The Principle of Non-intervention in China’s Foreign
Policy in the Post-Cold War Period
REN Mu
DISSERTATION
Submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in International Relations at Ritsumeikan University
Kyoto, Japan
June 2015
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This dissertation signifies the end of my long journey as a student studying in
the field of International Relations for eleven years. Of course, the study as a student
of IR will never reach the end. I begin with the expressions of my heartfelt thanks to
everyone I have encountered along my way to this temporary destination and of my
apologies to those whose names are not specified here. The completion of the
dissertation is a result that by no means attributes to only my effort. I am grateful to
the China Scholarship Council and Ritsumeikan University for providing me with the
opportunity to study in Japan. The China Scholarship Council offered me a three-year
scholarship. Ritsumeikan University funded my research trips to the Mainland China
and Taiwan.
In matters academic, my first thanks must go to my two principal advisors:
Professor Sachio Nakato and Professor Ryoji Nakagawa. I would like to thank
Professor Nakato, my supervisor at Ritsumeikan University. He kindly accepted me
as his doctoral student even though he had barely known me at that time. He has
taught me to improve my ability for empirical studies, while giving me room to freely
develop my interest. He has always given generously of his time and insights through
my study and encouraged me to keep on track. Professor Nakagawa, working as my
supervisor when Professor Nakato was in the US, gave me invaluable suggestions. I
continue to be deeply indebted to his generous help and advice. I am also delighted to
be able to thank Professor Keiji Nakatsuji and Professor Kenki Adachi. Their
i
constructive criticism on my study helped me recalibrate some of my own thinking in
history, theory, and methodology.
Jilin University in China nurtured my interests in IR. I spent the delightful
seven years living there and learning the basic knowledge of IR with the help of
professors in the university. My thanks exceptionally go to Professor Liu Xuelian, my
supervisor during the master study at Jilin University. Her rich academic experiences
abroad opened my vision and stimulated me to study overseas. I benefited greatly
from meetings and discussions with professors in College of Social Science at
National Sun Yat-sen University in Taiwan when I was studying there as a visiting
student during the semester in 2009 and 2010. The studying experience in Taiwan
motivated me to continue my study in IR.
I express my sincere thanks to all professors and researchers who accepted my
interviews in 2012 and 2013. These interviewees are all experts in the field of IR and
on China’s foreign policy in particular. They work at Tsinghua University, Peking
University, Jilin University, the Shanghai Academy of Social Science, National
Taiwan University, National Chunghsing University, and National Sun Yat-sen
University.
My biggest debt, however, is to my parents. They provided considerable moral
and financial support for my very long student career, which took me all the way to
Taiwan and Japan. Their faith in me has a source of my strength, and I therefore
dedicate this dissertation to them in loving appreciation.
ii
ABSTRACT
China has advocated the principle of non-intervention, which it applied as a
critical dogma to its relations with the rest of international society. Even though the
principle of non-intervention seemed obsolete to ensure China’s national interests, the
Chinese government is reluctant to abandon the principle. China’s adherence to the
principle of non-intervention thus raises a puzzle to observe China’s foreign policy.
This study takes the puzzle as the departure and attempts to investigate what role the
principle of non-intervention has played in China’s foreign policy and to what extent
the principle affects or restricts China’s foreign policy both in discourse and in
practice.
The dichotomies of the norm of non-intervention and interventionist practices
perplex China’s foreign policy. China’s foreign policy is not always consistent with its
rhetorical insistence on the principle of non-intervention in its diplomatic history. The
border between the principle of non-intervention and interventionist behavior in
China’s foreign policy depends on Chinese identity and China’s foreign policy
decision makers’ perceptions of international order and structure, thereby changing
the connotation and denotation of the non-intervention policy across various periods.
In the post-Cold War period, China’s non-intervention policy embodies the
combination of principle and flexibility and characteristics of both value and strategic
instrument. The principle of non-intervention does affect China’s decision-making
processes, but the extent of the effect varies. To what extent that the behavior of
China’s foreign policy varies in its degree of consistency with the principle of nonintervention in different international interventions depends on China’s perceptions on
iii
the pressure and opportunity brought by the international system, and the perceptions
are constrained by its domestic concerns.
iv
要約
中国は国際社会との関係において、他国の内政には干渉しない不介入政
策を原則としてきた。国際環境が変化し、中国の国力が増大する一方、不介
入政策は中国の国益に合致しない側面が生じている。しかし、中国政府の外
交文献及び発言などから見られる当該政策の重要度は依然として高い。本論
文はこの問題点を切口にし、不介入政策が中国外交に果たす役割、与える影
響とその限界を分析することにより、中国政府が不介入政策を実施し続ける
要因と、不介入政策に基づく中国外交の意思決定プロセスの解明を目的にし
ている。
本論においては、主権体系の下における重要な国際規範としての不干渉
原則について検討しており、国際関係史上の異なる時期における不干渉原則
と干渉行為の共存のあり方を探っている。このようなことを通じてわれわれ
は、国際社会における行為主体の不干渉原則に対する理解は、当該規範の内
生的な矛盾性により影響されており、またその矛盾性により行為主体の国際
行為が形付けられていることがわかる。その中で、国際社会の一構成員とし
ての中国も、当然ながらその規範の矛盾的本質の影響を受けざるをえないの
である。不干渉原則に対する認識をめぐり、国際社会による継続的な修正に
伴い、当該原則の適用範囲に対する中国政府の認識も変化しつつある。つま
り中国の場合、原則的には不干渉原則に準拠しつつも、実際の行動面におい
ては十分な柔軟性を見せており、それゆえ「言行不一致」ともみえる結果を
生み出している。あるいは、実際中国政府が諸々の国際干渉にかかわる意思
決定や実践活動を行ってきたにもかかわらず、それらの行為は中国の準拠す
る不干渉原則に矛盾しない行為であると中国政府により認識されることにも
由来するであろう。
ポスト冷戦期における中国の外交実践の発展に伴い、不干渉原則はいま
や道具性と価値性を兼備する外交上の指導原則になっている。中国にとって
いえば、不干渉原則は国際規範であるだけでなく、その原則に従っているの
v
は半植民地時代に起源を持ち、それゆえ価値性が付与されている。不干渉原
則は大多数の発展途上国により認められており、当該原則を提唱することは
中国とその国家との関係保全に有利であると同時に、中国の国内秩序の維持
において他国からの介入を免れる有効な道具でもある。このような不介入政
策の二重の性質こそが、中国外交の意思決定プロセスに実用主義的色付けを
しており、また、中国を国際社会の主流意見に背く方向に導いている。国際
社会に参与する際に、とくに国連の介入行為について討議する場合には、中
国の外交政策の意思決定に至るプロセスは慎重である。中国の外交政策の意
思決定において、国際社会の体系及びそのメンバー間の関係要因と当時の国
際秩序は決定的要因になっており、その国際体系的要因から生み出される圧
力が中国の外交政策を不干渉原則から掛け離れさせる遠心力になっており、
国内秩序の維持への考慮がそれを牽制する求心力になっている。国際干渉に
対する中国の外交政策の意思決定プロセスは不干渉原則の影響を受けており、
その影響の程度は、具体的ケースの差異により相違を見せている。以上述べ
たように、中国の外交行為における「干渉行為」の不干渉原則から掛け離れ
る程度は、国際社会からの圧力と機会により決められるのであり、この圧力
と機会が中国国内秩序の脆弱性にもたらし得る潜在的影響に対する中国側の
認知が、中国の具体的な外交政策を形作るのである。
vi
摘要
不干涉他国内政原则是中国外交重要的指导原则之一。因而中国被国际社
会视为信奉绝对主权的国家。随着国际环境的变化以及中国国力的增强，不干
涉原则逐渐成为中国外交的掣肘，但是中国政府一如既往地重视并屡屡于外交
文件及话语中提及不干涉原则。本文以此为出发点，试图深入理解不干涉原则
在中国外交中所扮演的角色，以及其对中国外交决策制定的影响和制约，以期
对中国坚持不干涉原则的原因以及中国不干涉外交的决策过程提供相对科学的
解释。本文以多元主义为方法论基础，遵循从宏观到微观的逻辑，应用相关的
国际关系理论对后冷战时期中国的不干涉外交进行解读，以国际关系理论为基
础观察中国的外交行为，同时对现有理论作出修正并建立具有解释力的分析框
架，进而以案例研究证明所建立的理论框架。
通过对不干涉原则作为主权体系下的重要国际规范进行的探讨，以及对不
干涉原则以及干涉行为在国际关系史中不同时期的共生形态的追溯，可见该规
范的内生矛盾性影响了国际社会行为体对其的理解和认知，从而形塑不同行为
主体的国际行为。中国作为当今国际社会的成员之一，不可避免地受到该规范
的矛盾性本质的影响。因国际社会不断修正以及通过实践重塑对不干涉原则的
认知，中国的对该原则的适用范围的理解亦随之发生变化。虽然其对不干涉原
则的坚持依然，但是其行为上却十分灵活，从而导致了其言行不一致的结果。
虽参与了诸多国际干涉的决策和具体实践活动，但中国政府却并不认为与其所
坚持的原则相冲突, 而是原则性与灵活性的统一。
vii
随着后冷战时期中国外交实践的发展，不干涉原则业已成为兼具工具性与
价值性的外交指导原则。于中国而言， 除却不干涉原则系国际规范外，坚持该
原则还源于其半殖民地的历史，因此不干涉原则被赋予其价值性。因该原则被
国际社会大多数发展中国家所认可，对该原则的提倡有助于拉近中国与这些国
家的关系，同时，该原则亦是维护本国国内秩序免受外来威胁的有效工具。此
双重性质使中国的具体外交政策决策过程中显现出实用主义的色彩，同时又使
中国数度与国际社会的主流意见背离。在参与国际社会，尤其是联合国干涉行
动的商议过程中，中国的外交政策是审慎决策的结果。国际社会的体系以及其
成员的互动因素和当前的国际秩序是中国外交政策的决定性因素，体系因素产
生的压力导致了其具体外交政策偏离于不干涉原则，而对国内秩序的维持的考
量是限制因素。不干涉原则影响中国对国际干涉的外交决策过程，而这种影响
的程度因所处理的具体国际问题的差异而有所区隔。总而言之，中国外交行为
在何种程度上呈现偏离于不干涉原则的干涉行为取决于国际社会所带来的压力
与机遇，而中国对于此国际压力和机遇对其国内秩序脆弱性所产生的潜在影响
的认知形塑了其具体的外交政策。
viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS......................................................................................................... i
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................... iii
要約 .......................................................................................................................................... v
摘要 ....................................................................................................................................... vii
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES ...................................................................................... xi
TECHNICAL NOTES .......................................................................................................... xii
DECLARATION .................................................................................................................. xiii
ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................................. xiv
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 1
Research Background: Non-intervention in the Contemporary World ................... 1
Research Subject: Why China Matters Regarding Non-intervention in the PostCold War Era .................................................................................................................................. 3
Literature Review: A Missing Piece in Study of China’s Foreign Policy ................... 7
Research Questions: Puzzles of China’s Non-intervention Policy ............................ 14
Research Methodology: An Approach of Eclecticism ....................................................15
Research Framework: Structure and Process .................................................................20
CHAPTER 1 INTERPRETING (NON)-INTERVENTION AND TURNING TO THE
CHINA’S CASE ..................................................................................................................... 22
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 22
Dichotomies of Non-intervention/Intervention in Theory and Practice ..............23
Continuity and Evolution of (Non)-intervention in Modern International
Societies ........................................................................................................................................32
China’s Approaches to (Non)-intervention in Its Diplomatic History ....................43
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................................63
CHAPTER 2 EXPLORING CHINA’S NON-INTERVENTION POLICY IN THE
POST-COLD WAR ERA ..................................................................................................... 65
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 65
Deficiencies of Different Paradigms in Explaining China’s Non-intervention
Policy ..............................................................................................................................................66
The Marriage of Neo-classical Realism and English School........................................72
Motivations Underlying China’s Non-intervention Policy ..........................................81
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 106
CHAPTER 3 AUTHORIZING INTERVENTIONS: THE CASES OF THE GULF WAR,
AFGHANISTAN, AND NORTH KOREA ....................................................................... 108
Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 108
Case 1: Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait (1990-1991)............................................................ 109
Case 2: Antiterrorism in Afghanistan (2000-2012) ................................................... 123
ix
Case 3: The Sanctions Against North Korea (2006-2009) ........................................ 136
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 147
CHAPTER 4 CONCEDING INTERVENTIONS: THE CASES OF CRIMEA, LIBYA,
AND DARFUR ................................................................................................................... 148
Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 148
Case 4: The Crimean Issue in Ukraine (February–June 2014) ............................... 149
Case 5: The Libya Conflict (2011) ..................................................................................... 157
Case 6: The Darfur Crisis in Sudan (2004-2007) ......................................................... 165
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 180
CHAPTER 5 OPPOSING INTERVENTIONS: THE CASES OF KOSOVO, SYRIA,
AND ZIMBABWE ............................................................................................................. 181
Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 181
Case 7: The Kosovo Crisis (1998-1999) .......................................................................... 182
Case 8: The Syrian Crisis (2011-2013) ............................................................................ 192
Case 9: Veto on Zimbabwe Issues (2008) ....................................................................... 208
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 213
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................... 215
Continuity and Change .......................................................................................................... 215
Compliance and Resistance ................................................................................................ 220
Value and Instrument ........................................................................................................... 229
REFERENCES .................................................................................................................... 233
APPENDIX ......................................................................................................................... 281
CURRICULUM VITAE ..................................................................................................... 290
x
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1 Chinese Sanctions-related Votes in the UNSC ............................................... 55
Table 2 Theoretical Assumptions and Logic of Neo-classical Realism ....................... 76
Table 3 Causal Mechanism of the Analytical Framework........................................... 80
Table 4 Motivations of China’s Non-intervention Policy in the Post-Cold War Era .. 95
Table 5 Patterns of China’s Non-intervention Policy in the Post-Cold War Period (1)
............................................................................................................................ 100
Table 6 Patterns of China’s Non-intervention Policy in the Post-Cold War Period (2)
............................................................................................................................ 105
Table 7 Key Gulf War-related UNSC Resolutions and China’s Responses .............. 113
Table 8 Motivations of China’s Foreign Policy Toward Interventions in Iraqi-Kuwaiti
Issues .................................................................................................................. 122
Table 9 China’s Attitudes Toward UNSC Sanctions Against the Taliban in
Afghanistan ........................................................................................................ 126
Table 10 Dynamics of China’s Foreign Policy Toward Afghanistan ........................ 135
Table 11 China Voting on the Main Sanctions Against North Korea (2006-2013)... 137
Table 12 China’s Non-intervention Policy in the Case of North Korea .................... 146
Table 13 Causal Mechanisms of China’s Foreign Policy Toward the Crimean Issue
............................................................................................................................ 156
Table 14 Voting in the UNSC on Sanctions Against Libya........................................ 159
Table 15 China’s Non-intervention Policy Toward the Libya Conflict ..................... 164
Table 16 Key Darfur-related UNSC Resolutions (2004-2007).................................. 172
Table 17 Motivations of China’s Non-intervention Policy Toward the Darfur Crisis
............................................................................................................................ 179
Table 18 Voting Records Regarding the Kosovo Crisis in the UNSC (1998-1999) .. 186
Table 19 Causal Mechanisms of China’s Foreign Policy Toward the Kosovo Crisis
............................................................................................................................ 191
Table 20 Voting Records on the Syrian Crisis in the UNSC (2011-2014)................. 198
Table 21 Causal Mechanisms of China’s Vetoes Regarding Syria ........................... 207
Table 22 China’s Veto on the UNSC Sanction Draft Against Zimbabwe .................. 213
Figure 1. Monthly Number of Articles That Reference “Sovereignty” in the People’s
Daily, January 1990–December 2011 .................................................................. 88
Figure 2. China-North Korea Trade (2000-2008) ..................................................... 143
Figure 3.The Crimean Crisis in Map (2014) ............................................................. 151
Figure 4. Map of Libya (2013) .................................................................................. 158
Figure 5. Map of Sudan (2007) ................................................................................. 167
Figure 6. Syria: Mapping the Conflict (2013) ........................................................... 196
xi
TECHNICAL NOTES
1. All the Chinese names in this dissertation, unless cited from other literature, are
transcribed in the Hanyu Pinyin Romanization system. Exceptions are made for the
respective names of Chinese personalities from areas and countries beyond the
Mainland China, such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore.
2. Family names precede given names for Chinese individuals.
3. Quotations from sources in Chinese and Japanese languages are translated into
English. Terms and expressions in the original text of quotations are written in the
form of Chinese characters or Pinyin Romanization and parenthesized.
xii
DECLARATION
I declare that this dissertation is solely my own work.
Parts of this dissertation are constructed upon my articles that have been published in
academic journals and revised.
xiii
ABBREVIATIONS
AMIS
African Union Mission in Sudan: AU ceasefire observer-cumpeacekeeping mission
APEC
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF
ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU
African Union
AUPSC
Peace and Security Council of the African Union
BRICS
Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
CCP
Chinese Communist Party
CCTV
China Central Television
CFM
Chinese Foreign Ministry
CNPC
China’s National Petroleum Company
CSIS
Center for Strategic and International Studies
DPA
Darfur Peace Agreement
ETIM
East Turkestan Islamic Movement
ETT
Eastern Turkistan Terrorists
EU
European Union
FBI
Federal Bureau of Investigation of the US
FPA
Foreign Policy Analysis
FRY
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
G8
Group of Eight
GNPOC
Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company
GoS
Government of Sudan
HSP
[Darfur] Heavy Support Package
xiv
ICC
International Criminal Court
ICJ
International Court of Justice
IL
International Law
IMF
International Monetary Fund
IOSC
Information Office of the State Council
IP
International Politics
IPT
International Political Theory
IR
International Relations
JEM
Justice and Equality Movement
KLA
Kosovo Liberation Army
LAS
League of Arab States
MDC
Movement for Democratic Change in Zimbabwe
MOC
Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China
NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCCPC
National Congress of the Communist Party of China
NCCS
National Co-ordination Committee of Syria
NIF
National Islamic Front in Sudan
NPC
National People’s Congress of PRC
NPT
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NTC
Libyan National Transitional Council
ODS
Official Document System of the UN
OIC
Organization of Islamic Cooperation
OPEC
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
OSCE
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
P5
Five Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council
xv
PELOAG
Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf
PKOs
Peacekeeping Operations
PRC
People’s Republic of China
PRST
Presidential Statement at the UNSC
R2P
Responsibility to Protect
SADC
Southern African Development Community
SAF
Sudanese Armed Forces
SCO
Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SCR.
UNSC Resolution
SIPRI
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SLM/A
Sudanese Liberation Movement/ Army
SNC
Syrian National Council
SPLM/A
Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/ Army
UK
United Kingdom
UN
United Nations
UNBISnet
UN Bibliographic Information System
UNGA
UN General Assembly
UNSC
UN Security Council
UNSCSC
UNSC Sanctions Committees
UNAMID
AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNHCR
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMIS
UN Mission in Sudan
UNSMIS
UN Supervision Mission in Syria
US
United States of America
USSR
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
xvi
WB
World Bank
WMD
Weapon of Mass Destruction
WTO
World Trade Organization
WWI
World War I
WWII
World War II
ZANU-PF
Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
xvii
INTRODUCTION
Research Background: Non-intervention in the Contemporary
World
Non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states has been viewed as an
attendant rule of sovereignty and is taken for granted by the majority of scholars and
policy makers. Scholars generally assume that the concept of non-intervention resides
under a sovereignty frame based on “territorially demarcated authority of the state”
(Abiew, 1999, p. 29; Krasner, 1999; Reus-Smit, 2013). The function of the principle
of non-intervention in world politics is, as John Vincent points out, “protecting the
principle of state sovereignty” (1974, p. 14). After WWII, states have increasingly
respected the principle of non-intervention as a result of the UN Charter’s
reinforcement of the principle of state sovereignty. This principle is regarded as a
foundation of the contemporary international order and a critical norm in international
politics. The practices of intervention, therefore, are viewed as either exceptions to or
violations of the non-intervention rule.
In the post-Cold War period, international society–predominantly Western
society–is continuing to move beyond the traditional concept of the modern states
system toward a post-Westphalia of limited sovereignty that must yield to democratic,
humanitarian, and economic needs (Jackson, 1990; Zhang Y., 1998; Ziegler, 2012).
The principle of non-intervention has been challenged by a steering mechanism of
contemporary international society, a high level of interdependence and interaction
between various international actors, including states and non-state actors, such as
international organizations, transnational corporations, and individuals (Adachi, 2015).
Driven by this mechanism, some international political phenomena are prominent:
1
one country’s problems easily spread beyond its border between domestic and
international politics, thus blurring the distinction between the two. Also, the number
of regional and international organizations has rapidly increased, which constrains the
absolute sovereignty of states; and the rights and security of individuals have been
paid more attention, which challenges the traditional concept of sovereignty based on
states.1 All these occurrences have shaken the root of state sovereignty and the norm
of non-intervention.
Permitting a non-state’s authority to intervene in a country or even to change
the regime of a country when that country’s activities violate a basic rule like free
trade or a common value such as human rights undermines the country’s sovereignty.
However, this kind of intervention has gradually become common and acceptable.
Humanitarian intervention, especially, has been viewed as the new norm and an
accountability of great powers in international society. All states are subject to the
truncated authority imposed by transnational forces. Therefore, tensions between the
non-intervention principle and the intervention practices plague many countries’
foreign policies, particularly those countries that advocate the absolute sovereignty
and non-intervention principle.2
1
The concept of sovereignty consists some dichotomous aspects, such as positive vs. negative
sovereignty and absolute vs. relative sovereignty. Negative interventions are usually conducted
covertly or by unilateral state, while collective interventions mandated by authorized international
organizations are legitimate. Absolute sovereignty here refers to that rules possess the unfettered right
to wage war and to engage in foreign conquests on the basis of raison d’état without any constraints
imposed by other authorities (Williams, Hadfield, & Rofe, 2012, p.115).
2
The majority of states do not enjoy the complete domestic sovereignty when facing restraints
on their authorities of the current international environment. These states, as Risse (2013) has argued,
contain “areas of limited statehood” to different degrees.
2
Research Subject: Why China Matters Regarding Non-intervention
in the Post-Cold War Era
China’s non-intervention policy is placed at the center of this dissertation
because the above-mentioned context makes China’s commitment to the principle of
non-intervention exceptionally peculiar.3 Non-intervention, as one item in the Five
Principles of Co-existence, was written into China’s Constitution in 1954 (NCCPC,
2004, Pref.), and the Chinese government has repeatedly emphasized its opposition to
interventions. The principle of non-intervention has therefore been understood as a
dogma of China’s foreign policy (Mitter, 2004; Carlson, 2010; Wu & Taylor, 2012).
Furthermore, China is distinctive because of its current great power status.
Few individual countries, especially great powers, take non-intervention as a
diplomatic principle. China is no longer a small power that countenances nonintervention purely for defense. It has the capability, or in some circumstances, the
responsibility, to intervene in others’ domestic affairs no matter whose interests are
concerned. Consequently, the principle of non-intervention places China’s foreign
policy in a dilemmatic position, as the principle is in conflict with Beijing’s political
objectives at times.
China purses national interests and values in international society without
sacrificing its power of exerting absolute sovereignty. It proactively engages in some
3
Although the principle of non-intervention is advocated by some developing countries and
enshrined in the treaties of regional organizations, such as the Constitutive Act of the AU, the Charter
of the ASEAN, and the Pact of the LAS, the degree of opposition of the member countries to
interventions varies. Chu (2001), in his conference paper, argued as follows: compared with Western
countries, most East Asian countries still strongly defend the traditional concepts of sovereignty and
firmly resist foreign interventions in their internal affairs of independent states, and the attitudes and
perspectives within East Asian countries on sovereignty and foreign interventions vary to different
degrees. It is worth noting that the AU has amended the application of non-intervention in the
Constitutive Act, which entitles the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the
Assembly in respect of grave circumstances (The AU, 2003, Article 4).
3
regional and international organizations, which inevitably confines China’s sovereign
rights; simultaneously, China struggles against the constraints on its sovereignty
imposed by the organizations.
Moreover, the non-intervention principle is unfavorable to China’s national
interests. China attempts to safeguard its expanding economic interests and security
across the world, to increase its international influence, and to promote its status in
the international community. However, its economic interests overseas might be
threatened owing to political turmoil in far-flung regions, such as the Middle East and
Africa. The non-intervention principle probably obstructs China’s involvement in
these regions and thus sacrifices Beijing’s economic interests.4 Furthermore, China’s
preference for non-intervention has been criticized by other countries, as a result of its
reluctance to support some international interventions and of its indifference to human
rights abuses in certain countries. China’s insistence on the principle of nonintervention is apparently inconsistent with its promise of being a responsible power.
If one takes these interests into consideration, the Chinese government ought to
abandon this hands-off principle when it comes to others’ domestic affairs. But this is
not the case.5 Chinese foreign policy makers still struggle with these dilemmas, which
gives rise to China’s ambivalence when it faces some thorny issues regarding
intervention. Therefore, why China prefers the principle of non-intervention and how
it deals with this ambivalence merit a closer analysis.
4
For example, China suffered massive economic loss in Libya because of the Libya War.
5
At least there is no sign that the Chinese government considers changing this policy in
official documents. For example, the “China’s white paper on national defense” published in 2010
explicitly reiterated, “China unswervingly pursues an independent foreign policy of peace and
promotes friendly cooperation with all countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence” (IOSC, 2011a).
4
The Analytical Period
This dissertation focuses on China’s foreign policy in the post-Cold War
period, because both the international environment China faces now and its domestic
objectives are different from what they were in the Cold War era.
International interventions have greatly increased during this period as the UN
started to exert its influence on dealing with international conflicts and issues. The
UN has been much more active in the management of peace and security after the
Cold War.6 The UN’s activism implies a heightened international concern with what
occurred in international society. The end of bipolarity and ideological confrontation
promoted a new international order to be formed, which generated a new international
norm and power configuration to all the actors in international society.
The objectives of China’s foreign policy have gradually transformed from
being ideology-centered to being interest-driven since the country was established in
1949. Ideology has been weakened in guiding China’s foreign policy since the 1970s.
China has significantly and comprehensively integrated into international society,
driven to do so particularly by its economic interests after the Cold War. As indicated
above, the objectives between obtaining interests and maintaining reputation in the
international arena are not totally incompatible, but did compete at times, especially
when they were associated with China’s non-intervention policy. The bigger its
6
Undeniably, the UN framework has proved inadequate and ineffective when confronting
some issues that threaten international peace and security. Despite the various problems the UN has,
especially the so-called "UNSC paralyzed," interventions authorized by the UNSC are commonly
viewed legitimate. In other words, states pursue the UN's mandate to be the moral basis of their
actions. Furthermore, the UN is important to China, and Kim (1999) and Tieh (2004) have discussed
the reasons. China’s White Paper on Peaceful Development specifies that it is important to give full
play to the UN’s role in maintaining world peace and security and in establishing a fair and effective
mechanism for upholding common security (IOSC, 2011b).
5
capability and interests grow, the more intense the dilemma becomes. The empirical
study on the interventions that have taken place in the post-Cold War period can
demonstrate how China copes with the dilemma concerning these international affairs.
Therefore, it is appropriate to underscore China’s behavior in the post-Cold War
period in studying how the non-intervention principle influences Beijing’s
involvement in international organizations and international interventions.
Although empirical examination of the post-Cold War period is the focus for
this study, it is inevitable to mention the issues in the Cold War period or even earlier.
The non-intervention principle and interventionist practices were present for a long
time before the post-Cold War era. It is difficult to capture the essence of the nonintervention principle and interventionist practices without examining the history of
this principle and phenomenon. Moreover, China’s non-intervention policy was
formulated in the Cold War period. A policy carried out by a given state that has not
experienced dramatic change, such as regime change, embodies a high degree of
continuity and stability in a certain time, whereas the state’s foreign policy is adjusted
in accordance with changes in the international environment. Although its regime (the
CCP) has not changed, China underwent changes in the international system and the
domestic demands. The Chinese government has applied various ideological concepts,
doctrines, and principles in its diplomatic history, such as united front, the People’s
War, the Five Principles of Co-existence and the Three Worlds theory, etc., but only
the Five Principles of Co-existence lasted for six decades. Therefore, a retrospective
look at China’s foreign policy regarding the principle of non-intervention in the Cold
War period will help us comprehensively understand China’s current non-intervention
policy.
6
Literature Review: A Missing Piece in Study of China’s Foreign
Policy
The IR community is never short of discussions on China’s issues, especially
its foreign policy. Scholars explored the uniqueness of China’s foreign policy from
the perspectives of Chinese traditional culture (Fairbank, 1968; Feuerwerker, 1972;
Bennett, 1979; Brzezinski, 2000), ideology and beliefs of political leaders (Van Slyke,
1967; Van Ness, 1970; Chan, 1979), national role concepts (Shih, 1988), domestic
political structure (Tretiak, 1981; Liberthal, 1982; Barnett, 1985), and domestic social
demands (Cumings, 1979; Zhao Q. , 1992). These explorations were based on the
methodologies of FPA, but emphasized different aspects, which provided profound
thoughts on China’s foreign policy.
Discussions on China have become more attractive since China’s economy
skyrocketed at the end of the twentieth century. Research regarding China’s foreign
policy was not limited to FPA. Instead, more studies focused on China’s international
behavior; specialists in studies on China have addressed various of issues: Johnson’s
influential study focused on China’s approach to arms control (1996; 2003); Foot and
Kent’s outstanding works emphasized China’s involvement in the international
human rights system (Foot, 2006; Kent, 1999); and Pearson (2004) considered
China’s role in the WTO. With a large number of studies on China’s foreign policy, it
is not possible to be comprehensive in this short review. Hence, this literature review
focuses on the motivations of China’s foreign policy and China’s international
behavior, such as its integration into international society, as discussions on
motivations are closely associated with foreign policy decision-making processes,
which will be discussed in the following chapters. This literature review is
categorized into three approaches according to different theoretical paradigms.
7
Furthermore, the last part of this review will discuss previous works with respect to
China’s non-intervention policy.
Power-pursuit Approach: Primary Motivation of the Rising Power
The approach of power pursuit is based on realism of IR theories–classical
realism in particular. Scholars following this approach have tried to prove theories of
power transition and hegemonic stability by discussing the interaction between China
and the US (Lampton, 2008; Layne, 2008; Drezner, 2009; Clark, 2011). For example,
the most well known argument is the inevitable conflicts between the US and China
maintained by Measrsheimer (2011), an observation that is a logical consequence
deduced by the theory of power transition. By dealing with the Sino-U.S. relations,
the relevant studies also reviewed U.S. China policy and summarized different
implications. Christensen (2006) elaborated U.S. policies toward the rise of China and
East Asia; he classified the previous discussions about U.S. China policy into two
categories: the zero-sum perspective and positive-sum perspective.7 Some scholars
have elaborated China’s foreign policy based on classical realism and pointed out the
power-maximum logic in China’s foreign policy (Christensen, 1996; Saunders, 2006;
Shirk, 2008); for example, Kitano (2011) argued that the China-centric order has been
the main tendency of China’s foreign strategy since the twenty-first century.
Other studies discussed China’s role in East Asia and Beijing’s possible
influence on the region, which focused on China’s foreign policy to the ASEAN and
SCO (Foot, 2006). Some scholars argued that China’s motivation for participating in
7
Although scholars from different perspectives, either the zero-sum or the positive-sum, have
diverse judgments on whether or not the U.S. policies were successful, they share a basic consensus
that the US has been and should be maintaining its presence in East Asia to balance China’s increasing
power.
8
numerous international organizations and turning to multilateralism in its foreign
policy was to oppose or constrain the US on moral grounds or at the level of norms
(Wu G. & Lansdowne, 2008), or to transfer its economic capability to political
influence (Kuik, 2008). Some analysts thought that China was welcomed as an engine
of economic growth, but its military modernization and increasing footprint created
palpable discomfort in its impact on global stability and the international system
(Bergsten, Freeman, Lardy, & Mitchell, 2008). Results concluded from this powerpursuit approach revealed China’s revisionism and judged that China is not satisfied
with the current international order and regime, and must constantly challenge the U.S.
leadership in world politics.
Rationalism-centered Approach: Cost-benefit Calculations
States pursue relative or absolute interests from the perspectives of realism
and neo-liberalism, and which approaches countries adopt depend on whether they
have the option or ability to pursue the maximization of interests.
Realists explain why China restrained itself from using force as its power
increased and it cooperated with other countries in regional and international
organizations (Economy & Oksenberg, 1999). They argued that China might harbor
the ambition of being a global great power, yet it has not possessed the commensurate
capabilities, thereby constraining the behavior that would have been robust (Terrill,
2005; Sutter, 2006; Cooney & Sato, 2009). Goldstein (2005) attributed China’s shift
in attitude toward multilateralism to the failure of its bilateralism in coping with
conflicts of the South China Sea. The experience of multilateralism praised in the Six
Party Talks underscored its willingness to advocate multilateralism and develop the
regime by itself (Wu X., 2009). China took advantage of multilateralism in regional
9
political and economic organizations and developed security cooperation with the
neighboring countries in order to ease their fear of China’s rising power and to mute
security dilemmas and avoid tests of military strength that it can presently ill afford
(Shambaugh, 2004; Fravel, 2005; Gill, 2007; Sutter, 2008; Goh, 2008).
Contrary to realists, the arguments from the neo-liberalist perspective
emphasized the positive implications of China’s rising power. Thus, China’s foreign
policy has been characterized as “reassurance based on cooperative security, dialogue,
and mutual economic benefit” (Lampton, 2005, p. 314). The existing literature
covered the themes that China’s participation in international economic regimes is
illustrated by the cases of WTO, IMF, WB, and APEC. The first factor of China’s
multilateralism is to decrease the cost to enter the economic regime and to maximize
its economic interests through participation in these organizations, which is driven by
the domestic demands of economic development (Mediros & Fravel, 2003; Zhao S.,
2004; Medeiros, 2009; Pang, 2011). In addition, the liberalism perspective
emphasized the accommodating elements in China’s national security strategy. For
example, Deng and Moore (2004) posited that China’s experience with and
perceptions of economic globalization have encouraged it to keep status quo and
participate in some international organizations.
The two theoretical paradigms based on rationalist cost-benefit calculations
provide different explanations for China’s foreign policy but lead to the same
conclusion: China’s foreign policy formation is a rational and prudent process with
which this study agrees. The different implications from the two paradigms and the
criticism to the assumption of rational choice, in other words, the cost-benefit
calculations, will be discussed in Chapter 2.
10
Norm-driven Approach: Narratives on China’s Socialization
The study of socialization is influenced by the major theoretical debates in
international relations. A theorizing paradigm based on rationalism considered a
country’s socialization as the expedient, and the effect of norm on a country’s
behavior has been overlooked. Constructivists argued that international norms and
institutions have a substantial influence on the practice of international relations. The
discussion of international norms and regimes regarding norm proliferation and the
domestic impact of compliance has been proceeding in recent years (Cortell, 1996;
Checkel, 1997, 1999; Bohman, 1999; Reus-Smit, 1999; Risse, 1999; Lake, 2003;
Buzan, 2004a). The norm-centered literature adopted the insights of constructivism
and argued that the reason for a country’s changed attitude and behavior in a
international organization is that the country internalized the value of certain
international regimes.
The previous studies argued that China has been socialized through
participating in multilateral organizations and dialogues (Johnston & Evans, 1999).
Medeiros and Fravel (2003) assessed that the decision-making of China’s foreign
policy has become less personalized and more institutionalized, and Chinese
diplomats have become more sophisticated in their articulation of the country’s goals.
Through examining the actions of China’s participation in the international Arms
Control Regime, some scholars conclude that China is probably transferring from a
reluctant observer to a promoter toward international norms (Johnston, 1996; Yuan I.,
2004; Chiu & Huang, 2010). Armstrong touched upon the integration of the once
revolutionary China into international society by taking steps to “conform to the
norms of the society of states” (1993, pp. 183-184). The studies on China’s foreign
11
policy regarding international norms were rich and provided us another perspective to
look at China’s issues, which is different from traditional FPA. However, there are
few sophisticated works on China’s non-intervention policy.
Non-intervention-related Research: Appreciation and Criticism
These studies discussed above are inclusive and provide insights into China’s
foreign policy. The specific theme of the principle of non-intervention in China’s
foreign policy, however, still remains underexplored. Chinese academia has failed to
discuss these questions, and instead, has focused on the debate about whether China
ought to abandon its non-intervention policy (Yan, X., 2011; Cui, 2012). For the most
part, however, Chinese scholars have either followed the government’s
pronouncement by justifying the non-intervention policy or defended the actual
interventionist activities for the government (Zhu& Liu, 2009; Qiao, 2011; Wang,
2011).
Western observations of China’s non-intervention policy are at odds about the
matter. Some scholars have argued that the Chinese government has been rigid in its
non-interventionist policy (Mitter, 2004; Ziegler, 2012), while the scholars taking the
opposite view have pointed out that China has carried out a more flexible and
pragmatic foreign policy concerning issues associated with sovereignty and
intervention (Nathan & Ross, 1997; Gill, 2007). Carlson’s (2004; 2005; 2006; 2010)
works on China’s sovereignty are most comprehensive and stimulating. These works
elaborate Beijing’s responses and approaches to sovereignty and intervention across
various time periods since China’s reform. In the book Unifying China, integrating
with the world: Securing Chinese sovereignty in the reform era, he provides a
framework for examining sovereignty, and the conception of sovereignty contains
12
four categories: territorial sovereignty, jurisdictional sovereignty, sovereign authority,
and economic sovereignty. He discusses non-intervention under the category of
sovereign authority by investigating the Chinese position on human rights. The
scholars who maintain the argument of China’s pragmatism have focused on China’s
changing policy toward PKOs (Fravel, 1996; Yuan J., 1998; Gill & Reilly, 2000; Gill,
2007; Gill & Huang, 2009). For example, Bräuner (2009) applies the perspective of
socialization to the analysis on China’s changing approach to sovereignty and
international interventions of PKOs and the R2P in the post-Cold War era.
The previous literature has only revealed some aspects of China’s nonintervention policy. These scholars explained China’s increased participation in
international interventions concentrating on PKOs and humanitarian intervention in
the light of China’s interests (Gill & Reilly, 2000; Gill, 2007; Gill & Huang, 2009;
Carlson, 2010; 2011; Karlsson, 2011; Duchâtel, Bräuner, & Hang, 2014). These
observations indicate the country’s tendency to soften its intransigence on the nonintervention principle and to widen the scope of interventionist activities. However,
the interest-oriented argument has not specified the priority of interests in China’s
foreign policy. The arguments have failed to explain why the Chinese government
favored the principle of non-intervention even if the interests and perspectives on
interventions had changed. In short, the oversight of previous literature is as follows.
First, it has not explicitly clarified how and where China’s non-intervention policy has
or has not changed. Second, it has not explained the incoherence of China’s approach
toward interventions. Lastly, most of the relevant literature has failed to provide
systematical causal mechanisms behind the patterns of China’s non-intervention
policy.
13
Research Questions: Puzzles of China’s Non-intervention Policy
The oversight of previous literature left two arduous tasks, which have
become the objectives of this study. First, a comprehensive and thorough examination
of China’s foreign policy concerning the principle of non-intervention is required.
Second, a valid causal explanation of China’s non-intervention policy, based on IR
theories, should be provided. In order to attain the objectives, this main inquiry is
raised and penetrates this entire study: Why, and in what ways, does the principle of
non-intervention matter in China’s foreign policy formation in the post-Cold War era?
This inquiry should be addressed by seeking the answers to these specific questions as
follows.
 What role has the non-intervention principle played in China’s foreign
policy? In other words, why does China espouse the principle of nonintervention, at least in rhetoric, despite the dilemmas that the principle
causes?
 To what extent does the principle of non-intervention affect or restrict
China’s foreign policy both in discourse and in practice?
Secondary Questions
1. How has China interpreted the principle of non-intervention?
2. How should one interpret China’s non-intervention policy?
3. What are the primary motives of China's diplomatic choices in dealing with
transnational issues? In other words, what factors determine or affect China’s
decision-making processes in certain interventions?
4. Under what conditions is China supportive of interventions or, alternatively,
reluctant and resistant to interventions?
14
Research Methodology: An Approach of Eclecticism
In order to answer these questions, this study adopts an approach of
eclecticism. As Sil and Katzenstein (2010) point out, a study following the logic of
eclecticism does not make methodological commitments, but synthesizes the relevant
insights drawn from existing theories to address specific problems. Therefore, a
pluralist methodology will be applied to examining the principle of non-intervention
and the dynamics of Chinese foreign policy regarding the principle of nonintervention.
Pluralist Methodology
This study not only uses insights merely from the theories within one
academic tradition, but also attempts to apply the elements across the boundaries, a
classification of international theories formulated by Snidal and Wendt (2009),
separating theorizing in IPT, IR, and IL. The Methodological pluralism is necessary
since the subject and questions of this research reflect normative, empirical, and legal
aspects simultaneously. Despite the fact that this dissertation does not explicitly
employ certain theories, such as constructivism and political sciences, it does take the
methodologies of these theories as the conceptual tools in interpreting the relevant
concepts and in understanding China’s foreign policy.
This research employs the methodologies of reflectivism and positivism. The
two methodologies are compatible during the analysis since they are employed to deal
with different questions. This approach is not concerned with or disturbed by their
ontological and epistemological differences. The author presumes that sovereignty
and non-intervention are the socially constructed concepts, not just the practice, in the
first place. This presumption, as Keohane (2013) argues, forces the discussants to
15
come to grips with the role of social norms in world politics. Hence, the discussion
about the norm of non-intervention in the history of IP is associated with an
interpretive and hermeneutic approach. The positivist methodology is applied to the
causation of China’s non-intervention policy.
In particular, a combination of neo-classical realism and the English School
theories based on the positivist methodology is applied to establish the causation
underlying China’s non-intervention policy. Theories are absolutely necessary in this
research. As Mearsheimer and Walt (2013) emphasize, not only do theories define
these key concepts, but also they identify the ways that independent, intervening, and
dependent variables fit together, therefore inferring testable hypotheses. The
theoretical bridge of neo-classical realism and the English School is useful, as it could
identify the variables of China’s decision-making processes by taking ideational and
material factors into consideration at both international and domestic levels. This
bridge is applicable since the two theorizing approaches share certain theoretical
assumptions, although their epistemological presumptions are not identical, which
will be discussed in detail below in Chapter 2.
Analytical Methods
To test the validity of the causal explanations for China’s non-intervention
policy, it is viable to adopt the three analytical methods in line with the pluralist
methodology: case study, process tracing, and analytical narratives. As Lake (2013)
has pointed out, the methodology drawing on history and case studies could test and
assess theories of foreign policy and international affairs with varying assumptions.
16
Case studies are a common research strategy and have been widely used in
discussing the causal mechanism of foreign policy. This case study method offers “the
detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test the
historical explanations that may be generalized” (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 5).
Therefore, case studies empirically investigate a contemporary phenomenon “within
its real-life context (Yin, 2009, p. 17),” and thus can prove and strengthen the validity
and utility of propositions one research establishes concerning the phenomenon.
The method of process tracing could demonstrate the linkage between causes
and outcomes. As George and Bennett (2005, p. 147) argue: “Process-tracing attempts
to empirically establish the posited intervening variables and implications that should
be true in a case if a particular explanation of that case is true.” This method is
appropriate to investigate the decision-making process and to explain how concerned
factors are translated into political outcomes. Analytical narratives construct the
organized material in a chronological order and a single coherent history to create a
theoretical account for a state’s foreign policy (Stone, 1981). Therefore, these three
methods are logically indispensable in testing the hypotheses based on the theoretical
framework of China’s non-intervention policy.
Case Selection Criteria
First, these entire cases selected must be typical and meet the purpose of this
research (Yin, 2009); thus, they must be theory-informative. Because this study has
applied multi-cases, not all cases are picked up distinctly by the standard of “most
likely” and “least likely” characters (Eckstein, 1975). Even so, these cases share
similarities: they are related to the issue of interventions either implemented by an
individual country or authorized by the UNSC to which China has different
17
corresponding responses; they appear a common feature in that they are anomalistic,
to a certain extent, for China’s foreign policy. China’s responses to these
interventions are seemingly not optimal in the sense of interest maximization and,
thus, cannot be sufficiently explained by existing theories. It is meaningful to
investigate these cases based on the proposed situations this research provides and to
clarify their characteristics and the patterns of Chinese responses. Hence, the cases are
designed to assess the patterns of China’s decisions-making regarding interventions.
Second, these cases are empirically significant. They fall within the major
issues involving international interventions in the post-Cold War period and are taken
from a wide range of geographical areas, thereby providing variation with diverse
dimensions. Most of these issues have been put on the UNSC agenda and discussed
both inside and outside the UN. They presented important affairs concerning
international stability, universal values, and the national interests of concerned
countries. The nine cases represent various issue areas and not only are they important
to the UNSC agenda, but also they are typical of China’s foreign policy, as they are
all associated with China’s non-intervention policy as well as Chinese concerns.
Study Methods
The primary methods of this study are qualitative, focusing on document
analyses and interviews. In addition to consulting the previous academic literature, the
author has also collected and analyzed governmental documents and news. When
undertaking research on such a sensitive topic, the author confronted a stark dearth of
empirical inquiries concerning China’s foreign policy. Some valuable data, such as
diplomatic documents that are unsettling or dangerous for domestic interests and the
country’s reputation, are viewed as being nationally confidential and thus have not
18
been published. Those so-called internal documents were inaccessible to the author.
In order to make up the deficiency of lacking first-hand materials, the author
conducted interviews with some experts in China’s foreign policy in Mainland China
and Taiwan. Although the opinions of these experts are second-hand material, some
of the experts work as advisors for the Chinese government or have a close
connection with governmental consultants. Therefore, some of the information they
provided or opinions they gave could be helpful for this research.
Clarification of Terms
The term “international society” is a description of a certain systemic
organization within which political actors or unites are bound by their consensus on
certain norms, orders, and institutions in world politics (国家間社会) (Adachi, 2015,
pp. 11-17). This term does not specifically refer to the jargon used by the English
School of IR, except for the discussion of the English School theories. It is
changeable with “international community” or “international system” according to the
context. The term “West” or “Western Society” in this dissertation refers to the
coalition of states, primarily located in Western Europe and North America, sharing
the perspective of maintaining the concept of limited sovereignty and taking the lead
in promoting humanitarian intervention.
A clarification needs to be made here. “International society” is also applied in
the review of (non)-intervention in the modern history of IP. Reviewing the principle
of non-intervention starts from early European history because the norm is a concept
that originates from European politics. So, the connotation of “international society”
in this part (the second section of Chapter 2) is territorially centered on Europe.
19
Non-intervention is both an international norm and one of China’s diplomatic
principles. So, the terms “non-intervention norm” and “non-intervention principle”
are interchangeable. “China’s non-intervention policy” refers to China’s foreign
policy with regard to (non)-intervention; it does not mean China never conducts
intervention. Concerning language translation, this research chooses “nonintervention” instead of “non-interference” to specifically describe China’s foreign
policy (中国的不干涉政策/中国の不介入政策).
Research Framework: Structure and Process
This dissertation addresses the research questions by a two-step research
process. It adopts the top–down structure based on the assumption of structure–agent
modality in IP. The first part focuses on discussions about (non)-intervention and
China’s non-intervention policy in a conceptual and theoretical context. Two chapters
proceed with the conceptual, descriptive, and theoretical analyses as the first step.
Chapter 1 first situates the theories and practices of intervention and nonintervention at the center to explore the essence and characteristics of the two
conceptions in world politics at a structural level. It then turns to China’s case in a
manner of description, which depicts how China has interpreted (non)-intervention
and how one should comprehend China’s non-intervention policy. A key point that
emerges from the discussion in this chapter is that the incongruity in China’s nonintervention policy between the rhetoric attachment to non-intervention and its
interventionist behavior is closely linked with the paradox between the nonintervention norm and interventionist practices in world politics.
20
Chapter 2 provides an analytical framework to theorize the causation of
China’s non-intervention policy. It first examines and points out the deficiencies of
the previous theories in explaining China’s non-intervention policy. Then, it provides
a theoretical framework to comprehensively interpret the motives and incentives
underlying China’s non-intervention policy. The framework combines the elements
and insights of neo-classical realism and the English School based on analytical
eclecticism. Lastly, this chapter draws on the implications of the causal mechanisms
of China’s non-intervention policy and offers four propositions comprised of six
patterns in China’s foreign policy decision-making processes.
The second step covers the case studies through which the propositions will be
tested and proved. Nine cases are under further scrutiny in Chapter 3, 4, and 5. They
are classified into three categories and distributed into three chapters according to
China’s reactions to the relevant interventions. Despite the fact that the classification
was based on the pattern-matching logic, almost all cases correspond to more than
one pattern because China responded differently to the issues according to the varying
contexts in each case. In Chapter 3, China’s cooperative reactions to the Gulf War, the
antiterrorism in Afghanistan, and sanctions imposed on North Korea are analyzed.
Chapter 4 investigates China’s concession to the interventions in the cases of the
Crimea issues, the Libyan humanitarian crisis, and the Darfur humanitarian crisis in
Sudan. Chapter 5 focuses on the cases of China’s resistance to interventions, which
comprise the Kosovo crisis, the Syria crisis, and Zimbabwe’s election violence.
The conclusion presents the findings that reflect key theoretical and empirical
implications of China’s non-intervention policy. It also summarizes some
contributions to the study on China’s foreign policy.
21
CHAPTER 1 INTERPRETING (NON)-INTERVENTION
AND TURNING TO THE CHINA’S CASE
Introduction
A discussion on China’s non-intervention policy requires precise explanations
of what the meaning of non-intervention is, what kinds of activities constitute
intervention, and what the non-intervention policy refers to. Scholars, policy makers,
diplomats, and individual citizens have extensively used the words intervention and
non-intervention principle in their discourse. However, these daily usages are
potentially confusing as a result of multiple interpretations of different people. Thus,
this chapter is firstly devoted to the definitions of intervention after developing a
discussion on (non)-intervention in theory and in practice in the fields of IL and IP.
It proceeds to consider the evolution of the non-intervention norm and
interventionist behavior in the history of IP. A conceptual and historical analysis will
help us understand the complex picture that encompasses the non-intervention norm
and practices of intervention in a longer-term context and, thus, interpret actors’
policies regarding (non)-intervention. This analysis can reduce the risk that we make
unsophisticated arguments or emotional value judgments. Based on the investigation
of (non)-intervention, this chapter lastly turns to the China’s case to discuss how
China has interpreted the principle of non-intervention and how one should
comprehend China’s non-intervention policy. This discussion focuses on the Chinese
government’s discourse and behavior with respect to intervention in its diplomatic
history in order to present a comprehensive picture of China’s non-intervention policy.
22
Dichotomies of Non-intervention/Intervention in Theory and Practice
In contemporary international politics, the principle of non-intervention can be
understood from a two-fold approach: a given country does not permit external actors
to intervene in its domestic affairs, nor will it intervene in other countries’ internal
issues. Albeit straightforward, this explanation hardly provides helpful criteria to
investigate international acts and to distinguish interventionist behavior in a given
country’s foreign policy. A clear demarcation of intervention shall be the starting
point.8 However, as some scholars have pointed out, intervention is difficult to be
defined because it is “both descriptive and normative” and often associated with “the
most pressing moral issues” (Rosenau, 1969, p. 149; Nye & Welch, 2011, p. 197).9
Therefore, this section first discusses the principle of non-intervention and
interventionist practices in the fields of IL and IP. Lastly, a definition of intervention
will be provided.
Non-intervention and Its Exceptions in IL
The principle of non-intervention in the domestic or territorial jurisdiction of
other states constitutes one of the foundations of contemporary international law
(Brownlie, 2008). It has become a customary law since a series of rules and
regulations were formulated under the UN framework. The current legal site of non-
8
An investigation of etymology of intervention is not helpful since intervention was initially
used as a purely diplomatic involvement in Europe during the 16th century. It was not until the 19th
century that intervention began to be used to refer to coercive interference by a state in the affairs of
another states (Trim, 2013).
9
Intervention is a long-standing subject in IP. Before international politics became a discipline
of social science in the early twentieth century, European philosophers and jurists had already started
contemplating theory and practice of intervention. For instance, Alberico Gentili (1552-1608),
Francisco Suarez (1548-1617), Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), Emerich de Vattel (1714-68), and John
Stuart Mill (1806-73), just name a few here.
23
intervention is Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which requires all members to “refrain
in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the purposes of the United Nations” (UN, 1945, p. 3). The UN Charter does not
explicitly specify non-intervention as a rule regulating relations between states, but it
has clarified the legal status of sovereign states and established the general prohibition
of military intervention as a rule.
In accordance with the UN Charter, the Friendly Relations Declaration
(UNGA, 1970) clearly states the principle of non-intervention:
No state or group of states has the right to intervene directly or indirectly, for
any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state.
Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or
attempted threats against the personality of the state or against its political,
economic, and cultural elements, are in violation of international law.
This Declaration not only prohibits intervention in other states but also
extends the scope of interventionist activities from the use of force to the spheres of
political, economics and culture. It reveals the coercive essence of intervention as
follows: “No state may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other
type of measures to coerce another state in order to obtain from it the subordination of
the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages of any kind.”
The ICJ in Nicaragua judgment of 1986 reaffirms the principle of nonintervention and reiterates the coercive characteristic of intervention. It clarifies as
follows, “Intervention is wrongful when it uses, in regard to such choices, methods of
24
coercion, particularly force, either in the direct form of military action or in the
indirect form of support for subversive activities in another State” (ICJ, 1986, para.
205).10 Accompanied with the thriving decolonization movements after WWII, the
principle of non-intervention has been reinforced, proliferated, and eventually widely
accepted as a norm in the international community.11 This principle therefore was
written into a number of international treaties.
Despite enjoying legitimacy in international law, the principle of nonintervention is “one of the most potent and elusive of all international principles”
(Jamnejad & Wood, 2009, p. 345). The principle led to various interpretations
because international law has not provided a clarified criterion to judge interventionist
behavior (Kinacioğlu, 2005). Moreover, there are some exceptions of the principle,
one of which is the boundaries for UN intervention itself. The authority of the UNSC
under the enforcement provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter is exempted from
the norm of non-intervention. According to UN Charter Article 2 (7), the UN has no
authority to intervene in matters that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of a subject
of international law, while “this principle shall not prejudice the application of
enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the Charter” (UN, 1945, p. 3). The
interventions authorized by the UNSC, which have been justified as the necessary acts
for regional and international security and peace, are not recognized as a violation of
the norm of non-intervention. Therefore, in the jurisprudential logic of the UN
Charter, non-intervention is the norm, and intervention is what must be justified
10
The element of coercion defines the very essence of prohibited interventions, which will be
discussed in the section “conceptualizing intervention.”
11
Before the WWII, most important constitutive norms of the Western international society,
such as sovereign integrity, did not apply to the whole non-Western countries that were taken as
barbarians by the Western countries (Jackson, 1990; Anand, 2003).
25
(Jackson, 1995). In this sense, intervention is not a practice that ought to be wholly
labeled as the moral inferior or the violation of international law. Rather, an
intervention might be an exceptional international action under certain circumstances,
such as in the arena of the UN, and the intervention overweighs the principle of nonintervention when valid reasons could warrant it.
Non-intervention and Its Predicaments in IP
In the field of IP, the principle of non-intervention has been considered a
logical corollary of sovereignty and a crucial measure in confronting the anarchical
international system since non-intervention is presumed as a key rule in maintaining
international order (Vincent, 1974). This normative principle indicates the reciprocal
recognition of sovereign states as independent and legal members in world politics.
Sovereign states possess jurisdiction over their territories and populations, and other
international actors must respect these states’ authorities. Likewise, sovereign states
are also obliged to respect other states’ jurisdictions. The norm of non-intervention
guarantees the authority of sovereign states, which signifies “a high degree of
insularity in the way it administers and governs the spatial domain over which it rules”
(Carslon, 2005, p. 16). Therefore, the non-intervention norm has been a wellestablished doctrine enjoying a universal assent in contemporary world politics, and it
is designed to serve “the state-centric system that had evolved since the settlement of
Westphalia” (Lyons & Mastanduno, 1995, p. 12).
26
Nevertheless, this ground norm has been frequently challenged, as nonintervention is often contradicted with other international norms in practices of IP.12
Interventionist activities are common phenomena, and intervention is described as a
“ubiquitous feature” in the history of world politics (Bull, 1986, p. 2). Nonintervention is based on a logic of absolute sovereignty, but the logic is almost ideal
and impractical in world politics, as long as the states are not isolated. Thus,
sovereignty is taken as a concept of “organized hypocrisy” (Krasner, 1999). IP
realism assumes that strong powers continually intervene in weak ones’ domestic
affairs for their own geostrategic and economic interests (Finnemore, 2003). The
liberalists argue that state sovereignty is being eroded or transcended because of the
globalization of economic relations, regional integration, and the development of neointerventionism (Strange, 1996; Santoro, 2010; Jones, 2011). The world-system
school scholars, represented by Immanuel Wallerstein, argue that globalized
capitalism leads to the division of core and periphery in world politics, and strong
capitalist states of the core use coercions with peripheral and semi-peripheral states
for their capitalist accumulations (Wallerstein, 1979). Some scholars, such as
feminists (Sterling-Folker, 2013) and solidarists in the English School (Linklater,
2011), build their arguments on epistemological individual or ethnics, and they
advocate necessary interventions to relieve humanitarian suffering.
Indeed, no aid or trade program, military action, or important diplomatic
communication can avoid having some impact on the public international realm of
sovereign states (Holsti, 1967; Jackson, 1995). Internal events that are completely
12
For example, some scholars point out the inherent contradictions between the norm of nonintervention and the rule of self-help, as well as between sovereignty and the right of self-determination
(Hoffman, 1986; McCarthy, 1993).
27
isolated from the external environment are rare, if there are any, in the contemporary
era presenting a high degree of interdependence. Once countries are involved in
international affairs and deal with their relations with others, it is difficult for them to
avoid interfering or being interfered with in domestic affairs. Therefore, scholars
summarized that interventionist behavior occurs almost every day.
Conceptualizing Intervention
As noted above, this preoccupation shared in the literature rests upon a broad
definition of intervention, which is a continuum of behavior that seeks to influence or
to interfere in the internal affairs of another state without the authority’s consent
(Donnelly, 1992). This definition largely contains all of the activities that are
undertaken to influence the political and social processes of other countries, including
military intervention, diplomacy, wars, foreign aid, diplomatic interference,
subversion, clandestine political action, and even inaction (Holsti, 1967, pp. 318-340;
Scott, 1968; Damrosch, 1989; Plant, 1993). The definition is problematic since it
constitutes all foreign activities of countries as intervention; therefore, it becomes
equal to international politics per se (Hoffman, 1986; Vincent & Wilson, 1993).
Accordingly, a question is raised here: If intervention is a daily behavior in IR,
is the norm of non-intervention invalid and valueless? The answer is obviously in the
negative. For instance, IP realist theories do not deny the role of sovereignty in the
international system, even though they do not consider norms’ role in IP complexes.
As Lyons and Mastanduno (1995) have summarized at the time of their writing, the
basic principles of Westphalian order, including non-intervention, have not been
fundamentally shaken by interventionist practices. Moreover, if intervention is
tantamount to all of the behavior of IR, then intervention per se will become
28
meaningless. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish intervention from other states’
activities.
Scholars have provided numerous criteria to judge intervention. Falk (1964,
pp. 40-41) divides intervention into five types: “Unilateral intervention, counterintervention, collective intervention, regional intervention and universal intervention.”
This classification only describes the types of intervention and does not clarify the
characteristics of intervention; thus, it cannot judge what kinds of acts are
interventions, and what acts are not. The oft-cited definition is from Oppenheim
(1992, p. 305): “Intervention is dictatorial interference by a state in the affairs of
another State for the purpose of maintaining or altering the actual condition of things.”
Stanley Hoffman (1986, pp. 9-10) points out the problems of this definition: Defining
intervention as act of dictatorial interference diminishes the application of the subject;
some activities called “explicit and implicit coercions,” for example, “rewards or
assistance to revolutionary groups or to opponents of a regime that one wants to unset,”
as well as bribery, are overlooked by this definition. Pearson (1974) offers a relatively
clarified indicator of intervention. He defines intervention as the movement of troops
of one country across the border of another. Based on this definition, Lyons and
Mastanduno provide the explicit purposes of interventionist behavior, which include
“transporting relief workers into the territory of a sovereign state to deliver
humanitarian assistance, providing materials to other states to suspend the internal
disorder or bombing a country’s nuclear or chemical facilities to stem the
development of weapons of mass destruction” (1995, p. 10). Although all of these
definitions have captured some important characteristics of intervention, they also
conclude a broad scope of the applications of intervention.
29
To provide descriptive and prescriptive criteria to discriminate empirical
phenomena, intervention in this research is redefined as the physical violation of the
realm of jurisdiction or authority of a widely recognized state, coercively conducted
by other actors unilaterally or collectively with clear-cut purposes of affecting the
target state’s decision-making process or domestic politics.
This redefinition presents some significant advantages. It delimits the
interventionist activities by emphasizing the characteristics and criteria of intervention.
Intervention is a specific modality of coercion. Some scholars have expressed this
essential nature. For instance, Thomas and Thomas (1956, p. 20) articulate that “the
essence of intervention is the attempt to compel.” Beloff (1968, p. 198) also describes
intervention as “the attempt by one state to affect the internal structure and external
behavior of other states through various degrees of coercion.” The coercive nature of
intervention excludes the activities that have been requested by the target states, such
as the PKOs invited by the target states.
Intervention represents organized and purposive activities to impose an
alteration or modification in the target states (Young, 1968, p. 178). Haphazard
activities and “transgressions as the product of incremental practices are not the
definition properly understood” (Reus-Smit, 2013, p. 1065). Intervention is associated
with physical activities across the territorial boundaries. Certain acts, such as political
propaganda and speeches of officials and diplomats in the actors’ country or the third
country concerning other countries’ domestic affairs, are not included under the
heading of intervention. Comparably, sanctions can be taken as intervention because
they are involved with mobility of materials and people.
30
Interveners and the target states must hold legally recognized authority. The
coercive activities conducted by certain social forces within or beyond one country
are not recognized as interventions, such as the act of terrorism. Border conflicts and
skirmishes between two sovereign countries for a disputed territory are not taken as
cases of intervention. In practice, certain interventions conducted under the condition
that the legitimate and autonomous government (i.e., domestic supreme authority)
does not exist even though the state’s sovereignty status is presented. Typical cases of
such interventions include Israeli intervention in Lebanon in the 1980s and
international intervention in Somalia in 1992.13 In such situations, interventions are
easily proved justifiable and thus become exceptions to the non-intervention principle.
This redefinition clarifies some confusing concepts. First, “interference” has a
broader scope of applications than that of intervention though in most contexts the
two terms frequently have been applied interchangeably. Strictly speaking,
interference connotes the broad definition of intervention, comprised of verbal and
behavioral coercions that aim to influence one country’s consideration of specific
issues and bring about political transformations. In contrast, intervention is usually
applied in international law (Mogami, 2004, p. 14). Second, “involvement” refers to
engagement with other states’ political decision-making processes. It “implies close
cooperation as two or more states work toward agreed and often shared purposes”
(Wriggins, 1968, p. 218). Activities like mediation, negotiation, and persuasion can be
categorized into this group of terminology. Involvement usually does not imply
coercive activities. Although it does not exclude one actor imposing political pressure
on another, in reality the process of involvement is not measurable.
13
For further information on this point, see Sadeghi (1993); Wheeler (2000); Lewis & Mayall
(2007).
31
Continuity and Evolution of (Non)-intervention in Modern
International Societies
International norms reflect a pattern of state practice, which is a product of
interactions between international actors. The “interplay between rules and [states’]
behavior” generates continual “normative change” (Sandholtz, 2007, p.10). The norm
of non-intervention is no exception. International actors have constantly reinterpreted
this norm and adjusted its applicability through their interactions. Wolff and Vattel,
jurists in the mid-18th century, were the first to clearly state the idea of equal rights of
sovereign states and their duty of non-intervention (Little, 1993). Although nonintervention has been seen as a logical corollary of sovereignty and a symbol of the
Westphalian system, it was not conceived simultaneously with the configuration of
states in which sovereignty has appeared. In practice, interventions have continually
been undertaken, although they change in character over time and place. Varying
international orders and respective norms demarcate standards and limitations
between the non-intervention rule and interventionist practices (Finnemore, 2003;
Keene, 2013; Macmillan, 2013a).
This section will review the non-intervention norm and intervention practice
in the modern history of world politics. Because of different understandings of
intervention in history, this review does not presume that the political actors of
interventions were sovereign states as we presently interpret them. There are several
different classifications of modern history in terms of religion and culture (Barzun,
2001) or of politics and economics (Kennedy, 1989). This review adopts the
following classification: heteronomous, bifurcated, and universal societies
(Macmillan, 2013a), based on characters and roles of sovereignty played in
international systems/societies.
32
Heteronomous International Society (1500 to 18th Century)
In the heteronomous international order of the early modern period,
intervention was not an action that violated territorially demarcated authorities.14
Instead, it was an encroachment on “a functional realm of jurisdiction” (Reus-Smit,
2013, p. 1066). It involved the relationship between sacral authority and temporal
powers. A pope’s realm of sacral authority and an emperor’s claimed realm of
temporal authority could not interfere with each other. Because jurisdiction and
ownership by a political actor were spatially separated, there was no line
distinguishing inside and outside politics in early modern Europe until the concept of
sovereignty emerged.15 In a heteronomous international society, thanks to the
diffusion of the concept of territory-bound sovereignty, European politics in
