Running head: FORECASTING THE PROBABILITY OF WAR
Forecasting the Probability of War between Russia and Georgia
Edward R. Raupp
Caucasus University, Tbilisi, Georgia
Author Note
Edward R. Raupp, Caucasus University, Tbilisi, Georgia
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Edward R. Raupp, Ph.D.,
Caucasus University, 77 Kostava Street, Tbilisi 0175, Georgia (Republic). Contact:
[email protected]
1
FORECASTING THE PROBABILITY OF WAR
2
Abstract
In August 2008, military forces of the Russian Federation and separatist paramilitary groups of
South Ossetia invaded the sovereign territory of Georgia. A ceasefire was facilitated by French
President Nicolas Sarkozy after a week of fighting. In the following spring, speculation raged in
Georgia about whether Russia would conduct another invasion in August of 2009. Little or no
evidence was presented to support the speculation, but fears persisted. This study attempts to
develop an evidence-based model to forecast the probability of another war between the two
nations. Recognizing the difficulty of forecasting under conditions of such a high degree of
uncertainty, the model combines multiple methods. Delphi uses a panel of foreign policy experts
to assess monthly the probability of war, with statistics producing a time series. A second
method selects relevant Russian press articles and assigns ratings based on a scoring rubric. The
third method, scenario scripting, envisions possible situations affecting the probability of war.
This is a long-term study, results of which will be of interest to and followed by government
agencies, non-government organizations, academics, and others.
Keywords: Russia, Georgia, judgmental forecasting, probability, war
FORECASTING THE PROBABILITY OF WAR
3
Forecasting the Probability of War between Russia and Georgia
This study addresses the following primary research question: What is the feasibility of
forecasting the probability of the outbreak of armed warfare between the neighboring states of
the Russian Federation and the independent nation of Georgia? Secondary research questions
include the following: What models might be adapted or created to address the primary question?
And what data are available or may be collected for use in the forecasting problem?
Background
The nations of Russia and Georgia are connected geographically, historically, and
culturally. The northern border of Georgia is the Greater Caucasus Mountain Range, which is the
southern border of the Russian Federation between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. Tsarist
Russia (Paul I) annexed Georgia in 1801, and again, under the flag of the Soviet Union, Russian
Bolshevik forces invaded and annexed Georgia in 1921 (Gvosdev, 2000). The dominant religion
in both nations is Orthodox Christianity, and family ties have crossed borders for centuries.
Russia and Georgia are also divided by geographic, historical, and cultural factors. The
Caucasus range separates the two nations, with only a few passable routes.
On April 3, 2008, in its Bucharest Summit Declaration, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) announced, “NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic
aspirations for membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countries will become
members of NATO” (NATO, 2008). On August 7, just four months after the NATO declaration,
military forces of the Russian Federation and separatist paramilitary groups of South Ossetia
invaded the territory of Georgia. A ceasefire was facilitated by French President Nicolas Sarkozy
after a week of fighting. In the process, Russian President Vladimir Putin remarked to Sarkozy,
FORECASTING THE PROBABILITY OF WAR
4
“I am going to hang Saakashvili by the balls” (Bremner, 2008). In the following spring,
speculation raged in Georgia about whether Russia would conduct another invasion in August of
2009. Little or no evidence was presented to support the speculation, but fears persisted and
continue to persist (Messenger Staff, 2012).
This study attempts to develop an evidence-based model to forecast the probability of
another war between the two nations. Recognizing the difficulty of forecasting under conditions
of such a high degree of uncertainty, the model combines multiple methods. Delphi uses a panel
of foreign policy experts to assess monthly the probability of war, with statistics producing a
time series. A second method selects relevant Russian press articles and assigns ratings based on
a scoring rubric. Other methods, including scenario scripting, will be added.
This is a long-term study, results of which will be of interest to and followed by
government agencies, non-government organizations, academics, and others.
Literature review
Following Wilson (1975), Thrane (2009) equates war with aggression: “Warfare is the
execution of collective, organized violence or aggression on a certain scale.” Wilson (p. 242)
states that, “Aggression entails exerting pressure on an individual to force him to surrender
something in his possession or to which he might have access, either by physical action or by the
threat of its use.” In April, 2010, at the United States Army War College at Carlisle Barracks,
Pennsylvania, a group of experts acknowledged the need to consider new realities in a
conference called “Defining War for the 21st Century” (Army War College, 2010).
One legal definition of war is, “A contention by force; or the art of paralyzing the forces
of an enemy” (Lectric Law Library, 2011). Clausewitz (1832) defined war as
FORECASTING THE PROBABILITY OF WAR
5
…an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will…a continuation of policy by other
means; the political intentions are the objects, and the war is the means. The nature of war
is therefore determined by political objects…It is, therefore, a political act. (p. 3)
The record shows that Vladimir Putin, Russia’s would-be dictator-for-life, considers
Georgia, in general, and Georgia’s President, in particular, to be his enemies (Bremner, 2008).
For his part, Saakashvili has said “that Georgia has no enemy like Russia’s Prime Minister,
Vladimir Putin, for centuries.” In a televised interview, the President of Georgia said, ““Georgia
has not had enemy like Putin after Shah Abbas,” he said, referring to Abbas I, the Shah of Persia
notorious in Georgia for his invasion of Georgia's eastern region of Kakheti in the early 17th
century” (Civil Georgia, 2009).
