Dealignment Meets Cleavage Theory
Gary Marks
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Robert Schuman Fellow, EUI
David Attewell
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Jan Rovny
Sciences Po, Paris
Liesbet Hooghe
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Robert Schuman Fellow, EUI
Version 1.00. Please do not quote. Comments welcome!
Prepared for a Workshop at the EUI on “Rejected Europe, Beloved Europe, Cleavage Europe?”
May 18-19, 2017
The rise of a new divide on immigration and Europe raises fundamental questions about the
character of party competition and the causal bases of voting. In this paper we suggest that
those who vote for political parties established on the new divide—green and radical-TAN
parties—have more structured partisan preferences than supporters of mainstream political
parties. While conflict between mainstream political parties has softened with the decline of
the class cleavage, that between green and radical-TAN parties is acute and has become
sharper over time. Social structural differences between voters for these parties are more, not
less, pronounced among younger persons. Education, which has been theorized as a source of
dealignment, powerfully differentiates voters on the transnational divide.
Consequently, we are drawn to reassess the idea that socially structured political
cleavages are a thing of the past. Among the implications of neo-cleavage theory are that the
dynamism in party systems arises from exogenous social change; that the party-political
response comes chiefly in the form of new political parties that rise on a new cleavage; and that
processes of alignment and dealignment coexist as new divides become solidified among voters
while old divides lose causal power.
There is a lot on the table. Let’s take this in steps. We begin by examining the structural
and ideological moorings of party choice across mainstream and GAL-TAN parties in countries
where these alternatives exist: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. We find that the cleavage between green and
radical-Tan parties is considerably more structured than that between mainstream left and
right political parties, and consequently party choice across the transnational divide is more
predictable than across mainstream parties. Further, we see that younger voters are more
structured across this divide than older voters.
We then examine the expectations of neo-cleavage theory in the preferences of voters
over time using panel data for the Netherlands and Switzerland. We find that expressed
preferences for green and radical-TAN parties are more stable than those for all mainstream
parties except small religious parties; that attitudes towards immigration and Europe play a
decisive role in attaching voters to these parties; and that these attitudes are themselves
rooted in social structure.
From cleavage theory to neo-cleavage theory
There is now incontrovertible evidence for the decline of the cleavages famously described by
Lipset and Rokkan in their 1967 paper (Dalton 2014: 155-82; Dalton, Flanagan, Beck 1984;
Franklin et al. 1992; Knutsen 2004, 2006; van der Brug 2010). The proportion of the workforce
in blue-collar manual jobs has fallen, as have the proportion of the workforce who join trade
unions. Fewer people go to church on a regular basis. People who express religious convictions
are less likely to vote for Christian democratic political parties. Union members are less reliably
labor or social democratic. These trends are particularly marked among younger voters (van der
Brug 2010; Walzcak, van der Brug, de Vries 2012). Younger generations feel less attached to
mainstream political parties rooted in past cleavages. The result is unusually high levels of
individual volatility as the traditional links between voters and parties have weakened.
1
There are two ways of making sense of this. One is to conceive the decline of traditional
cleavages as part of an ongoing process of de-alignment in which political choice becomes short
term, oriented to particular issues, personalities, and evaluations that leave little trace in a
person’s sense of self. This has several hypothesized causes. Political parties—and indeed
political institutions in general—have lost legitimacy, leaving individual voters adrift to form
evanescent attachments. Individuals lead lives that are only tenuously encased by durable and
homogenous social groupings. The decline of religion, the diversification of working life, and
greater occupational and spatial mobility have weakened the social ties that bind individuals to
traditional social strata. Finally, and most decisively, voters have gained the cognitive capacity
to make their own choices independently of the intermediary institutions—including churches
and unions—that once guided them. The vast expansion of mass education has given voters the
ability to form preferences on an individual, rather than group basis. Short-term preferences
may come to replace durable convictions. The upshot is that one would expect to see
considerable political party flexibility and weaker ideological structuring.
Alternatively, as we argue here, the weakening of traditional cleavages does not presage
de-alignment, but is a transitional phase in the re-articulation of political conflict (Hooghe and
Marks 2017; see also Bornschier 2010; Kriesi et al. 2006). Neo-cleavage theory extracts cleavage
theory from the particularities of the post World War II decades. Our expectation is that dealignment is a phenomenon of mainstream political parties on the left-right, but not of political
parties arising on the transnational divide.
Cleavage theory conceives political conflict in a society as structured by fundamental
divides that have a lasting impact on the formation of social movements and political parties.
These divides arise from large-scale processes that shape the lives and the livelihoods of those
in a society. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) identify three: the building of national states across
Europe from the sixteenth century, the emergence of Protestantism in northern Europe from
the seventeenth century, and the industrial revolution from the nineteenth century. Each of
these produced a distinctive divide1 with remarkable durability, which so impressed the
originators of cleavage theory that they used the unfortunate term “freezing” to describe their
impact. However, in the field of social relations, nothing is forever. An old divide can be
expected to lose its power to shape human relations as the socializing effect of prior
institutions is attenuated from generation to generation. As prior divides lose their shaping
force, there is the ever-present possibility that a new cleavage arises to overlay the old. The
model we have in mind is not one of re-alignment in which new conflicts replace old ones. It is,
instead, akin to a geological process in which cleavages are formed in succession and overlay
each other so that the resulting structure of conflict reflects both emerging and eroding
tensions.2
1
The industrial revolution produced an urban-rural divide and a worker-employer divide.
To pursue the metaphor, one might add the possibility that the erosion of a more recent deposit may uncover
prior layers, just as the erosion of left-right conflict in Britain has brought to the surface prior conflict about
national autonomy for Scotland. Similarly, the national-transnational conflict that is taking shape across Western
societies seems to revive a much older center-periphery cleavage.
2
2
Cleavages are best identified in the rear view mirror. In retrospect, it is evident that
there has been a sharp and prolonged rise in transnationalism with profound social, economic,
and cultural consequences for those living in western democracies. Following the neoliberal
impetus of the Reagan-Thatcher governments, there was a concerted effort to reduce barriers
to trade from the early 1990s. The demise of communism and the break-up of the Soviet Union
after 1989 was seen to herald a cosmopolitan and democratic world order under western
hegemony that would transcend national and ideological differences. The World Trade
Organization was negotiated from 1990 and came into existence in 1994. The Maastricht
Treaty, reconceiving the bulk of Europe as a political union with common citizenship and a
single currency, was negotiated from 1990 and signed in 1993. The North American Free Trade
Agreement (1992) was intended to eliminate trade and investment barriers in North America.