Christendom were entangled with tensions between states with de jure or de facto
sovereignty and sacral authority, as well as between sovereign states and
hegemonies.16
The concept of sovereignty was settled in the early 17th century with the Peace
of Westphalia. The Westphalian settlement neither inaugurated the concept of
absolute sovereignty nor created a non-intervention norm.17 Nevertheless, the
settlement on sovereignty empowered territorial states to enjoy a certain degree of
14
Some intervention practices investigated by philosophers and jurists were defined in the
present age as wars (Keene, 2013).
15
Trim (2011, p. 65) examines the interventionist behavior and relative theories in the history
of Europe and argues, “The conjuncture of state behavior and principles underpinning and molding it
indicates that a norm of intervention had emerged in early modern Europe.”
16
For details about these tensions, see Watson (2010).
17
The treaties of Westphalia established new mechanisms to check tyrannical power and
guaranteed the rights of minorities within Holy Roman Empire without fundamentally changing the
essence of heteronomous order (Trim, 2013, pp. 39-40).
33
autonomy.18 Jurisdiction and autonomy were stabilized within a territorial sovereign
state, which drew a basic demarcation between self and others and thus delimited
inside politics (Walker, 1993).
Absolute sovereignty did not exist, as political entities did not enjoy equality
in the hierarchical system of the heteronomous international society. The hierarchical
structure constantly restricted sovereign states and propelled intervention practice.
Two parallel interventionist phenomena took place behind the development of an
early form of territorial sovereignty from the early 17th century. One was the robust
colonization beyond European-Spanish expansion in the Americas and Portuguese
control in the Indian Ocean. Another was intervention in the affairs of territorial
sovereignties to “defuse confessional tension and constrain tyrannical rulers” (Trim,
2011, pp. 382-383). Driven by the desire to protect Protestants, the Aulic Council
under the Holy Roman Empire deposed or sanctioned some ruling princes. It was a
rudimentary form of collective intervention. As sovereign states rose and the Holy
Roman Empire fell, territory-bound sovereignty in states was fully rooted. The
concept of non-intervention was put into practice.
Bifurcated International Society (The 19th Century to WWI)
One feature of a Bifurcated international society is consideration for nonintervention norms and extensive intervention practices, such as European
colonization with the rise of France and Britain during the 19th centuries. Despite the
establishment of the non-intervention norm within Europe, intervention as one part of
18
It is a general description. States had autonomies in varying degrees depending on their
allegiance to Habsburgs. For example, protestant states, like France and Calvinist Netherland, had
relatively high level of autonomy.
34
imperial practices commonly occurred between European and non-European
communities. European classical texts warrant their interventions in non-European
states in terms of civilization.19 From the perspective of European colonists, the
colonial actors were not adequately sovereign, as the people of colonies were
localized in certain territories but not entitled to enjoy the essence of sovereignty. The
states that were recognized as sovereignty had to reach Western civilization standards;
otherwise, they were viewed as uncivilized barbarians without the right to wield
autonomy.20 The world transformed into an international system between core and
periphery, within which sovereignty was only recognized between political states in
the core.
Sovereignty constrained mutual interventions within core states, but it did not
absolutely guarantee application of the non-intervention norm in Europe. The Concert
of Europe, instituted after the 1815 Treaty of Vienna, played a significant
interventionist role in the 19th century. The Concert of Europe used force to forestall
emerging challenges that would threaten absolutist regimes. Typical examples are the
intervention of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in Naples in 1821 and of France in
Spain in 1823; consequently, the overthrown Spanish and Neapolitan kings were
restored to their positions. Great powers remarked that these interventions were for
the sake of the European Commonwealth; theorists such as Burke shared concerns
that instability in one state affected by ideological challenges threatened instability
19
The academic tradition of justifying colonization traces back to the thought of Victoria, who
proves Western colonization in India by resorting to Christian rule (Bain, 2013). The conception of the
standard of civilizations drives from the enlightenment movement in Europe (Gong, 1984).
20
For example, during the U.S. Civil War, the UK kept a neutral position without
interventionist activities. It is greatly because that the UK recognized the U.S. status as a sovereign
state (Little, 2013).
35
abroad (Hampsher-Monk, 2010).21 On the other hand, the interventions of great
powers secured the independence of Greece from the Ottoman Empire in 1830 and
Belgium from Dutch rule in 1831, which promoted the proliferation of nationalism. In
addition, British intervention in the Six Year Campaign against the Atlantic slave
trade has been cited as “a model of robust and successful [humanitarian] intervention”
(Macmillian, 2013b, p. 1096). In this period, interventions were justified by great
powers for economic or political order and morality, which was composed of the
liberal economy, the balance of power, and human rights.
Universal International Society (Post WWI to Present)
The international system transformed into the contemporary states system
following WWI. International society expanded over the whole world and a fully
global state sovereign system was born, within which intervention became a practice
between sovereign states (Lawson & Tardelli, 2013). Although the norm of nonintervention has been universally acknowledged since the end of WWII, the practice
of intervention never ceased, and the purposes of international interventions have
been diverse.
The Interwar Period
The universal international society was shaped through a series of institutions
established after WWI. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Concert of
Europe, as the authority of collective interventions, gradually lost its significant role
in balancing power in Europe. The Versailles settlement, which included several
21
Ideological challenge here refers to the ideology generated from the French Revolution.
36
minor treaties and brought about the establishment of the League of Nations, was
aimed at producing a settlement for Europe and establishing workable rules and
institutions for a worldwide society to maintain order and peace. Although the League
of Nations was proposed by US President Woodrow Wilson and based on his fourteen
points, the basic assumptions of this international organization were the inheritance of
the European concepts of “the sovereignty and juridical equality of the states
recognized as independent members of the society” (Watson, 2010, p. 282). The
League of Nations endorsed the concept of non-intervention, but this organization
was a successor of the Concert of Europe in the general sense of favoring collective
interventions.22 Furthermore, the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact, signed in Paris in 1928,
prohibited war as a legitimate method of resolving disputes or conflicts between
signatory states. Although these attempts to keep peace and establish a new
international order had proved too impractical to succeed during this period, the nonintervention principle, which was certified by these institutions and the rules, survived
in the form of customary international law.
The Cold War Era
Although non-intervention was enshrined in the UN Charter and became an
important international norm, the US and the USSR intervened in states that were
classified as Third World to extend their spheres of political and ideological influence
during the period of the Cold War (Westad, 2007). After investigating the
interventions in developing countries, Zartman summarized a theorem that “the more
that ideo-political identification is attached to geopolitical symbols, the greater the
22
Although the League of Nations was flawed in practice, it incorporated some significant
principles and established the institutions that empowered smaller states, which prompted the new
global society of states.
37
justification for intervention” (1968, p. 197). The norm of non-intervention was easily
ignored and interventions were justified by the superpowers.
Unilateral interventions were motivated by the combination of geopolitical
interests and revolutionary or ideological universalism during the Cold War period.
Collective interventions that could be justified for the security and stability of the
international community have been promoted with the establishment of the UN,
which inherited the traditional spirit of the Concert of Europe. Under the UN
apparatus, the UNSC has become a critical interventionist institution, conducting or
mandating interventions for the purpose of maintaining international peace and
security. Nevertheless, UNSC interventions have not been implemented smoothly
because of the antagonistic relationship between the two superpowers. It is notable
that humanitarianism was rarely applied to justify interventions during the Cold War
period. For instance, although Tanzanian intervention in Uganda and the toppling of
Idi Amin in 1978-1979 was partly driven by humanitarianism, Tanzanian public
justification for it was self-defense.23 Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia followed
the same vein (Wheeler, 2000). In short, in the Cold War period, transnational
conflicts easily trumped state sovereignty, and interventions were conducted by
sovereign states or international organizations for geopolitical interests, ideological
universalism, or maintaining international order. Interveners and intervention senders
applied ideological universalism or the restoration of stability to justifying their
interventions.
23
Ugandan forces invaded Tanzanian territory and attempted to annex the Kagera Salient,
Nyerere (Tanzania).
38
The Post-Cold War Period
International society has undergone a series of structural changes since the end
of the Cold War. International actors’ understanding of the relationship between state
autonomy and the authority of international society also underwent a qualitative shift,
and thus international intervention has grown in importance. Over the last three
decades, the UN authorized a set of extensive peace enforcement and humanitarian
operations that made international intervention an increasingly frequent phenomenon
(Carslon, 2004; Berdal & Economides, 2007). Unilateral and collective interventions
in Cambodia, Somalia, and Kosovo in the 1990s, and those activities which have
recently occurred in Sudan, Libya, and Syria, have all been mandated out of
humanitarianism. The UNSC authorizing military interventions in Iraq–i.e., the
Persian Gulf War–showed the UN’s purpose in restoring an international order based
on sovereignty. In addition, the UNSC set sanctions against sovereign countries that
had breached international norms, exemplified by the cases of North Korea and Iran.24
Furthermore, interventions carried out by great powers were usually justified as
appropriate methods for regional and international stability or political values, such as
democracy. Wars on terrorism are the typical case. This does not mean that the
interventions were absolutely just and accepted by the international community, but
the seeking of legitimate reasons reflected the effect of the non-intervention principle.
Some interventions can be accepted by domestic and overseas audiences for
certain reasons at certain times, but are at issue during other times. UNSC sanctions
24
Although the term, sanction, is not explicitly written in the UN Charter, the Charter
empowers the UNSC to order any combination of non-military measures against a wrongdoer.
According to Article 41 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UNSC may decide what measures, not
involving the use of armed force, are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call
upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures.
39
substitute for the use of force, are essentially coercively interventionist, and logically
conflict the principle of state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention, but
are widely accepted by a majority of countries in the post-Cold War period (Doxey,
1996; Cortright & Lopez, 2000). Ideological intervention was once recognized by
great powers yet now is taken as illegitimate. Interventions for protecting nationals in
other countries are controversial, depending on the specific contexts, as well as the
audiences inside or outside the intervening country. Russian intervention in Ukraine
regarding the Crimea crisis is one of illustrations. Protecting human rights has
gradually become the justifiable reason for interventionist activities. Finnemore
(2003) even indicated that the new international order was formed based on
humanitarian assistance. Moreover, the concept of R2P decays state sovereignty that
used to be utilized by some governments as a shield to illegalize appropriate
humanitarian interventions. The internationalization of human rights and the diffusion
of R2P have promoted the evolution of non-intervention principle in international law,
at least, in customary law. On the other hand, some cases such as Rwanda and Syria
yielded debates on the principle of non-intervention and the authority of the UNSC to
involve itself in a particular situation.
These controversies express the different judgments of individual countries
toward specific interventionist activities, which imply the conflicts between one
country’s perception and the transnational political value. Although commonly
recognized moral and political criteria to permit specific interventionist activities exist,
whether or not countries accept intervention relies upon the actors’ cognition or
interpretation. To what extent one country is tolerant of outside involvement
demonstrates how it separates its inside and outside political spaces.
40
Characteristics of (Non)-intervention
Intervention is a ubiquitous feature instead of an epiphenomenon in the history
of international politics. The norms of sovereignty and non-intervention could not
eradicate states’ desire to intervene. As Shilliam has argued, “Sovereignty and nonintervention are formatively paired to quasi-sovereignty and intervention” (2013, p.
1136). Even so, the non-intervention norm is still meaningful. It is built on recognized
sovereignty, which entitles each state’s equality to others, and the right to
independently make decisions. The non-intervention norm provides states with a
lawful tool to protect their authority and restrains international behavior. The norm
proliferated in the post-world war era throughout international society and has
become an important diplomatic principle in decolonized countries.
International norms and rules evolve with the change in international societies;
the same is true for non-intervention, though at any given moment it appears fixed.
International actors adjust the boundary between transnational force and domestic
authority by justifying their interventionist activities. Finnemore (2003, p. 18) puts
that for intervention to “work” and be useful politically, it must be proved legitimate
and accepted by states and the domestic public. Interventions are justified for reasons
of guaranteeing collective benefit, such as regional and international stability; of
protecting and upholding universal values, such as human rights; and of ensuring selfpreservation. Intervention for self-preservation excludes activities for a country’s own
sake, which includes natural resources, political interest, and economic interest;
exceptions to this rule include self-defense, counter-intervention, and saving overseas
nationals (Walzer, 2006, pp. 91-101). These prerequisites sometimes overlap in
practice. When the scope of legitimate interventions is regarded as fixed in a certain
41
time, interveners tend to justify their interventionist behavior by the reasons that are
commonly accepted by international actors at the time.
Some policy makers in the contemporary era tend to deem intervention as a
negative concept or act. This propensity prioritizes normative judgments to empirical
observations. However, the reality is extraordinarily complex. Few interventions are
purely altruistic without any rational prudence on the part of the intervening countries.
Some interventions intentionally appear moral and consequently beneficial to target
states or international orders, but intervening countries may also be pursuing their
national interests. Therefore, sovereignty and intervention can be seen as international
arrangements and the “modern social practice” of international order as coexisting in
international societies.
International norms have a subjective quality. Although states commonly
endorse a norm, they may have different interpretations of the norm and various
criteria for the applications of the norm (Adachi, 2015). So does the norm of nonintervention; this norm reflects actors’ perceptions on the sovereignty of themselves
and others distinguished between inside and outside (Weber, 1995). Receiving an
intervention means that one state’s absolute sovereignty is denied; and for interveners,
the target state is ineligible to be an authentic sovereignty, or the incumbent regime is
not legitimate. Whether international actors accept certain interventions depends on
their interpretations of the boundary between transnational force and their own
domestic authorities, and these interpretations can be demonstrated by their discourses
and practices concerning intervention. Therefore, examining China’s rhetoric and
practice concerning intervention can shed light on China’s interpretations of the
principle of non-intervention and intervention practices.
42
China’s Approaches to (Non)-intervention in Its Diplomatic History
It is undisputed that China holds fast to the principle of non-intervention in
rhetoric, as the Chinese government has emphasized the principle in most of the
official documents regarding foreign policy. This principle was first contained in the
Sino-Soviet alliance treaty signed in 1950.25 It was clearly established as a part of the
important diplomatic principles in 1954 when the Five Principles were endorsed as
the norms guiding the relations between China and India (CFM, 2000).26 The Five
Principles have been enshrined in the Chinese Constitution, and they are included in
every bilateral treaty signed by China. As a result, non-intervention has become one
of China’s foreign policy tenets. Furthermore, the Chinese government has frequently
expressed its adherence to the non-intervention principle in the official statements,
which reveals China’s oral intransigence on sovereignty.
It may be easy to become confused and draw an imprudent conclusion if one
only looks at the official political pronouncements. In practice, however, China has
frequently violated the stipulations in the treaties that include clauses prohibiting
mutual interference in each other’s internal affairs. China’s interpretation of the
principle is also reflected by whether or not and how the Chinese government applies
the principle in praxis. So, this section will proceed by simultaneously investigating
China’s discourse and its behavior.
25
It is the abbreviation of Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance.
The Fifth Article indicates as follows: “Each Contracting Party undertakes, in a spirit of friendship and
co-operation and in conformity with the principles of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for
the national sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of the other
Contracting Party, to develop and consolidate economic and cultural ties between China and the Soviet
Union, to render the other all possible economic assistance and to carry out necessary economic cooperation” (Foreign Languages Press, 1950, pp. 5-8).
26
The Five Principles include: mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and
sovereignty; mutual non-aggression; mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs; equality
and cooperation for mutual benefit.
43
China’s Application of Non-intervention and Its Interventionist Behavior
Terms interpreted from different perspectives will be given diverse meanings.
As Wittgenstein (1956) points out that when language games change, concepts and
notions change and through that the meaning of words. Words carry specific modes of
thinking and embody values actors possess (Descarries, 2003). The words one country
uses concerning intervention demonstrate the country’s interpretations of the nonintervention norm.
As for China’s oral intransigence, the question is raised as follows: What are
the philosophical bases and normative implications underlying the principle of nonintervention in the political leaders’ interpretation? In other words, how does the
Chinese authority conceptualize non-intervention? The answer could or must be
searched through examining China’s expressions and behavior regarding intervention;
and, then, the examination can reveal the meaning and value of non-intervention in
China’s domestic and foreign policies. Therefore, this section will examine China’s
rhetoric and behavior in three facets of the notion of non-intervention and three
categories of China’s interventionist behavior to explore China’s political boundary of
when the principle of non-intervention can or cannot be transgressed.
Facets of Non-intervention
The notion of non-intervention can be boiled down to the following three
facets in this research in order to investigate China’s non-intervention policy:
rejecting extra interventions in its affairs, promising not to intervene with other
countries’ domestic affairs, and opposing interventions in other states’ internal affairs,
both unilaterally and collectively.
44
Categories of Interventionist Behavior
The characteristics of China’s interventions are categorized into three types in
terms of the method, composing of direct intervention, indirect intervention, and
silent intervention.27 Direct intervention refers to the situation that an intervener exerts
unilateral coercions over another state to deal with the target state’s internal affairs,
and the measures include the use of force and sanctions. Indirect intervention
represents that an intervener gets involved in international interventions. This kind of
intervention is substantiated in China’s approval of UNSC resolutions with regard to
intervention. Despite not directly participating in the interventionist activities, China’s
support for certain interventionist resolutions could be taken as an interventionist
position. Silent intervention stands for an intervener’s undisclosed or secretive
behavior in other countries’ domestic affairs or interveners’ ambiguous attitudes
toward certain issues in international interventions. The former type refers to the
hidden interventionist behavior, such as China’s supports for opponents in another
state by providing necessary materials. The latter type of silent intervention is
manifested by China’s abstention or not voting on some UN resolutions regarding
intervention.
A clarification should be made here. China engaged with some international
affairs by sending diplomatic personnel to other countries to resolve their domestic
crises, in the cases of Myanmar, Sudan, and North Korea, etc. Although these
involvements are not taken as traditional interventions, diplomatic pressure inflicting
on the target states is not excluded. In addition, China dispatched its military force
27
The notion of intervention is not value-free. But the author does not presuppose any moral
judgments when considering the specific behavior of intervention. This classification adopts the
method premised by Tesón (2005).
45
abroad for participating in UN PKOs or for rescuing its nationals and ships abroad,
such as the navy mission around the Gulf of Aden in 2008. It is notable that the
Chinese government does not render its involvements and abroad rescue as
interventionist behavior. In order to keep analysis coherent and to investigate China’s
perceptions of intervention, the following discussion also considers China’s foreign
policy toward involvements and interferences.
The Cold War Period
In the Cold War period, China’s discourse of non-intervention had not
dramatically changed, while its interventionist behavior presented different
characteristics. The changes in China’s foreign policy regarding non-intervention
were in accordance with the transformation of China’s domestic politics. Therefore,
the discussion on China’s non-intervention policy in the Cold War period is divided
into two time periods, namely, the revolutionary period and the initial reform era.28
The Revolutionary Period (1949-1978)
At the outset of the establishment of the PRC, the CCP carried out the foreign
policy of “leaning to one side” toward socialism. China forged the alliance with the
USSR when facing an international environment in which two great powers existed
and were antagonistic toward each other (Mao, 1966). China apparently compromised
28
The revolution here does not refer to the New Democratic Revolution that ended on the
establishment of the PRC. Instead, it adopts the usage of the term in The Cambridge History of China
(Volume 14 and 15) and refers to the period between 1949 and 1978 when the PRC dedicated to
internal revolutions against capitalism and the participation in international communist movement.
Moreover, this division is based on the symbol of the third plenary session of the eleventh central
committee of the CCP held in 1978. At that conference, the CCP decided the new strategic center that
was transferred into economic developments, and also established Deng Xiaoping’s leadership in the
CCP. Note that the demarcation is in terms of economics, but China’s foreign policy was reconsidered
and adjusted prior to 1978.
46
to limited interventions from the USSR, as the latter’s interventions were inevitable
under the alliance. It is notable that the alliance treaty contains a paradox– the alliance
contradicted with China’s principle of non-intervention in practice, but the treaty
itself comprised the exact principle.29 If it can be explained from the perspective that
laggards could not afford the luxury of laissez-faire, the alliance with the Soviet
Union was a decision in which China had no other alternative to ensure the survival of
the weak regime.
With the exception of this alliance, China released strongly sentimental and
vigorous rhetoric regarding foreign interventions. Mao Zedong’s famous 1949
proclamation explicated China’s position on intervention: “The Chinese people had
stood up and would no longer tolerate external interference in China’s internal affairs”
(Carlson, 2005, p. 41). China’s insistence on non-intervention was underscored
through Zhou Enlai’s statement on the Five Principles of Co-existence at the Bandung
Conference in 1955. Western countries had not diplomatically recognized the Chinese
government (the CCP) in its incipient stage, while the announcement of nonintervention enhanced its prestige among the developing countries in Asia and Africa,
thereby reinforcing the legitimacy of the CCP. During this time, China’s domestic
affairs, in terms of economic development, had been little affected by foreign
29
Prior to the Sino-Soviet alliance treaty, the USSR and the CCP were negotiating some
problems in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance (Sino-Soviet treaty) that the USSR and
the Kuomingtang (Nationalist Party) signed in 1945. The Sino-Soviet treaty granted USSR special
rights in China’s Northeast and Xinjiang. In order to forge the alliance between the USSR and the CCP,
the two governments made concessions on key issues regarding the special rights, such as on the
Changchun Railway, Lüshun port, and Dalian. The two governments also signed the secret agreements
regarded as the precondition of the Sino-Soviet alliance treaty, as well as secret additional agreement
on the prohibition of foreign actions in Sino-Soviet border areas. The CCP ceded a part of its
sovereignty to the USSR, and the latter’s influence remained in the areas of Xinjiang and the
Northeastern China. Regarding the details, see Heinzig (2004), Niu (1998), Liu Shaoqi’s report to the
CCP politburo in 1949, the record of Conversation between Stalin and Mao Zedong in 1949 and 1950,
and the record conversation between Stalin and Zhou Enlai in 1952.
47
intervention, except for Soviet instructions, since China was quasi-isolated in
international society.
Even though China proclaimed its non-intervention principle to an
international audience, its revolutionary pass told a different story. During the
revolutionary period, China was involved in revolutionary activities conducted by
anti-government insurgents beyond China’s territories in the form of silent
intervention.30 It supported and encouraged armed national liberation struggles of
revolutionary forces in Asia and elsewhere, including the Japanese Communist Party
and Communist parties in South and Southeast Asia, such as Thai and Indonesian
Communist insurgents; it also engaged in illicit third-party trade with South Africa
and South Korea, although some activities were covered and hidden by other methods
(Kim, 1984; MacFarquhar & Fairbank, 1987). To cite one example, in 1983, Beijing’s
withdrawal of support for the Thai communist revolutionary movement reached the
point of shutting down the insurgent radio station, the Voice of the People of Thai,
which had been transmitting from China for years (Campbell, 1983). During the
Omani Wars (1967-75) in the Middle East, China’s political and military support for
PELOAG is another example.31
These activities, however, were hardly labeled as interventions from the
Chinese government’s perspective. As Bem’s self-perception theory contends that
individuals may feel a need to adopt beliefs that explain their actions, which give
30
The details concerning China’s interventions in internal affairs of other countries, see Cohen
(1973).
31
That can be explicitly evidenced by the ceremonial speech of Hasan Ghassani, from the
PELOAG’s office in Aden in which he expressed the Front’s “ heartfelt thanks to socialist countries,
particularly the PRC, for their moral and material support and aid to our revolution” (Behbehani, 1985,
pp. 175-188).
48
meaning and justification to their behavior (1972). The Chinese government justified
its interventionist behavior by explaining the applications of the non-intervention
principle. In November 1957, Mao Zedong restated the value of the non-intervention
principle, but set the preconditions of applying this principle.
The Five Principles have been broadly recognized, but whether or not
countries can adhere to it is another question. On the side of foreign
policy and relations of countries, it is correct to act based on this
principle. However, with respect to communist activities, the guideline
of a communist party needs to be involved in the support and
assistance to the community party that is in office in socialist countries,
and to the communist party in capitalist countries, as well as to the
independence movements in colonies and semi-colonies. Therefore,
this principle cannot be regarded as the guideline of a party’s foreign
relations” (Wu L., 1999, p. 152).
These interventions China conducted were motivated by its revolutionary
objectives: to ally China with communist states and to make the projects of antiimperialism and anti-colonialism workable through foreign activities.32 In 1963,
China systemically articulated its comprehension of the Five Principles.
It was formulated for targeting the aggressive policies and war policies
of imperialism. The basic principle of foreign policy for socialist
countries is proletarian internationalism. This principle should include
four terms: to develop friendly and mutually supporting states’
32
Mao Zedong practically believed that the center of world revolution had moved to China
and that he had become the leader of world revolution (Song, 2009).
49
relations in the socialist camp, to coexist with countries with different
social systems, to oppose aggressive policies of imperialism under the
Five Principles, and to support all revolutionary wars of the oppressed
people and nations (Renmin Ribao Bianjibu He Hongqi Zazhi Bianjibu
[Editorial Departments of People’s Daily and Red Flag Magazine],
1966, pp. 64-67; 70-72; 76).
After the Sino-Soviet relationship collapsed in the 1960s, the CCP became
devoted to the struggle against the USSR and attempted to acquire political support
from the “intermediate zone.”33 The Chinese government was concerned about its
relations with the USSR regarding the ideological confrontation on the orthodoxy of
Marxism that they inherited and the issues of China’s security, such as their territorial
conflicts, the management of Lüshun and Dalian ports, and Changchun railway (Hsu,
2011; Shen, 2013a). During the Sino-Soviet tension, these concerns were prior to the
promise of non-intervention for the Chinese government. It thus actively expanded its
influence in the “intermediate zone” to compete with the USSR. Nevertheless,
constrained by the principle of non-intervention, China was scrupulous with
intervention in other countries’ domestic affairs, focusing on providing ideological
and limited material support to some anti-governmental forces in Third World
countries and Communist parties instead of direct military intervention in the 1960s.
China was not a member of the UN until 1971. Although Beijing joined the
UNSC, it took a long time to observe and learn how it should behave in the
organization. Therefore, it seldom clearly expressed its attitude toward collective
33
The alliance ended in the 1960s because of the Sino-Soviet split (MacFarquhar & Fairbank,
1987; Hsu, 2011).
50
interventions and conducted activities of indirect intervention by not voting or casting
affirmatively (See Table 1 and appendix 2). Because of China’s unpleasant
experience during the Korean War, it strongly opposed the UN PKOs, viewing it as
the West’s interventions for their own sake in the name of humanitarianism.34
China’s responses toward unilateral intervention were inconsistent due to its
political ideology. For example, Beijing exhibited a contradictory attitude toward the
USSR’s interventions in Poland and Hungary. It criticized the intervention in Poland
and blamed the Soviet Union’s chauvinism. By contrast, it not only supported but also
recommended the USSR military intervention in Hungary. China’s judgments of these
interventions were based on the specific character of each issue: the Polish crisis was
due to Polish people’s pursuit of the state’s sovereignty and of opposing the Soviet
chauvinism, whereas the dynamic of the crisis in Hungary was anti-socialism (Shen,
2013b). This criterion for intervention has been abandoned after the Sino-Soviet split.
The Initial Reform Era (1979-1989)
China began the decade of the initial reform era when Deng Xiaoping took
power in the late 1970s, which signified the end of its revolutionary period. Beijing
adjusted its non-intervention policy. In general, China’s attitude toward external
interventions in its domestic affairs was uncompromising. However, it pragmatically
made limited compromises on the issues of international intervention. In particular,
China’s attitude toward the external criticism of its human rights records has subtly
changed. As Carlson observed, “China’s sweeping denunciations of human rights
34
The UN mandated the military intervention in the Korean peninsula during the Korean War.
Despite the justification in the sense of international law, China considered that the UN intervention
was not out of a just stand because the US manipulated the UN. Therefore, China kept skeptical about
the legitimacy of the UN collective activities, including PKOs, for a long time in the Cold War period.
51
were replaced with more selective criticism and limited Chinese participation in key
international human rights institutions” (2005, p. 147).
China revised the ideologically driven revolutionary foreign policy of the
Maoist period and re-promoted the primary status of the non-intervention principle in
China’s foreign policy, especially its policy regarding developing countries. Deng
Xiaoping (1983, pp. 278-279) expressed China’s attitude toward the Communist
Parties in other countries thusly: “The guideline and way of other countries’ parties
(the Communist Party) should be judged by their own citizens.” China also retrenched
its material support for the fraternal countries that believed in socialism or were prosocialism. However, China waged a war against Vietnam in 1979 after Vietnamese
troops invaded Cambodia, claiming it was a limited counter-attack in self-defense (对
越自卫反击战) as responding to repeated Vietnamese provocations.
During this decade of initial reform, China’s condemnation of unilateral
interventions against other countries became increasingly drastic, taking the form of
anti-hegemonism. The relevant content regarding anti-hegemonism has been written
into the 1982 Constitution. China consistently denounced the USSR’s intervention in
Afghanistan and the U.S. interventions in Grenada in 1983 and in Nicaragua in 1981
(Xie, 1994). In addition, Beijing used the platform of the UN to pursue its target of
anti-hegemonism. It not only supported UN resolutions condemning these
interventions but also expressed its ardent resistance to these interventions.35 In
accordance with the changes in China’s position at the UN, it began to participate in
limited peacekeeping tasks at the end of the Cold War.
35
Regarding all the speeches of opposing interventions of the USSR and the US, see Xie
(1994, pp. 79-106).
52
The Post-Cold War Period (1990- Present)
The meaning of non-intervention principle in China’s foreign policy has
subtly changed over time and now focuses more on independence and equality
between countries. The reports of the fifteenth NCCPC in 1997 and the sixteenth
NCCPC in 2002 explicitly conveyed that the CCP would continue to develop
exchanges and cooperation with political parties and organizations of all countries and
regions based on the principles of independence, complete equality, mutual respect,
and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs (Jiang, 1997; 2002). In the
“Report to the Seventeenth NCCPC” in 2007, President Hu Jintao (2007) stated as
follows: “We respect the right of the people of all countries to independently choose
their own development path; we will never interfere in the internal affairs of other
countries or impose our own will on them.” Xi Jinping, the current president of China,
reiterated the non-intervention principle when he delivered a speech at the Moscow
State Institute of International Relations (CFM, 2013a).
Chinese governmental officials frequently emphasize the non-intervention
principle when they visit other countries. For instance, when Premier Wen Jiabao
visited Uzbekistan in November 2007, he announced that the Chinese government
opposed any intervention in Uzbekistan’s internal affairs in the name of human rights
(The Central People’s Government of PRC, 2007). In addition, China is enthusiastic
to promote or to participate in regional organizations that advocate the nonintervention principle, such as the ARF and the SCO.36
36
Although China was cautious about the ARF at the outset of the organization, it changed its
attitude and actively participated in the ARF.
53
On the other hand, China has adopted political guidance to ensure stability in
internal politics and to maintain a low profile while actively participating in
multilateral organizations after the 1989 Tiananmen issue. Constraints from regional
and international organizations on China’s sovereignty are obviously beyond question
insofar as the economic sphere, as Beijing became a member of the WTO and other
economic organizations. In other political spheres, Beijing also conceded on certain
issues to the international organizations, such as arms control and human rights
(Johnston, 1996; Kent, 1999; Foot, 2006). China’s enthusiasm in joining regional and
international organizations demonstrates that it has loosened its strict understanding
of sovereignty.
China continued its denouncement of some international interventions carried
out without the authorization of the UNSC. NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo
was a representative case. Nevertheless, China was open to certain international
interventions mandated by the UNSC. Take the UNSC sanctions as an example:
China has generally emphasized its concerns about sanctions as a productive method,
but it has had a relatively positive attitude toward sanctions-related resolutions and
seldom exerted its veto power to alter the original proposals (See Table 1). As one of
the P5 members, China did not support all the interventions conducted by the UN.
China casts abstentions and vetoes to express its disagreement. In the 1990s, China’s
abstentions on sanctions-related draft resolutions were in the maximum frequency.
These abstentions mainly focused on the sanctions relevant to FRY; sorted
from most to least, other abstentions were cast regarding Iraq, Libya, Sudan, and
Cambodia. By not voting or casting abstentions to the UN resolutions, China has
allowed the UNSC interventions to be implemented. In the twenty-first century, China
54
cast fewer abstentions than it did in the last decade, but it has cast four vetoes. The
negative votes by China, consisting of abstentions and vetoes, were closely associated
with sanctions against countries in the regions of Africa and the Middle East,
including Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea, Libya, Zimbabwe, and Syria (See appendix 1).
Table 1
Chinese Sanctions-related Votes in the UNSC
Years
1971-1979
1980-1989
1990-1999
2000-2009
2010-2015.04
Aye
18
4
78
133
72
Abstention
0
0
20
5
3
Veto
0
0
0
1
3
Note. Data begin with China’s first vote, on November 21, 1971; Based on the UN ODS,
UNBISnet, and UNSCSC; author’s calculations.
In addition, China has gradually committed itself to a series of multilateral
operations, which modified its approach to PKOs and sovereignty's role in the
international community. By 2008, China became the fourteenth largest contributor
and the second largest among the P5 of the UN PKOs (Gill & Huang, 2009). China
tried to use its political influence to engage with certain countries’ politics that
committed severe human rights violations, such as Myanmar and Sudan, and it dealt
with their domestically conflicted situations.
In conclusion, China has emphasized its commitment to the principle of nonintervention in most of the cases. However, it has participated in interventionist
activities in different manners as suggested above. 37 In this post-Cold War period,
37
It is notable that China’s direct interventions have been more restricted in frequency and
scope than those performed by other great powers (Sullivan & Koch, 2009).
55
China’s interventionist activities are centered on indirect intervention supplemented
by silent intervention.
Dual Characteristics of China’s Non-intervention Policy
The non-intervention policy is so important that both the Chinese government
and academia have considered it as the unique value and culture of China’s foreign
policy (Yu & Chang, 2011). The meanings of the non-intervention principle for the
Chinese government have changed over time. Similar to other developing countries
that advocate the principle of non-intervention (Acharya, 2009), China’s perception of
non-intervention also derives from its own experience of semi-colonization.38 This
experience still affects Chinese understanding of the non-intervention principle; thus,
the principle plays an important role in China’s diplomacy.
Meanings of Non-intervention to China
China’s ruling group interpreted non-intervention as an absolutely justifiable
concept for anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism during Mao’s era, which was in
accordance with China’s revolutionary aim. From a Chinese perspective, nonintervention was rendered as being representative of a just international order. The
first generation of CCP leadership was pursuing an independent China that could get
rid of imperialism and colonialism. Before the establishment of the PRC, Mao
Zedong (1966) stated his diplomatic idea embodying the spirit of non-intervention.39
38
China advocated the non-intervention principle not merely because non-intervention was a
norm. Adhering to some international norms was not China’s prior concern during the Cold War era.
39
This statement appears in the article “On the Outrages by British Warships (1) Statement by
The Spokesman of the General Headquarters of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.” It states as
follows: “In the future, new China’s diplomacy with other countries must be based on the equality,
mutual benefit, and mutual respect for territorial integrity.”
56
He (1966, p. 1469) elaborated in 1949 as follows: “China’s issues must be addressed
by Chinese people; and China would not permit a tiny bit of intervention from
imperialist countries.” This interpretation of non-intervention not only affected
China’s doctrine of the “united front” against hegemonism in the Cold War period, it
also shaped China’s thought and cautious attitude toward interventionist activities
initiated by great powers whose intentions were interpreted by the Chinese
government as being hegemonic.40
After the revolutionary period, non-intervention was highlighted as the
corollary of the nation’s independence, self-reliance, and modernization, and of the
equal status in the international community.41 Struggling for independence was
labeled by the CCP as China’s diplomatic strategy and fundamental policy. In
addition to Mao’s period, all Chinese foreign policy decision-makers echoed the
pursuit of independence. In the twelfth NCCPC, Deng Xiaoping (1983, p. 372)
pointed out, “The independence and the self-reliance are the foothold regardless of the
past, present or future; and Chinese people not only cherish the friendship and
cooperation with other countries, but also value the independent rights through longterm struggle.” As Deng’s successors, President Jiang Zemin (2002) and Hu Jintao
(2007) highlighted the independent foreign policy in the reports of the sixteenth and
seventeenth NCCPC, respectively. Although these reports do not lack ideal
catchwords and propaganda, they reflect China’s consistent logic and self-positioning
40
The united front is a form of struggle or political organization that may be carried out by
revolutionaries or communist political regimes. In Chinese history, the united front has been carried out
three times. In this article, the united front refers to China’s foreign policy–based on Mao’s strategic
idea of “One Line”– implemented by the CCP to oppose the USSR from the early 1970s to1982.
41
Tsai (2011) elaborates the significance of independent diplomacy in China’s history. In the
history of China’s diplomacy, China has experienced the alliance with the USSR and the quasi-alliance
with the United States. While these episodes can be viewed as tactics or contingencies, one cannot
deny the larger story, i.e., that China continuously pursues independence.
57
with respect to foreign policies. Strengthening China’s capacity and enhancing its
prestige as an independent nation in the international arena are the steady goals for
which the Chinese have worked for decades. In short, one feature of China’s foreign
policy is a keenly rhetorical emphasis on ensuring respect for sovereign rights.
These statements above infer that China interprets interventionist activities as
the transgression of one country’s sovereign authority; the meaning of nonintervention is that each country must choose its own path of development, the key
message being to “start from national conditions, and take your own road” (Huang &
Zhao, 2009). Beijing uses this term to express that one country not only should not
intervene in other countries by military means, but also should not coercively request
other countries to follow its own values.
The norms of sovereignty, the non-intervention principle in particular, are
meaningful for the Chinese government, as these norms meet China’s political
practices and serve the country to protect its domestic core value and interests. Thus,
the principle of non-intervention has become a firm conviction of the Chinese
government when the country faces transnational forces. Accordingly, intervention in
China’s interpretations is attached with normative judgment and negative meanings.
The Chinese government criticizes Western countries’ involvements in its domestic
issues, such as territorial problems and the records of human rights, by using the
principle of non-intervention.42 The statements lashing out Western countries’
interventions reinforce the negative meaning of intervention in Chinese perceptions.
42
These condemnations frequently appeared in Chinese government officials’ statements and
regular press conference of the CFM, and the Chinese authority denounces foreign interventions and
interferences that are relevant to the Tibetan issue, Taiwan issue, Human right record, etc.
58
China’s interpretation of non-intervention is defensive, underscoring its domestic
authority that should not be superseded by transnational forces.
China’s Perceptions of the Applications of Non-intervention
Although China professed adherence to the non-intervention principle, it has
engaged in interventions throughout its diplomatic history; Chinese interventions
exhibit different emphases in different periods as discussed above. These emphases
reflect the Chinese government’s understandings and standards of legitimate
interventions, which are based on its perceptions of the international order and the
international structure, as well as its domestic demands.
At the beginning of the revolutionary period, from a Chinese perspective, the
world polity was distinctly divided into an internal group and an external group.
China shared a sense of collective identity with other Communist states and with the
communist party in other states.43 Mao Zedong stated that the possibility of military
intervention from imperialist countries made China to ally itself with other socialist
countries (Xue, 1989). Those capitalist countries belonged to the external camp with
which China conflicted. China did not consider that the non-intervention principle
should apply to its foreign policies toward the countries that pursued or accepted the
ideologies of socialism and communism. China justified its interventionist behavior
and some socialist countries’ interventions in the socialist camp through ideology. By
contrast, the interventions by the capitalist camp against socialist or neutral countries
were not acceptable. These standards that a transnational force can be permissible for
defense, value (i.e., ideology), and collective benefits are also applicable in China’s
43
Collective identity here refers to the ideology or the domestic political system that these
countries and the parties in some countries adopted was communism or socialism.
59
case. During the revolutionary era, from the Chinese perspectives, the legitimacy of
transnational force in the revolutionary period was based on socialism and
communism. Nevertheless, the Sino-Soviet relations were an exception after the
alliance split at the end of 1960s. China believed the USSR as a big threat to its
security and denounced Soviet interventions in some communist or neutral countries
as imperialist activities.
In the era of initial reform, China abandoned the revolutionary ideal and
adopted a strategic contraction.44 Based on its perception of the international order,
China viewed interventions conducted by the two superpowers as hegemonism,
particularly in the 1980s.45 However, it started to loosen its tight perceptions on nonintervention and its approach to intervention has incrementally changed. The
perceptions and approach continued changing and have become discernable after the
Cold War. China granted partial autonomy to some international organizations, such
as WTO, and simultaneously participated in international interventions. From the
standpoint of the Chinese government, the interventions it approved of or participated
in were legitimate and thus acceptable and justifiable.
After China abandoned an ideology-driven policy and gradually integrated
into international society, it viewed that legitimate intervention must be based on
44
At the outset of the initial reform era, China maintained its diplomatic relations with two
superpowers that formed in the early 1970s. China’s military intervention in Vietnam in 1979 reflected
Deng Xiaoping’s strategic thoughts on addressing China’s relations with the USSR. Deng believed that
the USSR was China’s main enemy and that Vietnam was USSR’s assistant to expand its sphere of
influence in Southeast Asia and encircle China. Although China’s desire for security motivated the antiVietnam War, the Chinese government justified the intervention as the promotion of anti-imperialism
and anti-hegemonism (Jones & Kevill, 1985; Vogel, 2011).
45
The tendency of the international situation was peace, and world war was not like to break
out. Nevertheless, China still faced the international economic and political order that was unjust,
unreasonable, and inequitable.
60
sovereign states’ consent. In the post-Cold War era, China generally does not
rhetorically approve of coercive measures imposed on sovereign states. China
emphasizes that the collective intervention must be carried out under certain
conditions.46 Nevertheless, although certain collective interventions have proved not
to be a violation of the norm of non-intervention, the Chinese government has firmly
articulated that an act of coercion and isolation is counterproductive in gaining the
cooperation of the target states.
Moreover, China had a relatively low level of convergence with the other four
members of the UNSC, especially with the Western group, including the US, France,
and the UK, though it seldom hindered interventionist initiatives (See appendix 2).
The disagreements are mainly concentrated on the incongruity between the coercive
measures advocated by Western countries and the foreign policy principles that China
has favored. Hence, China uses abstentions (often) or vetoes (infrequently) to express
dissent from other Western countries in the UNSC, which reflect Beijing’s
preferences, perspectives, and its attitude.
Tensions in China’s Non-intervention Policy
China’s foreign policy does not absolutely obey to the principle of nonintervention, which gives rise to an incongruity between praxis and rhetoric support
for non-intervention in China’s diplomacy. This incongruity, thus, causes two
tensions in China’s non-intervention policy.
46
These conditions include “It must proceed with respect for sovereignty, under the UN
authorization, and in the invitation of the target state; and force is only to be used when all other
options have proven ineffective” (Carlson, 2004, p. 10).
61
First, as for China’s non-intervention policy toward international interventions,
the tension between words and behavior becomes distinct. China’s preference for the
principle of non-intervention has affected its international behavior so deep that China
attempts to align rhetoric of non-intervention with its endorsement of international
intervention. In other words, China often applies the principle of non-intervention
when facing certain interventionist initiatives in the UNSC or international
interventions conducted by an individual country or some regional organizations.
From China’s perspective, only if a potential intervention has proved legitimate, the
transnational force is allowed to transgress the boundary of one country’s sovereignty.
In this situation, China may compromise on, accept, support, and even conduct
interventions.
The second tension is a consequence of the first one, which presents as the
divergence between China and other great powers in understanding the applications of
the non-intervention principle in certain cases. Authorizing UNSC intervention is a
typical case. China acknowledges the legitimacy of the UNSC but does not take this
regime as an impartial forum, as states naturally pursue their own interests in the
organization. Beijing is hesitant to associate itself with traditional Western countries
and remains skeptical about their underlying intentions and their actual benefits from
interventions. China continually denounces that some Western countries force other
countries to follow their values and political systems. From a Chinese perspective,
certain countries may use the authorized UNSC intervention to topple an incumbent
government and to acquire the target state’s obedience or compliance. Therefore,
China frequently expresses its dissatisfaction, which often brings criticism from these
Western countries.
62
Manifestations of China’s Non-intervention Policy in the Post-Cold War Era
In the post-Cold War period, China’s non-intervention policy presents the dual
characteristics of the preference for the non-intervention principle and the flexibility
in applying the principle. To be more explicit, China’s non-intervention policy is
manifested and classified into three categories, according to its various responses to
interventions, as follows: cooperation, compromise, and resistance. Cooperation
indicates that China supports or participates in a specific intervention, exemplified by
its affirmative votes in the UNSC. Compromise indicates that China does not
advocate a specific intervention but concedes to the international community, which
is represented by its abstentions from voting the interventionist draft resolutions in the
UNSC, although China expresses its disapproval of the interventions in diplomatic
discourse. Resistance indicates that China strongly opposes an intervention by
condemnations in its diplomatic statements and casting vetoes in the UNSC. These
variations in China’s non-intervention policy will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2.
Conclusion
The principle of non-intervention is a significant norm in contemporary world
politics. However, intervention has been always presented in the modern history of IP.
International actors reshape their interpretations of the principle by interventionist
practices to satisfy their realistic demands. The dichotomies of non-intervention and
intervention in international society perplex China foreign policy regarding
intervention and the observations of the policy. The principle of non-intervention has
played an important role in China’s foreign policy. In China’s diplomatic discourse,
political officials talk easily about or around interventions to manifest the significance
of the principle of non-intervention, although some activities are not interventions
63
strictly according to the theoretical standard. However, China’s foreign policy
behavior is not always consistent with its insistence on the principle of nonintervention. Instead, it has also directly, indirectly, or silently participated in specific
interventionist activities, which have varied in forms both temporally and spatially.
China’s preference for the principle of non-intervention is shaped by the
values of the sovereignty norms, and the preference reveals its understandings of
sovereignty and the boundary of authority between inside and outside. China’s
flexibility in applying the principle of non-intervention gives rise to a paradox in
China’s non-intervention policy between its words and acts.47 The gap between
discourse and actions can demonstrate China’s political boundary between
transnational forces and its domestic autonomy in diplomatic practices. It is notable
that the gap does not detract from the value of the non-intervention principle in
China’s foreign policy formations.
The real task is probably not only to identify the incongruity between China’s
words and deeds, but also to systemically analyze and compare this contradiction in
different situations. What factors influence China’s inclination of drawing the
political boundary in its non-intervention policy is worth examination for deeply
understanding China’s foreign policy behavior. Therefore, next chapter will
demonstrate the motivations and mechanisms underlying China’s non-intervention
policy.
47
Nevertheless, the paradox in China’s non-intervention policy does not necessarily lead to
China’s hypocrisy, bad faith, or deliberate obfuscation. It is common that a word/deed or
perception/policy dichotomy exists in all state behavior, to some extent, all human behavior as well
(Kim, 1984). As Krasner (1999) has pointed out, countries always make sovereignty compromises in
practice.
64
CHAPTER 2 EXPLORING CHINA’S NON-INTERVENTION
POLICY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA
Introduction
The dual characteristics of China’s non-intervention policy complicate its
foreign policy behavior. This complicated and mixed picture of the principle of nonintervention and interventions tangled in China’s foreign policy raises an inquiry:
Why and how does China’s foreign policy behavior vary in the degree of consistency
with the principle of non-intervention in different cases of international intervention?
To reply to this inquiry, the following attendant questions need to be solved in order:
What factors do determine or affect China’s foreign policy formations in certain
intervention? Under what conditions is China tolerant to interventions or even
participating in interventions, and in what situations is Beijing reluctant or resistant to
interventions?
This chapter first examines the previously theoretical explanations for China’s
foreign policy regarding non-intervention and then argues these explanations
underdetermine and cannot account for China’s non-intervention policy. Then, it
establishes an analytical framework to interpret the motives and incentives underlying
the policy. The framework based on the methodological eclecticism adopts the
elements and insights of neo-classical realism and the English School. The causation
shows that international factors and domestic demands are entangled in China’s
foreign policy decision-making processes, and China’s responses to interventions are
mainly motivated by international factors and simultaneously constrained by domestic
incentives. In other words, international factors are determinants of China’s foreign
65
policy toward interventions, while Chinese concerns about its domestic vulnerabilities
affect its perceptions of systemic factors, thereby leading to its different responses to
cases of intervention. Lastly, this chapter presents four propositions containing six
patterns to explain the preference and rationality in China’s non-intervention policy.
Deficiencies of Different Paradigms in Explaining China’s Nonintervention Policy
IP theories provide heuristic tools to investigate China’s foreign policy from
different perspectives. These theoretical narratives and analytical insights can help
students of IP systematically interpret certain aspects of China’s international
behavior. This section discusses how these theories, separated into macro-level and
micro-level theories, are applied to China’s foreign policy. These theories are all
convincing in explaining a foreign policy from a certain angle. However, a paradigm
usually emphasizes some elements of IP phenomena while overlooking other parts.
Similarly, single IP theories lack the explanatory power to wholly explain the
complexities and nuances that exist in China’s foreign policy, particularly with
respect to China’s non-intervention policy.
Macro-level Theories
At the macro level, structural theories, such as neo-realism, neo-liberalism,
and constructivism, focus on systemic effects that impact states’ foreign policy
formation. In recent decades, neo-realism has dominated IP; due to this dominant
position, neo-realism has a large number of disciples, as well as many critics. The
theory explains why states with different domestic political structures behave
similarly in the international system, and furthermore assumes that all states pursue
66
national security in an anarchical international system.48 The nature of this
international structure provides states with their primary incentives for foreign policy
decisions. Neo-realist assumption about the nature of the international system is the
starting point for observing China’s international behavior since it provides the
insights about the system. As Waltz notes, “a theory of international politics can tell
us what international conditions national politics have to cope with” (2008, p.59).
Neo-realism draws a holistic picture of the international environment China faces; it
also provides the systemic elements that should be taken into account in analyzing
China’s foreign policy.
However, as Waltz (1996) insists, neo-realism is a macro theory of
international politics rather than a theory of foreign policy; this theory therefore is
inapplicable when analyzing specific foreign policy behavior. In terms of
international structure in its material aspects, the neo-realism theory is appealing.
Nevertheless, neo-realism seldom takes ideational factors under consideration if they
exist. In the absence of consideration of pertinent values, norms, and ideologies, neorealism is problematic in explaining a state’s preference in terms of international
norms, particularly given situations where national interests are not involved.
Subaltern realism, an offspring of neo-realism coined by Ayoob, overcomes
this shortage in neo-realistic theorizing. Subaltern realism specifically aims to explain
certain behavioral patterns of states with the same characteristics; endorsing absolute
sovereignty is a main behavioral pattern. Ayoob attributes this behavioral pattern to
the Westphalian characteristics of the international system. He argues that weak states
48
Concerning the theory of neo-realism, see Baldwin (1993) and Waltz (1979; 2008). This
dissertation does not specially discuss the differences among classical realism, neo-realism, defensive
realism, and offensive realism.
67
are prone to create political structures that approach the Westphalian ideal type to
increase their effectiveness and legitimacy. Weak states (referring, in his narrative, to
the postcolonial states), dissociate themselves from the established members who
attempt to transcend the Westphalian model.49 These postcolonial states are cautious
about economic and political penetration by powerful external forces (Ayoob, 2002,
pp. 38-39). Hence, Westphalian ideals are utilized by these states to “build a stable
political order domestically” and to “participate in international society on a more
equal footing” (Ayoob, 2002, p. 40). This theory considers the domestic political
order of these states and thus explains their preferences, which supplies a plausible
explanation for China’s preference for the principle of non-intervention.50 However, it
serves little to explain that China has different responses to specific interventions and
why Beijing deviates from its commitment to the principle at times.
The assumptions of subaltern realism concerning the role of sovereignty are
not particularly fresh in explaining states’ attitudes to the norm of non-intervention,
especially when one considers Stephen Krasner’s inspiring works (Finnemore &
Goldstein, 2013). Other literature associated with the socialization discussed by neorealists and constructivists provides contrasting arguments on why states take
particular stances on sovereignty and intervention geared towards containing crises.
Socialization theories argue that actors likely change their original preferences to
conform to the expectations of other members of the society through processes of
49
This theory obviously borrows some thoughts, the concept of international society in
particular, from the English School.
50
Although China is not a weak country in terms of its economy, it still shares some similar
characteristics with postcolonial states.
68
social interaction between actors within the international system.51 With China’s
growing international engagement, its government has become exposed to the
widening and deepening normative scope of international society. In consequence,
China has softened its rigid understandings of the principles of sovereignty and nonintervention with being socialized in international society (Prantl & Nakano, 2011).
This line of thinking seems plausible in explaining why China chose to cooperate with
the international community in certain international interventions. Nevertheless, the
arguments are not sufficient to account for China’s different responses to international
interventions, such as compromise and resistance.
If one takes humanitarian interventions as a normative element to judge
China’s socialization, two consequences of China’s foreign policy concerning
intervention can be inferred from the logic of socialization-related presumptions. First,
China never intervenes in domestic affairs of other countries since it has insisted on a
non-intervention principle before internalizing humanitarian interventions into its
perceptions. Second, China has been socialized into international society, within
which the majority of members advocate humanitarian interventions, by learning and
participating (Levy, 1994); therefore, it takes humanitarian interventions as a new
norm and invariably supports humanitarian interventions. These implications are
discordant with the empirical reality (and somewhat inconsistent with each other) and
cannot help explain why China has different responses to interventions related to the
same issue during the same period in time. China’s inconsistent responses appear to
indicate that China has been socialized and not socialized simultaneously, which is
difficult to measure. If one wishes to know whether socialization into international
51
It is an outcome of socialization. Of course, neo-realists and constructivists emphasize
different processes with different mechanisms in socialization.
69
society and its norms have worked in China, the clear effect needs to be analyzed in
depth under varying conditions in detailed cases.
Micro-level Theories
Comparatively, the micro theories, represented by the FPA theories, have the
advantage of being able to explain the variations in China’s decisions related to
intervening versus not intervening in a given international situation. FPA theorists
assume that variations in any given country’s stance are primarily the product of
subtle shifts in the manner in which the country attempts to attain static interests
(Carlson, 2006). Rationalist approaches argue that specific foreign policies are
motivated by the need to maximize domestic interest when policy makers face
changing external environments and that culture and identity, like any other resources,
are deployed strategically by actors to further their own self-interests.52 For example,
Krasner (1999) has argued that politicians use sovereignty when it suits their larger
interests and disregard it when such interests change due to new incentives (an
opportunity to benefit from participation in an international convention or contract) or
lack of choice (as with the subject of international coercion or imposition). This
presumption is based on the Innenpolitik theories that the incentives behind states’
international behavior are related to the need to serve domestic demands.
In the case of China’s non-intervention policy, according to rationalism,
whether or not China participates in interventions depends on its cost-benefit calculus
about its material interests in different cases. Therefore, two predictions can be
52
The rationalism here refers to the approach of rational actor model in FPA theories. It speaks
of instrumental rationality, which asserts that the behavior of states is constantly motivated by profit
maximization.
70
expected from the perspective of rationalism. First, China upholds international
interventions as long as the interventions are beneficial for China’s economic and
strategic interests. Second, China never supports interventions targeting countries
with which China has intense economic and strategic relations, as these interventions
are probably adverse to Beijing’s national interests.
However, empirical data do not comprehensively support these predictions
(See appendix 3). First, as the second-largest economy in the world, China’s diverse
economic partners are worldwide in scope, and therefore few countries are of no
benefit to mercantilist China. Second, China has favored UNSC sanctions against
target states that were economically and strategically important to it, such as North
Korea and Iran. On the contrary, China did not completely support punitive measures
on the states that were seemingly unbeneficial to it; Eritrea is one example of this.
Material interests are not the single motivation for China’s foreign policy.53 In other
words, FPA theories become sterile when dealing with China’s non-intervention
policy in cases where the decision to intervene or not is not optimal from a rationalist
perspective.
Summary
Overall, the theories discussed are not satisfactory when questions related to
what leads to international interventions are tackled, nor do they explain the variations
in China’s non-intervention policy as revealed by empirical research. Neo-realism has
not explained why a state has a preference for a normative rule. Subaltern realism
explains this preference, but cannot be used to effectively examine behavioral
53
For instance, China has a larger economic interests in Iran than in Syria. China did not
obstruct sanctions against Iran, whereas casting some vetoes on sanctions against Syria.
71
variations in a state’s foreign policy. Socialization theories highlight the effects of the
international system but do not generate valid, measurable conclusions. In other
words, the concept of socialization overlooks the fact that a state’s behavior related to
international issues associated with an international norm may not be coherent. FPA
theories insist that national interest is the only reason a state’s behavior adheres to an
international norm, but cannot account for anomalies in China’s non-intervention
policy.54 Moreover, national interest is a slippery concept, and theories based on the
presence of rational actors have not specified which interests are more important than
others in a state’s decision-making process. Therefore, this research plans to establish
a analytical framework to provide relatively convincing explanations for China’s nonintervention policy.
The Marriage of Neo-classical Realism and English School
As discussed in the foregoing, it is difficult to understand China’s nonintervention policy by looking solely at one theory or from one perspective. In order
to provide an analytical framework for understanding the complexity of China’s nonintervention policy, this research adopts a method of eclecticism as follows: it
critically engages with the theoretical framework of neo-classical realism, reflecting
on the extent to which this theory provides a practicable causal mechanism and on
what aspect the theory lacks to offer an explanatory power in investigating the
dynamics of China’s foreign policy; it also applies the insights of the English School
54
It is notable that this study argues the insufficiency of rationalism in accounting for China’s
non-intervention policy but it does not deny the rationalist presumption. States’ decision-makers act
rationally but the decisions-making process is always constrained by many factors, such as pressure,
lack of information, and preference, which are also pointed out by the bounded rationality theory. As
Waltz (2008, p. 43) notes that, we “cannot expect of political leaders the nicely calculated decisions
that the word ‘rationality’ suggests as making foreign policy is a complicated business.”
72
theorizing to the variables of China’s foreign policy decision-making processes
regarding non-intervention. In addition to the values of the two theoreis in the
epistemological sense, their methodologies also fit the study’s objective—to establish
a valid causal explanation. The two theories have their strengths and weakness in
reaching this objective, which will be discussed below. This study argues that the
causal dynamics based on a combinition of neo-classical realism and the English
School could best explain the preference and variations in China’s non-intervention
policy.
The Approach of Neo-classical Realism
The term “neo-classical realism” was coined by Gideon Rose (1998) to
summarize and describe the effort of IR scholars who identify themselves as realists.
The neo-classical realism draws upon the theoretical insights of neo-realism without
sacrificing the practical insights into foreign policy, integrating the complexity of
statecraft found in classical realism with the theoretical approach in order to construct
a stronger explanatory analysis of a state’s foreign policy (Taliaferro, Lobell, &
Ripsman, 2009; Sørensen, 2013). Neo-classical realists share the base assumptions
with neo-realists that the international system is anarchic and that states pursue
security to maintain their survival. Neo-classical realism does not challenge the
analytical approach of neo-realism. Rather, it highlights the systemic incentives with
ontological and epistemological priority in its theoretical paradigm.55 Nevertheless, it
shares some nuances with the neo-realism in epistemology. In contrast to the
proposition of the neo-realism that different states in similar structural positions act
55
Concerning the problem of ontological priority and weight versus epistemological priority
and weight in methodology, see Tang (2011). Neo-realism made an apparent mistake in overestimating
the determinants of ontological priority.
73
alike in the anarchical international system, neo-classical realists argue that systemic
effects on the foreign and security policies of states vary, and thus, states’ behavior in
the international system also vary (Wohlfoth, 2008).
Neo-classical realists realized that the link between the distribution of power
in the anarchical international system and a state’s specific foreign policy is unclear in
neo-realism, which is due to the impracticability of neo-realism in analyzing a
specific foreign policy. A given state’s relative power in the international system is a
reality, but the practice has uncertainties on how the state’s decision makers interpret
such a reality and on the extent to which they mobilize their resources to achieve their
foreign policy objectives. Neo-classical realism thus “brings the state back” into the
theoretical analysis and opens the “black box” of the state. It integrates system-centric
epistemological priority of the neo-realism with some epistemological insights of the
classical realism. Neo-classical realists presume that systemic dynamics affect states’
foreign policy only through the mediating effect of unit-level variables, namely,
decision makers’ perceptions of international situations and domestic constraints,
because states need to assess international threats and opportunities. In other words,
“states conduct foreign policy based on their assessment of relative power and other
states’ intentions” (Taliaferro et al., 2009, p. 26), but the assessments are constrained
by domestic concerns.56
Neo-classical realism is a theoretical approach which explains states’ foreign
policy and thus can be seen as one subset of FPA. However, neo-classical realism and
FPA explain foreign policy formations from different directions. Traditional FPA
56
It is notable that Waltz did not take this argument as a challenge, or even a revision, to his
neo-realism theory. He defended the validity of his theory and thought that this argument is just a
movement from international political theory to foreign policy application (Waltz, 2008).
74
examines how domestic needs affect decision makers’ choice while neo-classical
realism seeks what constranits and opportunities are perceived by policy makers when
they look at the international enviorment (Freyberg-Iran, Harrison, & James, 2009).
Their divergence echoes the different causal directions between classical realism and
neo-realism. In addition to establishing an approach of foreign policy analysis, neoclassical realism attempts to produce a truly systemic account of mirco-macro
linkages to confront the explanatory puzzles in facing empirical problems of IR.
The remarkable feature of the neo-classical realism is that this theory
reconsiders the significance of unit-level factors that impinge on foreign policy
outcomes. Every state faces a “two-level game” in conceiving and implementing
foreign policy: on the one hand, they must respond to the limited choices set by the
international system, but, on the other, states need to extract and mobilize domestic
resources from domestic society and simultaneously maximize their ability to satisfy
domestic pressures (Putman, 1988; Taliaferro et al., 2009). Thus, neo-classical realists
bring domestic dynamics into the causal train they build, as Table 2 depicts, holding
that decision-makers’ calculations and perceptions of relative power, and domestic
constraints are intervening variables between international pressures and a state’s
foreign policy (Taliaferro et al, 2009).
In conclusion, neo-classical realism initiates a causal mechanism consisting of
three stepts. First, the theory identifies the independet variables that are the systemic
incentives in the anarchical international system. Second, the intervening variables are
decision makers’ perceptions at the domestic level that play the role of transmission
belt which sieves systemic forces. Third is the dependent variables, to put it
differently, the foreign policy outcomes.
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Table 2
Theoretical Assumptions and Logic of Neo-classical Realism
View of
international View of units
system
Important
Differentiated
Causal logic of neo-classical realism
Independent
variable
Systemic
incentives


