Mujahidin vs. Communists: Revisiting the battles of Jalalabad and Khost1
By Anne Stenersen
After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, groups of local insurgents continued the
fight against the Soviet-sponsored Afghan regime led by President Najibullah. Najibullah resigned
from power in 1992, leaving Afghanistan to be ruled by a coalition of mujahidin parties. But the
mujahidin never managed to stabilize the country, instead engaging each other in a devastating civil
war that would last for the next four years.
This paper is about the war between mujahidin and Najibullah’s Army in 1989-1992. Two battles in
particular will be examined; the battle of Jalalabad in 1989, where the mujahidin suffered heavy
losses, and the battle of Khost in 1991, where the mujahidin won and - according to popular belief paved the way for the conquest of Kabul later that year.
The battles of Jalalabad and Khost have not been analyzed in great detail. Consequently there is no
clear answer to why the mujahidin lost so drastically against the regime’s forces in 1989, while
succeeding in 1991. Some would argue that the question is not really relevant - after all,
Najibullah’s resignation in 1992 had little to do with the mujahidin’s military advances on the
ground.
Yet, the battles of Jalalabad and Khost are worth revisiting. They provide us with examples of how
local guerrillas confronted the armed forces of their own country to oust what they viewed as a
hostile “puppet regime”. There are several parallels to today’s situation. Like the mujahidin in 1989,
the Taliban guerrilla is likely to contain elements that will continue to fight against the Afghan
regime after international forces leave in 2014.
One should be careful to compare today’s conflict with the Afghan-Soviet war of the 1980s. As
argued by Bruce Riedel and others, there are probably more differences than likenesses between the
two wars.2 Still, an investigation of the military successes and failures of the mujahidin in 1989-92
may give some perspective of what it takes for a local guerrilla force in Afghanistan to take on
government troops - informing the current debate on whether, and to what extent, the Taliban and
other insurgent groups will be able to de-stabilize Afghanistan once foreign forces leave.
1
The battle of Jalalabad (March–June 1989)
The battle of Jalalabad was the first major attempt by mujahidin to seize power in Kabul after the
departure of the Soviet Army from Afghanistan. The plan, which was prepared by the Seven-Party
Union in Peshawar and the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), was to seize the Eastern
Afghan city of Jalalabad and use the site as a launch pad for a military offensive on Kabul itself.
The ultimate goal was to oust the Najibullah regime and install a mujahedin government in its
place.34
The offensive started on 6 March 1989, with mujahidin groups attacking from the East with tanks
and covered by mortar fire. The mujahidin managed to seize Samarkhel village east of Jalalabad,
and pushed on towards Jalalabad airport, only 2 miles from the town. They temporarily seized the
airport, but were forced to abandon it after a heavy counter-attack from the DRA (Democratic
Republic of Afghanistan)’s forces. In the following days, the mujahidin tried attacking again from
the North and South, but without succeeding, mainly due to heavy enemy artillery and air support.
The battle then turned into a stalemate. In April, DRA forces came on the offensive and by the end
of that month, the mujahidin had been driven back to the outskirts of Jalalabad. 5 By June, most of
the mujahidin had pulled out of the battle. Sources estimated that mujahidin lost some 3,000 dead
and injured; one of the largest single losses during the entire war.6
Why were the mujahidin defeated? Numerically, the two forces were not that different. Sources
estimated that the Kabul regime sent at least 15,000 men to Jalalabad, although some units
reportedly deserted. On the mujahidin side, the battle started out with some 5,000-7,000 men
amassed outside Jalalabad. Other sources estimated the number of mujahidin to a total of 15,000. 7
However, the DRA Army had numerous advantages, the most obvious being their firepower and
level of organization.
The mujahidin were unable to take advantage of the element of surprise. Their plans to attack
Jalalabad had been known for some time, and the DRA had had plenty of time to put up
fortifications and minefields around the city.8 While both sides reportedly had tanks (the mujahidin
having a few T-55 previously captured from the Soviets) the DRA had heavy artillery, including
SCUD missile systems operated by Soviets from Kabul, and air support. As the mujahidin had no
effective air cover, these attacks caused the majority of the mujahidin’s casualties.9
Moreover, the mujahidin’s fighting units were badly coordinated which made it impossible to carry
out coordinated attacks of any strength. While at least eight mujahidin groups were involved in the
battle, they carried out their own ambushes and skirmishes, without coordinating with the other
groups.10 One commander explained that due to the lack of coordination, “one group could be
attacking, while the group on the other side was sleeping.”11 There was reportedly a presence of ISI
officers among the mujahidin, but it was not sufficient to make the groups coordinated.12
2
Moreover, the political leadership of the mujahidin was deeply split and weakened. During the
Jalalabad battle there was a clash between Hekmatyar and Massoud forces in Tokhar province in
the north - indicating how little unity there was between the mujahidin parties. 13 It illustrates the
deep splits in the mujahidin’s political leadership. One source reported that Masoud allowed
Government supplies pass through his area during the Jalalabad battle, because he disagreed with
the ISI’s extensive support to Hekmatyar.14 Many other mujahidin commanders also did not
support the battle; predicting that it would result in disastrous losses for the mujahidin.15 As
explained by commander Abdul Haq, in May 1988: “It is dumb to attack Jalalabad ... because it is
dumb to lose ten thousand lives ... There’s no way the mujahidin can take the city now.”16
Finally the mujahidin lacked effective logistics system, especially when it came to re-supply of
ammunition. According to Yousaf, the mujahidin were only supplied with enough ammunition to
fight intensively for a week - and their supply chain was not effective enough to last a long
stalemate.17
Most sources agree that the battle at Jalalabad was essentially premature - the mujahidin were not
yet ready to fight a conventional battle. Moreover, the political level was far too fragmented to
unify around anything. In addition there was a divide between commanders inside Afghanistan and
the Seven-Party Union in Peshawar, which was only exaggerated after the Jalalabad battle.18
Consequences of the defeat at Jalalabad
“The Jehad has never recovered from Jalalabad” wrote Mohammed Yousaf, head of the ISI from
1983-1987, in his memoirs which were published in 1992.19 Indeed, the battle of Jalalabad was a
watershed in the history of the mujahidin movement. The failure of the Jalalabad battle appeared to
have brought a change of view among the mujahidin; that ”a mujahidin victory began to seem
improbable in the short run.” As a consequence, Najibullah’s ”National Reconciliation” process
was strengthened as many local mujahidin agreed to cease-fire with the government.20 This loss of
motivation to fight is also signified by the fact that mujahidin military activity dropped considerably
after the battle.21
Ismail Khan said, ”The battle of Jalalabad lost us the credit won in ten years of fighting.”
Consequently, the strategies of the mujahidin parties changed towards a coup d’état.22 There was
indeed a coup attempt - carried out by then-defence minister in the Najibullah Government, General
Shahnawaz Tanai, in cooperation with Hekmatyar, on 6 March 1990. However, the coup failed.23
Hekmatyar said after Tanai’s coup attempt that he believed a coup was the easiest way to seize
power in a country, as opposed to using military force.24
In spite of the setback after Jalalabad, some commanders, like Jalaluddin Haqqani, continued to
believe in military victory because they refused the National Reconciliation plan presented by
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Najibullah. In 1990, Haqqani initiated the forming of a National Commanders’ Shura (NCS) - a
council of senior mujahidin commanders to coordinate military efforts inside Afghanistan. It was
indicative of the deep split that the Jalalabad battle had caused between Seven-Party Union and the
commanders inside Afghanistan. The commanders wanted to act independently of the political
leaders in Peshawar, whom they saw as increasingly ineffective and corrupt.
The NCS sought to turn the tide of the mujahidin movement and motivate commanders to continue
the fight. As part of the effort, they issued propaganda claiming that the significance of the
Jalalabad battle had been exaggerated by Russia and the West, in order to create an impression that
the Afghan war could not be won militarily.25 But there is little doubt - considering other sources that the mujahidin aimed at seizing Jalalabad, and believed it would pave the way to a quick seizure
of the Afghan capital Kabul.26
The first meetings to set up the NCS took place in Paktiya 7-9 May 1990, and 22-24 June 1990. A
declaration issued after the last meeting stated, ”the purpose for the formation of this shoora [sic] is
in no way aimed at creating a gap between the leadership cadre and the jehad commanders and both
(these groups) are the real representatives of the people of Afghanistan and inseparable part of each
other.”27
A third Shura meeting took place in Shah Salim at the border with Badakhshan, 9-13 October 1990.
The third Shura was attended by some 1,000 commanders, including Ahmed Shah Masoud.28 The
October meeting ”passed resolutions against the ISI-sponsored strategy of a direct attack on Kabul
by militia units based in Pakistan. Instead it outlined a plan to capture provincial outposts of the
regime and set up regional administrations (base areas) in nine zones.” They declared that the
commanders would take care of military affairs, and jihad leaders of political affairs. However; if
the jihad leaders were unable to do so, the commanders would take care of political affairs too. 29
Initially, the NCS was boycotted by Hekmatyar and Sayyaf, and the ISI attempted to dissuade
people from attending it. However, both Hekmatyar and the ISI eventually came to support
Haqqani’s military campaign against DRA forces at Khost in 1991. The campaign led to a muchneeded victory for the mujahidin.
The battle of Khost (14 - 31 March 1991)
The battle of Khost took place in the second half of March, 1991. As opposed to the Jalalabad
battle, which dragged out for several months, the city of Khost was conquered by the mujahidin in
just two weeks. However, one should keep in mind that the geography of the two battles were
fundamentally different. Jalalabad is situated in the plains, on the main highway from Kabul to the
Khyber Pass border crossing with Pakistan. This made Jalalabad an important strategic location for
the Kabul Government. Khost, on the other hand, is situated close to the Pakistani border in the
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Southeast and isolated from the main highways in the country. “This was a town which had been
completely surrounded since the beginning of the war and was not of great strategic
significance...”30 This made it harder for reinforcements and supplies to reach the city. As long as
the Soviet Army was stationed in the country, it was ”possible to organize rescue operations in
order to resupply it and break the siege,” as happened at the end of 1987. But ”once the Red Army
was gone, Khost became off limits for Government supply coloumns,” and could only rely on air
supplies.31
The rugged terrain of Khost province gave great advantage to the mujahidin, allowing them to rely
on their well-known guerrilla tactics. The mujahidin in Khost had been fighting Soviet and Afghan
forces for more than ten years, and the mujahidin had already built a network of underground
tunnels, caves and trenches that provided crucial shelter for artillery and air strikes from Kabul.
On 14 March 1991, mujahidin started the attacks on Khost. The perimeter around the city was
attacked from at least three different sides with tanks, rockets and heavy artillery; including the
Soviet rocket system Sakr-20 (BM-21).32 One of the mujahidin tactics was to sneak up close to
enemy positions during the night and then shell them with rockets until they abandoned the
position. They also attacked directly with tank fire.33
After capturing DRA Army outposts on the perimeter, and gaining control over the airport,
mujahidin advanced towards the city itself. The goal was eventually to capture the DRA’s main
army garrisons at Takhta Beg and Matoon, which were manned by some 3,000-4,000 government
troops. It is unknown how many mujahidin participated. One source said that 1,500 mujahidin
participated on the “southwestern front” - so taking into account that there was at least two other
“fronts” (southeastern and northwestern), it is reasonable to assume that the total number of
mujahidin was on level with the number of DRA troops. Khost city fell on 31 March 1991 after the
DRA troops in the city surrendered to the mujahidin.34 The main reason for the surrender, according
to one captured Afghan general, was lack of supplies and morale among the troops.35
The lack of supplies was probably one of the key reasons why Khost fell so easily. 36 The fall of the
city was indeed due to a mass surrender of DRA troops; the mujahidin claimed to have taken more
than 2,000 Prisoners of War (POWs). As mujahidin controlled the roads, supplies could only be
flown in by air. Due to the mujahidin’s anti-aircraft capabilities37 the supplies had to be parachutedropped from high altitudes; and at least once, the supplies fell into the hands of the mujahidin, not
the DRA.38 The captured General said that his garrison had run out of supplies two days prior to the
surrender.
Another reason for the mujahidin’s success was their access to cover and concealment, which made
them less exposed to air and missile attacks. It is unclear whether the artillery and air attack
capability of the DRA at Khost matched that of the Jalalabad battle. But according to mujahidin
sources, the mujahidin were bombarded by both SCUD missiles, and targeted by airplanes, during
5
their advance towards Khost. The bombs and missiles were described as inaccurate, rarely hitting
their target. One commander exclaimed, “... they [the Scud missiles] cannot harm us in any way.
They smash to pieces on colliding with the mountains.”39
Mujahidin propaganda tends to “explain” these misses as a result of incompetence or – perhaps
equally common – divine intervention.40 A more accurate explanation is probably that the
geography of Khost, and pre-made trenches and caves, gave mujahidin good opportunities at cover
and concealment. One account admits that as mujahidin came closer to Khost city, they were in the
plains and more exposed to being hit.41
It has been claimed that bad weather made it impossible for the DRA to launch airstrikes on the
mujahidin during their campaign.42 However, this is contradicted by the eyewitness account of
Mufti Usmani, which specifies that the bad weather came only after Khost had been conquered.
While it prevented Kabul from bombing the city and destroying the heavy military equipment
which had been captured by the mujahidin, it does not seem to have prevented the DRA from
bombing during the mujahidin’s advance.43
A third reason for the mujahidin’s success at Khost - very often emphasized by the mujahidin
themselves - was their high degree of unity and cooperation on the ground. This was a factor that
had been greatly lacking in the Jalalabad battle.44
The Khost battle was initiated and organized by the National Commanders’ Shura (NCS) which had
been created in 1990. The NCS was led by Jalaluddin Haqqani, a highly respected commander and
a native to the area of Khost. The offensive had been thoroughly planned. The areas around Khost
were divided into different “fronts” and each commander was assigned a specific sector. At least
seven different commanders led the battle on the ground.45 The ISI was also said to have officers on
the ground, although this was officially denied by the mujahidin.46
The battle was coordinated by a “High Council,” led by Jalaluddin Haqqani, and with
representatives from all parties in the Seven-Party Union. Hekmatyar and Sayyaf, who had initially
boycotted the NCS, had eventually decided to join the battle. The mujahidin groups were able to
communicate and coordinate on wireless radios – allegedly supplied by the U.S.47 Mufti Usmani
confirmed in his account that the mujahidin “were in contact with each other over the wireless” and
this enabled them to attack on several fronts at the same time.48
Consequences of the victory at Khost
The victory at Khost was heavily used in mujahidin propaganda, in order to convince people that a
military solution to the conflict with Najibullah was still possible. It provided the mujahidin
movement with a golden opportunity to restore their dignity and popular support.
6
However, the real significance of the battle is disputed. The victory at Khost was a tactical victory
for the mujahidin, but it probably had little direct impact on the fall of the Najibullah regime. The
resignation of Najibullah in 1992 had other, fundamental causes. As summarized by Giustozzi,
“The fall of the President and of Afghanistan’s pro-Soviet regime in April 1992 was, as is
well known, largely a result of a combination of the mutiny of the northern militias and of a
coup by elements of the regime hostile to Najibullah. The background cause of the collapse
was … the end of the Soviet Union and the cut off of external help to Kabul in 1991.”49
Concluding remarks
The international military engagement in Afghanistan is coming to an end. The U.S. has announced
that they will transfer all security responsibility to Afghan forces by 2014. The decision has been
subject to much debate. Optimistic voices argue that Afghan security forces will be up to the task of
stabilizing the country and preventing the Taliban from coming back into power. The more
pessimistic ones fear that the withdrawal is premature, and that the country will plunge into chaos
and civil war once the international forces leave.
Negotiated settlement with the insurgents is seen as a key to successful withdrawal and post-war
stability. In recent years, the U.S. have endorsed negotiations even with the Taliban leadership, the
so-called “Quetta Shura” based in Pakistan. However, others have suggested that negotiations with
the Taliban today may neither be possible, or relevant, anymore: The insurgency is fragmented, and
the influence of the Quetta Shura has diminished over the years. 50 Negotiating with one insurgent
leader would only have a local effect, at best, but it would not stop the insurgency which is driven
by a very complex set of reasons, some of which are an inherent part of the Afghan state
administration.
The battles of Jalalabad and Khost may help to put the current situation into perspective. First and
foremost, the battles give some idea of what it takes for an insurgent movement to capture major
Afghan cities. The mujahidin who attacked Jalalabad were numerically strong (up to 15,000), had
access to some heavy weapons, and were given extensive outside support. Nevertheless, they were
unable to fight a conventional battle against the DRA’s army.
The Taliban insurgency is said to consist of several ten thousands fighters. Nevertheless, the
movement has rarely staged battles involving more than 100-200 fighters. In large cities, the
insurgents rely on using terrorist tactics involving small groups or cells. In May 2011, the Taliban
staged a ”major assault” on Kandahar city – which was unprecedented in the post-2001 conflict –
but which nevertheless included no more than sixty insurgents.51 Needless to say, there is an
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enormous difference in capability between the Taliban insurgency, and mujahidin who fought at
Jalalabad and Khost in 1989-92.
On the other hand, the DRA Army were forced after 1989 to concentrate on defending the large
cities in Afghanistan and to abandon less strategic areas. It is quite possible that the same will
happen when international forces leave Afghanistan in the near future. Radical movements may
find refuge in peripheral, inaccessible areas of the country.
Finally, one must expect that there will always be radical elements in Afghanistan who will refuse
to lay down their weapons, even if ”reconciliation” is achieved with parts of the current insurgent
movement. Therefore, one should not over-estimate the importance of negotiating with the Taliban
but rather, promote unity in Afghan Government. Internal splits in the current Afghan Government
are potentially much more dangerous than the military threat from Taliban-inspired insurgents.
1
Paper presented at the conference: COIN in Afghanistan: From Mughals to the Americans, Peace Research Institute
Oslo (PRIO), 12-13 February 2012.
2
Bruce Riedel, “Comparing the U.S. and Soviet experiences in Afghanistan,” CTC Sentinel 2, no. 5 (May 2009).
3
Barnett R. Rubin, The fragmentation of Afghanistan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002): 250.
4
Olivier Roy, Islam and resistance in Afghanistan (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. press, 1990): 211.
5
Gilles Dorronsoro, Revolution unending: Afghanistan 1979 to the present (London: Hurst, 2005): 228; Tanner, 271272.
6
Dorronsoro, Revolution unending, 228; Yousaf and Adkin, The bear trap, 231.
7
Dorronsoro, Revolution unending, 228; Yousaf and Adkin, The bear trap, 227, 230-31.
8
Yousaf and Adkin, The bear trap, 229-30; Tanner, 271.
9
Afghan Jehad 3, no.2: 16; Yousaf and Adkin, The bear trap, 228
10
F.ex. Tanner, 271-72.
11
Yousaf and Adkin, The bear trap, 228.
12
Dorronsoro, Revolution unending, 228.
13
Yousaf and Adkin, The bear trap, 231.
14
Dorronsoro, Revolution unending, 228.
15
Rubin, Fragmentation, 250.
16
Kaplan, 166.
17
Yousaf and Adkin, The bear trap, 229-31.
18
F.ex. as argumented in Roy, Islam and resistance in Afghanistan, 211-213.
19
Yousaf and Adkin, The bear trap, 220.
20
Dorronsoro, Revolution unending, 201-02.
21
Dorronsoro, Revolution unending, 185; 187, 229.
22
Dorronsoro, Revolution unending, 228-29.
23
Tanai started the rebellion because after the Jalalabad failure, the U.S. and Pakistan agreed to accept Najibullah to be
part of the interim/transition government. Mujahideen, Apr/May 1990: 15.
24
Mujahideen, Apr/May 1990.
25
Khuddam ul-Furqan, December 1989: 12-13.
26
For example, al-Qaida’s sources are clear on this. Ref. PhD.
27
Afghan Jehad 3, no.3: 30-31.
28
For more details, see Afghan Jehad 3, no.3: 19, 34-35.
29
Afghan Jehad 3, no.3: 19, 34-35.
8
30
Dorronsoro, Revolution unending, 229.
Dorronsoro, Revolution unending, 103.
32
Mujahideen, Oct/Nov 1991: 10.
33
Mufti Mohammad Rafi Usmani, Jihad in Afghanistan against Communism (Karachi: Darul-Ishaat, 1992): 303-04.
34
”How Khost was liberated? Special Afghan Jehad report,” Afghan Jehad 4, no.2: 18-20; on numbers: See also
Dorronsoro, Revolution unending, 80.
35
Usmani, Jihad in Afghanistan, find page.
36
As described, for example, in Dorronsoro, Revolution unending, 219.
37
Usmani, Jihad in Afghanistan, 316-17.
38
Usmani, Jihad in Afghanistan, find page.
39
Usmani, Jihad in Afghanistan, 301.
40
Usmani, Jihad in Afghanistan, 305-10.
41
Usmani, Jihad in Afghanistan, 300-01.
42
Find ref.
43
Usmani, Jihad in Afghanistan, 332.
44
See, for example, ”How Khost was liberated? Special Afghan Jehad report,” Afghan Jehad 4, no.2: 18-20. It says that
“the main factor which led to the liberation of Khost was the alliance and solidarity among the mujaheddin groups and
their joint command.”
45
Usmani, Jihad in Afghanistan, page?
46
Usmani, Jihad in Afghanistan, 294-95.
47
Find source.
48
For example, Usmani, Jihad in Afghanistan, 303, 315-16.
49
Giustozzi, Empires of mud, 69; see also Dorronsoro, Revolution unending, 238.
50
Sean M. Maloney, “Can we negotiate with the Taliban?” Small Wars & Insurgencies 21, no. 2 (June 2010): 404-08.
51
“Taliban hit Kandahar,” Wall Street Journal, 9 May 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703864204576310582253818422.html.
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