The 1990s saw the creation of several regional and global international organizations beyond
Europe and North America and a marked deepening of delegation to those in existence
(Hooghe et al 2017). The net result has been a rapid increase in international economic
exchange over the past three decades, vastly increased immigration resulting in intermixing of
ethnically distinct people, and a decline of national sovereignty, most stark in Europe. 3 What
makes transnationalism so politically combustible is that immigration, trade, and international
organization are patently the result of political choice.
Public opinion on transnationalism is sharply divided (de Vries 2017; van Elsas et al.
2016; Hooghe and Marks 2009; Inglehart and Norris 2016). There are reasons to believe that
the division will produce distinctive political parties that will gain support from individuals with
distinctive social locations and durable, rather than volatile, party preferences (Aichholzer,
Kritzinger, Wagner, Zeglovits 2014; Bornschier 2010; Hobolt and Tilley 2016; Häusermann and
Kriesi 2015; Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2015). Radical-TAN parties are the fulcrum of this
divide. They take coherent positions that connect immigration and opposition to European
integration which distinguish them sharply from parties that compete chiefly on the left-right
divide. Green parties generally take the most GAL (green-alternative-libertarian) positions on
the other side, though they compete with mainstream political parties that have conventionally
been pro-immigration and pro-integration, while these positions were usually not at the
forefront of their political identity.
Prior research finds that education plays a double role in placing persons into one camp
or the other. Higher levels of education are associated with attitudes sympathetic to
transnationalism, including tolerance for ethno-cultural diversity and European integration
(Ceobanu and Escandell 2010; Hakhverdian et al. 2013; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007).
Education is also the decisive path to economic security in a transnational world for those
lacking wealthy parents. Interestingly, education appears to have little effect on political
attitudes in the course of going to university (Kuhn, Lancee, and Sarrasin 2017; Lancee, and
Our analysis builds on a growing literature that investigates the politicization of trade, immigration, and
international organization. See e.g. Burgoon 2009; Caporaso and Tarrow 2009; Conceição-Heldt 2013; EckerEhrhardt 2014; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2014; Higgott 2000; Hooghe and Marks
2009; Hütter et al. 2016; Kay 2015; Kaldor 2000; Mansfield and Mutz 2012; Morgenstern et al. 2007; Rathbun
2012; Rixen and Zangl 2013; Teney, Lacewell, de Wilde 2013; Zürn et al. 2012.
3
3
Sarrasin 2015). Rather, education appears to be an indicator for background variables—
presumably related to family, socialization, resources, self-selection—that set a path in life and
attitudes. A series of studies using panel data suggest that family socialization –parents
influencing their offspring but also children influencing their parents—may be more
consequential, particularly with respect to new or rising parties (see e.g. Fitzgerald 2011; Kuhn
2009; Zuckerman, Dasovic, and Fitzgerald 2007). Education may sometimes facilitate
interpersonal persuasion, particularly apparently when it concerns green parties (Fitzgerald
2011: 788). Education may be just one of a series of interconnected structural factors that
predispose--or activate—individuals to express coherent choices on globalization, European
integration, and immigration (Kriesi 2010). The causal story is still to be told, but it seems
plausible to believe that education has a durable effect in dividing voters across the
transnational divide.
The argument in brief
Let us recapitulate the argument by summarizing the key claims of cleavage, de-alignment, and
neo-cleavage theory:
Classic cleavage theory




Individuals and political parties are rooted in durable, organizationally coherent, social
cleavages.
Social structure is causally powerful for voting.
The effects of social structure depend on the layering of cleavages. Hence, cross-cutting
cleavages produce cross-pressures at the individual level.
Cleavages are frozen.
De-alignment theory





Classic cleavages have declined in incidence and causal power.
Education enables individual choice.
Younger voters tend to be less partisan.
Transitory issues come to the fore in party competition and individual choice.
These produce decline of partisanship and increasing voter volatility.
Neo-cleavage theory




Classic cleavages have declined, but this does not rule out the rise of a new cleavage.
A transnational cleavage has emerged around conflict over the meaning and
implications of national community.
De-alignment has taken place among mainstream voters, not voters on the
transnational divide.
Educated individuals exhibit durable ideological commitments and less volatility.
4

Younger generations of voters are more structured than older voters on the
transnational cleavage.
We examine the plausibility of our conjectures against cross-sectional data from the European
Social Survey (waves 1 through 7 for ten Western European countries) and panel data for
Switzerland (sixteen waves from 1999-2015) and for the Netherlands (eight waves from 20082015).
A cross-sectional test
Our core claim is that de-alignment is a phenomenon of mainstream political parties on the leftright, but not of political parties arising from the transnational divide. In this section, we
estimate the social structure of those who say they voted for political parties on the
transnational divide—i.e. green and radical-TAN party voters—whom we compare to those who
say they voted for political parties on the left-right divide.4 To do this we draw on the European
Social Survey, which has asked consistently across waves which party a respondent voted for
“in the last national election.” These data are ideally suited to examine individual level
motivations for party choice as it asks identical questions to representative samples of voters in
participating countries in seven survey rounds: 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014.
Our sample focuses on ten countries in Western Europe that have had green and/or radicalTAN parties in the national parliament across the entire period. 5
The first column in Table 1 summarizes the results of a logit analysis in which those who
say they voted green in the past election are coded zero and those who say they voted radicalTan are coded one. Several social characteristics stand out. Education is chief among them.
Those who have only primary education or less are 6.4 times more likely to vote radical-TAN
than green compared to those who have attended university. Those with lower secondary or
upper secondary education are 5.58 and 3.49 times respectively more likely to vote radical-TAN
compared to those who have attended university. Men are around twice as likely to vote
radical-TAN as are women. Occupation also discriminates sharply. Production workers are more
than three times as likely to vote radical-TAN than green compared to socio-cultural
professionals in the reference category. Finally, an urban-rural divide shows up. Compared to
It is perhaps worth stressing that this question cannot be reduced to the effort to point-predict voting intentions
among all members of the electorate across all political parties. To predict how an individual votes one would need
a theory of which political parties are supplied to that person alongside a theory of the incidence of relevant social
and ideological characteristics that shape voting intentions in that society. None of the theories discussed here—
cleavage theory, de-alignment theory, neo-cleavage theory—point-predicts voting at their individual level. Nor do
they predict a simpler outcome, the share of the vote received by political parties. Rather these theories seek to
generalize about the factors that structure—or fail to structure--electoral choice. If Darwin had sought to pointpredict evolutionary outcomes (which are perhaps simpler than electoral outcomes), he would have been lost in
empirics.
