Philosophical Review
Prudence and Authenticity: Intrapersonal Conflicts of Value
Author(s): David O. Brink
Source: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 112, No. 2 (Apr., 2003), pp. 215-245
Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review
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ThePhilosophical
Vol. 112, No. 2 (April2003)
Review,
Prudence and Authenticity:
IntrapersonalConflictsofValue
DavidO. Brink
Prudence and authenticityare sometimesseen as rivalvirtues.Prudence, as traditionally
conceived,is temporallyneutral.It attachesno
intrinsicsignificanceto the temporallocation of benefitsor harms
withinthe agent'slife;theprudentagentshould be equallyconcerned
about all partsof her life.But people's values and ideals oftenchange
overtime,sometimesin predictableways,as whenmiddle age and parenthood oftentemporizeyouthfulradicalismor spontaneitywithconIn situationsinvolving
cerns forcomfort,security,
and predictability.
diachronic,intrapersonalconflictsof value, prudence-in particular,
temporalneutrality-appearsto require the agent to subordinateher
currentideals to her futureones or at least to moderatepursuitofcurrentideals in lightof futureones. But thisdemand mayseem to sacriifwe suppose thatauthenticity
ficeauthenticity,
requiresactingon the
and sincerelyaccepts at the timeof
ideals thatthe agent reflectively
raisesinterestaction.This tensionbetweenprudenceand authenticity
the structureof intrapersonal
ing questionsabout temporalneutrality,
conflictsof value, the natureof ideals, and the demands of authenticity.Afterexaminingvariousaspects of thispuzzle, I defend the commitmentsof prudence in situationsinvolvingintrapersonalvalue
conflictand argue thatauthenticity-understoodas being trueto oneI conclude by suggesting
self-actually supportstemporalneutrality.
how this defense of prudence lends credibilityto the more general
demand of temporalneutrality.
1. Prudence and TemporalNeutrality
Prudence demandsthatan agentact so as to promotehis overallgood.
More generally,prudence seems to require thatan agent's deliberations,attitudes,and actionsbe regulatedbya correctconceptionofhis
overall good. Accordingto some traditionsin the historyof ethics,
includingthe eudaimonisttraditionin Greekethics,practicalreasonis
fundamentally
prudentialand prudence is in a certainsense the ultimate virtue.1Such traditionsface the question of how,if at all, other
moraldemandsconfamiliarvirtuesand conventionalother-regarding
tributeto the agent's overall good and have various resources for
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DAVID O. BRINK
answering it. Other traditions treatprudence asjust one aspect of practical reason and as one virtue among other, potentially conflicting virtues. The problem that I want to discuss does not, I think,require us to
decide between these and other competing traditions about the status
and supremacy of prudence within practical reason or the virtues.
On both ancient and modern conceptions, prudence requires the
agent to be concerned about her own overall good. The prudent person should have equal concern for all parts of her life,which requires
that she not privilege or indulge her present or near-term interestsat
the expense of her distant interests.We might say that she is temporally
neutralinsofar as she assigns no normative significance, as such, to the
temporal location of benefits and harms within her life. But the
demands of prudence and temporal neutrality are complex and call
for extended discussion. We might begin by looking at the claims of
two historical proponents of prudence.
Adam Smith associates
For instance, in The TheoryofMoral Sentiments
with
of
which
the
prudence,
temporal neutrality
impartial spectator is
to
supposed
approve.
[I]n his steadilysacrificingthe ease and enjoymentof the present
momentforthe probable expectationof the stillgreaterease and enjoymentof a more distantbut more lastingperiod of time,the prudentman
is alwaysboth supportedand rewardedby the entireapprobationof the
impartialspectator,and of the representativeof the impartialspectator,
the man withinthe breast.The impartialspectatordoes not feel himself
worn out by the presentlabour of those whose conduct he surveys;nor
does he feel himselfsolicitedby the importunatecalls of theirpresent
appetites.To him theirpresent,and whatis likelyto be theirfuturesituation,are verynearlythe same: he sees them nearlyat the same distance,
and is affectedbythemverynearlyin the same manner.He knows,however,that to the persons principallyconcerned, theyare verydifferent
frombeing thesame, and thattheynaturallyaffectthem
in a verydifferent
manner. He cannot thereforebut approve, and even applaud, that
which enables them to act as if their
proper exertionof self-command,
future
situation
themnearlyin the same manand
their
affected
present
ner in whichtheyaffecthim.2
As Smith's appeal to an impartial spectator suggests, the demand for
temporal neutralityneed not be confined to a prudential concern with
one's own well-being but can extend to concern for the well-being of
others.This is why temporal neutrality is often an aspect, explicit or
implicit,in conceptions of impartialityand benevolence, as well as prudence. Also, as Smith makes clear, he conceives of temporal neutrality
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PRUDENCEAND AUTHENTICITY
as a normativerequirement, not as a description of how people actually
reason and behave. As Smith notes, it is an all too familiarfact that people are often temporally biased,investing short-termbenefits and sacrifices with normative significance out of proportion to their actual
magnitude and discounting distant benefits and harms out of proportion to their actual magnitude. This sort of temporal bias is sometimes
thought to play a major role in various familiar human failings,such as
weakness of will, self-deception, and moral weakness.3 But it is almost
always regarded as a mistake, typicallya failure of rationality.
In The Methods ofEthics Henry Sidgwick recognizes the normative
aspect of temporal neutralityin criticizingBentham for assigning normative significance to the temporal proximityof pleasures and pains.
[P]roximityis a property[of pleasuresand pains] whichit is reasonable
For myfeelings
to disregardexcept in so faras it diminishesuncertainty.
a year hence should be just as importantto me as my feelingsnext
minute,ifonlyI could make an equallysure forecastof them.Indeed this
equal and impartialconcernforall partsof one's consciouslifeis perhaps
the most prominentelement in the common notion of the rational-as
of pleasure.4
opposed to themerelyimpulsive-pursuit
Later, Sidgwick elaborates on the demands of temporal neutralityand
notes that it has broader application than its role in his own version of
hedonistic egoism.
Hereafteras suchis to be regardedneitherless nor more than Now. It is
not,ofcourse,meant,thatthe good ofthe presentmaynot reasonablybe
preferredto that of the futureon account of its greater certainty:or
again, thata week tenyearshence maynot be moreimportantto us than
a week now,throughan increasein our means or capacitiesofhappiness.
All thatthe principleaffirmsis thatthe mere differenceof priorityand
in timeis not a reasonable groundforhavingmore regardto
posteriority
the consciousnessof one momentthan to thatof another.The formin
whichit practicallypresentsitselfto mostmen is 'thata smallerpresent
good is not to be preferredto a greaterfuturegood' (allowingfordifferences of certainty).... The commonestview of the principlewould no
doubt be thatthe presentpleasureor happinessis reasonablyto be foregone withthe viewof obtaininggreaterpleasure or happinesshereafter;
but the principleneed not be restrictedto a hedonisticapplication,it is
equally applicable to any other interpretationof 'one's own good', in
whichgood is conceived as a mathematicalwhole,ofwhichthe integrant
partsare realisedin different
partsor momentsof a lifetime.5
There are several aspects of Sidgwick's account of prudence and temporal neutralitythat deserve discussion.
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DAVID O. BRINK
First,Sidgwickrecognizeshere thatprudence's temporalneutrality
is a structuralconstraintabout the distributionof goods and harms
overtimewithina singlelife.As such,itis neutralor agnosticabout the
contentof the good. Though all conceptionsof prudence are tempoconceptionsresultfromdifferent
conceptions
rallyneutral,different
of the good. Sidgwick'sown conception of the good is hedonistic.
one mightunderstandthe good in preference-satisfacAlternatively,
tion terms, as consistingin the satisfactionof actual or suitably
informedor idealized desire. Hedonism and preference-satisfaction
viewsconstruethe good as consistingin or depending upon an individual's contingentand variablepsychologicalstates.By contrast,one
mightunderstandthe good in more objectiveterms,eitheras consisting in the perfectionof one's essentialcapacities (forexample, one's
rationalor deliberativecapacities) or as consistingin some listof disparate objectivegoods (forexample,knowledge,beauty,achievement,
turnson
friendship).The tensionbetweenprudence and authenticity
and so should ariseon anyconthecommitmentto temporalneutrality
ception of the good. However,the resourcesforaddressingthistension mayvarywithdifferent
conceptionsof the good.
is not
Second,just as Sidgwickmakes clear thattemporalneutrality
limitedto hedonisticconceptionsof prudence, so too we can notice
thatit is not limitedto prudence.As Smithrecognizes,temporalneucan be applied to concernforanother,as wellas oneself.So, for
trality
example, the two methods of ethicsthatformSidgwick'sdualism of
practicalreason-egoism and utilitarianism-areequally temporally
and prudence,
neutral.I willfocuson the tensionbetweenauthenticity
but I willconclude witha more general discussionof the implications
of temporalneutrality.
Third, Sidgwickis carefulto claim thattemporalneutralityinsists
onlythatthetemporallocationofgoods and harmswithina lifehas no
concerned
intrinsic
or independent
significance.Prudenceis intrinsically
withthe magnitudeof goods and harms,but not theirtemporallocation. Temporallocation can inheritsignificancewhen it is correlated
withfactorsthatdo affectthe magnitudeof goods and harms.So ifat
some futurepoint in timeI will,forwhateverreason,become a more
efficientconverterof resourcesintohappinessor well-being,however
thatis conceived,thena neutralconcernwithall partsofmylifewillin
one sense requiregivinggreaterweightto thatpartofmylife.Perhaps,
in the"primeoflife"I have greateropportunitiesor capacitiesforhapwilljustifydevotinggreaterresources
piness.Ifso, temporalneutrality
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PRUDENCEAND AUTHENTICITY
to theprimeoflife.However,thisis nota pure timepreferenceforthat
future period over, say, the present, precisely because the same
resourcesyield goods of different
magnitudesin the presentand the
of thissortof discountingis an applicationof,
future.The rationality
not a departurefrom,temporalneutrality.
