Paper prepared for PRIO Conference: COIN in Afghanistan, 12-13 February 2012
Draft: Please, do not cite without permission from the author.
EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOR AFGHAN INSURGENTS:
CHALLENGES FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY THEORY
Kersti Larsdotter
After the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, several thousand Afghan Taliban forces fled across
the border to Pakistan, and this area became a safe haven for Afghan fighters. Various Pakistani
groups along the border also supported the Taliban struggle in Afghanistan,1 and according to
Barnett Rubin and Andrea Armstrong:
Several networks have linked Afghanistan to a wider arc of conflict, or a regional conflict
formation, stretching from Moscow to Dubai. Networks of armed groups, often covertly aided
by neighboring states, link the conflict within Afghanistan to violence in Kashmir, Chechnya,
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan.2
The regionalisation of insurgencies and civil wars is, however, considered a major obstacle to
peace.3 According to Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, the risk of civil war onset increases when
neighbouring states are engaged in civil wars.4 Other scholars argue that civil wars are more likely
to last and that belligerents are less willing to stop fighting if either of the belligerents receives
external support.5 External support also correlates with a lower success rate of peacekeeping
operations,6 and Rubin, Armstrong and Gloria Ntegeye suggest that so-called lessons learned
Ashok Behuria, 2007, ‘Fighting the Taliban: Pakistan at War with Itself’, Australian Journal of International Affairs,
61(4), pp. 531-532; Marvin G. Weinbaum, 2009, ‘Hard Choices in Countering Insurgency and Terrorism along
Pakistan’s North-West Frontier’, Journal of International Affairs, 63(1), pp. 74, 49.
2 Barnett R. Rubin, & Andrea Armstrong, 2003, ‘Regional Issues in the Reconstruction of Afghanistan’, World Policy
Journal, Spring, p. 31. See also Kristian Skrede Gleditsch & Kyle Beardsley, 2004, ‘Nosy Neighbors: Third-Party
Actors in Central American Conflicts’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 48(3), p. 380.
3 David Kilcullen, 2006, ‘Counter-Insurgency Redux’, Survival, 48(4), p. 114; Idean Salehyan, 2010, Transnational
Insurgencies and the Escalation of Regional Conflict: Lessons for Iraq and Afghanistan (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies
Institute).
4 Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, 2007, ‘Transnational Dimensions of Civil War, Journal of Peace Research, 44(3), p. 295.
5 David Galula, 1964, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security
International), p. 25; Jason Lyall, 2010, ‘Do Democracies Make Inferior Counterinsurgents? Reassessing
Democracy’s Impact on War Outcomes and Duration’, International Organizations, 64, p. 186; Jason Lyall & Isaiah
Wilson III, 2009, ‘Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars’, International
Organization, 63, pp. 87, 90; Salehyan, 2010; Idean Salehyan & Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, 2006, ‘Refugees and the
Spread of Civil War’, International Organization, 60; Barbara F. Walter, 2009, ‘Bargaining Failures and Civil Wars’,
Annual Review of Political Science, 12, p. 255.
6 Paul F. Diehl, 1988, ‘Peacekeeping Operations and the Quest for Peace’, Political Science Quarterly, 103(3), p. 500;
Paul F. Diehl, 1993, International Peacekeeping (Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins University Press), pp. 81-85;
Virginia Page Fortna, 2008, Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents’ Choices after Civil War (Princeton: Princeton
University Press), pp. 105, 107; Darya Pushkina, 2006, ‘A Recipe for Success? Ingredients of a Successful
Peacekeeping Mission’, International Peacekeeping, 13(2), p. 140. Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis argue that
this is also true concerning peacebuilding efforts. See Michael W. Doyle & Nicholas Sambanis, 2000, ‘International
Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis’, The American Political Science Review, 94(4), p. 781.
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from conflict prevention and peacemaking in civil wars might not apply to regional conflicts,
since the dynamics in these conflicts are different. For example, belligerent parties might not
reach a ‘hurting stalemate’ which forces them into negotiations, or interventions by external
actors in one conflict might have unintended consequences for conflicts in neighbouring states,
making them more difficult to solve.7
Despite the problem of the regionalisation of insurgencies and civil wars, how to address this
aspect is rarely discussed. Although different strategies of how to terminate external support for
the insurgents are to some extent addressed, this research is not particularly systematic and
without any ambitions of developing counterinsurgency theory.8 In order to develop
counterinsurgency theory to also include the regional dimension of insurgencies and civil wars,
the aim of this paper is to problematize contemporary counterinsurgency theory using the war in
Afghanistan as the point of departure.
The main argument in this paper is that the Afghan war is an especially challenging case for
contemporary counterinsurgency theory, both historically and currently, and that contemporary
counterinsurgency theory needs to be developed in order to be relevant for insurgencies such as
the one in Afghanistan. If counterinsurgency theory continues to ignore the regional dimension
of insurgencies and civil wars, important dynamics will be overlooked, making some wars
difficult to understand.
In the first part of this paper, a short overview of contemporary counterinsurgency theory is
presented. This will be followed by a discussion of why Afghanistan poses a challenge for
contemporary counterinsurgency theory. In the third part, the major insurgent groups in
Afghanistan are discussed as well as their external support from regional states and groups. In the
fourth part, a suggestion of how to develop counterinsurgency theory to also include the regional
dimension of insurgencies and civil wars is presented. Lastly, the paper is concluded with a short
discussion on the results.
