "Whatif everyone did the
that connected with some minor traffic same?"thereis an obvious response:there
is virtually no chance that everyone will
law. This varianceis well explainedby a
generalizedconsequenceanalysisbecause do so. In itself, Socrates'escapingwould
have little effect on Athenian laws.
the consequencesof everyone'srefusingto
pay their taxes would be far more severe Though the laws would be destroyed if
1242
This content downloaded from 128.143.23.241 on Tue, 20 May 2014 18:43:33 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Political Obligations
everyone disobeyed them, the requisite
connection between Socrates' disobedience and everyone else's has not been
established.In many cases A's failure to
obey a certainlaw would have no detectable effect on whether other individuals
(or at least a sufficient number to have
detectablesocietaleffects)would obey. In
a large society there are many cases in
which A's actions would not influence
those of other people, but people would
still condemnA's failureto obey the law.
ThoughactualconnectionsbetweenA's
behaviorand that of the requisitenumber
of X-itesare not always easy to draw and
utilitariangeneralizationsdoes not seem
an acceptable approach, the generalized
consequence test can be supported in
other ways."3 In recent years theories of
politicalobligationbased on the principle
of fairness have received a good deal of
attention. The principle was originally
formulatedby Hart in 1955 and developed by other thinkers, most notably
John Rawls (Hart 1955; Klosko 1987a;
Rawls 1964). The principlecenterson the
idea of the mutualityof restrictions:individuals who benefit from the cooperative
efforts of others have an obligation to
cooperate as well. As scholars have
shown, the principleof fairnessrests on a
more general moral principle, which
David Lyonsrefersto as "thejustdistribution of benefitsand burdens"(1965, 164).
Accordingto Rawls, "Weare not to gain
from the cooperative labors of others
without doing our fair share"(1971, 112;
also Arneson 1982 and Ewing 1953). A
clear example is national defense. If A
benefits from the protection his fellow
citizens provide, he has an obligation to
cooperate in their efforts. He can be
obligated to serve in the armedforces or
to help financethemwith tax paymentsor
both.
The principle of fairness provides the
requisiteconnectionbetweenthe behavior
of A and other X-ites. According to an
alternativeformulation of the principle,
presented by Rawls, the principle "requires one to abstain from an advantage
that cannot be distributedfairly to those
whose efforts have made it possible"
(1964, 17). National defense and other
similarbenefitsare necessaryfor the wellbeing of all X-ites, A included. Because
such goods require large-scale cooperation and all benefit from their provision,
A would behave unfairlyin receivingthe
benefits of others' cooperative activity
without cooperatinghimself. If the cooperation of many but not all is requiredto
providesome good, why shouldA, rather
than otherX-ites,be freeof the burdensof
cooperationunless there is some morally
relevant differencebetween A and them?
Content Value
I have arguedelsewherethat the principle of fairness can support a workable
general theory of political obligation.
Argumentsfor this theory (which I will
refer to as fairness theory) need not be
reviewed here.14 More importantfor our
immediateconcerns is the fact that fairness theoryis able to explainhow political
obligations vary in force. Because great
precisionconcerningthe force of political
obligationsis not easily attained, our account must be somewhat rough. But the
presentationhere should be able to cover
our intuitionsabout importantfeaturesof
political obligations.
