Peasant productivity and lordship economy.
A comparative study of south Sweden 1700–1860
Mats Olsson, Department of Economic History, Centre for Economic Demography,
Lund University.
Paper for World Economic History Congress 2009, Utrecht, 3–7August 2009 Session:
The development of the rural economy and the demesne lordship.
The impact of the agrarian system of demesne lordship on the productivity and prosperity of
peasant farmers has engaged a lot of researchers through the years. It was already in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries an area of debate among contemporary writers. But due to
lack of sources very few comparative analyses of economic outputs between e.g. freeholders
and subject tenants have been done. So, our idea of the economic impact of demesne lordship
on peasants is to a large extent influenced by contemporary opinions, either from critics or
defenders.
The aim of the study is to present broad quantitative analyses of production outputs from
peasants inside and outside a system of demesne lordship. In the region Scania (Skåne) in
south Sweden about half of the farmsteads belonged to freeholders or crown tenants, while the
other half were owned by noble landlords and tilled by subject tenants. In the nineteenth
century, the region saw a development full of contradictions, when the rise of the independent
peasantry coincided with a new wave of a commercial noble demesne expansion.
The comparative analysis show that while the differences between the peasant groups were
quite small in the eighteenth century, although a significantly lower production output for
manorial tenants is noticeable already then, the divergence increased in the nineteenth
century, in favour of the freeholders.
Freeholders versus subject tenants. What can Scania tell us?
The classical view on the impact of Early Modern demesne lordship is that the subject tenants
were victims of more or less brutal demesne expansions, involving evictions of farmsteads
and increased levels of unpaid labour services for the remaining tenants. In many parts of
Eastern Europe serfdom simultaneously was reinforced. This was not only the story from the
first modern researchers in the field (Knapp 1887, von Below 1900), but also the view of
many contemporary public observers. Especially since the 1980s, researchers have certainly
modified these stereotypes, and shown the complexity of rural life in all kinds of agrarian
structures, including the East-Elbian core areas of Gutsherrschaft.
The manorial demesnes seldom covered the major part of the land, and the complex social
and economic life of the subject tenants should be focused upon if we want to get a
meaningful picture. But hardly any comparative analyses of economic outputs of farmers
inside and outside a manorial system have been done. Prosperity and social status is likely to
be highly correlated with economic performance. Were there any differences in farm
production development between the two groups?
We could expect that the incentives for long-term investment in farm productivity were
1
weaker for farmers with insecure tenancies compared to owner occupiers or tenants with
secure tenancies. We could also expect that arbitrary raises in land rents through increased
labour services would likewise be bad incentives for the tenants. This would lead to a
hypothesis that independent peasants in the long run did better than subject tenants. As a
counterweight, demesne landlords in many countries have been regarded as forerunners in
implementing new agricultural technology. There could have been some spill-over effects to
their tenants, implying a faster production development than independent peasants.
For two reasons Scania is an ideal object for studying freeholders versus subject tenants, and
their respective economic output:
•
•
The region contains both these farm prototypes simultaneously, often located in the
same or adjacent villages and parishes.
The region provides us with unique sources for measuring annual individual farm
outputs during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
Preindustrial Scania experienced two major waves of commercial noble demesne expansion.
The first wave correspond to the general trend of landlord economic response to sixteenth
century price revolution in east, east-central and parts of north Europe. That was to put more
soil under their own ploughs and enlarge their demesnes, often by means of evicting tenant
farmers. When Scania was conquered by Sweden from Denmark in 1658 about half of its
peasant farmsteads belonged to the nobility, besides a little more than 10 percent demesne
land. Sweden never experienced institutionalised serfdom. The legal framework of
landlordship was instead, from the eighteenth century and onwards, defined in terms of
landlords’ unrestricted private property rights – to the demesnes and to the tenant farms. For
Scania, the new Swedish context meant secured property rights for noble landlords, and more
and more so even for crown tenants, who from the eighteenth century and onwards were
given the opportunity to buy their farmsteads from the Crown, turning them into freeholders.