4
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. All
countries are represented in each wave, except for Austria, which was represented in waves 1, 2, 3, and 7.
5
5
those living in large cities, persons in rural areas are two to three times more likely to vote
radical-TAN.
[Table 1 about here]
The social distinctiveness of those across the left-right divide is much softer, with the
exception of occupation.6 The second column of Table 1 confirms a de-alignment perspective.
Education, sex, urban-rural location have a relatively weak effect in setting left voters apart
from right voters, and while religiosity and union membership have, as expected, a stronger
effect in discriminating left and right voters than they do in discriminating green from radicalTAN voters, their effect is not particularly strong. Measures of model fit reveal that the
transnational divide has a much stronger social-structural basis than the left-right divide. Three
contrasting measures—McFadden’s R-squared, the area under the curve for Receiver Operating
Characteristics (ROC), and Tjur’s coefficient of discrimination—confirm that the explained
variation in the green/radical-TAN model is consistently greater than that for the left/right
model.
Table 2 disaggregates the analysis of the social bases of green/radical-TAN voters by age
group, and Table 3 does the same for left voters and right voters. The comparisons provide
additional confirmation for neo-cleavage theory. The divide between green and radical-TAN
voters is no less structured, and apparently more structured, for those aged 18 to 29 and aged
30-44 than for older persons. The smaller samples produce larger standard errors than for the
combined groups in Table 1. However, each of the three measures of fit in Table 2 show a
decline for successively older age groups. McFadden’s R-squared goes from 0.36 in steps to
0.27; the area under the ROC curve goes from 0.87 to 0.83, and Tjur’s coefficient goes from
0.42 to 0.31. On the transnational cleavage, there is no indication that voting is less structured
for younger generations. Instead, we seem to be seeing the emergence of a more cleavage-like
structuration with each new generation. The contrast with the left/right divide in Table 3 is
sharp. Because the samples are larger than for the analysis in Table 2, standard errors tend to
be smaller. However, the net effect of the structural variables is very much smaller on each
measure of fit for the left/right divide, and in each case, the youngest group, those between 18
and 29, has the weakest indicators for fit. This is consistent with the neo-cleavage claim that
while the social structuration of the left/right divide is weakening over time, that for the
transnational divide is much stronger and may actually be strengthening.
[Table 2 and Table 3 about here]
Figure 1 represents logits using the same structural factors across voters for fifteen pairs
of party blocks: radical-left and liberal parties in addition to green, radical-TAN, left, and right
parties. Network density is calculated using the inverse of Tjur’s coefficient so that political
parties that draw on socially similar voters are closer to each other than those that have socially
distinctive voters. Among the fifteen paired comparisons, the political parties with the greatest
structural differentiation are green and radical-TAN parties. It is worth stressing that this is not
a function of their extremism on the major dimension of party competition. Green and radicalWhen production workers are taken as the reference category, (associate) managers are 3.25 times more likely to
vote Right, and self-employed professionals and large employers are 2.89 times more likely to vote right.
6
6
TAN parties are relatively moderate on the major dimension—left/right contestation over the
role of the state, welfare, and economic freedom. Green parties tend to be more centrist than
social democratic parties on welfare and equality. Radical TAN parties tend to blur their
positions on the left/right (Rovny 2012, 2013) and most have moved away from rightist
positions towards a diffuse center.7 However, greens and radical-TAN parties define themselves
in relation to the transnational cleavage, taking polar positions on immigration and Europe, and
this divides their supporters in distinctive camps. Our analysis suggests that the basis of this
polarity is socio-structural—and not merely issue-motivated.
[Figure 1 about here]
Tests using panel data
In this section we use panel data from two countries, the Netherlands and Switzerland,
to examine volatility in voter preferences for political parties.8 The unit of analysis here is a
party choice over two panels. We treat responses that are missing, non-voting, ineligible to
vote, and “do not know yet” as missing. Table 4 provides some examples of the coding scheme
(see Kuhn 2009: Table 1).
[Table 4 about here]
Figure 2 summarizes individual volatility in party support among over eight annual
panels from 2008 to 2015 in the Netherlands.9 The figures in the nodes are the proportion of
respondents who re-select the same party, rather than a different party, in response to the
question, “If parliamentary elections were held today, for which party would you vote?”
The Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV) and the Christian Union (CU) have
the highest proportion of voters with stable preferences. Over the eight waves, 79 percent and
78 percent, respectively, of those who say they will vote for the PVV and CU say the same thing
at the subsequent panel in which they express a party preference. The Christian Union is a
small, socially conservative party—a remnant of the religious pillar—and the stability of its
electorate accords with classical cleavage theory. The PVV is embedded in the new
transnational cleavage, rooted in opposition to immigration and European integration. Those
who switch to the PVV tend to move from parties taking hard TAN positions—chiefly the shortlived radical-TAN party set up by Rita Verdonck and the VVD which is the mainstream party
closest to the PVV on immigration and Europe. However, the rates of switching are relatively
low, expecially to mainstream parties of the left and right. Radical-TAN parties are distinctive in
7
This is why we prefer to describe these parties as radical-TAN rather than radical right.
8
In each panel , we restrict the analysis to individuals of 18 years old or older at the time of the survey.
The LISS panel (Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social Sciences) is an internet panel representative of the
Dutch population, collected by CentERdata (Tilburg University, the Netherlands) and funded by the Dutch National
Science Council (NWO). The original survey of 2008 drew a true probability sample of 8204 households on the
basis of the population register of Statistics Netherlands (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, CBS). The panel
sample has been refreshed three times (2009, 2011-12, and 2013-14). Households without a computer with an
internet connection are provided with one. The LISS survey is monthly with questions concerning vote intention
and political attitudes on left-right, euthanasia, inequality, European integration, and immigration asked annually.
We use the eight annual waves that are currently available (https://www.lissdata.nl).
9
7
the intensity with which they oppose immigration and European integration. Radical-TAN
voters are relatively fixed even in a country known to have low barriers for party formation and
consequently high levels of voter volatility (van der Meer et al. 2012).
[Figure 2 about here]
Comparing vote choice between the 2006 and 2010 elections using a different panel
data source, van der Meer et al. (2012: 344) find that “the most loyal voters in the 2010
elections were those of the PVV” and that “the shifts of voters between parties most[ly] remain
within the bounds of specific party blocks.” They conclude that their results provide “little
evidence of dealignment” and that the “two-dimensional structure that we did observe is
consistent with the idea that Dutch voters have realigned along a sociocultural dimension.”
