Article
Truth From Language and Truth
From Fit: The Impact of Linguistic
Concreteness and Level of
Construal on Subjective Truth
Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin
36(11) 1576­–1588
© 2010 by the Society for Personality
and Social Psychology, Inc
Reprints and permission:
sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0146167210386238
http://pspb.sagepub.com
Jochim Hansen1 and Michaela Wänke2
Abstract
In four experiments, the impact of concreteness of language on judgments of truth was examined. In Experiments 1 and 2, it
was found that statements of the very same content were judged as more probably true when they were written in concrete
language than when they were written in abstract language. Findings of Experiment 2 also showed that this linguistic concreteness effect on judgments of truth could most likely be attributed to greater perceived vividness of concrete compared to
abstract statements. Two further experiments demonstrated an additional fit effect: The truth advantage of concrete statements occurred especially when participants were primed with a concrete (vs. abstract) mind-set (Experiment 3) or when
the statements were presented in a spatially proximal (vs. distant) location (Experiment 4). Implications for communication
strategies are discussed.
Keywords
truth, language, concreteness, abstractness, mind-set, distance
Received October 14, 2009; revision accepted July 2, 2010
Distinguishing truth from lie, reality from illusion, fact from
fiction, and likely outcomes from unlikely ones is an important
adaptive skill in mastering one’s environment and social interactions. Not surprisingly, this topic has been addressed by
research in various areas of psychology, such as reality monitoring, memory research, lie detection, and estimating risk,
among others. One point that can be distilled from these different bodies of literature is that the concreteness of mental
representations is positively related to their estimated realness
or truth.
In the present research, we pursue two goals. First,
whereas concreteness in previous research primarily refers
to the richness of detail, the present research goes one step
further and demonstrates that manipulating concreteness
with purely linguistic cues may affect truth judgments.
Language is one of the main channels of social communication. Thus, linguistic influences on judgments of truth may
be very insightful. As a second goal, the present research
tests how the concreteness level of linguistic phrasings
interacts with conditions that otherwise affect level of mental construal. Specifically, we suggest that a match of the
linguistic concreteness and the level of construal increases
subjective truth.
Concreteness and Truth
According to the American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language, concrete means “actual” or “existing in reality,”
whereas abstract is defined as “apart from concrete existence”
(Houghton Mifflin, 2000). Indeed, several lines of research
suggest that the concreteness of a mental representation may
be related to its perceived truth. Research on reality monitoring, for instance, identified which cues people use to distinguish memories of real experiences and events from imaginations
and construed memories (for reviews, see Johnson, 2006;
Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Johnson & Raye,
1981). Among these cues are the richness of perceptual,
semantic, and contextual details and the vividness of the
memory. With more vivid details, people classify their memories as more likely real instead of imagined (Schooler, Gerhard,
1
New York University, New York, NY, USA
University of Basel, Basel, Switzerland
2
Corresponding Author:
Jochim Hansen, New York University, Department of Psychology,
6 Washington Place, New York, NY 10003
Email: [email protected]
Downloaded from psp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 16, 2016
1577
Hansen and Wänke
& Loftus, 1986). Apparently, people conclude that if information seems so real, it must be real.
Likewise, research on deception suggests not only that lies
are often shorter and less detailed than truthful answers
(DePaulo et al., 2003) but also that people seem to be aware
of this fact, as they believe that truthful answers have greater
detail than lies (e.g., Akehurst, Köhnken, Vrij, & Bull, 1996;
DePaulo, Rosenthal, Rosenkrantz, & Green, 1982; Vrij, 2008;
Vrij, Evans, Akehurst, & Mann, 2004). For example, police
officers reported that they use the amount of detail and the
description of concrete feelings in a testimony as cues to its
credibility (Akehurst et al., 1996). Similarly, vivid prosecution
arguments led to judging a defendant as more likely guilty
than dull arguments (and vice versa for defense arguments),
although the essential content of the arguments did not differ
(Reyes, Thompson, & Bower, 1980).
Research from the judgment and decision literature also
suggests that vividly described information has more impact
on judgments than merely giving raw facts (Borgida & Nisbett,
1977). Detailed scenarios (e.g., a nuclear war between the
United States and Russia triggered by the actions of a third
country such as Iraq, Libya, Israel, or Pakistan) are often
judged as more likely than less detailed scenarios (e.g., a
nuclear war between the United States and Russia; Plous,
1993). Tversky and Kahneman (1982) phrase this as follows:
“As the amount of detail in a scenario increases . . . its representativeness and hence its apparent likelihood may
increase” (p. 98).
Finally, construal level theory (Liberman & Trope, 2008;
Trope & Liberman, 2000, 2003, 2010) proposes an association
between the probability of an event and the concreteness of
its construal. Likely events are more strongly related to direct
experience and thus represented concretely and in rich detail.
Unlikely events are not often experienced—if they are experienced at all. Thus, people lack information about specific
aspects and details here, and therefore unlikely events are
represented on a more abstract level (Todorov, Goren, & Trope,
2007; Wakslak & Trope, 2009; Wakslak, Trope, Liberman,
& Alony, 2006).
Taken together, there is converging evidence that the perceived likelihood, realness, and truth of a mental representation is linked to the level of its concreteness. Yet previous
research varied the concreteness of descriptions by varying
the content, such as adding details. Descriptions may, however, also vary in linguistic concreteness in rather subtle ways.
This aspect of concreteness has not been studied in the context
of truth judgments but is obviously relevant. Thus, the first
goal of the present research is to investigate the effect of
purely linguistic cues whereby varying only the description
of the content but not the content itself. We suggest that when
a statement is expressed in a concrete language, it will be
rated as more probably true than when it is expressed in an
abstract language.
The Linguistic Concreteness Effect
Verbal descriptions differ in the level of linguistic concreteness versus abstractness, as has been proposed in the linguistic
category model (LCM; Semin & Fiedler, 1988, 1991; for
reviews see Fiedler, 2008; Semin, 2008). The LCM distinguishes among several word classes that can be located on the
concreteness–abstractness dimension. The most concrete
words are descriptive action verbs that refer to specific behaviors in specific situations and describe an objective physical
reality. There is almost no element of interpretation apparent
here (e.g., to write, to count). Interpretive action verbs are
more abstract and leave more room for interpretation, as they
describe a whole class of behaviors, but they still refer to
specific action episodes (e.g., to help, to insult). On the next
level are state verbs that describe enduring states and cannot
be observed (e.g., to hate, to love). Finally, adjectives are the
most abstract word class. They abstract from the behavior and
describe long-lasting characteristics. In addition, passive voice
is usually thought of as more abstract than active voice.
Originally, the LCM was developed within the realm of
person perception. Most of the relevant work investigates the
effects of the description of a person’s behavior in abstract
versus concrete terms on how this person is perceived by others. For example, the LCM has been used as a framework to
study stereotyping (Maass, 1999), courtroom language (Schmid
& Fiedler, 1998), and personnel selection (Rubini & Menegatti,
2008). In the present research, we applied the model to judging
the truth of trivia statements. Based on the link between concreteness and perceived realness of events and the link between
concreteness and linguistic forms, we propose that the very
same contents will be judged as more probably true when written in concrete language than when written in abstract language.
To give an example, the statement “The poet Gotthold Ephraim
Lessing wrote the play Miss Sara Samson” is more concrete
and thus will possibly be rated as more probably true than the
phrasing of the same fact as “The play Miss Sara Sampson is
by the poet Gotthold Ephraim Lessing.”