No legal measures were ever taken to secure noble tenants security. The first hundred years
under the Swedish realm meant little in demesnes expansion, but this was to change.
The second wave of commercial noble demesne expansion was trigged by a new landlord
response to price incentives that started in the late eighteenth century. During the next century
about half of the subject tenants were evicted for demesne enlargement, which eventually
covered about 25 percent of the Scanian soil. For the remaining tenants unpaid labour services
were increased, typically from 100 days per year in the eighteenth century to 300–400 days
per year in the 1850s (Olsson 2002; 2006). However, the total tax and land rent pressure, as
fraction of production outcomes, remained 30–35 percent of a normal farm’s gross
production, while the fraction paid by freeholders and crown tenants continuously was
reduced, from 30–35 percent in the early eighteenth century to less than 10 percent by the end
of the nineteenth century.
Consequently, it is possible to compare the conditions for subject tenants with insecure
tenancies, who normally paid their landlords 300–400 annual days of labour services on the
demesnes each, with independent freeholders, living in the adjacent village. Additionally, two
in-between groups can be identified. It is the remaining Crown tenants, those who for some
reason never got the change, or never used the opportunity, to buy their land of. It is also the
tenants of noble land who were living outside the demesne parishes, with possibly more loose
bonds to their landlords. From other studies we can see that these tenants e.g. were less
affected by landlord involvement in farm succession (Dribe, Olsson & Svensson 2009).
2
In the parts of Sweden that experienced this late wave of demesne lordship, the differences
between the well emancipated owner occupying peasantry and the subject tenants under the
nobility were striking to some contemporary observers. One of them, Nils Bruzelius,
contrasted these two groups in terms of economic situation, housing and mentality. The
effects of demesne lordship and corvée was, according to Bruzelius, neglect of the tenants
own farming, miserable tenant housing, cringing and fawning in front of persons of rank,
backwardness and brutal minds (Bruzelius 1876).
In spite of such statements, and the obvious process of massive evictions of subject tenants in
the course of the nineteenth century, the “tenant problem” never became a national issue of
any importance in Sweden. The freeholders dominated the peasantry, and had held a unique
and strong political position, since the middle ages, with independent representatives in the
diet of the four estates. Ever since the freeholders’ and crown tenants’ own property rights
were secured in the eighteenth century they had no reason to challenge the noble landlords
and, thus, never raised the tenant issue.
Historiography on the Swedish rural society was for a long time dominated by the story of the
rise of the independent peasantry, although their farming techniques were seen as backward
and their production results were belittled. The noblemen’s demesne farms were instead
regarded as forerunners in agricultural change (see Heckscher 1949 and Möller 1987). This
view has been challenged during the last decades, and researchers have especially emphasized
that independent peasants often were initiators in the radical enclosure movements in the
nineteenth century, a movement with crucial impact on the agricultural revolution in Sweden
(Svensson 2008). Both freeholders and crown tenants had legal rights to apply for enclosures,
but not tenants on noble land.
The data and the area
The Historical Database of Scanian Agriculture is a longitudinal database on peasant farmers’
economy 1702–1881. It consists of unique data on individual farm outputs in all sorts of crops
and livestock. This is supplemented with demographic characteristics, property rights
specification, soil fertility, enclosures, prices, and other vital characteristics and events on
individual or communal level.
The economic outputs are measured from the farmers individual tithe payments to the local
clergy. Tithes records as measures of farm output have been debated, but in this case the
possible objections are few. It was a flexible production tax on every thirtieth sheave, which
was to be paid untreshed, directly from the field to the priest’s barn. This made it hard for the
farmers to get away with cheating on this tax, the sheaves were visible for the recipient when
they stood for drainage on the fields, and all he had to do was counting. Additionally, the
priest himself was an active farmer in the parish, with detailed information on annual harvest
outcomes. Likewise, every tenth living born foal, calf, lamb, gosling and piglet was to be
delivered.