Intervening
variable
Domestic
constraints
↓
Decision
makers’
perceptions

Dependent
variable

Foreign
policy
Note. From Rose (1998, p. 154), adjusted by author.
Neo-classical realism shares similar presumptions with neo-realism in
interpreting systemic mechanisms, so this approach leaves little room for the societal
or ideational dimension of theorizing. It is insufficient to explore the role of the nonintervention principle in the decision-making process of a specific state. Although the
principle is not a peremptory norm, in the contemporary world politics, it restricts
states’ international behavior to different extents or, at least, affects the consideration
of decision makers to determine whether or not they become involved in interventions
in domestic affairs of others. The insights of English school can make up for the
explanatory weakness of the neo-classical realism.
The Insights of the English School
In order to keep the theoretical analysis ontologically consistent, this study
adopts assumptions of the traditional English School, i.e., pluralism.57 English School
theory has a degree of convergence with neo-realism on the view that both of them
57
The ontology consistency here stands for the coherence of ontological priority. On the
distinctions between pluralism and solidarism, see Buzan (2004b, pp.139-160).
76
are all a structural theorizing paradigm. In contrast to neo-realists, English School
theorists pay more attention to international order and emphasize the effect of societal
factors, such as norms or other institutions. Hedley Bull, a widely recognized
representative of the English School theory, discusses a structural dimension of the
international society. Therefore, in the sense of causal direction, the English School
theory is not conflicted with the neo-realism.
Furthermore, the English School, as Richard Little argues, “is actually the
legitimate heir to classical realism” (2009, p. 21), because Bull’s central idea of the
international society was based on his assessment of overall characters of
institutionalization in world politics after he critically thought about and engaged with
classical realism (Bull, 2012).58 In addition, the pluralism of the English School
“favors a reductionist idea of structuration” (Spandler, 2015); that is to say, the theory
adopts an individualist approach and takes the actors’ dynamics into its analytical
consideration. Thus, the pluralism of the English School is not only compatible with
the neo-classical realism but also able to surmount the latter’s shortage.
The conception of the international society is regarded as a principal
contribution and the ‘hard core’ of English School. International society is defined as
follows:
The international society is a group of states (or, more generally, a
group of independent political communities) which not merely form a
system, in the sense that the behavior of each is a necessary factor in
58
From Bull’s perspective, the principal weakness of realism is that the theory pays
insufficient attention to the normative framework, including rules, norms, and shared understanding, on
which international society depends (Bull, 2012, p. xix).
77
the calculations of the others, but also have established by dialogue
and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their
relations, and recognize their common interest in maintaining these
arrangements (Bull & Watson, 1984, p. 1).
As evidence of the existence of a society, Wight puts forward the following
argument:
International society is manifested in the diplomatic system; in the
conscious maintenance of the balance of power to preserve the
independence of the member-communities; in the regular operations of
international law, whose binding force is accepted over a wide though
politically unimportant range of subjects; in economic, social and
technical interdependence and the functional international institutions
established latterly to regulate it (1996, pp. 96-97).
The pluralists of the English School presume that a group of states constitute
the international society. The essential character of international politics is anarchy,
but there are distinct possible sources of order under conditions of anarchy.
International order derives from states’ interactions. States act on their own interests
or values and, at the same time, consider others’ behavior and responses to that of
themselves, and thus they “conceive themselves to be bound by certain common
interests and a common set of rules in the relations with one another” by the
interactions and consensus they have reached (Bull, 2012, p. 13). Therefore, a certain
international order bonded by common interests of states emerged.
78
International order sustains through institutions, comprising the balance of
power, great powers, war, international law, and diplomacy (Bull, 2012). From the
perspective of pluralists of the English School, “An anarchical society of sovereign
states” has been shaped as the contemporary international order (Suganami, 2010, p.
18). Barry Buzan takes state sovereignty in the deep structure of international society
as the primary institutions (2004b). Sovereign states in the international society with
“a relatively low degree of shared norms, rules and institutions” and the
sovereignty/non-intervention norms restrict this international society (Buzan, 2004b,
p. xvii). The states coexist and compete with each other in the international society,
and in turn they simultaneously maintain the international order by preventing
conflicts and protecting differences.
The insights in the English School could rectify the weakness of the neoclassical realism. Societal elements should be put into the causation of foreign policy
formation, as a complement of the raw logic of neo-classical realism, to “get a
meaningful picture of how systems of states operate” (Buzan, 2004b, p. 8).
However, the English School theory contributes little in casual explanations
because of its academic tradition. As Buzan (2004b, p.24) has pointed out, Europeans
and Americans follow different traditions regarding using theories. Europeans are
inclined to use theory for “organizing a field systematically,” while Americans
demand theories to strictly explain “testable hypotheses of a causal nature.” Hence, a
combination of neo-classical realism and the English School can resolve both the
epistemological and methodological problems for this study’s objective.
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Integration of the Two Approaches
Both neo-classical realism and pluralism of the English School assume that
states are the principal actors and that the systemic factors of the international system
are the determinants of foreign policy outcomes. This research poses a premise that
the systemic incentives of a state’s foreign policy include both societal factors and
material elements. To put it from another way, in foreign policy making processes, a
state considers both normative components and interactions under the power structure
in the international system which is anarchical but with the order based on state
sovereignty. These systemic incentives as the result of interactions between
international actors generate both pressure and opportunity, which impel the state to
consider how to ensure its national interests and values. The state’s decision makers
identify the possible influence brought about from the systemic factors to the
domestic politics, and the domestic demands affect the decision makers’ perceptions
of the international pressure and opportunity. Therefore, the decision makers choose a
corresponding foreign policy based on their perceptions in a certain situation.
Table 3
Causal Mechanism of the Analytical Framework
Independent variable
Systemic factors
Systemic ordering
principle (anarchy)
Societal factors
(international order
based on state
soverignty)