Similar to our longitudinal analysis, they find that the core anchor on the radical-TAN side is the
PVV while three parties vie for multicultural votes on the GAL side: Groenlinks, D66 and a
resiliently GAL PvdA.
Analysis of seventeen annual panels regarding preferences over political parties in
Switzerland from 1999 to 2015 produces a similar structure.10 In Figure 3, the radical-TAN party,
the SVP, has the highest level of repeat choices, 86 percent. When one combines the two green
parties, the PES and the GL, this increases the proportion of those who repeat their party
preference to 72 percent. As in the Netherlands, there are relatively high levels of interchange
among green voters and those of other left political parties, but extraordinarily low levels of
volatility among radical-TAN voters.
[Figure 3 about here]
The underlying similarity in the stability of party choice among these countries is
impressive because the Netherlands and Switzerland are usually described as dissimilar cases.
After the breakdown of its vaunted system of pillars, the Netherlands is regarded as an extreme
case of voter volatility, while Switzerland, with its Proportz system of party representation in
government, is usually regarded as having relatively low volatility even though it has an PR
electoral system (Fitzgerald 2011; Kuhn 2009; Ladner 2001).
[Table 5 and 6 about here]
Tables 5 and 6 display the results of logit analyses for green and radical-TAN party
preferences in panel data for the Netherlands and Switzerland. In these analyses we predict the
current vote preference of the respondent with her vote preference in the previous panel. It is
consequently a simple lagged-dependent variable model in which measures of model fit
indicate the extent to which a current preference for a party is associated with a prior
preference for the same party. These models underline the powerful link between present and
past choice. This effect is, however, particularly strong for Christian parties, for the radical right,
The Swiss Household Panel (FORS - SHP) is an annual panel study using a random sample of private households
since 1999. Household members are interviewed primarily by telephone. Data collection started in 1999 with a
sample of 5,074 households with 12,931 respondents. The panel was refreshed in 2004 with 2,538 households and
6,569 respondents, and in 2013 with 4,093 households and 9,945 respondents (http://forscenter.ch/en/oursurveys/swiss-household-panel).
10
8
and for the greens. In the Netherlands, the models for the Christian Union and the Christian
Democratic Appeal have the highest measures of fit, followed by that for the PVV. In
Switzerland, the radical-TAN SVP has the highest measures of fit. The relatively weaker effect of
prior choice for mainstream left-right parties suggests that political choices regarding noneconomic divides – religion and transnationalism – are historically stickier, and consequently
more deeply rooted.
While these simple models test the stability of party choice, they are underspecified. To
push these analyses further, we specify binary vote intention models predicting the preference
for a given party as a function of past reported preference, while controlling for a number of
socio-economic characteristics, including gender, age, education, income, occupation, ruralurban, and religiosity. To test whether the effect of social structure diverges across
respondents, we interact respondent age with prior party preference and education with prior
party preference.11
The results point to some notable findings (see appendix). First, past behavior of
mainstream left-right voters tends to be a more powerful predictor of current vote the older
the respondent is. This is especially pronounced for the CDA, PvdA, and SP in the Netherlands,
and for the Radicals and Christian democrats in Switzerland. For green and radical right voters,
in contrast, age generally does not moderate the effect of past vote, but where it does, it has
the opposite effect. Voters of the Swiss Green Liberals are more likely to stick to their past vote
the younger they are.12
Second, higher levels of education increase the effect of past vote on current vote for
green parties. More educated green voters are significantly more likely to support the greens
again than less educated green voters. This effect is pronounced for the Dutch GroenLinks and
for the Swiss Green Liberals. The opposite effect, albeit less pronounced, occurs for the radical
TAN. Less educated radical TAN voters are most faithful in their vote.
These findings place the assumptions of dealignment theory into perspective. Our
results indeed suggest that younger voters are less faithful in their partisan choice, but only in
the case of certain mainstream parties. Younger voters of parties on the transnational cleavage
– the greens and the radical right – appear to be as loyal as older voters. Similarly, while
education is hypothesized to increase an individual’s autonomy in selecting her party of choice,
our results suggest that educated voters of green parties choose to be more stable and support
the greens repeatedly. Hence, youth and education do not automatically go together with
dealignment. On the contrary, they may strengthen voters’ resolve to remain faithful
supporters of parties that contest the issues they care about.
The equations for these models are the following: voteit = 0 +  1voteit-1 +  2ageit +  3voteit-1*ageit +  4genderit+
5incomeit+  6occupationit+ 7ruralit+ 8religiosityit +  9educationit + it , and voteit =  0 + 1voteit-1 +  2educationit +
3voteit-1*educationit +  4genderit+  5incomeit+  6occupationit+  7ruralit+ 8religiosityit + 9ageit + it
12 Note that the Dutch CU is a particular case of a conservative religious party that takes liberal stances on some
issues like international development, asylum and environmentalism.
11
9
Conclusion
The evidence presented in this paper throws into doubt both Lipset and Rokkan’s frozen
landscape thesis and its chief counter-claim, that individual party preferences are increasingly
volatile and unstructured. We find plenty of support for the contention that the conventional
left-right divide has narrowed; that class location only weakly distinguishes between
mainstream left and mainstream right political parties; that these phenomena are particularly
marked among younger generations of voters; and that those with higher levels of education
tend to be somewhat more volatile. However, we also find that none of this is true for those
who support political parties on the transnational divide—green and radical TAN parties taking
polar positions on immigration and Europe. Green and radical TAN voters are distinguished by
their level of education, their age, their occupation, where they live, and whether they are
female or male. These features set younger voters apart more sharply than older voters. We
also detect that those on the radical-TAN side tend to be exceptionally sticky in sustaining their
party preference over time. At either side of the transnational divide, voters appear to coalesce
into different groupings that have a distinct socio-structural profile, distinct and outspoken
preferences on Europe and immigration, and a strong predisposition to pledge allegiance to a
particular party family. A sizeable number of voters – like the mainstream parties they used to
vote for – appear caught in the middle, or rather, cross-pressured, between a weakening but
surviving left/right divide and a crystallizing new cleavage.