In assessing the strength of political
obligations, two factors should be taken
into consideration.I will call these content value and institutionalvalue. Content value is concerned with the importance of the benefits that stem from particular laws. Though the importanceof
differentbenefitscannotbe identifiedprecisely, we can divide the benefitssupplied
by governmentsinto rough classes, obligations correspondingto which appearto
vary in force. The first class is comprised
of benefits essential to individuals'well-
1243
This content downloaded from 128.143.23.241 on Tue, 20 May 2014 18:43:33 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
American Political Science Review Vol. 84
being. Examplesof thesehave been noted:
national defense, the rule of law, protection from a hostile environment.For example, in the case of national defensethe
cooperationof large numbersof X-ites is
requiredfor the benefitto be produced.If
Karl receivesthe benefit without bearing
his share of the burden, his behavior
would be clearlyunfair, and he would be
subjectto strong censure.As noted, during times of national emergency(e.g., in
the U.S. early in World War II), individuals who were believed to have illegally
avoided the draft, deserted, or taken illegal libertieswith the country'swartime
economic measures were harshly criticized.13If we employ the severity of such
censureas a measure,we shouldconclude
that the obligationsto obey theselaws are
of considerable moral force. Similarly,
the ruleof law is necessaryto protectindividuals from various sourcesof harm. Individualswho violate the law and thereby
threatenthe security of their fellow citizens are also harshlycondemned.Clearly,
there are strong obligations to obey a
rangeof laws bearingdirectlyon personal
security, though it is not easy to distinguish the componentsof these obligations
that stem from immediateharmsthat are
committed from more strictly political
obligations, obligations to obey laws
because they are laws.16
Of course, in addition to defending
theirpopulations,governmentsperforma
much wider range of services. As noted
above, the government in country X is
responsiblefor providingand maintaining
an infrastructureof roads, bridges, tunnels, and harbors.It regulatescommunication and education, provides sewers
and sanitation, works to promote
economic stability, and cares for the percentageof the populationthat is unableto
care for itself. The population of X will
contribute to government'sprovision of
these extensive services in various ways,
most notably by providing tax revenues
and by following the laws (e.g., traffic
regulations)that are necessaryto coordinate their actions with their fellows.
The benefits representedby this range
of governmentalservicesvary enormously in importance. Those that any given
programprovides citizen A can be quite
different from those enjoyed by other
citizens. Because of this wide range of
benefits and differencesin how they fall
out on differentindividuals,it seems unlikely that we would be able to specifythe
moralforceof specificobligationsto comply with specific programs. However, it
seems likely that there is a rough correspondencebetween the importanceof the
overall benefit that a given law produces
and the force of the obligationto obey it.
Thus, the obligationto obey minortraffic
laws is less strong than that to pay one's
taxes, which is in turn less strong than
that to serve in the armedforces in times
of dire need. Again, as noted in the last
section, the benefits in such cases should
be assessedin termsof generalizedconsequences. In itself A's avoidance of the
draftlaws may do no more harmto society than his or her failureto stop at a red
light on a desertedroad. But the consequencesof generalizingthe formersort of
behaviorwould be far worse than the latter. Similarly,we can make roughgradations within the range of governmental
services. Thus, we distinguish between
significantand insignificanttraffic violations. Going very fast on a busy highway
or in a residentialneighborhoodis a more
seriousoffensethanfailingto stop at a red
light on a desertedroad, whether or not
harmfulconsequencesresultfrom specific
instancesof each kind of act. Generalizing
the former sort of behavior would have
more severe consequencesthan generalizing the latter.
It seems, then, that thereis a roughcorrespondencebetweenthe force of the obligation to obey a given law and the benefits the law provides, assessedin termsof
generalizedconsequences.In contributing
to the force of a given obligation, the im-
1244
This content downloaded from 128.143.23.241 on Tue, 20 May 2014 18:43:33 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Political Obligations
portance of these benefits corresponds
roughly to the content of promises.
Institutional Value
In anothersense laws shouldbe obeyed
simply because they are laws, with reference to a differentaspect of theirspecific
consequences. In addition to content
value, obligationsto obey laws also have
institutionalvalue. We can refer to the
benefitsreceivedfrom the rule of law and
the existenceof a working social decision
process as institutional
goods.17 Because
the benefits that Karl receivesfrom institutional goods depend on widespread
willingness to comply with the law, it
follows from the principleof fairnessthat
he, too, has an obligation to cooperate.