There are several possible and not mutually exclusive reasons why mere linguistic concreteness may influence perceived truth. First, concrete words are recognized faster
(Bleasdale, 1987; de Groot, 1989; Kroll & Merves, 1986),
and therefore concrete statements may be easier to process
and to understand than abstract statements. If this is the case,
perceived comprehensibility may contribute to a truth advantage of concrete statements. Indeed, it has been shown that
judgments of truth can be influenced by the fluency of cognitive processing of the information (e.g., Hansen, Dechêne, &
Wänke, 2008; Parks & Toth, 2006; Reber & Schwarz, 1999;
Unkelbach, 2007; for a review, see Dechêne, Stahl, Hansen,
& Wänke, 2010). Second, concrete statements are more
“imageable” than abstract statements (Semin & Fiedler, 1988,
1991), and imageability correlates with easier recall from
Downloaded from psp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 16, 2016
1578
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 36(11)
memory (Paivio, 1969). Indeed, it has been shown that concrete words can be easier remembered than abstract words
(ter Doest & Semin, 2005). Insofar as participants have overlearned this association between concreteness and memory,
concrete statements may cause the impression of having been
encountered before. This subjective impression of familiarity
may contribute to the truth advantage of concrete statements
(e.g., Begg, Anas, & Farinacci, 1992). Third, imageability
itself is a source of perceived realness or truth. The ease with
which one can vividly imagine or mentally simulate an event
influences how likely it seems (e.g., Carroll, 1978; Garry,
Manning, Loftus, & Sherman, 1996; Gregory, Cialdini, &
Carpenter, 1982; Koehler, 1991; Sherman, Cialdini, Schwartzman, & Reynolds, 1985), which is precisely why more detailed
descriptions seem more real (e.g., Johnson et al., 1993; Johnson
& Raye, 1981) or probable (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982).
Given that linguistic concreteness correlates with imageability
(Semin & Fiedler, 1988, 1991), we may therefore expect an
effect of concreteness on perceived truth. We tested the basic
hypothesis of increased truth ratings for linguistically more
concretely phrased statements in Experiments 1 and 2. In
addition, Experiment 2 sought to shed some light on the underlying mechanism.
Fit Between Language and
Conditions That Promote
Concrete Versus Abstract Thinking
Concrete descriptions may be easier to comprehend, to recall,
and to imagine. These aspects may increase their perceived
truth. However, the processing of statements and the construal
of mental representations are also influenced by other factors
besides the way the information is linguistically described. For
example, psychological proximity (distance) of an event
enhances the ease of mentally construing concrete (abstract)
information about the event (Herzog, Hansen, & Wänke, 2007).
Thus, processing of concrete information is facilitated in situations that promote concrete construals and is more difficult
in situations that promote abstract construals, and vice versa.
Such feelings of fit may translate into truth judgments.
Based on previous research, we propose that the manipulation of spatial distance (Fujita, Henderson, Eng, Trope, &
Liberman, 2006; Henderson, Fujita, Trope, & Liberman, 2006)
or the current mind-set (Freitas, Gollwitzer, & Trope, 2004;
Wakslak & Trope, 2009)—both factors that affect the level
of mental representations—may interact with the linguistic
concreteness of statements. Specifically, there is evidence that
people gain “value from fit” between information processed
and mind-set (Higgins, 2000; Higgins, Idson, Freitas, Spiegel,
& Molden, 2003). For example, Semin and colleagues (Semin,
Higgins, Gil de Montes, Estourget, & Valencia, 2005) demonstrated that persuasive messages that were written in an abstract
or concrete language affect behavioral intentions more strongly
when the concreteness level of the message matched participants’ motivational focus, which is related to level of construal
(Förster & Higgins, 2005). Analogously, Experiments 3
and 4 tested whether a match between linguistic concreteness
and level of mental construal promotes perceived truth.
Experiment 1
In the initial experiment, we first tested the linguistic concreteness effect. Participants were asked to rate the truth of
52 statements, each phrased abstractly and concretely. To
repeat, we hypothesized that the concrete versions would be
judged as more probably true than the abstract versions while
the content is held constant.
Method
Participants and design. In exchange for course credit,
46 undergraduate psychology students (34 female, 11 male,
1 unspecified) took part in this study. They were randomly
assigned to a 2 (concreteness of statements: concrete vs.
abstract) × 2 (actual truth: true vs. false) × 2 (control factor:
Set A vs. Set B) mixed design with the first two factors varied
within participants and the last factor varied between participants. Age ranged between 20 and 42 years (M = 22.6, SD =
4.38). Gender was counterbalance in this and all subsequent
experiments. As the dependent measure we collected the subjective truth of the statements.
Materials. We used 52 statements from a wide variety of
topics (science, the arts, history, geography, politics, general
knowledge). Half of the statements were actually true, half
actually false. All statements had been pretested to ensure that
they were relatively ambiguous with regard to their subjective
truth. From each of these statements, we created a concrete
and an abstract version, according to the LCM (Semin &
Fiedler, 1988, 1991). Table 1 provides some examples of the
statements. For instance, in the first example, “writing” is
much more concrete (i.e., a descriptive action verb) than the
characteristic “is by,” which could be regarded as a state or a
stable characteristic. We took great care that the content of
the two phrasings was equal for each statement, that they were
equally common in the language in which the study was conducted, and that they had about the same length (t < 1). To
verify that the two versions indeed differed in level of concreteness, four raters coded the statements according to the
LCM (1 = most concrete to 4 = most abstract word class). To
do so, the 52 abstract and 52 concrete phrasings were divided
into two sets, A and B, of 26 concrete and 26 abstract phrasings each. Each content statement appeared only once in each
set, in its either abstract or concrete form. Each set was coded
by two raters. The two ratings correlated highly, r = .75, p <
.001 (N = 52) for Set A, and r = .91, p < .001 (N = 52) for Set
Downloaded from psp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 16, 2016
1579
Hansen and Wänke
Table 1. Examples of the Trivia Statements in Their Abstract and Concrete Phrasings
Example
1
2
3
4
Concrete version
Abstract version
The poet C. Dickens wrote the play Miss Sara Sampson.
In Hamburg, one can count the highest number of bridges
in Europe.
The Naab flows into the Danube.
The treaty of peace, which brought the German–French
war to an end, was signed in Frankfurt.
The play Miss Sara Sampson is by the poet C. Dickens.
Hamburg is the European record holder concerning the
number of bridges.
The Naab is a confluent of the Danube.
The treaty of peace, which brought the German–French
war to an end, was concluded in Frankfurt.
The examples are translations into English. All statements are actually true except the first: The author of Miss Sara Sampson is Gotthold Ephraim Lessing.
B, and were combined into an index that represented the level
of concreteness for the concrete and abstract versions of each
statement. A comparison between the abstract and concrete
versions revealed that the abstract versions were coded as
more abstract (M = 3.25, SD = 0.78) than the concrete versions
(M = 2.12, SD = 0.83), F(1, 51) = 53.579, p < .001, h2 =
.51, as intended. This difference did not interact with the set
or with actual truth, Fs < 1.
Procedure. The study was run as a questionnaire study in
an introductory psychology class. The participants were provided with one of two versions of a questionnaire (Set A or
Set B) that contained 26 abstract and 26 concrete statements
in one fixed random order. Those statements that were presented in their abstract form in one set were presented in their
concrete form in the other, and vice versa. This procedure allowed
us to control for the content of the statements because all
content statements were presented in a concrete and an
abstract version across participants. Half of the statements
in the questionnaires were actually true and half were actually false. The participants were asked to judge the truth of
each statement on a scale ranging from 1 (definitively false)
to 6 (definitively true). Afterward, some demographical data
were collected, and the participants were thanked, debriefed,
and given credit.