So far 2 200 farm units in 34 parishes, representing a little more than 80 000 production years,
has been included in the database. The individual farm series are of different lengths, on
average 34 years. In this study the different annual crops for each peasant has been
3
Map 1. The region of Scania and the 34 parishes in the sample
summarized into a rye and barley equivalent by their values. 1 The animal breeding is left out
of this analysis, since part of its outcome was to become a part of the farms’ fixed capital –
foals and to some extent calves that was to become draught animals. Animal breeding
normally constituted 15–20 percent of the value of the total farm production value.
Local studies: Who performed best?
To get a preliminary picture of the production development for peasants inside and outside a
system of demesne lordship we turn to local studies, measuring production within parishes
with mixed property rights or between adjacent parishes with diverging property rights but
with similar natural conditions. In these studies we do not discriminate between crown tenants
and freeholders, since many of the former were bought into the latter during the period of
investigation. Consequently, manorial tenants of varying subjections to demesne lordship is
not discriminated from each other in the figures, but are commented upon in the analyses.
The series have been indexed by the mean production volume of the freeholders’ grain output
of the first year in each comparative study. Eight such comparisons between
freeholders/crown tenants and tenants under private lordship are shown in the Figures 1–8.
1
One hectolitre oats normally constituted e.g. one third of the value of one hectolitre rye. The sources and
calculation techniques are further discussed in Olsson & Svensson, forthcoming.
4
Figure 1. Billinge 1720–1836, production outputs for freeholders and tenants under
demesne lordship (hectolitres per farm).
120
Freehold/Crown
100
80
60
Lords hip
40
20
1835
1830
1825
1820
1815
1810
1805
1800
1795
1790
1785
1780
1775
1770
1765
1760
1755
1750
1745
1740
1735
1730
1725
1720
0
Sources: Historical Database of Scanian Agriculture.
Billinge is a forested area in the middle of Scania. The parish held about 58 farmsteads in the
eighteenth century, of which 39 were freeholders and 19 tenancies. There were, however, no
manorial demesnes in the parish, and the tenants’ rents were mainly paid in money, to three
different noble landowners with manors in other Scanian parishes. It was not until 1834 when
the tenants under one of these manors were evicted, and a maison plate was established. Thus,
the tenants are supposed to be rather independent, with moderate landlord interventions in the
daily life and work of the tenants.
As can be seen in Figure 1 the production development of the freeholders and the manorial
tenants in Billinge was quite uniform. It was not until the nineteenth century when a small but
consistent difference appeared in favour of the freeholders. For manorial tenants the mean
production after 1805 was some 13 percent smaller than for freeholders. The radical
enclosures for most of the villages in the parish took place from the 1820s and after, and they
seem to have affected the freeholders slightly more than the tenants, in terms of production
output.
5
Figure 2. Brandstad 1711–1740 and 1790–1818, production outputs for freeholders and
tenants under demesne lordship (hectolitres per farm).
60
Freehold/Crown
50
40
30
20
Lords hip
10
1818
1815
1812
1808
1805
1802
1799
1796
1793
1790
1741
1738
1735
1732
1729
1726
1723
1720
1717
1714
1711
0
Sources: Historical Database of Scanian Agriculture.
The parish of Brandstad in mid-south Scania has meagre soils and is typical for the
intermediate type of peasant economy, between plains and forests. In the eighteenth century it
had some 44 farmers, of which 13 were tenants of the nobility. Like in Billinge, no noble
demesnes were traditionally located in the parish, and the tenants are consequently regarded
as lightly affected by demesne lordship.
Due to missing books, the tithe series from Brandstad display a longer break between 1743
and 1790 (Figure 2). In the period before that break the production development seems to be,
if anything, better for manorial tenants than for freeholders and crown tenants, at least from
the 1730s. But after 1790 the curves reveal a rising gap between the two categories, in favour
of the freeholders. The mean disadvantage, being a manorial tenant, was 34 percent lower
production for this period. The enclosures in the three villages in parish took place in 1805–
1808. In this case they don not seem to have had any effect on production outcomes, which
stagnated immediately after that.
6
Figure 3. Veberöd 1768–1830, production outputs for freeholders and tenants under
demesne lordship (hectolitres per farm).