He shouldnot profitfrom the sacrificesof
other people if the advantages of noncooperationcannot be extendedto them
as well. We can call the argumentthat
groundsA's obligation to comply with a
given law in A's need for the rule of law
the institutional argument.
According to the institutional argument, Karl'sobligation to obey the law
stems from the benefits he receives from
the rule of law and the means it provides
of peacefully settling disputes. These
benefits are of fundamentalimportance,
necessaryfor the continued existence of
society and its members.Karl'sobligation
to obey stemsfromthe corrosiveeffectsof
disobedience. Because the rule of law
requires general adherence, individuals
who lightly set asidelaws with whichthey
disagreeunderminethe social fabric.
The importanceof the rule of law gives
individualsan additionalreason to obey
specificlaws, the force of which is derived
from a second set of generalizedconsequences. Let us assume that A confronts
the question whether to obey some tax
law T of society X. The force of this obligation reflectsthe consequencesthat generalized disobedience of T would have
upon X. In additionto the specificsubject
matterwith which it is concerned,a given
law is a component of the legal system.
Because the rule of law in society X requiresgeneralobedienceto its laws, T included, generalobedienceor disobedience
of T will affectthe ruleof law in society as
a whole.18
The size and complexity of a modern
legal system renderthe institutionalforce
of obligations to obey the law complex.
These obligations appear to differ in
regardto differentkinds of laws pertaining to differentsocial functions. Though
we need not sort out numerouskinds of
laws, one distinction is important. In a
basic sense the rule of law is indispensable
to the maintenanceof society and so to
the well-beingof its members.Laws that
are importantin this regardincludeprohibitionsagainstphysicallyharmingother
people, taking their property, and defraudingthem. We can referto the direct
contributionof the rule of law to personal
security as its core or essential function.
The laws under consideration here are
centralto that minimalsocial ordernecessary for personalsecurity-for life so "as
not to be weary of it," to use Hobbes's
words (1968, 192). Since A undoubtedly
requiresthe rule of law in this sense, A
would be unfairnot to obey the range of
laws in question.
The obligationto obey the law encompasses other laws as well. Laws that fall
outsidethis core rangeshouldalso be supportedbecausethis contributesto the core
functions. There is an empiricalassumption here, but one that is virtuallytruistic
among political philosophers:19widespreadadherenceto the law promotesfurther adherence,while widespreaddisobedience has the opposite effect. If individuals develop a habit of disobediencein
regard to relatively minor matters, that
habit will extend to more importantmatters, while a habit of obediencein minor
matterswill strengthenobediencein major matters. Accordingly, compliance
1245
This content downloaded from 128.143.23.241 on Tue, 20 May 2014 18:43:33 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
American Political Science Review Vol. 84
with laws falling outside the core rangeis
indirectlygood in itself, becauseit works
to strengthenthe core functionof the rule
of law.
It seemsclearthat the institutionalcomponent of the obligation to obey specific
laws will vary in force, dependingon the
contribution that generalized adherence
to a given law makes to the rule of law in
society.20Thus, laws falling in the core
range will have greaterinstitutionalforce
than laws that contributeonly indirectly
to the core function. In many cases laws
that have considerableinstitutionalforce
will also have significantcontentvalue, as
general disobedience would lead to
serious direct harm. The obligations to
obey such laws will thereforebe doubly
strong.
The fact that the societies discussed
here are large makes mattersmore complex. In a large society, Kate'sdisobedience of a given law, whether major or
minor, is unlikely to have an appreciable
effect on the degree of adherenceto the
rule of law throughoutsociety as a whole.
If she disobeys minor laws, her resulting
habit of disobedienceis unlikely to have
detectablesocial effects. Accordingto the
principleof fairness, however, the actual
consequencesof a given act are not the
sole concern. As long as the rule of law
exists in her society and nonadherenceby
others would weaken their commitment
to it, Kate benefits from their obedience;
and the advantagesof her noncompliance
cannot be extended to them. Thus, Kate
should not disobey minor laws; because
general disobedienceof even minor laws
would underminethe ruleof law throughout society, it would be unfair of her to
disobey them.