Results and Discussion
Participant-based analysis. The truth ratings were analyzed
with a 2 (concreteness of statements: concrete vs. abstract) ×
2 (actual truth: true vs. false) × 2 (set: A vs. B) analysis of
variance (ANOVA) with the first two factors being withinparticipant factors. This analysis revealed a main effect of
concreteness. Statements were judged as more probably true
when they were written in concrete language (M = 3.58,
SD = 0.45) than when they were written in abstract language
(M = 3.45, SD = 0.40), F(1, 44) = 10.261, p = .003, h2part =
.19. This main effect was independent of the set and of actual
truth, Fs < 1; nor did we find a three-way interaction, F(1, 44) =
1.284, p > .26. The main effect of actual truth was not significant, F < 1.
Item-based analysis. Each statement was presented in its
concrete and in its abstract version. Therefore, we were able
to conduct an additional analysis with aggregating across participants and using the 52 statements as subjects of the analysis.
Truth ratings were analyzed with a within-item single-factor
ANOVA (concreteness of statements: concrete vs. abstract).
In line with the participant-based analysis, this item-based
analysis revealed that the same content was judged as more
probably true when it was presented in a concrete version
(M = 3.58, SD = 0.39) compared to an abstract version (M =
3.45, SD = 0.33), F(1, 51) = 3.158, p = .041, h2part = .058
(one-tailed).
Given that the concreteness coding represents a continuous variable (see the Materials section), we were also able
to conduct a more refined analysis. For each item, the difference between the concreteness ratings of the concrete and
the concreteness ratings of the abstract version was calculated. This score indicates to what extent the concrete version
was judged to be more concrete than the abstract version.
This difference in concreteness correlated significantly with
the respective difference in the truth judgments, r(N = 52) =
.29, p = .038, corroborating that the more concrete the concrete version was compared to its abstract counterpart, the
higher the truth advantage of the concrete version compared
to the abstract one. This finding provides further support for
our hypothesis that the concreteness of language is associated
with judgments of truth.
Experiment 2
The purpose of Experiment 2 was to explore possible explanations for the linguistic concreteness effect. As explained above,
(a) concrete statements may possibly evoke feelings of familiarity that may be attributed to truth, (b) concrete statements
may be easier to comprehend, and this perceived comprehensibility might enhance truth ratings, and (c) concrete descriptions may be imagined more vividly. These stronger feelings
of vividness may translate into increased truth ratings for concrete statements. We assessed whether these three variables
(i.e., familiarity, comprehensibility, and vividness) are affected
by the linguistic concreteness of our test phrases and to what
extent they are responsible for the effect of linguistic concreteness on subjective truth. We do not claim that these accounts
are mutually exclusive or exhaustive.
Downloaded from psp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 16, 2016
1580
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 36(11)
Method
Next, we conducted separate analyses with the three possible mediators as dependent variables instead of the truth
ratings. These analyses revealed that, first, subjective familiarity was not affected by any of the manipulated variables, all
Fs < 1 (overall M = 2.35, SD = 0.78, n = 38). Second, linguistic
concreteness did not affect ratings of comprehensibility, F < 1.
Interestingly, actual truth had a marginal effect on the comprehensibility ratings. False statements were judged as slightly
more comprehensible (M = 5.13, SD = 0.57) than true statements (M = 5.05, SD = 0.59), F(1, 32) = 3.399, p = .074,
h2part = .096; all other Fs < 1. Third, and most importantly,
linguistic concreteness had an effect on perceived vividness.
Concrete statements were rated as more vivid (M = 3.76,
SD = 0.56) than abstract statements (M = 3.51, SD = 0.73),
F(1, 31) = 9.658, p = .004, h2part = .238. No other effect was
significant in this analysis, ps > .15. Although we found no
effects of concreteness on comprehensibility and familiarity,
we cannot rule out that more refined measures may reveal
possible effects. Nevertheless, so far the findings suggest that
vividness may be the most promising mediator in the concreteness effect. In the item-based analysis below, we therefore
concentrated on vividness as mediator.
Item-based analysis. As in Experiment 1, we compared the
truth ratings of the concrete versions to the truth ratings of the
abstract versions, aggregating across participants and using
the 52 statements as subjects of the analysis. Replicating the
findings of Experiment 1, the statements were judged more
probably true when they were presented in the concrete version (M = 3.677, SD = 0.54) than when they were presented
in the abstract version (M = 3.501, SD = 0.36), F(1, 50) =
4.400, p = .04, h2part = .081. This effect was independent of
actual truth, F < 1. A comparable finding emerged when using
the vividness ratings as dependent variable. The concrete versions of the statements were judged as more vivid (M = 3.76,
SD = 0.61) than the abstract version of the statements (M =
3.51, SD = 0.53), F(1, 50) = 4.837, p = .033, h2part = .088.
Again, the effect was independent of actual truth, F < 1.
To test whether perceived vividness mediates the effect of
manipulated concreteness on truth judgments, we calculated
the difference between the average truth rating of the concrete
version and the average truth rating of the abstract version for
each statement, as in Experiment 1. This score indicates to
what extent the concrete version was judged to be more probably true than the abstract version. In addition, we calculated
the difference between the vividness ratings of the concrete
and the vividness ratings of the abstract version. This score
indicates to what extent the concrete version was judged to
be more vivid than the abstract version. To test the mediation
(cf. Baron & Kenny, 1986), we regressed these scores on the
difference in the prerated concreteness between the concrete
and the abstract versions of the statements (see the Materials
section of Experiment 1). Consistent with the analysis reported
above, we found that differences in concreteness predicted
differences in subjective truth, b = .301, R2 = .091, p = .03.
Participants and design. In exchange for course credit and an
additional option to three times win $100, 103 undergraduate
psychology students (81 female, 22 male) took part in this study.
They were randomly assigned to a 2 (concreteness of statements:
concrete vs. abstract) × 2 (actual truth: true vs. false) × 2 (control
factor: Set A vs. Set B) × 3 (mediator: familiarity vs. comprehensibility vs. vividness) mixed design with the first two factors
varied within participants and the last two factors varied between
participants. Age ranged between 19 and 38 years (M = 22.25,
SD = 3.6). For each statement, we collected ratings of one of
the three possible mediator variables and ratings of the subjective truth as the dependent variables.
Materials and procedure. Participants were provided with
the same materials as in Experiment 1. Participants were asked
to judge the truth of 26 concrete and 26 abstract statements
on a scale ranging from 1 (definitively false) to 6 (definitively
true). In addition, prior to each truth rating, participants were
asked to rate each statement on one of the following three
dimensions. One group of participants was asked to rate to
what degree the statements seem familiar to them on a scale
from 1 (definitely never heard before) to 6 (definitely heard
before). A second group was asked how easily the statements
could be understood on a scale for 1 (not comprehensible at
all) to 6 (very comprehensible). A third group was asked to
judge the vividness of the statements on a scale from 1 (not
vivid at all) to 6 (very vivid). At the end, some demographical
data were collected and the participants were thanked,
debriefed, and given credit.
