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The Downfall of Chechnya
May 18, 2017 Kadyrov’s plan to stay in power while Russia’s backing is unreliable could
accelerate his government’s demise.
By Kamran Bokhari
Russia has gone to great lengths since the Soviet Union’s collapse to keep Chechnya, the
majority Muslim, restive, semi-autonomous state in the Northern Caucasus, under control.
Around the turn of the century, Moscow was able to link up with a family, the Kadyrovs, capable
of restoring a semblance of order. But now the Kremlin’s grip on power at home is slipping away,
and allocating the time and resources needed to ensure Chechnya's stability is becoming
untenable. The Kadyrov regime has had to find its own solution: letting Islam trickle into
Chechnya’s politics. It’s a solution that will work to the advantage of jihadists.
After the Soviet implosion in 1991, Chechnya, then part of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous
Soviet Socialist Republic, declared its independence from Russia and split from what would
become Ingushetia. Russia launched the First Chechen War in 1994, lasting until 1996, in an
effort to regain sovereignty over the area. But it was not until the Second Chechen War, which
began in 1999 and lasted for the better part of the 2000s, that the Kremlin retook control. It was
then that Moscow gained the loyalty of Akhmad Kadyrov, the former mufti of the short-lived
independent Chechnya. He became president of the Russian-controlled Chechen Republic in
2003.
During the rebellion, however, three factions had emerged: nationalists, Islamists and jihadists.
Over the years, the nationalists lost influence, and transnational jihadists with ties to al-Qaida
took center stage in the fight against Russia. Jihadists assassinated Akhmad Kadyrov just seven
months into his presidency. His son and logical successor Ramzan Kadyrov was, according to the
Chechen Constitution, too young to hold office, so for three years another pro-Russia politician,
Alu Alkhanov, served as president. In 2007, President Vladimir Putin appointed Ramzan Kadyrov,
then 30, to the presidency.
By this time, the Russians had degraded the jihadist threat in the region, but certainly not
without luck. A great deal of Chechen jihadists had voluntarily left the region to fight in the
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Middle East and Central and South Asia. In recent years, Chechens have emerged as a key
element of the Islamic State’s jihadist regime in Syria and Iraq, even serving within the
leadership ranks. The occasional Chechen terrorist attack still occurs at home and even in
Russia proper, but by and large, Putin and Kadyrov’s direct and close relationship has
ensured stability. Kadyrov has even sent some of his government’s security forces to assist
Russia with its intervention in Syria.
But as Geopolitical Futures has discussed, Russia is in a state of decline. One of the immediate
implications of this trend is a diminished ability by the Kremlin to manage its territories and
influence countries in its periphery. Chechnya, which is already a major challenge for the
Russians, is the most significant area poised to descend into chaos. From the capital of Grozny,
Kadyrov’s clan has been the tool through which Russia has held Chechnya – and the broader
North Caucasus – together. This region is highly susceptible to jihadists, who would be the first
to try to take advantage of any opening in the system.
The delicate peace in Chechnya could be upended if serious challenges to Kadyrov’s authority
were to emerge. The challengers who could do it, from rival clans to jihadists, already exist.
What would accelerate this process is if Kadyrov were no longer able to rely on Moscow’s
support, whether because of a disagreement or an inability on the Kremlin’s part to come to
Kadyrov’s aid. The other Russian regional governments are doubtless watching with
apprehension; Moscow’s diminishing power creates opportunities for them to assume greater
independence, but it also creates opportunities for their enemies, internal and external.
Meanwhile, Putin himself is under a lot of pressure from the Russian political and military elite
because of the degradation of Moscow’s power. This has led to a situation in which the Kremlin
is unable to coherently attend to issues like managing Chechnya. Igor Sechin, the chief of
Russian oil giant Rosneft, is at odds with Kadyrov over control of Rosneft’s assets in Chechnya. It
is not in Putin’s interest to see this issue fester, but he has been unable to get Sechin to
cooperate. Managing Chechnya is hard enough for Moscow without elites in Russia undermining
Putin.
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Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin (C) meets with Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov (L) in Grozny on Oct. 16, 2008, while
visiting the newly built Akhmad Kadyrov Mosque. ALEXEY NIKOLSKY/AFP/Getty Images
Separately, there is the controversy over Chechnya’s persecution of homosexuals. Here again,
Putin has been forced to get involved personally. Normally this is not something that Putin would
be concerned with, and he is no champion of gay rights. But the negative attention the issue has
received in international media has been enough that Putin has been urging Kadyrov to back off.
Kadyrov denies that he is involved in the crackdown, which has led to the deaths of a dozen
people and imprisonment of at least a hundred others. In fact, Kadyrov claims that there are no
homosexuals in Chechnya given its Muslim tradition.
But this is merely the tip of the iceberg when it comes to upholding Islamic religious norms.
Kadyrov has positioned himself as the defender of the Islamic faith in Chechnya, enforcing dress
codes for women, encouraging severe punishments for co-mingling of the sexes and supporting
polygamy. Under normal circumstances, promoting religion would irk Kadyrov’s masters in the
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Kremlin. Moscow has been silent, however, because both governments recognize that now is not
the time to provide fodder for jihadists – not when Russian resources are spread thin and
transnational jihadist groups are spreading throughout the world.
But the problem with pandering to religion (and this extends to many, if not most, Muslimmajority areas) is that radical Islamists are the ones who benefit most. In an ironic twist, the
Muslim governments that employ religion to preserve stability usually create the outcome they
sought to avoid by legitimizing and giving voice to the jihadists. In Chechnya’s case, religion is
unlikely to compensate for the problem hardwired into the Kadyrov regime, which is that it is a
Russian creation.
It is true that Russia needs Kadyrov in power to oversee Chechnya. The reverse is equally if not
more true; without the Kremlin’s support, Kadyrov could not keep dissidents at bay and sustain
his fiefdom. But as Russia’s ability to help manage the area wanes, jihadist forces and other
rivals of Kadyrov will try to exploit it. Just as the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s could no
longer project power into its peripheral regions, leading to the secession of its republics in the
Baltics, Caucasus and Central Asia, a weakened Russia will not be able to keep its grip on
Chechnya and the wider North Caucasus. Left to its own devices, Chechnya is bound to devolve
into factional warfare. And this is where jihadists, with their propensity to rally people around
religion, are likely to benefit the most.
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