The discussionof institutionalvalue up
to this point has omitted various complicating factors. Different kinds of exceptional cases should be considered, however briefly. First,becausethe principleof
fairness traces obligations to the receipt
of benefits,in circumstancesunderwhich
laws are widely disobeyed so that Kate
does not benefit from the rule of law,
the institutionalvalue of particularlaws
should be low or nonexistent.As Hobbes
says, "He that should be modest, and
tractable, and performeall he promises,
in such time, and place, whereno man els
should do so, should but make himselfea
prey to others, and procurehis own certain ruine"(1968, 215). Not only would it
be foolish for Kate to obey when all
othersdo not, but it would be unfairto requireher to do so. Along similarlines, the
institutionalvalue of political obligations
is subject to being overriddenby other
moral considerations. For example,
assumethat Lisa'scountry, Y, is grievously unjust, along the lines of Nazi Germany. In this case, the fact that the ruleof
law existsand so providesherwith important benefits would create an obligation
for Lisa to obey Y's laws. But it is likely
that this obligation would be overridden
by the moral requirementnot to commit
unjust actions (or support their perpetration), just as the obligation to keep a
promisecan be overriddenby the injustice
of what is promised.
A more difficult range of cases centers
on the fact that particularlaws appearto
be without institutional value even
though (1) the rule of law exists in the
legal system in question and (2) the system as a whole is acceptably just. In a
complexsociety it is likely that many laws
will be institutedthat individualsdo not
feel they should obey. Many laws are in
fact widely disobeyed, and it may seem
unclearthat thereis an obligationto obey
them. Undoubtedly, beyond a certain
point, specificlaws that are-unfairor unjust lose their binding force. Especially
importantfor our purposes,it is not clear
that laws that cannot be shown to serve
real or legitimatesocial purposesor those
that actually detractfrom public welfare,
should be obeyed. However, despite appearancesto the contrary,theselaws have
positive institutional value, though this
1246
This content downloaded from 128.143.23.241 on Tue, 20 May 2014 18:43:33 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Political Obligations
can be overriddenby their negative content value. When some law is widely
believedto be detrimentalto society, people can generallyfeel that it shouldnot be
obeyed despite the implicationsthat disobeying it might have for the rule of law
throughout society. In a complex legal
system many sorts of laws lose their rational justificationsover time if they ever
had them. Frequently,such.lawspass out
of use and cease to be enforced.Examples
are laws against witchcraft and similar
practices, still on the books in various
countries. Similarly, blue laws can pass
out of social fashion before they are officially repealed.In many casesuselesslaws
can be identifiedby the fact that they are
violated openly, without strong disapproval. For instance, certaintrafficlaws,
such as the 55 miles per hour speed limit,
are routinely disobeyed. Proof that the
benefitsof noncompliancewith theselaws
can be generalizedwithout undueharmto
society is the fact that nonadherenceis
widespread.
The variablesin thesecases are difficult
to sort out, but it appearsthat in many
cases the widespreadbelief that a given
law has negativecontentvalue will lead to
the widespreadbelief that it can be rightfully disobeyed.Speedlimitlaws areespecially clearinstanceshere, as are also laws
forbiddingvarioussocialpractices,for example, certain sexual relations among
consenting adults. Public attitudes indicate generaldisdainfor speed limits. The
fact that those who are caught speeding
and ticketedare often met with sympathy
ratherthan censureis strongevidencethat
(under many circumstances)the laws in
questionare widely believed not to serve
legitimate social purposes. Under other
circumstances, however, speed limits
serve clear and importantpurposes and
are regarded differently. When individuals are known to go very fast, say 100
miles per hour on busy highways, they
constitute a danger and are accordingly
subjectto censure.Or if individualsspeed
in residential neighborhoods, especially
where children are playing, they too
become dangers and will meet disapproval. Thus, there are circumstancesin
which-theselaws are clearlyimportant,as
is indicatedby public reaction. If, under
other circumstances,a given law actually
is useless and widely disobeyed, modifying it would serve an important social
purposein preventinga habit of disobedience from developingin its regard.