Furthermore,we may be differentially
epistemicallysituatedwith
respectto different
points in time,and thiswill affectwhat temporal
neutrality
requires.Relativeto eventsin the near future,eventsin the
furtherfuturedepend on more interveningeventsand are typically
harderto predictand less certain.The mostobviouscase of thissortis
the certaintyor predictability
of mycontinuedexistence.It is less certain or predictablethat we will exist the furtherinto the futurewe
project.The probabilitythatI willexistin 2030 is lowerthantheprobrationalplanningcan and
abilitythatI willexistin 2010. Presumably,
should take thiskind of uncertaintyinto account by discountingthe
But,again,
significanceof a futuregood or harmbyitsimprobability.6
thisseems to be an applicationof,ratherthan a departurefrom,temporal neutrality.Insofar as near and distant goods and harms are
equallycertain,I should have equal concernforthem.
Anotherwayto make thispointis in termsof the importantdistincand subjective
reasons.7
tion,which Sidgwickdraws,between objective
Claims of objectiverationality
are claimsabout whatan agent has reason to do giventhe factsof the situation,whetherhe is aware of these
factsor in a positionto recognizethereasonsthattheysupport.Claims
of subjectiverationality
are claimsabout whatthe agent has reason to
do givenhis beliefsabout his situationor whatitwould be reasonable
forhimto believeabout hissituation.Actionsthatare objectivelyrational can be subjectively
irrational,and vice versa. Prudence can admit
thatthe existenceofmynear futureis more certainthanthe existence
of mydistantfutureand thatthisepistemicfactshould affectwhatit is
rationalforme to do; it claims onlythatinsofaras I have
subjectively
both presentand futureinterests,theyprovideme withequallystrong
objectivereasonsforaction.
This point reflectsthe fact that prudence is, at least in the first
instance,a theoryabout an agent's objectivereasons. This focus on
objectivereasons is worthelaborating.Subjectivereasons are normativelyimportant.In particular,it is common forthose who make the
distinctionto thinkthatwe should tie praise and blame to subjective,
ratherthan objective,reasons insofaras an agent's subjectivereasons
are accessible to her in a way thather objectivereasons may not be.
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DAVID O. BRINK
Insofar as praise and blame are constrainedby what is withinthe
agent's power to recognize and do, we have reason to tie praise and
withher subjectivereasons.But we can
blame to an agent'sconformity
and should still recognize objective reasons. Objective reasons are
independentof subjectivereasons,as is reflectedin theperspectiveof
second-personand third-personevaluators,who distinguishbetween
and whatwas reasonableto do from
whatwasreasonableto do toutcourt
the agent'sperspective.But objectivereasonsare also essentialto firstpersonevaluationin twoways.Objectivereasonsare centralto the retrospectiveevaluationof one's own conduct and to learningfrompast
successesand failures,even when thesesuccessesand failuresare not
appropriateobjects of praise or blame. Moreover,objectivereasons
appear to be the object of prospectiveevaluationand deliberation.In
practicaldeliberation,one aims at formingone's bestjudgmentabout
whatit is objectivelyrationalto do, even if praise and blame are best
apportioned in accordance with one's subjectivereasons.8 Indeed,
objectivereasons have a kind of explanatoryprimacyinsofaras we
identifyan agent's subjectivereasons withthe actions thatwould be
rationalifonlyher beliefsabout her situation,or thebeliefs
objectively
about her situationthatit would be reasonable forher to hold, were
true. These considerationsgive objective reasons an independence
and theoreticalprimacyin discussionsofpracticalreason.Prudenceis,
in the firstinstance,a theoryabout objectivereasons,and thatwillbe
our primary,but not exclusive,focusin assessingits commitmentto
temporalneutrality.
We have now seen twowaysin whichSidgwickthinksthattemporally
treatmentof different
neutralconcern can justifydifferential
periods
in one's life.There is anotherwayin whichprudence mightjustify
temthat
seem
with
temdiscriminations
mightinitially
incompatible
poral
but
On
which
does
not
some
Sidgwick
anticipate.
poral neutrality,
views,a lifeis an organicwhole whosevalue cannot be reduced to the
sumof thevaluesofitsparts,or,at least,cannotbe reduced to the sum
ofthevaluesofitsnonrelationalparts.It is possibleto hold a versionof
thisviewthattreatsliveswithcertainnarrativestructureas being more
valuable, all else being equal, than other lives. One could hold, for
betterforthe value of one's lifeto disexample, thatit is intrinsically
an
such
thata lifein whichevils(forexample,
play upwardtrajectory,
and
failure) preceded goods (for example, good
misfortunes,
pain,
luck,pleasure,and success) was,all else being equal, betterthan a life
in whichthe goods came first.I do not wantto defendthisview,but it
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PRUDENCEAND AUTHENTICITY
of
is, I think,coherent.Such a viewsays,in effect,thatthedistribution
and
harms
within
a
life
is
itself
a
the
good, improving qualityof
goods
theperson'slife.Such a viewwould requireassigningnormativesignificance to the temporallocation of goods and harmswithina life.But
of different
thisunequal treatment
periods in one's lifewould be justiall
an
concern
for
fied by
equal
parts of one's life.9Though such an
agent is equally concerned about all partsof her life,she sees thatby
locatingthe goods laterin lifeshe actuallymakes a greatercontribution to thevalue of her lifeoverall.This sortof temporalbias does not
assign normativesignificanceto temporallocation as such; it is comifand onlyif
patiblewithand, indeed, requiredbytemporalneutrality
ofgoods and harmswithina lifeactuallyconthe temporaldistribution
tributesto the value of thatlife.
This means thattemporalneutrality
should be understoodto claim
thatthetemporallocationofgoods and harmswithina lifehas no normativesignificanceexcept insofaras it contributesto thevalue of that
life.We mightsaythaton thisviewtemporallocationhas no independent
significance.The prudentperson, concerned to advance his overall
good, will be temporallyneutral,assigningno independent significance to the temporallocation of goods and harmswithinhis life.
There willoftenbe diachronicintrapersonalconflictsofvalue in which
whatone does affectsboth themagnitudeof goods and harmsin one's
lifeand also theirtemporaldistribution.
Temporalneutrality
requires
a
nearer
for
a
Call
this
later,
sacrificing
good
greatergood.
now-for-then
This aspect of temporalneutrality,
sacrifice.
Sidgwickthinks,is a central
aspect of our concept of rationality.10
contrasts
witha narHowever,thisconceptionoftemporalneutrality
rowerconception thatis suggestedbysome of Sidgwick'sremarks.As
all thatthe
he sometimesconceivesthedemand oftemporalneutrality,
is
and
affirms
that
the
mere
difference
of
priority posteriority
principle
in time should not affectthe normativesignificanceof goods and
harms.11This maysuggestthattheprincipleis limitedin itsapplication
to intrapersonalconflictsin which the onlyvariableis temporallocaIn particular,thatconception
tion.But thatwouldbe fartoo restrictive.
would limititsapplicationto intrapersonalconof temporalneutrality
flictsbetweengoods of the same kind-for instance,smallerpleasure
now versusgreaterpleasure later.The principlewould not apply to
kindsofgoods are at stake.Sidgwick'sfocus
conflictsin whichdifferent
on conflictsamong homogeneousgoods is,ofcourse,reinforcedbyhis
sympathyfor hedonism, which is a monistic theoryof the good.
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DAVID O. BRINK
Though he contemplatesotherconceptionsofprudence,informedby
nonhedonistictheoriesofthegood, Sidgwickdoes notexplore themin
rivalsto hedonism
much detail,and he mayassume thatall significant
would also be monistic.But there is no reason for us to make this
to conassumptionor to restricttheapplicationof temporalneutrality
flictsof homogeneous goods. We avoid thisproblemifwe allow temporal neutralityto apply to conflictswithmultiplevariablesinsisting
onlythatit prohibitsassigningvalue to temporallocationexcept insofaras thisaffectsthevalue of the whole. If so, temporalneutrality
can
of
the
sort
that
would
to
conflicts
of
be
recheterogeneousgoods
apply
ognized by suitablypluralistictheories of the good. Prudence will
sacrificeevenwhen the goods at stakeare ofdifdemand now-for-then
ferentkinds,providedonlythatthepluralityofgoods is notan obstacle
to commensurability.
Prudencerequirestemporalneutrality,
which,in turn,requiresnowfor-thensacrifice.But authenticityseems to require conformingto
principlesthatone accepts at the timeof action. If so, prudence and
authenticityappear to make incompatible demands in situations
involvingdiachronicintrapersonalconflictsof value. To focus on the
conflictbetweenprudence and authenticity
we mustfocuson a special
kindof intrapersonalconflictofvalue.
Talk about an agent's values, like talk about her interests,can be
ambiguous.An agent's interestscan referto whatis in her interestor
whatbenefitsher,or itcan refertowhatshe takesan interestin or cares
thatinterestsan agentis in herinterest.Simabout. But not everything
an
referto whatis good forher or to whatshe
values
can
ilarly, agent's
thatan agent cares about is good for
cares about. But not everything
her. It will be helpful, for purposes of discussion, to distinguish
values.We can identify
betweentheagent'sprudentialandnonprudential
our concernswithanother'swell-beingwithwhatwe care about insofar
we maythink
as we are concernedwithhimforhis own sake. Similarly,
ofan agent'sprudentialvaluesas pickingout whathe cares about insofaras he is concernedwithhis own sake and his nonprudentialvalues
as pickingout whatcaresabout independentlyofitscontributionto his
own sake. We can make thisdistinctionwithoutmakingany assumpwe can
tionsabout whata person'swell-beingconsistsin. In particular,
and
allow thatsuccessfulpursuitof other-directed
projects
plans contributesto an agent'sown good. We can also allow thatpursuitof such
projectsand plans involvespursuitof prudentialvalues,providedthat
theirpursuitis regulatedby the agent'sbeliefthattheseprojectsand
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PRUDENCEAND AUTHENTICITY
plans make a causal or constitutivecontribution to the value of his life.
To focus on the conflict between prudence and authenticity,we must
focus on intrapersonal conflicts of prudential value. Indeed, unless I
indicate otherwise, the only sort of intrapersonal conflict that will concern me is this sort of conflictbetween differentconceptions the agent
holds at differenttimes about what makes his life go well. But because
the demand of temporal neutrality has application outside of prudence, I will conclude by examining and assessing the demands of temporal neutrality in cases of intrapersonal conflicts of nonprudential
value as well.
2. IntrapersonalBalancingand Compensation
If prudence requires temporal neutrality, and temporal neutrality
requires now-for-thensacrifice, we might wonder if it is so reasonable
to be prudent. Why sacrifice some periods in one's life for the sake of
others? Why accept intrapersonal balancing?
The natural answer appeals to compensation.
Now-for-thensacrifice is
one of our paradigms of rational planning. When we engage in nowfor-thensacrifice we undertake actions and commitments to which we
would otherwise be indifferentor that we would otherwise regard as
downright burdensome for the sake of some later, greater good.
Agents who deliberate and possess reasons for action are temporally
extended entities. As a result, now-for-thensacrifice is compensated,
because the agent, who is temporally extended, is both benefactor and
beneficiary. This seems to meet the worry that prudence requires
intrapersonal sacrifices.
Or does it? We might consider a familiar comparison between
intrapersonal and interpersonal neutrality. Prudence is temporally
neutral and assigns no independent significance to whena benefit or
burden occurs in a person's life. Utilitarianism is interpersonally neutral; it assigns no independent significance to whoma benefit or burden
befalls.Justas temporal neutralityrequires intrapersonal balancing, so
too person neutralityrequires interpersonal balancing. It requires that
benefits to some be balanced against harms to others, if necessary, to
produce the best interpersonal outcome overall. Utilitarianism's person neutralitythus effectsa kind of interpersonal balancing akin to the
intrapersonal balancing that prudence's temporal neutralityrequires.
But many think that this sort of interpersonal balancing is unacceptable because it ignores the separatenessofpersons.Whereas balancing
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DAVID O. BRINK
benefitsand harmsmaybe acceptable withina life,balancing benefits
and harms acrosslivesmayappear unacceptable. In the intrapersonal
are thesame person,so compensation
case,benefactorand beneficiary
is automatic.In the interpersonalcase, benefactorand beneficiaryare
different
people; unless the beneficiaryreciprocatesin some way,the
benefactor'ssacrificewill not be compensated.The lack of interperto insistthat
sonal compensationleads some criticsofpersonneutrality
distributionsof benefitsand harmsacross livesbe such thattheyare
acceptable,in a waythatneeds to specified,to eachaffectedparty.13
This appeal to compensation challenges utilitarianism'sinterpersonal balancing withoutdrawinginto question the intrapersonalbalancing that prudence demands. But we mightwonder whetherthe
doubtsabout interpersonalbalancingcouldn't be extended to intrapersonalbalancing.If the separatenessof personsdefeatsinterpersonal
periodsin an indibalancing,whydoesn't theseparatenessofdifferent
vidual'slifedefeatintrapersonalbalancing?Afterall, me-nowand melaterare distinctpartsof me.14But then it mayseem hard to see how
me-nowis anymorecompensatedforitssacrificeson behalfofme-later
than I am compensated by mysacrificesto you.Justas doubts about
interpersonalbalancing lead to a distributedconcern,requiringfurther articulation,with each person, perhaps doubts about intrapersonal balancing support a distributedconcern, requiring further
articulation,witheach partof an individual'slife.
But it is significantthatdifferent
periods withinan individual'slife
are partsof a largerorganicwhole,whereasdifferent
lives,as such,do
not seem to be proper partsof any largerorganicwhole. Partsof an
organicwhole have theirnaturedeterminedin partbytheirrole in the
whole of whichtheyare parts.The natureof an agent at any point in
timeis largelyconditionedbyher being a temporallyextended being.
So, forexample,she willpossessvariousdesiresand intentionsto be a
certainsortof person and to engage in certainvocationsand avocato futurestagesofhertions,all ofwhichare future-directed,
referring
self.This means thatin orderto characterizeher at particulartimeswe
need to see these as partsof a largerwhole. So person-stagesare necessarilypartsof persons.Bycontrast,groupsofpeople, as such,do not
formwholes thatare as stronglyorganic.Individualscan formdesires
and intentionsthatdo not essentiallyreferto otherindividualsor the
set of individualsthattheytogetherform.
Moreover,agents (or the livesof agents) are essentiallytemporally
extended.To be an agentis to be a being thatis distinctfromparticular
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PRUDENCEAND AUTHENTICITY
and
appetitesand emotions,who can distinguishbetweentheintensity
of
her
and
deliberate
about
the
emotions,
authority
appetites
appropriateobjectsofher appetitesand emotions,and regulateher conduct
in accordance withthesedeliberations.This makes an agenta temporallydispersed creature.But whereas agents span times,theydo not
normallyspan persons.There are exceptions.We can make sense of
groupsofpeople bound byassociationaltieswho engage injoint deliberationsand decision makingqualifyingas corporateagents.But collectionsof individualsdo not,as such,formcorporateagents.15
Insofaras agents are discrete,temporallyextended individuals,we
can see how diachronic,intrapersonalcompensationis automaticin a
waythatinterpersonalcompensationis not. This allowsus to defend
the intrapersonalbalancingthatprudence demands withoutcommittingourselvesto unrestricted
interpersonalbalancing.16In particular,
the appeal to compensationallows us to defend temporalneutrality
and itscommitmentto now-for-then
sacrifice.
It is no accident, therefore,that prudence's temporal neutrality
seems to be a requirementof practical reason and temporal bias
We engage in the
appears as a paradigmaticform of irrationality.
wheneverwe
intrapersonalbalancingrequired bytemporalneutrality
in
now-for-then
sacrifice.
This
we
undertake
do
whenever
we
engage
and
commitments
to
which
we
would
otherwise
be
actions,projects,
indifferent
or averseforthesake ofsome later,greatergood. This kind
of rationalplanning is ubiquitous.We maynot notice its more mundane applications,such as when we standin line in orderto get tickets
to a movie,whenwe stopto refuelour cars,orwhenwe go to thedentist
for routine preventivedental care. We are more likelyto recognize
now-for-then
sacrificewhen the sacrificeis more significant.For
instance,I engage in such sacrificewhen I undergo a medical procedure thatinvolvesan extendedand painfulrecoveryin orderto regain
fullrange of motion and the abilityto participatein a fullerrange of
physical activitiesthan would otherwisebe possible. The training
required forsuccess in manyvocationsand avocationsoftenrequires
variousnon-negligiblephysical,financial,and personalsacrifices.Provided the laterbenefitsgenuinelydo outweighthenear-term
costs,the
sacrificesseem rational,and failureto persevere,if understandable,
neverthelessseems to be a formof weakness.Indeed, the evolutionof
of now-for-then
the abilityto recognizethe rationality
sacrificeand to
regulateone's appetites,emotions,and actionsin accordancewiththis
recognitionis arguablya significantpartof the process of normative
225
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DAVID O. BRINK
development that marks the progress from adolescence to responsibilityand maturity.17
3. TemporalNeutralityand Authenticity
However, it is perhaps significant that the sort of unproblematic applications of temporal neutralitythatwe have so far considered all involve
continuity of the agent's projects, interests,and ideals. I was assuming
that my interest in seeing a particular movie persists through the wait
in line to buy tickets.There is a certain fixityof interestsif my interest
in full range of motion in myshoulder, derived frommypassion to play
various sports, motivates mydecision to have rotator cuffsurgeryand is
rewarded by successful surgery,physical therapy, and rehabilitation.
And when I endure financial and personal hardship to train for a successful professional career, it seems significant that my professional
aspirations, forwhich I undertake the sacrifices,persist long enough to
be realized. It is less clear that temporal neutralityis desirable or even
possible when diachronic fixityof interests,projects, and ideals does
not obtain. Doubts about temporal neutralitycan seem especially compelling in cases of diachronic intrapersonal conflictsof values or ideals.
In ThePossibilityofAltruismThomas Nagel claims that temporal neutralityis unproblematic when any "preference changes" are "regarded
with indifference". However, he sees a problem when neutrality is
applied to intrapersonal conflicts of ideals.
It may happen that a person believes at one time thathe will at some
futuretime accept general evaluativeprinciples-principles about what
reasonsforaction-which he nowfindspernicious.Morethingsconstitute
over,he maybelieve thatin the futurehe willfindhis presentvalues pernicious. What does prudence require of him in that case? Prudence
requiresthathe take measureswhichpromotethe realizationof thatfor
whichthere willbe reason. Do his beliefsat the earliertimegivehim any
groundsforjudging whathe willhave reason to do at the later [time]?It
is not clear to me thattheydo, and ifnot, then the requirementof prudence or timelessreasonsmaynot be applicable.18
In a footnote, Nagel qualifies these doubts about temporal neutrality.
On the other hand, he mayhave a clear viewabout the matter.Suppose
forexample thathe now believes thatin twenty
yearshe willvalue secuhe
and
whereas
now
values sex, spontanerity,status,wealth,
tranquility,
ity,frequent risks,and strong emotions. A decisive response to this
situationcould take eitherof twoforms.The individualmaybe strongly
of his inevitablefuturevalues simenough convincedoftheworthlessness
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PRUDENCEAND AUTHENTICITY
ply to refusethem any claim on his presentconcerns. We would then
regardhis presentvalues as valid for the futurealso, and no prudential
reasonswould derivefromhis expected futureviews.On the otherhand
he maytreatboth his presentand futurevalues like preferences,regarding themeach as a sourceofreasonsunder a higherprinciple:'Live in the
of yourchoice.' That would demand of him a certainprudence
life-style
In eithercase,
about keeping open the paths to eventualrespectability.
his positionwould be formulablein timelessreasons.19
The waysthat Nagel qualifies his initial doubts about temporal neutrality are suggestive. But these claims, understood as applying to an
agent's objective reasons, make the defense of temporal neutralitytoo
dependent on what the agent thinks about her present and future reasons for action. Now regarding my future ideals as worthless does not
make them worthless, any more than my later regarding my current
ideals as worthless makes them worthless. If not, then privileging my
current ideals cannot be so easily squared with temporal neutrality.
Nor is it clear that we should tryto defend temporal neutralityby treating our conflicting ideals like conflicting preferences. It is comparativelyeasy to view changes in mere preferences with equanimity; it is
harder to view changes in ideals that way.20
In Reasons and PersonsDerek Parfitis more emphatic than Nagel that
such intrapersonal conflicts of value undermine temporal neutrality
and prudence (or the self-interesttheory, as he calls it). Writing of
Nagel's example, Parfitclaims that, according to temporal neutrality
thisyoung man mustgive the same weightto his presentand predicted
futurevalues and ideals. This would be givingthe same weightto whathe
now believes to be justifiedand whathe now believes to be worthlessor
It mayevenbe logicallyimpossible.21
contemptible.Thisis clearlyirrational.
Parfit reasons that temporal neutrality requires neutrality between
one's current and future ideals. This sort of neutrality,he thinks,is at
least irrational and perhaps incoherent. Why exactly?
Such neutralitywould be irrational ifwe assume that an agent ought
to act on those value judgments she sincerely accepts or would accept
on reflection at the time of acting. An authentic agent would seem to
be one who acts in a principled way and in accordance with the principles she avows. But then an agent who fails to act on ideals she accepts
at the time of action would seem to display bad faith or lack of authenticity,and this might seem to constitute a kind of irrationality.
To see why this sort of inauthenticitymight be irrational, consider a
parallel issue. Suppose that an agent (for example, a doctor) has to
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DAVID O. BRINK
decide whatto believeabout some non-evaluative
matter(forexample,
the cause of a patient'ssymptoms)in order to decide whatto do (for
example, how best to treatthe patientmedically).There maybe conflictingevidenceand hypothesesabout the cause ofthepatient'ssymptomsthatthe doctoris obligatedto assessin an open-mindedway.But
she mustformsome belief about the cause of the agent's symptoms
and prescribetreatmenton the basis of her bestjudgmentat the time.
Prescribinganytreatmentat variancewithwhatshe thenjudges to be
the best treatmentforthe maladyshe believes the patienthas would
seem to displaybad faithor a lack ofauthenticity.
Moreover,such a disconnect between the doctor'sjudgments and her actions seems to
invitethe charge of irrationality.
But ifthe doctorwould be irrational
withher best medical deliberationsat the time,
to act inconsistently
thenitseems plausiblethatan agentwho acted inconsistently
withher
bestpracticaldeliberationsat the timewould also be irrational.
Indeed, as Parfitsuggests,temporalneutrality
mayseem to ask the
It
is
to
common
view
an
intentional
action as the
impossible.
agent's
of
his
such
as
his
beliefs,and his conproduct
representationalstates,
ativestates,such as his desires,at thetimeofaction.And,ofcourse,his
desires may be shaped by his evaluativebeliefsabout what sortsof
On such a view,an agentcan fail
projectsand activitiesare worthwhile.
to act on his currentideals throughweaknessofwillifhe is moved by
good-independentdesires.Buthe cannotact on ideals thathe does not
have at the timeof actinganymore thanhe can act on someone else's
ideals. Of course,he can adopt now ideals thathe knowshe willhave
later,just as he can adopt someone else's ideals. But in eithercase,
adoption of hithertoalien ideals internalizesthem and so confirms,
ratherthanviolates,the requirementthatan agentcan act onlyon ideals he acceptsat thetimeof action.Ifso, temporalneutrality
mayseem
to runafoulofa kindof temporalbias thatis builtintotheveryidea of
intentionalaction.22
4. TemporalNeutralityand Personal Identity
Elsewhere,Parfitsuggeststhatthesedoubts about the implicationsof
forintrapersonalconflictsofvalue are
prudence's temporalneutrality
reinforcedby adoption of what he calls a psychologicalreductionist
conception of personal identitythat analyzes personal identityinto
relationsof psychologicalconnectednessand continuity.
Roughly,two
are
connected
insofar
as
the
intentional
states
persons
psychologically
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PRUDENCEAND AUTHENTICITY
and actions of one influence the intentional states and actions of the
other. Examples of intrapersonal psychological connections include
A's earlier decision to vote Democratic and her subsequent casting of
her ballot for the Democratic candidate, A's later memories of a disturbing childhood incident and her earlier childhood experiences,
and A's later career change and her earlier re-evaluation of her priorities concerning work and family.Two persons are psychologically continuous insofar as theyare links in a chain or series of people in which
contiguous links in the chain are psychologically connected. Both connectedness and continuitycan be matters of degree. According to the
psychological reductionist, personal identityconsists in maximal (nonbranching) psychological continuity.23
Such a conception of personal identitymay put intertemporal conflictsof ideals in a new perspective. Parfit describes the case of a nineteenth-centuryRussian nobleman.
In severalyears,a youngRussianwillinheritvastestates.Because he has
socialistideals, he intends,now,to give the land to the peasants.But he
he
knowsthatin timehisideals mayfade.To guard againstthispossibility,
does twothings.He firstsignsa legal document,whichwillautomatically
giveawaythe land, and whichcan be revokedonlywithhiswife'sconsent.
He thensaysto hiswife,'Promiseme that,ifI everchange mymind,and
ask you to revokethisdocument,youwillnot consent.' He adds, 'I regard
myideals as essentialto me. IfI lose theseideals, I wantyou to thinkthat
I cease to exist.I wantyou to regardyourhusband then,not as me, the
man who asks you forthispromise,but onlyas his corruptedlater self.
Promiseme thatyou would not do whathe asks.'24
Parfituses the Russian nobleman example to argue that adoption of a
reductionist view of personal identityshould lead us to revise our views
about promissory fidelity,especially in cases involving intertemporal
conflicts of ideals.25 But we can also use it to raise furtherquestions
about temporal neutrality.
Parfit seems to think that psychological reductionism justifies the
Russian nobleman's claim that loss of his socialist ideals represents a
substantial change, one that he does not survive. He claims that this
explains why the nobleman's bourgeois successor cannot revoke the
nobleman's commitment, and why the nobleman's wife would be justified in carrying out the promise, despite the successor's attempts to
revoke it. Presumably, Parfit believes that psychological reductionism
implies that a change in fundamental ideals severs psychological continuityand connectedness and so constitutes a substantial change. If
so, thiswould appear to pose a problem forprudence's demand of tem229
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DAVID O. BRINK
poral neutralityas well. To the extentthatintertemporalconflictsof
ideals disrupt psychologicalcontinuity,they make what otherwise
appear to be intrapersonalconflictsresembleinterpersonalconflicts.
willbe no moreplausiblethaninterBut thenintertemporal
neutrality
as
we
personal neutrality.Just mightrejectinterpersonalbalancingon
the ground thatsuch sacrificesare uncompensated,so too we might
thatwe balance the interestsof
rejectdemands of temporalneutrality
the nobleman and his bourgeoissuccessor.Ifwe viewcases of whatwe
initiallycalled intrapersonalconflictsof value on the interpersonal
seems a problematicdemand.
model, then temporalneutrality
5. Identityand Neutrality
withoutFixityof Character
This last doubt about temporalneutralitythreatensto turnan issue
about intrapersonaldistributionintoan issue about interpersonaldistribution.Let us deal withit first.It turnsout to involveseveraldistinguishableissues.
First,thereis a question whetherParfit'sconclusion,whichrejects
betweencurrentand futureideals, is even inconsistentwith
neutrality
For Parfit'sdefenseofa bias towardcurrentideals
temporalneutrality.
depends upon psychologicalchanges that diminishcontinuityand
connectednessand threatena substantialchange. But then the bias is
not a pure timepreference,givingsignificanceto a mere differencein
temporallocation. Temporal location has normativesignificance,on
thisview,onlyinsofaras itis correlatedwithdiminishedcontinuity
and
connectedness.
as denySidgwick,who sometimesconceivesof temporalneutrality
in
that
mere
differences
can
location
have
rational
ing only
temporal
be
content
with
this
to
Parfit.
But
resisted
we
significance,might
reply
thatconception of temporalneutrality
as too narrow.Temporal neuto
should
conflicts
of value as well. More
trality
apply heterogeneous
think
of
we
as denyingthattemgenerally, might
temporalneutrality
and
location
of
harms
can
have
normative
poral
goods
significance
theactual or expectedvalue ofthelifein
withoutin some wayaffecting
whichtheyoccur.But whileParfitdoes thinkthatthe change ofideals
affectscontinuityand connectednesswithina life,he does not claim
thatit affectsthe magnitudeof the goods or harmsat stake for the
socialistor his bourgeois successor.So if diminishedcontinuityand
connectednesssupporta bias forthe present,thisis a bias thatdoes
oftemporalneutrality.
seeminconsistent
withourbroaderunderstanding
230
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PRUDENCEAND AUTHENTICITY
Of course,ifa change of ideals constitutesa substantialchange, in
which the socialistand his bourgeois successorare literallydifferent
wayto reconcilea bias toward
people, then thereis a straightforward
currentideals withprudence. For prudence requiresneutrality,
when
it does, between one's own currentand futureideals, not neutrality
betweenone's own currentideals and the futureideals of another.If
different
thesocialistand thebourgeoisare literally
people withdifferent interests,then prudence won't automaticallyask the socialistto
concernhimselfwiththe interestsof his bourgeoissuccessor.
But perhaps changes of ideals can affectcontinuityand connectedness withoutliterallyproducingsubstantialchange. Here we need to
askwhetherreductionismmakes constancyof characterand ideals an
and connectednessor identity.
ingredientin eithercontinuity
A psychologicalreductionistaccount of personal identitymaypreof characterifit groundsidentityin connectednessand
suppose fixity
as an ingredientin connectedness.Successiveselves
treatssimilarity
thatare connectedare usuallyquite similarpsychologically.
Wholesale
and instantaneouspsychologicalchange is extremelyrare and might
is essentialto connectedqualifyas a substantialchange. If similarity
then change of ideals
ness and connectednessis essentialto identity,
substantial
well
may
produce
change.
We mightagree thatpsychologicalconnectednessdoes presuppose
and resistthe idea thatchange of ideals induces substantial
similarity
thattypichange bypointingto the range of psychologicalsimilarities
of
ideals.
Call
the
of
a
disstages
temporally
callypersistdespitechange
if
with
ideals
Before
and
After.
Even
different
Before
persed person
and Afterhave different
ideals and otherdifferencesconsequentupon
thosedifferent
ideals,theyare likelyto have manyotherpsychological
traitsin common. Theyare likelyto share manyfactualbeliefs(about
non-evaluativeand some evaluativematters),(quasi-) memories,and
intellectualand practicalskills(forexample,linguistic,mathematical,
and athleticabilities),and mayshare otherpersonal and avocational
interestsin common. Where thisis true,After'sstateswillbe causally
condependent on Before'sstates,whichwillmake Aftersubstantially
nected to Before.
Ifthe
However,thisis not thebestwayto defendtemporalneutrality.
of
the
model
character
of
defense
change depends on
intrapersonal
formsof
then it maybe helped by significant
psychologicalsimilarity,
formsof dissimibut it mustalso be weakened bysignificant
similarity
larity.
231
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DAVID O. BRINK
A betterdefense of the intrapersonalmodel of characterchange
challenges the assumptionthat psychologicalreductionismrequires
For,as psychologicalconnectednessis usuallyunderstood,it
similarity.
Two people are psychologicallycondoes not presuppose similarity.
nectedinsofaras thereis therightsortofpsychologicalinteractionand
influencebetweenthem.But theseare causal relationsthatdo notpresuppose similarrelata.A can influenceB even ifA and B are quite different.
Such a conceptionofpsychologicalconnectednessfitswiththemain
rationaleforpsychologicalreductionism.John Locke, who conceives
ofpersonalidentityin termsofmemoryconnectedness,providesintellectual inspirationfor manyin the psychologicalreductionisttradiHuman Understanding
tion.26 In An Essay Concerning
Locke distinguishes
between persons and men (or, as we might preferto say,human
beings) and claims thatthe concept of a person and thatof the same
person overtimeare "forensic"concepts.27PartofwhatLocke means
because only
is thatonlypersonsare accountable in law and morality,
for
are
their
actions.
responsible
Non-responsibleagents act
persons
on theirstrongestdesires;iftheydeliberate,itis onlyabout theinstruof theirdesires.Bycontrast,responsimentalmeans to the satisfaction
ble agents must be able to distinguishbetween the intensityand
authorityof theirdesires,deliberate about the value or authorityof
theirdesires,and regulatetheiractionsin accordance withtheirdeliberations. Only agents who are responsible in this way are persons.
Locke also thinksthatascriptionsof responsibility
presupposeidentity
inasmuchas he thinksit makessense to punishA forB's crimeonlyif
A and B are thesame.Whetheror notwe agreewithLocke thatresponwe can agree withhim about the forensic
sibilitypresupposesidentity,
rationale for psychologicalreductionism.But this rationale gives us
reason to focuson thosepsychologicalconnectionsthatexhibitdeliberThat is, of special importance for the psychological
ative control.28
reductionistought to be those connectionsthathold among actions,
intentions,and priordeliberationsin the reasoned maintenanceand
modificationof intentionalstatesand in the performanceof actions
thatreflectthesepriordeliberations.
But ifwe understanddeliberativecontrolas a keyingredientin psychological connectedness,then we have furtherreason for denying
thatcharacterchange, as such,disruptspsychologicalconnectedness.
For,on thisview,thereis deliberativecontroland, hence, psychological connectednessbetweenBeforeand Afterwhentheagentintention232
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PRUDENCEAND AUTHENTICITY
allymodifiesher beliefs,desires,values,and plans,as wellas when she
retainsthemunchanged. So long as the person playsa suitablerole in
generatingand shapingher change of ideals, characterchange is no
obstacleto connectedness.29
thatpsychologicalreductionismis formuMoreover,it is significant
ratherthan connectedness.As Thomas
lated in termsof continuity,
Reid suggestedin his criticismof Locke's account of personalidentity
in termsof memoryconnectedness,identityis, but psychologicalconrelation.30IfA = B and B = C, thenA = C.
nectednessis not,a transitive
But even ifA is connectedto B and B is connected to C, A need not be
connectedto C. Not so withcontinuity,
whichis definedas a chain the
linksofwhichare connected.31ProvidedA is connected to B, and B is
connected to C, A and C willbe continuous,even iftheyare not connected.But thenevenif,contraryto fact,thepsychologicaldifferences
betweenBeforeand Afterpreventedthemfrombeing connected,this
factwould not preventthemfrombeingcontinuous.Even ifsuccessive
selveshad to be somewhatsimilarto each otherand wholesaleinstantaneous characterchange did count as substantialchange, thiswould
be compatiblewiththepoles in a seriesofcontinuousselvesbeing radicallydifferent.
So, at leastin normalcases ofcharacterchange,in whichtheprocess
is suitablyendogenous,thereis no reason to treatthe change as a substantialchange. This means thatsuch intertemporalconflictsofvalue
are intrapersonalconflictsofvalue. That makescompensationpossible
to work.
and so allowsroom forthejustificationof temporalneutrality
reductionism
no
distinctive
Psychological
provides
perspectiveon
intrapersonalconflictsofvalue.
6. The Coherence of TemporalNeutrality
Even ifintertemporalconflictsof ideals are best seen as intrapersonal
distributionproblems,the demands of temporalneutralitymay not
make sense if temporalbias is builtinto the veryidea of good-dependent choice. When I act on the basis of ideals,I can act onlyon ideals
I now have. I can no moreact on ideals thatI do not have now,butwill
have later,than I can act on someone else's ideals.
is
However,thisapparentconceptualobstacleto temporalneutrality
spurious.Understoodone way,temporalbias is unavoidablebut is no
threatto temporalneutrality.
Understoodanotherway,temporalbias
is a threatto temporalneutralitybut has no necessityto it. Temporal
233
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DAVID O. BRINK
bias does seem unavoidable in the sense that my good-dependent
choice can onlyreflectjudgmentsthatI accept at the timeof action. I
cannotact on merelyfuturejudgmentsanymore thanI can act directly
on thejudgmentsof another.We mightsaythatthiskind of unavoidand timing
able temporalbias reflectsa factabout the ownership
ofjudgwhose
where
that
involves
ments,
notjust
judgmentstheyare butwhen
theyare held. But these truismsabout the ownershipand timingof
judgmentsimplynothingabout theircontent.
Though I can act onlyon
I
can
of
another
adopt thejudgments
personand make
myjudgments,
I can modifymycurrentjudgments
in lightof
themmyown.Similarly,
If
judgmentsI knowor expect to have later. I am initiallyinclined to
judge 4, but I realize thatyou havejudged X or thatI myselfwilllater
judge X,thenI maywantto revisitmyreasonsforjudging 4. This will
be so especiallyifI havereason to thinkthatyourjudgmentsor myown
laterjudgmentshave been formedbyprocessesat least as reliable as
thosethatinitially
led me tojudge 4. In revisiting
myinitialjudgments,
I may modifythem. In the case of plans or projects,I can abandon
themor modifythemin a waythatwillallowme to pursue otherplans
can affectthe contentof mycurlater.In thisway,temporalneutrality
rentjudgmentsand ideals. IfI have to act now on the basis ofmyjudgments,I willhave to act on thosejudgmentsand ideals I now accept,
butthecontentofthesecan incorporatethedemandsoftemporalneuSo in the sense in whichtemporalbias is unavoidable (ownertrality.32
and
timing), this is compatible with temporal neutrality
ship
In
the sense in which temporalbias is incompatiblewith
(content).
temporalneutrality(content), temporalbias is not unavoidable and
maywell be irrational.33
7. DefendingPrudence
But to say that prudence's temporal neutralitymakes a coherent
demand is notto saythatitmakesa plausibledemand. Eveniftemporal
neutralitycan be defended by appeal to compensation,thatdefense
need notbe decisive.Perhapsin cases ofintrapersonalprudentialconflict,itis notunreasonableforan agentto refuseto sacrificehiscurrent
ideals, even if he, a temporallyextended agent, is compensated for
such sacrifice.Perhapsthedemands of temporalneutrality
require,as
Parfitclaims,thatthe agent viewher ideals as mere preferences,like
preferencesin ice cream. It seems acceptable to indulgeyourcurrent
preferenceforRockyRoad, but onlyin waysthatleave you freeto sat234
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PRUDENCEAND AUTHENTICITY
isfyyour later preferencefor Neapolitan. That kind of equanimity
about expected changes in mere preferencesis hard to apply to
expectedchangesin ideals.It is hard to imaginetheRussiannobleman
acquiescing in his anticipatedchange of ideals. If we are unwillingto
viewchanges in ideals like changes in mere preferences,thenperhaps
we should rejectprudence and itsdemand of temporalneutrality.34
In assessingthis concern,we should firstnotice somethinga little
odd about the wayintrapersonalconflictsof value are typically
represented.Imagine thatBeforeis at a crucialforkin the road of lifeand
hisprudentialideals speakin favorofrouteA, buthe knowsthathe will
later become After,whose prudentialideals will be servedonlyif he
now chooses route B. Should Before be true to his own ideals and
choose routeA, should he empathizewithAfterand choose routeB, or
should he tryto forgesome thirdrouteC thatcompromisesbetweenA
and B? This wayof posing the problem assumes thatthereis a factof
thematterabout thecontentof one's futurecharacterand ideals independentlyof the crucial choices one makes now. But often,perhaps
thisis false.One's futurecharacterand ideals are verymuch
typically,
influencedbycrucialpracticaldecisionsone makeson theroad oflife.
It is quite unlikelythata radicalyoungsocialistwillturnintoa complacent bourgeois regardlessof the decisions he now makes. Who one
becomes depends in partupon whatone does now.35But thenit may
be possible to avoid manyintertemporalconflictsof value bymaking
choices now thatpreserve,ratherthancompromise,one's presentideals. Providedone's presentideals are worthwhile(about whichmore
below), one can honor temporalneutralityby acting in accord with
one's presentideals and therebyavoidingintertemporalconflict.
Of course, suicide maybe the onlywayof avoidingintertemporal
So the criticofprudence could always
conflictwithcompletecertainty.
that
there
will
be
an
conflictregardlessof (nonintertemporal
stipulate
suicidal) choices the agent now makes.And theremaybe some cases
where thisstipulationis not unrealistic,as when one's currentideals
conflictwitha wide range of possible futureideals. For instance,it is
not unreasonable to suppose thattherewillbe or willlikelybe a conand one's
flictbetweenone's presentpenchantforrecklessdaredevilry
futurepenchants,whatevertheymightbe (includingrecklessdaredevilry) or that there will be or will likelybe a conflictbetween one's
and one's futureideals,whatpresentideal of an extravagantlifestyle
ever they might be.36 But, as such examples suggest,in cases of
demand formoderaunavoidable intertemporalconflict,neutrality's
235
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DAVID O. BRINK
tion and compromiseis oftenfairlyplausible. Indeed, liabilityin an
ideal to generatingunavoidable intertemporalconflictsof values is
itselfa vice in an ideal. Other thingsbeing equal, an ideal thatavoids
intertemporalconflictis betterthanone thatdoes not.
In focusingon unavoidableconflicts,
we need to ask about thestatus
ideals. Ideals involvevaluejudgments.
or credentialsof the conflicting
Much depends upon whetherwe thinkthatvaluejudgments can be
true,justified,or otherwisereasonable. Ifwe do not,perhaps because
we regardvalue judgments as mere expressionsof noncognitiveattitudes,then conflictsof value willbe verymuch like conflictsof mere
preferences.
Justas the importantthingwitha mere preferenceis not
so too the important
the contentof thepreferencebut itssatisfaction,
is
not
their
with
attitudes
objectbuttheirsuccessful
thing
noncognitive
not
seem
does
problematicas applied to mere
expression.Neutrality
preferences,and it should be no more problematicas applied to
(other) noncognitiveattitudes.The situationis more complicatedif
one believes,as I do, thatvaluejudgmentsare fallibleand can be more
or less justified.For present purposes,we can be quite ecumenical
andjustification.37
Providedthat
about the relevantformsof fallibility
we thinkthatideals can be more and less reasonable,then,in underwe must
standingand ultimatelyassessingthe demands of neutrality,
concern ourselveswiththe meritsof the conflictingideals.38In doing
so,we need to considerand distinguishcases. We willsee, among other
things,that temporalneutralitydoes not require neutralitybetween
currentand futureideals independentlyof the meritsof thoseideals.
It will help to divide unavoidable conflictsinto symmetrical
onesthose in which the meritsof conflictingideals are comparable-and
ones-those in whichthe meritsof conflictingideals are
asymmetrical
different.
very
The asymmetrical
conflictsare perhapsmorestraightforward.
There
are twosuch cases. In the case of Corruption,
Before'sideals are valuable, whereasAfter'sare not. By contrast,in the case of Improvement,
Before's ideals are worthless,whereasAfter'sideals are valuable. In
cases of Corruptionand Improvement,the demands of temporalneuare clear-act on theworthwhile
ideal whenyou have it,not the
trality
worthlessone. This is a claimabout one's objectivereasons,thereasons
one has in virtueof the factsabout the situationwhetherone is in a
positionto recognizethemor not. In these cases, temporalneutrality
does not requireneutrality
betweencurrentand futureideals.
236
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PRUDENCEAND AUTHENTICITY
It is fairlyeasyto see how theagentcan and willact on thesereasons
in the case of Corruption,forthisjust requiresactingon his current
ideals. Here, actingon one's current,ratherthanfuture,ideals is also
whattemporalneutrality
demands.
However,mattersare more complicated in the case of Improvement. Temporal neutrality'sclaim about one's objective reasons
remainsplausible.One has objectivereason to act lateron thosevaluable ideals thatone willhold, ratherthan theworthlessideals thatone
now embraces. But can one act on thisverdictif it is the worthless,
ratherthanthe valuable,ideal thatone now embraces?Can temporal
make plausible claimsabout subjectiverationality?
Could it
neutrality
rationalto act on valuable ideals thatone does not now
be subjectively
hold? The answeris Yes, providedthatwe understandsubjectivereasons as the reasonsone has, not in virtueofwhatone nowjudges, but
in virtueof whatit would be reasonable forone tojudge now if one
gave the matterdue attention.It is part of a theoryof subjectiverationality,whichI willnot pursue furtherhere, to specifymore precisely
whatkindof idealizationoftheagent'sepistemicsituationis appropriate in determiningher subjectivereasons.As long as the worthlessness
of Before'sideals and the meritofAfter'sideals do not transcendreasonable idealizationsof theagent'sepistemicsituation,whateverthose
are, the comparativemeritsofearlierand laterideals willbe ascertainable in the relevantway.If the comparativevalue of her currentand
futureideals is availableto her in thisway,we can ascribe to her a subjectivereason to favorher futureideals. However,in cases ofImprovementin whichthe comparativevalues of currentand futureideals is a
transcendentfact (transcendingthe relevantidealization), then the
demands of objectiveand subjectiverationality
appear to diverge.The
friendof prudence can and should defend temporalneutralityas a
claim about theagent'sobjectivereasons.Whethershe is in a position
to recognizeit or not, she has no reason to act on her currentideals
and will have reason to act on her futureideals. This can be a case
rationalto do whatis in factobjectively
whereitmaynotbe subjectively
rational.
What about unavoidable conflictswhose meritsare symmetrical?
situationoccurswhen the conflictingideals are simThe Minus-Minus
Here
it seemsrightto agree withneutrality's
claimthat
worthless.
ilarly
thereis objectivereason not to act on eitherideal but to find,adopt,
and act on some thirdideal thathas merit.Providedthatthe comparativemeritsof the meretriciousand genuinelyvaluable ideals are rea237
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DAVID O. BRINK
sonablyascertainableand are not (in the relevantsense) transcendent
facts,thisalso yieldsa plausible claim about the agent'ssubjectivereasons.The agentshould act on neithermeretriciousideal but adopt and
act on the newvaluable ideal.
case of unavoidableconflictis thesymPerhapsthe mostinteresting
ideals are bothvaluable and commetricalcase in whichtheconflicting
parablyso. One example mightbe a conflictbetween excellingas a
professionalathleteearlyin life,whichmayrequireforgoingextended
educational and professionaltrainingand may impose significant
healthcostslaterin life,and variousformsofprofessionaland personal
success later in life. Another example might be familiarconflicts
between success in professionaland familylife.39We mightcall any
such case a Plus-Pluscase. Byhypothesis,
the conflictis unavoidable,so
thatAfter'sideals conflictwithBefore'sno matterwhatthe agent now
does, and each ideal is valuable. Here, temporalneutrality
recognizes
a conflictofobjectivereasonsand counsels a kindofneutrality
among
the competingideals. On reflection,thisseems right.If the agent can
pursue Before's ideals unreservedlyonly by completelyfrustrating
After'sideals (and vice versa),thenthereseems somethingobjectively
wrongwiththeunreservedpursuitofpresentideals. Ideally,one would
tryto finda wayto achievesubstantialsuccessin one's ideals bothnow
on the
and later,evenifitrequiredsome moderationin or restrictions
counsel ofmoderateor
pursuitof one's ideals nowor later.Neutrality's
restrictedpursuitof currentideals is an instanceof the familiaradage
"Not to burn one's bridges."Where such compromiseand accommodation are possible,neutrality
makesgood normativesense. Call these
But accommodationmaynot alwaysbe possicases of Accommodation.
ble. In cases of GenuineDilemmathere is no prospectof substantially
accommodatingboth ideals. Here, neutralityseems compatiblewith
twopossibilities.On the one hand, one mightachievesome less-thansubstantialsuccessalong both ideals-neither a stellarsuccess nor an
one mightengage in theunreabject failureat anytime.Alternatively,
served and successfulpursuitof ideals either now or later (but, by
hypothesis,not both), provided that the process of selecting the
favoredideal gave equal chances of successto bothideals (as in a coin
but thatseems to be a conseflip). Neither alternativeis attractive,
of
the
situation's
dilemmatic.40
One consolationis that
quence
being
unavoidable conflictsare somewhatrare,and Genuine Dilemmas are
even more exotic. Neutrality'sclaims about our objectivereasons in
such cases seem plausible enough.And, as before,providedthemerits
238
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PRUDENCEAND AUTHENTICITY
of the conflictingideals are not transcendentfacts,theseclaimsabout
the agent'sobjectivereasonsapplyto her subjectivereasonsas well.
8. ReconcilingTemporalNeutralityand Authenticity
characteristic
ofprudence can be defendedby
The temporalneutrality
whetherthe implications
We
wonder
to
might
compensation.
appeals
whichseem otherwiseacceptable,are plausible
of temporalneutrality,
in such
in cases involvingintertemporalconflictsofvalue. Is neutrality
cases desirable or even possible?I have triedto suggestthatwhen the
is not onlyposnatureofsuch conflictsis clarified,temporalneutrality
sible but plausible.
But ifwe accept thisdefenseofprudence,mustwe sacrificeauthenseems to involvebeing trueto oneself,to one's ideAuthenticity
ticity?
withone's commitments.
als and principles,and actingin conformity
Insofaras temporalneutralityrequiresin some cases of unavoidable
conflictof ideals thattheagent act in a waythatalienatesher fromthe
ideals she thenholds,isn'tprudencepurchasedat theprice ofauthenticity?
ifwe
We can reconcile the demands of prudence and authenticity
rememberthatthe agentis a personwho is temporallyextended.Her
past,present,and futureare equallypartsof her and her life,and her
near and distantfuturesare equallypartsof her.To be trueto herself,
extendedperson,she mustbe trueto all ofher
sinceshe is a temporally
attentiveto her currentidereasonableideals and cannotbe selectively
als. She mustweighherfuturereasonableideals,wheretheseare fixed,
againsther currentreasonable ideals,wherethisis necessary,in order
to conformher behaviorto all of her reasonable commitments.This
sortof concern forone's whole lifedoes not require forsakingone's
currentprudentialideals. But it does require conditioningtheirpursuit on recognitionof the legitimateclaims that one's reasonable
futureprudentialideals make on one.
This defenseof prudence has focusedon the demands of temporal
in intrapersonalconflictsof prudentialvalue. But temporal
neutrality
neutralityhas widerapplication to other sortsof intertemporalconcan arise in any context
flictsof value.41Concerns about authenticity
wherethe agent is asked to attachnormativesignificanceto ideals he
does nototherwiseendorseat thetimeofaction.We haveseen howthis
can occur when there is a conflictbetween the agent's currentand
239
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DAVID O. BRINK
futureprudentialideals. It can also occur betweenthe agent'scurrent
and futurenonprudentialideals.
Though it is not alwayseasy to distinguishbetweenprudentialand
nonprudentialideals, preciselybecause our viewsabout whatmatters
our viewsabout
froma moralor religiouspointofviewoftentransform
whatmakes our own livesworthliving,we can imagine thatsomeone
mighthave moralor religiousideals forwhichhe is willingto sacrifice
hisprudentialideals. But ifhismoralor religiouscommitments
change
in relevantwaysover time,he may have an intrapersonalconflictof
nonprudentialvalue. PerhapstheRussiannoblemanexample involves
a conflictof nonprudentialideals, though it is an open question
whetherthatconflictof social ideals is unavoidable and whetherthe
competingideals are comparablyreasonable. If the agent can anticipate thisconflict,he can framethe question of whetherhe should be
neutralas betweenhis currentand futureideals.
Here thereis no questionofdefendingneutrality
byappeal to diachronicintrapersonalcompensation.Because theideals are nonprudential,neitherideal is undertakenforthe agent'sown good and thereis
no prospectofcompensation.Butthereis stillthequestionwhetherhe
should in anywaymoderatepursuitofhiscurrentnonprudentialideals
in lightofhisfutureones. The demandsofneutrality
are equallycoherent and plausible when applied to thiscontext.Temporal neutrality
does not alwaysrequireneutrality
ideals,and,when
among conflicting
it does, this demand is defensible.Where possible, agents should
embrace ideals thatdo not giverise to conflictsor to conflictsamong
reasonable ideals. Where conflict among nonprudential ideals is
cases in which
unavoidable,we need to considercases. In asymmetrical
one ideal is meritoriousand the other is meretricious,the agent has
objectivereason to act on thevaluable ideal and lacksobjectivereason
cases of meretricious
to act on the meretriciousideal. In symmetrical
ideals an agenthas objectivereason to act on neitherideal butto adopt
and conformto a newideal thathas value. In symmetrical
cases ofvaluable ideals, the agent should recognizea conflictof objectivereasons.
Where accommodation is possible, neutrality's
demand not to burn
one's bridgesseems to be the objectivelyreasonable course of action.
Where the situationis genuinelydilemmatic,the agent has objective
reasonto act on eitherideal, itdoesn'tmatterwhich,providedtheprocess ofselectingthefavoredideal givesequal chancesofsuccessto both
ideals.All theseclaimsabout the agent'sobjectivereasonsapplyto his
subjectivereasonsas well,providedonlythatthecomparativemeritsof
240
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PRUDENCEAND AUTHENTICITY
the conflicting ideals are reasonably ascertainable in the relevant way.
Insofar as the conflicting but reasonable ideals are equally commitments that the agent undertakes, even if theyare undertaken at different times, faithfulnessto himself and his ideals requires conditioning
his pursuit of present ideals on recognition of the normative significance of his future ideals.
Agents are persons who persist through time and whose temporal
parts are equally real (or whose life has phases that are equally real).
When authenticityis understood in terms of faithfulnessto oneself and
one's principles, we can see that it is temporal bias, not temporal neutrality, that threatens authenticity. Indeed, properly understood,
authenticityrequires the commitment to temporal neutrality.
University
ofCalifornia,San Diego
Notes
This materialwasfirstpresentedas an invitedsymposiumat theAPA CentralDivisionMeetingsin Chicago in 2002 and laterat Ohio and Yale universities. I would like to thankaudiences on those occasions, especiallyStephen
Darwall,mycommentatorat the APA meetings,for extremelyhelpfulcommentaryand discussion.I would also like to thankthe editorsof the PhilosophicalReviewforvaluable commentson an earlierversionof thisessay.Workon
thismaterialwas supportedbya fellowshipfromthe National Endowmentfor
the Humanities.
1See, for example, GregoryVlastos,Socrates,
Ironistand MoralPhilosopher
Press,1991), 203, and Terence Irwin,Plato'sEthics
(Ithaca: Cornell University
Press,1995) sects. 36-37, 142, and "Aristippus
(New York:OxfordUniversity
74
Monist
(1991): 55-82.
AgainstHappiness,"
2Adam Smith,TheTheory
6th ed. [originallypublished
ofMoralSentiments,
1790], ed. D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie (Oxford: OxfordUniversity
Press,
Clarendon Press,1976), 6.1.11.
3Temporalbias playsan importantrole in Socraticand Aristoteliandiscussions of weaknessof will.Compare Plato's Protagoras
(356a-357e) and Aristotle's NicomacheanEthics 7.2-10. The significance of temporal bias or
(New York: Camdiscountingis explored in George Ainslie, Picoeconomics
and
Breakdown
Will
Press,
1992)
(New York: Cambridge
of
bridge University
Press,
2001).
University
4 HenrySidgwick,TheMethods
7thed. (Chicago: University
ofChiofEthics,
cago Press,1907), 124 n.; cf. 111.
5 Ibid., 381.
6Perhaps it is this differentialepistemic relation that we bear to the
presentand futurethatexplains whySmithsaysthat the impartialspectator
the same manner.
willweighpresentand futuregoods in nearly
394-95.
7Methods,
207-8,
8 1 believe,but cannot argue properlyhere, thatthisis trueeven of Stoic
241
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DAVID O. BRINK
and Kantian traditionsof practicaldeliberationthatofferaccounts of virtue
thatemphasizevoluntarycontroland indifference
to the actual consequences
of theagent'sattemptsto performhisduty.For such traditionsdo allowbeliefs
about the consequences of actionsto help determinewhichactionsthe agent
should attemptto perform,even ifsuccess in performingthe actions or producing the consequences for which he aims is, on these views,a matterof
moralindifference.
9 In interpersonalcontexts,we sometimesdistinguishbetweenequal concernand equal treatment.
Cf.Ronald Dworkin,"ReverseDiscrimination"in Taking RightsSeriously(Cambridge: Harvard UniversityPress, 1977), 227. For
instance,treatingmytwochildren,one ofwhomhas a significant
physicaldisas
in
them
terms
of
medical
and
ability, equals mayrequiretreating
unequally
other resources.We need to make the same distinctionin the intrapersonal
context.Prudence and temporalneutrality
requireequal concern,ratherthan
equal treatmentper se, forall partsof an agent'slife.
10Others,besides Smithand Sidgwick,have also defended temporalneuRamseydescribestemporalbias as "ethicallyindefensible";see Frank
trality.
Ramsey,"A MathematicalTheoryof Saving,"reprintedin FrankRamsey,Foundations(Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), 261. Rawls endorses Sidgwick's
account of temporal neutralityand describesthe commitmentto temporal
neutralityas "a featureof being rational";see John Rawls,A Theory
ofJustice
Press,1971), 293-94.
(Cambridge:HarvardUniversity
11Methods,
381.
12See Stephen Darwall, "Self-Interest
and Self-Concern,"SocialPhilosophy
and Policy14 (1997):158-78. This is one worryabout desire-satisfaction
conon the contentof the
ceptions of a person's good thatplace no restrictions
person'sdesires.
13Cf.Thomas Nagel, ThePossibility
(Oxford: OxfordUniversity
ofAltruism
Press,Clarendon Press,1970), 138, 142; Rawls,A Theory
of ustice,23-24, 2627, 29, 187-88, 191; and Robert Nozick, Anarchy,State,and Utopia (New
York:Basic Books, 1974), 31-34.
141intendtalkabout temporalpartsof a personor person'slifeto be metaecumenical in twoways.First,it is convenientto talkabout persons
physically
and theirtemporalpartswhetherpersons are four-dimensional
entitiesthat
entitieshave spatialparts)
literallyhave temporalparts (as three-dimensional
or whethertheyare three-dimensional
entitiesthathave no temporalpartsbut
do have lives,histories,or careers that have temporal parts or stages. Talk
about a person's temporalpartscan referto temporalpartsof persons or to
partsoflivesor careersofpersons.Second, mytalkoftemporalpartsis neutral
in the debate among thosewho treatpersonsas four-dimensional
entitieshaving temporalpartsabout whetherpersonsor theirtemporalpartsare priorin
order of explanation.
151 do not address here the sortof strongsocial organicismcontained in
the absolute idealisttradition,forexample, in the workof T. H. Green and
F. H. Bradley.For discussionof one strandin thistradition,see myPerfectionismand theCommonGood:Themesin T. H. Green(Oxford: OxfordUniversity
Press,Clarendon Press,2003), sects. 18-20.
242
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PRUDENCEAND AUTHENTICITY
16For a fullerdiscussionof these issues,see my"RationalEgoism and the
Separatenessof Persons,"in ReadingParfit,ed. J. Dancy (Oxford: Blackwell,
1997).
17In ThePossibility
and interNagel defendstemporalneutrality
ofAltruism
personal neutralityor altruism.Prudence insiststhatan agent'sfutureinterests provide her with reason for action now, and altruisminsiststhat the
interestsof others provide her (now) withreason for action for theirsake.
Nagel arguesthatfailureto recognizeprudenceinvolvestemporalsolipsismfailureto see the presentas one time among others,equally real-and that
failureto recognize altruisminvolvesinterpersonalsolipsism-failureto see
oneselfas one person among others,equally real. I have oftenthoughtthat
the real value of Nagel's thesislies in itsadequacy as a descriptionofdevelopmental psychology.For it seems to me thatthe process of turningchildren
into matureand responsibleadults (a processthatin some cases is nevercompleted) is in significant
partthe processofovercomingtemporaland personal
solipsism.
18ThePossibility
74.
ofAltruism,
19Ibid.
20Nagel's claims are more adequate as applied to subjectivereasons. But
even here thingsare more complicated.As I willargue,subjectivereasonsare
betterrelativized,not to the agent's actual evaluations,but to the evaluations
itwouldbe reasonableforher to make.Also,as we willsee, an agentis not limited to treatingher futureideals as worthlessor treatingall herideals as mere
preferences.
21Derek Parfit,Reasonsand Persons(Oxford:OxfordUniversity
Press,Clarendon Press,1984), 155.
22This mightbe one wayof pursuingWilliams'sinsistencethatthe "correct
perspectiveon one's lifeis fromnow."BernardWilliams,"Persons,Character,
and Morality,"
reprintedin BernardWilliams,MoralLuck (Cambridge:CamPress,1981), 13.
bridgeUniversity
23Two qualifications:(1) Ifwe are to defineidentityin termsof relationsof
these relationscannot themselvespresupposeidenpsychologicalcontinuity,
Relations
such
as
rememberingone's earlier experiences and fulfilling
tity.
willhave to be replaced
one's priorintentions,whichdo presuppose identity,
by more general quasi-relationsthat are otherwisesimilarbut presuppose
causal dependence withoutpresupposingidentity.See SydneyShoemaker,
7 (1970): 269-85
"Personsand Their Pasts,"AmericanPhilosophical
Quarterly
whichis
and Parfit,ReasonsandPersons,
220-21. (2) Ifwe are to defineidentity,
whichcan takea onea one-one relation,in termsof psychologicalcontinuity,
psychologicalcontinumanyform,we mustdefineit in termsof nonbranching
leads
us
to
this
conclusion
also lead us to the
that
But
the
may
ity.
reasoning
conclusionthatit is continuity(a potentiallyone-manyrelation),ratherthan
identity
per se, thatis whathas primarynormativesignificance.Parfitdiscusses
theseissuesin ReasonsandPersons,
chap. 12; I discussthemin "RationalEgoism
and theSeparatenessofPersons"and "Self-loveand Altruism,"
SocialPhilosophy
and Policy14 (1997):122-57.
24Reasonsand Persons,
327.
243
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DAVID O. BRINK
25The Russian nobleman example alwaysremindsme of the scene in Mel
in whichtheyoungFrankenstein(Gene Wilder) is
Brooks's YoungFrankenstein
about to enter a dungeon to calm the monster(Peter Boyle) and makes his
assistant(Teri Garr) and Igor (MartyFeldman) promisenot to open the dungeon door under anycircumstances.Needless to say,he regretstheseinstructions,whichhis assistantsrigidlyenforce.
26See Parfit,Reasonsand Persons,
part3, and SydneyShoemaker,Self-KnowlCornell
and
(Ithaca:
UniversityPress, 1963) and "Personal
Self-Identity
edge
Identity:A Materialist'sAccount,"in SydneyShoemaker and Richard Swinburne,PersonalIdentity
(Oxford:Blackwell,1984).
Human Understanding
[firstpublished
27JohnLocke, An Essay Concerning
ed.
P.
H.
Oxford
Nidditch
Press,Clarendon Press,
1690],
(Oxford:
University
1979), 2.27.8, 15, 17-21, 23, 26.
28Ifwe decide thatitis psychologicalcontinuity,
ratherthanidentityper se,
thatmatters,or even thatthe formerhas significantindependentnormative
presuppose
significance,we may conclude that ascriptionsof responsibility
and especiallydeliberativecontrol,ratherthanidenpsychologicalcontinuity,
and corpotityper se. This willallow us to make sense of sharedresponsibility
rateagency.
29There is some similarity,
I am not sure how much, betweenthese claims
about the role of deliberativecontrolin intrapersonalunityand Korsgaard's
Kantianclaimsabout the unityof agency.See ChristineKorsgaard,"Personal
and
Identityand theUnityofAgency:A KantianResponse to Parfit,"Philosophy
18 (1989): 101-32.
PublicAffairs
Powersof Man [firstpublished
30Thomas Reid, Essayson theIntellectual
1785], ed. B. Brody(Cambridge:MIT Press,1969), 3.357-58.
31Mypresentconcern is withthe conditionsof substantialchange and so
rather
withidentity.
Requiringthatidentitybe definedin termsof continuity,
than connectedness,is compatible,I think,withleavingit an open question
whetheritis continuity,
connectedness,or boththathas or have normativesignificance.
321 thinkthatwe could make essentiallythe same point by distinguishing
and second-orderjudgments.Mycurrentfirst-order
betweenfirst-order
judgmentmightbe 4, but I mightalso (currently)accept the second-orderjudgment thatI should act onlyon first-order
judgments thatare diachronically
that
stable.Providedthatrationality
agentsregulatetheirbehaviorin
requires
accordance withsuch second-orderjudgments,the fact that agents can act
consisonlyon such second-orderjudgmentswhentheyhold themis perfectly
tentwithtemporalneutrality.
betweenthisresponseto the alleged impossibil33There is a clear similarity
and
of
ity temporalneutrality a familiarresponse to the alleged impossibility
of altruisticaction thatdiagnoses the apparentnecessityof selfishmotivation
ofdesires(whereas
and content
as restingon a confusionbetweenthe ownership
an agentalwaysacts so as to satisfy
her own desires,the contentof her desires
need not referto herself).
34The idea of an ideal thatis somethingmore thana mere preferencemay
be related to Williams'sideas about categoricaldesires and ground projects
244
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PRUDENCEAND AUTHENTICITY
11-14), thoughhe tendsto prescind,as I
("Persons,Character,and Morality,"
would not, fromtalk about the meritsor value of such desiresand projects.
But I won'tpursue thepotentialconnectionwithWilliams'sdiscussionanyfurther.
35Lurkingsomewherehere is a relativeof Parfit'sNon-Identity
Problem.
That problem makes it hard to assess the moral consequences of alternative
actionsin certainfamiliarways(forexample,person-affecting
ways)inasmuch
as manyalternativesaffectnotjust how benefitsand harms are distributed
among a givenset of people but also who existsto be benefitedor harmed
(Reasonsand Persons,chap. 16). In the intrapersonalcase, alternativesoften
determinewhichideals existto be promotedor hindered.ParfittakesthenonI am unclear
identityproblem to supporta formof interpersonalneutrality.
whetherthe correspondingintrapersonalproblem about plasticityof ideals
How farthe parallelsextendand whattheyshow
supportstemporalneutrality.
about the intrapersonalcase deservefurtherconsideration.
36It is a signofjusthow harditis to identify
genuinelyunavoidableconflicts
is not in factincompatiblewith
thata presentideal of an extravagantlifestyle
all possible futureideals. For instance,it would be compatiblewitha future
ideal of an asceticlifestyle.
37So the followingdiscussionneed not presuppose realismor any other
comparablysectarianmetaethicalview.
38In Reasonsand PersonsParfitcomplainsthatprudence musttreatideals as
mere preferences(154). But Parfitfoiststhissortof radicalsubjectivism
about
value on friendsof prudence withoutanyjustification.The demands of prudence can and should reflectthe comparativemeritsof an agent'sideals.
391 thinkthatit is less clear thatthisconflictis inevitableor unavoidable,
and it is as much a synchronicconflictas itis a diachronicconflict.
40These claims about intrapersonaldilemmas parallel claims we might
make about moral dilemmas. See David O. Brink,"Moral Conflictand Its
Review103 (1994): 215-47.
Structure"Philosophical
411 do not address intertemporalconflictsbetween one person's current
ideals (prudentialor otherwise)and the futureideals of anotherperson (prudentialor otherwise).
245
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