Intervening variable
Domestic constrains

Dependent variable

Foreign policy
Domestic demands
↓

Decision makers’
perceptions
Material elements
(Distribution of power)
80
Motivations Underlying China’s Non-intervention Policy
This section illustrates the dynamics of China’s non-intervention policy based
on the formulated analytical framework. The analytical framework provides the
theoretical elements in the causal mechanisms of states’ international behavior, which
need to be specified and applied to China’s foreign policy.
The Determinant Role of Systemic Factors
International society within which international actors interact with each other
brings about both pressure and opportunity to states. Identifying systemic factors is
helpful to examine causal mechanisms underlying a given state’s foreign policy. That
is to say, the starting point is to determine the “effects that the international system
has on national behavior” (Zakaria, 1992, p. 197). In the post-Cold War period,
systemic dynamics in world politics derive from the distribution of power under U.S.
unipolarity in the anarchical international system that presents the international order
based on state sovereignty.
States share their normative understandings of the principles of sovereignty.
They pursue their independent authority and interests in interactions with others in an
anarchical world and thus agree to maintain an order based on state sovereignty by
adherence to the rules of “mutual respect of each other’s sovereignty, nonintervention, and the established codes of diplomacy” (Sterling-Folker, 2006, p. 307).
In this sense, these sovereignty norms are means rather than ends. These norms do not
control states’ actions, and states follow the norms in order to stabilize the
international order. The features of balance of power, power politics, and the
usefulness of diplomacy are embedded in this international order.
81
In the case of paramount state sovereignty, if an agenda is to become a
necessary act in international organizations, it must be supported by legitimate
reasons on the basis of states’ consent, normally constituting the requirements of the
power proposing it and the demands of other states approving it. During the process
that a political agenda transforms to an activity, states are under pressure generated by
the interactions among states in international society, which make them approve or
oppose the proposed agenda. This international pressure is rooted in states’ pursuits of
national “interests” and “reputation” in the international system (Keohane, 2002). A
state’s unaccommodating attitudes and acts may put these pursuits at risk and face
further punishments or retaliations of other states. Therefore, international consensus
on legitimizing interventions in a certain state exerts pressure that forces a state with
non-interventionist preference to cooperate or compromise with the international
community. A given state tends to cooperate with the international community if an
interventionist agenda is commonly accepted and does not threaten the state’s national
interest. If the interventionist agenda is inconsistent with the state’s preference or
adverse to its interests, the state may compromise with the international community
when facing enormous international pressure.
China’s insistence on the principle of non-intervention is based on a statecentered ontology, which highlights the security of states rather than the security of
individuals in international society. China is likely to concede with respect to
international interventions when it faces strong pressure caused by a broad consensus
making the interventions legitimate. China’s approval of certain international
interventions to some extent reveals that it is willing to sacrifice its principle and
interests to concede to the international community, thereby benefiting the majority
states in international society. The concession contains China’s hesitation and
82
reluctance at times, which is based on its intention of maintaining the international
order, as well as the non-intervention norm. China’s hesitation and reluctance are
generally under the conditions that interveners resort to military force or the reasons
of intervention are not convincing viewed by the Chinese government.
Non-use of Force
To maintain the international order, China has a preference for political
negotiation and coordination as disagreed with using coercive measures against the
target states; this preference is based on China’s belief in non-intervention combined
with its commitment to mutual respect of the integrity of territoriality and sovereignty.
As a consequence, China hesitates to support or permit the use of armed force to
resolve other states’ problems. It advocates that the UNSC is the only authorizing
organ on the use of force, and regional arrangements or organizations must obtain
UNSC authorization prior to any enforcement action (CFM, 2005). From China’s
perspective, the use of force is a last resort measure and should not be employed as
long as alternatives exist. Hence, China prefers to carry on a continuous dialogue
aimed at persuading the target states to accept UN involvements in managing
conflicts, and it also pursues resolutions by the UNSC with the consent of the
governments of the target states. In short, China is cautious about advocating an
agenda on the use of force without the consent of the target states or the unanimous
approval of all UNSC members.
Justifiable Reasons
China insists that international intervention must rely on justification and
reasonable intention. It favors cooperation with the governments of the target states
83
that are seen as legitimate representatives of the population in addressing their
domestic issues. Collective interventions can be limited pressure serving as a political
signal that compels the target state to reconsider its policies, especially if combined
with inducements and opportunities for progress through dialogue. China disagrees
with harsh sanctions aimed at forcing policy changes by inflicting injury to a
country’s economy and the livelihood of the people. Beijing has different criteria and
principles toward international issues from that of Western countries. It even applies a
strict criterion on the emerging norm R2P in order to avoid military intervention that
may derive from the vested interests of a particular state or to avoid a humanitarian
catastrophe.59 Moreover, regime change is one of China’s gravest concerns. China is
wary of the international intervention that might be an excuse by a certain country
that might take advantage of civilian protection or international order to change the
troublesome regime of a target state.
In addition to international pressure, the international order based on the state
sovereignty also supplies a beneficial environment for China to pursue its power,
which is essentially determined and motivated by the anarchical system.60 China
vigorously opposes interventions by applying the non-intervention principle when
interventions threaten its national interests or interventions emanated by Western
countries may shake the foundation of the international order. Therefore, China’s
opposition to international interventions is also motivated by maintaining the
59
China officially states that any response to a massive humanitarian crisis should strictly
conform to the UN Charter and the opinion of the country and the regional organization concerned
should be respected. The action should lead to a peaceful solution (CFM, 2005).
60
Chinese scholars think that China has started to recognize and, to some extent, maintain this
system since it integrated into the international system. See, for example, Shi (2013).
84
sovereign states system, although essentially for its national interests, thereby
preventing external interventions from achieving legitimacy.
The systematic characteristics also include the polarity and the distribution of
power in the society (Hudson, 2007). After the Cold War, unipolarity has become the
distinguished feature of the international system. This current system features a highly
asymmetric distribution of relative capabilities in which the US is a dominant
superpower. States confront opportunities and constraints underlying the unipolar
system, which creates incentives that prompt states to counterbalance the dominant
pole. On the other hand, the potential cost and risk of the challenge would be very
high (Hansen, Toft, & Wives, 2008). Hence, it is rational for states to be free riders
when they face limited options provided by the international system.
However, conceding to the superpower is not an unchangeable behavior of
states, particularly for great powers, as powers pursue their economic wealth, prestige,
and influence in world politics (Choucri & North, 1975; Rosecrance, 1986; Wolforth,
2009). Neo-classical realism presumes that states respond to the uncertainties of
international anarchy by seeking to control and shape their external environment
(Rose, 1998). If a transformation of the system is imminent or the distribution of
power starts to change, rising powers tend to challenge the dominant power’s
legitimacy. When rising powers’ relative capabilities are not strong enough to directly
confront the hegemon, they attempt to shape the environment by subtly resisting
against the superpower.61 Thus, the relative distribution of power among states affects
61
Schweller and Pu (2011) call this behavior as “rightful resistance”, and they analyze the
possible roles of emerging powers in the international system after unipolarity by investigating China’s
case. They argue rising powers tend to be shirkers, who pursue power’s privileges but do not want to
take responsibilities.
85
their considerations of their positions in the international system and the extent to
which they can pursue their national interests. As far as a specific international
agenda is concerned, a state takes other powers’ responses into account and may
associate itself with other powers to counterbalance the hegemon.
China’s foreign policy in the last three decades demonstrates this rationality. It
has avoided direct conflicts with the US, enjoying the public goods provided by the
US. China’s material capability has gradually increased, marking it as the second tier
power in the world. Therefore, China tends to collaborate with the US to authorize
interventions in the UNSC when facing high-level diplomatic pressure form the latter.
However, China also resists the unipolar system by two dimensions:
pragmatically accommodating U.S. hegemony and, on the other hand, contesting the
legitimacy of U.S. hegemony by discourse and activities (Schweller & Pu, 2011).
Regarding international interventions, China condemns U.S. interventionism and
hegemonism through Chinese newspaper and official statements, and it joins Russia
or other like-minded countries as a countering coalition to vote against the US in
international institutions. Support from other countries in international society
provides China the opportunity to oppose U.S. hegemony, and this opposition would
not lead to a direct conflict between China the US.
The pressure and opportunity penetrated within the international system
determine China’s non-intervention policy, but they do not automatically work in
China’s foreign policy decision-making processes. The extent of pressure and
opportunity understood by the Chinese government is constrained by China’s
domestic needs. Therefore, the domestic factors are specified in the following part.
86
The Important Role of Domestic Constraints
This analytical framework relies on a state-centric dynamic; it thus also
explores what and how domestic constraints affect foreign policy choices of states’
decision makers. Investigating the social and cultural constraints that decision makers
face is helpful for explaining why an international norm has achieved the domestic
salience in a state’s foreign policy configuration (Mesquita, 2003).62 State power,
which is associated with both ideational and material elements, is considered as the
underpinning of the domestic incentives in China’s non-intervention policy. In the
causal train of foreign policy formulated by the neo-classical realism, state power is
an important intervening invariable. State power is defined as “the relative ability of
the state to extract or mobilize resources from domestic society as determined by the
institutions of the state, nationalism, and ideology” (Taliaferro, 2009, p. 213).63
Therefore, ideological base as a source of state power should be evaluated first.
Ideational Factor: Ideological Base
The domestic factors identified here are ideas and preference, which explain
some portion of the variance in a state’s international behavior. Foreign policies are
deemed to “protect domestic core value from external threats,” and are to “pursue
country’s interest as well” (Leffler, 1990, p. 143). Ideologies and interests intersect in
foreign policies; therefore, ideologies should be taken into account in analyzing a
62
The concept of domestic salience of norm derives from the theory of constructivism, which
refers to an international norm has been accepted and achieved legitimacy by one state. The
mainstream constructivists presume that “when stats regularly refer to the norm to describe their own
behavior and that of others, the validity clams of the norm are no longer controversial even if actual
behavior continues to violate the norm” (Risse-Kappen, 1994; Peevers 2013, p. 45).
63
On factors that affect the degree of state power, see Taliaferro (2006).
87
state’s foreign policy.64 An actor’s ideology is based on his/her worldview and
reflects the actor’s perception of ego and others, as well as their relations. A state’s
perception of an international norm relies on the collective identity of the policy
makers and the people, to some extent. Volkan (2004) points out historical events are
crucial in defining a group’s identity. The leaders of a group tend to accentuate the
chosen glories and chosen traumas (real or construct) to shape people’s identity,
thereby framing people’s interpretation and perception of a specific norm.
Figure 1. Monthly Number of Articles That Reference “Sovereignty” in the People’s
Daily, January 1990–December 2011
Note. Lee (2012), cited from Johnston (2013, p. 13).
China’s principle of non-intervention expresses the Chinese standpoint of
advocating the infrangible state sovereignty for which Chinese people have been
longing since they had acknowledged the concept of sovereignty at the end of the
Qing dynasty.65 Chinese enthusiasm for sovereignty is emphasized in the country’s
64
This assumption is different from constructivism, which underscores the logic of
appropriateness that the international norm frames states’ perceptions on the norm.
65
It is consentingly considered Asia was a tributary system in which China was the center
before the end of Qing Dynasty. Although the Qing court signed two treaties of Nerchinsk and Kyakhta
88
official discourse, which can be illustrated by Figure 1 that shows the importance of
“sovereignty”(zhuquan 主权/主権) in China’s official rhetoric.66 The concept of
sovereignty, which was exogenously given and did not present in Chinese civilization,
was imported into China through the translation and diffusion of the “Elements of
International Law” (Wheaton, 1865). When this concept was established in Chinese
cognition, it has not been put to a locus of contestation because the concept met the
exact demands of China, a de facto semi-colony after the Qing dynasty.
Sovereignty has immediately become a momentously conceptual instrument
for the Chinese intellectuals to face the European international society and to rethink
China’s identity.67 As Kim (1994, p. 429) has argued, “Contemporary Chinese views
of sovereignty developed during the period of turbulence in the late Qing dynasty of
the nineteenth century and became identified with state building, a project greatly
aided by China’s adopting a sovereign-centered approach to international relations.”
The amalgamation of instrument and morality of sovereignty has shaped the Chinese
foreign thoughts in PRC’s history. Hence, the historical legacy, in particular the
exploitation by more powerful developed countries, profoundly affected Chinese
political thinking about the sovereignty norms, thus forming their intuitionally
negative attitude toward intervention.
with Russia in 1689 and 1727 to draw the borderlines between Russia and China, the Qing court
insisted that the two treaties were set under the tributary system and refused to recognize the
conception of modern sovereignty (Adachi, 2015, pp.67-68).
66
The lowess (locally weighted least squares) curve is a smoothing technique that fits a
regression line to a specified fraction of time-series data.
67
In fact, the case that late-Qing China changed the administrative status of Taiwan and
Xinjiang from the dependency to the province was a consequence that China had been affected by the
very conception of territorial sovereignty (Lam, 2009).
89
As Chapter 1 discussed, in the context of Chinese perceptions regarding its
foreign policy, non-intervention stands for the national value and moral judgment,
although the Chinese government emphasized altered meanings of the nonintervention principle, including independence, self-reliance, anti-imperialism, anticolonialism, and anti-hegemonism, in different circumstances. Opposing
interventionist activities from other countries empowers the Chinese people to
manage their own affairs and represents the termination of their disgraced history.
Non-intervention is not only an international norm, and it also reflects the country’s
pride of independency. Intervention, however, often comes to Chinese minds as a
description of Western countries’ malicious actions thus should be denounced.
Therefore, the notion of intervention in the Chinese worldview has been constructed
as powers’ coercions toward the weaker and thus is perceived as a sign of immorality.
Political Survival: State-societal Relations
In addition to the ideational factors, another dimension in the analysis is the
primary goal of states—survival, assumed by realism. In fact, in contemporary
international society, the extinction of a state is hardly to become a reality. Survival
thus is understood as a country’s capability of maintaining authority with a highest
degree. In other words, internationally, a country’s political survival is achieved
through “unimpeded, indigenous decision-making power wholly free of externally
imposed constraints or inducements to that state’s security” (Richardson, 2010, p. 10).
Domestically, policy makers’ primary motivation for political survival is retaining
their power. States vary depending on the characteristics of regimes, so the political
survival of “state” in some instances can be motivated by regime survival rather than
90
national survival, especially in the case of authoritarian countries.68 Guaranteeing the
survival of a given current regime depends on the state’s autonomy and legitimacy,
which is closely associated with state power. Strengthening its state power requires a
regime to effectively manage the relationship between state and society in its
country.69
As an authoritarian state, maintaining political survival of the existing regime
is the crucial objective of Chinese reigning elites. As Sørensen (2013, p. 364) points
out, “to keep the CCP in power gives paramount importance to the Chinese
leadership’s effort to maintain domestic social and political stability.” The Chinese
ruling group commits itself to assure its authority, reputation, and power, which are
the basic domestic motivations in Chinese foreign policy.70
The aim of political survival is achieved by strengthening its state power, the
political competence of manipulating the society. The Chinese government maintains
the substantive methods for self-preservation as “core interests,” which include “state
sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity and national reunification, China’s
political system established by the Constitution and overall social stability, and the
basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic and social development” (IOSC,
2011b).71 Although the specifications of the core interests in China’s official
68
It does not mean that the regime’s interest is totally separated from nation interests. To a
large extent, an authoritarian or a dictatorial regime takes its interest as the nation interest.
69
The term “state” in this discussion about relations of societal and state refers to a political
regime in domestic politics instead of a nation or country in international politics.
70
Although some episodes such as the Cultural Revolution and the Tiananmen carnage have
undermined the regime’s internal and external legitimacy, the remedies involving strengthening
country’s capacity and reputation by dint of various approaches worked effective.
71
It has been pointed out that the essence of this announcement or the core interests is to
maintain China’s political system, in other words, to keep the CCP’s priority (Zhang W. , 2011).
91
declaration are general and obscure, China explicitly takes the terms “state
sovereignty” and “economic and social development” into the core interests. These
items in China’s official declarations indeed reflect China’s domestic priorities and
real considerations, which are in accordance with Chinese domestic demands.72 In
short, maintaining the country’s development and keeping the authority control over
domestic issues are approaches that the China’s regime remains legitimate.73
Economic Development
The country’s economic growth and growing prosperity are an indispensable
approach to sustaining the regime’s survival, provided that the common good to its
citizens is the rightful source of domestic political authority. China has kept the lowprofile diplomacy and immersed itself in the economic development for more than
two decades. Bulwarking China through two serious economic crises underscores the
effectiveness of economic performance as the critical way to maintain CCP’s
legitimacy.
China’s high-speed economic development is contributed by the heavy
investment and merchandise exports, and its growth seriously relies on the energy
supply. In 1993, China transferred its role in the market of energy resources,
especially natural oil, from exporter to importer in the early 1990s. It has thus
72
These pronouncements are natural not merely for the Chinese government, according to
Holsti (1967), most policy-makers assume that the most essential objectives of any foreign policy are
to ensure the defense of the home territory and perpetuate a particular political, social, and economic
system based on that territory.
73
A regime usually adopts three approaches including ideological legality, performance
legality, and procedural legality to achieve legitimacy (Easton, 1965; Beetham, 1991). In China’s case,
after the Cultural Revolution, the ideological legality gradually loses effectiveness; and as an
authoritarian country, it does not satisfy the procedural legality. Thus, the performance legality is the
last method for the Chinese government.
92
developed a growing hunger for more energy and natural resources. Nowadays,
approximately half of China’s natural resources are imported.74 More than half of the
crude oil imports are supplied by the Middle East, and one-third comes from Africa.75
The demand of China’s domestic development affects China’s foreign policy toward
these resource-rich countries. The stability of these countries, as well as regions, is
significant for China to guarantee the resources importation. Therefore, China’s
booming energy demand affects its relationship with these countries and its responses
to interventions in these countries.
Domestic issues
Mearsheimer (2001, p. 31) points out that powers seek to “maintain their
territorial integrity and the autonomy of their domestic political order.” China’s nonintervention policy is used as the shield to keep its absolute control toward domestic
affairs away from foreign engagements. The unstable and unresolved territories are
most significant domestic affairs concerning China’s non-intervention policy, as these
issues easily attract international involvements.76 The human rights issue is also
important but this issue in China evokes different arguments but hardly attracts
physical interventions of foreign countries. Thus, China always condemns foreign
interferences in its human rights issue as violation of the non-intervention norm.
74
China’s import dependence ratio on natural oil is as high as 55.2% in months during January
to March of 2011, and that number is higher than that of US. The datum is adopted in a report (Li &
Ma, 2011, p. 2), but there are two other accumulated data of 53.5% and 61% given respectively by the
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and the National Development and Reform
Commission of PRC.
75
See the statics provided by the General Administration of Customs of the PRC.
76
The expression of “unresolved territories” does not refer to the disputed territories between
China and other claimant states, such as those in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, for
conflicts between sovereign countries for a disputed territory are not taken as cases of intervention in
this study, which have been pointed out in Chapter 1.
93
One of the initial purposes of establishing the Five Principles was to resolve
the territorial problem (Tibet) between China and India. Taiwan issue is another
crucially important territorial problem for the Chinese government. From the
perspective of the Chinese government, Taiwan was an “un-liberated Chinese
territory,” and any international interventions concerning Taiwan are “egregious
Western interference with China’s internal affairs” (Ford, 2010, p. 199). In addition to
the reclamation of the lost regions such like Hong Kong and Macao, China has sought
to hinder outside supports for separatist movements in these areas inhabited by ethnic
minorities to guarantee the physical control over these areas. External intervention
explicitly entails a threat to a state through the empowerment of dissident groups
inside the state. China is acutely sensitive to these domestic issues and has denounced
other countries’ actions and words that supported the independence of Tibet, Xinjiang,
and Inner Mongolia, among others. The political stability of largely ethnic and
marginal areas delimits China foreign behavior, particularly its participations in
international interventions.
China’s struggle for political survival reveals its domestic vulnerability that is
caused by its legitimacy crises and the centrifugal forces existing in China’s domestic
politics. Having gone through some grave legitimacy crises, the Chinese government
is sensitive to international issues that may shake its legitimate foundation.77 As
Sarotte (2012, p. 181) has affirmed, “The collapse of [Communist] party authority
abroad weighed heavily on the minds of the CCP’s leaders.” Accordingly, China’s
domestic vulnerability constrains its perceptions of the international environment.
77
Sarotte gives the conclusion from the observation of the Tiananmen Square massacre. This
issue is a prominent case in which the CCP was worried about the contagion of democratic movements
yielding domestic chaos and party factionalism in Eastern Europe.
94
China usually does not support the activities for toppling the current regimes in other
countries by force, in the form of foreign interventions or domestic rebellions, no
matter what the reasons are. It is a mirror that the Chinese government supports
whoever is in power in another country, because the CCP emphasizes its
unchangeable legitimacy as the current regime and its infrangible control over
domestic affairs.
Table 4
Motivations of China’s Non-intervention Policy in the Post-Cold War Era
Systemic incentives
International order
based on state
sovereignty (IO)
Distribution of power
under U.S.
unipolarity (DOP)
→ The extent of
pressure and
opportunity
Domestic constraints

↓
Perceptions
Ideational factor: Ideological
base

Political survival: Statesocietal relations (economic
development; domestic
issues)
→ Possible effect on the
domestic vulnerability

Outcome

Non-intervention
policy
↓
The extent of supposed threat,
pressure, and opportunity
Casual Explanations for China’s Non-intervention Policy
China’s non-intervention policy is formulated through a prudent decisionmaking process. In this process regarding interventions, China faces different degrees
of pressure and opportunity generated by international systemic incentives, and these
systemic incentives and their conjunctions with the country’s domestic concerns are
considered. Domestic vulnerability influences China’s ability to confront
interventions, and the extent of the systemic effect on domestic vulnerability shapes
95
decision markers’ perceptions of the international environment. Decision makers, thus,
respond to international interventions based on their perceived threats or opportunities
generated by the systemic incentives. Therefore, China’s non-intervention policy is
constituted by its nuanced responses to international interventions, as well as its
decision of (non)-intervention (See Table 4).
Implications of the Causal Mechanisms and Reflections
Based on these theoretical premises, four propositions can be deduced from
the casual mechanisms of China’s non-intervention policy.
I: As a target state, China applies the principle of non-intervention to firmly
oppose interventions when facing strong international pressure.
II: As a potential intervener in bilateral relationships, China prefers to
advocate for the principle of non-intervention in the absence of international pressure.
III: When international society exerts strong pressure on China to make
concessions in cases of international intervention, China tends to deviate from the
principle of non-intervention.
IV: If international pressure decreases, China is likely to apply the principle
of non-intervention and respond reluctantly to or resist specific international
interventions.
The four propositions are categorized according to China’s identity, in other
words, China’s different roles in various kinds of intervention. Using the three
responses in China’s non-intervention policy suggested in Chapter 1 as the dependent
variables, we can identify six plausible casual pathways as propositional sequences of
96
decision-making formation. Six sub-propositions are inferred from these four
propositions.
Pattern 1: China faces strong pressure from the international environment
that increases domestic vulnerability, and consequently, China chooses to resist
interventions.
This outcome of norm-abiding is self-explanatory. International interventions
in China’s internal affairs intensify its domestic concerns and thus impair its state
power to mobilize the societal resources to maintain its political survival. Because of
China’s domestic vulnerability in this context, the Chinese government views any
international interventions or involvements as direct threats. The normative factor in
international society provides an opportunity as a legal shield for China to defend
itself from the direct threat. For example, in 2011, China strongly protested U.S.
President Obama’s meeting with the Tibetan spiritual leader Dalai Lama, and the
CFM stated, “The meeting in disregard of China's resolute opposition and solemn
representations is serious interference in China's internal affairs” (The BBC
Monitoring Asia Pacific, 2011). Furthermore, the Chinese government has used the
principle of non-intervention to oppose critiques on its human rights records since the
Tiananmen issue took place. It protested the U.S. issuance of the “Country Report on
Human Rights Practices” almost every year, claiming that the report violates China’s
sovereignty and interferes with China’s internal affairs.78 China has traditionally paid
78
But the sacred non-intervention principle is not able to stop Western countries from the
“violation of China’s sovereignty.” Ironically, China also published the “Report on Human Rights
Practices of the US” following the US Report as a counterattack on the US, but the Chinese
government does not see its behavior as a violation of the US sovereignty as well as its nonintervention policy(Qiao, 2011).
97
grave attention to its sovereign rights by resolving its own issues, in keeping with its
resistance to outside involvement in affairs it perceives as strictly domestic.
The Chinese government tends to extend applications of the non-intervention
principle to oppose all foreign involvements and interferences with China’s internal
affairs; it can hold the weapon of non-intervention principle in its unrelenting efforts
to maintain its control over domestic problems. In conclusion, the implementation of
the principle of non-intervention is driven by concerns about domestic vulnerability
and is a strong statement for ensuring political survival.
Pattern 2: China faces low systemic pressure and high opportunities to
strengthen state power in the international arena by maximizing its national interests,
especially overseas interests.
China takes advantage of the principle of non-intervention to attract likeminded countries. It has proved that China’s rhetorical promise of non-intervention in
the domestic affairs of other countries was productive for some so-called rogue
countries that are also rich in resources. That does not necessarily mean China is
hypocritical and immoral when dealing with the relations with these countries. As a
latecomer to natural resources exploration and exportation, Chinese enterprises lack
the technological advantages, experience, and market share in cooperating with these
countries. Companies reasonably acquire the market share by taking advantage of
favorable connections between China and these developing countries. Although it is
the behavior of companies to pursue profits, given China’s demand for natural
resources and the nature of state-owned enterprises, these companies unavoidably
undertake the task of developing the country; in turn, the Chinese government is
obliged to help these companies fulfill their tasks.
98
The defense of sovereignty is a major element in the policies and rhetoric of
developing countries that view intervention as an endemic and pervasive feature of
international relations, embedded in the very structure of power relations between
themselves and the highly industrialized countries of the North (Gamba, 1993). China
does not impose its values on weaker nations, and thus offers an alternative to the
American conception of a new kind of world (Nathan & Ross, 1997). Therefore,
China can utilize the policy of non-intervention to consolidate the friendly relations
with these developing countries.
The Chinese government employs the non-intervention policy to woo
developing countries in opposition to the Western countries. Promising not to
intervene in the domestic affairs of other countries, usually weaker than China, is not
only to appease these countries, but also to portray China as morally superior to
Western countries. For example, Wen Jiabao spoke at the Opening Ceremony of the
4th Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation that:
The Chinese government and people respect the right of African
countries to independently choose their social systems and support the
African people in exploring development paths that suit their national
conditions. We firmly believe that Africa is fully capable of solving its
own problems in an African way. The economic cooperation and trade
between China and Africa are based on mutual benefit, win-win
progress, openness and transparency. China has never attached any
political strings to its support and assistance to Africa, and nor will it
do so in the future (Wen, 2009).
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Table 5
Patterns of China’s Non-intervention Policy in the Post-Cold War Period (1)
Pattern
Independent
variables

Intervening variables

Dependent
variables
Ideational factor: Concerned
Political survival
IO
1
DOP

→ Increases vulnerability
↓
→ Strong pressure
Opportunity
Direct threat
 Resistance
Ideational factor: Concerned
Political survival
IO
2
DOP

→ Increases vulnerability
↓
→ No pressure
Opportunity
Direct threat
Note. In Patter 1, China is a target state; in Pattern 2, China is a potential intervener in
bilateral relations, and increasing vulnerability is the outcome of potential interventions.
China’s outreach has been well received by many governments of developing
countries. They welcomed China’s rhetoric of non-intervention and constant
inveighed against American “hegemonism” (Eisenman & Kurlantzick, 2006, p. 222).
For instance, on the visit to Beijing, Mozambique’s prime minister announced that his
country would support China’s “independent foreign policy”–a term Beijing uses to
denote independent foreign policy from American power, and called for China to play
a larger role on the African continent (Eisenman & Kurlantzick, 2006, p. 219). The
success of China’s non-intervention policy to some extent is attributed to political
compatibility between China and some developing countries. Similar undemocratic
regimes facilitate their consensus on opposing foreign interventions. Giving routine
lip service to the developing countries through the twin identifications of shared
100
common interests and solidarity, China’s non-intervention policy thus can be marked
by its strategy to enhance its own status and interests. Moreover, the non-intervention
policy also gives China the time to decide its foreign policy concerning other
countries’ domestic problems or to decide how it should behave concerning a certain
international affair after receiving responses from the rest of international society.
In these following proposed patterns, China is a potential intervention sender
or an intervener. China conveys its views and concerns over various interventions
through negotiation with other states or by discourse and votes on interventionist
initiatives under the framework of UN or other organizations.
Pattern 3: Under the conditions that international circumstance produces high
pressure requiring Chinese concessions and that the specific intervention is likely to
alleviate Beijing’s domestic vulnerabilities, China cooperates with international
efforts.
China cooperates in authorizing a specific intervention when confronted with
huge international pressure. Especially when the intervention is likely to ease
systemic stresses or strengthen state power, and in view of the Chinese government,
the systemic pressure does not pose a direct threat, the potential intervention might
align with China’s national interests. This pattern also occurs in situations when the
target state is not in a pivotal geographic zone and is not intimately related to China’s
domestic concerns, and an intervention against the target state would not threaten
regional or international stability or have a significant impact on China’s national
interests. China also faces international pressure from the major powers and other
stakeholders that have approved the intervention. In this situation, it is reasonable for
China to not block the intervention. From China’s perspective, this kind of
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international intervention per se does not pose a threat against its regime, but the
international pressure of hindrance might put its national interests at stake. In this
context, the principle of non-intervention is never the normative reason for resisting
international intervention, which was evident in China’s response to the UNSC
sanctions against Serra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Ethiopia, etc.
Pattern 4: Under the conditions that international society exerts strong
pressure on China to make concessions and that the specific intervention might
aggravate domestic vulnerability, the Chinese government, despite the perceived
threat, compromises and admits the legitimacy of the intervention.
This pattern emphasizes the diplomatic priorities in China’s decision-making
processes regarding international interventions when high international pressure and
Beijing’s domestic interests have converged. If certain coercive measure has proved
legitimate and has been strongly advocated by the international community, China
may admit the legitimacy of intervention by acquiescence in the form of casting
abstentions and, at the same time, rhetorically applying the principle of nonintervention. In this situation, China does agree with the reasons or manners of an
interventionist activity. From the Chinese government’s perspective, the intervention
violates the sovereignty norms and shakes the international order. Thus the
intervention would pose a potential threat to the Chinese government’s political
survival, and the threat becomes evident in the case that the issue area of the
intervention is closely related to China’s domestic concerns. China’s abstentions from
voting the UNSC sanctions against Afghanistan, the FRY, Somalia, and Eritrea can
illustrate this pattern.
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Patterns 5: When China’s non-interventionist attitude is shared by certain
great powers but these powers do not insist on non-intervention in action, China
makes a compromise.
Under conditions of international dissent that there is division among great
powers regarding legitimizing collective interventions, the international pressure on
China forcing it to deviate from the principle of non-intervention will be lessened.
Thus, China pursues similar political stands with other great powers.
In most cases, the target states are not strategically significant to China, but
potential interventions may threaten Beijing’s national interests in the states. Conflictaffected regions like the Middle East and Africa are not within China’s security
concerns, while Russia and other Western countries traditionally compete with each
other for maintaining their power presence in these regions. When these countries
encounter a divergence regarding a target state, China often sides with Russia.
China’s alignment with Russia to oppose U.S. interventionism is also a challenge to
the superpower’s legitimacy.
In the situation that the international intervention is seriously concerned about
China’s state power, under the support of other powers, China may negotiate with the
intervention sponsors to minimize its possible threats by discussion or threatening to
wield the veto power under the UN framework. Other powers’ sympathy with China’s
non-interventionist preference can lessen Beijing’s pressure in international society,
which also provides it the opportunity to decrease the potential threat on domestic
vulnerability. However, China complies with the international community when other
like-minded powers do not strongly oppose certain international interventions.
103
Examples of the China’s foreign policy toward sanctions against North Korea, Sudan,
Libya, and Crimea make the point.
Pattern 6: When a great power supports China’s attitude of non-intervention
and strongly opposes intervention, China vigorously resists intervention.
In this situation, China fiercely condemns the intervention or vetoes against
the relevant interventionist proposals at the UN. Based on empirical studies, China,
along with Russia, has cast vetoes on some interventionist initiatives. By acting in
concert with Russia, China not only expresses its concerns about the tension between
its foreign policy principles and the international interventions, but also takes no
responsibility in obstructing international actions. Russia’s support eases China’s
external pressure and provides China an opportunity to oppose potential interventions
that may increase China’s domestic vulnerability.
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Table 6
Patterns of China’s Non-intervention Policy in the Post-Cold War Period (2)
Pattern
3
Independent
variables

IO
DOP
→ Strong
pressure

Intervening variables
↓
Perceptions
Ideational factor
Political survival
→ Reduces or no effect on
vulnerability
↓

Dependent
variables
 Cooperation
High pressure
Indirect threat/ No threat
4
5
6
IO
DOP
→ Strong
pressure
IO
DOP
→ Lessened
pressure with
limited
opportunity
IO
DOP
→Lessened
pressure with
opportunity

Ideational factor
Political survival
→ Increases vulnerability
potentially or directly
↓

High pressure
Indirect/ direct threat
Compromise
Ideational factor
Political survival
→ Increases vulnerability
potentially or directly
↓


Lessened pressure
Limited opportunity
Indirect/ direct threat

Ideational factor
Political survival
→ Increases vulnerability
potentially or directly
↓
 Resistance
Lessened pressure
Increased opportunity
Indirect/ direct threat
Note. This table depicts China’s responses to international interventions. The extent of
threat refers to China’s perception of the potential intervention.
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Conclusion
This chapter has shed light on the reasons why China favors the principle of
non-intervention in its foreign policy and why China’s international behavior in some
cases contradicts its rhetorical support for non-intervention.
To do so, the IR literature on China’s non-intervention policy has been
evaluated and criticized. First, theoretical approaches that stress the international
system might help explain China’s preference for the principle of non-intervention but
cannot account for the inconsistency in China’s application of non-intervention policy.
Second, theoretical paradigms of rationalism and Innenpolitik focusing on domestic
factors account for the priorities and incentives in China’s foreign policy but ignore
the constraints imposed on China by international society and, thus, cannot explain
the suboptimal choices of the Chinese government. In short, these assumptions of IR
theories are sorely deficient for examining China’s non-intervention policy.
This chapter has built an analytical framework combining the insights of neoclassical realism and the English School in a theoretical construction in order to
understand China’s non-intervention policy. Applying this theoretical framework
established the causal logic of the motivations underlying China’s non-intervention
policy by identifying the systemic dynamics and domestic incentives. China’s
decisions whether to employ interventions largely depend on how it interprets the
international systemic imperatives. China’s perceptions of the norm of nonintervention and its domestic needs for a non-intervention policy, particularly the
effect of domestic issues and national development on regime survival, are also
emphasized in different situations.
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This theoretical framework can explain why the Chinese government has
strongly emphasized the non-intervention principle in political pronouncements. It
also identifies the conditions under which China’s foreign policy is likely to conform
to systemic requirements and deviate from the non-intervention principle. As well,
this framework highlights the conditions under which China prefers to take an
ambiguous attitude toward international intervention by balancing its rhetorical nonintervention and interventionist behavior.
The analytical framework identified four propositions comprising six patterns
that summarize the mechanisms at work in China’s non-intervention policy formation.
The first two mechanisms are intuitive and straightforward, consistent with rationalist
theory. Taking advantage of the legitimacy of non-intervention established in
contemporary world politics, China’s non-intervention policy serves two purposes in
diplomacy, targeting different objects in international society. China seeks to protect
its domestic affairs when the country is a potential target for intervention. In contrast,
China promises not to intervene in developing countries in order to satisfy them for
Beijing’s own interests. The remaining four mechanisms of decision-making
processes have drawn a picture of how China has changed its understanding and
activities of intervention under certain international environments to address specific
problems and how China has balanced its political pronouncements and practices
regarding non-intervention policy. The four patterns might help explain the rationale
for Chinese foreign policy’s acceptance of certain alternatives and suboptimal choices
in the form of anomalies. These mechanisms need to be demonstrated through explicit
case studies. Accordingly, nine cases are scrutinized in the following chapters in order
to test the validity of the analytical framework.
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CHAPTER 3 AUTHORIZING INTERVENTIONS: THE
CASES OF THE GULF WAR, AFGHANISTAN, AND
NORTH KOREA
Introduction
It does not seem surprising that China showed a cooperative attitude towards
some international interventions, which can be illustrated by the affirmative votes it
has cast in the UNSC. Indeed, China has rarely objected to UNSC interventions in
countries that are not located in pivotal geographic positions or are insignificant for
Beijing’s interests. Viewing from a rationalist perspective, China’s cooperative
attitude in such cases is reasonable, as few countries are willing to get involved in the
affairs of another when it does not serve their strategic and economic interests.
However, China has supported the international interventions in the affairs of some
countries that are geopolitically significant to their regions, and specifically to China.
All three cases explored in this chapter concern either a regional power or a
state closely associated with China’s security. China supported and was even involved
in international interventions in these countries, making diplomatic efforts in addition
to voting in the UNSC. Military intervention in the Persian Gulf War was authorized
by the UNSC because of Iraq’s aggression upon Kuwait. China’s reactions to the
international interventions regarding the Iraqi-Kuwaiti conflict were relating to
Beijing’s concerns about the use of force by the international community and the
maintenance of international order. Further, the case of antiterrorism in Afghanistan
was linked to China’s concerns about legitimizing international interventions and
domestic stability, as well as the geopolitical situation surrounding Beijing. Lastly,
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the case of North Korea presented a significant issue concerning missile launches and
nuclear programs, which posed a threat to regional and international stability and
security. China’s involvement in this case required a balancing act between selfinterest and the international order, and challenged China’s very commitment to the
NPT. These three cases are all intimately relevant to China’s non-intervention policy
and how it is applied in light of competing interests with these countries. Therefore,
this chapter discusses these three anomalous cases to test the propositions posed in
Chapter 2.
Case 1: Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait (1990-1991)
In the past three decades, issues that have taken place in Iraq easily attract
international attention and military and humanitarian efforts. The Persian Gulf War
was not the first war that involved other countries in Iraq’s conflicts; nonetheless, the
war was a major military action by the superpower that dragged many great powers
into it. Although the Persian Gulf War occurred toward the end of the Cold War, it
heralded and, to some extent, revealed a new international structure of the post-Cold
War era. This war has not only changed the post-Cold War strategic configuration of
great powers in the Middle East but also marked the emergence of the UNSC’s role in
addressing international issues.
The Gulf War was also closely associated with China’s foreign policy,
especially to its non-intervention policy. China re-espoused the non-intervention
principle in its foreign policy toward the end of the Cold War, and the Tiananmen
incident further strengthened Beijing’s commitment to the principle. The Gulf War
broke out right after the Tiananmen incident. It would have been reasonable for China
to distance itself from the issues with regard to the Iraqi-Kuwaiti conflict to keep its
109
oral promise of non-intervention or to have chosen the Iraq’s side since Beijing was
suffering from international isolation initiated by Western countries as a result of the
Tiananmen incident. As a simple principle of realism is that the enemy of my enemy
is my friend. In reality, however, China was supportive of and cooperative with the
majority of countries by condemning the Iraqi government both in pronouncements
and international behavior. In addition, China’s responses to international
interventions in Iraqi-Kuwaiti issues were distinct as China was extremely sensitive
and conservative in the collective actions taken by the UNSC at that time. Therefore,
the theories based on rationalism, as well as innenpolitik, could not explain China’s
cooperation. It is worthwhile to examine China’s responses to the relevant issues
regarding the interventions in the Iraqi-Kuwaiti conflict to test the validity of the
causal explanations in the analytical framework.
Background
The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq was triggered by border disputes.
Comparatively, Kuwait had the geographical advantage of being an oil export country
possessing several ports and naval bases while Iraq lacked significant Gulf port access.
The border between Iraq and Kuwait was set by the UK in 1913 but had not been
officially demarcated by the two countries since the end of WWII. Iraq aimed to
annex Kuwait following Kuwait’s independence from the UK, but this ambition was
restrained because of pressures from the UK and other regional states until Iraq’s
aggression against Kuwait in 1990. In early 1990, owing to increased oil production,
the decreased price of oil plunged Iraq into a severe financial plight. Iraq failed to
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persuade its fraternal Arab states to provide loans for its economic rebuilding.79 In
order to seek recompense from Kuwait, Saddam Hussein, Iraq’s president at the time,
blamed Kuwait for exceeding the OPEC production quotas and draining oil from the
Rumaila field, which drove down the price of oil and aggravated Iraq’s financial crisis
(Klare, 2003).80 Iraq asserted that Kuwait’s actions were tantamount to military
aggression.81 Hussein underestimated the U.S. reaction to Iraq’s military action since
the US and Iraq were recovering their relationship, and the Iraqi government
militarily invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990.82
Iraq’s military action stimulated an immediate international response. The
UNSC passed a series of sanctions-related resolutions to force Iraq to stop the
occupation of Kuwait and implicitly authorized military action against Iraq. Punitive
actions against Iraq lasted more than a decade until the end of the Iraq War in 2003.
The nature and modulations of the UNSC sanction regime have been transformed in
accordance with the objectives of the international community based on the Iraqi
government’s performance and Iraq’s domestic condition. As the humanitarian
situation in Iraq deteriorated, rifts began appearing within the international
community. The Hussein regime attributed the humanitarian crisis in Iraq to
international sanctions through “manipulating the access of the media and
79
Iraq thought that the Arab states were obliged to help Iraq’s economic reconstruction since
Iraq sacrificed its economy largely for Arab countries in the Iran-Iraq War. Therefore, Iraq viewed that
Kuwait’s refusal of providing loans was intolerable.
80
The Rumaila field straddles the border between Iraq and Kuwait.
81
Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz drew this conclusion when stating Iraq’s stance
(Malone, 2006, p.57).
82
Duelfer and Dyson (2011) have pointed out that both Iraq and the US wrongly understood
each other’s intention, and their decisions were based on the misperceptions, which ultimately caused
their conflicts.
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humanitarian organizations” (Byman & Waxman, 2000, p. 33). Out of humanitarian
concern as well as their respective strategic considerations, UNSC members,
especially the P5, constantly debated on the “relaxation, alternation, suspension and
lifting of the sanction regime” (Yang, 2013, p. 136). China participated in these
debates and expressed its political attitudes toward sanctions against Iraq and other
relevant issues, such as the Oil-For-Food Program.
China’s Non-intervention Policy Toward the Iraqi-Kuwaiti Issue
China collaborated with other countries in the UNSC to impose sanctions
against Iraq in the early 1990s. The UNSC passed 11 resolutions concerning the IraqiKuwaiti issue before adopting Resolution 678 that implicitly legitimatized the use of
force in Iraq. China showed favor of all the draft resolutions by casting affirmative
votes but abstained from voting on the pivotal UNSC Resolution 678.
Some observers argued that China supported the Western countries’ proposal
in order to dilute its own international denouncement and isolation after the
Tiananmen incident that had resulted in China’s duplicate legitimacy crisis at the
domestic and international levels; many argued that China’s abstention from
Resolution 678 was a signal that China would shift its compliant attitude to the hard
line of anti-U.S. position (Huo, 1992; Kim, 1994). It is difficult to determine the
expectation that the Chinese government might have harbored in the decision-making
process concerning the Iraqi-Kuwaiti problem. However, the consequences do not
elucidate China’s expectations. The international pressure on China caused by
economic sanctions had not been eased, and Sino-U.S. relations had not quickly
improved after China’s cooperation. Besides, China was cooperative or presented a
compromising stance on UNSC sanctions against Iraq after the Gulf War (See Table
112
7); this is evident though China casting only minor abstentions from UNSC draft
resolutions. In general, China took a consistent political stand on the conflicts
between Iraq and Kuwait.
Table 7
Key Gulf War-related UNSC Resolutions and China’s Responses
Date
SCR. Purpose
Aug. 2,
1990
660
Calls for Iraq to
withdrew from
Kuwait
Aug.6,
1990
661
Sets up sanctions
against Iraq
Nov. 29,
1990
678
Authorizes member
states to use all
necessary means to
implement SCR. 660
and relevant
resolutions
Passes a cease-fire
solution for
addressing the border
conflict between Iraq
and Kuwait; requests
Iraq to remove and
destroy the WMD.
China’s
vote
Objection
Aye
Not
applicable
Aye
Not
applicable
12, 1, 2
China
abstention,
Cuba and
Yemen vetoes
Abstention
CP (use of
force)
12, 2, 1
Cuba veto,
Ecuador and
Yemen
abstentions
Aye
Not
applicable
10, 5, 0
China, Egypt,
France, Kenya
and Russia
abstentions
Abstention
CP
(sanctions)
Abstention
CP
(humanitarian
situation)
Voting
summary
14, 1, 0
Yemen not
voting
13, 2, 0
Cuba and
Yemen
abstentions
Apr. 3,
1991
687
Oct. 23
1997
Threatens travel ban
on Iraq for failure to
1134
cooperate with
UNSCOM
Dec. 3
1999
11, 4, 0
China,
Malaysia,
Extends ‘Oil for Food’
1280
Russia
Program
abstentions,
France not
voting
Notes. CP refers to the measure in question would be counter-productive. Voting summary is
written in “Aye, Abstention/ Not Voting, and Veto.” Based on ODS; UNBISnet; UNSCSC.
113
The Immediate UNSC Resolution 660
The swift international reaction to Iraq’s aggression and the consensus on
intervention in the Iraqi-Kuwaiti issue affected China’s responses to Iraq’s military
action and the international intervention. The US and Kuwait submitted a draft
resolution employing Article 39 and 40 of the UN Charter that condemned Iraq’s
aggression and demanded Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. The draft resolution was
passed as UNSC Resolution 660. Noticeably, the USSR was not against this draft
resolution. In addition, France, the country having a certain political influence and
economic interests in Iraq, also seconded the resolution draft. Hence, while
responding to the issues regarding the Iraq-Kuwaiti conflict, China faced the strong
international pressure that all great powers in the UNSC had agreed with the
collective action against Iraq, which arguably led to Beijing’s cooperation.
China faced some problems in dealing with the conflicts between Iraq and
Kuwait. First, China was concerned about its political relationships with the two
countries, as it had to choose only one side. Second, China encountered the problem
of balancing its self-identified responsibility at the UN for protecting the interests of
states in the third world and the fulfillment of its commitment to the international
norm of sovereignty, which was reflected by the expression of CFM spokesman.83
The international norm based on sovereignty was taken into account in the
Chinese decision-making process when China encountered these problems. China
83
The spokesman conveyed that China views no essential conflict among the countries in the
third world and that all the divergences must not be resolved by force (Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily],
1990). China recognized the sovereignty status of Kuwait since Sino-Kuwaiti diplomatic relationship
was established in 1971. Hence, the Chinese government should recognize the fact that Iraq’s invasion
of Kuwait violates the international norm of sovereignty.
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chose to apply the international norm to its diplomatic rhetoric and act. On August 2,
1990, the CFM spokesman conveyed China’s condemnation of Iraq’s aggressive
invasion of Kuwait. The spokesman expressed that Iraq’s behavior seriously violated
the international norm (Qian, 2003). Li Daoyu, Chinese ambassador to the UN, spoke
at the UNSC meeting right after the Resolution 660 had passed; he asserted that the
hostilities between Iraq and Kuwait must cease immediately and demanded Iraq’s
withdrawal (UNSC, 1990a). The norms of sovereignty were well-established
standards by which to make judgment and to simultaneously justify discourse and
behavior. Therefore, China accepted international involvement in the issues without
considering the principle of non-intervention.
Imposing Sanctions Under UNSC Resolution 661
On August 6, 1990, the UNSC passed Resolution 661 with 13 affirmative
votes and 2 abstentions, which authorized the sanctions against the Iraqi government.
This sanctions-related resolution made opposing Iraq possible on a global scope.
Compared to the legal citation of Resolution 660, this resolution was enacted under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. All imports of Iraqi and Kuwaiti products were
prohibited so was the sale of non-humanitarian products, especially military
equipment to Iraq and Kuwait (UNSC, 1990b). China supported this resolution
without hesitation, although the US and European countries had not terminated the
economic sanctions on Beijing. At the same time, China expressed its concerns about
any harsher international reactions to the invasion.
The international response, in particular great powers’ attitudes and actions,
came into the considerations of the Chinese government. The US and the USSR
subsequently announced the freezing of Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets and the arms
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embargo against Iraq on the day when UNSC Resolution 660 passed. The two
superpowers conveyed their political positions on Iraq’s invasion by a joint statement
denouncing Iraq’s military action as a “blatant transgression of basic norms of
civilized conduct” on August 3, 1990 (The Associated Press, 1990). Other countries
harbored various concerns about this issue but had not objected to the sanctions. In
addition, the US dispatched Assistant Secretary Richard Solomon to China to discuss
the Iraq-Kuwaiti conflict while US had a ban on high-level exchanges between two
countries (US Department of State, 1990a). It is difficult to elucidate whether this
meeting between the US and China had affected Beijing’s response to the
interventions in Iraq, but the US directly conveyed its intention to force Iraq to
comply with the UN’s request. Even though China’s sensitiveness to the collective
intervention, the international pressure from the great powers’ consensus on
legitimatizing the UNSC sanction against Iraq again urged China’s cooperation.
China’s political position on the issue regarding the Iraqi-Kuwaiti conflict was
clear. China did not consider imposing sanctions against Iraq because Beijing was
suffering from sanctions by Western countries at that time, but it did not support
Iraq’s military action. It condemned the Iraqi invasion and annexation of Kuwait, a
sovereign state, and it called for immediate withdrawal of the Iraqi military force
from Kuwait in public statements. On August 4, 1990, Yang Fuchang, Vice Minister
of CFM, had urgent meetings with Iraqi and Kuwaiti envoys to China. Yang
conveyed China’s basic standpoint to the two envoys. Li Daoyu iterated this
standpoint in the UNSC meeting regarding Resolution 661. His statements surrounded
China’s unbiased view on the issue based on norms, comprised of the Five Principles
and the inviolability of sovereignty under the UN Charter. He also warned the
concerned parties against further steps that would aggravate the situation and
116
advocated for a peaceful settlement (UNSC, 1990c). Chinese President Yang
Shangkun spoke about the same position to Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to China,
Tawfiq Alamdar, in their meeting. Therefore, China’s favorable vote on Resolution
661 was also driven by maintenance of the international order based on state
sovereignty.
China’s Abstention From UNSC Resolution 678
Before the Gulf War broke out, China was in favor of subsequent UNSC
sanctions-related resolutions except for Resolution 678. From the U.S. point of view,
UNSC Resolution 678, adopted on November 29, 1990, set the deadline for Iraqi
withdrawal from Kuwait and authorized UN member states to use military force to
address the issue if Iraq failed to implement Resolution 660 before the deadline.
Twelve countries were in favor of the draft resolution. Cuba and Yemen cast vetoes
on the draft resolution, and China abstained. This abstention was consistent with
China’s political position.
China was cautious about the crisis and international interventions. Although
it supported the UNSC sanctions and appreciated the international diplomatic efforts,
China was skeptical about the use of force against Iraq. In September 1990, Chinese
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen attended the 45th session of UNGA meetings. Qian
presented Chinese stances on Iraqi-Kuwaiti issues: Iraq should stop the occupation
and withdraw Iraqi forces from Kuwait, and the issues should be addressed in
diplomatic manners, which implied that China was not in favor of military
interventions in the Persian Gulf (Zhongguo Lianheguo Xiehui [UN Association of
China], 1998). After the UNGA meetings, Qian had conversations with his
counterparts from more than 60 countries, including the officials who were in change
117
of diplomacy from the USSR, France, and Arabian countries, to discuss the IraqiKuwaiti problem. The information China received from these conversions was that
the US was prepared to use force to attack Iraq and other countries’ diplomatic efforts
had proved fruitless (Qian, 2003).
China decided to make a diplomatic effort to address the Iraqi-Kuwaiti
conflict. Qian Qichen worked as the Chinese special envoy and visited the Middle
East in November 6-12, 1990. During his visit, Qian met with the highest-ranking
officials of the countries in the region and had a discussion with James Baker, the US
secretary of state, at the Cairo Airport. At the time, the US had already forged the
coalition alliance against Iraq and obtained assent from over 100 countries by Baker’s
shuttle diplomacy. The US was concerned with China’s vote on a planned UNSC
draft resolution to use military force against Iraq; Baker inquired about the Chinese
attitude toward the UNSC draft resolution and confirmed U.S. preparation for military
activities. Qian conveyed the U.S. intention to Saddam Hussein in their meeting but
the meeting generated little positive result. After the meetings with political leaders in
the Middle East, China made the following judgments: Saddam Hussein was an
ambitious aggressor, and other countries in the Middle East were concerned about the
impact of potential wars (Qian, 2003). China’s abstention from the UNSC resolution
and its responses to the issues regarding the Iraqi-Kuwaiti conflict after the Gulf War
were based on these judgments.
This abstention China voted UNSC Resolution 678 was mainly driven by
systemic incentives. On one hand, China was aware of the limitations of other great
powers and that the consensus to use military force against Iraq had already been
achieved. This international consensus generated pressure on China requiring the
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country’s concession to the mainstream of the international community. China
recognized that war was unavoidable, and Beijing was not able to persuade the Iraqi
government to concede. According to Li Daoyu’s recollection of the Chinese decision,
Deng Xiaoping decided to abstain from the draft resolution after a few rounds of
discussions and research within the Chinese decision-making circle. Deng set up the
principles and guidelines for China’s responses to the Iraqi-Kuwaiti issues in the
UNSC. First, China would support the UNSC resolutions that requested Iraq to
withdraw its military force from Kuwait. Second, China would not endorse any
proposal to use armed force to address the conflicts (Li D., 2002). China tried to
fulfill its commitment to international principles about the use of force based on the
principles of sovereignty. The Chinese government considered about maintaining the
international order and keeping the normative power of these principles.
On the contrary, the domestic concerns have not greatly affected China’s
decision-making process concerning UNSC Resolution 678. Before the resolution
was discussed, the US released the signal to China of easing the tension between the
two countries in order to achieve Beijing’s support for the initiative of using military
force against Iraq in the UNSC. James Baker discussed the draft Resolution with Qian
Qichen in the telephone talking on November 25, 1990 (US Department of State,
1990b; Qian, 2003). Besides, Baker had appreciated China’s “effort to pressure
Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait (US Department of State, 1990c)” and
invited Qian to visit Washington. The visit as the first step of restoring two countries’
relations to normal could release China’s pressure from the international sanctions.
Although the U.S. concession to the bilateral relationship was to guarantee China’s
support, China still abstained from the voting in the UNSC instead of casting an
affirmative vote. China’s abstention revealed that the societal factors in the
119
international system were taken into account in its foreign policy on the issue
regarding the use of force against Iraq.
Summary
This case study focused on China’s reactions to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and
the following UNSC sanctions against Iraq before the Gulf War broke out.84 The
discussion on this case has been to assess the reasons why China was in favor of the
UNSC involvement and intervention and why the country reluctantly approved the
use of force of the UNSC in the basis of the theoretical framework established in
Chapter 2.
The analysis could support Proposition III. Systemic factors played the
significant role in China’s decision-making process through this case. International
consensus about opposing Iraq’s invasion upon Kuwait yielded a great pressure on
China’s diplomacy. At the same time, Iraq’s aggressive infringement on the
international order based on state sovereignty was also China’s concern. The
cooperation with international society to intervene in the Iraq-Kuwaiti issue prevented
the international pressure from transforming into a direct threat to China’s domestic
vulnerability. China maintained the consistency of its political positions while
addressing the crisis. It was cooperative on the international involvement and
supported the UNSC sanctions, which are exemplified by China’s affirmative votes
on UNSC Resolution 660 and 661.
84
China’s responses to the weapons inspections in Iraq have been discussed in the author’s
article concerning the Iraq War.
120
However, China did not agree with resorting military force to resolve the
issue. When the international community did not support China’s position of
opposing military interventions, China conceded in the form of abstention from
voting on UNSC Resolution 678. Although international interventions did not give
rise to a direct threat to China that would increase its domestic vulnerability, the
Chinese government was wary of the use of force authorized by the UNSC in a
sovereign state, especially the justified military intervention initiated by the
superpower, i.e., the US. China made a compromise to the international community
regarding the Gulf War but did not take the Persian Gulf War as a just act, which can
be inferred from Deng Xiaoping’s comment that the war was an example of “big
hegemonists beating up small hegemonists” (Kristof, 1991). China disassociated itself
from other countries that initiated military intervention by declaring its impartial
stance on the issues as well as in the Gulf region.
121
Table 8
Motivations of China’s Foreign Policy Toward Interventions in Iraqi-Kuwaiti Issues
Domestic factors
Systemic incentives
 Outcome
↓