120
Freehold/Crown
100
80
60
40
Lords hip
20
1828
1825
1822
1819
1816
1813
1810
1807
1804
1801
1798
1795
1792
1789
1786
1783
1780
1777
1774
1771
1768
0
Sources: Historical Database of Scanian Agriculture.
The nearby parish Veberöd share Brandstad’s characteristics regarding natural conditions and
property rights. It held some 60 peasants of which 32 were under demesne lordship, but from
manors that were situated 10-15 kilometres away.
The patterns of production development were also likewise, as shown in Figure 3. In the
eighteenth century no discernable differences between the two peasant groups can be
detected, but that changed in the century to come. Although in this case the differences are
again slighter, only 13 percent lower production being a manorial tenant 1807–30.
7
Figure 4. Stenestad and Kågeröd 1796–1836, production outputs for freeholders and
tenants under demesne lordship (hectolitres per farm).
80
Freehold/Crown
70
60
50
40
Lords hip
30
20
10
1836
1834
1832
1830
1828
1826
1824
1822
1820
1818
1816
1814
1812
1810
1808
1806
1804
1802
1800
1798
1796
0
Sources: Historical Database of Scanian Agriculture.
Again back in the more forested areas, we turn to the neighbouring parishes of Stenestad and
Kågeröd, the former being a genuine crown tenants’ and, eventually, freeholders’ parish, the
latter being a stronghold for demesne lordship. Stenestad held 36 peasant farms, none of them
were owned or controlled by the nobility, Kågeröd held 103, all but 4 were owned by the
nobility. The dominating manor was Knutstorp, which controlled 80 percent of the peasant
farms. The typical land rent was, until the 1870s, labour services. In the 1830s and 1840 about
half of the tenants were evicted for demesne expansion and four big farms with separate
mansions were set up on the lands of four former peasant villages.
The two parishes formed a parsonage and the series are derived from the same books, written
by the same hand. The mean value of the Kågeröd series is about 9 percent lower than for
Stenestad before the 1820, less than 3 percent lower in the 1820s, and again lags behind after
that, implying a difference of 16 percent in the 1830s. In spite of the fact that production
development was stagnant in both these parishes the tenants under demesne lordship
performed worse. The corvée dues were unregulated during the whole period, but it was not
until 1837, the year after when the series stops, that the massive evictions in Kågeröd started.
8
Figure 5. Lyngby 1737–1779, production outputs for freeholders and tenants under
demesne lordship (hectolitres per farm).
90
80
Lords hip
70
60
50
40
Freehold/Crown
30
20
10
1779
1777
1775
1773
1771
1769
1767
1765
1763
1761
1759
1757
1755
1753
1751
1749
1747
1745
1743
1741
1739
1737
0
Sources: Historical Database of Scanian Agriculture.
Now we turn to two districts were the manorial tenants seems to have been doing equally
good as, or even better than, the freeholders. Lyngby in south-west had 29 peasant farms in
the eighteenth century, of which 14 were tenancies under the manor Assartorp. Especially
after the middle of the century it is indicated from Figure 5 that the tenants under demesne
lordship were doing better than the freeholders and crown tenants. After 1750 the mean
production output was 20 percent higher for the former. The figure also reveals that it is the
good harvest years that make the big difference; if they were good for freeholders they were
even better for the tenants. The explanation for this is possibly geographical. The manorial
tenants in Lyngby were living in the village with the same name on the fertile plain lands, the
freeholders on the more meagre soils on the slopes of the Romele ridge. 2
2
In a contemporary survey the soils of Lyngby village was characterized as ”good and sufficient” and the rest
of the parish soils as ”poor and small” (Gillberg 1765: 166).
9
Figure 6. Lilla Harrie 1760–1826, production outputs for freeholders and tenants under
demesne lordship (hectolitres per farm).
400
Freehold/Crown
350
300
250
200
150
100
Lords hip
50
1826
1823
1820
1817
1814
1811
1808
1805
1802
1799
1796
1793
1790
1787
1784
1781
1778
1775
1772
1769
1766
1763
1760
0
Sources: Historical Database of Scanian Agriculture.