Innumerablecomplexities bearing on
the institutionalcomponentof the obligation to obey differentlaws cannot be discussedhere. But to hazarda few generalizations by way of summarizing,it seems
that even in questionablecases, individuals can be presumedto have primaface
obligations to obey the law because it is
the law. In most cases, one can assume
that this obligationis of significantmoral
force. To the extent that disobedienceof
any law underminesthe generalfabric of
the rule of law on which the welfareof all
depends, individuals who disobey are
subject to condemnation.We have seen,
however, that there are exceptionsto this
rule-that when a given law is unjust or
detractsfrom the publicgood, the obligation to obey can be overridden.
It seems that the force of the obligation
to obey a given law can be assessedafter
the model of the obligation to keep a
promise. We have seen that the force of
the obligation to keep a promise is comprised of the value of the performance
that gives rise to the promise, combined
with the value of the consequences of
keepingor breakingit. As we have seen,
the force of the obligationto obey a given
law depends on two factors. We have,
first, the generalizedconsequencesof obedience to the law, its content value. Second is one particulargeneralizedconsequenceof obedienceor disobedience,that
bearing on the law's contributionto the
rule of law throughoutsociety, its institutional value. Once again, in the abstractit
is difficult to specify the force of a given
1247
This content downloaded from 128.143.23.241 on Tue, 20 May 2014 18:43:33 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
American Political Science Review Vol. 84
law. However, the analysishereshouldbe
helpful in indicating the factors to be
taken into account in assessingany given
case.
It appearsthat all laws have positiveinstitutionalvalue, though some laws have
greaterinstitutionalvalue than others, as
generalized obedience to them is more
centralto maintenanceof the rule of law
in society. In assessingthe moral force of
a given law, institutionalvalue should be
combined with content value. As noted,
institutionalvalue will vary in relationto
the contributionthat generalobedienceto
a given law makesto the ruleof law. Content value will also vary in strength. As
the consequencesof generalobedienceto
differentlaws become increasinglyimportant, the value of their corresponding
obligationswill increase.But as we have
seen, in some cases the consequencesof
general adherenceto a given law will be
either negligible or actually harmful. In
certain cases negative content value can
negate or actually overridepositive institutionalvalue, and the obligationto obey
certain laws will be of little or no force.
Suchlaws are often recognizedby the fact
that they are violated openly, with little
condemnation.It seems that laws of this
sort should be stricken from the books,
because of the potentially corrosive effects of theiropen violation on the rule of
law throughoutsociety.
ment confirms both up to a point. We
have seen that the obligation to obey a
specificlaw is in part a functionof its consequences(generalizedconsequences).We
have also seen important institutional
considerationsthat supportobligationsto
obey all laws. In regardto these factors,
the law is a seamlessweb; within limits,
disobedienceof any law underminesthe
habit of obedience on which the entire
legal system rests.
I believe that our intuitionsabout political obligation support both a presumption that a law should be obeyed because
it is a law-a presumptionthat is subject
to being overriddenby the negativevalue
of specific laws-and the view that obligations to obey differentlaws differ significantlyin force. We have seen that the
force of the obligation to obey a specific
law can be interpretedas a combination
of the law's content and institutional
values and that fairness theory accounts
for both of these components. The fact
that fairnesstheory is able to ground our
intuitions about the varying force of
political obligations is a significantconsiderationin favor of its claim to support
a workabletheory of politicalobligation.