Barnett R. Rubin, Andrea Armstrong & Gloria Ntegeye, 2001, ‘Conceptual Overview of the Origin, Structure, and
Dynamics of Regional Conflict Formations’, CIC Report, p. 7.
8 See, for example, Yoav Gortzak, 2009, ‘Using Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency Operations: The French in
Algeria, 1954-1962’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 32(2), pp. 313-314; Richard Shultz, 1978, ‘Breaking the Will of the
Enemy during the Vietnam War: The Operationalization of the Cost-Benefit Model of Counterinsurgency Warfare’,
Journal of Peace Research, 15(2), pp. 111-112. Regional aspects of civil wars are also only rarely discussed in the civil war
literature as well. For an overview of the civil war literature, see Virginia Page Fortna & Lise Morjé Howard, 2008,
‘Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature’, The Annual Review of Political Science, 11.
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COUNTERINSURGENCY THEORY
In the counterinsurgency literature, there are two principal approaches to how to conduct
successful counterinsurgencies. On the one hand, insurgencies are mainly seen as a struggle for
the support of the population, and the main aim of the counterinsurgents is to win their support
– a so called population centric approach. On the other hand, the insurgents are seen as the
enemy, and the main aim of the counterinsurgents is to annihilate them – a so called enemy
centric approach. These approaches are not always explicitly discussed, but are intermingled in
the literature. Different measures are considered to simultaneously influence the support of the
population and to defeat the insurgents.
The population centric approach can in turn be divided into two main approaches: the ‘hearts
and minds’ approach and the ‘coercion’ approach. According to the hearts and minds approach,
the government needs to convince the population that it represents a better alternative than the
insurgents. The government has to win their ‘attitudes of identification and allegiance’. This is
primarily achieved by increasing the security of the population (i.e. protection against repressive
measures primarily by the insurgents but sometimes also by the government) and by increasing
the state’s capacity to govern (i.e. economic and social development as well as promoting good
governance).9 According to this approach, repressive measures taken by the government in
response to an insurgency stimulate insurgent activity and violent repression makes the
insurgency stronger. According to Melnik, it ‘is necessary to eliminate the negative feelings on
which the insurgency is based. However, the use of force and violence runs the risk of increasing these same
negative feelings.’10
According to the coercion approach, it is not the hearts and minds of the local population that
matters, it is their actions. Actors are considered to be rational actors, making decisions
depending on a cost-benefit calculation of the costs in relation to the gains of continued fighting.
But instead of only take the belligerents into consideration, the population is considered to be
especially important. The population represents rational actors that respond, more or less
predictably, to certain incentives and sanctions from both the insurgents and the
Paul Dixon, 2009, ‘”Hearts and Minds”? British Counter-Insurgency from Malaya to Iraq’, The Journal of Strategic
Studies, 32(3), p. 362; Michael Fitzsimmons, 2008, ‘Hard Hearts and Open Minds? Governance, Identity and the
Intellectual Foundations of Counterinsurgency Strategy’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 31(3); Austin Long 2006, On
“Other War”: Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation), pp.
21-30; Michael Shafer, 1988, ‘The Unlearned Lessons of Counterinsurgency’, Political Science Quarterly, 103(1); Shultz,
1978; Wolf quoted in Long, 2006, p. 24 (quote). However, some include a more coercive approach in hearts and
minds. For a discussion of different interpretations, see Dixon, 2009, pp. 363-366.
10 Melnik quoted in Long, 2006, p. 27 (emphasis in original).
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counterinsurgents. According to this approach, people’s preferences are not important. The side
that provides better incentives for the population will win their support.11
On the one hand, this implies that the possible negative feeling of the population created by
the use of repression is not important. If they consider the costs of supporting the insurgents too
high, because of repression from the government, they will support the government regardless of
their negative feelings towards the government. On the other hand, this also implies that
increasing the standard of living of the population through development measures might not
reduce the insurgency. Instead, development makes resources available for the local population
which can be acquired by the insurgents ‘through persuasion, coercion or a combination of the
two’. According to Wolf, in order for development to be efficient in hampering an insurgency, it
‘must be accompanied by efforts to extract something in return for whatever benefits and
improvements are provided,’ for example, cooperating with the government and depriving the
insurgency of their support.12
Hence, the main difference between these approaches is to what extent coercion can be used in
order to make the population support the government. According to the hearts and minds
approach, the use of coercion will make the people turn to the insurgent in order to obtain
protection from the counterinsurgency forces and the government, whilst according to the
coercion approach, the population can be coerced to cooperate with the government, especially if
combined with certain kinds of positive incentives.
Enemy
Centric
Population
Centric
Coercion
Hearts & Minds
Table 1: Overview of traditional counterinsurgency approaches
The role of external support for insurgents has attracted some attention.13 Apart from concluding
that external support decreases the likelihood of achieving peace, already discussed above, some
researchers have developed different ways of characterising external support in civil wars.
Kristian Skrede Gleditsch distinguishes between different categories regarding the nature of the
intervention: direct and indirect intervention. He define direct intervention as instances when
external actors crosses the state border, while indirect intervention include, for example, “covert
Long, 2006, pp. 24-26; Shafer, 1988, pp. 72-73; Shultz, 1978, pp. 110-111.
Wolf quoted in Long, 2006, p. 25 (emphasis in original). See also Shafer, 1988, p. 72.
13 Galula, 1964, p. 25; Lyall, 2010; Idean Salehyan & Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, 2006, ‘Refugees and the Spread of
Civil War’, International Organization, 60.
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support to one of the parties, not interfering in arms transactions, or permitting rebels to operate
on their territory.”14 David Galula divides between different forms of support: moral, political,
technical, financial and military support, while Daniel Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman,
William Rosenau & David Brannan use the importance of the support for the recipient as a
distinguisher: critical forms of support (i.e. safe haven and transit; financial resources; political
support and propaganda; and direct military support); valuable forms of support (i.e. training;
weapons and materiel); and minor forms of support (i.e. fighters; intelligence; organizational aid;
and inspiration).15 Although the effectiveness of the different kinds of support is usually not
investigated, Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson have found that two types of external support are
especially crucial for insurgent success: safe havens in neighbouring states and the provision of
military or economic aid.16
While research on different strategies of how to counter an insurgency and ending civil wars is
plentiful, surprisingly little attention has been given to the regional dimension of these wars and
how to counter external support for the insurgents. In research on counterinsurgencies, detailed
descriptions of different strategies are sometimes discussed. Yoav Gortzak, for example,
discusses the so-called barrages created by the French forces in the Algerian War (1954-1962). The
barrages was “a network of electrified fences, minefields, and free-fire zones, manned by rapidreaction forces that could be brought to bear upon any ALN [National Liberation Army, the
armed wing of National Liberation Front, FLN] units trying to cross” – built along the borders
with Morocco and Tunisia.17 Another example is Richard Shultz, who analyses the U.S. bombing
campaign against North Vietnam in his research on the U.S. strategy in Vietnam between 1965
and 1968. It was a program which was aiming to “contribute to the defeat of the insurgents by
denying them the external logistical supports deemed essential to their survival and growth.” He
discusses different forms of border surveillance, barriers and direct pressures used during the
campaign.18
However, this research is mostly focused on the description of different counterinsurgency
practices, rather than on the development of a counterinsurgency theory including the regional
dimension of insurgencies. Furthermore, existing counterinsurgency theory can not cover the
Gleditsch, 2007, p. 296.
Daniel Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau & David Brannan, 2001, Trends in Outside Support
for Insurgent Movements (Santa Monica, CA: RAND), pp. 84-100; Galula, 1964, pp. 25-28.
16 Lyall & Wilson, 2009, p. 82.
17 Gortzak, 2008, pp. 313-314.
18 Richard Shultz, 1979, ‘Coercive Force and Military Strategy: Deterrence Logic and the Cost-Benefit Model of
Counterinsurgency Warfare’, The Western Political Quarterly, 32(4), p. 455. See also, Shultz, 1978, p. 111. For a
discussion on different technical approaches to borders surveillance, see James Igoe Walsh, 2008, ‘Intelligence
Sharing for Counter-Insurgency’, Defense & Security Analysis, 24(3), p. 282.
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regional dimension of insurgencies, since strategies of how to win the hearts and minds of the
local population or how to annihilate the insurgents are dependent on state borders.
THE AFGHAN STATE
The combination of two specific aspects of the Afghan state makes Afghanistan especially
challenging for contemporary counterinsurgency theory: a weak central government together
with the strong power of the tribes; and state borders drawn through tribal areas, separating
people from the same tribe or ethnic group. These aspects have made the borders of Afghanistan
rather insignificant for the local population, making contemporary counterinsurgency theory ill
fitted for the case.
The first aspect of the Afghan state, which poses a challenge to contemporary
counterinsurgency theory, is the relationship between the central government and the tribes.
According to Shultz and Dew, the central state has never been an important macro-level social
organisation or source of identity in Afghanistan. Instead, it is the tribe that has been the main
component of the society. The tribe consists of several clans, each clan an extended community,
based either on genealogy or on geography. Although the tribe is maybe the most important
source of identity in the Afghan society, the clans in a tribe are self-reliant and tend to cooperate
only when they are threatened.19 According to Goodson, there are 345 distinct tribal units in
Afghanistan.20
Another important form of social organisation and source of identity in Afghanistan is the
ethnic group, consisting of several tribes. According to Shultz and Dew, there are seven main
ethnic groups in Afghanistan: Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek, Turkmen, Baluchi, Nuristani and Hazari.
The largest ethnic group is the Pashtuns (around 42% of the population). They have dominated
the political life for the last 250 years. They generally speak Pasthu and are Sunni Muslims. The
second largest group is the Tajiks (around 27% of the population) who mainly live in the central
and north-eastern regions of Afghanistan. They are also predominately Sunni Muslims.21
Given the strong position of clans, tribes and ethnic groups in Afghanistan and the relatively
weak position of the government, it has been essential to carefully balance the power of the tribal
Richard H. Shultz & Andrea J. Dew, 2006, Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat
(New York: Columbia University Press), pp. 152-153.
20 Larry P. Goodson, 2001, Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban (Seattle &
London: University of Washington Press), p. 28.
21 Shultz & Dew, 2006, pp. 151-152.
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leaders against the power of the government in order for the government to gain any substantial
control over Afghanistan.22
The second aspect of the Afghan state, which poses a challenge to contemporary
counterinsurgency theory, is the creation of the Afghan borders. When the contemporary borders
of Afghanistan were drawn in the 1890’s, it was not the result of an Afghan state struggle. It was
rather a consequence of the power game between the Russian and the British Empires during the
nineteenth century, the so-called Great Game. Afghanistan became a buffer zone between the two
empires, and the borders were drawn with no consideration of the local population, right through
tribal areas and ethnic groups.23
The Great Game began already in 1839, when the British Empire invaded Afghanistan in order
to balance Russia’s recent move into Asia. This was the beginning of the first, of three, AngloAfghan wars. In 1878, they invaded Afghanistan a second time, this time since the leadership of
Kabul had invited a Russian diplomatic mission to Kabul while refusing the British to do the
same. On both occasions, the British forces managed to quickly take Kabul, almost without
resistance. However, outside of Kabul tribal leaders fought each other in order to win the power
of Afghanistan, and the British forces could not extend their control outside of Kabul. In 1841
and 1880, respectively, the surrounding tribes and clans joined together to attack the British
forces, eventually forcing them to withdraw. However, in 1880, the British managed to keep the
responsibility of Afghanistan’s foreign affairs, especially along the Afghan-Russian border. This
came to have large consequences for the formation of the Afghan borders.24
During the following sixteen years, the modern borders of Afghanistan were essentially settled
by Britain and Russia, together with the Afghan amir, Abdur Rhaman Khan. In 1887, 1891 and
1896, different boundary commissions decided on Afghanistan’s northern boundaries. In 1893,
the Durand Line between Afghanistan and British North-West India was delineated, and in 1905,
the Persian-Afghan border was settled. These borders were drawn with Russian and British
strategic interests in mind, rather than the interests of the Afghan state or the historical location
of tribes and ethnic groups. Consequently, the borders were partly drawn right through tribal
areas, for example, the Durand Line was drawn right through Pashtun territory.25
The third Anglo-Afghan War erupted in 1919 when Afghan anti-British sentiments boiled over
and they attacked British border forts. The British retaliated with bombings, quelling the war
Shultz & Dew, 2006, pp. 151, 157
Goodson, 2001, pp. 31-32.
24 Goodson, 2001, pp. 30, 32, 34; Shultz & Dew, 2006, pp. 159-165.
25 Goodson, 2001, pp. 35-36; Shultz & Dew, 2006, p. 166.
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almost before it had begun. However, during the following negotiations, Afghanistan was freed
to conduct its own foreign affairs and finally became fully independent.26
In areas where the borders divide tribes and ethnic groups, maybe especially along the Durand
Line between Afghanistan and Pakistan, cross border affairs are common and the borders are
often ignored.27 According to a report from UNHCR,
most people do not actually know where the border is located, separating Afghanistan and
Pakistan. Students often leave their homes in the morning to go to school on the other side, as
it is for them part of their community, not two different countries.28
The strong identification with the clan, tribe and ethnic group, rather than with the government,
together with the construction of borders dividing tribal areas, have made the borders rather
insignificant for the local population along the borders in Afghanistan.
THE REGIONAL DIMENSION OF THE AFGHAN WAR
Regional support to the insurgents is a strong feature in the contemporary Afghan war, which
partly reflects the particular features of the Afghan state and the historical circumstances
discussed above. The war is primarily a war between the Afghan government (supported by the
International Security Assistance Force, ISAF) and different insurgent groups who try to oust the
government from power and to force the international troops out of Afghanistan. There are
several insurgent groups opposing the government, but the three main insurgents groups are the
Taliban, the Hezb-i-Islami and the Haqqani Network, all with extensive contacts in neighbouring
states.29 In addition, several hundred tribal leaders have taken up arms against the government,
the international presence and each other, and the situation is similar to the chaos that
characterised Afghanistan before the Taliban.30
The main insurgent group in Afghanistan is the Taliban. They emerged outside of Kandahar in
1994, in the chaos of the civil war that broke out in 1992 between different Mujahideen groups
(i.e. between supporters of the Sunni political party Jami’yat-I Islami (JIA) and the Hezb-i-Islami,
led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar). Initially, the Taliban emerged as a group that provided protection
for the local population around Kandahar. But, already later the same year they attacked and
Goodson, 2001, p. 36; Shultz & Dew, 2006, p. 166.
Goodson, 2001, footnote 24, p. 29.
28 Nassim Majidi & Eric Davin, 2009, ‘Study on Cross Border Population Movements between Afghanistan and
Pakistan’, UNHCR, p. 19.
29 Stanely A. McChrystal, 2009, COMISAF’s Initial Assessment, Headquarters International Security Assistance Force,
Kabul Afghanistan, pp. 2-6.
30 Abudulkader H. Sinno, 2008, Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond (Ithaca & London: Cornell University
Press), p. 255.
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seized Kandahar and their influence in Afghanistan increased rapidly. In 1996 they managed to
take Kabul and claimed the power of Afghanistan, and by 1999, they controlled most of
Afghanistan except for the north. Their vision was founded on Wahhabi ideals, with a
fundamentalist doctrine.31 In December 2001, the Taliban was overthrown by the United States
together with the United Kingdom in Operation Enduring Freedom, and they fled to the
mountains along the border to Pakistan.32
After the fall of the Taliban, the Taliban leadership relocated to Quetta in Pakistan, under the
leadership of Mullah Mohammad Omar. Since they claim that they are still the rightful leadership
of Afghanistan, they continue to call themselves the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), but
they are also called the Quetta Shura Taliban (QST). Apart from the shura based in Quetta, they
also have a shura based in Peshawar in the North-Western Frontier Province of Pakistan
(NWFP) and one in Waziristan in FATA.33
The recruitment and mobilisation of the organisation is highly ethnic, primarily rural Pashtuns
from southern and south-eastern Afghanistan.34Apart from Afghan fighters, they also include
foreign fighters to a certain extent (see below for a longer discussion on foreign fighters), and a
number of facilitators. Apart from logistics, the facilitators are responsible for receiving and
directing foreign fighters.35 According to Stenersen, the estimated number of active fighters vary
between 4000-5000 according to a UN report in 2006 to 25 000 according to a US intelligence
report from 2009.36
Another major insurgent group in Afghanistan is Hezb-i-Islami (HIG). Hezb-i-Islami was
established already in 1975 by the Pashtun commander Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, during his exile in
Pakistan. During the Soviet invasion (1979-1989) HIG was backed by Pakistan and when the
Soviet forces withdrew HIG became one of the main parties of the civil war (1992-1996). In
1993-1994 and in 1996, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar served as Afghanistan’s prime minister, but when
Shultz & Dew, 2006, pp. 180-182.
Tim Youngs, Paul Bowers & Mark Oakes, 2001, The Campaign against International Terrorism: Prospects after the Fall of
the Taliban, Research Paper 01/112 (London: House of Commons Library), p. 9.
33 Jeffrey A. Dressler, 2009, ‘Securing Helmand: Understanding and Responding to the Enemy’, Afghanistan Report
2, Institute for the Study of War, September 2009, p. 7; Anne Stenersen, 2010, ‘The Taliban Insurgency in
Afghanistan: Organization, Leadership and Worldview’, FFI-report 2010/00359, p. 18; Seth G. Jones, 2008,
Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan (Santa Monica, CA: RAND), p. 59 [Interview with officials from several Western
government agencies, 2005 and 2006; and newspaper article with quote from former Afghan Interior Minister, Ali
Jalali]. For a detailed discussion on the Quetta leadership, see Stenersen, 2010, pp. 41-47.
34 Stenersen, 2010, p. 30.
35 Dressler, 2009, pp. 8-9.
36 Stenersen, 2010, p. 18.
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the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan, he fled to Iran. After the fall of the Taliban, he came
back to Afghanistan and he led HIG to join the insurgency.37
The organisation is formed after the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East and revolutionary
Islamists in Iran, and their aim is to overthrow the Afghan government and to install Hekmatyar
as a leader. They are primarily based in Kunar and Nuristan, but they have also relatively strong
support in Nangarhar, Paktika and Paktia.38 According to Jones, the organisation includes several
hundred fighters, and they have openly cooperated with al Qaeda forces.39
A third major insurgent group in Afghanistan is the Haqqani Network. It was established in the
mid-70’s by Jalaluddin Haqqani. During the Soviet invasion, they fought against Soviet forces in
south-eastern Afghanistan, and after the Soviet withdrawal, they became a party in the civil war.
In 1991 they seized the city of Khost and in 1996 Haqqani joined the Taliban government as the
minister for tribal affairs. After the fall of the Taliban, he fled to his old base in Waziristan in
Pakistan and joined the insurgency. The stronghold of the Haqqani Network is in south-eastern
Afghanistan and across the border in Waziristan in Pakistan. In contrast to HIG, the Haqqani
Network has confirmed their allegiance to the Taliban publicly.40
The main source of external support for the insurgents in Afghanistan comes from Pakistan,
although some support also comes from Iran.41 The Pakistan government is often accused of
supporting the insurgents in Afghanistan in several ways, and former Pakistani officials have
openly admitted their sympathies for the Afghan insurgents. According to Jones, NATO officials
have also uncovered several instances where Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has
provided intelligence to insurgents in Afghanistan. However, the Pakistan government denies any
support for the insurgents.42 Nevertheless, the territory of Pakistan is used extensively by Afghan
insurgents as a safe haven and they have substantial freedom to operate inside of Pakistan.43
Furthermore, several insurgent and tribal groups in Pakistan actively support the insurgents in
Afghanistan.44
Jones, 2008, p. 41; Sinno, 2008, p. 261; Stenersen, 2010, p. 20.
Jones, 2008, p. 41 [Interview with US government official, 2006; Saleh, Strategy of Insurgents and Terrorists in
Afghanistan, p. 2]; Stenersen, 2010, p. 20.
39 Jones, 2008, p. 41 [Interview with US government official, 2006].
40 Stenersen, 2010, p. 19.
41 See Jones, 2008, pp. 41, 61.
42 Seth G. Jones, 2007, ‘Pakistan’s Dangerous Game’, Survival, 49(1), p. 18; Jones, 2008, pp. 54, 56 [Rubin, Afghanistan
and the International Community, p. 24]; Austin Long, 2010, ‘Small is Beautiful: The Counterterrorism Option in
Afghanistan’, Orbis, 54(2), p. 200; Stenersen, 2010, p. 40.
43 Jones, 2007, p. 18; Jones, 2008, p. 57.
44 Jones, 2008, p. 58.
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The border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is over 2000 kilometers long, and the border
areas are largely inaccessible, with mountainous terrain, narrow valleys and desert plains. On the
Afghan side of the border are the provinces of Badakhshan, Nuristan, Kunar, Nangarhar, Paktia,
Khowst, Paktika, Zabul, Kandahar, Helmand and Nimruz. On the Pakistan side of the border are
the Pakistan’s Federally Administrated Tribal Area (FATA), the North West Frontier Province
(NWFP) and Baluchistan.45 The border is highly difficult to secure, and there are a number of
border crossings along the border. According to Johnson and Mason, there are only two
established border crossings along the border where most of the legal daily cross-border traffic
passes the border. These are manned by officials. There are also around twenty smaller bordercrossing routes which are used quite frequent and manned by officials. However, there are almost
350 unmanned crossing points which are illegal but known, and hundreds of unaccounted foot
and goat paths used by insurgents, smugglers, locals and nomads.46
Since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, the border areas in Pakistan have become a safe
haven for Afghan insurgents, and according to Rubin and Sidique, some tribal areas have even
‘become a small-scale copy of Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, where Islamist militants can
recover and plan fresh operations while gradually imposing their will on the secluded region.’47
All the major insurgent groups are using these areas for their purposes.48
The support for the insurgents can be divided into several categories, such as leadership
sanctuary, training camps, recruiting ground, foreign fighters, material support and financial
support. The leadership of the Quetta Shura Taliban, for example, is using Pakistan as a sanctuary
from where they plan their offensives and direct their organisation. According to Dressler, they
give general guidance from Pakistan to their commanders in Afghanistan in the beginning of the
fighting year. They also move fighters between commanders in Afghanistan and allocate foreign
fighters regarding to their strategic priorities.49 Afghan and foreign fighters are also trained in a
number of training camps in Pakistan. Some of these camps were formed already during the
Afghan jihad in the 1980’s and used by al Qaeda in the 1990’s. Suicide attackers are often trained
in these camps.50
Thomas H. Johnson & M. Chris Mason, 2008, ‘Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan’, Orbis,
51(1), pp. 43-46; Jones, 2008, p. 54.
46 Johnson & Mason, 2008, p. 44. See also Dressler, 2009, p. 10; Jones, 2008, p. 58; Stenersen, 2010, p. 38.
47 Barnett R. Rubin & Abubakar Sidique, 2006, Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate, United States Institute of
Peace, Special Report 176, Washington, October, p. 3. See also Stenersen, 2010, p. 38.
48 Long, 2010, p. 200, Stenersen, 2010, p. 20 [Mohammad Masoom Stanekzai, ‘Thwarting Afghanistan’s Insurgency’,
Special Report 212, USIP, 2008, p. 8].
49 Dressler, 2009, pp. 8-9.
50 Dressler, 2009, p. 10; Jones, 2008 pp. 44, 57; Stenersen, 2010, p. 38.
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The border areas in Pakistan are an important area for the recruitment of fighters for the
Afghan insurgency.51 According to NATO, forty per cent of all fighters in Afghanistan came
straight from Pakistan in 2006.52 The Afghan insurgent groups recruit their members in Pakistani
madrassas, mosques and refugee camps. Some insurgent groups even run madrassas and welfare
services in Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan.53 According to Jones, many suicide bombers in
Afghanistan come from refugee camps located in Pakistan.54
Numerous of the foreign fighters supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan come through
Pakistan as well, especially from Pakistan’s madrassas and refugee camps in Baluchistan and
FATA.55 According to Jones, the foreign fighters are mainly individuals from the Caucasus and
Central Asia (such as Chechens, Uzbeks, and Tajiks), and Arabs (such as Saudis, Egyptians and
Libyans). Their objective is broader than that of the Taliban. Apart from launching jihad against
Western forces and eradicate them from the region, their aim is also the return of the Islamic
caliphate in the Middle East. The foreign fighters are often better equipped, trained and
motivated than Afghan insurgents, and they typically carry out more sophisticated attacks. They
also play a key role as trainers, shock troops and surrogate leaders for the Taliban in the field.
They take guidance from senior commanders at the strategic level, but they often have autonomy
at the tactical level.56
Afghan insurgents and foreign fighters rely on areas in Pakistan for material support. Fighters,
weapons, IED components, ammunition and other supplies are often smuggled into Afghanistan
across the border from Pakistan. Although much of the supplies are smuggled over the border on
small paths to remote towns close to the border, such as Barham Chah in southern Helmand, the
insurgents also use bigger roads such as Highway 4 in the Kandahar province to smuggle in
fighters and supply into Afghanistan. These paths and roads are also used to smuggle out heroin
in order to finance the insurgency.57
The Afghan insurgents are also conducting financing operations in Pakistan, and donor
networks in Pakistan raise funds from Pakistani militants sympathetic to the Taliban cause.58
Furthermore, according to Stenersen, Arab “money teams” arrives from Pakistan to supply local
Jones, 2008, p. 59; Stenersen, 2010, p. 38.
Stenesen, 2010, p. 30 [Guistozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop, p. 52].
53 Dressler, 2009, pp. 10, 13; Stenersen, 2010, pp. 19-20 [‘Insurgency in the East: The Taliban’s military strategy for
2008’ Kabul Direct 2, no 7, p. 5; [‘Assessing Hizb Islami threats: Question to Qazi Min Waqad’, Kabul Direct 1, no 1,
2007, p. 8].
54 Jones, 2008, p. 57.
55 Dressler, 2009, p. 10, 13.
56 Dressler, 2009, p. 10; Jones, 2008, pp. 43-46; Stenersen, 2010, p. 21.
57 Jones, 2008, p. 57 [Interview with NATO officials, January 2007]; Dressler, 2009, pp. 9, 13; Stenesen, 2010, p. 38.
58 Jones, 2008, pp. 46, 59; Stenersen, 2010, p. 40.
51
52
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commanders close to the border in Afghanistan with weapons, money and technical assistance.59
Financial donor networks also exist on a wider scale. For example, the international al Qaeda
network is using wealthy international contacts in the Muslim world, especially from the Gulf
States, such as the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, in order to raise money to the
insurgents in Afghanistan.60
Ethnic ties and tribe affiliation across the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is often an
important feature in the support from Pakistan. Due to common ethnicity, the Afghan insurgents
have significant support networks in, for example, Baluchistan, FATA and Waziristan. These
networks are based on tribal affiliation on both sides of the border and are very difficult to
penetrate.61 Unfortunately, contemporary counterinsurgency theory does not discuss how to
handle this kind of circumstances.
REGIONAL COUNTERINSURGENCY THEORY
The regional dimension of the Afghan war is indeed acknowledged by NATO officials. For
example, in COMISAF’s Initial Assessment from 2009, McChrystal argues:
While the existence of safe havens in Pakistan does not guarantee ISAF failure, Afghanistan
does require Pakistani cooperation and action against violent militancy, particularly against
those groups active in Afghanistan.62
Furthermore, the goal of the U.S. forces in Afghanistan, according to President Obama, is to
‘disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return
to either country in the future.’63
Several kinds of measures have been accomplished by NATO and U.S. forces. According to
numerous newspapers, NATO and the U.S. have conducted several attacks in Pakistan in order
to ‘cripple the Taliban’ and to end their attacks on Afghan and international security forces in
Afghanistan. Drone aircrafts are, for example, used over Pakistan. According to Long, this was
introduced already in 2004. Since 2008, the number of drone attacks has increased, and in 2010
Stenersen, 2010, p. 39.
Jones, 2008, p. 62.
61 Jones, 2008, pp. 58, 46 [Interview with Afghan Foreign minister Rangin Dadfar Spanta, 2006; Barno, Afghanistan –
The Security Outlook; Center for Army Lessons Learned, Ranger Observations from OEF and OIF: Tactics, Techniques and
Procedures, 2005; Buffaloe, Conventional Forces in Low-Intensity Conflict: The 82nd Airborne in Firebase Shkin, pp. 16-17];
Gretchen Peters, 2009, ‘How Opium Profits the Taliban’, Peaceworks, No 62, United States Institute of Peace, pp. 2627; Qandeel Siddique, 2010, Teherik-e-Taliban Pakistan: An Attempt to Deconstruct the Umbrella Organization and
the Reasons for its Growth in Pakistan’s North-East, DIIS-Report 2010:12, p. 7.
62 McChrystal, 2009, pp. 2-10.
63 Quoted in Long, 2010, p. 200.
59
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alone, C.I.A. carried out more than 70 drone attacks on Taliban strongholds in Afghanistan. 64
The U.S. armed forces are also using so called reconnaissance blimps, to gather intelligence, and
helicopter air strikes against targets inside Pakistan.65
Military operations against insurgents outside the host state borders seem to be quite usual in
other counterinsurgency campaigns as well, such as the U.S. intervention in South Vietnam or
South African operations in South West Africa/Namibia (1966-1989), although often more
substantial than the measures taken in Afghanistan. However, state and intervening forces have
also aimed at closing the border in order to prevent border crossings. For example, in Namibia,
the South African Defence Forces created a so-called free-fire zone along the border between
Namibia (at the time called South West Africa and annexed by South Africa) and Angola. They
cleared out vegetation and systematically forced people who lived along the border to move
about one kilometre from the border. Two fences were erected along the border, one on the
border itself and one about one kilometres south of the border inside Namibia. In these free-fire
zones, anyone could be shot on sight. They also installed a sophisticated electronic warning
system in the border zone, and according to some sources, planted a deadly plant, the Mexican
Sisal, in the zone.66 Apart from training courses for the Afghan Border Police, and the provision
of new equipment for these forces, focus does not seem to be on the control of borders in the
Afghan war.67
Instead, focus seems to be on cooperation with Pakistan. Pakistan has supported the Afghan
efforts by collecting intelligence against Afghan insurgents in Pakistan, allowing drone strikes
inside Pakistan and conducting own military operations against Afghan insurgents in Pakistan. 68
They have, for example, conducted military operations in the FATA against foreign fighters,
especially Central Asians and Arabs, and against Pakistani Taliban in the tribal regions. 69
Long, 2010, p. 212 [Miller, “Predator Strikes in Pakistan”; Lisa Burgess, “U.S. Troop Presence in Afghanistan at
17,900, and expected to Hold Steady”, Stars and Stripes, July 9 2004; Ismail Khan and Dilawar Khan Wazir, “Night
Raid Kills Nek, Four Other Militants”, Dawn, June 19, 2004]; Mazzerati & Schmitt, 2010.
65 Mazzetti & Schmitt, 2010.
66 Kenneth W. Grundy, 1983, 1983, Soldiers without Politics: Blacks in the South African Armed Forces (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press), pp. 253-254; Francis Toase, 1985, ‘The South African Army: The Campaign in South
West Africa/Namibia since 1966’, in Ian F.W. Beckett & John Pimlott (eds), Armed Forces of Modern Counter-Insurgency
(Beckenham, Kent: Croom Helm Ltd), p. 210; Lieneke Eloff de Visser, 2011, ‘Winning Hearts and Minds in the
Namibian Border War’, Scientia Militaria, 39(1), pp. 93-94 [interview with Maj. Gen. Chris van Zyl, 4 May 2010]; Tony
Weaver, 1989, ‘The South African Defence Force in Namibia’, in Jacklyn Cock & Laurie Nathan (eds), War and
Society: The Militarisation of South Africa (New York: St. Martin’s Press Inc.), p. 97.
67 Reuters, 9/2/2011, ‘NATO Races to Secure Violent, Porous Afghanistan-Pakistan Border’; NATO, 2010,
‘Training Courses Celebrate Graduates in Afghanistan’; UNODC, 2010, ‘The Remote Frontier: UNODC Assistance
to Afghanistan’s Border Patrol’.
68 Long, 2010, p. 201; Omar Waraich & Andrew Buncombe, 2009, “Pakistan Readies for New Assault on Bin Laden
Lair”, The Independent (UK) October 6; Report to Congress, 2010, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in
Afghanistan, p. 88.
69 Jones, 2008, pp. 57-58, 60; Long, 2010, p. 201.
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However, the Pakistan government is repeatedly accused of only focusing on foreign fighters and
Pakistani militants rather than on Afghan Taliban in the region.70
Nevertheless, NATO continues to work towards better cooperation with Pakistan. They have
created the Tripartite Commission, a joint forum on military and security issues including
representatives from ISAF, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Tripartite Commission focus on four
main areas of cooperation: intelligence sharing, border security, countering improvised explosive
devices (IEDs) and initiatives relating to information operations. The Joint Intelligence Operation
Centre (JIOC) is also a joint initiative between ISAF, Afghanistan and Pakistan which was
established in Kabul in 2007. NATO has also opened up training and education courses to
Pakistani officers, and guidance to the Pakistan military.71
Several NATO member states also have their own polices for the region, for example, the
United States and Canada.72 While Canada’s policy is focused on border security, the U.S. policy
prescribes a more comprehensive approach. According to the Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional
Stabilization Strategy, President Obama declared on December 1, 2009, that:
Today, it is clearer than ever before that we must expand our relationship with Pakistan
beyond security issues, and lead the international community in helping the Pakistani people
overcome political, economic, and security challenges that threaten Pakistan’s stability, and in
turn undermine regional stability.73
Apart from enhancing Pakistan’s counterinsurgency capabilities, key areas of the strategy include:
energy, agriculture, water, health and education, assistance to displaced Pakistanis, strengthening
Pakistan’s democratic institutions and empowering Pakistan’s Women.74
All these different aspects might be valuable to incorporate into a regional counterinsurgency
theory. Traditional counterinsurgency theory can be divided into enemy centric and population
centric approaches to counterinsurgency, and the population centric approach can in turn be
divided into a hearts and minds approach and a coercion approach (see table nr 1 above).
If also including the regional dimension of insurgencies in a theory of counterinsurgency, an
enemy centric approach could be used against the enemy in a neighbouring state (for example,
the Afghan Taliban in Pakistan), and a coercion approach or a hearts and minds approach could
be used both against the local population in a neighbouring state (for example, non-militant tribal
Jones, 2008, p. 60.
Report to Congress, 2010, pp. 50-51; NATO, 2011, ‘NATO Cooperation with Pakistan’.
72 Government of Canada, 2011, ‘Afghanistan-Pakistan border’.
73 Department of the State, 2010, Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy, Office of the Special
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, p. 25.
74 Department of the State, 2010, pp. 25-30.
70
71
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groups on the Pakistan side of the border), or against the government in a neighbouring state (for
example, the Pakistan government (see table nr 2 blow).
Coercion
Hearts & Minds
Enemy
Centric
HEC
Host State
Population
Centric
HPC
Enemy
Centric
NEC
HPH
Neighbouring State
Population
Centric
NPC
Government
Centric
NGC
NPH
NGH
Table 2: Overview of regional counterinsurgency approaches
The use of helicopter attacks against Afghan Taleban in Pakistan could be seen as a neighbouring
state, enemy centric, coercive approach (NEC), while support to health and education in Pakistan
could be seen as a neighbouring state, population centric, hearts and minds approach (NPH) or a
neighbouring state, government centric, hearts and minds approach (NGH).
CONCLUSIONS
The regional dimension of the Afghan war is prominent, and external support to the insurgents
in Afghanistan is plentiful, especially from Pakistan. According to traditional counterinsurgency
theory, this is highly problematic in order to achieve victory. Nevertheless, the regional
dimension of insurgencies is largely ignored in traditional counterinsurgency theory. In this paper,
I have used the war in Afghanistan to problematize traditional counterinsurgency theory. The war
in Afghanistan is especially challenging for counterinsurgency theory since a strong tribal
affiliation and ethnic group belonging, a weak central state, and borders drawn right through
tribal areas, makes the borders of Afghanistan quite unimportant for the local population.
In order to counter external support to the insurgents in Afghanistan, both international and
host state forces are conducting different kinds of counter measures. These can be divided
according to traditional counterinsurgency theory, although with three new receivers of the
policy: an enemy in a neighbouring state; the local population in a neighbouring state and the
government of a neighbouring state. By developing the traditional counterinsurgency theory to
also include regional aspects of insurgencies and civil wars, this theory can more easily be used
when analysing insurgencies with a regional dimension.
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