Perceptions
Pattern/
cases
Ideological base:
Integrity of territorial
sovereignty
The superpowers
have achieved
Being a sanction target
consensus on
– Little concerned
intervention in the
3 / SCR.
 Cooperation

→ Little effect on
Iraq-Kuwait issues.
660, 661,
etc.
domestic vulnerability
→ Strong pressure
↓
High pressure
The international
Indirect threat
Ideological base:
community
Integrity of territorial
advocated coercion.
sovereignty
→ Increases domestic
China’s disapproval
vulnerability potentially
of the military
↓
activity has not
been supported by
 Compromise

great powers.
The use of force
against a sovereign
High pressure
Indirect threat
state.
→ Strong pressure
122
4 / SCR.
678
Case 2: Antiterrorism in Afghanistan (2000-2012)
Although international antiterrorism is taken for granted at present, the
international rules and norms regarding this issue have been subject to controversy
within the international community.85 Military responses to terrorism and
international interventions imposed on states charged with sponsoring terrorism have
been viewed as violations of the norms of sovereignty, especially those that provide
for non-intervention. For some countries, terrorism has been categorized as an
indigenous issue that needs to be addressed by domestic criminal law. China was one
of the countries opposing the transnational force whose purpose was to attack
terrorism. During the Cold War period, China, along with the USSR, opposed a weak
draft resolution that was initiated by the UN to condemn terrorism (Luck, 2004). In
the post-Cold War era, China was hesitant to endorse UNSC sanctions on the
governments that have been acknowledged as terrorism supporters. China abstained
from voting on some relevant UNSC resolutions, such as Resolutions 748 and 1054,
which imposed sanctions on Libya and on Sudan, respectively, in the 1990s.
International antiterrorism interventions in Afghanistan are an important case
for discussion with respect to China’s non-intervention policy. First, Afghanistan is a
neighboring country of China, located in Central Asia and intimately associated with
China’s geopolitical strategy. China is likely to become involved in geographically
proximate countries, since the stability of surrounding regions, and thus China’s
survival, is of chief concern to the country. The Afghanistan situation not only affects
the environment in the Central-Asian post-Soviet Islamist states; it also threatens the
stability of the Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region. The UNSC involvement in
85
Regarding the evolution of the norm of antiterrorism, see Stiles (2009).
123
Afghanistan would cause a tension, which harmed China’s domestic stability and
strategic interest in the region; in addition, coercion imposed on the incumbent
government was closely related to China’s concern, so Beijing’s resistance would not
be surprised. However, China compromised with the UNSC on interventions against
the Taliban government and aligned with the US to attack terrorism in Afghanistan. It
is difficult to apply rationalist theories to China’s compliance on this issue, as the
harm of the intervention to China’s national interests was predictable; furthermore,
the theories have also failed to explain why China has shifted its attitude toward
antiterrorism interventions in Afghanistan against the Taliban from one of reluctance
to cooperation. Therefore, it is worth examining why China changed its foreign policy
in this case and what factors affected the transformation of China’s perceptions on
terrorism and its foreign policy formulation.
Background
Foreign penetration in Afghanistan, which may date back centuries, is hardly a
new phenomenon. At the end of the Cold War period, the USSR withdrew from the
weakened country, leaving it without a sense of national identity or a competent
government. The Taliban, an organization consisting of Islamism fundamentalists,
assumed power in 1996 and gained control of the Afghanistan government. Al-Qaeda,
the terrorist organization, aligned with the Taliban government and relocated to
Afghanistan from Sudan in 1996. The Al-Qaeda terrorists aimed their activities at the
Western countries, especially the US, which had been known to invade Islamist
countries; these terrorists use inhumane methods to kill innocent people. The Taliban
had been seen as a supporter of Al-Qaeda based on their common religious pursuits,
and the Taliban government covered the terrorist organization after September 11,
124
2001. Moreover, the connection among Al-Qaeda terrorists, Taliban, and Pakistan
complicated the situation. Pakistan not only is a neighboring country of Afghanistan
but also was treated as a necessary factor in the Taliban’s survival. Rashid (2000, p.
185) stated that “The Taliban were born in Pakistani refugee camps, educated in
Pakistani madrassas and learnt the fighting skills from Mujaheddin parties based in
Pakistan.” The Pakistani government was believed as one of Al-Qaeda’s supporters.86
Terrorism has been of great concern to the US and its close allies for many
years. International organizations such as the UN have made efforts to deal with the
issue of terrorism.87 However, there is continued debate in the international
community about how to resolve the problem. The skepticism of some countries kept
them from applying coercion to sovereign states that were closely related to terrorism,
although no country denied the urgent need to eradicate terrorism before 2001. The
UN and UNSC formulated conventions relating to terrorism, but the UNSC did not
invoke Chapter VII of the UN Charter to mandate military intervention.88 In 1998, the
reaction of the international community toward the American unilateral air strikes
against Al-Qaeda was muted. However, regional organizations, namely the OIC and
the AU, were reluctant to endorse international counterterrorism (Stiles, 2009). With
the attacks on the US, combating terrorism became urgent, and it was easier for
countries to put their own concerns aside. The UNSC and the UNGA immediately
86
The Pakistan’s intelligence service gave the sanctuary and provided huge support to AlQaeda and Taliban (Waldman, 2010).
87
The details on the international legal instruments concerning international counterterrorism,
see United Nations action to counter terrorism, available at
http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/instruments.shtml
88
For instance, UNSC Resolution 1267.
125
passed the resolutions condemning the terrorist attacks.89 The US implemented the
war against terrorism in Afghanistan, and the Taliban government was overthrown
during the Afghanistan War. The UNSC subsequently imposed sanctions on the
Taliban in Afghanistan (See Table 9).
Table 9
China’s Attitudes Toward UNSC Sanctions Against the Taliban in Afghanistan
Date
SCR.
Voting
summary
China’s
attitude
Purpose
Abstention
Imposes arms embargo
on Taliban in
Afghanistan
13, 2, 0
Dec. 19,
2000
1333
China and
Malaysia
abstention
Dec. 20,
2002
1452
15, 0, 0
Aye
Dec. 22,
2006
1735
15, 0, 0
Aye
June 17,
2011
1988
15, 0, 0
Aye
Dec. 17,
2012
2082
15, 0, 0
Aye
Confirms financial
sanctions on terrorism
and humanitarian
exemptions to the assets
freeze.
Decides further measures
against Al-Qaeda and
Taliban
Establishes a new
Sanctions Committee
concerning individuals
and entities and other
groups and undertakings
associated with the
Taliban.
Implements measures
imposed against
individuals and
organizations associated
with the Taliban
Note. Voting is written as “Aye, Abstention/Non-voting, and Veto.” based on ODS;
UNBISnet.
89
For further information, see UNGA Resolution 56/1 and SCR. 1368.
126
China’s Foreign Policy Toward Antiterrorism in Afghanistan
China’s foreign policy toward terrorism has gone through a transformation.
During China’s revolutionary period, the country provided financial and military
assistance to a number of anti-governmental liberation movements, some of which
could be defined as terrorist activities by the current standard. China’s role as a
supporter of these types of movements has changed since it has endorsed the
international non-proliferation rules and introduced strict export control measures.
China was not a direct target of international terrorist acts; however, the country was
among those who suffered from terrorist activities. Xinjiang autonomous region,
home to the ethnic minority Uighurs, has been of great concern to China since its
association with Afghanistan and international terrorism. The Uighurs have a natural
link with Afghanistan because they practice the same religion. During the battles
against the USSR in Afghanistan, many Uighurs participated in the war as volunteers.
Beginning in 1996, the Uighur separatists started to initiate violent actions against the
Chinese government and received material and ideological assistance from some
radical Islamic entities or Islamic countries, such as the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and Saudi
Arabia (Schweitzer & Shay, 2003). The Chinese government was very cautious in the
issue of international antiterrorism interventions with respect to Afghanistan.
Abstention From UNSC Resolution 1333
Although China was worried about Xinjiang’s connection with terrorist
organizations, it was reluctant to authorize the UNSC intervention against the Taliban
government. It therefore abstained from the vote on UNSC Resolution 1333, initiated
by the US, which imposed sanctions on the Taliban. After his abstention, Wang
Yingfan, Chinese representative to the UN, expressed China’s principle of
127
disapproving sanctions and emphasized China’s concerns about the extremely serious
humanitarian situation in Afghanistan (UNSC, 2000). None of the other great powers
shared China’s opinion, and only Malaysia abstained from the vote on Resolution
1333 without an explanation. Despite the association between the Taliban government
and the Uighur separatists, the independent movements in Xinjiang were under the
control of the central government. The Chinese government had suppressed the
biggest Uighur insurgency, named the Ghulja Incident, occurred in 1997. The
movements of Uighur separatists were clammed in 2000; therefore, the domestic
issues were not taken into account in China’s decision-making process regarding the
UNSC sanctions against Afghanistan.
By contrast, the priority of China’s foreign policy was apparently based on its
geopolitical considerations as well as its normative concerns. China was hesitant to
vote affirmatively in order to avoid dangers associated with the failure of the Taliban
regime as the result of international sanctions. Pakistan is China’s informal alliance,
an all-weather friend country (Tan & Li, 2013, p. Chap.4). Beijing was considering
Pakistan’s relationship with the Taliban, as well as Pakistan’s influence in the region
(Dhaka, 2014). Disagreeing with the sanctions against the Taliban government meant
that the Chinese chose to stand with Pakistan. Furthermore, international coercion
applied to Afghanistan as a result of terrorism and illegal drug trafficking might
establish a legal precedent to further mandate international interventions in the
domestic issues of a sovereign country. The international interventions legitimized by
norm building would potentially increase China’s domestic vulnerability as it faced
128
similar domestic problems that easily attract international interventions.90 On the
other hand, China encountered an international atmosphere in which great powers had
made a consensus to attack terrorism in Afghanistan, which applied significant
pressure on Beijing. Hence, China conveyed its dissatisfaction with the international
interventions by abstention.
Cooperation in Antiterrorism
China changed its response to terrorism and to the Taliban government after
the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. As a result, China dismissed its original
sympathy for the Taliban government. Beijing cast an affirmative vote for UNSC
Resolution 1373, which was adopted directly after the September 11 terrorist attacks.
The resolution officially endorsed the U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan.
China was also in favor of all UNSC sanctions against the Taliban and terrorism, in
general. The Chinese government expressed its support for military actions against
terrorism and cooperated with the international community in the process.
In addition, China took the opportunity to mend fences with the US by
proactively collaborating with the country with respect to attacks on international
terrorists. On September 12, 2001, Jiang Zemin telephoned U.S. President Bush to
convey his condolences and promised to offer China’s cooperation in counterterrorist
efforts. China’s cooperative attitudes were frequently expressed through
governmental officials’ pronouncements and comments on terrorism in international
organizations. For example, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan said that
international cooperation against terrorism was necessary and pressing, and that China
90
The ETT’s terrorist acts in Xinjiang are to the point. In addition, China suffered from the
drugs trafficking from Afghanistan to Xinjiang area (Zhao & Kuchins, 2012).
129
was ready to enhance its dialogue and cooperation (People's Daily, 2001). Moreover,
China offered cooperation in intelligence matters, allowing an FBI legal attaché’s
office to be established in Beijing (Foot, 2006). Beijing used its traditional ties with
Islamabad and provided material assistance to persuade Pakistani President Pervez
Musharraf to cooperate with U.S. efforts in Afghanistan (Gill, 2007; Larson &
Schevchenko, 2010). China also supported the SCO’s activities against the Taliban
and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan (Zhao & Kuchins, 2012).
The international environment was largely attributed to the shift of China’s
responses to the Taliban government and terrorism. The September 11 terrorist
attacks marked a transformation in the international atmosphere with respect to
counterterrorism. Condemnations of terrorist actions were flooding the international
community. China admitted that September 11 showed that international terrorism
had become a serious threat to world peace and stability. The Taliban government, as
a political regime, has lost its external legitimacy. Pakistan, the traditional supporter
of the Taliban, broke its ties to the terrorist organization. When talking about
Pakistan’s past assistance to the Taliban, Richard Boucher, a U.S. State Department
spokesman, confirmed: “Pakistan has clearly made its views known on the Taliban,
and Pakistan has supported the effort against the Taliban” (Boucher, 2001). Although
it is difficult to elucidate whether Pakistani compliance was due to the effects of
China’s persuasion, Pakistan’s link with the Taliban eventually was cut off. Hence,
China did not need to consider any possible damage to the Sino-Pakistani relations.
China no longer recognized the Taliban as a legitimate regime of Afghanistan after
September 11. It denied any official connections with the Taliban government and
stated that the Afghan people should decide their political system and development
model (CFM, 2001a; 2001b).
130
After September 11, China acknowledged that it would benefit from the war
on terror. Making efforts to cooperate with the US against terrorism not only repaired
its worsened diplomatic relations with Washington but also legitimized its own
campaign against the insurrection within Xinjiang area. These efforts alleviated both
its international pressure and its domestic tension. As a response to potential terrorist
activities in Central Asia as well as in the Xinjiang region, China initiated the
Shanghai Five, the predecessor of the SCO, with Russia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and
Kyrgyzstan. China was cautious in its relations with the Taliban since the latter
snatched Afghanistan’s state power in 1996. Beijing began to attach great importance
to the development of the Shanghai Five to deal with the potential challenges of more
radicalized Islamists in the region from 1996 (Gill, 2007). China implied that there
were a number of Uighur separatists participating in terrorist trainings in Afghanistan
after September 11 (CFM, 2001b). China’s collaborative efforts with respect to
counterterrorism would probably gain the support of the US for China’s domestic
concerns about Xinjiang separatism. In 2002, the US announced that the ETIM was
considered a terrorist organization and placed it on the UN list of terrorist
organizations.
In the years following September 11, China played a proactive role in
cooperating in the US-led battles against terrorism and in the reconstruction of
Afghanistan. China provided Afghanistan with assistance worth US $62 million to
support “Afghan elections, local police training, and regional drug control
cooperation in 2003 and 2004” (Gill, 2007, p. 129). However, China remained wary
of engaging too deeply in Afghanistan’s affairs. It refused to participate in military
actions in the U.S. counterterrorist movements in Afghanistan and to open the Wahan
Corridor, which connects Xinjiang to Afghanistan, to transport U.S. supplies (Zhao &
131
Kuchins, 2012; Clarke, 2013). As Dhaka argued, “China was a silent spectator in the
decade plus rebuilding process that was initiated in 2002” (2014, p. 97). China was
involved in the Afghanistan issue insofar as its cooperation with the US while
simultaneously trying to keep its distance from the US, which demonstrated the
differences between China and the US regarding the political aim in Afghanistan, and
also revealed China’s dilemma over U.S. interventions in Afghanistan.
From China’s perspective, the stability in Afghanistan was critical for the
creation of a secure surrounding environment. In addition, preventing the Xinjiang
Uighurs from being transformed by radical Islamism was the primary goal since
Uighurs separatist insurgents had become aggravated in recently years. On the one
hand, the U.S. presence in Afghanistan against the Taliban objectively brought
positive influence to the security of Xinjiang. On the other hand, China prevented the
US from intervening in Xinjiang affairs, as the U.S. presence in Afghanistan was
closely entrenched in the sensitive region.
Summary
This section has assessed China’s decision-making processes with respect to
UNSC interventions in Afghanistan based on the proposed theoretical framework.
This case study could support the Proposition III that China was under high pressure
from the international community while responding to the issues in Afghanistan.
China’s foreign policy toward Afghanistan when the latter’s government was
controlled by the Taliban and afterwards has gone through a shift.
Regarding UNSC sanctions against the Taliban government, the international
community had reached a consensus on punishing the Taliban, and China’s
132
disapproval of international sanctions was not shared by any great power.
International pressure generated by the consensus compelled China to make
compromise its stance to accommodate the international community.
However, China emphatically opposed international interventions in sovereign
states that were closely associated with its domestic concerns. Despite its wariness of
the Taliban government, China was reluctant to endorse the UNSC sanctions against
the regime because it viewed the Taliban as the legitimate authority in Afghanistan.
China did not wish to see the international efforts overthrow the incumbent
government and the potential international interventions in its domestic affairs. Based
on the geopolitics, the association between the Taliban and Pakistani governments, as
well as the connections between the Taliban and the Xinjiang Uighur separatists, were
taken into China’s consideration. The connection between the terrorism supported by
the Taliban government and the Uighur separatists increased China’s domestic
vulnerability. Moreover, the Chinese government also considered the Taliban
government’s relationship with Pakistan, as well as the stability of Afghanistan.
Under the condition that its domestic problems were still under control, China did not
welcome any external interventions in this region. Comparably, the consequence that
the regional order was broken by external force was more dangerous for China’s
political survival. China eventually made a compromise and expressed its
dissatisfaction by the abstention from the vote on Resolution 1333. The abstention
was motivated by the systemic dynamics and based on its interpretations of the
specific issue. In short, China’s compromise fits the Pattern 4.
China’s cooperation with the international community was formed under
different international circumstances. The September 11 attacks have changed the
133
international environment, as well as the systemic incentives for China’s nonintervention policy. The international voice against terrorism has amplified and
subsequently caused China’s reconsideration of the Taliban. China’s concerns about
interventions in sovereign states were no longer valid if the Taliban government was
viewed as illegitimated. Besides, the broken relations between Pakistan and the
Taliban eased China’s wariness about adverse effects resulting from the international
interventions. From the perspective of the Chinese government, its participation in
antiterrorism could not only reduce its domestic vulnerability and but also cause it to
avoid deep involvements from external forces in the region. China’s cooperative
attitude toward counterterrorism prompted U.S. support of Chinese absolute control
over domestic problems. China cooperation generated outcome that alleviated
Beijing’s pressure raised from the international environment and the country’s
domestic concerns. In summary, China’s cooperation in this case could convincingly
corroborate the argument in Pattern 3.
134
Table 10
Dynamics of China’s Foreign Policy Toward Afghanistan
Domestic factors
Systemic incentives
↓

 Outcome
Pattern/
cases
Perceptions
The international
Ideological base: Non-
community advocated
intervention in a
coercions toward the
sovereign state
Taliban government.
Stability of surrounding
environment
China’s nonintervention attitude
has not been
→ Increases domestic

vulnerability
supported by great
 Compromise
4/ SCR.
1333
↓
powers. (Regime
change)
High pressure
Pakistan’s relations
with the Taliban.
Direct threat
→ Strong pressure
The international
Ideological base:
Taliban lost legitimacy
community advocated
Xinjiang issue
coercions toward the
Stability of surrounding
environment
Taliban and AlQaeda.
→ Reduces domestic
vulnerability
Pakistan cut off its
↓
relations with the
Taliban
→ Strong pressure
High pressure
No threat
135
3/ SCR.
1452,
 Cooperation
1735,
1988,
2082.
Case 3: The Sanctions Against North Korea (2006-2009)
North Korea is geopolitically and strategically important to China. In history,
China had numerously been involved in Korean issues out of geographical
proximity.91 At the beginning of the Cold War, China chose to take the side of North
Korea to fight the adversary in the Korean War. Any international interventions in
North Korea were likely to cause the instability of the region and thus to affect
China’s national interests, security in particular. It would have been reasonable for
China to block all the interventions in North Korea, especially under the condition
that Pyongyang was sensitive to international involvements and sanctions.92 However,
China approved all the UNSC interventions in North Korea. Tensions on the Korean
peninsula caused by UNSC interventions against North Korea were predictable;
China’s security was invariably at risk. Hence, China’s behavior in North Korea’s
case cannot be well explained by theories based on rationalism. The reason for
China’s approval of these interventions at the expense of stirring Pyongyang’s outrage
needs to be analyzed.
Furthermore, China negotiated with the stakeholders of the North Korean
issue before the relevant draft resolutions became the UNSC agenda, and it
proactively engaged in the negotiations with North Korea. What factors motivated
China to engage with the North Korean issue is also worthwhile to examine.
Therefore, the case study is to explore China’s concerns about the specific issues and
to examine how it implemented the non-intervention policy.
91
The typical cases are the first Sino-Japanese War broken out in 1894 and the Korean War in
the 1950s.
92
North Korea viewed the international responses, especially international sanctions imposed
by the UNSC, as infringing upon its sovereignty and hurting the dignity of the Korean people (Nakato,
2012).
136
Background
The UNSC intervened in the issues of North Korea several times in the forms
of PRSTs and resolutions since Pyongyang declared its withdrawal from the NPT and
started to develop nuclear capability in 1993. But the UNSC did not impose sanctions
against North Korea until Pyongyang launched the Taepodong-2 missile in 2006.
Table 11 lists five main UNSC sanctions on North Korea. The North Korean crisis
reached a deadlock when international sanctions had little effect on Pyongyang’s
continual missile launches and nuclear tests. China’s role in the process of
confronting this crisis went through a transformation from “a passive onlooker” to “a
reticent host” and, ultimately, “a chief mediator” (Glaser & Wang, 2008, p. 166).
Table 11
China Voting on the Main Sanctions Against North Korea (2006-2013)
Date
SCR.
Reason
July 15, 2006
1695
Missile
launches
Oct.14, 2006
1718
First nuclear
test
June 12, 2009
1874
Jan. 22, 2013
2087
Mar. 7, 2013
2094
Contents
Embargo of missile-related materials
Embargo of missile-related and
nuclear-related materials as well as
luxury goods
Widens the embargo of the arms,
missile-related and nuclear-related
Second nuclear
materials, WMDs, and luxury goods;
test
lays out procedures for conducting
cargo inspections.
Missile
Imposes measures of SCR. 1717 and
launches
1874
Third nuclear
test
Note. Based on UNSCSC.
137
Embargo of arms, missile-related and
nuclear-related materials, WMDs, and
luxury goods; Ban of financial assist; a
travel ban; assets freeze.
International Involvements and Chinese Responses
Weakened Resolution 1695
North Korea launched a series of seven ballistic missiles that landed in the Sea
of Japan in July of 2006, which cast a shadow over the security of Northeast Asia.
The Taepodong-2 rock, one of the missiles, was suspected of being capable of
reaching the territory of the US. The UNSC consequently passed Resolution 1695,
which demanded that North Korea suspends all missile-related programs, and called
on member states to exercise vigilance in terms of arms transfers to and from North
Korea (UNSC, 2006a). China did not block the resolution and made a regular
statement that Beijing was gravely concerned about the emerging situation on the
Korean peninsula and was opposed to any further tension (UNSC, 2006b).
China originally intended to alleviate this crisis.93 A CFM spokesman said in a
statement that China urged all parties to remain calm and hoped parties would not
take actions that might complicate the situation (Xinhua News Agency, 2006). Japan
and the US attempted to exert pressure on North Korea through the UNSC sanction,
but China, backed by Russia, hoped to propose a PRST following the model of the
1998 missile tests (Cooper & Hoge, 2006). The UN agreed with China’s plan of
attending to the North Korean missiles issue through bilateral dialogue (Abramowitz
& Lynch, 2006). At the same time, China dispatched Wu Dawei, China’s Six Party
Talks representative, to Pyongyang on July 8 to persuade North Korea to exercise
restraint, but he returned to China without any agreement on July 14. China
93
It is notable that one day before the missile test, China released the news of its high-ranking
officials’ visit to North Korea, during which China would have persuaded Pyongyang to abandon the
missile launch.
138
reconsidered measures to address the missile launch although it had not given up on
diplomatic negotiation with North Korea during Wu’s visit.
At that time, UNSC members, except China and Russia, had reached a
consensus on imposing sanctions against North Korea. US ambassador, John Bolton,
said the Council was making “good progress” on a resolution, backed by 13 of the 15
council members (Leopold, 2006). On July 10, the P5 and Japan convened a meeting
to discuss the resolution against North Korea. China strongly opposed the Japanese
draft but had changed its attitude to a possible resolution. The Japan-sponsored draft
would have allowed military enforcement under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and
would have banned all UN members from acquiring North Korean missiles or
weapons of mass destruction (Fox News, 2010). After the meeting, Wang Guangya,
the Chinese permanent representative to the UN, said that if other member states
wanted a resolution, they should have a modified one instead of the current one. The
following day, China and Russia proposed a draft resolution on North Korea in the
UNSC, which did not include strong measures such as sanctions. Although Japan
could not accept this new draft, it still made a compromise.94
The second day after Wu’s return from North Korea, China ultimately
approved the watered-down draft resolution, which did not invoke Chapter VII of the
UN Charter and excluded calling Pyongyang a threat. Instead, the resolution called on
states to exercise vigilance in their arms transactions with North Korea. In this
process, China kept the same political stand with Russia, but Russia did not play a
role in engaging North Korea and followed China’s actions. The international
94
Kenzo Oshima, Japanese ambassador to the UN, said in New York that the Chinese-Russian
draft resolution would be very difficult for Japan to accept (The BBC, 2006a).
139
consensus on punishing North Korea exerted strong pressure on China, but Russian
political support released the pressure. With Russia’s support, China negotiated with
the interventions-sponsored countries and requested their concessions. However,
Russia did not rigorously oppose the international intervention in North Korea.
Russian support lessened the international pressure China faced but merely offered
limited opportunity that did not enable China to oppose the international intervention.
Therefore, China made a compromise to the international community on interventions
in North Korea, but it made efforts to minimize the possible threat by negotiations.
Watered-down Sanctions Under Resolution 1718
Contrary to that of the missile launch crisis, China’s reaction to North Korea’s
nuclear test was forceful and straightforward. On October 9, 2006, the very day of
North Korea’s second nuclear test, China swiftly issued a statement condemning
North Korea for defying the international community and calling the nuclear test a
“flagrant” act (CFM, 2006). The Chinese government had rarely applied the Chinese
word “hanran（悍然）,” equivalent to “flagrant,” in its diplomatic parlance unless
the issues deeply hurt Chinese people’s feeling.95 In addition to the wordplay, China
was ready to agree to actions against North Korea. Wang Guangya responded that
there had to be some punitive actions in the draft resolution presented to the UNSC by
the US on October 9 (The BBC, 2006b). China had directly and indirectly conveyed
its position on denuclearization of the Korean peninsula to North Korea, but
Pyongyang ignored it. The nuclear test became a deep embarrassment and an
95
The Chinese government had only used the word “hanran” to describe Japanese prime
ministers’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and the U.S. bombardment of China’s embassy in Belgrade.
140
intolerably grave provocation to China.96 China did not send a special envoy to North
Korea for negotiation and did not submit an alternative draft resolution on this issue.
However, it did not completely uphold the draft resolution proposed by the US.
The US considered keeping the military option on the table, but China did not agree
with using military force (Quek, 2006). The discrepancy between China and the US
focused on one provision in the draft resolution– the authorization of international
inspections of cargo leaving and arriving in North Korea to detect weapons-related
material. China rejected the revision due to a likely escalation of North Korean
provocations induced by the inspections. In order to dissolve objections from China,
the US modified the draft and excluded the measure of using military force as well as
a blanket arms embargo (Nichols & Leopold, 2006). The ultimate resolution passed
by the UNSC was more severe than Resolution 1695, but it had been watered down
and did not include economic sanctions. China limited the sanctions to nuclear and
missile materials transactions because excessive sanctions might have led to the
economic collapse of North Korea, which gravely concerned China. China’s concern
with coercive methods toward North Korea was reasonable since the Kim Jong-il
regime would likely shift the burden of sanctions to the people, resulting in an
accelerated humanitarian crisis.97 The nature of this crisis, a nuclear test undeniably
threatening China’s interest, and the unanimous international condemnation of North
Korea had affected Beijing’s decision. The watered-down draft resolution, which was
in accordance with Chinese views, facilitated the approval of Resolution 1718.
96
After returning from a two-day trip to China, Chun Yung-woo, South Korea’s chief nuclear
envoy, explained China’s views and said that China had decided to spearhead efforts for the
denuclearization of North Korea (The BBC, 2006c).
97
Byman and Lind (2010) have analyzed the scenario of imposing an economic sanction on
North Korea.
141
Harsher Sanctions in Resolution 1874
China was disappointed in North Korea’s second nuclear test on May 25, 2009,
which was depicted by the rhetoric that North Korea had ignored universal opposition
and that China was resolutely opposed to it (Xinhua News Agency, 2009). Beijing
voted in favor of UNSC Resolution 1874, which included harsher sanctions than its
precursor. The punitive measure was the only option to deal with North Korea’s crisis
since North Korea had declared its withdrawal from the Six Party Talks, thus
signaling the failure of dialogue and negotiation. Similar to Resolution 1718,
Resolution 1874 did not include implied military measures and the content that all
states should search North Korean ships suspected of carrying illicit cargo, as
originally suggested by the US. Nonetheless, both resolutions were aimed at
prohibiting North Korea from conducting nuclear tests or using ballistic missile
technology in the future.
Resolution 1874 differed from its predecessor on the scope of an embargo and
the means of enforcing the sanctions. It called on international institutions and all UN
member states not to undertake new grants and financial assistance to North Korea,
except for humanitarian purposes. The resolution used the word “call on” rather than
“require,” and therefore, the compulsivity of the effective enforcement was
minimized. The flexibility in interpreting the sanctions might not have made North
Korea more vulnerable (Shen D. , 2009). The main aim did not change to an
overthrow of the Kim regime, and the sanctions would not lead to North Korea’s
economic collapse.98 Besides, based on the consequence of previous sanctions, those
98
The author interviewed with some Chinese experts on the study of North Korea, they also
took this argument to explain Chinese affirmative votes.
142
measures would not have negative impacts on China’s economic interests. Figure 2
shows that trade between China and North Korea steadily increased since the first
sanctions were implemented, and decreases in trade that followed the immediate
aftermath of the sanctions were normal seasonal changes. Therefore, economic
relationship between China and North Korea was not a factor that affected China’s
response to UNSC Resolution 1874.
Figure 2. China-North Korea Trade (2000-2008). From Noland (January, 2009, p. 69).
Summary
This section focused on China’s positions in UNSC sanctions against North
Korea. Although critics charged that China had indulged North Korea’s provocations,
Beijing did make an effort to address the nuclear crisis, and it even supported almost
all sanctions against Pyongyang. Proposition III and IV can explain China’s
cooperation, as well as compromise, with the international community on the North
Korean issues.
China was concerned about the stability of the Korean peninsula due to the
geopolitical significance of North Korea. China tried to avoid the precipitating
143
collapse of the North Korean regime by promoting dialogues between Washington,
Pyongyang, and other regional stakeholders. Even though China was reluctant to use
coercive measures against North Korea, it conceded on the appeal of the international
community. China did not veto or cast abstentions from UNSC sanctions-related draft
resolutions on North Korea. One important factor was a high pressure China faced
that the international community had reached a consensus to apply sanctions against
North Korean provisions, especially after much persuasion did not result in North
Korea’s cooperation. However, China did not force North Korea into a corner. China
tried to avoid the adverse consequence by negotiation with concerned parties, and it
devoted to acquiring concessions from the US and Japan to minimize the damage of
relevant draft resolutions. Sympathized by Russia, China forced the US and Japan to
make compromise on Resolution 1695. The weakened resolution did not impose
harsh sanctions against North Korea and thus has not shaken the Kim regime. As a
result, the intervention in the Korean peninsula would not threaten China’s security
and domestic stability.
After North Korea’s nuclear test, China faced the high pressure from the
international community but received no international support for its noninterventionist policy. Moreover, one reason why China did not impede the
international intervention on this issue was that North Korean developing nuclear
weapons escalated the political tense in Northeast Asia and, thus, would threaten
China’s security. Given the fact that tough sanctions might result in an impact on
North Korean stability, which would directly decrease China’s security, Beijing
requested other countries’ concession to release its domestic concerns. Therefore,
UNSC Resolution 1718 authorizing sanctions against North Korea was watered down.
With respect to Resolution 1874, having experienced the Resolution 1718, Chinese
144
noticed that sanctions against North Korea could be a method to alter the latter’s
provocations under the condition of diplomatic deadlock, and the UNSC sanctions
would not lead to severely adverse influence to North Korea. From a Chinese
perspective, Resolution 1874 and respective resolutions of 2013 were more symbolic
than serious punishment. The international interventions in North Korea would not
become a direct threat to China, while the escalation of North Korean nuclear issues
that probably gave rise to the regional insecurity and instability became China’s
concern. China’s cooperation with other stakeholders to intervene in North Korean
nuclear issue would ease the pressure from international society and guarantee the
country’s national security and interests.
China’s positions on UNSC interventions in North Korea have changed
according to the perceived threat caused by changing situations. China disapproved of
non-intervention because of domestic concerns that international interventions in the
Korean peninsula would give rise to regional instability. However, international
consensus on the interventions in North Korea generated high pressure on Beijing.
This pressure was decreased by Russian support, so China negotiated with the
intervention advocates and requested their concessions. After the North Korean
nuclear test, China approved UNSC interventions because it faced international
consensus on legitimizing coercions against North Korea. At the same time, it
attempted to reduce the risk caused by the sanctions imposed on North Korea. China
became more supportive of authorizing UNSC sanctions on North Korea since
Beijing had confirmed that no negative effect on its domestic vulnerabilities would be
caused by such sanctions. China’s negotiation and cooperation with the international
community in the case of North Korea proved the Pattern 5–3.
145
Table 12
China’s Non-intervention Policy in the Case of North Korea
Systemic incentives
UNSC sanctions were
highly supported by the
international community
except China, Russia,
and South Korea.
Russia backed China’s
stance on North Korea.
→ Lessened pressure
UNSC sanctions were
highly supported by the
international
community.
Korean nuclear test
violated the NPT
Korea disregarded
Domestic factors

↓
Perceptions
Ideological base: Nonviolation in sovereignty
state
 Outcome
Pattern/
cases
National security –
Strongly concerned
 → Increases domestic
vulnerability
↓
Lessened pressure with
limited opportunity
5/ SCR.
1695