Conclusion
I have discussedtwo differentways in
which the moral force of political obligations is commonly evaluated. Smith
assesses political obligations in terms of
their consequences and notes that the
obligationsto obey certainlaws appearto
be weak. Finnisdiscussesthe interwoven
complexityof legal systems. Viewing the
law as a seamless web, he believes that
thereis a significantobligationto obey all
laws. It seems that both of these approaches are partially correct; my argu-
Notes
This researchwas supportedby a Universityof
VirginiaSesquicentennialgrant. For assistanceand
commentsI thankBartGruzalski.An earlierversion
of this paperwas presentedat the 1990 meetingof
the MidwestPoliticalScienceAssociation.
1. Forthe conceptof obligation,see Brandt1964;
for its wider use in discussionsof political obligation, see Simmons1979, chap. 1 and Smith 1973,
950-52.
2. Cf. the languageof Ross1930, 18-20; for problems with his language,see Searle1978.
3. Smith'sadditionalargumentconcerningthe additive force of the obligationto obey the law (1973,
970-71) will not be discussedhere; but see below,
n. 16.
4. See below, n. 16.
5. For differentanalyses, see Prichard1968, and
the exchangebetweenRaz (1972)and MacCormick
(1972).
6. To keep discussionreasonablysimple,I do not
1248
This content downloaded from 128.143.23.241 on Tue, 20 May 2014 18:43:33 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Political Obligations
discussadditionalfactorsrelevantto the rightnessor
wrongfulnessof promises,as, for instance,if fulfilling a given promisewould cause one to violate certainindividuals'rightsor wouldbe inherentlywrong
for otherreasons.Obviously,if rightswouldbe violated by Adam's fulfilling some promise or if it
would be inherentlywrong for him to keep it for
some other reason, this would tell stronglyagainst
his obligationto keep it.
7. Though I believe that consent.theory is irretrievablyflawed,it would still meritconsiderationif
all othertheoriesof politicalobligationwereequally
or more defective. Although the matter cannot be
discussedherein detail, I believethis is not the case.
Becausethe principleof fairnessroots obligationsin
the receiptof benefitsand does not requirespecific
voluntary performances,it is able to ground a
theory of political obligationthat possessesthe advantages of consent theory without its disadvantages; see Klosko 1987a. An excellentdiscussionof
consent theory and its flaws is found in Simmons
1979, chaps. 3-4.
8. Public goods (as the term is generallyused)
are also characterizedby nonrival consumption,
that is, that one individual'sconsumptionof a given
good will not affectthe amountavailablefor others.
This condition is not directly relevantto my concernsand so is not discussed..
9. An importantrecentdiscussionis Parfit1984,
part 1. Though the cases under discussioncan be
referredto as prisoner'sdilemmacases, they do not
fall under the prisoner'sdilemmain the technical
sense. In prisoner'sdilemma cases the different
participantshave differentmaximands,whereasin
the cases underdiscussionwe can assumecommon
interest;see Regan1980, 62-63.
10. This line of argumentis disputedby Parfit
(1984, chap. 3); his view is criticized in Klosko
1990b.
11. For criticismof utilitariangeneralization,see
Lyons1965 and Gruzalski1982.
12. See Broad 1915-16, Ewing1953, and Strang
1960.Forevidenceof connectionsbetweenA's political obligationsand the behaviorof otherpeople,see
Klosko 1987b.
13. 1 do not considervariousversionsof Kantianism becauseof the objectionablemetaphysicalcommitmentsthey generallyinvolve.
14. See Klosko 1987a, which respondsto important criticismsof the principleof fairness,including
those of Nozick 1974, 90-95 and Simmons 1979,
chap. 5. (See also Klosko1987bin criticismof Simmons.) Klosko 1990a respondsto Simmons'(1987)
criticismsof Klosko1987a.
15. Individualswho are believed to violate the
spirit,as opposedto the letter,of suchlaws are also
censured. It seems, however, that those who are
believedto violate the letter(as well as the spirit)are
criticizedmoreharshly,as is indicatedby publicattitudesin regardto the recentinsidertradingcases
on Wall Streetor the tax law conviction of Leona
Helmsley.