Lilla Harrie is a small plain land parish with excellent soil conditions. Of its 15 farmsteads 8
were freeholders or crown tenants, and 7 were tenant under the estate Örtofta in the adjacent
parish. At least from the 1790s and for about 20 years the latter seems to have been doing
slightly better than the former in terms of production outcomes. In 1809 a radical enclosure
took place that equally affected the two peasant categories in terms of land redistribution, but
in terms of production outcomes it seems to have positively affected the freeholders slightly
more.
10
Figure 7. Västra Karaby and Örtofta 1791–1845, production outputs for freeholders and
tenants under demesne lordship (hectolitres per farm).
450
Freehold/Crown,
Väs tra Karaby
400
350
300
250
200
150
Lords hip,
Örtofta
Lords hip,
Väs ta Karaby
100
50
1845
1843
1841
1839
1837
1835
1833
1831
1829
1827
1825
1823
1821
1819
1817
1815
1813
1811
1809
1807
1805
1803
1801
1799
1797
1795
1793
1791
0
Sources: Historical Database of Scanian Agriculture.
Finally we compare production outcomes in some parishes that were fully under demesne
lordship with some parishes with hardly any noble interests, in the course of the fast agrarian
growth in the first half of the nineteenth century. Starting with some fertile soil parishes in
western Scania, Västra Karaby had about 50 farmsteads in the 1790s, and all but 5 of them
were freeholders or crown tenants. For these 45 farmsteads, mean production tripled during
the first 30 years after the turn of the century. As can be seen in Figure 7, the dotted line, the
five subject tenants in the parish also had a strong production increase 1803–1809, but after
that it was more stagnant. 1814–1845 average production output was a quarter below the
freeholders in the same parish.
Some 10 kilometres further to the east is Örtofta, a parish totally dominated by the estate with
the same name – all the 22 peasants were subject tenants. As compared to the freeholders in
Västra Karaby their production development was equivalent until 1804. After that there
certainly was a strong increase – production more than doubled until the 1840s – but not in
phase with the Västra Karaby freeholders, whose average outputs were 27 percent better after
that year.
11
Figure 8. Ven and Sireköpinge 1804–1827, production outputs for freeholders and
tenants under demesne lordship (hectolitres per farm).
160
Freehold/Crown, Ven
140
120
100
80
60
40
Lords hip,
Sireköpinge
20
1827
1826
1825
1824
1823
1822
1821
1820
1819
1818
1817
1816
1815
1814
1813
1812
1811
1810
1809
1808
1807
1806
1805
1804
0
Sources: Historical Database of Scanian Agriculture.
Ven is a small island in the Sound between Sweden and Denmark. All the 30 peasants were
freeholders, but their taxes were paid as labour services to a Crown demesne, Uranieborg, on
the island. 3 Unlike tenants under demesne lordship such labour services were regulated, and
did not increase over time. Mean farm output more than doubled from the early nineteenth
century until the 1820s.
Sireköpinge on the main land had similar soil conditions but was, like Örtofta, dominated by a
single estate and all the 47 peasants in the parish were subject tenants under demesne
lordship. In the period 1801–1827 their farm production stagnated. As compared to the
freeholders on Ven, who had similar soil conditions, the Sireköpinge tenants show a growing
deficit, implying that they in the 1820s performed more than 50 percent worse on average.
Sireköpinge was later to become one of the quite rare Scanian examples of major noble land
sales to peasant. In 1850 about half the parish land was sold in small pieces to peasants, the
other half was sold to major capitalist farmers. It is likely that there was a strong production
increase after these sales. 4
3
The estate was founded 1576 by the famous astronomer Tycho Brahe, when the Danish king gave him the
island as a fief.
4
This is suggested by Dribe and Olsson (2006) from demographic indications. Unfortunately the tithe series
stops at 1827 in this case.
12
Regional analyses: Controlling for other factors
An overall impression from the local studies is that while the differences in production
outcomes between freeholders/crown tenants and tenants of the nobility were small in the
eighteenth century, an increasing gap, in favour of the former, appeared in the nineteenth
century. Is this a consistent result? To test this we turn to regional multivariate analyses for
the two periods.