Compromise
Direct threat
Ideological base– Not
concerned
National security–
Strongly concerned
→ Increases domestic
vulnerability
↓
High pressure

4/ SCR.
1718
 Cooperation
3/ SCR.
1874;
2087;
2094
China’s warnings.
→ Strong pressure
The international
consensus on imposing
sanctions against North
Korea.
Korean nuclear test
violated the NPT
→ Strong pressure
Direct threat
Ideological base– Not
concerned
National security–
Concerned
→ No negative effect
on domestic
vulnerability
↓
High pressure
No threat
146
Conclusion
The three cases discussed in this chapter all represent typical collective
interventions in the affairs of a sovereign state that has violated international norms or
treaties, such as territorial sovereignty, human rights, and NPT. China was
cooperative with the majority of countries in the international community in most of
these situations, and to various degrees made efforts to deal with the particular issues
of each case. In all of them, despite concerns China harbored, the huge amount of
pressure generated by the international community made it concede. China’s
cooperation and compromises on the issues in these cases have proved that its foreign
policy decisions regarding the interventions either ensured its domestic interests or
reduced the threat to its domestic vulnerabilities.
However, China attempted to reduce potential risks caused by these
interventions through negotiations, persuasion, or other diplomatic efforts when it
perceived that the collective interventions would possibly pose a threat to its domestic
vulnerability. In the situations in which China’s political position was supported by
other great powers, China’s self-protecting activities were clear and direct. In
conclusion, these cases within which the various situations match the Pattern 3, 4, and
5 of the propositions, and they could prove the validity of the causal mechanisms
underlying China’s non-intervention policy this research posits.
147
CHAPTER 4 CONCEDING INTERVENTIONS: THE CASES
OF CRIMEA, LIBYA, AND DARFUR
Introduction
Three cases in this chapter represent different kinds of issues but are all related
with civil wars. The Crimean issue has been regarded as an outcome of the strategic
games played between great powers, and was triggered by an ethnic secession. The
case of Libya derived from conflicts between the government and insurgents. The
Darfur crisis in Sudan was rooted in the unbalanced development and unfair
distribution between regions within Sudan.
These three cases were all essentially domestic problems that attracted the
attention of international actors. The Crimean issue was particularly thorny for the
international community, and for China in particular, as Russia was a direct
stakeholder and embarked on the interference. The two other cases involved the
question of UNSC positions on issues of human rights abuse; China’s dilemma was
choosing between humanitarian intervention favored by the international community
and its non-intervention principle, as well as Beijing’s concerns about using military
force. In general, China was made to compromise with the international interventions
on the issues in these three cases. Nevertheless, Beijing faced unique challenges and
dilemmas in these decision-making processes. Various diplomatic objectives and
interests of the Chinese government in certain cases were pitted against one another,
which made Beijing to choose between principle and interest. This chapter attempts to
trace these processes, and thus to manifest the mechanism of Chinese nonintervention policy.
148
Case 4: The Crimean Issue in Ukraine (February–June 2014)
The Crimean issue has recently become a focal point in international affairs.
Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine over the Crimean issue clearly violates the
norm of sovereignty, especially the respect for territorial integrity and the principle of
non-intervention. However, Russia has justified its military intervention as protecting
the Russians and its national interest in this region. China was cautious in dealing
with Russian military intervention and UNSC interventions in Ukraine. China’s
reactions reveal how it formulates its foreign policy when facing a military
intervention conducted by a like-minded great power and an issue intimately related
to its domestic concerns. Hence, China’s responses and the underlying factors of its
foreign policy in the Crimean crisis bear scrutiny.
China did not express support for Russia by Chinese media or official
statements, but its attitude toward UNSC interventions on the Crimean issue was
ambiguous. From the perspective of realism, China should take advantage of the
sanctions imposed by Western countries on Russia to align with Moscow; it would be
reasonable that China publicly supported Russian actions in the UNSC or other
international organizations. On the contrary, if one considers the issue of Russian
intervention in Ukraine over Crimea and connects the issue with China’s domestic
concerns, Beijing’s opposition to Russia would be predictable. In reality, however,
China abstained from the voting regarding the Crimean issue in the UN. The existing
theories are not convincing of explaining China’s compromise with the international
community and its appeasement toward Russian military intervention. Therefore, the
examination of China’s foreign policy toward the Crimean issue shows the extent to
which Beijing adhered to its diplomatic principle of non-intervention and what its
diplomatic priorities were.
149
Background
The Crimean issue in 2014 was directly aroused by the Ukrainian revolution
that took place after a series of insurgencies caused by the termination of an
agreement on closer trade ties with the EU by the Ukrainian government in November
2013. Viktor Yanukovych, the pro-Russian president of Ukraine, was deposed by the
parliament and fled to Russia in February 2014. Dissatisfied with the new government,
pro-Russian gunmen seized the building of Crimea’s parliament on February 27, 2014.
On the same day, Sergey Aksyonov, a pro-Russian politician in Ukraine, was selected
by the Crimean parliament as the new Prime Minister. He then declared the holding of
a referendum on the Crimean autonomy. On February 28, unidentified militants
occupied two international airports in the Crimean peninsula, and Russia dispatched
armored vehicles to the region in the name of protecting the security of the Black Sea
fleet stationed in Sevastopol (See Figure 3).99 Russia's parliament ratified Vladimir
Putin's request to use force on Ukraine to protect its interests, which justified Russia’s
military intervention with the domestic legitimacy in Ukraine. Crimea's secession
referendum on whether or not to rejoin Russia was passed with 97 per cent
affirmative votes on March 16.100 On March 18, Russia signed the formal bill to
include the Crimean Peninsula to the Russian Federation.101
99
The Ukrainian minister accused Russia of seizing the airports (Sekretarev, 2014). Russia
stated that any movements of the Black Sea Fleet “did not require any coordination” (The Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2014).
100
Russia stated it would support Crimea if the region votes to leave Ukraine. See BBC
NEWs- Ukraine Crisis Timeline, available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26248275.
101
This dissertation takes the military act of Russia in Ukraine over the Crimean Peninsula as
a military intervention rather an aggressive annexation as the Crimean people decided to join Russia by
referendum.
150
Figure 3.The Crimean Crisis in Map (2014). From the BBC, retrieved July 10, 2014,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world- europe-26387353
Despite the fact that the Ukrainian crisis led to the Crimean issue, the
secession of Crimea was complicated by historical, ethnic, and geopolitical issues.
Crimea was annexed by the Russian Empire in 1783 and remained part of Russia until
1954, when it was transferred to Ukraine under Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev
during the commemoration of the 300th anniversary of Ukraine becoming part of the
Tsardom of Russia. In May 1944, Tatars, the original residents of Crimea, were
expelled from Crimea during WWII accused of collaboration with the German Nazi.
A large number of Russians immigrated to this area and became the ethnic majority;
ethnic Russians account for approximately 60 per cent of the total population in
Crimea. Russian is the daily language in Crimea, and more than 70 per cent of
residents consider Russian as their native language. People of Crimea have longed for
the return to Russia after the collapse of the USSR because of their strong ethnic ties
to Russia. Thus, Russia played the Crimea card to manipulate its relationship with
151
Ukraine after the Cold War.102 Moreover, Crimea is strategically significant to Russia
because of the Black Sea Fleet, Russia’s naval base, stationed in the port of
Sevastopol (Schwartz, 2014). Thus, the majority of Russian people widely supported
the government’s military action to annex Crimea (Pew Research, 2014).
International Response and China’s Attitude
In the aftermath of the military intervention in Ukraine, countries from the
international community expressed their diverse concerns. For instance, the US
condemned Russia’s aggression and imposed sanctions against the persons they
considered to have contributed to the situation in Ukraine and threatened the
territorial integrity of Ukraine (US Department of State, 2014). The EU and its
member countries respectively took similar steps to impose sanctions against
Russia.103 The US submitted a draft resolution to the UNSC one day prior to the
referendum to call for the recognition of the territorial integrity of Ukraine and the
invalidity of the referendum without citing Chapter VII of the UN Charter (UNSC,
2014a). The draft resolution was not adopted because of Russia’s veto. However, the
non-binding draft resolution with similar contents was approved with 100 affirmative
votes, 58 abstentions, and 11 vetoes in the UNGA in March 2014 (UNGA, 2014a).
China faced strong international pressure to respond to Russian military action and
the proposed international intervention in the Crimea issue in its decision-making
process.
102
Crimea was an autonomous republic under the Ukraine government. It failed to separate
from Ukraine before 2014 majorly because of lacking Russia’s support.
103
For reference, see the blog- Russian Sanctions Update by Baker and McKenzie, available at
http://www.bakermckenzie.com/sanctionsnews/
152
China’s eventual response to the Russian military intervention was calm and
ambiguous. It neither condemned Russia’s military action nor chose the stand of
either Russia or the West. China eschewed commenting on Russia’s military
intervention in CFM’s press conference, and the CFM spokesman only emphasized
the principle of non-intervention in dealing with countries’ relations (CFM, 2014).
Chinese President Xi Jinping stated that “nothing [what the Chinese government
expressed regarding the Crimean issue] could be constructed as support for Russia” in
a phone conversation with Putin on March 4 (Pei, 2014). In addition, China abstained
from voting on the draft resolutions in the UNSC and the UNGA. Liu Jieyi,
Permanent Representative of China to the UN, said that after his abstention in the
UNSC, China “sought a balanced solution to the conflict within a framework of law
and order” and called on the relevant parties not to do any actions that would further
escalate the conflict (UNSC, 2014b). He underlined China’s impartial approach to the
issue of Ukraine and its preference for resolving the problem in the manner of
dialogues in the UNGA on March 25 (UNGA, 2014b). China’s abstentions appeared
neutral, but they implicitly demonstrated that Beijing relented to Russia’s military
actions.
China’s political pronouncement was consistent with the principle of nonintervention, but its attitude and behavior were incongruent with the discourse. Its
response was also at odds with that to the Kosovo crisis, which is inherently similar
toward the Crimea issue (See discussions in Chapter 5). However, China’s foreign
policy toward this issue was rational and flexible. First, Russia’s military intervention
violated the international norm enshrined in international treaties particularly
composed of the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, and the Budapest
153
Memorandum.104 China was hardly in favor of this infringement, as the public support
for Russia must dramatically discredit its pronounced commitment to the nonintervention principle. Second, China could not agree with Russia’s use of force, a
foreign military intervention to support the ethnic secessionism in other counties. For
example, CCTV did not emphasize the Russian propaganda but highlighted the efforts
the US and Germany made to alleviate the situation during the Ukrainian crisis
(Francis, 2014). Therefore, China was cautious in terms of Russia’s behavior. On the
one hand, China was reluctant to side with the West, especially with the US, to
alienate Russia. From China’s perspective, the Ukrainian crisis was a consequence of
the geopolitical competition between the West and Russia (He, 2014; Zhang W.,
2014). Thus, the Chinese officials expressed China’s tolerance to the Russian
intervention by highlighting the backdrop of the issue and deploring the violence
without designating the specific conductors (Xinhua Wang [Xinhua Net], 2014).105
Domestic factors also affected China’s calculation of cost and benefit in the
Crimean issue. First, its neighboring countries and the US have pressured China for
its assertiveness in claiming the disputed territories in the South China Sea and the
East China Sea. A potentially strategic cooperation with Russia will be beneficial for
China to deter the US. Second, the importation of natural gas from Russia will ease
China’s increasing pressure from energy demands. Russia’s activities in the aftermath
of the Crimean issue have satisfied China’s expectations. On May 20, 2014, Putin
104
In 1994, three countries of the US, the UK, Russia, and Ukraine achieved an agreement
required by Ukraine President Kuchma. The three countries’ presidents or prime ministers personally
signed the Budapest Memorandum, and they pledged to “respect Ukrainian independence and
sovereignty and its existing borders,” and “to refrain from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine” (Onyschuk, 2014).
105
Chinese diplomatic officials used the Chinese words, shichu youyin (事出有因) and qianze
baoli (谴责暴力), to comment the Crimea issue.
154
officially visited China. In the following day, the presidents of the two countries
attended the signing ceremony of the cooperation of importing natural gas from
Russia to China, an agreement that China and Russia had negotiated for almost two
decades. Russia made a great concession on the price of natural gas because Putin was
eager to complete this agenda during his visit; this concession depicted Russia’s
strategic intention of guaranteeing China’s moderate position by offering special
incentives to attract Beijing.106 Given that Russia needed its political support, China
did not have to concern that Russia would militarily intervene in China’s ethnic
problems as it acted on Crimea.
Summary
The discussion on the case of Crimea was to explain the dynamic of China’s
foreign policy toward the crisis. China was cautious on the relevant issue and
struggling between the normative principles and its relations with Russia, as well as
the international community as a whole. The Chinese government did not agree with
Russian military interventions in Ukraine, but it took an ambiguous attitude to handle
the thorny problem. After the issue had been put on UNSC agenda, China used the
principle of non-intervention to avoid choosing side. Although the international
pressure has been lessened by Russian unyielding attitude toward the UNSC
involvement in the Crimea issue, it was difficult for China to obstruct the UNSC draft
resolution partly because of China’s commitment to the sovereign principles. China’s
abstention from the voting of the UNSC draft resolution revealed China’s worries
about Russian action, as the intervention in Ukraine to support the independence of
106
Although the two countries did not publicize the ultimate price of natural gas, Putin made a
joke to China’s official who visited Russia that the Chinese negotiators drank a great amount of blood
of their Russian counterparts (International Bussiness Times, 2014).
155
the ethnic minority was related to Beijing’s domestic concern, i.e., ethnic problems.
Public support for Russian interventions would demonstrate that China admits the
legitimacy of intervention in the ethnic issues of other countries and probably increase
its own domestic vulnerability in the future. The ambiguous attitude toward the
Russian intervention, as well as UNSC intervention in the Crimean issue, showed its
implied sympathy for Russia, but would not bring about condemnation from the
international community. It was rational for China to maintain a vague attitude toward
the Crimean and Ukraine issues and to abstain from the UNSC draft resolution. The
following consequence of Russian reward reflected that China’s neutral choice was
optimal, in a result of reducing its domestic vulnerability.
Table 13
Causal Mechanisms of China’s Foreign Policy Toward the Crimean Issue
Domestic factors
Systemic incentives

↓

Outcome
Pattern
Perceptions
Ideological base:
Territorial sovereignty
non-violation
International dissent
(Majorities in the
international
community V.S.
Russia)
→ Lessened
pressure with limited
opportunity
Economic development
energy demands–
Concerned
Domestic issues–
Strongly relevant but
indirectly concerned
→ Increases domestic
vulnerability potentially
↓
Lessened pressure with
limited opportunity
Indirect threat
156
 Compromise
5
Case 5: The Libya Conflict (2011)
Compared to other great powers that have traditionally political influence and
geopolitical strategy in the Middle East, China’s political weight in the region is
marginal. China does not geopolitically compete with other powers in the region, but
it has vast economic interests in these resource-rich countries within which Libya was
an important economic partner to Beijing. An unstable domestic condition in Libya
apparently endangered Chinese economic interests. Based on rationalist theories,
exerting its veto power or hindering any possible military interventions in the UNSC
might be the better alternatives for China, but it was relatively cooperative in the
UNSC interventions in Libya. The Libya War gave rise to a blow on Chinese
economic interests, which reinforced the irrationality of choices the Chinese
government had made. Hence, the case of Libya is worthwhile to be examined since
the existing theories have failed to provide a convincing explanation for China’s
behavior in the case. Why China compromised to or cooperated with the international
community in the interventions in Libya will be answered through an examination of
China’s non-intervention policy toward the Libyan conflict.
Background
The Libyan crisis is a direct consequence of the Arab Spring, referring to the
democratic uprisings that arose and spread across the Arab World in 2010-2011. In
February 2011, Libyan colonel Muammar Gaddafi chose a robust response to the
protest movement by not only describing the anti-government civilians as
“cockroaches” but also declaring war on the Libyan uprising. Soon, more than a
thousand protestors were killed. After the Gaddafi forces gained the territory of
Benghazi, which was at the epicenter of the rebellion, a mass cleansing of the
157
discontented population was foreseen. In response to the rapidly strenuous situation
and the possible humanitarian crisis, the UN initiated interventions in a series of
condemning statements, and by March 2013, the UNSC passed seven sanctionsrelated resolutions.
Figure 4. Map of Libya (2013). From Map No. 3787 Rev. 8 United Nations, March
2013.
China’s Responses to the International Interventions
Regarding these resolutions, China cast several votes, which exhibited the
country’s concerns and diplomatic priorities. China did not oppose draft Resolution
1970, which imposed sanctions against Libya, and even abstained rather than blocked
the more severe sanctions contained in Resolution 1973, which established a no-fly
158
zone over Libya and all necessary measures to protect civilians from attacks by forces
led by Gaddafi. This case is unique because the sanctions implied the potential of
using force and the Western target of overthrowing the then regime, which lay at the
heart of China’s foreign policy principles.
Table 14
Voting in the UNSC on Sanctions Against Libya
Resolution
1970
1973
Sanctions
Sanctions
15,0,0
10,5,0
Grouping
corresponding
with the U.S.
views
11
Grouping
corresponding
with China
views
Grouping
corresponding
with other
views
Main Objects
Votes
2009
UN
PKF
15,0,
0
2016
Sanctions
terminated
2017
UN
Monitoring
2040
UN
PKF
15,0,
0
2095
UN
PKF
15,0,
0
15,0,0
15,0,0
10
-
-
-
-
-
2
4
-
-
-
-
-
2
1
-
-
-
-
-
Note. Votes are written as “Aye, Abstention, and Veto.” PKF stands for Peace-keeping Force.
Member states are grouped according to their statements following their UNSC votes on
resolutions. From Odgaard (2013, p.33), adjusted by author, based on UNSC (2013).
China had extensive ties with Libya before the Libyan conflict broke out;
there were more than 50 Chinese investment programs in Libya, mainly infrastructure
and oil programs. In his first official visit to Libya in April 2002, Jiang Zemin signed
agreements, which included a $40 million deal for a Chinese company to extend
Libya’s rail network and a Libyan commitment to open its hydrocarbon sector to
Chinese firms (St John, 2008). Before the UNSC lifted the sanctions against Libya in
September 2003, Chinese oil companies vigorously entered the Libyan crude oil
159
market and the China Petroleum Pipeline started the program of construction of oil
and gas pipelines in Western Libya (Wang Y., 2007). The bombing of Libya placed
Chinese investments, worth billions of dollars, along with the lives of 35,860 Chinese
nationals working in Libya, at risk. According to the report of the MOC, the full value
of China’s engagement with Libya was attacked on at least 27 Chinese construction
projects, resulting in a 45 per cent fall in contract projects (MOC, 2012). Although
Libyan oil imports were attractive to China, they only accounted for 3 per cent of
Chinese oil imports before the crisis (China Industrial Map Editorial Committee;
China Economic Monitoring and Analysis Center, 2013), which did not provide a
sufficient reason for China to help Gaddafi in the UNSC. Therefore, although the
economic interests in Libya were important to the Chinese government, this domestic
factor had not determined Beijing’s attitude toward UNSC sanctions against Libya.
From a Chinese perspective, the consent of the international community
provided the necessary backing for the UNSC’s decisive actions. In the Libyan case,
the views of regional stakeholders, including the Arab and African organizations,
were also taken into account. Between February 20 and February 23, the Security
Council of the LAS, the Secretary-General of the OIC and the AUPSC all issued
statements condemning Libya’s descent into violence; the LAS subsequently went a
step further and suspended Libya’s membership of the League (UNSC, 2011a; OIC,
2011; AUPSC, 2011). Jiang Yu, CFM spokeswoman, expressed Chinese opinions on
the principles behind the Libya crisis during a regular press conference on March 03,
2011; she emphasized that “The UNSC should pay attention to and respect the
opinions of the Arab and African countries” (Huanqiu Net, 2011). On July 21, Hu
Jintao communicated with the president of South Africa and acknowledged the
important role that South Africa and the AU had played in the political resolution of
160
the Libyan issue, which showed the determination of African countries to solve an
African issue in an African way. He stated, “China highly appreciates your efforts and
would like to maintain close consultation and coordination on the Libyan issue”
(Reuters, 2011). In addition to the regional organizations, other countries supported
the resolution against Libya, which led to a guarantee of China’s affirmative vote for
Resolution 1970. Li Baodong, China’s UN representative, highlighted the safety of
foreign nationals in remarks at the UNSC meeting. Li urged the immediate end of
violence to restore stability “to avoid future bloodshed and civilian causalities,” and
“the safety and interests of the foreign nationals in Libya must be assured” in the
process. The international consensus on the Libyan issue produced pressure to China,
and Beijing thus supported the punitive measures against Libya and rhetorically
underlined the emergency of protecting human rights.
Regarding Resolution 1973, while China abstained, it virtually acquiesced to
the military intervention by allowing the passage of the resolution. With the escalation
of the Libyan crisis, Western countries considered a more serious and effective
measure to combat it. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton conferred in Paris with
European leaders on the possibility of establishing a no fly-zone over Libya as a
means to addressing the unrest. A week before the discussion on Resolution 1973, the
LAS stated its support for a no-fly zone (IBTimes, 2011). Resolution 1973 shared the
same intention with Resolution 1970, that is, humanitarian aid, which regional
stakeholders had advocated. Although China was concerned that the approval of the
use of military force in Resolution 1973 would contradict its principles, it decided not
to veto because of the endorsement of sanctions associated with the use of military
force from the AU and the LAS (UNSC, 2011b).
161
Notwithstanding, China was still cautious about the military measures and
thus abstained from Resolution 1973. After the resolution was passed, Li Baodong
explained: “The state sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of
Libya should be respected and the peaceful means should be used as the priority
option to resolve the Libyan issue.” He added that in handling international relations,
“China has remained opposed to the use of military force. Many problems remain unclarified and un-answered. Thus China found serious difficulties with some parts of
the resolution” (Permanent Mission of the PRC to the UN, 2011). Some Chinese
scholars argued that the pace of the events in Libya propelled China’s acquiescence
(Duowei Net, 2011). Hence, China’s abstention, to some extent, succumbed to
demands by other UNSC members.
The other four abstentions were cast by Russia, Brazil, India and Germany.
Except Germany, the other abstentions were from members of the BRICS. There was
little information on whether these countries had reached consensus on the Libyan
issue before the UNSC draft resolution was tabled. However, one month after
Resolution 1973 was passed, the BRICS meeting opened in China’s Hainan Province.
There is a significant possibility that the five countries had discussed the Libyan
problems at the meeting, and it became obvious that the BRICS members did not
share the West’s enthusiasm for the Arab Spring and saw more troubles than gains
ahead, which was a follow-up episode responding to the voting record on Resolution
1973 (Babich, 2012). During the debate on the Libyan issue, the Permanent Mission
of the PRC to the UN clearly stated: “We oppose any discretionary view toward
Resolution 1973 and foreign countries purposely overthrowing the current regime of a
sovereign state or becoming involved in an internal war in the name of protecting
civilians” (Xinhua News Agency, 2011b). In addition, Chinese President Hu expressed
162
his disquiet about the multinational coalition’s air attack on Libya, which might have
caused additional civilian human rights disasters. He once said, if the air attack caused
civilians causalities in Libya, this would probably breach the original intention of
UNSC Resolution 1973 (Xinhua News Agency, 2011a). The expressions of the
Chinese government regarding the Libyan issue demonstrated the country’s
disagreement with the international military intervention in Libya to change the
Libyan regime, which was rooted in China’s understanding of the sovereign norms.
Summary
China’s cooperation and compromise in the case of Libya proved the proposed
causal mechanisms underlying China’s non-intervention policy, which are in
accordance with the Propositions III and IV, respectively. Systemic factors were
primary incentives being considered in China’s decision-making processes regarding
the Libya conflict. The international pressure caused by the international consensus
urged China to approve the sanctions embodied in the UNSC resolutions. China
approved UNSC Resolution 1970 since the international community had taken
sanctions against the Libyan government as an appropriate method to resolve the
humanitarian crisis.
In contrast, China abstained from Resolution 1973 because of the possible use
of military force. It is difficult to elucidate if China took the possible economic loss
into the consideration with respect to Resolution 1973. However, China had been
objected to the use of force attacking a sovereign state, and this political stand has not
been changed since Beijing expressed it on UNSC Resolution 678 regarding the Gulf
War. It is arguable that the systemic factor– maintaining the international order– was
the primary reason for China’s position on SCR. 1973. In addition, the interaction
163
between great powers also played a role in China’s non-intervention policy toward the
resolution. Other UNSC members, especially Russia, also shared China’s emphasis on
the normative principle, but Russia did not rigorously oppose the use of force. The
international pressure thus not released enough for China to defend its principle of
non-intervention by wielding its veto power.
Table 15
China’s Non-intervention Policy Toward the Libya Conflict
Systemic
incentives
The international
community has
unanimously
agreed with the
UNSC sanctions
against Libya.
→ Strong
pressure
Domestic factors

↓
Perceptions
Ideological base– Not
concerned
 Outcome
Pattern/
case
 Cooperation
3/ SCR.
1970
Compromise
5/ SCR.
1973
Economic interests– Little
concerned
 → Little negative effect on
domestic vulnerability
↓
High pressure
Indirect threat
Some Western
countries and
stakeholders
agreed with
interventions.
Ideological base: Sovereignty
non-violation
Economic interests– Concerned
→ Increases domestic
Russian shared
vulnerability potentially
↓
China’s stance but
did not strongly
Lessened pressure with little
oppose using
opportunity
force in Libya.
→ Lessened
Indirect threat
pressure
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Case 6: The Darfur Crisis in Sudan (2004-2007)
The civil war between Northern and Southern Sudan lasted decades and
concluded with South Sudan declaring its independence in 2011. One particular
episode in this war attracted intense international attention: the Darfur crisis. In
particular, the Darfur crisis posed a considerate diplomatic challenge to China’s
policy of non-intervention, making the Darfur crisis a significant case in China’s nonintervention policy in the context of its engagement with Africa (Lee, Chan, & Chan,
2012; Osondu, 2013). Analyzing China’s response to this particular crisis allows us to
discern how China dealt with specific cases of humanitarian violations, how it
perceived the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention and the norm of nonintervention, and how it balanced the cost and benefit of its national interests in the
face of intense international pressure.
China’s non-intervention policy toward Sudan over the Darfur crisis presented
cooperation and compromise with international society on collective interventions. In
addition, China was involved in dealing with the crisis by diplomatic efforts. It would
be rational that China opposed any interventions in Darfur to maintain the stability in
the country because of China’s material interests in Sudan. However, China had
acquiesced to UNSC sanctions on Sudan in 2004 in the form of abstentions. The
innenpolitik theories are unable to explain why China compromised on the UNSC
interventions that might put its material interests at stake. Realist theories are not
sufficient to explain why China had changed its attitudes toward the Darfur issue from
reluctance to cooperation on authorizing sanctions against Sudan. Therefore, the
analysis of this case is to explain the operation of systemic and domestic factors
involved in China’s decision-making process throughout China’s embedment in and
reaction to the Darfur crisis in order to prove this study’s propositions.
165
Background
The Darfur crisis erupted in February 2003 during negotiations between the
GoS in Khartoum and the SPLM/A, the opposite party centered in South Sudan.
Similar to the majority of civil wars in postcolonial nations, the Darfur crisis began as
a domestic problem derived from historical, ethnic, and developmental conflicts,
which was aggravated by the state’s incompetence in managing the state-society
relations. Darfur is a region in Western Sudan that is home to nomadic and pastoral
people, a racial mix of indigenous non-Arab and the Arabs people (See Figure 5).
During Sudan’s colonial period, the UK’s indirect governing of the Anglo-Egyptian
condominium resulted in the segregation of Darfur. When Sudan emerged as an
independent state in 1956, the GoS failed to produce a developmental program for
Darfur to address this historical legacy, yielding a loose confederation of tribal, racial
and regional identities in Darfur. In 1989, the Darfuri residents began to suffer under
a central state determined to plunder Darfur’s resources and subjugate its people
(Bassil, 2013).
Sudanese political elites within the GoS not only were incapable of cultivating
a national identity in Darfur but also exploited the Darfuri people to consolidate their
own political power. Domestically, the GoS allied with some Darfuri tribes to
suppress the SPLM. Instead of providing economic assistance when the region
suffered from natural disasters, the GoS opted to implement a policy of arming tribal
militias. However, recruiting its SAF soldiers mainly from Darfur affected the GoS’
ambiguous policy toward the region. Internationally, Darfur was a pawn in the
triangle relations among Sudan and two neighboring countries: Chad and Libya. In
the Cold War era, the GoS ceded Darfur to the Libyans. Darfur was also used as a
166
“staging point for armed forces launching operations into Chad” (Bassil, 2013, p. 156).
In the post-Cold War period, the governments of Chad and Sudan maneuvered against
each other by supporting rebels based in the border area in or around Darfur.
Figure 5. Map of Sudan (2007). From Wikimedia Commons, the free media
repository, modified from United Nations, 2004. Sudan. Map No. 3707 Rev. 7.
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Cartographic Section.
Eventually, Hasan al-Turabi, a Sudanese opposition leader and prominent
Muslim, agitated Darfuri resentments rooted in the long-lasting conflicts and centralperiphery inequality and called on the Darfuri People to overthrow the central
government. In 2003, large-scale violence led by rebel organizations in Sudan– the
JEM, supported largely by the Zaghawa, and the SLM/A, supported by the Fur –
broke out. To confront the rebels while avoiding relying on the SAF, which had a
167
high percentage of Darfuri soldiers, the GoS mobilized the Janjaweed militia in
Darfur. The situation deteriorated because of the Janjaweed’s human rights abuses
and the SAF’s indiscriminate attack on both rebel and civilian targets (Shinn, 2009).
By 2004, approximately 200,000 people had been killed, 200,000 had fled to Chad as
refugees, and another 1.2 million had been displaced internally (The Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
2004). These disastrous outcomes brought the humanitarian crisis in Darfur under the
international spotlight.
Sino-Sudanese Relations
The international community criticized China’s foreign policy concerning
Sudan because of the close relationship between the two governments and Beijing’s
significant national interests in Sudan. In the public discourse, Sudan is China’s allweather friend. The two countries’ relations were solidified when the NIF took power
in 1989. Although China was initially uncertain about the NIF’s Islamic politics, it
gradually became Sudan’s weapons supplier. During Bashir’s visit to China in 1990,
Sudan, funded by Iran, purchased Chinese arms. According to UN Comtrade data,
China and Iran contributed 96 per cent of the small and light weapons exported to
Sudan between 1992 through 2005 (HSBA, 2007a).
Military relations between China and Sudan escalated after 2002, when the
GoS attempted to crush the Darfur uprising while negotiating with the SPLM/A to
end the civil war with the South (HSBA, 2007b). During the Darfur crisis, China sold
over $55 million in small arms to Sudan (Human Rights First, p. 1). As long as the
Sudanese did not use the weapons in Darfur, China was not violating UNSC sanctions
concerning the arms embargo against Darfur. Although evidence has indicated that
168
China’s exports objectively contributed to the human right abuse in the region (Shinn,
2009), a CFM spokesman denied the accusation that Chinese weapons sold to the Gos
had been used in Darfur (CFM, 2008b). However, the possibility that the GoS had
used the military equipment in Darfur without any reference to China was not
excluded. Furthermore, there was no indication that China had attempted to prevent
the GoS from using the weapons in Darfur.
The economic relationship between the two countries also changed when
Khartoum invited Chinese investment in Sudan’s oil sector in 1994, replacing the
Chevron (Large, 2008). By 2004, the CNPC, then owning 40 per cent of the GNPOC
(a consortium that dominates Sudan's oil fields in partnership with the national energy
companies in Malaysia and India) was the biggest customer of Sudanese oil industry
(Goodman, 2004, p. A01). China imported 50 to 80 per cent of Sudan’s oil; in 2007,
Sudan was China’s fifth-largest oil supplier and the second largest supplier in Africa.
Chinese companies invested significant sums of money to build oil infrastructure in
Sudan, such as a pipeline from the oil fields to Port Sudan and an export terminal at
Port Sudan. Therefore, China was viewed as the political power that had much
leverage and political influence in addressing the Darfur crisis yet inactive to do so.
International Responses and China’s Attitude to the Crisis
Although the situation in Darfur was grave, the international community
disagreed on whether the crisis constituted genocide and questioned the GoS’s
responsibility.107 Officially, the US was the first country to identify the crisis as
genocide. Moreover, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell blamed the GoS and the
107
The definition of term is related to whether or not the situation in Sudan met the
requirements to implement the R2P.
169
Janjaweed, stating: “Genocide has occurred and may still be occurring in Darfur”
(Kessler & Lynch, 2004b). Although they generally agreed with this assessment,
political organizations such as the AU and the UN and some other countries used the
term “crimes against humanity” instead of genocide to refer the crisis.
Regardless of their interpretation of the crisis, international actors made
significant international efforts to address the issue. For example, Chad attempted to
mediate the crisis as soon as it broke out and held two rounds of talks in 2003. When
the crisis escalated, Chadian President Déby convened a third round of talks in March
2004. However, because the US supported the negotiations, Sudan President Bashir
refused to participate until the AU interfered directly. These negotiations established
the initial deployment of the AMIS.
At the same time, UN senior humanitarian officials attempted to persuade
UNSC members to scrutinize the conflict and place the humanitarian situation in
Darfur on the UNSC’s agenda. However, the legitimacy of the UN interventions in
Darfur was controversial from the start. Large sections of the UN Secretariat
considered the conflict too risky, and the UNSC members could not reach a consensus
on action in Darfur (Gelot, 2012).
As the situation deteriorated, the US sought a UNSC resolution to impose
sanctions on Sudan. However, China, supported by Pakistan, the LAS, and various
other developing countries, opposed a punitive approach and attempted to dilute the
language of a PRST in May 2004. China continually expressed its disagreement with
imposing sanctions on the GoS regarding Darfur by casting abstentions on relevant
draft resolutions (See table 14). Furthermore, China did not participate in the
mediations between the GoS and the Sudanese rebels before 2006 and attempted to
170
cope with the crisis solely under the UNSC framework. At the time, the crisis had no
effect on Sino-Sudanese relations. China continued extracting natural resources and
building infrastructure in Sudan and providing military equipment to the GoS.
China’s indifferent behavior toward the humanitarian crisis attracted intense
condemnation from the international community.
China’s critical economic interest in Sudan eventually led to international
accusations of China’s shared responsibility in the Darfur crisis. Some groups
criticized China’s “blind eyes” in its self-interested support of the GoS in the UNSC
(Large, 2008). In the West, activists even called for a boycott of the 2008 Olympics in
Beijing, calling it the “Genocide Olympics.” Even though China insisted that its role
in the Darfur crisis had been exaggerated, it continued to face strong international
pressure.
From Non-intervention to Involvement
Although international condemnation appeared to compel China’s
involvement, China’s responses to the Darfur crisis were not intransigent of opposing
interventions in Sudan. China clearly considered guaranteeing its national interests in
Sudan in its decision-making process. However, to achieve its political aims, the
Chinese government had to address various competing interests and concerns.
Developing an apt foreign policy toward the Darfur crisis tested China’s ability to
balance cost and benefit and demonstrated China’s perception of international
pressure and threats and its formulation of diplomatic priorities.
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Table 16
Key Darfur-related UNSC Resolutions (2004-2007)
Voting
summary
13,2,0 (China,
Pakistan)
China’s vote Contents
Date
SCR.
July, 30, 2004
1556
Sept. 18, 2004
1564
11,4,0 (China,
Russia, Algeria,
and Pakistan)
Abstention
Nov. 19, 2004
1574
15,0,0
Aye
Mar. 24, 2005
1590
15,0,0
Aye
1591
12,3,0 (China,
Russia, and
Algeria)
Abstention
Mar. 29, 2005
Abstention
11,4,0 (China,
Algeria, Brazil,
and the US)
12,3,0 (China,
Qatar, and
Russia)
Mar. 31, 2005
1593
Mar.29, 2006
1672
May. 16, 2006
1679
15,0,0
Aug. 31, 2006
July. 31, 2007
Abstention
Imposes arms embargo
on Darfur region.
Threatens oil sanctions,
opened human right
monitors, and urged rapid
expansion of the AMIS
A comprehensive Peace
Agreement in Sudan
Establishes the UNMIS
Extends sanctions on
Darfur region in Sudan
for failure to comply with
previous resolutions
Referred the Darfur issue
to the Prosecutor of the
ICC
Abstention
Imposes sanctions toward
officers in Sudan.
Aye
Implements the DPA
1706
12,3,0 (China,
Qatar, and
Russia)
Abstention
Expands the UNMIS to
support the
implementation of the
DPA
1769
15,0,0
Aye
Establishes the UNAMID
Note. Based on ODS; UNBISnet; UNSCSC.
Cooperation and Compromise in the UN (2004-2006)
Although China generally did not agree with the use of coercive methods
against the GoS to relieve tensions in Darfur, China did not wield its veto power or
threaten to use veto to block UNSC draft resolutions related to the crisis. Instead,
China’s political position remained flexible. China supported the peace negotiations
between the GoS and opposition groups and endorsed the AU’s role as mediator in
172
resolving the conflict in Darfur. When the UNSC proposed imposing a ban on the sale
of arms to all non-governmental entities and individuals operating in Darfur, without
any mechanism to monitor the Sudan’s compliance in terms of disarming the the
Janjaweed militia (UNSC, 2004a), China abstained from the draft resolution. China
insisted that alienating the GoS would be counter-productive. Zhang Yishan, China’s
deputy permanent representative to the UN, justified China’s abstention by arguing,
“As all the parties are speeding up diplomatic efforts, such measures [mandatory
measures against the GoS] cannot be helpful in resolving the situation in Darfur and
may even further complicate it” (UNSC, 2004b, p. 3). Despite China’s arguments, no
great power stood on China’s side in the vote on Resolution 1556; the UNSC
members, the four great powers of P5 in particular, had reached a consensus on
sanctions against Sudan.108 China eventually compromised, albeit reluctantly, under
the international community’s pressure.
In the vote on UNSC Resolution 1593, which referred the situation in Darfur
to the ICC, China maintained its insistence on respecting the sovereignty of the GoS
by abstaining in an alignment with the US. Washington abstained because of its
objections to the ICC’s existence. U.S. hesitance alleviated the tension between the
international community’s interventionist impulse and China’s policy of nonintervention, providing China an opportunity to argue its preference of nonintervention. However, lacking the strong support of other great powers in resisting
the draft resolution, China eventually compromised once more.
108
The US sought UNSC sanctions on the GoS in July 2004. According to U.S. officials, only
China and Pakistan disagree with the interventions, and the US needed to “persuade the two countries
to back the resolution.” Algeria’s U.N. ambassador Abdallah Baali confirmed the consensus that had
reached on interventions in the Darfur crisis by the international community (Kessler & Lynch, 2004a).
173
China later discovered an “ally” in Russia. Russia had adopted a position
similar to that of China regarding UNSC draft resolutions related to Darfur, excluding
Resolution 1556 and 1593. Russia and China did not favor UN intervention in Darfur,
because the actions challenged “the principle of domestic jurisdiction” (Gelot, 2012, p.
94). In addition to this normative preference, Russia’s national interests were also
factored into its foreign policy toward the Darfur issue. Russia’s economic interests in
Sudan were marginal, but its concerns about Chechnya drove Russia to prevent
certain UNSC interventions. As Russia’s deputy foreign minister conveyed, “Any
decision on Darfur should be based on constructive dialogue and cooperation”
(Wuthnow, 2013, p. 105). Hence, lacking strong opposition to UNSC interventions in
Darfur, Russia adopted a milder attitude than that of China and only supported
China’s political position. China and Russia abstained together from four UNSC draft
resolutions, namely, Resolution 1564, 1591, 1602, and 1706.
With Russia’s support, China’s opposition to various UNSC sanctions was
strong. For example, in September 2004, the US and its partners asked the UNSC to
authorize harsh sanctions against the GoS for breaching Resolution 1556. The original
draft resolution would have established a no-fly zone for Sudanese military aircraft,
monitored by international over flights, and targeted sanctions against the GoS that
would include oil industry (Bellamy, 2005). The implementation of this US-sponsored
draft would have negatively affected China’s economic interests, particularly the
extraction of oil. Accordingly, China acknowledged it was considering using its veto
power against the resolution (Slashnews, 2004). The resolution ultimately adopted
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was largely toned down from the original draft. Even so, China still cast an
abstention.109
Constrained by its non-intervention principle, China preferred negotiation and
discussion that encouraged “African solutions to African problems” in addressing the
Darfur crisis. During the Abuja Peace Talks, a series of negotiations between the GoS
and the Darfur rebel groups, China cooperated with the international community and
supported UNSC Resolutions 1574, 1590, and 1679. The Bashir government was
initially resistant to international intervention due to its fears of foreign conspiracy;
however, it compromised by allowing PKOs into Sudan and cooperating with the
international community to normalize Sudan’s relationship with the Western
countries, particularly the US.
After the GoS conceded, China had no reason to obstruct the peace
construction process in Sudan. However, the negotiations began to fail when the Gos
realized the US would not keep its promise to re-establish diplomacy between the two
countries. The GoS began to withdraw from its commitment to allowing UN PKOs
into Darfur. The US promptly urged the UNSC to adopt a Resolution, expanding the
mandate of UNMIS to Darfur under the authority of Chapter VII, without negotiating
with Sudan (Waal, 2013). Although the mandate of Resolution 1706 did not follow
the conditions of legitimation of PKOs, rather than vetoing the resolution, China cast
an abstention vote.
109
The US had proposed a more coercive draft resolution on Sudan to UNSC members, which
included sanctions on oil industry. China and Russia were strongly against the initiative. The US
conceded and eventually removed the term in the formal draft resolution, yet it insisted warning the
GoS by threatening oil sanctions. As a result, China, along with Russia, abstained from the voting of
UNSC Resolution 1564 to express dissatisfaction (US Department of State, 2004).
175
Diplomatic Efforts and Concession (2006-2007)
Despite the UNSC’s adopting of Resolution 1706, the GoS did not allow UN
peacekeeping force into Sudan, and international efforts in the negotiations
concerning Darfur reached an impasse. At the time, China was under considerable
pressure from the international community to contribute to the problem-solving
process. A range of international actors, such as NGOs of the human rights
community and individuals in the West, had condemned China’s inaction, and a
growing campaign to boycott the 2008 Olympics was raised during the Darfur crisis
(Cha, 2008). The pressure could be taken into account in China’s decision-making
process, as China began to move away from its intransigent rhetoric of nonintervention. In 2006, China found its motivation to become involved in the Darfur
crisis: diplomatic relations between Chad and Taiwan was broken, and then China
promised to help ease the unabated situation on Chad’s eastern border. Accordingly,
when Chinese President Hu Jintao met Bashir at the African Summit in Beijing in
November 2006, he conveyed China’s concern about the Darfur conflict and hoped
Sudan would “strengthen dialogue with all parties, coordinate stances, and strive to
reach an appropriate solution” (Buckley, 2006). Permanent Representative to the UN
Wang Guangya asserted that China sent a strong message to Sudan (International
Crisis Group, 2009). This message to Khartoum was not impelling but mixed with
material benefits, including a $13 million interest-free loan, $4.8 million in
humanitarian aid to Darfur, and $70 million in debt relief (Shinn, 2009).
Between late 2006 and 2007, China also made efforts to obtain the GoS’s
concession, exerting pressure on the GoS to accept UN intervention. Chinese officials
and a special envoy to Sudan encouraged the GoS to handle the Darfur issue flexibly
176
(Wuthnow, 2013). China’s pressure seemed instrumental in achieving the GoS’s
agreement, as the Bashir government approved the HSP and consented to the AU and
the UN’s hybrid operation. With the issue resolved, the UNSC unanimously passed
Resolution 1769, which established the UNSMID.
Summary
China’s non-intervention policy in the case of the Darfur crisis was
complicated yet typical. Beijing’s specific responses to the crisis are in accordance
with pattern 3, 4, and 5, respectively, as depicted in Table 17. In general, China
disagreed with the coercive methods of UN interventions not only out of its normative
preference but also because of the potential effect on China’s domestic concerns,
which was indicated by China’s negotiation with other UNSC members to revise the
draft resolution that had initially planned to impose sanctions on Sudan’s oil
exportation. However, China refrained from using its veto power to obstruct
international interventions. Despite the nuances of its attitude toward specific UN
interventions, China made compromise in most cases.
As was previously noted, China abstained from UN Resolution 1556 because
no great power seconded China’s non-interventionist preference. Supporting this
resolution would have negatively affected China’s interest in Sudan; at the same time,
from China’s perspective, the UN sanctions might threaten China’s interests but were
likely insignificant. Likewise, China recognized the U.S. abstention from Resolution
1593 as an opportunity to advocate the non-intervention principle without the threat
of international criticism.
177
Although China compromised with the international community in these
previous instances, when proposed sanctions would have posed a direct threat to its
economic interests in Sudan, Beijing threatened to exert veto power to ease the
unsatisfactory language and methods. China’s opposition to UN interventions also
became stronger when Russian supported its position. Russian support lessened the
international pressure China faced. However, Russia did not strongly oppose UN
interventions in Sudan, which limited China’s ability to maintain its intransigence.
China supported peace negotiations between the two political sides involved
as well as the PKOs of the AU and the UN. However, it insisted on strict standards of
legitimizing the UN PKOs, particularly the consent of the target state. Overall, China
cooperated with the international community and authorized several UN resolutions
related to the Darfur crisis once international consensus had been reached and the
GoS conceded. In this situation, UN involvement in Sudan did not constitute a direct
threat to China, and international actions overrode China’s principle of nonintervention. China deviated from the principle of non-intervention to become
involved in the Darfur crisis only when it faced intense international pressure exerted
by condemnation of the human rights community and individuals. Finally, when
China became concerned about the threat of long-term instability in Sudan to its
economic interests and about its reputation as an Olympics host country, it took a big
step by negotiations with the GoS. Moreover, the diplomatic breakthrough in its
relationships with Chad eased its domestic concerns. In summary, when international
pressure China faced became heavier and might threaten its domestic demands, the
principle of the non-intervention was underweight in its foreign policy formation. As
a result, Beijing compromised with the international community and become involved
in the Darfur crisis.
178
Table 17
Motivations of China’s Non-intervention Policy Toward the Darfur Crisis
Systemic incentives 
→ High pressure
The international
community
advocated coercion.
 Outcome
Pattern/
cases
Ideological base: The
principle of non-intervention
The international
community
advocated coercion.
China’s nonintervention policy
has not been
supported by great
powers.
Domestic factors
↓
Perceptions
Economic development–
Strongly concerned