Results and Discussion
Participant-based analysis. The truth ratings were analyzed
with a 2 (concreteness of statements: concrete vs. abstract) ×
2 (actual truth: true vs. false) × 3 (tested mediator: familiarity
vs. comprehensibility vs. vividness) ANOVA with the first
two factors varied within participants. This analysis revealed
a main effect of concreteness. Replicating Experiment 1, statements were judged as more probably true when they were
written in concrete language (M = 3.61, SD = 0.49) than when
they were written in abstract language (M = 3.51, SD = 0.42),
F(1, 100) = 8.762, p = .004, h2part = .081. This main effect was
independent of actual truth, and it did not depend on which
additional variable was assessed (i.e., which mediator was
tested), Fs < 1. The only further effect that emerged was a
main effect of the tested mediator, F(2, 100) = 7.319, p = .001,
h2part = .128. Participants who were first asked to judge their
familiarity with the statements rated them as less probably
true (M = 3.36, SD = 0.41) than participants who first rated
comprehensibility (M = 3.73, SD = 0.45), t(69) = 3.673, p <
.001, or vividness (M = 3.58, SD = 0.38), t(68) = 2.345, p =
.023. Apparently, when attention was concentrated on lack of
familiarity, truth ratings were attenuated. All other Fs < 1.
Downloaded from psp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 16, 2016
1581
Hansen and Wänke
Differences in concreteness predicted differences in perceived
vividness as well, b = .353, R2 = .124, p = .01. When simultaneously entering concreteness and vividness differences into
a regression analysis to predict differences in truth judgments,
the overall regression was significant (R2 = .164), F(2, 49) =
4.821, p = .012, and differences in vividness significantly
predicted differences in truth ratings as expected, b = .29,
p = .043. Furthermore, the direct relationship between differences in concreteness and differences in truth was no longer
significant, b = .199, p = .16 (Sobel’s z = 1.91, p = .056). This
finding suggests that the linguistic concreteness effect on subjective truth may relate to differences in perceived vividness
of the concrete versus the abstract phrasings.
Experiment 3
In Experiment 3, we tested whether a fit between linguistic
concreteness and a person’s level of mental construal affects
truth ratings in addition to the truth advantage of concretely
phrased statements. Therefore, we primed a concrete versus
an abstract mind-set before participants judged the truth of
concrete and abstract statements. We thereby created conditions of match versus mismatch between linguistic style and
level of mental construal. As explained above, previous work
has shown that people gain “value from fit” between task
demands and mind-set (Förster & Higgins, 2005; Higgins,
2000; Higgins et al., 2003; Semin et al., 2005). Based on this
work, we expected that when participants read statements
written in a language that matches their current mind-set, they
may “feel right” about the harmonious processing of the statements and consequently would judge them as more probably
true compared to a situation in which the concreteness level
is at odds with their current mind-set.
Method
Participants and design. In exchange for course credit,
102 undergraduate students (82 female, 20 male) took part in
this study. They were randomly assigned to a 2 (concreteness
of statements: concrete vs. abstract) × 2 (actual truth: true
vs. false) × 2 (set: A vs. B) × 3 (mind-set: concrete vs. control
vs. abstract) mixed design with the first two factors varied within
participants and the last two factors varied between participants.
Age ranged between 19 and 41 years (M = 21.9, SD = 3.69).
As the dependent measure we collected the subjective truth of
the 52 statements (1 = definitively false to 6 = definitively true).
Materials and procedure. The study was run as a questionnaire study in an introductory psychology class. First, participants completed a mind-set priming manipulation, developed
by Freitas et al. (2004). Participants in the abstract mind-set
condition were asked to consider in four successive steps why
they would engage in an activity. They were presented with
a diagram of vertically aligned boxes that began at the bottom
of the page and were connected by upward arrows labeled
Why? (see Freitas et al., 2004). The box at the very bottom of
the diagram was filled in with the statement, “Maintain good
physical health.” Participants were instructed to insert a
response in the box immediately above the bottom box,
answering the question of why they would maintain good
physical health. After inserting their first answer, they were
to insert a second response in the box immediately above the
box they had just completed answering the question why they
would engage in their initial response. For example, a participant might have answered the question, “Why do I maintain
good physical health?” by writing, “To be strong.” The diagram would then prompt him or her to ask himself or herself,
“Why do I want to do be strong?” On completing that answer,
participants were then prompted again by the diagram to ask
themselves why they might engage in their response. Participants provided four responses in this manner.
In contrast, participants assigned to the concrete mind-set
condition were directed to consider in four successive steps
how they would engage in the same activity. As with the
abstract mind-set condition, participants were presented with
a diagram of vertically aligned boxes. These boxes, however,
began at the top of the page and were connected by downward
arrows labeled How? The box at the top of the diagram was
filled in with the statement, “Maintain good physical health.”
Participants were instructed to insert a response in the box
immediately below the top box, answering the question of
how they would maintain good physical health. After providing their first answer, the diagram prompted participants to
insert a second response in the box immediately below, asking
themselves how they would engage in their initial response.
For example, participants might have responded to the question, “How do I maintain good physical health?” by writing,
“Go exercise.” The diagram would then prompt them to ask,
“How does one go exercise?” On completing a second
response, the diagram would then prompt them again to ask
how they would engage in their second response. As with the
abstract mind-set manipulation, participants provided four
responses.
Previous research has demonstrated that considering questions of why is effective in priming an abstract mind-set,
whereas considering questions of how is effective in priming
a concrete mind-set (Freitas et al., 2004; Wakslak & Trope,
2009). An additional control group was not primed.
Next, the participants were asked to judge the truth of
26 concrete and 26 abstract statements, as in Experiment 1.
They were provided with one of the two versions of the questionnaire that was used in Experiment 1 (i.e., Set A or Set B)
and that contained 26 abstract and 26 concrete statements in
one fixed random order (half actually true, half actually false).
The participants were asked to judge the truth of each statement on a scale ranging from 1 (definitively false) to 6 (definitively true). At the end, some demographical data were
collected and the participants were thanked, debriefed, and
given credit.
Downloaded from psp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 16, 2016
1582
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 36(11)
Results and Discussion
Participant-based analysis. The truth ratings were analyzed
with a 2 (concreteness of statements: concrete vs. abstract) ×
2 (actual truth: true vs. false) × 2 (set: A vs. B) × 3 (mind-set:
concrete vs. control vs. abstract) ANOVA with the first two
factors being within-participant factors. Again, the concreteness effect was replicated. Overall, concrete statements were
judged as more probably true (M = 3.63, SD = 0.35) than
abstract statements (M = 3.55, SD = 0.33), F(1, 96) = 5.642,
p = .02, h2part = .056.
In addition to the main effect of linguistic concreteness,
we also found the predicted interaction between concreteness
and mind-set priming, F(2, 96) = 4.544, p = .013, h2part = .086.
Figure 1 depicts the condition means. This interaction was
independent of actual truth and of stimulus set, ps > .20. The
main effects of truth, p > .22, and the main effect of mind-set,
p > .51, were not significant.
To examine this 3 × 2 interaction more closely, we corrected
the means that define the interaction for the main effects of
the conditions, as suggested by Rosnow and Rosenthal (1989,
1995, 1996). These residual means for the interaction confirmed the predicted pattern of a fit effect. Truth ratings were
positively affected when participants rated concrete statements
in a concrete mind-set (residual M = +0.06, SD = 0.33) or
abstract statements in an abstract mind-set (residual M = +0.06,
SD = 0.30). In contrast, truth ratings were negatively affected
when participants rated concrete statements in an abstract
mind-set (residual M = –0.06, SD = 0.37) or abstract statements
in a concrete mind-set (residual M = –0.06, SD = 0.36).
The control group ranged in between and showed no fit
effect, as could be expected because no mind-set was primed
here (residual Mconcrete statement = 0.00, SD = 0.34; residual
Mabstract statement = 0.00, SD = 0.30).
Item-based analysis. As in Experiments 1 and 2, we analyzed
the truth ratings aggregating across participants and using the
52 statements as subjects of the analysis. Truth ratings were
analyzed with a 3 (mind-set: concrete vs. control vs. abstract) ×
2 (concreteness of statements: concrete vs. abstract) ANOVA
with all factors varied within items. Replicating the findings
of Experiment 1, over all conditions the statements were
judged more probably true when they were presented in the
concrete version than when they were presented in the abstract
version, F(1, 51) = 2.773, p = .05, h2part = .052 (one-tailed).
More importantly, as expected we found a significant interaction, replicating the fit effect in this analysis, F(2, 102) =
3.295, p = .041, h2part = .061. A match of the linguistic phrasing and the participants’ mind-set had a positive effect on
perceived truth whereas a mismatch had a negative effect.
As in Experiments 1 and 2, we correlated the difference in
concreteness between the concrete and the abstract versions
of the statements with the difference in the truth judgments
of the concrete and the abstract versions. We found a significant positive correlation in the concrete mind-set condition,
Figure 1. Subjective truth as a function of the primed mind-set
and the concreteness of the presented statements in Experiment 3
(± 1 SE)
The mean truth score ranged from 1 to 6; higher values indicate more
subjective probability of truth.
r(N = 52) = .46, p = .001, indicating that in this condition concreteness was used as a basis for the truth judgments. The correlation was smaller in the control group, r(N = 52) = .17, p =
.23, and in the abstract mind-set group, r(N = 52) = .14, p = .32.
The findings provide support for the hypothesis that the
current mind-set interacts with linguistic concreteness. This
fit effect operated on top of the linguistic concreteness effect.
A concrete mind-set augmented the concreteness effect,
whereas an abstract mind-set promoted truth ratings for
abstract statements. Although previous research showed the
value-from-fit effect with different tasks, this finding is the
first evidence for truth from fit.
Experiment 4
So far, the findings have demonstrated that concretely phrased
statements are more likely to be judged as true than abstractly
phrased statements. In addition, a fit between language and
activated mind-set seems to have a value of its own—a feeling right (Higgins, 2000)—and in the context of truth judgments it generates a feeling of truth. To corroborate this
finding, a further context variable that affects level of mental
representations was investigated in Experiment 4. Especially,
we manipulated the spatial distance in which the statements
were presented. Several studies demonstrate that spatial distance is related to level of construal (Fujita, et al., 2006;
Henderson et al., 2006). In one study, for example, participants watched a video of two students interacting (Fujita
et al., 2006). When participants believed that the interaction
was spatially far away, they described it in a more abstract
way than when they believed that the interaction took place
at a spatially proximal location. Given the relationship
between spatial proximity (distance) and concreteness
Downloaded from psp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 16, 2016
1583
Hansen and Wänke
(abstractness) of representation, we proposed that spatial
distance has a similar function to a directly manipulated concrete versus abstract mind-set.
We hypothesized that a presentation of the statements in a
spatially proximal location would lead to a truth advantage of
concrete statements, whereas a presentation at a distant location would bring a truth advantage to abstract statements on
top of the overall concreteness effect. To test this idea, we
borrowed a design from Bar-Anan and colleagues (Bar-Anan,
Liberman, Trope, & Algom, 2007). In their study, pictures
that conveyed a spatial distance were shown to the participants.
On each picture a word stimulus was presented in a broad
green arrow that pointed to either a spatially near or a spatially
distant location on the picture. In our fourth experiment, we
presented abstract and concrete statements in a near and a
distant location.
Method
Participants and design. In exchange for a coffee voucher,
course credit, or $5, 41 students of various majors (22 female,
18 male, 1 did not report gender) took part in this study. They
were assigned to a 2 (concreteness of statements: concrete vs.
abstract) × 2 (actual truth: true vs. false) × 2 (spatial distance:
near vs. far) within-participant design. Age ranged between
19 and 57 years (M = 24.32, SD = 6.16). As the dependent
measure we collected the subjective truth of the statements
(1 = definitively false to 6 = definitively true).
Materials. The experiment was programmed with E-Prime®
software (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002). Sixteen
different pictures from standard computer screensavers and
wallpapers found on the Internet were used to manipulate
perceptual depth. All pictures showed a landscape in which a
street, an alley, a bridge, or a trail led away from the perceiver
into the distance. As in Bar-Anan et al. (2007), broad green
vertical arrows were integrated in these scenes that pointed
to a spot either in the foreground (near spatial distance) or in
the background (far spatial distance; see Figure 2 for an example). The statements were printed in the arrows. Because of
this form of presentation, we had to select statements that were
short enough to fit the arrows. From the statements of the
previous studies we selected 32 items (16 true and 16 false).
According to the pilot test (see the Materials section of Experiment 1), the level of abstractness differed between the concrete
(M = 1.81, SD = 0.71) and the abstract (M = 3.62, SD = 0.54)
versions of these 32 statements, F(1, 30) = 169.258, p < .001,
h2part = .85.
One false and one true item were randomly assigned to
each of the 16 pictures, with the restriction that the content of
the pictures was unrelated to the content of the statements.
From each of the 32 picture–item combinations, four versions
were designed: (a) a version in which the item was phrased
abstractly and appeared in the near distance (i.e., no fit),
(b) a version in which the item was phrased concretely and
Figure 2. Example of the picture stimuli used in Experiment 4
appeared in the near distance (i.e., fit), (c) a version in which
the item was phrased abstractly and appeared in the far distance
(i.e., fit), and (d) a version in which the item was phrased
concretely and appeared in the far distance (i.e., no fit).
For each of these four combinations each participant saw
4 true and 4 false items, resulting in 32 picture–item combinations being viewed. Each of the 16 pictures was shown once
during the first 16 presentations and once during the second
16 presentations (but each time with a different item). Thus,
8 false and 8 true statements were presented in the first half
of the presentation and 8 false and 8 true statements were
presented in the second half. The assignment of true and false
statements to the pictures resulted in one fixed order of
statements for all participants. In addition, we counterbalanced
Downloaded from psp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 16, 2016
1584
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 36(11)
the order of the combinations of spatial distance and concreteness in the series using eight different Latin squares, so that
overall each distance–concreteness combination preceded and
followed each other distance–concreteness combination
equally often across participants and appeared equally often
at each position in the presentation.
Procedure. After signing consent, the participants were seated
in front of a computer and asked to read the instructions on the
screen. Before the start of the main task of the experiment,
the 16 different pictures (without statements) were shown to
the participants in a fixed order for 2 s each. This was done to
familiarize the participants with the picture material so that
they could concentrate on the statements in the following
main task. For the main task, participants were presented with
32 picture–item combinations (see the Materials section).
They rated the truth of each statement on a scale ranging from
1 (definitively false) to 6 (definitively true) by pressing the
respective number on the computer keyboard. The pictures
with the statements were presented until the participant pressed
a key. The next trial followed after a blank screen of 500 ms.
Afterward, some demographical data were collected and the
participants were thanked, debriefed, and paid.
Results and Discussion
Participant-based analysis. The truth ratings were analyzed
with a 2 (concreteness of statements: concrete vs. abstract) ×
2 (spatial distance: near vs. far) × 2 (actual truth: true vs. false)
ANOVA with all factors realized within participants. Different
from the first three studies, true statements were judged as more
probably true (M = 3.61, SD = 0.45) than false statements
(M = 3.38, SD = 0.53), F(1, 40) = 5.546, p = .024, h2part = .122,
indicating that, on average, the participants of this study were
more knowledgeable than the participants of the previous experiments. Perhaps this was because the sample consisted of students
of various majors, which increases the probability that some
participants recognized whether a statement was actually true
or false. Despite this effect of the actual item content, the
phrasing of the item also played a role, as concrete statements
were judged as more probably true than abstract statements,
(Mconcrete statements = 3.57, SD = 0.47, and Mabstract statements = 3.41,
SD = 0.44), F(1, 40) = 4.375, p = .043, h2part = .099, replicating
the concreteness advantage of the first three experiments. Distance per se had no effect on the truth ratings, F < 1.
Importantly, in addition to the main effect of linguistic
concreteness, spatial distance interacted with concreteness,
F(1, 40) = 5.222, p = .028, h2part = .115 (see Figure 3 for the
condition means). This interaction was independent of the
actual truth, F < 1. To examine the interaction more closely,
we corrected the means that define the interaction for the main
effects of the conditions, as suggested by Rosnow and Rosenthal
(1989, 1995, 1996). These residual means for the interaction
confirmed the predicted pattern. Truth ratings were positively
affected when concrete statements had been presented spatially
Figure 3. Subjective truth as a function of the spatial distance
and the concreteness of the presented statements in Experiment 4
(± 1 SE)
The mean truth score ranged from 1 to 6; higher values indicate more
subjective probability of truth.
near (residual M = +0.09, SD = 0.25) or abstract statements
had been presented at a distant location (residual M = +0.09,
SD = 0.25). In contrast, truth ratings were negatively affected
when participants rated concrete distant statements (residual
M = –0.09, SD = 0.25) or abstract near statements (residual
M = –0.09, SD = 0.25).
The only other effect that emerged was a significant interaction between actual truth and the concreteness of the statements, F(1, 40) = 7.753, p = .008, h2part = .162, indicating that
the concreteness effect emerged especially for the actually
false statements. False concrete statements were judged as
more probably true (M = 3.55, SD = 0.62) than false abstract
statements (M = 3.195, SD = 0.64), F(1, 40) = 11.996, p =
.001, h2part = .231. True concrete statements did not differ
(M = 3.59, SD = 0.61) from true abstract statements (M = 3.62,
SD = 0.51), F < 1. Although not predicted, this finding emphasizes that linguistic cues especially play a role in perceptions
of truth when the respective knowledge of content is lacking.
In Experiments 1–3, we did not find this interaction with actual
truth because participants were apparently less knowledgeable
with regard to the statements. Further research may investigate
the role of knowledge in the linguistic concreteness effect.
Item-based analysis. When the data were examined using
items as subject of analysis, the main effect of actual truth
was replicated, F(1, 30) = 6.282, p = .018, h2part = .173. In
addition, the predicted interaction between distance and concreteness was marginally significant, F(1, 30) = 3.979, p =
.055, h2part = .117, as was the interaction between actual truth
and concreteness, F(1, 30) = 2.889, p = .100, h2part = .088 (all
other ps > .12).
In sum, concrete statements were judged as more probably
true than abstract statements. In addition to the linguistic concreteness effect, a fit effect was found: Although abstract
Downloaded from psp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 16, 2016
1585
Hansen and Wänke
statements profited from being presented in the distance, concrete statements profited from being presented in proximity.
These findings replicate the results of Experiment 3 regarding
the fit between level of mental construal and language with a
different manipulation.
General Discussion
Four experiments found that subtle linguistic properties alone
were sufficient to affect truth judgments. Given the very same
content, concrete statements were judged as more probably
true than abstract statements. This finding extends previous
research that suggests that richness in detail affects reliability
judgments (e.g., Akehurst et al., 1996; Johnson, 2006). In our
studies, no details were added and the statements varied merely
in their linguistic properties (Semin & Fiedler, 1988, 1991).
Apparently, minor variations in language were sufficient to
affect the perceived truth of the statements. The findings of
Experiment 2 suggest that perceived vividness may contribute
to this effect: Linguistic concreteness makes the described
situations more imaginable. Increased imaginability, in turn,
causes people to believe the statements with greater likelihood.
The findings obviously have a wide range of applications, as
we discuss below.
In addition to the linguistic concreteness effect, the findings
of Experiments 3 and 4 suggest that a match (compared to a
mismatch) between linguistic concreteness and the level of
mental construal promotes perceived truth as well. Factors
that change the likelihood of abstract versus concrete representations interacted with linguistic concreteness in predicting
subjective truth. One of these factors is the participants’ current mind-set (Freitas et al., 2004); another is spatial distance
(Fujita et al., 2006; Henderson et al., 2006). When participants
were in a concrete state of mind or when the statements were
presented in proximity, concrete statements were judged as
more probably true than abstract statements. In contrast, priming an abstract mind-set or presenting the statements in the
distance hampered the concreteness advantage. Here, abstract
statements benefitted from a match with the current level of
mental construal. Thus, neither concrete nor abstract phrasing
was rated as more probably true when one considers both the
fit of abstract mind-set and abstract language and the main
effect of concreteness on subjective truth.
How can the fit effect be explained? We suggest that a fit
between concreteness and level of mental construal may have
facilitated processing of the statements. Processing of concrete
information should be easier in situations that promote concrete construals and should be more difficult in situations that
promote abstract construals and vice versa. As processing
fluency can influence truth ratings (e.g., Hansen et al., 2008;
Parks & Toth, 2006; Reber & Schwarz, 1999; Unkelbach,
2007), subjectively experienced ease could have caused higher
truth ratings when mind-set or distance matched the level of
concreteness of a statement. Although we have no direct data
yet that confirm this speculation, one can imagine that a fit
between language and mind-set may have been interpreted
as an indicator of the statement’s validity in Experiments 3
and 4. Such an interpretation is in line with other findings
that a match between processing style and contextual cues
creates a metacognitive feeling, which itself affects the outcome of the processing (Förster & Higgins, 2005; Higgins,
2000; Higgins et al., 2003; Semin et al., 2005). For practical
purposes it should be noted, however, that the fit effect was
about the same size as the main effect of linguistic concreteness. In our studies, the factors that favored abstract mental
construal compensated for the disadvantage of abstract language but did not supersede it.
The finding that psychological distance attenuated the
effect of a concrete representation of truth judgments may
explain findings of previous research. For instance, in the
context of lie detection, it was found that information with
many details was believed to be true with a higher probability
than less detailed information, but only if participants were
not suspicious of the communicator (Johnson, Bush, &
Mitchell, 1998). To the degree that suspicion can be regarded
as psychological distance, a fit between distance and concreteness may have contributed to this finding. Nonsuspicious participants believed the concrete information with a
greater likelihood, but suspicious participants believed the
abstract (less detailed) information with a greater
likelihood.
At least one possible limitation of the present findings that
should be noted is that the mean differences in the present
studies are rather small. One may wonder if such small effects
might have any impact in the real world. However, we would
like to point out that, first, despite their sizes, the effects are
still reliable. When calculating Cohen’s d for the concreteness
effect in the four studies, we find small to medium effect sizes
of d = .48, d = .30, d = .25, and d = .33, respectively. These
effects are in the region of the mean sizes of the classical
repetition truth effect, which range around d = .39 (see the
meta-analysis by Dechêne et al., 2010). Second, although the
effects are small, it is still remarkable that such a slight manipulation as the subtle linguistic variation can account for any
variance in subjective truth at all. Given that the statements
in our studies did not differ in content but only in language,
the present findings are quite amazing. Third, even small
effects may nevertheless have an enormous impact in a practical context. For instance, in marketing, convincing even a few
thousand consumers (out of millions) that product descriptions
are true may be enough to keep a company in business, and
in politics, a single vote for the candidate whose statements
are believed more may decide an election.
Implications
The findings of the present research have implications not
only in advertising and politics but also in several realms. In
Downloaded from psp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 16, 2016
1586
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 36(11)
daily interactions, for instance, concrete communications may
be more believable than abstract ones. This idea corresponds
nicely to findings of research on deception detection, which
demonstrates that people believe truthful communications to
be more detailed than lies (e.g., Akehurst et al., 1996; DePaulo
et al., 1982; Vrij, 2008; Vrij et al., 2004). However, although
the amount of detail is related to level of concreteness, the
present research suggests that the level of concreteness is
sufficient to affect truth judgment independent of richness of
detail. Even if a concrete statement has the same amount of
detail as an abstract statement of the same content, people
may nevertheless judge it to be more probably true than the
abstract statement because they construe the communicated
situation more in terms of its low-level, detailed, and contextualized features in the concrete case than in the abstract case.
Thus, it may be a good strategy to communicate concretely
when others have to be persuaded.
Indirect evidence for such a communication strategy can
be found in research on the linguistic expectancy bias. Here, it
has been shown that people express expected information in
more abstract and less detailed language than unexpected
information (Wigboldus, Semin, & Spears, 2000). It is just
the unexpected information that runs the risk of not being
believed by the receiver of the communication. Thus, people
may intuitively express the information more concretely to
increase the chance that the receiver accepts the information
as true. Similarly, when the validity of a statement is challenged by the communication partner, people tend to rephrase
it in more concrete terms (Fiedler, Semin, & Bolten, 1989).
Other research shows that people use linguistic categories
strategically to follow explicit communication goals (e.g.,
being fair vs. unfair to a target, or enhancing vs. diminishing
valence of a target; Douglas & Sutton, 1993). In combination
with the present results, a strategic use of linguistic categories
in previous research may reflect an attempt to increase recipients’ acceptance of a message. Presumed believability may
be a key variable in the strategic use of concrete versus abstract
language in persuasion and communication.
This analysis is especially important in applied contexts
such as in eyewitness testimonies, therapists’ listening to
clients, or framing of news in the media. In all these areas,
concretely phrased statements may be more readily believed
than abstractly phrased statements. For instance, a witness
or defendant in a law trial can increase his or her credibility
by using very concrete language. The differentiation between
concrete and abstract language is particularly crucial for
expert witnesses, who are often in jeopardy of using abstract
technical language but whose credibility judgments are often
decisive for the outcome of trials. To increase their credibility, expert witnesses are well advised to concretize their
statements.
In this regard it is interesting to note that previous research
has reported differences in linguistic concreteness as measured
by the LCM in courtrooms. According to several studies
(Schmid & Fiedler, 1996, 1998; Schmid, Fiedler, Englich,
Ehrenberger, & Semin, 1996), defense attorneys use more
abstract language when referring to the defendant’s positive actions and more concrete language when referring to
negative actions. Prosecutors showed the opposite pattern.
This choice of language can be easily explained as reflecting
the respective attributions or as a strategic attempt to influence the jury’s attributions. Our results suggest that this choice
of language may lead to unintended and probably undesired
effects regarding the credibility. All else equal, a defense attorney’s description of the defendant’s positive actions may sound
less credible than the description of the negative ones, but
vice versa for descriptions of the prosecutor. It is beyond the
present article to disentangle the effects resulting from attributional processes and credibility caused by concreteness in
language, but the example shows once more that language
conveys much more than merely content.
On a different note, the present research suggests that concrete communication is especially consequential when the
receiver of the message is in a concrete state of mind or psychologically near to the message. For instance, when the communication is face to face, concrete language may be especially
believable. The effect may diminish in long-distance and less
direct communications. The implications of mind-set and distance are important for applied contexts as well. For instance,
a fair assessment of witness testimonies without being deluded
by linguistic concreteness may be possible when the recipient
considers a witness’s statements from the distance or in an
abstract mind-set.
The effect of level of concreteness does not stop with judgments of truth. Ultimately, truth judgments influence behavior,
such as legal decisions, consumer behavior, and interpersonal
actions. As such, the present research provides further evidence
that language as a means of social communication also affects
social reality. How something is said is sometimes at least as
important as what is said.
Acknowledgments
The authors thank Alice Dechêne, Klaus Fiedler, Malte Friese, and
two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on an earlier
version of this article; Georg Halbeisen and Tobias Vogel for their
help with the data collection of Experiment 2; and Annkathrin
Dittmann for her help with the construction of the material and the
data collection of Experiment 4.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interests with respect
to the authorship and/or publication of this article.
Financial Disclosure/Funding
This research was supported by a grant (PA00P1_124124/1) from
the Swiss National Foundation awarded to the first author.
Downloaded from psp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 16, 2016
1587
Hansen and Wänke
References
Akehurst, L., Köhnken, G., Vrij, A., & Bull, R. (1996). Lay persons’ and police officers’ beliefs regarding deceptive behaviour.
Applied Cognitive Psychology, 40, 461-471.
Bar-Anan Y., Liberman, N., Trope, Y., & Algom, D. (2007). Automatic
processing of psychological distance: Evidence from a Stroop task.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 136, 610-622.
Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social psychological research: Conceptual,
strategic, and statistical considerations. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 51, 1173-1182.
Begg, I. M., Anas, A., & Farinacci, S. (1992). Dissociation of processes in belief: Source recollection, statement familiarity, and
the illusion of truth. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 121,
446-458.
Bleasdale, F. A. (1987). Concreteness-dependent associative priming: Separate lexical organization for concrete and abstract
words. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory,
and Cognition, 13, 582-594.
Borgida, E., & Nisbett, R. E. (1977). The differential impact of
abstract vs. concrete information on decisions. Journal of
Applied Social Psychology, 7, 258-271.
Carroll, J. S. (1978). The effect of imagining an event on expectations for the event: An interpretation in terms of the availability
heuristic. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 14, 88-96.
Dechêne, A., Stahl, C., Hansen, J., & Wänke, M. (2010). The truth
about the truth: A meta-analytic review of the truth effect. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 14, 238-257.
de Groot, A. M. B. (1989). Representational aspects of word imageability and word frequency as assessed through word association. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory,
and Cognition, 15, 824-845.
DePaulo, B. M., Lindsay, J. J., Malone, B. E., Muhlenbruck, L.,
Charlton, K., & Cooper, H. (2003). Cues to deception. Psychological Bulletin, 129, 74-118.
DePaulo, B. M., Rosenthal, R., Rosenkrantz, J., & Green, C. R.
(1982). Actual and perceived cues to deception: A closer look at
speech. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 3, 291-312.
Douglas, K. M., & Sutton, R. M. (1993). Effects of communication goals and expectancies on language abstraction. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 84, 682-696.
Fiedler, K. (2008). The implicit meta-theory that has inspired and
restricted LCM research: Why some studies were conducted
but others not. Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 27,
182-196.
Fiedler, K., Semin, G. R., & Bolten, S. (1989). Language use and
reification of social information: Top-down and bottom-up processing in person cognition. European Journal of Social Psychology, 19, 271-295.
Förster, J., & Higgins, E. T. (2005). How global versus local perception fits regulatory focus. Psychological Science, 16, 631-636.
Freitas, A. L., Gollwitzer, P. M., & Trope, Y. (2004). The influence
of abstract and concrete mindsets on anticipating and guiding
others’ self-regulatory efforts. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 40, 739-752.
Fujita, K., Henderson, M., Eng, J., Trope, Y., & Liberman, N.
(2006). Spatial distance and mental construal of social events.
Psychological Science, 17, 278-282.
Garry, M., Manning, C. G., Loftus, E. F., & Sherman, S. J. (1996).
Imagination inflation: Imagining a childhood even inflates confidence that it occurred. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 3, 208-214.
Gregory, W. L., Cialdini, R. B., & Carpenter, K. M. (1982). Selfrelevant scenarios as mediators of likelihood estimates and compliance: Does imagining make it so? Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 43, 89-99.
Hansen, J., Dechêne, A., & Wänke, M. (2008). Discrepant fluency
increases subjective truth. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44, 687-691.
Henderson, M. D., Fujita, K., Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2006).
Transcending the “here”: The effect of spatial distance on social
judgment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91,
845-856.
Herzog, S. M., Hansen, J., & Wänke, M. (2007). Temporal distance
and ease of retrieval. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43, 483-488.
Higgins, E. T. (2000). Making a good decision: Value from fit.
American Psychologist, 55, 1217-1230.
Higgins, E. T., Idson, L. C., Freitas, A. L., Spiegel, S., & Molden, D. C.
(2003). Transfer of value from fit. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 84, 1140-1153.
Houghton Mifflin. (2000). American heritage dictionary of the English
language (4th ed.). Retrieved from www.thefreedictionary.com
Johnson, M. K. (2006). Memory and reality. American Psychologist, 61, 760-771.
Johnson, M. K., Bush, J. G., & Mitchell, K. J. (1998). Interpersonal
reality monitoring: Judging the sources of other people’s memories. Social Cognition, 16, 199-224.
Johnson, M. K., Hashtroudi, S., & Lindsay, D. S. (1993). Source
monitoring. Psychological Bulletin, 114, 3-28.
Johnson, M. K., & Raye, C. L. (1981). Reality monitoring. Psychological Review, 88, 67-85.
Koehler, D. J. (1991). Explanation, imagination, and confidence in
judgment. Psychological Bulletin, 110, 499-519.
Kroll, J. F., & Merves, J. S. (1986). Lexical access for concrete and
abstract words. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning,
Memory, and Cognition, 12, 92-107.
Liberman, N., & Trope, Y. (2008). The psychology of transcending
the here and now. Science, 322, 1201-1205.
Maass, A. (1999). Linguistic intergroup bias: Stereotype perpetuation through language. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advantages in
experimental social psychology (Vol. 31, pp. 79-121). San
Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Paivio, A. (1969). Mental imagery in associative learning and memory. Psychological Review, 76, 241-263.
Parks, C. M., & Toth, J. P. (2006). Fluency, familiarity, aging, and
the illusion of truth. Aging, Neuropsychology, and Cognition,
13, 225-253.
Downloaded from psp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 16, 2016
1588
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 36(11)
Plous, S. (1993). The psychology of judgment and decision making.
New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
Reber, R., & Schwarz, N. (1999). Effects of perceptual fluency on
judgments of truth. Consciousness and Cognition, 8, 338-342.
Reyes, R. M., Thompson, W. C., & Bower, G. H. (1980). Judgmental biases resulting from differing availabilities of arguments.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39, 2-12.
Rosnow, R. L., & Rosenthal, R. (1989). Definition and interpretation of interaction effects. Psychological Bulletin, 105, 143-146.
Rosnow, R. L., & Rosenthal, R. (1995). “Some things you learn
aren’t so”: Cohen’s paradox, Asch’s paradigm, and the interpretation of interaction. Psychological Science, 6, 3-9.
Rosnow, R. L., & Rosenthal, R. (1996). Contrasts and interactions
redux: Five easy pieces. Psychological Science, 7, 253-257.
Rubini, M., & Menegatti, M. (2008). Linguistic bias in personnel selection. Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 27,
168-181.
Schmid, J., & Fiedler, K. (1996). Language and implicit attributions
in the Nuremberg trials: Analyzing prosecutors’ and defense
attorneys’ closing speeches. Human Communication Research,
22, 371-398.
Schmid, J., & Fiedler, K. (1998). The backbone of closing speeches:
The impact of prosecution versus defense language on juridical attribution. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 28,
1140-1172.
Schmid, J., Fiedler, K., Englich, B., Ehrenberger, T., & Semin, G. R.
(1996). Taking sides with the defendant: Grammatical choice
and the influence of implicit attributions in prosecution and
defense speeches. International Journal of Psycholinguistics,
12, 127-148.
Schneider, W., Eschman, A., & Zuccolotto, A. (2002). E-Prime:
A user’s guide. Pittsburgh, PA: Psychology Software Tools.
Schooler, J. W., Gerhard, D., & Loftus, E. F. (1986). Qualities of the
unreal. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory,
and Cognition, 12, 171-181.
Semin, G. R. (2008). Language puzzles: A prospective retrospective on the linguistic category model. Journal of Language and
Social Psychology, 27, 197-209.
Semin, G. R., & Fiedler, K. (1988). The cognitive functions of linguistic categories in describing persons: Social cognition and
language. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54,
558-568.
Semin, G. R., & Fiedler, K. (1991). The linguistic category model,
its bases, applications and range. In W. Stroebe & M. Hewstone
(Eds.), European review of social psychology (Vol. 2, pp. 1-30).
Chichester, UK: Wiley.
Semin, G. R., Higgins, T., Gil de Montes, L., Estourget, Y., &
Valencia, J. F. (2005). Linguistic signatures of regulatory focus:
How abstraction fits promotion more than prevention. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 89, 36-45.
Sherman, S. J., Cialdini, R. B., Schwartzman, D. F., & Reynolds, K. D.
(1985). Imagining can heighten or lower the perceived likelihood
of contracting a disease: The mediating effect of ease of imagery.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 11, 118-127.
ter Doest, L., & Semin, G. (2005). Retrieval contexts and the concreteness effect: Dissociations in memory for concrete and
abstract words. European Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 17,
859-881.
Todorov, A., Goren, A., & Trope, Y. (2007). Probability as a
psychological distance: Construal and preferences. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 43, 473-482.
Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2000). Temporal distance and timedependent changes in preference. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 79, 876-889.
Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2003). Temporal construal. Psychological Review, 110, 403-421.
Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2010). Construal-level theory of psychological distance. Psychological Review, 117, 440-463.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1982). Judgments of and by representativeness. In D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, & A. Tversky (Eds.),
Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases (pp. 84-100).
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Unkelbach, C. (2007). Reversing the truth effect: Learning the interpretation of processing fluency in judgments of truth. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition,
33, 219-230.
Vrij, A. (2008). Nonverbal dominance versus verbal accuracy in lie
detection: A plea to change police practice. Criminal Justice and
Behavior, 35, 1323-1336.
Vrij, A., Evans, H., Akehurst, L., & Mann, S. (2004). Rapid judgements in assessing verbal and nonverbal cues: Their potential
for deception researchers and lie detection. Applied Cognitive
Psychology, 18, 283-296.
Wakslak, C. J., & Trope, Y. (2009). The effect of construal level on
subjective probability estimates. Psychological Science, 20, 52-58.
Wakslak, C. J., Trope, Y., Liberman, N., & Alony, R. (2006). Seeing the forest when entry is unlikely: Probability and the mental
representation of events. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
General, 135, 641-653.
Wigboldus, D. H. J., Semin, G. R., & Spears, R. (2000). How do we
communicate stereotypes? Linguistic biases and inferential consequences. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78, 5-18.
Downloaded from psp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 16, 2016