The dependant variable is individual farm production output. The number of observations in
the 34 parishes are way over 30,000 for each of the two periods (1702-1802 and 1803-1864),
derived from 1,300 to 1,700 farmsteads. The mean value of the dependant variable was 40
hectolitres per mean farm in the eighteenth century and almost twice as high in the next
century. Average farm production increased about four and a half times from the early
eighteenth century to the middle of the nineteenth century. A little more than half of the
observations in the sample were from freeholders and crown tenants, the rest from tenants
under demesne lordship. The latter is divided into two groups. Lordship 1 is tenant farmers
living in the same parishes as their lords’ demesnes were located. They were by fiscal
definition, corvée peasants (Sw: insockne). They are expected to be under stronger influence
from demesne lordship than the other group, Lordship 2, who were living more distant from
the demesnes, sometimes so far that they never were called to corvée, but paid their land rents
in money or in kind.
These four peasant groups are the independent variables which are focused upon. To explore
the response to economic incentives among the different peasant groups, their interaction with
expected prices is analysed. In this analysis the peasants have been divided into two groups –
with or without connection to demesne lordship. Expected prices are calculated with a model
built on the last five years’ prices, with declining weights with time. 5
Additionally, some variables are controlled for. These are farm size, measured in the taxation
unit mantal, and enclosures, both early enclosures, which basically meant redistribution of
land within the village communities in the eighteenth century, and the subsequent radical
enclosures, which meant dissolution of the village communities. Natural conditions are also
controlled for, using a classic geographical-ethnological division into plain lands, wood lands
and intermediate. 6 Finally, time is controlled for, using 16 time variables, one for each
decade. These are not further exposed in the analysis, but they certainly capture periodical
effects and change over time, and thereby prevent from biases due to periodical effects and
changes in the composition of the sample. 7
Tables 1–3 about here
The result for the eighteenth century show a moderate but significant negative effect on
production, being a tenant under the nobility (see table 2). The closer connected to demesne
lordship the tenant was, the worse was the performance in terms of crop production. The
response to expected prices were however weak for both freeholders/crown tenants and
5
The expected price model used is proposed by e.g. Askari and Cunnings, 1977 and Schäfer, 1997, pp. 110–111,
and called the Nerlove model, where the first preceding year is weighted five times as high as the fifth.
6
From Campbell 1928.
7
A panel data set approach is used, simultaneously testing for changes within the farms and differences between
the farms. As expected the total value of explanation is much higher between, since the annual variations within
the farms was highly dependant on the weather, a variable that is not tested for in this analysis.
13
tenants under the nobility, implying that the peasant economy was yet not strongly
commercialised.
In the nineteenth century the negative effect of manorialism on peasant production was even
stronger. For the corvée tenants it meant 16–17 hectolitres less of annual crop production,
compared to freeholders. However, in the more commercialised nineteenth century peasant
economy all peasant groups show a strong and significant response to expected prices, but
stronger for peasant that were not under demesne lordship. Notable is also that the remaining
crown tenants now lagged behind the freeholders, performing almost at the same level as the
manorial tenants with looser bonds to the demesne lordship.
As for the control variables the strongest effects on crop production, besides farm size which
is self evident, are from natural conditions. A farm located on the fertile plains produced 40–
50 hectolitres more than a farm located in the wood lands or in the intermediate districts.
Radical enclosures had a significant positive effect on production outcomes. The negative
effect of early reallocations of land within the village communities is puzzling, but it can be
due to initial production disturbances in connection with reallocations. They could have been
followed by increased production after some years, but these effects are possibly neutralized
by the time variables in the regression.
Conclusions
From the local studies, parish by parish or between parishes with similar natural conditions,
we have seen tendencies of diverging production patterns for freeholders and subject tenants,
especially during the nineteenth century. In some cases the differences were small, but in
many cases substantial differences evolved in the course of the agrarian transformation and
the sharp increase in production output for the independent peasant. The subject tenants
lagged behind.
These results were confirmed from the regional analyses, when testing for other variables,
such as farm sizes, natural conditions, enclosures and time. In the nineteenth century the
subject tenants produced substantially less than freeholders, and especially the tenants that
were more strongly affected by demesne lordship, being corvée tenants and living in the same
parishes as the demesnes of their landlords. More remote settled tenants were often less
affected by the active involvement of the lordship. Their economic performances were
consequently more similar to the remaining crown tenants in the nineteenth century, who also
performed significantly less than the freeholders. Nevertheless, the subject tenants increased
their market involvement in the nineteenth century, but the independent peasants did so even
more, which is shown by their stronger response to expected prices.
Thus, the story of the misery of the subject tenant can not be completely revised, at least not
for south Sweden. With its late wave of manorialism, with demesne expansions, massive
evictions of tenants and increased land rents in the form of labour services for those who were
spared, Scania provides us with a classic story of bad incentives for tenant farmers. Their
situation could be compared directly with the situation of the owner occupiers, who from a
common starting point performed significantly better during the nineteenth century
agricultural revolution.
14
References
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15
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the sample, percent of observations, mean production
output in hectoliters and numbers of farms and observations.
Variable
1702–1802
1803–1864
Land ownership
Freehold
Crown
Lordship 1
Lordship 2
30
24
26
20
100 %
43
17
14
25
100 %
Early enclosures
Not enclosed
Enclosed
Re-enclosed
82
16
2
100 %
Radical enclosures
Solitary unit
Not enclosed
Enclosed
5.1
94.6
0.3
100 %
8
55
36
100 %
Natural conditions
Plains
Intermediate
Woods
14
48
38
100 %
21
41
37
100 %
Mean farm output*
Hectoliters per year
40
79
Number in the sample
Farms
Observation
1,298
38,798
1,729
32,771
* = Mean output for a farm of mean size in 1803 (0.31 mantal).
16
Table 2. GLS-regression of crop production in hectolitres 1702–1802, random effects
Category
Variable
Coefficient
Std. error
Z
P>z
Land ownership
Freehold
Crown
Lordship 1
Lordship 2
r.c.
-1.89
-6.26
-3.04
0.55
0.96
0.89
-3.43
-6.51
-3.42
0.001
0.000
0.001
Interaction exp. price with
Lordship
Non-lordship
-0.52
0.05
0.27
0.25
-1.95
0.29
0.051
0.761
Farm size
Size in mantal
75.40
2.61
28.91
0.000
Early enclosures
Not-enclosed
Enclosed
Re-enclosed
r.c.
–2.64
1.05
0.26
0.60
–10.04
1.74
0.000
0.082
r.c.
2.92
0.06
1.23
1.90
2.37
0.03
0.018
0.973
r.c.
-38.81
-41.65
1.40
1.46
-27.67
-28.50
0.000
0.000
50.10
1.96
25.60
0.000
Radical enclosures
Natural conditions
Open-field
Enclosed
Solitary, initially
Plains
Intermediate
Woods
Constant
R-sq:
Within
Between
Overall
0.14
0.63
0.58
Wald chi2(18)
Prob > chi2
8287.37
0.0000
17
Table 3. GLS-regression of crop production in hectolitres 1803–1864, random effects
Category
Variable
Land ownership
Freehold
Crown
Lordship 1
Lordship 2
Coefficient
Std. error
Z
P>z
r.c.
-6.95
-16.55
-7.55
1.09
2.36
2.76
-6.36
-7.02
-2.74
0.000
0.000
0.006
Interaction exp. price with
Lordship
Non-lordship
7.67
10.68
0.87
0.76
8.83
13.98
0.000
0.000
Farm size
Size in mantal
152.16
4.53
33.62
0.000
Radical enclosures
Open-field
Enclosed
Solitary, initially
r.c.
6.73
0.71
0.56
3.37
12.07
0.21
0.000
0.834
r.c.
-41.46
-49.70
1.91
2.04
-21.62
-24.41
0.000
0.000
101.69
2.97
34.28
0.000
Natural conditions
Plains
Intermediate
Woods
Constant
R-sq:
Within
Between
Overall
0.20
0.54
0.46
Wald chi2(18)
Prob > chi2
9873.45
0.0000
18