16. The generalizedconsequencetest does not
seem clearlyto apply to certainactionsthat violate
laws, especially criminal laws prohibitingactions
thatentaildirectand immediateharms(suchas laws
against murder, robbery, and rape). It should be
noted, however, that the test does seem to apply in
certaincases (e.g., white-collarcrime,stealingfrom
the rich, and robbingbanks) in which the actions
under considerationare strongly condemnedeven
though it is not clear that they cause immediate
harm.Becauseacts such as murderand rapeare immediatelyharmful(andso, clearlywrong),the test is
not normallyappealedto. But this does not indicate
that-it does not identify an additional respect in
which the acts are wrong. As is seen in Smith'sexample of the moral differencebetweenkilling 1000
people and killing 1001 people (1973, 970, n. 37),
our intuitions are not always reliable in cases in
which we identifyadditionalrespectsin which acts
that are obviously reprehensibleare wrong. It
shouldalso be noted that criminallaws performimportant coordinationfunctions in society so that
general adherenceplays an obvious role in maintainingthe social fabric;see Boardman1987.
17. It is not necessaryfor us to sort out different
aspectsof the rule of law and the values associated
with each. On the formalconceptionof the rule of
law and its benefits(whicharedistinctfromthe protection of persons from coercive interferenceby
others),see Raz 1979, chap. 11. I attemptto capture
aspectsof the ruleof law in this sensein discussinga
workingdecisionprocedure,whichprovidessociety
with stable, predictablerulesgoverningsocial interaction.
18. Thoughmy overallargumentdoes not require
any particularaccount of the obligation to keep
promises,the analogy between this obligationand
that to obey the law is moreclearlyseen if we accept
(for the sake of argument)an accountthat roots the
obligationto keep promiseson concernsof fairness;
for this analysis,see Rawls1971, sec. 52. According
to this construction,if A breaksa promiseto B, his
wrong is twofold: (1) the damagedone to B, who
reliedon A to keep the promiseand (2) the unfairness of breakinga promise.Accordingto a fairness
account, the practiceof promisingrests on general
adherenceto its rules. By makingand then breaking
a promise, A acts unfairly;he takes an advantage
thatcannotbe extendedto thosewhose effortsmake
it possible. If we acceptthis construction,the force
of promissory obligations involves factors very
similarto those seen in politicalobligations,as discussedin this section.
19. Aristotle,Politics,2. 13-14; ThomasAquinas,
Summatheologica,1-12. 97. 2 (in D'Entreves1973,
72-73).
20. In contrastto Smith(1973),who believesthat
obligationsto obey laws becausethey arelaws areof
1249
This content downloaded from 128.143.23.241 on Tue, 20 May 2014 18:43:33 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
American Political Science Review Vol. 84
only slight moral force, the argumenthere suggests
that the force of such obligationswill vary. Some
laws have slight force, while others have much
more, dependingupon the contributionthat general
adherenceto a given law makesto the ruleof law in
society.
References
Arneson, Richard. 1982. "The Principle of Fairness
and Free-Rider Problems." Ethics 92:616-33.
Boardman, William S. 1987. "Coordination and the
Moral Obligation to Obey the Law." Ethics
97:546-57.
Brandt, Richard B. 1964. "The Concepts of Obligation and Duty." Mind 73:374-93.
Broad, C. D. 1915-16. "On the Function of False
Hypotheses in Ethics." International Journal of
Ethics 26:377-97.
Brock, Dan W. 1973. "Recent Work in Utilitarianism." American Philosophical Quarterly 10:
241-76.
D'Entreves, A. P., ed. 1959. Aquinas: Selected
Political Writings. London: Basil Blackwell.
Ewing, A. C. 1953. 'What Would Happen If Everyone Acted Like Me?" Philosophy 28:16-29.