→ Increases domestic
vulnerability directly
↓
4/ SCR.
1556
High pressure
Direct threat
Ideological base: Domestic
jurisdiction and nonintervention

Compromise
Economic development–
Either the US did not
Strongly concerned
endorse the
international
 → Increases domestic
intervention or
vulnerability directly
Russia took similar
political stand with
↓
China in some cases.
Lessened pressure with limited
opportunity
→ Lessened
pressure
Direct threat
5/ SCR.
1564;
1591;
1593.1602;
1706.
Ideological base– Not
concerned
The international
community
advocated UN
involvement.
The GoS conceded.
→ Strong pressure
Reputation in international
society– Concerned
Economic development–
 Concerned
→ Reduces adverse effect on
domestic vulnerability
↓
High pressure
No threat
179
Cooperation
3 / SCR.
1574; 1590;
1679;
Diplomatic
efforts
Conclusion
China compromised on the three cases covered in this chapter, although
nuances existed in China’s non-intervention policy to the different cases, depending
on the specific issues. These cases challenged China’s commitment on the principle of
non-intervention and were associated to different extents with its domestic concerns.
In the end, international pressure was the determining factor in China’s compromises.
Under continuous pressure in the cases wherein China was without support from other
great powers, the sacrifice of its certain national interests, economic interests in most
of the cases, was acceptable.
By contrast, China tried to resist the international pressure in order to reduce
the risk that its domestic concerns were at stake, as well as to keep its promise of nonintervention, when it had received support from other great power(s). These three
cases illustrate the point. In addition, the case of Darfur demonstrated that Beijing got
involved in and engaged with the specific issues that greatly increased its domestic
vulnerability, in other words, the oil importation.
180
CHAPTER 5 OPPOSING INTERVENTIONS: THE CASES
OF KOSOVO, SYRIA, AND ZIMBABWE
Introduction
China has toned down its condemnation of international actions that will not
impose a direct threat on China in its diplomatic discourse since the end of the Cold
War (Carlson, 2005). Nevertheless, China has condemned certain international
interventions by applying abrasive language at times, reflecting its resistant discursive
stance. In addition, China had seldom wielded its veto power to block the UN draft
resolutions (See appendix 1). From the Chinese perspective, the veto in the UNSC is a
strongest expression of its disagreements and cannot be easily applied unless that
particular issue is intimately associated with Chinese “core interests,” such as Taiwan
issue.110 However, China vetoed several times on issues undertaken in some countries
where China possessed insignificant visible interests, such as Zimbabwe and Syria.
China’s resistance to certain international interventions raised questions about why it
responded so rigidly that it was willing to take the risk of being condemned as a
protector of rogue authorities in faraway countries. China’s decisions that hardly seem
tied to tangible interests are worth examining in certain cases.
The three cases that will be discussed in this chapter originated from different
issue areas, and China showed resistance to them to different extents. The Kosovo
crisis derived from the ethnic conflicts that commonly take place, but had attracted
massive international involvement. China was trapped between many competing
110
This observation had been iterated and highlighted not only by Chinese officials who
engage in diplomacy but also by the scholars I interviewed.
181
interests in facing this case and eventually chose a relatively intense response to the
international intervention. This case represents China’s responses to the use of force
and UNSC interventions regarding the principle of self-determination. In another area,
the Syrian crisis provoked vigorous debates in the international community in the past
few years. China opposed interventionist initiatives by vetoing four times on the issue
in the UNSC. This case reflects China’s resistance to certain international actions
concerning the human rights violation and humanitarian intervention. Finally, the case
of Zimbabwe was promoted as a UNSC agenda item by the US and did not result in
an international consensus. China’s response was indicative of its negative attitude
toward the UNSC agenda on issues of civil and political rights. All these are worth
examination, as they demonstrate China’s foreign policy making processes regarding
the principle of non-intervention.
Case 7: The Kosovo Crisis (1998-1999)
The Kosovo War was the first time that Western countries attacked a
sovereign country for humanitarian purposes in the post-Cold War period, and China
extremely opposed and condemned the West-led military interventions. However,
China compromised with international society on UNSC interventions regarding the
Kosovo crisis. The crisis posed a challenge for China at that time. On one hand, China
had been negotiating with the US to join the WTO. Supporting the Serbian
government obviously seemed irrational for China, which stood on the opposite side
of the US. On the other hand, the interventions in Kosovo contradicted the principle
of non-intervention by which China has abided. China disagrees with any military
intervention in a sovereign state to support secessionist movements. However
usefulness rationalist theories are, it is difficult to apply these theories to explaining
182
China’s non-intervention policy toward the Kosovo crisis since the country’s different
interests were entangled in facing this crisis, and the theories have failed to provide
what interests were prioritized in China’s decision-making process. Therefore,
exploring China’s responses to this crisis can explain the factors determining and
affecting its foreign policy in order to prove the proposed theoretical framework.
Background
The Kosovo crisis was caused by ethnic conflicts between Albanians and
Serbs in Serbia. Kosovo, which is mainly populated by Albanians, an ethnic minority,
used to be a province of Serbia. The proportion of Albanians in the total population
was approximately 90 per cent during the Kosovo crisis. The ethnic conflict was
historically rooted, and it continued for more than half a century. The conflict
intensified because of the revival of the Greater Serbian nationalism and ethnic
policies, particularly the removal of the autonomy of Kosovo in 1989 that was
implemented by Slobodan Milošević, president of the FRY. Inspired by the
independence of Slovenia and Croatia, Kosovar Albanians started to pursue a formal
statehood. They held a referendum on independence and elected Ibrahim Rugova as
their unofficial president (Ker-Lindsay, 2009).
The international community did not recognize the political pursuits of the
Kosovar Albanians until the KLA launched the first attack against a Serbian police
patrol in 1996. The KLA, which was composed of separatist Albanian guerrillas, was
initially labeled as terrorists by the US (The BBC, 1998). It intensified the fights with
Serbs and eventually controlled parts of the province.
183
International Involvement and China’s Response
Although Milošević insisted that the Kosovo issue was a domestic problem of
Serbia, the international community decided to be involved in the crisis when it
realized that the intra-state violence could become a civil war and spread to
neighboring Macedonia. In 1998, the UNSC adopted three sanctions-related
resolutions against the FRY concerning Kosovo (See Table 18). However, the civil
war did not ease under the UNSC resolutions. In March 1999, NATO launched a
bombing campaign against Serbia after the failure of negotiations and mediations
initiated by the intervening countries between the Serbian government and the
secessionists.111 This military action did not achieve the UNSC mandate and thus
invoked numerous normative problems and debates. NATO members justified this
military action as a humanitarian intervention, but some countries, particularly Russia
and China, remained skeptical about the true intention behind this military attack.
China did not support the international interventions in Kosovo when the
UNSC put this issue on the agenda. The Chinese delegations to the UN denied the
international character of the situation in Kosovo and emphasized that the UNSC
interference did not conform to its principled position: “Kosovo crisis should be
resolved through negotiations between both parties concerned on the basis of the
principle of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY” (UNSC,
1998a). China stated this opinion regularly in the UN and sequentially cast
abstentions from the voting of all UNSC resolutions relevant to Kosovo. It doubted
the intervening states’ pretext of dealing with a humanitarian crisis (UNGA, 1998)
111
Milošević rejected the Rambouillet Accord in early 1999.
184
and was concerned that the outcome of the involvement would set a bad precedent in
the future for intervention in secessionist movements of sovereign states under the
guise of humanitarian purpose (UNSC, 1998b). The Kosovo crisis is strongly
associated with China’s domestic concerns that movements of secessionists in Tibet
and Xinjiang would likely result in foreign interventions and would challenge China’s
sovereignty. China implied this concern by the expressions in the UNSC that “ethnic
issues are extremely complicated and sensitive” and that the UNSC’s intervention in
ethnic issues within states “without a request from the country concerned, it may set a
bad precedent and have wider negative implications” (UNSC, 1998a). Despite
China’s sympathy for the FRY, the unanimity of the international community
softened China’s intransigence on the UNSC sanctions over the Kosovo crisis, as
exemplified by Resolutions 1160 and 1199.
Nevertheless, China’s opposition to NATO’s proposal of military intervention
in Kosovo was adamant, and its resistance was explicitly expressed when its argument
was shared by Russia. Before the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1203, which avoided
an outright threat to use force against the FRY, China and Russia threatened to veto a
resolution that would have permitted military action by NATO (Ibrahim, 1998).
During the UNSC debate on Resolution 1203, China explained its position as follows:
“NATO’s threat of military action constituted unlawful interference in the FRY’s
internal affairs, and it condemned NATO for acting without consulting with or
seeking the authorization of the UNSC” (Davis, 2011, p. 248). Even if the easing
language about the threat of using force mollified the two countries, China and Russia
still abstained from voting on Resolution 1203. For China, the resolution “does not
entail any authorization of using force or threatens to use force against the FRY”
185
(UNSC, 1998c).112
Table 18
Voting Records Regarding the Kosovo Crisis in the UNSC (1998-1999)
Date
SCR.
Voting
Summary
China’s vote Contents of the resolution
Mar. 31,
1998
1160
14, 1, 0
Abstention
Sept. 23,
1998
1199
14, 1, 0
Abstention
1203
13, 2, 0
(China and
Russia)
Abstention
May 14,
1999
1239
13, 2, 0
(China and
Russia)
Non-voting
June 10,
1999
1244
14, 1, 0
Abstention
Oct. 24,
1998
To impose arms embargo against
FRY including the Kosovo area.
Call for ceasefire and dialogues
among the parties concerned, and
to require the Yugoslavian army
to immediately stop all actions on
civilians and to allow the EU
watch group to conduct effective
monitoring in Kosovo.
The UNSC demands Yugoslavian
government
and
Kosovar
Albanian leadership to comply
fully and swiftly with Resolutions
1160 and 1199 and cooperate
fully with the OSCE Verification
Mission in Kosovo and the
NATO Air Verification Mission
over Kosovo.
To invite the UNHCR and other
international humanitarian relief
organizations to extend relief
assistance to the internally
displaced people in Kosovo, the
Republic of Montenegro and
other parts of the FRY, as well as
other civilians affected by the
ongoing crisis.
To approve of the agreement
between Yugoslavia and NATO.
Note. Voting is written as “Aye, Abstention/Non-voting, and Veto.” From Wu C., (2010, p.
77), adjusted based on the UN ODS and UNBISnet.
112
Qin Huasun, the Chinese delegate to the UN, made this statement after his abstention.
186
China immediately condemned NATO’s bombing campaign in the FRY in
March 1999. Through a strongly worded front-page commentary in People’s Daily,
the Chinese media considered NATO’s military action to be “brazenly and brutally
trampling on the UN Charter and violating its own principle of self-defense”
(Mowbray, 1999). The Chinese government resonated the comments and denounced
NATO’s intervention as a violation of the accepted international law in the March 24,
1999 UNSC meeting (UNSC, 1999a). Unlike the Russian opinion of the NATO
strikes being an “open aggression” as stated by Russian President Boris Yeltsin,
China criticized the illegality of the intervention that bypassed the UNSC and the
Western propensity to power politics, that is, the strong bullying the weak (UNSC,
1999a). Moreover, China was in favor of a UNSC draft resolution proposed by Russia
that declared NATO’s strikes as a violation of the UN Charter and “demanding an
immediate halt to NATO’s attacks and the resumption of negotiations,” but this draft
resolution was rejected through a vote of 12 to 3 (UNSC, 1999b; Waikato Times,
1999). During the Kosovo War, the Chinese media sided with the FRY and focused
on the suffering of the Serbs caused by the NATO’s bombing (Poole, 1999).
China’s denunciation of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo culminated on May
7, 1999 when the US bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, leaving three
journalists dead and twenty Chinese citizens injured. China then directed its anger
toward the US. Anti-American protests intensified across the country shortly after the
bombing. The Chinese government did not restrain this sentiment. NPC Chairman Li
Peng even instigated animosity among the public by declaring: “The whole Chinese
people is united in hatred of the common enemy— the US” (Yahuda, 2002, p. 199).
China then suspended all military exchange and human rights talks with the US
(Kucharski, 2012). Almost all Chinese scholars attributed the motive of NATO’s
187
military intervention in Kosovo to U.S. geopolitical interest. They pointed out that the
military intervention in Kosovo was never a contingency (Guo, 1999; Zhai, 1999).
Rather, it was a U.S. conspiracy that used NATO to carry out hegemony and to impair
Russia’s geopolitical influence on the Balkans in the name of humanitarian
intervention (Feng, 1999; Kong, 1999).
It should be noted that China played a marginal role in resolving the Kosovo
crisis although its rhetoric was particularly striking. Russia’s response to this specific
issue affected China’s perception and decision-making. Russia has centuries-old
religious and cultural ties with the Serbs (Goshko, 1998). The Balkans is a historically
“turbulent frontier” that Russia and European countries became embroiled in with
interventions and conflicts.113 On May 14, 1999, when the UNSC used Resolution
1239 to invite humanitarian organizations to extend relief assistance to the refugees in
the area, both China and Russia did not vote to express their disagreement. China did
not participate in the negotiations among the concerned parties during the Kosovo
crisis. Russia attended the mediations but failed to deter the NATO’s military attack.
In May 1999, Russia continued the mediation between the FRY and the intervening
countries through the G8 and dialogues with Milošević. Moscow made a compromise
to other intervening countries, and it successfully persuaded Serbia to withdraw all
forces from Kosovo and allow the UN civil mission and the Kosovo Protection Force,
which was controlled by NATO, to enter the province. Thus, Russia cast an
affirmative vote on the consequential UNSC Resolution 1244. Without Russia’s
support, China abstained from voting on the resolution but kept its fierce disapproving
113
Woodward (2013) applied this concept of the “turbulent frontier” to describe foreign
interventions in the Balkan theatre. The concept was originally used by Galbraith (1960) to explain the
British imperial expansion in the mid-19th century.
188
position in rhetoric.114
Summary
This section attempted to explain why China strongly opposed NATO’s
intervention in rhetoric, partly in behavior, yet it was not against UNSC interventions
in Kosovo and what factors played the primary role in its foreign policy formation
regarding the crisis. The explanations for this incongruity rest on the causal
mechanisms of China’s decision-making process presented in Chapter 2.
China’s response to the interventions in Kosovo was unprecedentedly
vehement and its discourse was consistent, insisting on the principle of nonintervention. In the 1990s, military intervention in a sovereign state for humanitarian
purposes was not established by the customary international law and not widely
accepted by states in international society. Particularly, UNSC is the only
international organization conducting collective interventions legitimately. China
insisted that any interventions without the UNSC’s authorization are unlawful.115 As
China has a similar domestic problem to that of Kosovo, it was wary of setting a
precedent that legitimately permits foreign interventions in domestic affairs of states
caused by ethnic problems.116 The military intervention in Kosovo posed a threat, at
least a potential threat, to China’s sovereignty and security.
114
Shen Guofang stated in the UNSC meeting: “NATO created an extremely dangerous
precedent in the history of international relations…In essence, the ‘human rights over sovereignty’
theory serves to infringe upon the sovereignty of other States and to promote hegemonism under the
purposes and principles of the UN Charter” (UNSC, 1999c, pp. 8-9).
115
The view also could be found in Chinese officials’ statements regarding the Iraq War in
2003.
116
The Chinese delegate highlighted the scope of issues addressed by the UNSC in the
meeting after the Resolution 1244 has passed, “Fundamentally speaking, ethnic problems within a
189
Even though China’s domestic concern had not changed with respect to the
issues in Kosovo, it made compromises to certain international interventions, such as
UNSC sanctions, as consensus on doing so had been reached in the international
community. The international pressure from the international consensus on
intervening in Kosovo forced China to concede. China’s attitude became recalcitrant
to the interventions when seconded by Russia. China’s reiteration of the illegality of
the NATO military interventions revealed its concern about the decreased authority of
the UN challenged by the power politics of Western countries.
In addition, China’s criticism directly shifted to the US since the bombing of
the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. Beijing was not tolerant to the U.S. behavior that
not only challenged the security system in which China enjoyed great power status
but also inflicted damage on Chinese citizens. Nevertheless, China’s opposition to the
US, as well as the UNSC interventions in Kosovo, was not strongly supported by any
great power. Regarding UNSC Resolution 1244, no great power sympathized with
China’s non-interventionist position. China compromised again by an abstention.
Comparably, the economic factor played a small role in China’s decision-making
process, as it intensely opposed the US even with the risk of potential economic loss
during the negotiation on it entering the WTO.
State should be settled in a proper manner by its own Government and people, through the adoption of
sound policies. They must not be used as an excuse for external intervention, much less used by foreign
States as an excuse for the use of force” (UNSC, 1999c, pp.8-9).
190
Table 19
Causal Mechanisms of China’s Foreign Policy Toward the Kosovo Crisis
Systemic
incentives

Domestic factors
↓
 Outcome
Pattern/ cases
Perceptions
Ideological base:
International
consensus
Territorial sovereignty
integrity and nonviolation
No great
power
seconded
China’s nonintervention
attitude.
Domestic issues: Ethnic
secessionists
4/ SCR. 1160,
1199, 1244.
→ Increasing domestic
vulnerability potentially
↓
→ Strong
pressure
High pressure
Indirect threat
 Ideological base:
Territorial sovereignty
International
dissent (NATO
led by US V.S.
Russia)
NATO’s
bombing of the
Chinese
Embassy in
Belgrade.
→ Lessened
pressure
 Compromise
integrity and nonviolation
Domestic issues: Ethnic
secessionists
→ Increases domestic
vulnerability directly
↓
Lessened pressure with
limited opportunity
Direct threat
191
5/ SCR.1203,
1239.
Condemnations
and
demonstrations
Case 8: The Syrian Crisis (2011-2013)
The Syria crisis that was caused by civil war resulted in an urgent
humanitarian disaster. Despite the serious situation in Syria, the UNSC failed to adopt
a plan of action to address the crisis, as the permanent members have not reached
consensus on the plan. Along with Russia, China has vetoed four UN draft resolutions
initiated to curb a possible escalation of violence in Syria, which raised an important
question on China’s foreign policy: why has China joined Russia to block draft
resolutions on Syria? China’s insignificant strategic and economic interests in Syria
make its vetoes more anomalous. Despite a remark that China sees Syria as an
important trading hub (Yan, 2012), Syria is neither an ally nor a major trade partner of
China.117 China barely sells any weapons to the Syrian regime. In 2011, China
exported $2.4 billion to Syria and imported $26 million of goods from Syria (National
Bureau of Statistical of China, 2012). China’s investment in Syria was less than $20
million, and it had approximately 30 companies and little more than 100 workers in
Syria (Hille & Peel, 2012). China’s economic interest in Syria was very moderate.
It seems irrational for China to block the actions of the UN concerning the
Syria crisis, since its veto might not only lead to isolation from the West, but also
damage its reputation in the Arab world. In fact, China had another alternative– an
abstention. If China had abstained from voting for intervention in Syria, the outcome
would be the same, and Sino-Russian relations would not likely be negatively
impacted. However, in addition to preventing international interventions in Syria in
the UNSC, China continually offered financial support to the Assad regime.
117
For the discussion of Russia’s interests in the Syrian conflict, see Bagdonas (2012).
192
Some observers looked at China’s vetoes from a power-pursuit perspective.
For example, Ching (2012) suggests that China’s veto of the UNSC resolution on
Syria reflects its assertiveness, in contrast to an earlier period when the Chinese
would simply go along with the majority by abstaining. Similar assessments of
Chinese assertiveness have prevailed in the Western media and among academia.118 If
this is indeed the case that China was prepared to be an anti-status quo power that
pushes back against Western countries, one could ask, why Syria? The Assad regime
is not an “old friend” of China, and Beijing has no direct interest to protect this
abusive regime.119 China has not wielded its veto power on other agenda in the UNSC
after the Syrian crisis. Moreover, this assumption of assertiveness is not in accordance
with the previous instances of China’s diplomatic engagements.120
Chinese scholars tend to interpret these vetoes based on international norms.
They offer an explicit and full-throated criticism of Western behavior, which is
echoed with the government pronouncements (Swaine, 2012). For example, Qu Xing
(2012) explains that China’s vetoes are based on the basic principles of the UN
Charter, and the norm of R2P is easily misused and cannot apply to the Syrian crisis.
This argument is also not convincing since China has not impeded UNSC
interventions that were associated with similar norms to that of Syria, such as the
interventions in Libya. Therefore, China’s responses toward the Syrian crisis need a
more comprehensive explanation, and China’s policy toward this crisis can be a
118
For example, see Swaine (2010) and Small (2010).
119
Chinese officials and media label a foreign leader an “old friend” to express their deeply
political relations.
120
For instance, China did not vote against the UNSC resolutions to issue sanctions against
North Korea and Iran; comparing with these countries, Syria is a less significant partner for the
Chinese government.
193
typical case to observe the mechanisms underlying China’s non-intervention policy.
Background
The Arab Spring, in which citizens have engaged in mass protests and
demonstrations to depose of their governors, has spread across North Africa and the
Middle East since late 2010. Affected by this democratic movement in this region,
people of other nations have organized protests to overthrow their government. In the
cases of Libya and Syria, the government employed a military attack against its
opposition. The Syrian uprising began in February 2011, following those that had
occurred in Tunisia and Egypt, and it escalated in 2012 and 2013. Two main opposing
groups, the SNC and the NCCS, emerged during the conflict.121 Nevertheless, they
did not reach a consensus on whether to conduct dialogue with or to overthrow the
Assad regime to end the crisis. Consequently, the situation came to a civil war, with
opposition groups seizing villages and fighting more sophisticated battles against
government forces. The Assad regime did not concede to opposition forces. Rather,
the regime waged air attacks on the regions occupied by the insurgents. According to
UN data, more than 100 thousand Syrian citizens have died, and more than 2 million
Syrian people have become refugees, pouring into neighboring countries within
nearly three years of the conflict (The BBC, 2013; UN Refugee Agency, 2014).
The conflict in Syria incorporated complicated religious and historical
problems, and they were gradually turning a naturally domestic problem into a
regional issue. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad inherited power from his father,
Hafez al-Assad, and this authoritarian regime of the two generations has ruled Syria
121
At the beginning of the demonstrations, the Syrian opposition did to be organized, in
contrast to Libya rebels (Shadid, 2011; Suleiman & Simon, 2011).
194
since 1970. The Assad family belongs to a secretive sect of Shi’ite Muslim, the
Alawite, which makes up just 12 per cent of the Syrian population.122 This minority
sect governs the majority Sunni Muslimism citizens, which account for 76 per cent of
Syria's population of 22 million.123 In 1982, President Hafez al-Assad launched a
suppression in the Syrian town of Hamma, and massacred over ten thousand citizens
when he ordered the Syrian army to squash a purported revolt against the regime,
driving tens of thousands citizens into exile. This event buried a time bomb in Syrian
soil, which exploded into the 2011conflict. The uprising against Assad initially was
organized by Alawites who called for greater freedom and government transparency.
As the conflict progressed, Sunni rebels targeted Alawite communities, thereby
transforming this democratic move into a dispute between two opposing political
forces underpinned by religious disputes (Burke, 2013). Former exiles of the bloody
suppression of the 1979-82 Islamist Insurgency joined the insurgence against the
incumbent administration within and outside Syria.
Syria’s geopolitical situation and its relations with neighboring countries make
this issue more complex. Syria is located in the heart of the Middle East surrounded
by the countries with divergent religions and complex interactions with each other
(See Figure 6). As Pankin, Russia’s ambassador to the UN, has said, “Syria is the
cornerstone of the Middle East security architecture” (UNSC, 2011c, p. 7). In terms of
religions, Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon sympathize with the Assad administration, while
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar support the Sunni Muslim rebels. The Syria- Iran
alliance was born out of defense against the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the Iraqi
122
Alawites consider themselves Muslims, but most mainstream Muslims call them heretics.
123
For details of religious sections in Syria, see Aoyama & Suechika (2009, pp. 8-9).
195
invasion of Iran.124 Therefore, Syria’s entangled relations with the countries in the
Arab world easily invite external interventions.
Figure 6. Syria: Mapping the Conflict (2013). From Sharp & Blanchard (2013).
International Interventions in Syria (2011-2013)
Syria had been a sanction target of Western countries since the conflict broke
out (Sharp, 2011). With the escalation of the insurgence, members of the UNSC
started to express their concern about the rapidly deteriorating Syrian situation in
April 2011. The UNSC did not take any action due to members’ disagreements over
both the characteristics and potential remedies of the crisis. The UNSC only issued a
PRST without adopting a binding resolution until August 2011. In October, China and
Russia blocked a proposed UNSC resolution sponsored by the UK, France, Germany,
124
Syrian military and diplomatic support for Iran helped check Iraq and was reciprocated by
Iran’s mobilizing of the Lebanese Shi’ites to shift the balance in Lebanon against Israel (Hinnebusch,
2009).
196
and Portugal. The resolution would have condemned the ongoing violence and
threatened Syria with possible sanctions if the government failed to halt its violent
offensive (UNSC, 2011d).
When the LAS’s observer mission was conducted and then proved a failure, a
draft resolution supported by the LAS and the Western countries was put to a vote on
February 4, 2012. China and Russia vetoed that draft. Following the setback of this
double veto of UNSC resolutions, the UNGA passed a non-binding resolution
containing similar wording to the vetoed UNSC draft, which strongly condemned the
“continued widespread and systematic human rights violations by the Syrian
authorities” (UNGA, 2012). China and Russia, along with a small number of
countries, vetoed this resolution, but these vetoes did not affect the eventual outcome.
Following the second double veto in the UNSC, the UN and the LAS
appointed Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the UN, as Joint Special Envoy to Syria.
Annan proposed a six-point plan, which was agreed to by the Syrian government and
subsequently endorsed by the UNSC in April 2012 (UNSC, 2012b). The UNSC
adopted Resolution 2042 and 2043 that established the UNSMIS with 300 observers
to monitor the cessation of violence. However, the six-point plan was not effectively
implemented. Then, Annan quit from that position. Divisions between Western
countries, Russia, and China re-emerged in the UNSC in July 2012, when the UNSC
draft resolution supported by Western countries on whether to extend the UNSMIS
was vetoed by China and Russia. The impasse of international efforts was not broken
until the UNSC unanimously approved Resolution 2118 in September 2013, after the
197
use of chemical weapons in Syria was confirmed.125 This resolution endorsed results
of the negotiation between the US and Russia in Geneva, and focused on the
elimination of Syrian chemical weapons.
Table 20
Voting Records on the Syrian Crisis in the UNSC (2011-2014)
Date
Oct. 4, 2011
Feb. 4, 2012
Apr. 14,
2012
Apr. 21,
2012
Resolution/Draft
Votes
China’s reasons
Imposes arms embargo on
Syria
Russian and
Chinese vetoes;
Abstentions:
Brazil, India,
Lebanon, South
Africa
CP (sanctions); TI
Threatens to use further
measures to Syria and calls
on Syria’s President Assad
to step down
Resolution 2042; endorses
the Six-Point Plan
Resolution 2043;
establishes the UNSMIS
July 19, 2012 Extends UNSMIS in Syria
Russian and
Chinese vetoes
Aye
unanimously
Aye
unanimously
Russian and
Chinese vetoes;
Abstentions:
Pakistan, South
Africa
CP (measures to put
pressure to Syria);
TI
Inapplicable
Inapplicable
CP (sanctions); TI
Sep. 27,
2013
Resolution 2118; endorses
the Geneva Communiqué
and deals with chemical
weapons issue
Aye
unanimously
Inapplicable
May 22,
2014
To refers Syria to the ICC
Russian and
Chinese vetoes
TI
Note. CP refers to the measures in question would be counter-productive; TI stands for that
the measures do not respect territorial integrity/sovereignty. Based on the ODS of the UN and
UNBISnet.
125
For the report on the alleged use of chemical weapons in Syria, see UN (2013).
198
China’s Vetoes Regarding the Syrian Crisis
China has vetoed four UNSC draft resolutions and one resolution in the
UNGA on the Syrian crisis within which some were weak or even watered down in
order not to be hindered by Russia and China, but China did not make a compromise.
The international responses to the Syria crisis and the interactions between
international actors in dealing with the crisis set the backdrop of China’s nonintervention policy in the issue. China’s four vetoes in the UNSC took place during
different stages within the crisis, and it gave different explanations for these vetoes.
These vetoed draft resolutions have some similarities in that the US and other
Western countries were proponents and Russia vetoed all of them. When the
international community divided due to sharp contestations, China was disposed to
pursue the Sino-Russian convergence to oppose Western countries’ interventionist
initiatives.
In the Syrian case, China has two options– veto or abstention– on the UNSC
draft resolutions. China should have abstained from the resolution to avoid
condemnation from the international community, as well as to evade the
responsibility to this geographically distant country, but it chose to firmly stand with
Russia to protect the Syrian regime. Russia’s attitude obviously played a large role in
China’s consideration of the Syrian crisis. China regarded its political alliance with
Russia as a success in opposing the Western countries. At 2013 APEC meetings,
Chinese President Xi Jinping called his government's cooperation with Russia on
Syria an example of how the two nations "are cooperating very closely to resolve
urgent and acute international and regional issues" (Hayoun, 2013). Russia and China
submitted a draft concerning the Syria crisis to the UNSC; the draft has not been
199
adopted by the UNSC, and directly resulted in China’s second veto, which was
viewed as a Russian and Chinese diplomatic riposte.126 Furthermore, a de facto SinoRussian alliance could counterbalance the US and oppose unilateral action by the US
at the UN.127
Moreover, China drew like-minded countries over to its side against the US
and other Western countries’ intervention. In April 2011, the BRICS meeting opened
in China’s Hainan Province. The BRICS members discussed the relevant problems,
and they did not share the West’s enthusiasm for the Arab Spring and saw more
troubles than gains ahead (Babich, 2012). The agreement they reached likely supplied
the reason for Brazil, India, and South Africa to support Russia and China by
abstaining on the UNSC resolution draft on Syria in October 2011. China pursued
political support from like-minded countries in multilateral organizations in which it
can play a role, such as BRICS and the SCO. The Syrian affair has been an issue in
summits on these platforms since 2011, and China’s proposition of resolving the crisis
by means of dialogue has been written into the declarations.128
In addition to developing the political coordination against the West, China
tried to control or, at least, to influence the discourse by denouncing U.S. intention
and behavior toward Syria. China condemned the U.S. interventionism through the
media. People’s Daily commented on U.S. foreign policy toward Syria in February
126
China explained its veto that the suggestions of Russia and itself had not been adopted by
the UNSC, which led to a serious division between parties over the current situation of the Syrian crisis
(UNSC, 2012a).
127
Although the US might bypass the UNSC and set out a unilateral intervention in Syria, this
intervention without authorization of the UNSC, in China’s opinion, would be no legitimacy, and hence
it would be immoral.
128
See BRICS (2012; 2013); Mcdermott (2013); Panin (2013).
200
2011. The article criticized that U.S. self-perception as “protector” of the Arab
citizens was a product of its arrogance and immoral superiority complex, and China
called for Arab citizens to judge and control the Arab’s issue (Zhong, 2012). After
U.S. allegations that the Syrian regime was using chemical weapons, People’s Daily
claimed that the US had hidden motivations concerning the Syrian crisis, stating,
“Syria does not acknowledge allegiance to America but is allied with America’s
regional rival Iran; so Syria is a thorn in America’s flesh; and America has hoped
there would be regime change in Syria since the 2011 Arab uprising” (Zhong, 2013).
Through domestic media propaganda, China’s defiance of U.S. interventionism
became morally grounded.
China has also justified its non-interventionist policy and opposing attitude to
the West through international law and appeal to norms in the UNSC, claiming that
interventions should be based on international law and the UN Charter. Concerning
the draft vetoed in October 2011, China opposed the idea of intervention in other
countries’ internal affairs on a basis of principles set out by the UN Charter and its
non-intervention policy. It implied that the methods advocated by Western countries
would threaten the security and survival of small and medium-sized countries, as well
as world peace and stability (UNSC, 2011e). Regarding the second double veto on
Syria, Chinese Ambassador Li Baodong also argued that the actions of the UNSC on
the Syrian issue should comply with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.
He said that the draft would have served only to “complicate the issue” and would
“prejudge the result of dialogue” since it was designed to pressure the Syrian
authorities instead of condemning the opposition’s violence (UNSC, 2012a, pp. 9-10).
After China’s third veto on Syria in the UNSC in July 2012, China said that the draft
issued by the US, UK, and France completely contradicted the aims of a political
201
settlement to the Syrian crisis. China highlighted its altruistic behavior and
emphasized the sovereign equality and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other
countries (UNSC, 2012c). By casting vetoes along with Russia, the Chinese
government expressed China’s concerns about the tension between its foreign policy
principles and normative reasons for international order, and let its voice to be heard.
The blowback effect from Libya also affected China’s position on the
intervention in Syria. By acquiescing to the UN military intervention to protect
civilians in Benghazi, Beijing felt it was tricked into accepting a western-led regime
change in Libya (Anderlini, 2013). Chinese opinions were clearly reflected in the
discussion about the Libyan issue, as discussed in Chapter 4. China’s abstention did
not bring the desired outcome. Instead, China has suffered an unstable relationship
with the Libyan NTC, and neither NTC nor the West showed appreciation for China’s
compromise. Beijing lost its historical relationship with Gaddafi as well as oil deals
(Sun Y., 2012). The Libya situation made China contemplate its non-intervention
policy of supporting an authoritarian regime, which substantiates China’s resistance to
referring to the “R2P” in the case of the Syrian conflict.129 Although similar
intervention would not occur in China because of its status as a P5 member of the
UNSC, it was reluctant to set a precedent of justified intervention to topple the
incumbent regime through actions in Syria.
China recognized the complicated situation in the Syrian crisis. There are
entrenched ethnic and religious divisions, intricate geopolitical games, and growing
terrorist threats behind the Syrian uprising (People's Daily, 2013a). The insurgency in
129
China and Russia explained their veto against the UNSC intervention in Syria that they
were to prevent a repetition of the regime change in Libya (UNSC, 2011e). For further information, see
Sun Y. (2012) and Voeten (2012).
202
Syria has become increasingly tied to the religious issue, deviating from a purely antigovernment, democratic movement. No cohesive Syrian opposition emerged in the
protest, though the West tried to gather these oppositions onto one side. An article in
the People’s Daily (2012) predicted that even if the Assad regime were overthrown,
oppositions could not establish a democratic state due to lack of solidarity. Moreover,
if the religious minority regime fell to the rebels, sectarian violence or ethnic
cleansing would likely break out.
In addition, Syria is of enormous strategic significance in the Middle East.
Chinese officials have referenced Henry Kissinger’s words, “You cannot make peace
without Syria in the Middle East,” to demonstrate the significance of Syria’s strategic
location (Wu S., 2012). The Syrian regime is not isolated in this region, and
reinforcement from Iran, Lebanon, Iraq, and Palestine could add strength to the Syrian
defense (Zifcak, 2012). For instance, Iran has continually provided military support
and dispatched military troops to Syria (Coughlin, 2012). Therefore, China was
concerned that a military intervention would provoke the Assad administration as well
as oppositions, which could lead to an escalated conflict or even a regional war that
involved all the regional stakeholders (People's Daily, 2013b). Moreover, from
China’s perspective, the Iranian regime could be the next target that the US sets out to
overthrow after the Assad government (Beijing Wanbao [Beijing Night News], 2013).
If Western countries overthrew the Iran regime, the strategic structure in the Middle
East would be entirely altered, which may severely affect China’s interest in this
region.130
130
Most of the Chinese scholars the author interviewed at Tsinghua University and the
Shanghai Academy of Social Science take this opinion.
203
China’s prior interest in the Middle East is in the economic arena. The Middle
East is the largest crude oil exporter to China. In 2010, the largest crude oil exporting
supplier to China was Saudi Arabia, and Iran ranked third (China Industrial Map
Editorial Committee; China Economic Monitoring and Analysis Center, 2011). The
instability in the Middle East will directly impact China’s resources importation and
its economic development in general. Saudi Arabia is the primary regional supporter
of the Syrian opposition, but China remained confident that its Syria policy would not
affect its economic cooperation with Saudi Arabia.131 Therefore, China insisted that
military action in Syria would produce a negative result, which would be a great risk
facing China.
The Syrian opposition’s connection to terrorists is one factor that forced China
to conceive its current policy on Syria. Al-Qaeda and other Islamism extremists
supported the opposition and participated in the fights against the Syrian government.
Other Central Asian jihadists in Syria have increasingly publicized their activities
with Al-Qaeda in Iraq and al-Sham, and the Eastern Mediterranean (Zenn, 2013b).
China has confronted a series of separatist violent incidents in Xinjiang since 1996;
when the violent riots broke out in Ulumuqi in 2009, the capital city of the Xinjiang
Uyghur autonomous region, more than 200 Uighurs and Han Chinese were killed.
The Chinese government claimed the ETT had organized these riots. The ETT has
become the main target of China’s counterterrorism activities, especially following
131
An Huihou, Chinese ambassador to Egypt and Tunisia, received a television interview and
said assertively that China’s veto would not affect the traditional friendship between China and the
Middle East countries (Xinhua News Agency, 2012a). In addition, China dispatched diplomats to the
Middle East to mediate Syria and other countries in the Arab League. Particularly, Chinese envoy
visited the region immediately after its veto in the UNSC in 2012. It is arguable that China had
affirmed its diplomatic relationships with the Middle East countries without an adverse effect brought
about by the veto during the visit.
204
the connection between localized separatist movements and al-Qaeda, which was
discovered in 2009.132 Pan Guang, China’s Middle East specialist from the Shanghai
Academy of Social Science, has stated, “In the July 2011 Xinjiang bombings, for the
first time Uyghur separatists planted a Salafist flag (black with Arabic writing) rather
than their usual East Turkestan flag (blue with star and crescent similar to Turkey’s
flag)” (Lin, 2013). Syria’s ambassador to China affirmed that there were more than 30
Uighurs who received military training in Pakistan and went to Turkey to join the
anti-government fight. The Chinese government has claimed that since 2012 the
Uyghur militants from Xinjiang have been fighting with the rebels in Syria against the
regime, one of which returned to Xinjiang and was arrested while planning to carry
out violent attacks in China (Huanqiu Shibao [Global Times], 2013). The CFM
(2012) highlighted the alleged connection between militants from China’s Turkic and
Muslim minority and Al-Qaeda. Chinese Foreign Minister Spokeswoman Hua
Chunying claimed that the member of ETT who returned from Syria was associated
with China’s core interests (i.e., the stability of Xinjiang) (CFM, 2013b). From the
perspective of the Chinese government, if the Assad regime were replaced by another
Islamist regime, extremism would quickly spread to the Muslim republics in Central
Asia and Xinjiang, which would become a direct threat to China’s stability and
security.
Summary
The proposed analytical framework can explain China’s vetoes on UNSC and
UNGA resolutions regarding the Syrian crisis. Systemic factors and domestic factors
132
Al-Qaeda issued a video of Abu Yahya al-Libi, a member of the ETT, who claimed that
Xinjiang was the Muslim world’s forgotten wound (Zenn, 2013a).
205
underlying the Syrian crisis have determined and affected China’s non-intervention
policy toward the Syria crisis. In the unipolar international structure, China cannot
directly confront the hegemony, yet subtlety challenges the legitimacy of hegemony
on principle. Concerning the Syrian crisis, China took advantage of Russia’s Syria
policy to oppose the interventionist initiatives. Moreover, China’s experience with
Libya acted as a triggering factor that affected its negative response to international
interventions in Syria, which was greatly based on China’s domestic vulnerability. As
Kadercan (2013, p. 1018) has argued, “Concern for relevant losses stimulates much of
international politics.” Although protecting the Syrian regime would not serve
ostensible interests, China’s perception that a foreign-imposed regime change would
yield profound negative consequences for its domestic security and stability is
reasonable. China’s domestic priority of the regime survival, associated with the
concerns over foreign-imposed regime change, security of resources, and stability of
the Xinjiang ethnic minority area, motivated China to maintain the sovereign order by
wielding veto power and condemning the U.S. interventionism.
However, China has not blocked all the resolutions aiming at intervening in
Syria’s issues, and it also proactively engaged in the Syrian conflict. The perceived
possible harm generated from the Syrian crisis to China’s domestic vulnerability has
encouraged Chinese leaders to make a diplomatic effort to alleviate the tensions in
Syria and the Middle East.133 China’s economic interests and prestige in the Middle
East created incentives for its diplomatic involvement in the Syrian crisis. In short,
China responses to the Syrian crisis were based on China’s understanding of the
Syrian situation and determined by its perceptions of threat and opportunity which
133
China not only sent special envoy to Syria but also initiated peace plans for Syria (Xinhua
News Agency, 2012b; 2012c).
206
were generated by the interactions between great powers in international society; the
understanding and perceptions were simultaneously constrained by its domestic
concerns about the Xinjiang stability and economic development.
Table 21
Causal Mechanisms of China’s Vetoes Regarding Syria
Domestic factors
Systemic
incentives


↓
Russian vetoes
Guarantees security of
imported resources in the
Middle East
The blowback
effect from
intervention in
Libya.
Maintains stability of
Xinjiang
→ Lessened
pressure with
opportunity
Pattern/ cases
Perceptions
Ideological base:
Sovereignty non-violation
West (US)initiated
interventions.
Geopolitical
significance of
Syria
Outcome

→ Increases domestic
vulnerability directly
↓
Lessoned pressure with
opportunity
Direct threat
207
 Resistance
6/ UNSC
draft
resolutions
on the
Syrian
crisis
Case 9: Veto on Zimbabwe Issues (2008)
China, along with Russia, vetoed a draft of sanctions at the UNSC on
Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe and thirteen of his henchmen in the wake of
the post-election political violence. This veto seemed irrational for the Chinese
government because its veto was cast less than one month before the opening
ceremony of the Beijing Olympic Games, which would apparently result in adverse
effects on China’s image. In order to protect its good image on the international scene,
Beijing should have restrained from conflicts with most countries and cooperated with
the international community in dealing with some international issues, as it did in the
case of the Darfur crisis. But that was not the case. China eventually resisted the
international interventions in Zimbabwe.
Some scholars have taken China’s material interests in Zimbabwe into
consideration as a plausible explanation for China’s veto of the sanction against
Zimbabwe. In 2007, China’s investments in Zimbabwe reached $1.6 billion, and
Beijing was reportedly Zimbabwe’s second largest trading partner and its largest
investor (Russell, 2007; Banya, 2008). As one of Zimbabwe’s major trading partners
and weapon suppliers, China was worried that sanctions would affect its exports
(Doyle, 2008; Nasaw, 2008). Nevertheless, from China’s perspective, economic
cooperation with Zimbabwe was not as important as other observers argued. Rather,
its economic interests in Zimbabwe were relatively modest (See appendix 3). There is
no record that China exported weapons to Zimbabwe after 2008. The Zimbabwe issue
seemed not associated with China core interests.
Rationalist theories cannot explain China’s veto on Zimbabwe issue. The
Zimbabwe issue was closely related to China’s concern, but international intervention
208
in Zimbabwe would not result in a direct threat to China. The Zimbabwe government
was not so significant for China risking its own interests to protect it. This case was
abnormal because China did not make a publicly diplomatic effort to mediate the
issues with the authorities in Zimbabwe and the West. Zimbabwe’s case was peculiar
since China’s veto departed from reasonable assumptions. Therefore, it is worth
examining China’s non-intervention policy toward the Zimbabwe issue based on the
proposed theoretical framework.
Chinese Reponses to the Situation in Zimbabwe
As early as April 30, when the UNSC discussed whether or not to place the
Zimbabwe issue on the agenda, China opposed the inclusion of the issue without
public justification. On June 23, Beijing supported the UNSC’s PRST condemning
electoral violence. One day later, a CFM spokesman emphasized China’s desire that
the parties “resolve their disputes through dialogue and other peaceful means to
complete their presidential election smoothly” (Chinese News Net, 2008). However,
Beijing voted against the sanctions in the following month. China’s explanation for
exercising its veto power to block the draft resolution was that the issue was no threat
to world stability, and it called upon the UNSC to respect the position of African
countries on that issue and to allow more time for the good offices and mediation
efforts of the AU and the SADC (UNSC, 2008). Along with China, Russia, Libya,
South Africa, and Vietnam cast negative votes, and Indonesia abstained.
It is difficult to measure the extent to which China had made an effort, through
bilateral dialogue or other means, to cope with this crisis, as Chinese officials only
expressed that it consistently supported dialogue among Zimbabweans and hoped
they could find their own solutions. A week before the vote, US Secretary of State
209
Condoleezza Rice was in China and tried to get Chinese officials to support sanctions
against Zimbabwe (The Herald, 2008). Beijing subsequently issued a statement,
similar to the foregoing, but did not publicly make a promise to support the sanctions.
China faced pressure from the US and U.S. allies that were seeking UNSC
interventions to address the Zimbabwe issue. Simply saying “no” to that draft
resolution would inevitably bring discredit to China’s reputation in the international
community. Nevertheless, Russia, sympathizing with Beijing’s position, became the
focus of criticism. Russia had been persuaded at the G8 summit in Japan to join in
condemnation of the Zimbabwe regime. But Moscow backpedaled and sabotaged the
imposition of sanctions by using its veto power, which resulted in angry recrimination.
John Sawers, the UK’s ambassador to the UN, saw Russia’s veto as an
“incomprehensive” action. He added that China followed Russia’s lead and that
neither had made any effort to discuss the resolution (Nasaw, 2008).134 Besides,
Zalmay Khalilzad, the US permanent representative to the UN, also expressed
America’s disappointment at Russia’s veto and indirectly criticized Russia as having
eschewed a contribution to addressing the Zimbabwe crisis and delayed the
consultation with the excuse of presidential absence in Moscow. Regarding China’s
veto, his comment was short and articulated that China disturbingly joined Russia
with the veto (USUN Press, 2008). The international community did not expect China
to play an important role in resolving the Zimbabwe crisis.
The Chinese government was concerned about the possible impact of foreign
interventions on Zimbabwe’s domestic situation. As Chinese scholars have argued,
134
According to John Sawers’ remark, the Western countries assessed that “China would not
have vetoed it on its own because they [Chinese] have a range of conflicting interests are stake”
(MacFarquhar, 2008).
210
American and European sanctions on Zimbabwe since 2000 had “made an already
bad situation much worse” (Zeng & Li, 2007, p. 37).135 China’s response to the
Zimbabwe affair reflected this concern. Liu Jianchao, the CFM spokesman, said,
“Under the current circumstances, a resolution on imposing sanctions against
Zimbabwe will not help the various factions in Zimbabwe to conduct political
dialogue and negotiations and achieve results; instead, it will lead to further
complications in Zimbabwe’s situation” (CFM, 2008a; Xinhua News Agency, 2008a).
In addition, China also considered South Africa’s attitude toward the UNSC
draft resolution. South Africa’s President Thabo Mbeki was appointed mediator in
March 2007 by the SADC. When the political violence broke out in 2008, his role
was reaffirmed by SADC, and he was mandated to facilitate talks between the rival
parties– the ruling party, ZANU-PF led by Mugabe and the opposition party, the
MDC founded by Morgan Tsvangirai. Mbkei’s mediation did not proceed smoothly.
Tsvangirai was skeptical of Mbkei’s role (Bearak, 2008), and Western countries also
thought Mbkei had deliberately covered up the Mugabe government (Nasaw, 2008).
Less than one week before the draft resolution was voted, Mugabe agreed to resume
talks with the MDC, but the conversation did not lead to breakthroughs. South Africa
thought that the door of negotiation was not yet closed and argued that its neighbor
was not a threat to world peace. People’s Daily asserted that Mbkei-sponsored talks
attained preliminary results, and thus there was a reason to allow more time before
taking punitive steps (Pei, 2008). Wang Guangya conveyed that the situation in
Zimbabwe was highly complex and sensitive, but the negotiation process was already
underway, and the resolution of sanctions against Zimbabwe would unavoidably
135
From March 2003, the US commenced unilateral sanctions against Zimbabwe.
211
interfere with the negotiation process and lead to further deterioration of the situation
(Xinhua News Agency, 2008b). The vetoes by Russia and South Africa apparently
affected China’s decision. In this situation, China had the justifiable reason to
emphasize the principles on which it insisted and simultaneously avoided the
overwhelming condemnation of the international community.
Summary
Zimbabwe’s political violence had propelled the humanitarian crisis, which
invoked Western countries’ outcry and engagement, but China thought that it was
inappropriate to get involved in this crisis, even in the context of international
intervention. Although the failure of the Mugabe regime’s economic policy had led to
a severe economic condition and a humanitarian crisis, the Zimbabwe issue, in terms
of UNSC draft resolutions, was raised by the political tension between the current
regime and the opposition party. China, adhering to the policy of non-intervention in
other countries’ domestic affairs, insisted that it was not able to intervene, as long as
the issue did not impose a threat to regional or world stability.
On one hand, regional countries might have convinced China that negotiations
were still promising. On the other hand, in order to attend to this domestic crisis,
which was geographically far from China, mediation of the regional organization
seemed be an appropriate medium. China took advantage of the Russian veto, which
provided China with an opportunity of not compromising to the needs of the
international community.
China disapproved international involvement and intervention in the
Zimbabwe issue since it viewed that the domestic situation in Zimbabwe had not
212
resulted in regional insecurity and instability. In other words, from China’s
perspective, the situation was not so severe to intervene. When the division emerged
in this respect between Russia and other great powers, and Moscow concurred with
Beijing’s view, the international pressure China faced from the intervention advocates
was reduced. Thus, China took advantage of Russian opposition to advocate its noninterventionist principle and, at the same time, avoided any risks that would have
increased its domestic vulnerabilities.
Table 22
China’s Veto on the UNSC Sanction Draft Against Zimbabwe
Systemic
incentives
Domestic factors
↓

 Outcome
Pattern
Perceptions
International
Ideological base: Non-
dissent (Western
intervention in domestic issues
countries V.S.
Domestic issues– Little concerned
Russian and the
→ Increases domestic
AU)
vulnerability potentially
Russia vetoed on

↓

 Resistance 6
the draft
resolution.
Lessened pressure with
→ Lessened
opportunity
pressure with
Indirect threat
opportunity
Conclusion
The three cases discussed in this chapter can be described as ones in which
China stood its ground on the non-international principle and opposed the
213
international interventions. Employing veto power in the UNSC is an extreme signal
of its strongest dissatisfaction in China’s foreign policy. China did not veto in the case
of Kosovo in the UNSC, but it expressed its reluctance through abstaining from the
vote, and by public condemnations and demonstrations to the international
interventions. Although NATO’s bombing resulted in Chinese victims in the FRY,
China compromised with the international community on the Kosovo issue.
In the cases of Syria and Zimbabwe, Russian political position was pivotal to
understanding China’s foreign policy formations. The international community
generated huge pressure on China, but Russia’s firm support lessened its effects. In
cases such as this, veto might not be Chinese sole option; in fact, Beijing took the
advantage of Russia’s opposition to the interventions not only to reduce any possible
threat to its domestic vulnerabilities, but also to fulfill its commitment of nonintervention.
214
CONCLUSION
The principle of non-intervention in other countries’ domestic affairs has
traditionally been taken as China’s diplomatic value and guidance. In order to
understand China’s foreign policy and its international behavior, an exploration of
China’s non-intervention policy is valuable. However, the previous literature on
China’s foreign policy has not provided a systematic research on this specific theme.
To rectify this weakness of the existing works, this research aimed to explain why the
principle of non-intervention is important in China’s foreign policy and to provide the
causality underlying China’s non-intervention policy. Accordingly, this work first
reviewed China’s discourse and behavior regarding non-intervention to exhibit the
continuity and changes of China’s non-intervention policy; it revealed the incongruity
of China’s approach toward intervention. It then explained the reasons for the
incongruity by establishing a causal mechanism underlying China’s non-intervention
policy in the post-Cold War period to demonstrate the role of non-intervention in
China’s foreign policy it has played. In summary, the theoretical and empirical
contributions of this study reflected in the following three respects.
Continuity and Change
This research could advance the study of China’s foreign policy. China’s nonintervention policy throws valuable light on the questions of a non-Western emerging
power’s trajectory and performance in world politics. Concerning the practical merits,
China’s approach to sovereignty and intervention determines the role it plays in
international society and the extent to which it is compatible with the Western society.
This research provided a comprehensive picture of China’s foreign policy regarding
215
the principle of non-intervention. This picture showed the Chinese government’s
dilemma and ambivalence about applying the non-intervention principle, presented
the continuity and change in China’s non-intervention policy, and exhibited the
contradiction between China’s rhetoric commitment to non-intervention and its
interventionist behavior in its diplomatic history.
This research first located the discussion of China’s foreign policy in the
backdrop of international society and explored the interconnectedness between China
and international society with respect to the principle of non-intervention. The
principle of non-intervention was frequently asserted in official discourse of the
Chinese government. The international environment in which the international
community has increasingly legitimated interventionist activities and expanding
domestic demands have posed some moral and practical dilemmas for the Chinese
government to honor its commitment to the principle of non-intervention. These
dilemmas in China’s non-intervention policy are rooted in the dichotomies of the
normative principle of non-intervention and interventionist activities in international
practices.
Non-intervention in International Society
In the history of IP, the concept of non-intervention has been applied to the
relations between international actors who, as legitimate regimes, exercise absolute
sovereignty and control over their respective demarcated territories and populations.
However, intervention is also a long-lasting concept and a ubiquitous phenomenon in
world politics. Although constrained by the norm of non-intervention, international
actors embark on, and seek to justify, their interventionist activities. At different times,
international actors in international societies reach different consensuses on the
216
interpretation of justified interventions, and therefore generate different international
orders.
Moreover, the concept of non-intervention is never changeless, and the
normative power of the non-intervention principle derived from a complicated
process of interpretation and application. Although an international society is
relatively stable, international actors’ interpretations of justifiable intervention vary,
depending on the actors’ perceptions of transnational force and domestic authority.
International actors understand and judge an intervention as positive or negative,
depending on the nature of the intervention, the circumstances in which it takes place,
and the intent of intervening actors. As a result, interventionist activities should not be
always judged as immoral.
Non-intervention in China’s Interpretation and Diplomacy
Affected by the dichotomy of the non-intervention principle and intervention
practices, China’s non-intervention policy reveals the incongruity between discourse
of China’s political leaders and their behavior. In other words, China’s international
activities are not always consistent with its insistence on the principle of nonintervention. In addition, China’s foreign policy regarding non-intervention has
undergone a significant shift since the PRC was established. In China’s diplomatic
history, the government has not continuously emphasized the non-intervention
principle, although Chinese officials were keen to highlight a consistency. China has
conducted and participated in interventionist activities in different ways during its
diplomatic history. However, it has never entirely abandoned its attachment to the
principle, and the principle of non-intervention does constrain China’s behavior to an
extent. The border between the principle of non-intervention and interventionist
217
behavior in China’s foreign policy depends on Chinese identity and perceptions of
international order and structure, thereby subtly changing the connotation and
denotation of the non-intervention policy across various periods.
Despite the changing non-intervention policy, China’s interpretation of the
concept of non-intervention has remained fixed in terms of moral judgment. China
tends to associate intervention with negative meanings. The understanding toward
non-intervention gives rise to a problem in which the Chinese government tends to
broadly use the negative side of intervention to describe interventionist behavior and
involvements proposed by Western countries while blurring its own similar actions by
applying different terms in Chinese that are essentially akin to intervention, such as
“conciliation (tiaojie 调解),” “mediation (woxuan 斡旋),” “creative engagement
(chuangzaoxing jieru 创造性介入).” In doing so, it thereby avoids using the very
“negative” word “intervention,” and at the same time, the Chinese government could
condemn the Western countries’ intervention or interventionist initiatives on a moral
high ground.136 Since the Chinese government continually constructs the negative
meaning of intervention, there is no convincing reason to abandon the nonintervention principle.
Not abandoning the principle of non-intervention does not mean China does
not conduct interventions. As noted above, China conducted numerous interventionist
activities, and these interventions presented different characteristics. As a result,
China’s pronouncements and activities are contradicted regarding the non-
136
These words are easy to find in official documents and Chinese scholars’ academic articles.
The typical one is the book Creative Involvement written by a famous Chinese researcher Wang Yizhou
(2011; 2013).
218
intervention principle. In the post-Cold War period, this contradiction was mainly
manifested in China’s responses to international interventions. China’s tolerance to
interventions and its participations in international interventions deviated from its
principle of non-intervention.
From the standpoint of China, however, fixed principles and implementations
of the principles by flexible policies, even not in accordance with the principles at
times, are not contradicted. It is easy to find the words of principles (yuanze xing 原
则性) and flexibilities (linghuo xing 灵活性) seemingly contradicted but
simultaneously recorded in China’s governmental documents. When the CCP
prepared to establish a new China in 1949, Zhou Enlai brought out the basic guideline
of diplomacy: adhere to principles but at the same time keep a flexible position to deal
with specific problems according to the specific contexts (Li P., 1994). In addition to
foreign policy, Mao (1966, p. 1437) carried the governance position by using the
combined notion, “Our principle must be steadfast, but in order to fulfill that principle
we also need to hold the permitted and necessary flexibility.”137
Some scholars argue that a ritualistic conformity to proper form (orthopraxy)–
coexisting with a practical acceptance of divergent beliefs (heterodoxy)– has been a
hallmark of traditional Chinese culture; and the ancient Chinese money, round with a
square hollow in the middle, serves as a metaphor in thinking about the dichotomy
(Chan, 1999; Zhao Q., 2007).138 From the perspective of culture, China’s case is so
137
China’s claim to an independent foreign policy is a case in point. Even though the Chinese
government takes it as a value and objective, the independence has never been attained to the absolute
extent because of the Sino-Soviet alliance and the Sino-US quasi-alliance.
138
This is a traditional Chinese people’s philosophy that one needs to shape his/her personality
which resembles to the ancient Chinese money (waiyuan neifang 外圆内方).
219
complex and diverse that there is bound to be a substantial flexibility in its
components to adapt itself to changing conditions and issues.139 China usually holds
various doctrines and principles that are mutual contradicted at the same time, but the
Chinese think them as complementary rather than competitive.140 In this way, the
Chinese could freely address realistic problems about which they are concerned most
without breaking a certain principle. The behavioral culture combing principle and
flexibility has dispelled the inconsistency between its words and acts from a Chinese
perspective. In terms of China’s diplomatic culture, the adherence to non-intervention
principle and the flexible implementation of interventionist actions are compatible.
Compliance and Resistance
This research could contribute to the IR theory development, at least, partly to
the mid-level theory. It bridged neo-classical realism and the English School theories
to establish an analytical framework, which provided a plausible explanation for a
state’s international behavior and for the state’s perception of the basic phenomenon
and issues of IR. Either the neo-classical realism or the English School theory does
not sufficiently explain China’s international behavior concerning non-intervention.
In addition, as Walt’s substantial criticism toward the neo-classical realism, “The
theory has yet to offer a distinct set of explanatory hypotheses of its own” (2002, p.
221). This research addressed this problem by conflating this theory with the elements
of the English School and applied this theoretical synthesis to an empirical study. The
139
This dissertation does not intend to justify China’s behavior. Instead, it is to explain that
China’s interventionist activities are inconsistent with China’s commitment to the principle, but they
are taken for granted in the Chinese culture.
140
The typical case is the principles of “peaceful coexistence” and “anti-hegemonism” carried
out by the Chinese government at the same time.
220
proposed analytical framework combining the two theories can strengthen their
explanatory power in explaining China’s foreign policy. This theoretical combination
can be applied to the dynamism of one state’s foreign policy toward the institutions
and rules in certain international organizations.
Causation in China’s Non-intervention Policy
The paradox of China’s non-intervention policy and diplomatic dilemmas
emerged when it faced international interventions. For example, while the Chinese
government apparently favored the non-intervention principle and emphasized its
commitment to such, it faced pressures that put its economic interest, security, and
reputation at risk. The pressures forced China to detach itself from the nonintervention principle and to become involved in certain interventionist activities.
Accordingly, China portrayed its responses to international interventions as
compliance and resistance, in general. To be more specific, the Chinese government
cooperated or compromised with the international community to intervene in certain
countries’ domestic affairs, yet resisted interventions in other cases.
IR theories provided rich insights into the analyses of China’s foreign policy.
Nevertheless, the existing theories, either at the macro- or micro-level, do not
sufficiently explain the paradox of China’s non-intervention policy, and previous
works concerning the principle of non-intervention have failed to provide the casual
explanation for the complexities and dynamics of it as well. Hence, this research
established an analytical framework, synthesizing the elements and factors in the neoclassical realism and the English School, to demonstrate the underlying mechanism of
China’s non-intervention policy.
221
This theoretical framework follows the causal direction from structure to
agent– the logical method shared by neo-classical realism and the English School. As
indicated in Chapter 1, the incongruity of China’s non-intervention policy
interconnects with dichotomies within the norm of non-intervention in the
international community. Systemic incentives, taken as determinants, i.e., the
independent variables, include societal and material factors. The impact of systemic
incentives transfers into China’s perceptions such that a given intervention becomes a
threat through China’s domestic constraints; hence, domestic concerns, including
ideological factors and state-societal relations, and perceptions become intervening
variables. China, thus, makes different decisions regarding intervention to the extent
of the perceived threat.
Explanations for China’s Compliance on International Intervention
China's extensive stake in the contemporary international system drove it to
compromise with the majority of countries in the international community, as well as
cooperate with international efforts aimed at minimizing disruption to the
international order based on state sovereignty. From China’s perspective, the
foundation of contemporary society is the state’s sovereignty, within which states are
paramount actors in world politics. The reactions of most countries, especially when
they reach consensus on an intervention, generate high international pressure, thereby
affecting China’s foreign policy-making process.
China’s non-intervention policy has been criticized by Western countries,
which created a diplomatic dilemma for China and, thus, brought about pressure on
the country’s government. China’s investments and assistance benefit the governors
of some pariah countries rather than those countries’ average civilians because China
222
ignores the terrible human rights records of those countries, and thus acquiesces in the
inhumane behavior. If China chooses the policy of non-intervention or remains silent
when it faces authentic mass human violations, its inaction will probably be
interpreted as implicit moral approval of the wrongdoing. Therefore, under the
situations that the potential intervention is well accepted by other countries and it
would not directly threaten China’s national interest, the Chinese government is
inclined to cooperate with the international community to conduct interventions.
Furthermore, because China is an emerging power, its isolationist foreign
policy does not correspond to its capability and position in the international
community. China is in a less favorable position to take advantage of non-intervention
today than it was in the Cold War period and early 1990s. As a result, China is
slightly tweaking its behavior, albeit reluctantly and cautiously, and is engaging in
some international interventionist activities.
On the other hand, the normative power of the non-intervention plays a role in
the causal impact on China’s decision-making processes when the country deals with
intervention. Any political or governmental interventions that shake the current
international order based on sovereignty become China’s concerns. Consequently,
China is sometimes suspicious of some international organizations that may constrain
states’ sovereignty, the UN specifically, on some sensitive issues. Although the
international pressure is intense, China’s reluctance to completely cooperate with the
international community is derived from its domestic vulnerability. In this situation,
China may compromise on specific interventions by other countries in international
society largely because the international pressure impacts China’s domestic concerns.
In other words, pressures from the international community are determinants of
223
China’s compromises with interventions, while China’s concerns about its domestic
vulnerability are also the incentives of the non-intervention policy.
Moreover, China acknowledges that the political structure under U.S.
unipolarity is hard to change. China is not capable of directly challenging the US in
the international arena, but a situation in which the international community lacked a
consensus left room for China to maneuver diplomatically to deal with an
international issue regarding intervention. Thus, China is likely to associate with likeminded countries to express their disagreements with interventions. In short,
international environments have shaped China’s tolerance to international
interventions in various situations, and the manifestations of the tolerance, namely,
cooperation and compromise, depend on how China perceives and judges the extent
to which the potential interventions threaten its domestic demands.
Explanations for China’s Resistance to International Intervention
China shows intransigence in the face of international intervention if it is the
target state or a potential intervener in bilateral relations. In these two situations, the
principle of non-intervention is apparently a diplomatic shield for China’s national
interests; China’s non-intervention policy supported the Proposition I and II indicated
in Chapter 2. China also displays this inflexibility in the international community
when the pressure China faces from other countries and coalitions is largely eased. In
this situation, China could take advantage of other great powers’ opposition to
intervention. To do so, China is able to express its own preference for nonintervention and to minimize the risk to its interests that might be caused by the
potential interventions by other countries; moreover, China could also reduce the risk
224
of being condemned from the international community by partly transferring
international pressure to other great powers.
The Applications of the Causation
China’s non-intervention policy combines both principle and flexibility.
China’s selection of this pragmatic approach results from its interactions with other
international actors in the contemporary international community. China aims to make
prudent and reasonable decisions reflecting its perceptions of systemic incentives,
which are constrained by its understanding of the norm of non-intervention and
domestic demands to manage state-society relations in order to ensure regime survival.
This mechanism operates in all applications of China’s non-intervention policy,
particularly anomalistic cases that present apparent irrationality and cannot be
explained by existing theories.
Nine cases are discussed to test the proposed theoretical framework. Despite
some different features and characteristics, these cases feature international
interventions which, to different extents, generated international pressure on China’s
decision-making processes and forced it to choose whether to apply the nonintervention principle. The causal mechanisms of China’s non-intervention policy
permit deducing two propositions. Proposition III and IV are intended to examine
China’s compliance and resistance when facing different degrees of international
pressure. Patterns 3–6, inferred from Proposition III and IV, specify three
consequences of China’s non-intervention and their causal mechanisms. These nine
cases match the four patterns and prove the validity of the analytical framework.
225
Proposition III presumes that systemic incentives impose heavy pressure on
China to make concessions in international interventions, so China is likely to deviate
from the principle of non-intervention. Pattern 3 and 4 evaluate this proposition. In
Pattern 3, China tends to cooperate with international efforts to intervene in specific
countries if it is under high pressure to make concessions and the specific
interventions is likely to alleviate Beijing’s domestic vulnerabilities. This pattern can
be seen in China’s responses to UNSC sanctions for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait,
antiterrorism actions in Afghanistan after the September 11 attack, UNSC sanctions
against North Korea after North Korea withdrew from the Six-party Talks, and UNSC
sanctions during the Libyan crisis. China had different concerns in these international
interventions which involved issues or countries relevant to China’s domestic
vulnerabilities. The interventions in Afghanistan and North Korea directly affected
China’s security and domestic issues, while those in Libya and Sudan over the Darfur
crisis put China’s economic interests at stake. The sanctions on Iraq were a special
case: they were not directly relevant to China’s national interests but presented it with
the diplomatic decision to side with Iraq or Kuwait. In these cases, China favored
international intervention after confirming that all great powers agreed to the
intervention and that the intervention would not shake China’s ideological base and
not directly threaten its domestic stability.
Pattern 4 suggests that China will be likely to compromise and admit the
legitimacy of a given intervention which might aggravate its domestic vulnerabilities
if China faces high international pressure for concessions. This pattern is evidenced
by China’s expression of disapproval of UNSC Resolution 678 which implicitly
authorized the use of military force against Iraq, UNSC sanctions against
Afghanistan’s Taliban government, UNSC sanctions against North Korea
226
immediately after its second nuclear test, UNSC Resolution 1556 addressing the
Darfur crisis, and international interventions against the FRY in the Kosovo crisis.
Regarding the issues in Iraq, Afghanistan and Kosovo, China was worried by a
military intervention in a sovereign country, especially for the purpose of ethnic
secession, and by the interventions intended to overthrow legitimate national
governments. These interventions might set precedents legitimatizing interventions
that could undermine the norm of non-intervention and the international order based
on state sovereignty, posing an indirect threat to China’s domestic stability. As noted,
interventions in North Korea and Sudan could harm China’s national interests.
However, the international community had reached consensus on the interventions,
and no great power supported China’s preference for non-intervention, so despite the
perceived threat, China eventually compromised with the international community.
Proposition IV indicates that, when international pressure decreases, China
likely will apply the principle of non-intervention. Pattern 5 and 6 specify the
conditions under which China might resist or compromise on a specific international
intervention. In Pattern 5, China is likely to compromise with international society
when certain great powers share its non-interventionist attitude but do not insist on
non-intervention. This pattern generally occurred in China’s responses to the Crimean
and Kosovo crises, UNSC sanctions for North Korea’s 2006 missiles launch, UNSC
Resolution 1973 implicitly authorizing the use of force in Libya, and UNSC sanctions
against Sudan during the Darfur crisis. These issues were relevant to China’s concerns
about its ideological base and domestic demands. China’s political stance in the case
of Libya was consistent with that toward the Gulf War, in which it disagreed with
using military force in a sovereign state. China enjoyed Russia’s support in the cases
of North Korea and Darfur and more strongly disapproved of international
227
interventions and negotiated with countries supportive of intervention. Regarding
UNSC Resolution 1593 which attempted to put the Darfur issue on the ICC agenda,
China took advantage of U.S. opposition to express disagreement. In the case of the
Kosovo crisis, NATO’s intervention in Kosovo harmed China’s national interests, but
it compromised with international society on intervention, which aligned with Russian
responses. The Crimean crisis presented a distinct case because it directly involved
the great power Russia. China’s tacit approval of international interventions, as well
as the Russian intervention in Ukraine, reflected its consideration of its commitment
to the non-intervention principle and the expected consequences that might alleviate
China concerns about its security and domestic demands.
In Pattern 6, China tends to resist intervention if a great power strongly
opposes it. The pattern can be clearly seen in the cases of the Syrian crisis and
Zimbabwe. Although the issue in Zimbabwe was related to China’s domestic
concerns, intervention in this country would not have a direct impact on its domestic
vulnerabilities. However, interventions in Syria might cause instability in the Middle
East which, from the perspective of the Chinese government, could directly threaten
China’s domestic stability. In these cases, China chose to side with Russia and
strongly opposed interventionist initiatives by the double vetoes against the UNSC
draft resolutions.
It is notable from the discussion of those cases that China easily becomes
involved in international affairs that are intimately related to its domestic concerns
and strategic interests. China's traditional strategic pivot is located in East Asia, but its
strategic interests are slowly spreading. That strategic importance is China's priority
when Beijing makes the decision how it implements the non-intervention policy. The
228
security and political interest are more important to China than the economic interest.
With interests that extend across the world, the Chinese government is likely to use
the non-intervention policy more flexibly, although it may not shelve the principle
completely as long as the international order is still based on sovereign states, and
China’s domestic vulnerability exists.
Value and Instrument
The third contribution is based on the last two. This study used a social
scientific methodology of causal inference to explain the puzzles and debate in the
Chinese academia as to whether China should abandon the principle of nonintervention. Instead of providing a definitive answer “ought to,” this study based on
the observable fact that China has not changed its preference for the principle
explored the role of the principle in China’s foreign policy through the theoretical and
empirical research. The purpose of this research is not to provide prescriptions for
resolving the problems China faces or to discover the hypocritical contradictions in
China’s foreign policy. Rather, it is purely to inquire into China’s non-intervention
policy. By doing so, this research could add the missing piece into the jigsaw puzzle
of the China study and provide the explanations for the puzzles of China’s nonintervention policy that previous work has failed to or, at least, has insufficiently
expounded.
The principle of non-intervention is very important in China’s foreign policy
because it entails both ideology and rationale; it also plays the roles of normative
value and pragmatic instrument in the country’s foreign policy formation.
229
The principle of non-intervention is the ramification of the state’s sovereignty,
which forms the core of the order in the contemporary international society. The
principle was normalized after being written into the UN Charter. China’s
endorsement of the principle is also rooted in its historical experience. The concepts
of sovereignty and non-intervention proliferated in China before the PRC was
established. The character of this essentially defensive principle determines its
significance in the country’s foreign policy. Therefore, China maintains this principle
as its foreign policy guide since the international society is composed of sovereign
states with different values and cultures.
However, any norms embodied both intrinsic value and instrumental value.
Viewed from the perspective of rationalism, the non-intervention policy draws its
vitality and meanings in specific circumstances from its service to China’s national
interest. This approach has enabled Chinese leaders not only to avoid diplomatic
disputes and enhance China’s diplomatic status during the Cold War, but also to
maximize the resources directed toward domestic economic growth and to build
foreign relationships with a wide variety of regime types in the post-Cold War era. As
for the concept of non-intervention, an extraneous word, China is able to appropriate
its meaning for Beijing’s own purpose of seeking to guard its domestic system from
foreign influence. Furthermore, it justifies its foreign activities by supporting this
conventional Westphalian system.
In the post-Cold War period, to a large extent, the implementation of nonintervention has hitherto been a technology of power. For China, the non-intervention
policy is not only a commitment to preventing conflicts, but also a strategic policy to
engage in international society. With China’s rise, the self-appointed role as the
230
“responsible country” is a principal method to enhance its international image. The
commitment to non-intervention in other countries’ affairs is one facet of China’s
promise of being a responsible power. Officials in the Chinese government always
take the commitment as morally superior and implicitly condemn other powers’
foreign policies toward some developing countries, which can be illustrated by
Chinese comments on their country’s development assistance to African and Asian
countries without political precondition. If the Chinese government abandoned this
policy, Beijing not only would break its own promise but would also damage its own
interests in developing countries. Although the criticisms of other countries have
damaged China’s international image, these would not shake the foundation of the
current regime. The benefit surpasses the cost regarding non-intervention from the
Chinese government’s perspective.
Despite opposing interventions, the Chinese government has not clarified the
definition and means of interventions. This obscure approach leaves China’s foreign
policy with much more room for reinterpretation of intervention. The ambiguity and
vagueness toward non-intervention, though often poorly interpreted as mystery and
obscurity, is a good tool that can be applied to changing situations. This contradiction
in Chinese perspectives is an advisable approach to confront different issues in
various circumstances. Chinese diplomatic officials use the word “non-intervention”
so freely that they undermine the respect for this principle. It engenders the notion of
non-intervention as a cliché for China to blindly attack foreign critiques and to
technically escape international responsibilities.
Although China has attempted to avoid being directly involved in
interventions in the post-Cold War period, as one of the P5 in the UNSC, it has not
231
always been able to steer clear of authorizing and participating in international
interventions. Because of its commitment to the non-intervention principle, China’s
attitude toward certain issues regarding intervention has been disassociated with the
mainstream in international society. It technically applies the non-intervention
principle to express its disagreement and dissatisfaction with interventionist initiatives,
yet it avoids incurring damages to its material interests and reputations as a
consequence of pressures and condemnations from other countries. The mixture of
principle and flexibility in China’s non-intervention policy denotes that the country
has been a cautious player in the international community. The causal mechanisms
underlying China’s decision-making processes regarding the non-intervention
principle manifests itself in the fact that Beijing pays close attention to its
counterparts’ reactions and their interactions and, at the same time, tries to safeguard
its national interests by taking advantage of any favorable systemic factors and
maintaining the international order based on state sovereignty.
232
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280
APPENDIX
1. China’s Negative Votes Regarding UNSC Sanctions-Related Votes
Chinese Abstentions Regarding UNSC Sanctions-Related Votes in The 1990s
Date
Terms
Mar. 31,1992 Libya
May 30,
1992
Bosnia
Oct. 9, 1992
Nov. 16,
1992
Bosnia
Bosnia
Nov. 30,
1992
Cambodia
Mar.31, 1993 Bosnia
Apr.17, 1993 Bosnia
Nov.11, 1993 Libya
Dec. 2, 1994
Bosnia
Sep.23, 1994
Bosnia
Apr.21, 1995
Bosnia
Apr. 26,
Ethiopia1996
Sudan
Aug.16, 1996 EthiopiaSudan
Oct. 20, 1997 Iraq
Mar. 31,
Kosovo
1998
Oct. 14, 1998 Kosovo
Purpose
SCR.
Vote
Imposes aviation, arms embargo due to
concerns about Libyan-sponsored terrorism
Imposes economic, aviation, arms, cultural
embargoes on Serbia and Montenegro (the
FRY)
Bans military flights in FRY airspace
Demands end to external interference
(from the FRY) in Bosnia-Herzegovina
748
10,0,5
757
13,0,2
781
787
14,0,1
13,0,2
Threatens measures against Party of
Democratic Kampuchea for failure to meet
obligations under Paris Treaty
Extends ban on military flights
Threatens sanctions on Bosnian Serbs for
continued violence
Imposes economic and financial sanctions
on Libya for failure to comply with
previous resolutions
Affirms that economic measures adopted
under SCR. 820 be enforced
Extends the economic measures adopted
under previous resolutions against the
Bosnian Serb forces
Extends partial suspension of particular
measures against the FRY
Imposes sanctions on Sudan in relation to
failure to extradite suspects
Imposes aviation sanctions on Sudan for
non-compliance with SCR.1054
Threatens travel ban on Iraq for failure to
cooperate with UNSCOM
Imposes arms embargo on FRY due to
situation in Kosovo
Demands FRY comply with OSCE and
NATO missions in Kosovo
792
14,0,1
816
820
14,0,1
13,0,2
883
11,0,4
None
942
Russian
veto
14,0,1
988
13,0,2
1054
14,0,1
1070
13,0,2
1134
10,0,5
1160
14,0,1
1203
13,0,2
281
Chinese Abstentions Regarding UNSC Sanctions-Related Resolutions (2000-present)
Terms
Date
Afghanistan
-Taliban
Dec. 19,
2000
Sudan,
issues of
Darfur
Somalia and
Eritrea
Libya
Purpose
SCR.
Vote
Objection
Imposes arms embargo on
Taliban in Afghanistan
1333
13,0,2
CP
(sanctions)
July 30,
2004
Imposes arms embargo on
Darfur region in Sudan
1556
13,0,2
CP
(sanctions)
Mar. 29,
2005
Extends sanctions on
Darfur region in Sudan for
1591
failure to comply with
previous resolutions
12,0,3
CP
(sanctions)
Apr. 25,
2006
Imposes sanctions toward
officers in Sudan
1672
12,0,3
CP
(sanctions)
Oct. 14,
2010
Imposes arms embargo
against Sudan
1945
14,0,1
Unclear
Oct. 13,
2009
Imposes comprehensive
sanctions on Eritrea
1907
13,1,1
CP
(sanctions)
Oct. 5,
2011
Imposes arms embargo
against Eritrea
2023
13,0,2
CP
(sanctions)
Mar. 17,
2011
Establishes a ban on
flights in the Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya airspace
1973
10,0,5
CP (use of
force)
Note. “Purpose” describes only the aspects of the proposal relevant to sanctions; some are
omnibus proposals that also deal with other subjects, such as peacekeeping. Vote is written as
“aye, veto, and abstention.” CP= measure in question would be counter-productive. Based on
ODS and UNBISnet.
282
Chinese Vetoes in the UNSC (1990-now)
Terms
Date
Guatemala
Jan. 10,
1997
Macedonia
Myanmar
Zimbabwe
Purpose
Vote
Objection
Establishes UN PKOs
in Guatemala
14, 1, 0
CS (one China
Principle)
Feb. 25,
1999
Extension of UN PKOs
in Macedonia
13, 1, 1
CS (one China
Principle)
Jan. 12,
2007
Condemnation of
Myanmar’s human
rights abuses
Russian and
Chinese vetoes
July 11,
2008
Imposes economic
sanctions and arms
embargo on Zimbabwe
Russian and
Chinese
vetoes; 9, 5, 1
NA; CP
(sanctions)
Oct. 4,
2011
Imposes arms embargo
on Syria
Russian and
Chinese
vetoes; 9, 2, 4
CP (sanctions);
TI
Feb. 4,
2012
Russian and
Threatens to use further
Chinese
measures to Syria
vetoes; 13, 2, 0
CP (measures
to put pressure
to Syria); TI
July 19,
2012
Threatens to impose
sanctions to Syria
Russian and
Chinese
vetoes; 11, 2, 2
CP (sanctions);
TI
Refers Syria to ICC
Russian and
Chinese
vetoes; 14, 2, 0
TI
NA
9, 3, 3
Syria
May 22,
2014
Note. Objections: CP= measure in question would be counter-productive; CS= principled
stand on invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter; NA= the UNSC is not appropriate venue
for settling problem in question; TI= does not respect territorial integrity/ sovereignty. Based
on ODS and UNBISnet. Special topic on China’s vetoes, Xinlang reading, available at
http://book.sina.com.cn/z/foujuepiao/
283
2. P5 Voting in the UNSC
100.00%
95.00%
The US
90.00%
The USSR/
Russia
85.00%
80.00%
China
75.00%
France
70.00%
65.00%
The UK
60.00%
Years
Note. The Average Rate of P5 Affirmative Votes in UNSC Voting Records (1971.11 –
2015.04); Data begin with China’s first vote, on November 21, 1971; Based on ODS;
UNBISnet; author’s calculations.
35.00%
30.00%
The US
25.00%
20.00%
The
USSR/Russia
China
15.00%
10.00%
5.00%
France
0.00%
The UK
Years
Note. The Average Rate of P5 Abstentions/Non-Participation in UNSC Voting Records
(1971.11– 2015.04); Data begin with China’s first vote, on November 21, 1971; Based on
ODS; UNBISnet; author’s calculations.
284
11.00%
10.00%
9.00%
The US
8.00%
7.00%
The
USSR/Russ
ia
China
6.00%
5.00%
4.00%
3.00%
France
2.00%
1.00%
0.00%
Years
Note. The Average Rate of P5 Vetoes in UNSC Voting Records (1971.11 – 2015.04); Data
begin with China’s first vote, on November 21, 1971; Based on ODS; UNBISnet; author’s
calculations.
285
3. China’s Bilateral Relations With the Sanctions Target Countries
1.20
1.00
Iraq
0/000
0.80
Liberia
Ethiopia
FRY
0.60
Somalia
Haiti
Rwanda
0.40
Sierra Leone
Sudan
0.20
Libya
0.00
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Year
Note. The Share of Bilateral Trade Value of Targeted State in China’s Foreign Trade in the
1990s (Percentage). Based on JETRO, China Foreign Trade Statistics (1990-1994); National
Bureau of Statistics of PRC, China Statistical Yearbook (1995-2000); author’s calculations.
286
14.00
Iraq
Liberia
12.00
Eritrea
Ethiopia
10.00
Somalia
Rwanda
0/000
8.00
Sierra
Leone
Cote
d'lvoire
6.00
Sudan
Libya
4.00
Iran
North
Korea
2.00
Syria
Zimbab
we
0.00
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Year
Note. The Share of Bilateral Trade Value of Target State in China’s Foreign Trade (20002011) (percentage). Based on National Bureau of Statistics of PRC, China Statistical
Yearbook (2001-2014); author’s calculations.
287
China Economic and Military Relations With the Target States (1990-present）
Country
Years
Bilateral
trade (first
instance)
(US$ 10,0
00)
Bilateral
trade (end or
in 2011)
Arms transfers
Iraq
1990-
11,659
(1990)
1,426,829
(2011)
No record
Yugoslavia
19912001
10,050
Inapplicable
Anti-tank
missile, Tank
destroyer
(1994
delivery)
0.52%
0.06%
Cambodia
(KR)
1992
Not
applicable
Inapplicable
No
record
0.05%
Somalia
1992present
412
(1992)
9,700
(2011)
WZ120/Type-59
(1990
delivery)
No record
No
record
No record
Rwanda
19942008
241
(1994)
8,859
(2008)
No record
No
record
0.03%
Sierra
Leone
19972010
409
(1997)
10,912
(2010)
Patrol craft;
Type- 83
122mm towed
gun (2006 and
2010 delivery)
2%
0.11%
Eritrea and
Ethiopia
DRC
20002001
2003present
5,857
(2000)
5,166
(2003)
8,057
(2001)
398,721
(2011)
No record
No
record
No
record
No record
Liberia
2003present
19922001
6,814
(2003)
11,570
(1992)
500,793
(2011)
No record
(2001)
No record
No
record
No record
Sudan
2004present
1996
252,176
(2004)
8,674
(1996)
1,153,615(2
011)
Tank (2003
delivery);
aircraft (2004
delivery); IFV
(2004
delivery);
portable SAM
(2005
delivery)
1.54%
3.16%
288
APC (2007
delivery);
ZFB-05 (2009
delivery)
Rate of
Rate of TIV
TIV of
of arms
arms
exports from
exports
China (1990from
2012)
China
(first
instance)
No record 0.11%
0.01%
Côte
d'Ivoire
North
Korea
2004present
2006present
23,147
(2004)
170,009
(2006)
70,273
(2011)
564,149
(2011)
No record
Iran
2006present
1,444,741
(2006)
4,510,340
(2011)
Zimbabwe
None
28,131
(2008)
Eritrea
2009present
Libya
Syria
No
record
No
record
No record
Anti-ship
missiles,
IFVs, portable
SAMs
(various types,
delivery dates
and quantities)
8.67%
11.84%
87,437
(2011)
K-8 combat ac
(2006
delivery)
No
record
0.32%
3,992
(2009)
14,903
(2011)
No record
No
record
0.05%
2011present
19922003
278,395
(2011)
11,105
(1992)
Inapplicable
No record
No
record
No record
None
244,640
(2011)
Inapplicable
Towed MRL
(1964-1990);
APC (19721992); Type6633 (19731995);
portable SAM
(1985-1994)
1.96%
21,568
(2003)
Air search
No
0.11%
radar (2010
record
delivery)
Note. Date of arms transfers represented in the table is during or before the sanctions. The
targets of non-State entities are not included in this table. These abbreviations of weapons can
be found at http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_data.html. Based on China Foreign
Trade Statistics (1990-1994); China Statistical Yearbook (1995-2012); SIPRI Arms Transfer
Database.
289
CURRICULUM VITAE
REN, Mu
Doctoral student in International Relations at Ritsumeikan University (China
Scholarship Council Project)
Education
Ritsumeikan University, Graduate School of International Relations, 2011-present,
Ph.D. Candidate in International Relations
Jilin University, Administration Department, 2008-2011, M. A. in International
Politics
Jilin University, Administration Department, 2004-2008, B. A. in International
Politics
Articles in English
China’s Non-intervention Policy Meets International Military Intervention in the PostCold War Era: Focusing on Cases of Illegal Intervention, Ritsumeikan Annual
Review of International Studies, Vol. 13, 2014, pp. 127-155.
Interpreting China’s (Non-) Intervention Policy to The Syrian Crisis: A Neoclassical
Realist Analysis, Ritsumeikan Kokusai Kenkyu (The Ritsumeikan Journal of
International Studies), Vol. 26, Issue 1, 2014, pp. 259-282.
China’s Non-intervention Policy in UNSC Sanctions in the 21st Century: The Cases of
Libya, North Korea, and Zimbabwe, Ritsumeikan International Affairs, Vol.12，
2013, pp. 101-134.
An Analysis on the Contradiction Between China’s Non-intervention Policy and
Intervention Activities, Ritsumeikan Kokusaikankei Ronshu (The Ritsumeikan
Journal of International Studies: Special Edition For Postgraduate Students),
Vol.13, 2013, pp. 21-48.
290
Articles and Chapters in Chinese
Exploring "R2P" and Its Diffusion in The International Society: Focusing on the
Process of Norm's Diffusion, Pacific Journal, Volume 22, Issue 2, 2014, pp.
134-141.
The Origin and Conception of “Responsibility to Protect”: Thoughts on the Concept
of Sovereignty from Multiple Dimensions. In Qingguo Jia & Fangming Han
(Eds.), Global Governance: Responsibility to Protect. Beijing: Xinhua
Publisher. 2014, pp. 21-33.
Strange Bedfellows: The Potential Limitations of Security Cooperation Between
Japan and ASEAN in the Period of the Post-Cold War, Southeast Asian
Studies, Vol.6, No.201, 2012, PP. 38-44.
Gender Ethics and Cooperation Preference: Rethinking International Cooperation
from the Perspective of Feminism, Studies in Ethics, No. 5, 2010, pp.72-74, 78.
Second author
Interpreting Classical Texts in Politics: A Post-modernist Criticism, Economic
Perspective, No. 12, 2010, pp.71-73. First author
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