The decline of the left-right cleavage and the rise of a transnational cleavage suggest
that, far from being frozen, party systems are subject to an unending process of discontinuous
systemic shocks, which can produce durable divides. We intentionally use the concept of
cleavage, even while we shed some of the baggage of the Lipset-Rokkan formulation. The neocleavage theory proposed here is anchored in a less deterministic view on how social structure
encapsulates individuals even though—and surprisingly—there is considerable sorting of
individuals on age, education, and family and social networks. The crystallization of a new
cleavage does not mean a clean sweep of the party-political landscape. As Lipset and Rokkan
stressed, cleavages overlay and interact with each another – and so prior cleavages constitute a
prism that affects the incidence of a more recent cleavage.
It is true that the large intermediary institutions of Lipset and Rokkan’s era—church and
union—have lost much of their socializing force, but this does not mean that individuals are
thrown back onto themselves to face media messaging, party entrepreneurs, or elite cueing. We
suspect that one requires a more fine-grained analysis of social networks—neighborhood,
family, work and educational environment, and the digital grids and groups in which people selfselect—to lay bare how socio-structural positions are articulated into political preferences and
behavior. Some fascinating work by sociologists using panel data reveals the socializing power of
familial and physical proximity.
10
A core premise that neo-cleavage theory shares with classical cleavage theory is that
change comes in response to rare, and major, exogenous shocks with the power to produce
shifts in voter preferences. The shocks that have been observed so far are the rise of the
national state, which produced a center-periphery cleavage; the rise of Protestantism, which
produced a religious cleavage; the industrial revolution, which produced an urban-rural and a
class cleavage; and, we argue, the perforation of national states producing a transnational
cleavage. It is interesting that the transnational cleavage reverses the first critical juncture that
Lipset and Rokkan diagnosed: the formation of the nation-state. We now see intense
contestation about its continued predominance.
11
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14
Table 1: Logit comparing the structure of Green vs. Radical TAN and Left vs. Right vote
(odds ratios)
Age
Gender (male)
Education
Tertiary
Primary
Lower secondary
Upper secondary
Post-secondary
Occupation (Oesch)
Socio-cultural professionals
Self-employed profs, CEOs
Small business owners
Technical professionals
Production workers
(Associate) managers
Clerks
Service workers
Urban-rural
Big city
Suburbs
Town
Country village
Farm/countryside
Religiosity (0=not; 10=very)
Union (non-member)
Intercept
N
Country dummies
McFadden R2
Area under ROC curve
Tjur’s coefficient of discrimination
Green vs. RadicalTAN (1)
1.02 (0.00)***
2.11 (0.13)***
Left vs. Right
(2)
0.998 (0.001)***
1.21 (0.03)***
Reference category
6.40 (0.94)***
0.49 (0.02)***
5.58 (0.55)***
0.68 (0.03)***
3.49 (0.24)***
0.83 (0.02)***
2.81 (0.36)***
0.89 (0.05)*
Reference category
1.74 (0.32)**
2.63 (0.02)***
1.72 (0.18)***
2.47 (0.11)***
1.73 (0.19)***
1.07 (0.05)
3.45 (0.37)***
0.71 (0.03)***
1.14 (0.01)
1.41 (0.05)***
1.93 (0.21)***
1.01 (0.04)
2.33 (0.24)***
0.86 (0.03)***
Reference category
1.48 (0.14)***
1.24 (0.05)***
1.73 (0.14)***
1.17 (0.04)***
2.32 (0.18)***
1.49 (0.05)***
3.15 (0.39)***
2.05 (0.10)***
1.00 (0.01)
1.12 (0.00)***
1.18 (0.08)*
1.75 (0.04)***
.038 (0.01)***
0.67 (0.04)***
9351
43574
YES
YES
0.33
0.09
0.857
0.696
-0.384 (.005)
-.116 (.002)
Note: Reference category = Green in model 1; Left in model 2. Odds ratios with standard errors in brackets. An odds
ratio expresses how a one-unit increase in the independent variable changes the odds of voting for a radical TAN
party compared to the odds of voting for a Green party (model 1). For example, an odds ratio of 2.11 for gender in
model 1 indicates that the odds of voting radical TAN rather than green increase by a factor of 2.11 for male
15
respondents. Significance: *** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05.
Sample: ESS wave 1-7 respondents who voted for a green or radical TAN party in the last national election (model 1)
or for a left or right party (model 2) in the next national elections in ten Western European countries. See Appendix 3
for a listing of political parties by country and party family.
16
Table 2: Logit comparing the structure of Green vs. Radical TAN Vote by age group (odds ratios)
Gender (male)
Education
Tertiary
Primary
Lower secondary
Upper secondary
Post-secondary
Occupation (Oesch)
Socio-cultural professionals
Self-employed profs, CEOs
Small business owners
Technical professionals
Production workers
(Associate) managers
Clerks
Service workers
Urban-rural
Big city
Suburbs
Town
Country village
Farm/countryside
Religiosity (0=not; 10=very)
Union (non-member)
Intercept
N
Country dummies
McFadden R2
Area under ROC curve
Tjur’s coefficient of discrimination
18-29 y
1.58 (0.25)**
30-44 y
2.01 (0.22)***
45-60 y
2.07 (0.22)***
60+
3.12 (0.44)***
10.99 (9.66)**
5.00 (1.43)***
3.10 (0.62)***
3.64 (1.20)***
Reference category
9.75 (4.42)***
10.07 (2.93)***
6.34 (1.22)***
6.90 (1.17)***
3.77 (0.46)***
4.44 (0.55)***
3.48 (0.74)***
2.89 (0.64)***
4.63 (1.05)***
4.47 (0.92)***
2.53 (0.41)***
1.05 (0.37)
6.55 (5.40)**
1.52 (0.57)
1.57 (0.50)
3.95 (1.12)***
1.38 (0.48)
2.27 ().67)***
1.58 (0.44)
Reference category
1.69 (0.62)
2.18 (0.63)**
1.95 (0.38)**
1.74 (0.32)**
1.71 (0.33)**
1.77 (0.36)**
3.00 (0.57)***
3.92 (0.76)***
1.03 (0.20)
1.07 (0.20)
2.09 (0.41)***
1.69 (0.32)**
2.72 (0.50)***
2.38 (0.42)***
1.15 (0.39)
1.53 (0.33)
1.74 (0.44)*
2.64 (0.63)***
1.38 (0.30)
2.10 (0.49)**
2.60 (0.60)***
1.55 (0.40)
2.23 (0.46)***
3.76 (0.76)***
4.96 (1.69)***
1.01 (0.03)
0.72 (0.13)
0.13 (0.04)***
1503
YES
0.36
0.870
0.415
Reference category
1.87 (0.33)***
1.30 (0.23)
1.95 (0.30)***
1.38 (0.21)*
3.24 (0.48)***
1.64 (0.24)**
3.15 (0.70)***
2.49 (0.53)***
0.99 (0.02)
0.99 (0.02)
0.87 (0.10)
1.62 (0.19)***
0.09 (0.02)***
0.13 (0.03)***
2920
2925
YES
YES
0.34
0.32
0.861
0.852
0.394
0.374
1.03 (0.22)
1.45 (0.27)*
1.46 (0.26)*
2.68 (0.77)**
1.03 (0.02)
1.71 (0.30)**
0.20 (0.06)***
1997
YES
0.27
0.833
.311
Note: Reference category = Green vote. Odds ratios with standard errors in brackets. Significance: *** p<.001; **
p<.01; * p<.05. Sample: ESS wave 1-7 respondents who voted for a green or radical TAN party in the last national
election in ten Western European countries.
17
Table 3: Logit comparing the structure of Left vs. Right vote by age group
Gender (male)
Education
Tertiary
Primary
Lower secondary
Upper secondary
Post-secondary
Occupation (Oesch)
Socio-cultural professionals
Self-employed profs, CEOs
Small business owners
Technical professionals
Production workers
(Associate) managers
Clerks
Service workers
Urban-rural
Big city
Suburbs
Town
Country village
Farm/countryside
Religiosity (0=not; 10=very)
Union (non-member)
Intercept
N
Country dummies
McFadden R2
Area under ROC curve
Tjur’s coefficient of discrimination
18-29 y
1.24 (0.09)**
30-44 y
1.38 (0.06)***
45-60 y
1.19 (0.05)***
60+
1.24 (0.09)**
0.31 (0.13)**
0.54 (0.08)***
0.79 (0.07)**
0.76 (0.11)
Reference category
0.55 (0.13)*
0.54 (0.06)***
0.62 (0.06)***
0.73 (0.05)***
0.86 (0.04)**
0.86 (0.04)**
0.87 (0.08)
1.06 (0.10)
0.31 (0.13)**
0.54 (0.08)***
0.79 (0.07)**
0.76 (0.11)
2.20 (0.79)*
2.06 (0.38)***
1.12 (0.15)
0.92 (0.12)
1.09 (0.14)
1.09 (0.14)
0.91 (0.11)
Reference category
2.14 (0.33)***
2.89 (0.38)***
2.12 (0.19)***
2.40 (0.19)***
1.07 (0.9)
1.10 (0.08)
0.65 (0.05)***
0.72 (0.05)***
1.44 (0.10)***
1.37 (0.09)***
1.08 (0.09)
0.93 (0.07)
0.80 (0.06)**
0.89 (0.06)
2.20 (0.79)*
2.06 (0.38)***
1.12 (0.15)
0.92 (0.12)
1.53 (0.21)***
1.09 (0.14)
0.91 (0.11)
1.12 (0.12)
1.31 (0.12)**
1.60 (0.16)***
2.67 (0.42)***
1.06 (0.01)***
1.52 (0.12)***
0.80 (0.13)
4237
YES
0.06
0.662
0.082
Reference category
1.25 (0.09)**
1.53 (0.11)***
1.14 (0.07)*
1.35 (0.08)***
1.65 (0.11)***
1.74 (0.11)***
2.11 (0.20)***
2.23 (0.18)***
1.08 (0.01)***
1.11 (0.01)***
1.71 (0.09)***
1.85 (0.08)***
0.68 (0.07)***
0.44 (0.04)***
10912
13776
YES
YES
0.09
0.10
0.694
0.700
0.113
0.122
1.12 (0.12)
1.31 (0.12)**
1.60 (0.16)***
2.67 (0.42)***
1.06 (0.01)***
1.52 (0.12)***
0.80 (0.13)
4237
YES
0.06
0.662
0.082
Note: Reference category = left vote. Odds ratios with standard errors in brackets. Significance: *** p<.001; ** p<.01;
* p<.05. Sample: ESS round 1-7 respondents who voted in the last national election for a left or right party in ten
Western European countries.
18
Figure 1: Patterns of Socio-Structural Dissimilarity between party voters for ten Western European countries
(2002-2014)
green
liberal
radical-left
right
left
radical-TAN
Tjur’s coefficients of discrimination for logit models comparing socio-structural
characteristics between pairs of party families
Green
Radical TAN
Radical Left
Left
Right
Liberal
Green Radical Radical
Left
Right
Liberal
TAN
left
0
0
0.385
0.353
0.324
0
0.162
0.159
0.09
0
0.149
0.176
0.15
0.116
0
0.265
0.321
0.271
0.115
0.085
0
Note: Socio-structural variables: age, gender, occupation (Oesch classification), education, rural-urban, and
religiosity. Tjur’s coefficient calculates for each of the two categories of the dependent variable the mean of the
predicted probabilities of an event, and then takes the absolute value of the difference between those two means. If a
model makes good predictions, the cases with events should have high predicted values and the cases without
events should have low predicted values. Tjur showed that the R2 (or coefficient of discrimination) is equal to the
arithmetic mean of two R2 formulas based on squared residuals, and equal to the geometric mean of two other R 2’s
based on squared residuals. The Tjur statistic has an upper bound of 1, and is closely related to R 2 statistics for
linear models (Allen 2014; Tjur 2009).
19
Table 4: Illustration of Coding of Party Stayers or Party Changers
A
n
A
n
n
Party choice by a respondent in successive
panels
A
A
B
B
B
A
A
n
n
B
n
n
n
n
A
A
n
A
n
B
A
n
B
x
B
n
x
B
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
Coding
̶
̶
̶
̶
̶
S
̶
S
̶
̶
S
̶
S
̶
̶
C
̶
S
̶
̶
S
S
S
S
̶
S
S
S
S
̶
C
S
C
̶
̶
S
S
C
S
̶
Note: Party Choice: A = Party A; B = Party B; n = No preference; x = Missing information.
Coding: S = No change; C = Change in party preference; ̶ = Excluded from sample or missing observation.
Note: This table replicates the procedure used by Kuhn (2009).
20
Figure 2: Party Stayers and Party Changers from wave t to wave t+1 in the Netherlands
(2008-2015)
Groenlinks
PvdA
0.57
0.69
D66
0.66
SP
0.70
0.75
CDA
0.78
PVV
0.79
CU
0.16
0.75
Verdonck
Verdonk
VVD
Note: node= proportion of panel respondents choosing same party at time points t and t+1; edge/ line = indicates size of vote flow from A to
B and B to A between time points t and t+1.
Vote choice at time t
Vote choice at time t+1
CDA
PvdA VVD
SP
GL
D66 CU
SGP
Verdonk
PVV
CDA
0.75
0.02
0.05
0.02
0.01
0.03
0.08
0.02
0.08
0.02
PvdA
0.02
0.69
0.02
0.08
0.13
0.08
0.01
0.00
0.04
0.02
VVD
0.09
0.02
0.75
0.02
0.01
0.08
0.01
0.01
0.22
0.09
SP
0.02
0.10
0.01
0.70
0.11
0.05
0.03
0.00
0.05
0.05
Groenlinks
0.01
0.05
0.01
0.05
0.57
0.06
0.02
0.00
0.01
0.01
D66
0.05
0.09
0.09
0.06
0.12
0.66
0.02
0.00
0.06
0.01
ChristenUnie
0.02
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.79
0.04
0.00
0.01
SGP
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.03
0.89
0.01
0.00
Verdonk
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.16
0.00
PVV
0.03
0.02
0.06
0.06
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.03
0.36
0.78
PvdDieren
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.01
Total:stable+changers 3238 3148 3378 2927 1356 2531
993
494
702
2554
Note: shaded cells refer to vote shifts of more than 2 percent of the party’s vote at time 1.These are reflected in the figure.
21
PvdD
0.01
0.04
0.03
0.07
0.05
0.04
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.09
0.66
488
Figure 3: Party Stayers and Party Changers from wave t to wave t+1 in Switzerland (1999-2015)
Greenlib
Ecology
0.59
0.61
Liberals
0.33
Socialists
0.85
0.78
Radicals
0.86
SVP
0.77
Christdems
0.68
0.81
BDP
Evangelicals
Note: node= proportion of panel respondents choosing same party at time points t and t+1; edge/ line = indicates size of vote flow from A
to B and B to A between time points t and t+1.
Vote choice at time t
PRD
0.78
0.04
0.03
0.06
0.02
0.00
0.01
0.03
0.02
4205.00
PDC
0.06
0.77
0.04
0.06
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.03
0.02
3155.00
PSS
0.02
0.02
0.85
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.06
0.02
0.01
7281.00
SVP
0.05
0.03
0.02
0.86
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.03
4966.00
PLS
0.51
0.03
0.03
0.02
0.33
0.00
0.01
0.05
0.01
329.00
PEV
0.02
0.08
0.02
0.02
0.00
0.81
0.01
0.02
0.01
443.00
PES
0.01
0.02
0.18
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.61
0.16
0.01
2750.00
GL
0.06
0.04
0.09
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.18
0.59
0.03
2049.00
Vote choice at time t+1
Radicals (PRD)
Christdems (PDC)
Socialists (PSS)
Radical-TAN (SVP)
Liberals (PLS)
Evangelicals (PEV)
Ecologists (PES)
Greenlib (GL)
Bourgeois (BDP)
Total:
stable+changers
Note: shaded cells refer to vote shifts of more than 2 percent of the party’s vote at time 1. These are reflected in the figure.
22
BDP
0.08
0.03
0.03
0.10
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.05
0.68
1028.00
Table 5: Logit analyses on Dutch panel data with lagged dependent variable on vote intention
Model
McFadden
Area under ROC curve
Tjur’s coefficient of
discrimination
PVV
4.280***
(0.059)
0.415
0.828
0.483
Groenlinks
3.838***
(0.070)
0.301
0.774
0.297
D66
3.388***
(0.052)
0.282
0.770
0.323
CU
6.103***
(0.109)
0.611
0.901
0.634
SP
3.850***
(0.053)
0.375
0.824
0.425
PvdA
3.875***
(0.052)
0.389
0.836
0.435
CDA
4.539***
(0.058)
0.497
0.882
0.551
VVD
3.886***
(0.051)
0.390
0.830
0.455
Source: LISS data for 2008-2016 (7 waves); respondents of 18 years or older and who have expressed a vote intention on the relevant question. N=21,821.
Table 6: Logit analyses on Swiss panel data with lagged dependent variable on vote intention
SVP-UDC
Model
McFadden
Area under ROC curve
Tjur’s coefficient of
discrimination
Ecology
Green
Liberals
4.863*** 3.692*** 3.982***
(0.039)
(0.04)
(0.054)
0.550
0.320
0.263
0.896
0.793
0.734
0.629
0.338
0.260
Radicals
(PRD)
4.220***
(0.035)
0.452
0.861
0.529
Christdem
(PDC)
4.528***
(0.041)
0.473
0.864
0.523
Liberals
(PLS)
4.903***
(0.082)
0.346
0.780
0.284
Socialists
(PSS)
4.223***
(0.030)
0.496
0.887
0.593
Evangelicals
(PEV)
6.317***
(0.10)
0.546
0.863
0.529
Conserv.
(BDP)
5.260***
(0.080)
0.382
0.783
0.374
Source: SHP data for 1999-2015 (17 waves); respondents of 18 years or older and who have expressed a vote intention on the relevant question. N=49,545.
Methodological note: If the Ecology and Green Liberals parties are combined, the respective statistics are: Model=3.982 (0.036), McFadden = 0.393; ROC stat =
0.829; Tjurs coeff.=0.450.
23
Appendix 1a: Logit analyses on Dutch panel data: interaction of lagged dependent variable & age under
controls
24
Appendix 1b: Logit analyses on Dutch panel data: interaction of lagged dependent variable & education
under controls
25
Appendix 2a: Logit analyses on Swiss panel data: interaction of lagged dependent variable & age under
controls
26
Appendix 2b: Logit analyses on Swiss panel data: interaction of lagged dependent variable & education
under controls
27
Appendix 3: Categorization of Political Parties in the ESS Analyses by Party Family and Country
(waves 1-7)
Country
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Austria
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Denmark
Finland
Finland
Finland
Finland
Party
Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP)
Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (SPÖ)
Bündnis Zukunft Österreich (BZÖ)
Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ)
Die Grünen
Kommunistische Partei Österreichs (KPÖ)
Piratenpartei Österreichs (PIRAT)
Team Stronach für Österreich
NEOS
Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams (CD&V)
Open Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten (VLD)
Centre Démocrate Humaniste (CDH)
Mouvement Réformateur (MR)
Parti Populaire (PP)
Socialistische Partij Anders (sp.a)
Parti Socialiste (PS)
Vlaams Belang (VB)
Front National (FN)
Écologistes Confédérés (ECOLO)
Groen!