Finnis, John. 1984. "The Authority of Law in the
Predicament of Contemporary Social Theory."
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics, and Public
Policy 1:115-37.
Griffin, James. 1982. 'Modern Utilitarianism."
Revue international de philosophic 36:331-75.
Grube, G. M. A., trans. 1978. "The Crito" in The
Trial and Death of Socrates. Indianapolis:
Hackett.
Gruzalski, Bart. 1982. "The Defeat of Utilitarian
Generalization." Ethics 93:22-38.
Hart, H. L. A. 1955- "Are There Any Natural
Rights?" Philosophical Review 64:175-91.
Hart, H. L. A. 1958. "Legaland Moral Obligation."
In Essays in Moral Philosophy, ed. Abraham I.
Melden. Seattle: University of Washington
Press.
Hobbes, Thomas. 1968. Leviathan. Ed. Crawford B.
Macpherson. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Kiosko, George. 1987a. "Presumptive Benefit, Fairness, and Political Obligation." Philosophy and
Public Affairs 16:241-59.
Klosko, George. 1987b. "The Principle of Fairness
and Political Obligation." Ethics 97:353-62.
Klosko, George. 1990a. "The Obligation to Con-
tributeto DiscretionaryPublicGoods."Political
Studies38:196-214.
Klosko, George. 1990b. "Parfit'sMoral Arithmetic
and the Obligationto Obey the Law."Canadian
Journalof Philosophy20:191-214.
Lyons,David. 1965.FormsandLimitsof Utilitarianism. Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.
MacCormick,Neil. 1972. "VoluntaryObligations
and Normative Powers,"pt. 1. Proceedingsof
the AristotelianSociety Suppl. 46:59-78.
Nozick, Robert.1974. Anarchy,State, and Utopia.
New York:BasicBooks.
Parfit, Derek. 1984. Reasonsand Persons.Oxford:
OxfordUniversityPress.
Pateman, Carole. 1979. The Problem of Political
Obligation.New York:Universityof California
Press.
Prichard, Harold A. 1968. Moral Obligation.
Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.
Rawls, John. 1964. "LegalObligationand the Duty
of Fair Play." In Law and Philosophy, ed. S.
Hook. New York:New YorkUniversityPress.
Rawls,John.1971.A Theoryof Justice.Cambridge:
HarvardUniversityPress.
Raz, Joseph. 1972. 'Voluntary Obligations and
Normative Powers," pt. 2. Proceedingsof the
AristotelianSociety Suppl. 46:79-102.
Raz, Joseph.1979. The Authorityof Law. Oxford:
OxfordUniversityPress.
Raz, Joseph.1984. 'The ObligationTo Obey: Revision and. Tradition."Notre Dame Journal of
Law, Ethics,and PublicPolicy 1:139-55.
Raz, Joseph. 1986. The Morality of Freedom.
Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.
Regan,Donald. 1980. Utilitarianismand Co-operation. Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.
Ross, William D. 1930. The Right and the Good.
Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.
Searle, John. 1978. "PrimaFacie Obligations."In
PracticalReasoning,ed. J. Raz. Oxford:Oxford
UniversityPress.
Simmons, A. John. 1979. Moral Principles and
Political Obligations.Princeton:PrincetonUniversity Press.
Simmons,A. John. 1987. "TheAnarchistPosition:
A Reply to Klosko and Senor."Philosophyand
PublicAffairs16:269-79.
Smith,M. B. E. 1973. "IsTherea PrimaFacieObligation To Obey the Law?"Yale Law Journal
82:950-76.
Strang,Colin. 1960..'WhatIf EveryoneDid That?"
DurhamUniversityJournal53:5-10.
GeorgeKloskois AssociateProfessorof Governmentand ForeignAffairs,University
of Virginia,Charlottesville,VA 22901.
1250
This content downloaded from 128.143.23.241 on Tue, 20 May 2014 18:43:33 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions