Chapter IV
THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE
Chapter lV
THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE
The Eisenhower Doctrine (see Appendix VI) emerged from
the ruins of the Suez crisis.
dragged further
The United States was
in the quagmire of the Middle East
politics because of the role
it had played in
it.
President Eisenhower was extremely eagar for peace and
stability in the region through a balance of power.
He
also believed that given the altered power structure in
the region after the end of the British influence there,
" ... a greater responsibility now evolves upon the United
States." 1
Doctrine
From this conviction emerged the Eisenhower
which
ignored the
satisfied
fact
that
no
one
Egypt had
in
particular
emerged
important player in post Suez period.
as
the
as
it
most
This chapter
will try to analyse the foreign policy objectives of the
United States in the post-Suez period,
the enunciation
of
reactions
the
Eisenhower
Doctrine
and
the
that
followed.
1. Special Message to the Congress on the Situation in
the Middle East, Janurary 5,1957,p.6 Public Papers of
the President
of the United States : Dwight
~
Eisenhower 1957 (Washington D.C., 1957).
Henceforth
cited as PPE-DDE.
229
The
principles
that
Eisenhower
pronounced
in
,
special message to the Congress on January 5,1957 cam•
to be popularly known as the Eisenhower Doctrine
Appendix VII) .
(Se•
This message was very important as i·
tried to delineate the United States role in the Middl•
East in the post Suez era.
of
Unite~
States foreign policy in the Middle East were,
endin~
the Arab-Israeli boundary dispute,
bette:
According
understanding
to
with
Eisenhower
the
the
nations
objecion
achieving a
of
the
preventing the spread of Communism therein.
region
an~
It was th1
last objective that concerned the President the most
He said :
(the Middle East was an area that had) been often
troubled ... (and it had)abruptly reached a new and
critical stage in its
long and
important
history ... (the area had) always been coveted by
Russia, would today be prized more than ever by
international Communism ... 2
He went on to declare that the
protector of small nations." 3
2. Special Message, n.l, pp 6-7
230
United States was, " ... i
It would appear that Eisenhower's message was full
of paradoxical statements.
supporting,
each and
On the one hand he talked of
" the full sovereignty and independence of
every nation of
the Middle
East. " 4
He
emphasised the Soviet Union's desire to, "dominate" the
region and the United States having never "entertained
such
a
thought." 5
But
it
is
quite
evident
that
Eisenhower's support to the sovereignty of the countries
of the Middle East was primarily intended to prevent
Communism from gaining a
eventuality
would
have
interest He
sought to
stronghold there.
threatened
fulfill
this
vital
aim
by
Such an
American
promising
economic and military aid to the nations of the area.
For this purpose he asked the Congress to allocate the
sum of $200 million on an annual basis for a period of
two years(l958 and 1959).
4. Ibid. , p. 7
5. Ibid.
231
However, since the containing
of
Communism
remained
the
primary
goal
the
other
pressing problems of the region got relegated to the
background.
Doctrine.
This was a major drawback of the Eisenhower
Had Eisenhower tackled the other
issues
alongside, he would have earned the deep respect of the
Middle East nations.
According
to
the
contemporary
sources
reactions to the Eisenhower proposals were mixed.
felt that the Doctrine
was
'new'
the
Some
something which
prompted the foreign policy of the United States after
1956 to,
" ... set
its rudder and sails for
with the Arab-Asian lands. n 6
friendship
Others pointed to its,
"
vague" 7 character and saw it as an expression of antiCommunism,
ignoring the more
Israeli struggle.
relevent
issue
of
Arab-
Most people at the time agreed that
the Communism factor could not be totally
ignored.
However, they also believed that:
clearly a program to stop Soviet penetration must
start with the politial issues which have made the
Russians welcome in the area, namely the suez
crisis and the Arab-Israeli feud, which the
President chose not to discuss in his January 5
appeal. 8
The contemporary journals and newspapers of
6. Joseph c. Harsch," The Certainty of change", The
Republic, January 1957, p.12.
7. The New Republic, January
8. Ibid.
232
14, 1957, p.3.
New
the time
foreign
offered numerous
policy aims
suggestions
on
the
general
of the Eisenhower administration.
Irwing Kristol writing in The
New Republic in January
1957 said that the, "basic problem of American policy in
the next decade will be, not the cold war in Europe, but
the
defining
of
bloc. n9 However,
its
relations
to
he conceded that
separate the one from the other.
the
Asia-African
it was difficult to
For it was the cold
war alone which set the pattern for the foreign policy
goals of the United States
regardless
of
the
area
involved.
In
an
Republic,
another
editorial
in
January
stated that Egypt should have been the focal
concern of the United States after 1956, but that it was
being ignored.
States
was
Eisenhower
It
trying
Doctrine
also pointed
to
isolate
centered
out
that
Nasser
around
the
and
this
United
that
the
alone.
It
wrote :
The unstated purpose of the Eisenhower Doctrine
beyond the warning to Russia, is to isolate
Nasser's Egypt and his ally syria from all
neighbouring countries and thus to insulate the
centre of Russian penetration ... the United States
had only to play upon a widespread fear of Russia
9. Irwing Kristol, "Bandung Powers- Danger Zone for u.s.
Policy," The New Republic, January 14, 1957, p.15
233
now growing among the Arab themselves and the Ar~b
resentment against Col. Nasser for econom1c
hardships stemming from his casual seizure to
widen the gap between Egypt and her neighbours. 10
It seems,however, that these comments were based on the
wrong assumption that Egypt was a Communist stronghold
in the Middle East which it really was not.
Nasser was
friendly with the Communists in order to secure economic
advantages
for
Egypt.
He
Union.But
Had
Communist.
balanced
policy
ideologically
the
moved
by
pragmatic
friendly relations with the
consideraton to develop
Soviet
was
United
rather
he
was
States
than
over
strongly
adopted
anti-
a
more
emphasising
on
Communism it would have endeared itself to the countries
of the area, particularly Egypt.
Eisenhower had won a
great deal of regard among the Arabs for his role in the
He had the magic moment almost
Suez crisis.
clasp, but he lost it.
The reason was that he could not
think beyond containment of
United states policy.
in his
Communism, the globalism in
And in that sense his Doctrine
had an extremely narrow perspective.
The New
warning
Doctrine.
10.
the
Times carried a number of i terns
United
States
on
the
demerits
of
the
It reported criticisms from various quarters.
Ed.,"The Evolving Doctrine,"
January 21, 1957, pp 3-4.
234
The New
Republic,
From the Arabs,
the Soviet Union,
China,
the British,
most of the Democrates in the American Congress and fron
A few examples are
some of the Republicans as well.
given
here
to
illustrate
the
point.
The
Russiar
newspaper Pravada rejected the, "Eisenhower plan as move
to enslave and exploit the area. 1111
The Jordaniar
Government said that
it rejected,
idea that an1
vacuum
fall
created
by
of
"the
British
and
Frenct
imperialism, should be filled by another great power." 1 ~
Adlai E.Stevenson, the candidate of the Democratic part}
for
the
Presidential
proposal as,
elections
"a blank
of
cheque to
1956
fight
attacked
in
the
the Middle
East." 13 Further Syria denounced the plan and declare~
that,
" Middle East security is sole responsibility of
peoples of area. 1114
British Labour Member of Parliament
A.Bevan warned that the Eisenhower Doctrine may,
plunge world into final war. 1115
And French Deput1
Mendes-France said that the Eisenhower plan will be a
II
doctrine
only
when
it
defines
us
stand
on
1
alJ
outstanding Mideast issues. 1116
Some anti-Doctrine headlines in the New York
were;
'Arabs
resent
and
-------------------------11. New York Times, January
distrust
2 I 1957, p.l.
12. Ibid., January 3 I 1957, p. 3.
13. Ibid., January 4, 1957, p.13.
14. Ibid., January 11, 1957, p.5.
15. Ibid., January 14, 1957, p. 3.
16. Ibid., January 15, 1957, p.17.
235
it
as
Time~
result
c
propaganda,'
'Premier Chou En-Lai denounces pLan as
imperialist and aimed at replacing British and French
influence,"
does
not
"King
Hussein
interfere
with
welcomes
Arab
plan
states
providing
it
sovereignty,"
"Egyptian press attacks Eisenhower plan, M.H.Heikal and
others state US drags Mideast
into
cold
war,"
Republican senator from Pennsylvania,
Hugh D.
termed
an
the
Eisenhower
Doctrine
as
and
Scott
undated
declaration of war. ,1 7
Arab
Further
Hussein (Jordan) ,
Assali(Syria),
leaders
like
Saud (Saudi Arabia)
Nasser,
and
King
Premier
el
"reject idea that vacuum exists and
affirm Arab nationalism is sole basis for Arab policy,"
"Syrian Minister el Bitar sees USSR without ambitions in
•
Mideast, holds West creates fear among Arabs for own
ends," "Democratic Senators attack Eisenhower Doctrine
as unconstitutional," "Truman calls Eisenhower Doctrine
as
too
Council
late
and too
deplores
little,"
"Democratic
Eisenhower Administrative
policy
charges resolution fails to meet problems of
and
so
the
accusations
continued.
The
Advisory
and
area, n 18
Doctrine
ultimately cleared by the Congress but its passage,
was
it
can be
17.
See the New York Times, of January 5, 1957, Januar
8, January 10, and January 10 respectively.
18.
See the New York Times, January 20, 1957, February
12, February 17, and February 18, respectively.
236
safetly said,
was due more to the fact that no othe
viable alternative existed and
also
because
an
anti-
Communist Doctrine would have been hard to reject by an
anti-Communist American Congress.
It was not that everyone condemned the Eisenhower
Doctrine there were a few newspapers and journals of the
time which
favourably
commented on
however, fewer in number
it.
These
were
than the uncomplimentary ones.
The New Republic for instance declared :
The
central merit of the Eisenhower Doctrine is
that it places the Governments of the Middle East
on notice that the United States is 'determined to
prevent the satellization of that area by the
Soviet Union and that if the Soviet Union
recklessly chooses to intervene militarily in that
area it will have to fight this country. 19
It
was
a
different
matter
ofcourse
that
the
satellization of the Middle East was never going to be a
reality. In the New York Times the complimentary remarks
came from Dulles, from Republican Senators, from Israel,
Lebanon,
Saudi
Arabia,
Lybia
and
from
Eisenhower
himself.
Interestingly there were no appreciative
comments
from
Governments.
19.
either
It
makes
the
one
British
wonder
or the French
whether
this
Ed.," The Midest Debate," The New Republic, Februar
4, 1957, p.4.
237
indifference was not because of
the United States role
in the Suez crisis?
Secretary Dulles, the unofficial spokesperson for
the Doctrine used the oft repeated line and
said that
the,"United States has major responsibility to help
prevent spread of USSR imperialism in the Mideast. " 20
Lebanese diplomat, Charles Malik said that Lebanon,
"will welcome more active US policy to fill
power'
left
historic
by
Great
opportunity
and
Britain
for
us
to
France,
help
•vacuum of
and
Arab
sees
states
strengthen security of area." 21 Republican Senator
Jacob Javits from New York, extendes his full support to
the Eisenhower plan. 22
Some complimentary headlines in the New York Times
included,
'Israel lauds Eisenhower Doctrine,'
'
Dulles
warns wide inquiry that delays Eisenhower program will
increase danger of USSR infilteration.'
Libya
express
appreciation
understanding of Arab problems,
peoples
of
Mideast
against
for
1
'King Saud and
Eisenhower's
'Eisenhower warns
international
communism,
reiterates purpose of resolution is to free area from
20. New York Times, January 1, 1957, p.1.
21. Ibid., p.3.
22. Ibid., January 3, 1957, p.1.
238
menace of communism,' 23
An interesting point to note
here is that though Egypt was against the Doctrine,
it
was not against the economic advantages it would have
brought
for
the
Middle
East
countries.
This
is
indicated by the report carried in the New York Times of
January 1, 1957 'Egypt interested in economic aspects of
plan.' 24
The
washington
Post
reports about the Doctrine.
in
favour
stance.
of
it
because
too
carried
complimentary
The editorial was generally
of
its,
In a report by Thomas J.
anti-Communist
Foley on January 7,
1957 the Congress members were accredited with siding
with
, " ... Eisenhower's Middle East program to curb
Communist moves in the strategic area. 1125
The editorial
of the Post on the same day tended to agree with this.
It declared:
There will be almost unanimous agreement in this
country
with
the
purposes
of
President
Eisenhower's program for the Near East ... the prime
essential in this process is to deter Russia from
pushing further into the area either directly or
. d'J.rectly ... 26
J.n
It
is
surprising that
the
national
dallies
had
23.
See the New York Times, January 10, 1957, January
26, February 25, and February 26, respectively.
24.
New York Times, January 1, 1957, p.6.
2 5.
Thomas J. Foley,
1957, p.l.
26. Ibid., p.A-12,
239
The Washington Post,
January 7,
little pragmatism to see the future implications of the
policy
beyond
its
immediate
cold
war
context.
Containment of Soviet expansion in the rigion had become
an
all
consuming
national
passion.
The
liberal
newspapers also hoped that the Doctrine would pave the
~ay
for better relations with the Arabs. The washington
Fost
emphasised
There is no American desire to capitalize upon
British misfortunes.
Near East oil is far more
vital to Britian and Western Europe than to this
country.
There is now a chance if we use it
wisely to strengthen the adherence of the Near
Eastern countries to the free ~or ld in a manner
that previously was impossible. 2
And
in a report it similarly stressed:
A new and far more active period of American
participation in Middle Eastern affairs can thus
be forseen--which is probably why the Soviets have
denounced the whole Eisenhower plan. 28
In the cold war context the American reason
appeared only logical. But there was
not
way by which
these hopes could be realized without the solution of
27.
The Washington Post, n.26.
2a.
The Washington Post, March 10, 1957,p.l.
240
intra-religonal
problems
Middle
Instead
East.
these
were laid on the determination of the United States to
thwart the foreign attempt to gain
region.
control
of
the
That the doctrine could itself be seen as an
instrument of aggrandisernent did not occur to those who
formulate
the
Doctrine.
The
Soviet
Union
could
access to the countries of the region only if
gain
they were
willing to let some one else come in. The Power vaccurn
could be filled by the regional powers themselves.
Overall most of the newspapers and journals
the
time
and
perspective
later
of
the
felt
that
Mideast
President
problems
of
Eisenhower's
was
extremely
limited.
It was definitely true that Communism should
not
been
have
the
focal
point
of
his
attention.
Instead the United states should have made a beginning
by addressing itself to the Arab-Israeli problems and by
improving relations with Nasser.
Kerr Malcolm writing
in 1967 in the International Affairs titled his article
'Corning to terms with Nasser. • 29
have concerned Eisenhower the most.
That is what should
But instead says
Malcolm, " ... the Eisenhower Doctrine(was) devoted to the
purpose of isolating Nasser and his Syrian allies and
-------------------------Kert Malcoln, "Corning
29.
to terms with Nasser;
Attempts and Failures," Internaltional Affairs 43,
January 1967.
241
building
a
strong
anti-Communist
them. 30
An article
alliance
in Newsweek
in
without
1958,
insisted
similarly that ~ Approach to Nasser, • 31 should have been
the direction of the United States's foreign policy in
the post Suez period.
It was a
United States Government.
real dilemma for the
And the road that President
Eisenhower took was not the right<t one at the time. An
article in Newsweek posed the question, "What should the
West do about the United Arab Republic president Gamal
Abdel
Nasser
nationalism?" 32
and
the
surging
force
of
Arab
It was a very valid question.
article provided the answer.
It stated that since
American
appeasement
and
British,
French
military
offensive
had
failed,
perhaps
different was required,
The
It emphasised,
and
Israeli
something
now a
II
new
approach seems clearly needed if the West is to salvage
its vast stake in the Mi.Q.dle East. 1133
The question that
emerges is whether thE Eisenhower Doctrine was the
answer, the new approach?
The article answered in the
affirmative. "An extensive aid programme to bolster
Egypt ' s tottering econoJ1\:y ... " 3 4 was what
it felt the
Eisenhower Doctrine had in mind, not only for Egypt but
30. "Coming to terms with Nasser," n.29, p.72.
31. "Approach to Nasser 1
32. Ibid., p.l8
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid., p.22
242
11
Newsweek, August 11, 1958.
for all the countries of the Middle East.
However,
effect very little aid really went to Egypt.
in
In 1957,
the total amount of development and technical assistance
to Egypt was only $28,000. 35
On the whole
Eisenhower emphasised that his
programme would attempt to spread the message of peace
and economic betterment to the countries of the Middle
East.
b~
Peace for him was related to the acceptance
the Arabs of a disassociation from the Soviet Union. But
the Doctrine should have actually led the United StateE
to,
"
favour the complete independence of the Arat
peoples ... and to assist in the economic development of
Egypt as,well as other parts of the Arab world." 36
As
regards
the
reactions
to
the
Eisenhower
Doctrine in the American Congress at the time,
were
termendous
discussions
for
in
and
to
the
varying.
both the houses
nearly two months
message
vastly
after
Congress.
of
Congress
Eisenhower
The
Very
Congress
these
heated
continued
had
was
sent
hiE
as
the
Congressional Quarterly Almanac noted :
Unwilling to write a 'blank check(sic)' for the
President,
but equally concerned over the
psychological effect that defeat of the resolution
35.
US Aid Programs 1955-57, White House Office, Office
of the Special Assistant for National Security Af
(1952-61) Records, File; NSC Service, Breifing
Notes Subseries, Box 19. Henceforth cited as OSANSA
36.
Earnest K. Lindley, "Nasser and
Newsweek, August 18, 1958, p.17.
243
Arab
unity,"
would have throughout the world.37
Most of the opposition in the House and the Senate was
over the huge sum of $200 million which the President
had proposed in the aid programme for the Mideast.
It
was also reluctant to concede to the President the
freedom to use troops
in the Mideast
he deemed
as
necessary."
on the first issue, Senator Richard B. Russell (D,
Ga.) proposed an amendment opposing the authorization of
aid fund. His amendment was ultimately rejected.
second
issue
words,~as
the
Congress
succeeded
he deemed necessary, 'to the
to use armed
forces
in
~u.s.
On the
changing
the
was prepared
if the President determines the
necessity. '
The impression that one derives from the debates
in the Congress is that most members were not really
very enthusiastic about the Middle East resolution.
To
them the Communist threat was not imminent and the
economic aid as proposed was too much and unnecessary.
Pro and anti Doctrine voices were raised
House
and
the
Senate
though
the
latter
in both the
were
more
numerous.
37.
Congressional
Quarterly
Almana, Vol XIII,
(Washington D.C., 1957), p.573. Henceforth cited as
CQA.
244
In the House some doubts were
voiced
on
the
enormous sum of money which the President had asked for.
It was felt that the spread o·f Communism could be
stopped without sacrificing so many dollars.
Kenneth J
Gray(D,Ill.) emphasised:
It is my firm conviction that we can ward off
communism in the Middle East by offering to help
protect any country from aggression without
pouring millions of dollars down a rat hole in
economic aid. 38
It can ofcourse be argued that economic aid definitely
has a relevence that cannot be overlooked.
fact that Nasser bought arms
from the
Was it not a
Czechs because
they were providing these on easy exchange terms (Czech
arms for Egyptian cotton)?
Or was it not that
money
too was a major consideration that prevented the United
States from giving a loan for the Aswan Dam?
And that
the loan was eventually provided to Egypt by the Soviet
Union?
So preventing the spread of Communism in the
Middle East without giving econonic aid might have been
a difficult proposition.
Eisenhower understood this and
thus he made it a major part of his proposals for the
region.
John D Dingell (D,Mich.)
38.
also questioned the
House Proceedings, Middle East Economic And
Military
Cooperation,
January
29,
195f1l
Congressional
Record, Vol 103, Part I, 85
Congress, Ist Session (Washington D.C., 1957),
p.1154 Henceforth cited as CR.
245
validity of the economic part of the resolution.
His
opposition was not so much to the amount, but on how it
was to be spent.
President Eisenhower had requested
former Democratic Representative James P Richards to go
to
the
Middle
requirements
of
East
to
ascertain
each
country.
The
the
financial
objections
raised against the despatch of this mission.
remarked, "this is a terrible way to legislate.
for
were
Dingell
To ask
money without the vaguest idea of how it was to be
spent." 39
The political and military goals of the Mideast
proposal were also questioned by him.
It is not right
said he:
... to make threats against a danger
not very real at this time; and to
defend an area with weapons which
could turn the whole region into
wasteland. 40
which ... is
threaten to
conceivably
radioactive
This point that the danger to the Middle East
nations
from
Communism was
non-existent
comes
through in most of the debates both in the House
and the Senate.
39.
House
Proceedings, n.38, p.1321
40. Ibid.
246
On the other hand there was Charles Vanik (D,Ohio)
who felt that the United States had committed many
mistakes during the last few years which had provided
communism a chance to make an impression in the Middle
He laid the blame for the
East.
United States weak
position in the Middle East to its declining friendship
with
Britain,
Eisenhower for
crisis.
France
and
Israel.
He
also
blamed
his support to Nasser during the
1956
This policy he said was one of, " ... overhelping
Nasser," which led to the creation of a Frankestein that
the United States could not contro1. 41
Vanik thought
that by siding with Egypt in the Suez war the United
States had
East.
bought peace for a short time in the Middle
But consequently it had created more problems for
it had solved he concluded.
Finally he confessed that:
We are so thoroughly bogged down in our Middle
East polcy that no other course remains but to
support the President's declaration in the hope
that a just peace will result.
In the House debates it was ultimately what Frank
H Coffin(D,Me.)
said that sums
41. House Proceedings, n.38, p.1319.
42. Ibid., p.l320
247
up what most of the
members
felt
about
the Mideast
resolution.
In
very
practical terms he stated:
This resoultion will by no means cure the cankers
in the Middle East.
It does nothing to foster a
stable
peace
between
Israel
and
Egypt;
unrestricted use of the suez
Canal;
fair
resettlement or compensation of the Palestine
refugees; resumption of normal trade and economic
progress.
All it does and tries to do is on the
one hand to raise a warning signal to Russia, and
on the other hand to give courage, stopgap
economic aid and military assistance in the Middle
East nations.
This resolution in the strictest
sense is unnecessary.
But the strongest argument
in
favour of it is the complete absence of any
alternative.
It we reject it, it will then tell
the world that the Middle East can go hang for all
we care.
We cannot buy friendship with dollars,
but we can perserve the integrity and stability
and self-respect of nations long enough to help
them to gain genuine independence. 43
There were other member in the House who stressed
on the worth of the resolution.
Eisenhower,
Communism was
a
To these members like
force
that
had
to
be
destroyed and thus they viewed the resolution in that
very
light.
Doctrine,
"a
Charles
Hallek
declaration of
Joseph W Martin
(R,Mass.)
(R,
Ind.)
purpose
and
called
the
courage. n 4 4
similarily emphasised:
The resolution is a notice of our intention to the
one country, the Soviet Union, which might have
43. House Proceedings n.38, p.l182.
44. Ibid., p.1154
248
ideas of aggression and conquest, that the United
states will give the full weight of its support to
the little nations that want to be free ... What is
wrong with that, we have appropriated the money to
bring peace and economic security to that area of
the world ... (President Eisenhower) knows better
than we the real situation, who are we to go
contrary to (his) solemn judgement. 45
John W McCormack (R,Mass.) too had nice things to
say about the Doctrine.
He linked it to the national
interests of the country and stressed:
This resolution represents affirmative action on
the part of our country in connection with a very
important part of the world which directly
concerns the national interests of the United
states. 46
In a sense this was true since though the United States
had limited
state in the oil of the Middle East,
it
still valued its importance as an international waterway
with termendous commercial advantages.
Ultimately the resolution was passed in the House
on January 30,
by 188
voting in its favour.
Democrates and 167 Republicans
135 Democrates and 26 Republicans
against it.
In the Senate the hearings and debates lasted for
45.
House Proceedings, n.38, p.l154.
46.
Ibid., p.1156.
249
about a month.
Much of the debate centered around the
Russell amendment. There was actually less debate on the
Mideast resolution itself then on whether the Russell
amendment was
discussion
Doctrine,
to
be
revolved
around
To some members
needs of the hour.
Rest
of
the
the
necessity
of
the
was
irrelevent
to
the
pasased or
There
it
is
not.
no doubt
as
previously
emphasised that the Doctrine delievered a message that
was
in no way related to
the problems
It offered no solutions.
East.
of the Middle
It only accepted
Communism as enemy number one and offered the
United
states to the Middle East nations as a buffer against
that enemy!
The Senate proceedings tended to bring out this
very weakness of the resolution.
For example Wayne L
Morse (D,Ore.) attacked the resolution on these
grounds~
He said:
I think it is very dangerous to commit ourselves
to unilateral military action in the Middle East
with no pledges at the same time from our allies,
when we all know and it cannot be successfully
disputed that the primary underlying purpose of
the resolution is the protection of the oil areas
of the Arab states to Western Europe. . . Russia
250
taking over the
oil
wells
by force is a scarecrow
argument ... We should (on the contrary) excercise the
leardership to the United Nations to face up quickly to
the three great issues in the Middle East- Suez canal,
Arab refugee problem and terri tor ial integrity of
Israel .•. (No resolution) can be reconciled with giving
to any President ... at any time the kind of unchecked
blanket powef that Mr.Eisenhower is asking for, in his
resolution. 4
Thus Senator Morse questioned the economic,
political,
military as well as the constitutional validity of the
resolution.
These were the very four points which were
to recurr again and again during the cold war.
The sweeping economic powers that the resolution
attempted to give to the President was the other issue
of concern in the Senate,
something which the Russell
amendment sought to take away.
while
voting
economic
against
plank
the
as
irreconcilable," ... with
a
Sam J Ervin Jr.(D,N.C.)
resolution,
attacked
its
something
which
was
proper
regard
for
the
resources of the American tax-payers and the lives of
American boys." 48
The
support
in
the
Senate
was
once
47.
Senate Proceedings, Middle East
January 29, 1957, CR, n.38, p.1139.
48.
San J. Erwin, 'Senate Debates,' COA, n.37.
251
again as
situation,
in the House, linked to the anti-communist thrust of the
Resolution. Jacb K Javits (R,N.Y.) elaborated:
United States overseas economic and technical
assistance programs are in the danger in the
Congress.
Unless there is a great rallying of
public support behind these programmes, they could
be so seriously crippled as to materially retard
the fight against Communism and the struggle for
international peace... military aid is only the
sheild. Behind this sheild, we must integrate and
develop a free world, give it hope, encouragemnt
and progress, if we are to overcome successfully
the constantly increasing Communist drive of
infilteration and subversion. 49
In
the
resolutely
same
asked
vein,
for
H.
an end
Alexander
to
Smith
(R,N.J.)
"partisan
political
blocking"of the resolution and '' full and unconditional
support 1150 of the President.
It should be noted here
that support and opposition to the resolution were not
on partisan lines.
Those who supported the resolution
were
sense
moved
President.
by
a
of
responsibility
the
Some did not like his proposals and some
would have preferred the Russell amendment,
with
to
Eisenhower
to
prevent
a
but sided
,"political
embarrassment 1151 to the President.
49.
Senator Jacob J. Javits, "Foreign Aid Is Vital To
United States Security," New York Herald Tribune,
March 13, 1957, P.4233.
50.
Ibid.
51.
John F. Kennedy (D, Mass.), CQA, n.37, p.579.
Another Senator Stuart Symington ( D, Mo.) is
reported as having agreed with Russell, but voted
against his amendment in order to give the
President his complete support.
252
The Senate finally passed the slightly amended
resolution(~as
he deemed necessary' was changed to
~the
us was prepared to use armed forces if the President
determines the neccessity') on March 5, and on March 9,
the resolution became law.
In the Senate it was cleared
with 30 Democrates and 42 Republicns voting in its
favour and 16 Democrates and 3 Republicans against it.
It is important to note that the floor debates and votin
in both the houses were not on party
but on ideological
lines.
For a clearer understanding of the Eisenhower
Doctrine, it is essential to analyse, how the President
himself viewed it after he had announced it.
In his
memoirs he justified it by saying:
We felt that a declaration making clear the
American view of the current situation and our
intentions respecting it was necessary so that all
including the Soviets would understand that
despite our
disagreement in 1956 with our major
European allies over a logical course of action,
respecting the Suez Canal,
we were fully
det~rmmed to sustain Western rights
in the
reg1on.
This implies that he was deeply concerned in assuring
Britain
52.
and
France
of
the
United
States
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace 1956-1961,
York: Doubleday & Co. Inc., 1956) ,p.178.
253
(New
ination to keep the West united. It can also mean
isenhower needed the support of his allied for the
; of his resolution.
vn January 23, 1957 President Eisenhower addressed
a
news conference on the
relevence
of
his Mideast
proposals. A variety of questions on the military and
economic aspects of the Doctrine, on the significance of
the Richards Mission,
Doctrine
and the expected results of the
in the Middle
East were
posed
to
him.
An
analysis of the questions and answers would be helpful
in understanding Eisenhower's approach to the Doctrine.
Raymond
P. Brandt
of
the
St.
Louis,
Dispatch
How essential is it that the Armed Forces section
and the economic and military aid to be in one
package?
The President
To my mind, it is vital. You cannot do the things
that need to be done ... to wage the peace, mearly
with arms.
You have got to have the human
understanding of human wants, and you have got to
make it possible for people to achieve something
in satisfying those wants if we are going to wage
254
peace successfully.
so to have one part of this
without the other, I think, would destroy what we
are really trying to do, because we don't want any
weaker nation to be overcome by force,
by
subversion or by Communist influences. But at the
same time if we limit ourselves to that, then I
would say it was a self-defeating effort because
we must, particulary by technical help and
sometimes by helping in investments, let them
develg~ their resources so they can have a better
life.
Thus to Eisenhower, Communism could be made less
attractive to the countries of the Middle East, if these
were given lots of military and economic aid. Weakness
and poverty incresed the attractiveness of communism. If
these were removed Communism would have less appeal-that
was the logic. To another question on the Soviet Union's
perception of the Doctrine, Eisenhower replied stressing
on the fact that military and economic help would not
imply interference
countries.
in the
internal affairs
of these
Charles E. Shutt, of the Telenews asked :
A few days ago, Sir the Communist leaders of
Russia and China signed a
prouncement in Moscow
saying, in effect they would protect the Middle
East countries from any interference from the
Eisenhower Doctrine.
Can you give us your views
Sir, as to what concern that might cause this
Government
for
a
conflict
or
general
misunderstanding in the area?
53.
The President's News Conference,
1957, PPP-DDE, n.l, p.BO.
255
January
23,
The President replied :
... we said we will help those countries desiring
it.
Now let me say again, there is no one, no
government, we are trying to dominate .
To
dominate a country is to take on, if nothing else,
responsibilities which we wouldn't want to be
charged with.
So they have to handle their own
affairs and we are not going to interfere in the
internal affairs of any country.
We stand ready
to help though and prevent 4hem from falling prey
to the communist influence. 5
A question was also posed as to how the sum of
$200 million was going to be spent.
implied that the Richards Mission,
The question
that the President
proposed to send to the Middle East to ascertain the
financial requirements of the various countries of the
region,
was
not
really
the
appropriate
method
of
ascerting the financial requirements of the countries of
the region of doing so. 55 On this the President insisted
on the necessity of the mission,
because he felt that
the only way he could:
find out exactly how to spend the $200 million
would be through the medium of the Richards
Mission.Now one of the reasons it is going out is
to explore with these countries the character of
their needs. Until we can get that kind of study
we wouldn't give any program the expenditure at
all. 5 6
54.
News Conference, n.53, p 80-81.
55.
Question posed by Rowland Evans, New York Herald
Tribunes. The question was : Sir one of the main
points of resistance to your resolution in the
Senate
is-there
seems
to
be
no
clear
understanding of how the 200 million might be
spent.
56.
News Conference, n.53, p.84.
256
There
seemed
However, the
to
be
sense
in
this
argument.
mission did not accomplish much as it did
not visit the countries where funds might have been most
necessary to win them to the Western side like Egypt for
one.
To the President thus the Doctrine was a
unique
one,
meant to save the Middle East countries from the
intrusion of Communism, after the exist of Britain from
the area.
Though there was no harm in this the Doctrine
should also have been directed towards solving the
Palestine refugee problem, Arab-Israeli conflict and
Arab Nationalism. Eisenhower left the first two to the
United Nations to deal with.
The third one, he chose to
ignore as a passing phase, which would be overcome he
had hoped,
Arabs.
by closer association of the West with the
And in the process,
says Gulshan
Dei tal
the
Eisenhower Doctrine sacrificed:
... the regional issues
on which stability and
prosperity depended to the security interests of
the Western alliance.
It was based on the
ideological and strategic considerations rather
than on considerati~9 for the betterment of the
people of West Asia.
Deital further
says that
the Eisenhower Doctrine
challenged Nasser's, leadership of the Arab world. 58
57.
Gulshan Dietl, The Dulles Era
International, 1986), p.146.
58.
Ibid.,p.150.
59.
Ibid.,p. 139.
257
(New Delhi:
Lancer
She sums up that the Doctrine was a declaration that the
United States was prepared to enter West Asia as the
spearhead
of
the
Western
alliance's
interest
in
the
region. 5 9
There are numerous other secondary accounts which
agree that the Eisenhower Doctrine focused on only two
issues;
anti-Communism
and
However, these were the very
anti-Arab
nationalism.
issues which should have
been kept
in focus
if anything positive had to be
achieved.
Richard A. Melanson and David Mayers, two of
the revisionist historians
of
Eisenhower's
foreign
policy wrote:
The President gained esteem in the Arab world by
forcing the allied invaders out of the Suez, but
did not then chose to work with Nasser toward
resolving the underlying poliical and economic
problems of the region.Instead he hastened to
ensure that neither Nasser nor the Soviets reaped
too much advantage from
Suez; he declared the
Eisenhower Doctrine had committed the United
States to propping up the status quo. 60
Melanson
and
Mayers
are
extremely
critical
of
Eisenhower's post-suez policy towards the Middle East.
They feel that the President was
dragged down
more of an idealist,
by his European connections, rather than -
59.
Dietl, n.57, p.l39.
60.
Richard A. Melanson & David Mayers, Re-evaluating
Eisenhower L American Foreign Policy in the 1950's
(Urbana & Champagne : University of Illinois Press,
1987) 1 p.214.
258
being a
realist and accepting the
people of West Asia
towards the region.
as
the
basis
improvemnet of the
of
any
new
policy
Thus they lamented:
such a cavalier treatment of an
issue that
comprised at once a grieveous human tragedy and
the greatest single threat to enduring stability
in the region ... The events of the immediate postsuez period suggest what might have been
accompalished if Eisenhower had used his leverage
on behalf of the Palestinians.
But there was a
difference between using United States leverage
for the immediate sake of Europe's oil and using
it to fulfill the long term requirements of
regional stability.
Ensuring Europe's oil
demanded nothing more than a narrow realism.
Coping with the Palestine question demanded a
sensitivity towards the fate of an Arab people.
But Eisenhower was concerned with problems only to
the extent they affected direct western interests.
His Euro-centric tunnel vision brought him longrun dangers 1!1_at might have been avoided with a
broader view.
According to Townshend Hoopes,
the
Eisenhower
Doctrine was in a way misdirected, since its aim was to
crush the spread of Communism
in
the Middle
East,
whereas the real enemy of Westernism in the region was
Egypt's Nasser and his Arab nationalism.
danger to the Middle East
Arab
nationalism
propagandist. 1162
with
11 ... the real
were not the Communists but
Nasser
as
its
leading
Nasser according to Hoopes was,
11 the
61.
Melanson & Mayers, n.60, p.215.
62.
Townshend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles
(Boston : Little Brown, 1973), p.405.
259
principle agent
of
Middle East." 63
Soviet
Communist
expansion
in the
Also Nasser was too proud to give up
his cherished ambition to make Egypt the leading nation
of the region.
nationalist
He thus did not accept the view that
goals
should
be
subordinated
He saw it just the other way.
Communism.
the Doctrine was perhaps unable to make a
contribution to Egypt's development.
Eisenhower Doctrine
to
anti-
Therefore,
meaningful
In this sense the
as a means to overthrow Communism
in the Middle East by providing arms aid was,
"a rather
blunt instrument.n64
Leonard Mosley
the
opposite
Doctrine was
view.
biographer of Dulles,
Outwardly
an instrument to
Communism in the Middle East.
and
agrees
with
Dulles,
he
agrees
deter
the
holds
that
the
spread of
But otherwise he quotes
that
the
Doctrine,
II
was
directed more against Nasserist expansion in the Arab
countries than Soviet intrusions.n 65
Basically
in
a
historical
sense
the
Eisenhower
63.
Hoopes, n.62, p.439.
64.
Ibid., p.408
65.
Leonard Mosley, Dulles _;_ A Biography of Eleanor,
Allen and John Foster Dulles and Their
Family
network (New York: The Dial Press, 1978), p.435.
260
Doctrine
can
be
seen
as
a
succession
to
the
pronouncements of a similar nature to protect American
interests abroad,
Doctrine(l823),
directly or indirectly.
the
Cleveland
The Monroe
Doctrine(l895),
the
Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine(l903) ,the
Lodge Corollary(l9ll)
precceded it.
and the Truman Doctrine(l949)
There was no harm in such doctrines.
Particularly in the post World War II period, there was
a consensus in the United states that it faced a threat
from the Soviet Union. On April 23,1957
in his weekly
news conference, Dulles had referred to the Doctrine as,
an attitude, a point of view, a state of mind ... " 66
"
That was not what Eisenhower had in mind when he sent
his message to the congress.
Author Richard P. Stebbins
1958
too pointed to
writing as early as
the Communist phobia of the United
States which clouded its vision of the real issues that
needed attention in the Middle East in the post Suez
period. He wrote:
To many
observers it seemed that the really
press1ng problems in
the Middle East were more
localised
in character and only indirectly
related to communism. Most of the troubles of the
66.
Department of State Bullettin, Vol.
1956, p.146.
261
4 7,
July 22,
•
area in recent years could be traced to the
unbridled nationalism and Xenophobia which had
secured such a hold on Egypt and various other
Muslim countries. These were the forces that had
participated in the conflicts over the Anglo
Iranian oil and the Suez Canal as well as the
perennial strife
b~tween
Israel and the
neghbouring Arab States. 6
Stebbins
also felt that the Western assumption that the
Soviet Union would attack any of
the
nations
of the
Middle East was an erronous one. Thus he questioned:
Communist Governments were not generally in the
habit of resorting to armed attack when they saw a
chance of gaining their objective by other
methods. Why should they risk an armed showdown
when they already had good footholds in Egypt and
Syria and when the current trend of events
througg~ut the Arab world seemed so favourable to
them ?
Stebbings
himself provided the answer which was
similar to what so many Congressmen had given.
newly released material provides ample
Stebbings perspective.
that,
The
answer
The
support for
Stebbings
gave
wa
"... the administration in its attempt 'to sell'
the program continued to dwell almost exclusively on the
threat of Communist aggression. 69
Arslam Humbaraci, another historian, says that th
67.
Richard P. Stebbings, The United
World
Affairs (New York
Harper
1958) ,p.38
68.
Ibid., p.39.
69.
Ibid., p.40.
262
States
i
Brother,
&
11
real purpose
of
the
Eisenhower
Doctrine
was
to
enable the United States to replace Britain and take
over the policy symbolised by the Baghdad Pact. 117 0
Humbaraci,
feels that the end of British domination in
the Middle East was, 11 a great historial development. 71
And the replacement of British power by the United
States was he says,
11 . . . a logical and necessary step,
unless this vital region was to be left entirely open to
kremlin's brand of civilization 1172 The desire to keep
Communism out was
welcomed by most poeple
in
the
world, though they were critical of the manner in which
it manifested.
Humbaraci's work
illustrates
it.
He
stressed:
... what could be critized and condemned however,
is the way in which this take over took place,
some of the motives which inspired it and
the
way in which the so-~alled Eisenhower Doctrine was
put into operation. 7
To him the
~so
called Eisenhower Doctrine,'
was doomed.
Because as he pointed:
... the ~vacuum' theory on which it was based was
mere wishful thinking. The ~vacuum' the Americans
were so egar to fill had already been filled by
the Arabs and Egyptian nationalistic middle
classes. . . It regarded communism as the
chief
problem, when it was really nationalism. 74
70.
Arslam Humbaraci, Middle
East Indictment
From
the
Truman
Doctrine,
the
Soviet
Penetration
and
Britain's downfall
to the
Eisenhower ~tirne (London : Robert Hale Limited,
1958), p. 242.
71.
Ibid., p.237.
72.
Ibid.
73.
Ibid. , p. 2 3 9 .
74.
Ibid.
263
H. Paul Castleberg, writing in 1959, felt that the
emphasis of the Eisenhower Doctrine on a
Communist
threat to the Middle East, amounted to a "··· a public
confession of opposition to
East)
what some of the
(Middle
states do not necessarily consider an enemy. n 75
And this tended to
alienate most
of
the Arab states
against the Eisenhower Doctrine, for to them Communism
was the
lesser of the
two evils
than
colonialism.
Richard and William Polk in an artick, concluded:
Treaties, pacts and aid agreements have seemed
almost to become ends in themselves, to be sought
even to the point of damaging the relationships
they were designed to support. The Eisenhower
Doctrine is a recent example. It was presented in
a way (~stand up and be counted; we will make it
worth your while') which made it seem to confirm
Radio Moscow's daily portraval of it as nefarious
new
imperialism' As a result, fearing popular
outcry, no Arab government except that of Lebanon
- a small, half- Christian state with a western
orientation- dared to endorse it, and the over-all
position of the United States in the Middle East
was weakened rather than strenghtened. 1176
Thus the majority of books and articles on the issue are
highly critical of the misguided notions,
on which the
Eisenhower Doctrine was based.
7 5.
Paul H. Castleberg, "The Arabs view of Post-War
American
Foreign Policy,"
Western Political
Quarterly V.12, March 1959, p.17.
76.
Richard H. Notte and William R. Polk, "Toward A
Policy for The Middle East," Foreign Affairs,V.36,
July 1958, p. 646.
264
The recently released material which
includes
primary United States Government documents as well as
the numerous interviews, all confirm to the deductions
of the contemprary material on the Eisenhower Doctrine
From these
we
learn that
the
discussions
on
the
Eisenhower Doctrine in the United States began as early
as December 1956. With the defeat of Britain, France and
Israel in the Suez war of 1956, Eisenhower felt that the
united States had a
special
responsibility
in the
area. In a telephone call to Dulles on
December 8, 1956
Eisenhower said that, "he was
for
looking
deal' that would combine various factors,
a
package
economic etc.
to allow us to get on a little bit better basis with
these people. 1177 It is odd that in this call, Eisenhower
himself hinted at the fact that, at that
time the fear
of Communism was the least. He said:
... if we discount a Soviet attack arising out of
anger and frustration,
the world is in the
best shape vis a vis communism that ~t has been in
recent years since 1950 at any rate. 8
It leads one to question as to why then did Eisenhower
build up a Soviet bogey?
77.
Telephone call by Eishenhower to Dulles, December
8, 1956, Ann Whitman Diary Series Dwight ~
Eishenower Diary Series, File; December 1956, Box
20. Henceforth cited as AWDS DDEDS.
78.
Ibid.
265
A lot of this perhaps had to do with the Suez
Crisis.
It had brought out two important points.
One,
that the Soviet Union would definitely make attempts to
use the vulnerability of the region to make its presence
felt
there.
emerged
as
independent
And secondly that
a
great
power,
the
no
United
longer
States
hesitant
had
of
action against its allies in the name of
fair play. Both these are reiterated in the new sources.
In a letter to the American Ambassdor in Cairo
Raymond
Hare in December 1956, Dulles spoke on the first issue
with great apprehension.
In the letter he advised how
the American Ambassedor was to talk to Nasser. He wrote:
You may also make the point that our objective
must be to lift up the Middle East from the morass
into which it has fallen as a result of the
development of the past year. We believe that the
bad turn of events can be dated from the active
intervention of the Soviet Union in the area. We
do not believe that there can be anything but
increasing distress and misery unless this
intervention is excluded for the future because
the obvious purpose of the Soviet Union is to
create
trouble
which
will
increase
its
opportunities to extend its influence in the area.
If this were unapposed,
the economies of Asia,
the Middle East and Europe would be at the mercy
(of Russia) . 79
Similarly
in
a
telegram
Raymond
Hare informed
---~----------------------
79.
Letter from Dulles to Raymond Hare,
December 20,
1956, John Foster Dulles Papers 1951-59, File;
Chronological Series, December 1956(2) Box 14.
Henceforth cited as JFDP.
266
Dulles
in November
1956:
I am
now
convinced that, as far as Egypt and
possibily other Arab States are concerned United
States has suddenly emerged as a real champion of
right. In past a few have had implicit faith in us
but great majority were either only half convinced
or openly suspicious. Now they tend to see us for
fir~B time as we have sought to bring them to see
us.
This the President himself confirmed in a telephone call
to Dulles. He told him: "We can thereby displace Soviet
influence in many areas through our standing firm in the
United
Nation
in
opposition
to
the
invasion
of
Egypt ... "81
The
concept
of
a
'vacuum'
resulting,
from
the
defeat of the British and French forces in the Middle
East, too emerges from the recent material. The minutes
of a bipartisian Congressional Meeting on Jan 1, 1957,
noted
The President ... recalled traditional Russian
ambitions in the Middle East,
the present
impossiblity of France and Britain acting as a
couterweight, and the existing vacuum that must be
filled by the United States before it is filled by
82
.
R USSla,
••
From this belief of the special role of the United
States in the post-Suez period emerged Eisenhowers'
80.
Telegram from Raymond Hare to Dulles, November 5,
1956, Dwight D.Eisenhower, White House Central
Files 1953-61 (1 of 2),Fiiles : Confidential File,
Subject Series, State Department of November December 1955, Box 70. Henceforth cited as DDE-WHFC
81.
Telephone Call, n.77.
82.
Bipartisan Congressional Meeting,
January 1,
1957, AWDS-DDEDS, File; January 1957' Mis (4), Box
21.
267
second conviction:
that without economic upliftment, a
military support to the area would be of no use.
Eisenhower that,
Said
"the United States must assure th
Middle East countries of our friendship and must help
them
econ~mically
since the primary concern
of
local
rulers is in the their local economies. 1183 Again in a
message to the Congress on January 10, 1956, Eisenhower
stressed:
Without economic strength they (the Middle East
Countries)
cannot
support
the
mi 1 i tary
establishments that are necessary to deter
Communist armed aggression. Economic strength
is
indispensable,
as well,
in
securing
themselves
against
internal
Communist
subversion. 84
Thus
one
vulnerability
sees
of
that
the
Eisenhower's
Middle
East
belief
to
in
the
Communist
intervention and the special obligation the United
States had to prevent it, is amply revealed. A few more
examples
said,
clearly prove
this.
For
instance
Eisenhower
to the bipartisan group of members belonging to
Congress
the United States just cannot
II
leave a
vacuum in the Middle East and assume that Russia will
stay out. 85 Similarly Dulles wrote to Repesentative John
83.
Bipartisan Congressional Meeting, n.82, p.3.
84.
Foreign Economic Policy Message by the President to
the Congress, January 10, 1956, p.8. C.D. Jackson
Papers 1931-1967, File ; Time Inc., Dwight D.
Eisenhower, Speeches and Messages
(2),
Box
41. Henceforth cited as CDJP.
85.
Bipartisan Congressional Meeting, n.82, p.4.
268
c.
Higgins in February 1957,
emphasising on the faith
the other countries had in the American capability to
keep them free. He stated:
... the United States is the power upon which the
free world primarily depends militarily and
economically. It is a power which has a worldwide
perspect~Xe being both an Alantic and a Pacific
power ...
An interesting point which emerged from the recent
material is that President Eisenhower was very keen to
give the name
~American
Doctrine' to his proposals on.
He was certain that there was a
~vacuum'
of power in
the Middle East, which he felt that the United States
alone could fill.
and
rejected
Doctrine.
Others, however,
the
(59-61),
~American'
~American'
In March 1957,
Secretary of state
State
term
saw it differently,
attached
Christian Herter,
( 1957-59)
to
Under
and later Secretary
wrote to Dulles,
on this program tends
the
of
"placing the name
to
encourage
our
enemies to use it as proof we are trying to fill any,
~vacuum' which may exist in the Middle East." 87
86.
Letter from Dulles to
John C. Higgins,
February
23, 1957, JFDP,
File
Chronological Series,
February 1957(1), Box 14.
87.
Letter from Christian Herter to Dulles, March 11,
1957, Christian Herter Papers 1957-61 File; Letter
A-L-official-classified, Box
19.
Henceforth
cited as CHP.
269
In his
interview Manfred Halpern, 88
stressed
on the
miscalculated goal of the Eisenhower Doctrine -
to
prevent the spread of Communism in the Middle East. And
because of this Halpern
felt
that
the
Doctrine
was,
"hardly respected. n 89 Halpern argued that the goal of
the Doctrine itself was misconceived and because of this
it did not command any respect from the countries of the
region. The goal was to prevent the region from coming
under Communist influence. But the people of the region
felt that it was Western colonial dominance which was
the real threat which the Doctrine in Halpern's view,
completely ignored. He believed that even the notion of
'a vacuum'
was off the mark.
He exclaimed
,"
that a
vacuum existed in the Middle East and that it had to be
filled,
this astonishing theory
the United States
Government expected the 280 million people of the Middle
East to accept and agree that they were a vacuum ! n 90
This
is -what
he
felt
alienated
the
United
States
Government from the people of the Middle East.
The reactions
to
and results
of
the
Eisenhower
Doctrine also clearly point to its counter productive
nature.
No one really took the Doctrine seriously.
Coming immediately after the Suez crisis, it was a great
88.
See Footnote, n.82, Chapter II
89.
Ibid.
90.
Ibid.
270
let down. The aims of the Eisenhower Doctrine had been;
to destroy Communism, to win over the countries of the
Middle East by providing
assistance,
them military and economic
to destroy Arab Nationalism,
to win over
Nasser but destroy his power by isolating him and to
make the Arab countries realise the worth of going in
for
a Western alliance.
Going by the effects
of the·
Doctrine,
none of the above mentioned objectives were
achieved.
Only three countries besides the Baghdad Pact
signatories
reacted
positively
to
the
Eisenhower
Doctrine; Lebanon, saudi Arabia and Jordan. The Baghdad
Pact signatories included, Pakistan, Turkey and Iraq.
Libya,
Lebanon,
Ethopia,
and
Saudia
Arabia
were supicious of Russia and the United states had
military bases in these countries. But Libya and Ethopia
did not react favourably to the Eisenhower Doctrine. And
Egypt and Syria did not join it.
A mission was sent to the Middle East under the
supervision of
former
Democrate
Representative,
James P. Richards to convince the countries to accept
the Eishenhower Doctrine,
fact
finding mission -
Richards was officially on a
to determine the financial
requirements of various countries.
Richards visited
Lebanon, Lybia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia,
Greece,
Israel, Tunisia, and Morocco. He did not visit
Egypt,
Syria
governments
did
271
and
not
Jordan;
perhaps
invite
him whole
because
heartedly.
their
King Hussein of Jordan was
eager to accept the
Doctrine and align himself with the United States. But
his pro-Doctrine attitude led to hostilities between his
supporters and the pro-Nasser forces in his country. The
presence of the American 6th Fleet in the Lebanese
waters kept a civil strife as well as direct American
intervention at bay.
In Syria a very strong anti-American movement got
under way as a reaciton to the Eisenhower Doctrine
to
such
of
an extent
that
it
"had the
curious
uniting various parties and army factions
United States alliance. 1191
effect
in an anti-
The United States,
scared,
that Syria would seek Communist help, tried to forge an
anti-Syrian
alliance,
but
to no
avail.
Iraq
was
too
concerned about, "its oil pipelines that passed through
Syria,
King Saud was threatened by domestic rivalries
and Jordan
take
and Lebanon
initiative. 1192
the
felt
And
themselves
Russia
inadequate to
was
prepared
to
break it.
In Lebanon, a fight resulted between the pro and
anti
Doctrine groups. The United States troops landed
in Lebanon on July 15,
Iraq's coup,
of
Fearing a
repetition of
where the pro-Western ruler Nuri as Said
was overthrown,
removal
1958.
the United States had to agree to the
Lebanon's
91.
Dietl, n.57, p.207.
92.
Ibid.
272
President,
Camille
Chamoun
replacing him with, Faud Shehab.
A glance at the New York Times of the year 1957
reveals interesting contrasts on the reactions and
results of the Eisenhower Doctorine Ambassador
Richards
ofcourse had only complimentary things to say on it From
his
mission he kept sending reports back to Washington
on how impressed the Middle East nations were with the
Eisenhower Doctrine.
On April
saying
talks
that,
II
28,
with
he was reported as
Mideast
leaders
on
Eisenhower Doctrin (were) highly successful ... 1193 Then a
month later
Doctrine
Richards said that the,
(was)
already
II
successful. 1194
It
Eisenhower
is
possible
that these reports were the result of the warm welcome
and
positive
~friendly'
From
reaction
that
Richards
recieved
in
the
Middle East countries that he visited ?
this
emerges
an
interesting
point
that
initially the Eisenhower Doctrine was welcomed though
not by all.
But as time progressed, the glamour dimmed.
Lebanon's response illustrates the point very well.
Initially
the Lebanese Government voiced its support to
93. New York Times, April 28, 1957,p.2.
94.
Ibid., May 28, p.3.
273
the Doctrine. On March 17, 1957
lined
a
story:
the New York Times head
backs
"Lebanon
Eishenhower
Doctrine. " 95 Ambassador Richards had by then had talks
with the Government of Lebanon in which it had agreed to
accept the Doctrine. Then on April 28,
spoke
another report
of Ambassador Richards success with the
of the Middle
East
Saudi Arabia etc.)
countries
(Turkey,
Iraq,
leaders
Lebanon,
on the Eisenhower Doctrine. 96 As a
consequence to the strong friendship that seemed evident
between the United states and Lebanon, the latter became
the
first
country
to
get
an
arms
shipment
from
the
former in June 1957.
"Ist military aid shipment under
Eisenhower Doctrine,
40
jeeps to
lebanon, 1197 reported
the New York Times on June 8th. Lebanan also warned the
Arab nations that, "their conflicts cannot be solved by
an
alliance
Lebanon's
with
stand
Communism , 1198
on
the
But,
Eisenhower
a
change
Doctrine
in
was
perceptible thereafter. It could have been the result of
a desire
on the part of the Lebanese
move away from
too close an alliance with the United
States due to the Arab - Israeli conflict.
95.
New York Times, March 17, 1957, p.l.
96.
Ibid., April 28, p.2.
97.
Ibid., June 8, p. 4.
98.
Ibid. , October 9, p. 9.
274
Government to
On October 30, at a news Conference, the President
had said that the United States was not keen to expand
the
influence of the
Doctrine.
National Jewish Post
Lillian
of
Levy
the
asked :
Ques: Mr. President in your opinion, does the
currently increased penetration of the Communists
in the Middle East require that the Eisenhower
Doctrine be either expanded or ammended, and if
so, in what way?
Levy was referring to the political crises in Syria in
Septmenber October 1957 in which the Soviet Union was
reportedly
taking
a
great
deal
of
interest.
The
President replied:
We, we (sic) have not as of now considered
expansion of the Doctrine. I doubt whether it
could be expanded greatly and be acceptable either
to me or to the Congress ... 100
On October 31,
States
too Eisenhower said that the United
Government
Eisenhower
President
has,
Doctrine. n99
realised
Eisenhower's
the
II
It
no
is
plans
to
possible
limitations
of
assertion of keeping
that
his
the
expand
the
Policy.
Eisenhower
Doctrine in its original form is an indication of not
99.
New York Times, October 31, 1957, p.10,
100. The Presidents
News Conference,
1957, PPP-DDE n.1, p.787.
275
October
30,
I
only
its
limitations,
realization that the Arab
the United States
but
also
perhaps
of
the
states would not rally behind
strongly enough to make his Doctrine
a real success. Therefore, he may have felt that it was
better to keep a concept alive than to push
it too far
and destroy it.
The secondary sources
available on the subject,
also emphasis on the limitations of the Doctrine for.the
peculiar
problems of the area.
But these do conclude
that it was sucessful in attaining
the main
goal of
the United States foreign policy i.e to halt the spread
of Communism. on the particular issues of importance to
the area,
the most glaring ommission of the Doctrine
these feel was that it did not address itself to Egypt the one country which was hoping for some support from
the United States, after the Suez crisis.
Infact the Eisenhower Doctrine did not give any
indication as to
included
in
the
276
"
vague
what precise
countries
were
term 'Middle East' and against
which nations '
controlled by 1
international communism
were they to be protected?"1° 1
The emphasis of Eisenhower 1 s
policy was thus on
the containment of Communism. This raises one question,
for whom was the Doctrine meant? Was it meant to give
security to the countries of the Middle East? Or was it
meant to appease the Western nations,
particularly
Britain and France? Was the United States by proclaiming
the Doctrine
trying to justify its anti - allied action
in the suez war? The answer provided by the declassified
records is is that perhaps the Doctrine served all these
purpose However,
some writers have asserted that had
the Communist threat materialised the United States may
not have responded by military retaliation.
After all
military intervention was to be only at the request of
the affected party.
101.
Stebbings, n.67, pp 42-43.
277
•
A question was posed to the President at a news
conference on January 23,
1957 as to,
"··· what action
~overt
would the United States take in case an
armed
aggression actually occured? 11102 The President's reply
was very evasive. He said , "I don't know what we would
wouldn't guess on it at all." 103 This only
do and I
reveals
an ambiguity
Communist
requires
about the
aggression.
However,
of
force
sometimes
against
diplomacy
that the course of action be not spelled out.
Author
Humbaraci
was
Doctrine
vague
agreed
in
concentration. 104 The United
Middle
use
East
countries
its
that
Eisenhower
and
goal
States
to
the
target
did not want
become,
the
"Soviet
Satellities." 105 But what alternative did it offer? The
alternative it offered was, "··· of becoming an American
satellite. n 106 Perhaps this accounts for its rejection
by most of the Arab nations of the Middle East.
They
feared that in the garb of military and economic help
the
United
States was
actually
going
to
British and French more than anything else.
102. Stebbings, n.67
103. Stebbings, n. 67, p.43.
104. Humbaraci, n.70, p.
105. ibid 239.
106. Ibid.
278
replace
the
Humbaraci felt that:
The desire to monopolise was one of the reasons
the Americans were so egar to oust the British
from the region. It accounted also for the fact
that the Eisenhower Doctrine turned out to be
merely a continuation of fhe past policies of the
British and the French. 0
This however,
is debatable.
If the Eisenhower Doctrine
was a continuation of British and French
policies then,
like them the United States should have also 'acquired'
areas of control there.
But that did not happen. Again
if
continuation
the Doctrine was
a
of
past
colonial
traditions then the President should have consulted the
British
and
French
Governments
before
announcing
policy. But he did not. This infact leads
his
Stebbings to
question the validity of the Doctrine. He wrote:
What, more specifically, was the real purpose, of
a
plan which had been developed in obvious
haste,
bore no traces of consultation with
Allied Governments, had apparently not been
cleared through the National Security Council and
evidently envisaged the possibility of milira~y
action indepandently of either NATO or the UN? 0
The
acceptance
of
the
friendly Arab States was
Eisenhower Doctrine
by
not wholehearted. King Saud of
107. Humbaraci, n. 70, p.239.
108. Stebbings, n.67, p.42.
279
even
saudi Arabia in a Conference with other Arab leaders in
February
1957
did
not
speak
of
laudatory a fashion. He did say
American attitude seemed to
the
Doctrine
though that,
in
too
the
II
him to reflect a
new
appreciation of the Arab view point.n 109 But he did not
insist on its acceptance by the other Arab states,
particularly by those not friendly with the United
States.
According
to
apparently made no
Stebbins,
attempt to
put
(King
"he
the
Saud)
conference
on
record in support of the Eisenhower Doctrine ... 11110 The
friendly Arab states of the Middle East at their best,
gave
diplomatic support to the Doctrine. And the non-
firendly states ignored it and described it,
blatant interference
in the
domestic
"... as a
affairs
of Arab
nations. 11111 It seems the Doctrine was the earnest
attempt of one man to assert that the United States
was
deeply concerned about the danger to the Middle East
from Communism. Whether that danger existed or whether
the countries of the Middle East wanted the support of
the United States or not was never given consideration
by Eisenhower. It was simply a "one man show, 11112 as one
historian
rightly.
The
of
the
newly
Eisenhower
Presidency
released material
displays
points
a
out
similar
109. Stebbings, n. 67, p.179.
110. Ibid.
111. Elmo Richardson, The Presidency of Dwight ~
Eisenhower (Lawrence, kansas : The Regents Press
of Kansas, 1979), p. 150.
112. Ibid.
280
conclusion on the
fall out of the Eisenhower Doctrine.
Besides a few new and interesting facts also emerge out
of the declassified record.
There are numerous documents
Eisenhower Doctrine
in the papers
relating to the
of
the
Special
Assistant for National Security Affairs Gordon Gray. 113
In
one such account Gray gives a list of foreign policy
aims
he thought should have been
kept in mind for the
Middle East after 1956. He listed them as," will fight
to preserve peace,
interest
in
constructive
the
recognize that Soviet
area, . . .
goals
of
indentify
Arab
(sic)
ourselves
nationalism 11114
has
with
It
is
surprising that though foreign policy bureaucracy had a
clear
understanding
of
the
need
of
the
hour,
no
effective measures resulted. Was the refusal to come to
terms with the actual
problems of the Middle East a
deliberate step? Did the United States feel it was more
profitable to emphasis on Western solidarity to keep the
Communist
phobia
alive?
relevance in the context of
written as
These
questions
acquire
a paper on the Near East
late as January 1958,
an year after the
Eisenhower Doctrine was announced. 115
113. There were two other special Assistants for
National Security Affairs, Robert Cutler and Dillon
Anderson. Their records are listed under the same
headings as of Gordon Gray.
114. List by Gordon Gray. untitled and unlisted, OSANSA
NSC Adminis trative Subseries, File; The Middle
East (1), 1957-59, Box 13.
115. OSANSA, Ibid.
281
The paper accepted the declining influence of the
United States and the
West and the rising one of the
Soviet Union in the Middle East. It listed the probable
reasons for this as
( 1) Many Arabs believe that U.s. is seeking to
protect its interest in Near East oil by
supporting the statue quo and by opposing
political or economic progress.
(2) That the US seeks to maneuver the Arab states
into a position where they will be committed to
fight in a world war against the Soviet Union, in
the face of tradi tiona! Arab reluctance to any
sort of commitment.
(3) That the USSR, on
the contrary favours the
goals of Arab nationalism and is willing to
support Arabs in their efforts to attain these
goals ...
( 4) That Arab interests are best served by a
competition between the free world and the Soviet
bloc rather than by the exclusion of either.
(5) Many Arabs belive that Israel poses a greater
threat
to
Arab
interests
than
Communist
imperialism and Israel must be, if not destroyed
at least contained and isolated.
(6) Many Arabs believe that while the Soviets
support Arabs against Israel the US gives Israel
more aid ... than it gives to all Arab states, that
the US supports Israel position on the Arab
refugees and on immigration of Jews into Israe1. 116
The paper also posed three very
relevent questions,
proper dealing of which might have improved the United
116. Briefing Note on the Near East, January 28, 1958,
p.1. OSANSA, Box 13.
282
States status in the Middle East. The questions were :
( 1) How and where to find enough indigenous
strength, political economic and military upon
which to build an effective resistance to
Communist penetration which has already occured in
the area ?
(2) How to resolve the overriding Arab-Israel
dispute ?
(3) ... How
problem? 117
to
It is unfortunate,
solve
Palestine
the
refugee
that despite such papers and other
warnings the Eisenhower administration did nothing to
alter either the parameters of the Eisenhower Doctrine
in
relation
to
the
above
or
in
relation
to
foreign
policy goals in the Middle East.
Another paper presented by the National Security
Council in November 1958 too emphasied the same points,
stressing
in
the
process
the
danger
to
the
United
States postion in the Middle East from Communism. This
paper saw Arab Nationalism aided by Communism as the
greatest danger to Western
interests.
Thus
the paper
read :
The most dangerous challenge to Western interests
arises not from Arab nationalism per se but from
117.
Briefing Note, n.116, p.62.
283
the coincidence of many of its objectives with
many of those of the USSR and the resultant
way in which it can be manipulated to serve
Soviet ends. soviet policy in the Near East is
aimed at weakening and ultimately eliminating
Western influence using Arab nationalism as an
instrument and substituting Soviet influence for
that of the West ... It has become increasingly
apparent that the prevention of further Soviet
penetration of the Near East and progress in
solving Near Eastern problems depends on ·the
degree to which the United States is able to work
more closely with such aims and aspirations of
the Arab people as are not contrary to the basic
interests of the United States. 118
The last few lines of the above statement show that Arab
nationalism was seen as eroding Western influence. The
United States saw the region as the arena of strength
between the Western influence and the Soviet influence.
It
thought
Nasserissm
to
expansionist. Did not equate it
which it wanted
be
aggressive
and
with Arab nationalism
to support.
A letter by Millar Burrows, Professor Emeritus of
the Biblical Theology, Yale University in the New York
Times,
of
August
16,
1958
displays
a
similar
viewpoint.It read :
118. Statement of United States Policy Toward the Near
East, November 4, 1958, pp 1-2 OSANSA, NSC Policy
Papers Subseries, File; Policy Towards the Near
East (2), Box 26,
284
We are beginning to realize that this is a force
to be reckoned with but our chief reaction to- it
seems to be that we must control and
'contain'
it. . . The Arabs need and want help both for
development and for defence, but they want it on
terms that do not destroy their independence. 19
The letter went on to point out that unless and until
the Palestine
and Arab
refugee problems
were
solved,
nothing concrete would emerge vis-a-vis the United
States
and the Arab nations.
The
use
of
the
word
'contain' was so symbolic of the general United States
foreign policy. The United States had always seemed to
'contain' everything which was against its national
interests.
Another
public person,
Edward
L.R.Elson,
minister of the National Presbyterian church, also wrote
a letter directly to Eisenhower in July 1958, requesting
and
almost
pleading
for
a
understanding towards the Arabs.
praising
genuine
approach
of
This letter started by
Eisenhower's action during the Suez crisis.
Said Elson, " Your action was correct in the Sinai-Suez
crisis of 1956 (one of your greatest moments). 11120 And
then Elson offered suggestions on the
119. Letter to the Editor, from Millar Burrows,
New York Times, August 16, 1958, CDJP, File ; Time
Inc., Arab Affairs, Box 24.
120. Letter to Eisenhower from L.R. Elson, July 24,
1958, P.1 AWDS-DDEDS, File ; Staff Memos July 1958
( 1) , Box 35.
285
possible future American course of action in the Middle
East. He stated
we must find the way to identify ourselves with
the Arabs' natural aspirations for freedom under
God, for self-fulfillment and the achievement of
an honorable national destiny consonant with their
cultural and religious heritage
in private,
and when possible in public, assure the Arabs we
are as devoted to the containment of Israel as we
are to order and stability of the Arab world. 121
Once again the word 'containment' appeared and this time
in the context of Israel!
was
well
aware
of
It seems the American public
their
Goverment' s
adherence
to
containment.
However,
letters, statements or policy papers did
little to change the set aims,
and the course of the
Eisenhower's policy in the Middle East. Even Dulles gave
a
fair warning on the exact words
to be used
Doctrine as early as Janurary 1957,
in the
so as to make the
United States appear less anti-Communist and therefore,
more welcome to the Middle East. If his warning was not
heeded what
facet
Dulles
121.
can be
said
of
others!
This
is revealed in a set of two letters
to
Gordon
Gray
Letter, n.120, p.2.
286
in
January
1957.
interesting
sent by
Excerpts
are reproduced here for a clearer understanding.
Thus
Dulles wrote:
I have been asked for my opinion on a number of
amendments to the Middle East Resolution dealing
with the matter of subversion.
In my view there is great danger in any amendment
which might be construed
as authorising, or
indicating any purpose on the part of the United
States
to interfere in the internal affairs of
any Middle East nation on the grounds that the
United states was thereby combating Communist
subversion. Such an amendment would be sure to
raise in the Middle East and indeed in other parts
of the world, the fear of unilateral intervention
by the United States, a fear which would be
exploited by the Soviets.12 2
And the next day he again wrote to Gray voicing the same
apprehensions. He stressed
Since the Resolution is designed not to be a
~sense'
(sic) resolution but a statement of what
the United States will do, we feel it undesirable
to make any further reference to subversion as an
. ... 123
express1on
Thus
Dulles
also
had
reservations
about
United
States action against possible subversion aided by the
Soviet Union and he wanted to underplay it, so that the
nations of the Middle East would not oppose the Doctrine
violently.
122. Letter from Dulles to
Gordon Gray,
January 23,
1957, JFDP, Chronological Series, File; January
1957 (1), Box 14.
12 3. Letter from
1957, Ibid.
287
Dulles to Gordon
Gray,
January 24,
This factor becomes
even
more noteworthy since
Eisenhower also made a reference to it in a television
talk in July 1958. He stated :
We may as well bring out into full day light the
fact that among the Arabs, there is today a
widespread notion that America is indifferent to
and even hostile towards, the dream of Arab
Nationalism ... Now all of a sudden we seem to see
this
paradox
the
Soviet
Union,
whose
contribution until very recently to the education
ideals, health and progress of the area has been
precisely
zero,
has
climbed
on
the
Ara~
Nationalism bandwagon hooting a big brassy horn. 1 5
Despite
this
realization,
it
is
astonishing
that
Eisenhower did nothing to give the United States foreign
policy aims a different outlook. Perhaps
by this time
the Middle East had been too deeply cast in the mould of
the cold war, to change effectively ?
Amongst the oral interviews, recently released are
of
a
few
individuals
Doctrine.
who
assessed
the
Eisenhower
Of these two should be specially mentioned.
These are
of
Camille
Chamoun,
Lebanon and Charles Malik,
former
President
a Lebanese diplomat.
of
Their
views acquire special significance since Lebanon was one
of the few countries that had shown a positive attitude
to
the
indicate
Eisenhower
Doctrine.
Their
remarks
clearly
the resentment
125. Presidents Television talk on the Mid East, July
28, 1958, pp 5-7, CDJP, File ; Time Inc.
Middle
East Crisis, Working Papers, Results etc. ( 2) , Box
63.
288
that some of the Lebanese felt
States and more particularly the
against the United
Eisenhower Doctrine.
Chamoun lamented
(When the Eisenhower Doctrine was introduced to
us), it was full of promises of the amount of aid
to Lebanon. They wanted Lebanon to be the first
Arab country to enter into agreemnt with the
United states about
the implication of this
doctrine. And when it materialized, it materalized
by very little results.126
Chamoun not only portrayed the fact that Lebanon felt
let
down,
he
also
said
that
Eishenhower Doctrine out of fear
Lebanon
of
joined
isolation
the
in the
Arab world. Thus he accepted
I signed the Eisenhower Doctrine, because I
started to realise ... the danger of having on one
side Egypt with Nasser's ambition; on the other
side Syria, which was not part, yet of the UAR,
but which was siding a 100% with Egypt against
Lebanon. Thats one of the reasons for which I have
signed the Doctrine. 12 7
The above words are a harsh indicatment of the Doctrine
as well as of the United States in the Lebanese eyes.
It was possible ofcourse that Lebanon wanted the United
States to offer American assistance against their Arab
rivals rather than against Communism.
Charles Malik
126. Camille Chamoun, interviewed by Dr. R. Bayly
Winder, Beirut, Lebanon, August 28, 1965, p. 6,
John Foster Dulles Oral History Collection. Seeley
J. Mudd library Princeton University, Princeton,
NJ, USA. Henceforth cited as JFD-OHC.
127. Chamoun, Ibid, p.45.
289
went a step further and strongly assailed
the idea that
Lebanon had even accepted the
Doctrine.
Eisenhwer
He
stated :
People say Lebanon ~adhered' to the Eisenhwoer
Doctrine . . . what do you mean by saying Lebanon
~adhered
to the Eisenhower Doctrine' who adheres
to the Eisenhower Doctrine?
In the first place, Lebanon was never consul ted.
In the second place the phrase ~Eisenhower
Doctrine' does not exist except in newspapers. All
that exists is a decision taken by the United
States Congress. In
what sense can a country
~adhere' to a decision taken by the legislature of
another sovereign country without being asked
about it what so ever? In no sense at all.
All that happened was that the Americans
acted. . . without consulting with anybody in the
world at least without consulting with us. It was
they who acted, and they who elaborated the
Congressional Act, and they who passed it later in
March 1957. It is they who did it. It is they who
felt that the time had come for the United States
to pass an act by the legistati ve whereby the
United States would tell the world that it would
support any country in the Middle East that would
appeal to it for its support if that country is
endangered or being undermined by international
communism.
Now, in what sense did Lebanon ~adhere' or ~join'
In no sense at all. We had nothing to do with it.i 28
These are only two voices
that!)
but
these
are
(and afterthoughts at
embarrassing
indicators
of
th
dislike of the Eisenhower Doctrine by even the friendly
128. Charles Malik, interviewed by R. Bayly Winder, AlRabiya, Lebanon, August 27, 1964, PP-31-32, JFDOHC.
290
1/
nations of the Middle East ! Ultimately the Eisenhower
Doctrine pleased no one, not even Dulles or Eisenhower,
as is revealed. It seems that once having announced the
programme
and
retreat from
basing
its
identity
with
Communism,
it became a difficult proposition.
the United States continous to support
Thus
it in public, as
contemporary sources have showed.
It is not beyond doubt that as the President
the most powerful Western nation,
of
Eisenhower felt that
given the circumstances some grand announcement of the
United States role in containing Communism was required.
And thus his Doctrine. He himself agreed to this in a
letter to his friend "Swede" He said :
All this, ofcourse, is nothing but a by-product of
a process which has as its principle purpose of
strengthening the freedom and the gradual
exhaustion of Communism in the world ... 129
The Doctrine also was too broad-based and vague on
its exact functions. But that might have been the result
of Eisenhower's desire not to limit his course of action
in the politics of the region. Political Scientist and
renouned
historian
on
Eisenhower
presidency, Fred
I
129. Robert Griffith
ed. , Ike's Letters To A Friend
1941-1958 (Kansas
University Press of kansas. ,
1984), p.185.
291
Greenstein in an interview stated
It was characteristic
of
Eisenhower
to be
cautions, so that it did not limit his actions
later on ... and to him the Middle East was an area
of animosity and problems and he felt that America
should not get too involved.130
It is possible that
the Eisenhower Doctrine was
thus deliberately left vague and ambiguous and not
spelled out in
detail in order
•
chance to use it more flexibly.
brought
Eisenhower
only
to give Eisenhower a
However,
discredit.
the Doctrine
Raymond
Hare,
Ambassader to Egypt (1956-58) concluded
... however well
intentioned it
(Eisenhower
Doctrine) might be
this was a gesture of a
type that was going to be misinterpreted in the
area and goil'}_?3 to cause trouble - which it did.
Which it did. 1
Definitely it was going to cause trouble. Repetetive of
past doctrines it had nothing new or positive
to offer
to the area for which it was intended and was a dismal
failure.
130. Fred I. Greenstein, Political Scientist Professor
of Politics and Chairman, Programme in Leadership
Studies, Department of Politics, Woodrow Wilson
School of Public and International Affairs,
Princeton
University
Princeton,
NJ,
USA,
interviewed by researcher, October 26, 1992.
131. Raymond Hare, intervieved by John Luter, August 28,
1972, Oral Transcripts, No. 189 (2), p. 100,
Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.
292