Partij Van de Arbeid (PVDA+)
Parti du Travail (PTB)
Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie
Venstre (V)
Det Konservative Folkeparti (DKF)
Kristendemokraterne (K)
Socialdemokraterne (A)
Danske Folkeparti (DF)
Enhedslisten – De Rød-Grønne (Ø)
Socialistisk Folkeparti (F)
Radikale Venstre (B)
Liberal Alliance
Kansallinen Kokoomus (KOK)
Suomen Keskuta (KESK)
Kristillisdemokraatit (KD)
Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue (SDP)
28
Party Family
Major Right
Major Left
TAN
TAN
Greens
Radical Left
Other
Liberal
Liberal
Major Right
Major Right
Major Right
Major Right
Major Right
Major Left
Major Left
TAN
TAN
Greens
Greens
Radical Left
Radical Left
Liberal
Major Right
Major Right
Major Right
Major Left
TAN
Radical Left
Radical Left
Liberal
Liberal
Major Right
Major Right
Major Right
Major Left
Finland
Finland
Finland
Finland
Finland
Finland
Finland
Finland
France
France
France
France
France
France
France
France
France
France
France
France
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Ireland
Netherlands
Netherlands
Netherlands
Netherlands
Netherlands
Perussuomalaiset (PS)
Itsenäisyyspuolue (IPU)
Vihreä Liitto (Vihr)
Vasemmistoliitto
Suomen Kommunisten Puolue (SKP)
Kommunistinen Työväenpuolue (KTP)
Piraattipuolue
Muutos 2011
Union Pour Un Mouvement Populaire (UMP)
Parti Socialiste (PS)
Parti Radical de Gauche (PRG)
Parti Radical Valoisien
Front National (FN)
Mouvement Pour la France (MPR)
Europe Écologie Les Verts (EELV)
Lutte Ouvrière (LO)
Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste (NPA)
Front de Gauche (FdG)
Nouveau Centre
Modem
Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (CDU/CSU)
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD)
Alternative für Deutscheland (AfD)
Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD)
Die Grünen
Die Linke
Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP)
Piratenpartei Deutschland
Fianna Fail
Fine Gael
Labour
Green Party
Sinn Fein
Socialist Party
United Left Alliance
People Before Profit
Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD)
Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA)
ChristenUnie (CU)
ChristenUnie – Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (SGP)
Partij Van de Arbeid (PvdA)
29
TAN
TAN
Greens
Radical Left
Radical Left
Radical Left
Other
Other
Major Right
Major Left
Major Left
Major Left
TAN
TAN
Greens
Radical Left
Radical Left
Radical Left
Liberal
Liberal
Major Right
Major Left
TAN
TAN
Greens
Radical Left
Liberal
Other
Major Right
Major Right
Major Left
Greens
Radical Left
Radical Left
Radical Left
Radical Left
Major Right
Major Right
Major Right
Major Right
Major Left
Netherlands
Netherlands
Netherlands
Netherlands
Netherlands
Netherlands
Norway
Norway
Norway
Norway
Norway
Norway
Norway
Norway
Norway
Portugal
Portugal
Portugal
Portugal
Portugal
Portugal
Portugal
Spain
Spain
Spain
Spain
Spain
Spain
Spain
Spain
Spain
Spain
Spain
Spain
Spain
Sweden
Sweden
Sweden
Sweden
Sweden
Sweden
Partij Voor de Vrijheid (PVV)
GroenLinks (GL)
D66
Socialistische Partij (SP)
Partij voor de Dieren (PvdD)
50Plus
Kristeleg Folkeparti (KrF)
Høyre
Arbeiderpartiet (A/Ap)
Framstegspartiet (FrP)
Miljøpartiet Dei Grøne
Sosialistisk Venstreparti (SV)
Raudt
Senterpartiet (Sp)
Kystpartiet
Partido Social-Democrata (PSD)
Centro Democrático e Social - Partido Popular (CDS-PP)
Nova Democracia (PND)
Partido Socialista (PS)
Partido Nacional Renovador (PNR)
Bloco de Esquerda (BE)
Partido Comunista dos Trabalhadores (PCT-MRPP)
Partido Popular (PP)
Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV)
Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE)
Izquierda Unida (IU)
Compromis
Convergencia y Unió (CiU)
Amaiur
Unión Progreso y Democracia (UPyD)
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya
Bloque Nacionalista Galega (BNG)
Coalicion Canaria
Foro de Ciudadanos
Geroa Bai
Moderaterna (M)
Kristdemokraterna (KD)
Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetareparti (SAP)
Sverigedemokraterna (SD)
Miljöpartiet de Gröna
Vänsterpartiet (V)
30
TAN
Greens
Greens
Radical Left
Other
Other
Major Right
Major Right
Major Left
TAN
Greens
Radical Left
Radical Left
Liberal
Other
Major Right
Major Right
Major Right
Major Left
TAN
Radical Left
Radical Left
Major Right
Major Right
Major Left
Radical Left
Radical Left
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other
Major Right
Major Right
Major Left
TAN
Greens
Radical Left
Sweden
Sweden
Sweden
Sweden
Switzerland
Switzerland
Switzerland
Switzerland
Switzerland
Switzerland
Switzerland
Switzerland
Switzerland
Switzerland
Switzerland
UK
UK
UK
UK
UK
UK
UK
UK
UK
UK
UK
UK
Feministiskt Initiativ (FI)
Centerpartiet ( C )
Liberalerna (L)
Piratparteit
Parti Socialiste Suisse (PSS)
Parti Démocrate Chrétien (PDC)
Bürgerlich-Demokratische Partei Schweiz (BDP)
Parti Evangelique Suisse (PEV)
Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP)
Lega Ticino
Grüne Partei der Schweiz
Grünliberale Partei der Schweiz
Parti Suisse du Travail (PDA/PST)
Alternative Linke
Parti Radical Démocrate (PRD)
Conservative Party
Labour Party
UKIP
Green Party
Liberal Democrats
Alliance Party (NI)
SNP
Plaid Cymru
Ulster Unionist Party
Sinn Fein
SDLP
Democratic Unionist Party
31
Radical Left
Liberal
Liberal
Other
Major Left
Major Right
Major Right
Major Right
TAN
TAN
Greens
Greens
Radical Left
Radical Left
Liberal
Major Right
Major Left
TAN
Greens
Liberals
Liberals
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other
Other