Why do nations go to war? The causes of war are many and complex (Levy, 1989;
Blainey, 1988). Geopolitical factors are paramount. Russia has no warm water ports, so Georgia
is an enticing target, with its Black Sea ports of Batumi and Poti – and Sokhumi, in Georgia’s
breakaway province of Abkhazia. Georgia also represents an alternative route for Caspian Sea
Basin oil and gas to the West. Putin is notoriously connected to the Russian oil and gas sector
(Gessen, 2012) and resents the fact that Azerbaijan’s oil and gas is increasingly flowing through
pipelines in Georgia rather than through Russia. Resources are common causes of war, as with
Japan in the first part of the 20th century. This would not seem to be relevant, as Russia has no
need of Georgia’s natural resources.
Aristotle writes, “We make war that we may live in peace” (Bartlett & Collins, 2011).
This, however, sounds eerily like Orwell’s 1984: “War is peace.” Even earlier, the Latin
admonition, Si vis pacem, para bellum. “If you wish for peace, prepare for war.” The relevance
here is that Georgia, aspiring to full NATO membership, has been arming and training for war.
FORECASTING THE PROBABILITY OF WAR
6
Georgia’s participation with NATO forces in Iraq and Afghanistan is intended to demonstrate to
NATO its commitment to being a good partner for the alliance. More to the point, Thucydides
(431 B.C.E.) concludes that small states must align with one or the other when big states are at
war. Georgia, long allied – unwillingly – with Russia, has determined to ally with the West. This
determination, and its manifestation in Georgia’s intense and urgent desire to become a full
member of NATO, has enraged Vladimir Putin and may in large part – or entirely – have been
the reason for his attack on Georgia in August, 2008. Putin’s message to NATO: If you allow
Georgia to become a member of NATO, then you will have to go to war against Russia.
(Larison, 2012). This message has apparently cowed German Chancellor Angela Merkel into
submission. Merkel, in any event, was born and raised in Russian dominated East Germany and
leans heavily toward the Russian position. It is no surprise, then, that Merkel is the strongest
opponent to Georgia’s membership in NATO.
A perhaps less rational, but historically no less important, cause of war is what the
Greeks called pleonexia, an insatiable desire for more, for what belongs to others, or,
approximately, greed or covetousness. In his annual speech on April 25, 2005, Vladimir Putin
lamented “that the collapse of the Soviet empire ‘was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the
century’” (Associated Press, 2005). Putin imagined himself as the upcoming leader of the Soviet
Union, the new Tsar of all the Russias. But when his came time, there was no more Soviet
Union. While the former states of the Soviet Union quickly asserted their independence from
Russian dominance, Putin has repeatedly attempted to reassert that dominance politically,
economically, and militarily. His formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States in 1991
(CIS, 1991) was a transparent attempt to reestablish Russia as the overriding power in the sphere
of influence formerly occupied by the Soviet Union; he would thus achieve his ambition of
FORECASTING THE PROBABILITY OF WAR
7
becoming Tsar of all the Russias (Rowley, 2012; United Nations, 1994). Only 10 of the 15
former states of the Soviet Union are members of the Russian dominated CIS, Georgia having
withdrawn after being invaded by Russia in August, 2008 (Pravda, 2008). Aslund (2012), writes,
“Putin's record is all too evident. He has systematically transformed Russia from a semidemocracy to an authoritarian state. Tales of his gross personal corruption are abundant.”
Other examples of pleonexia might be Hitler’s invasion of Poland in 1939 and Bush’s
invasion of Iraq in 2003. In both cases, there was a buildup of propaganda preceding the invasion
designed to rally support for the invasion based on falsehoods. In the case of the Bush invasion,
the falsehood was that Iraq had “weapons of mass destruction” and was preparing to use them
against the United States and its allies. Richelson (2004) writes,
In addition, members of Congress and Parliament, as well as potential political opponents
and outside observers have criticized the use of intelligence by the Bush and Blair
administrations. Charges have included outright distortion, selective use of intelligence,
and exertion of political pressure to influence the content of intelligence estimates in
order to provide support to the decision to go to war with Iraq.”
As to Putin’s invasion of Georgia, Halper (2011) quotes Condoleezza Rice, criticizing a
story in the Atlantic attributing blame to Georgia for the August 2008 war, “It’s outrageous. The
idea that I would blame the Georgians couldn’t be further from the truth.” Putin’s anti-Caucasian
propaganda has taken the position that Russia is the only provider for peace in the region, lest it
become another Gaza or Afghanistan (Pozhidaev, 2011).
Predicting the outcome of war has been treated extensively (Dupuy, 1979; Economist,
2005; Erwin, 2009). Predicting the outbreak of war, however, has been less often studied.
Olbrich and Hergovich (2001) use a neural network for such predictions. Understating the
FORECASTING THE PROBABILITY OF WAR
8
problem, they note, “The prediction of conflicts and also the resolution of disputes are difficult in
a complex world.” Their model uses three psychological theories: Integrative Complexity, Social
Identity Theory, and Groupthink. They conclude that, “The application of neural nets and the
three theories of Social Psychology yield a good basis for political psychological consulting in
international relations and conflict prediction.” Rummel (2005), commenting on the approach by
Olbrich and Hergovich, writes,
I’ve seen so much of this kind of psychological reductionism over the years when all one
has to do is look at the type of government a country has –but, this is too simple. Yet,
what personalities become rulers or leaders depends on the political system, and its
culture, and history, and what they can do with the power they have also depends on these
variables.
For his part, Rummel (1991) offers an interesting construct for understanding the
processes involved in arriving at war and arriving at peace. The construct may be a useful
theoretical guide to developing more specific forecasting models.
Erwin (2009) reports that the United States Department of Defense was planning to spend
some $2 billion on new models and simulations in light of the new realities of asymmetric
warfare. It is not clear how much of this amount has been allocated to predicting the onset of war
and how much to the outcome of a war once started.
In the absence of rigorously scientific methods of forecasting, the field is left to those
who predict based on such variables as stock market prices (Harrison, 2011) or fear (Messenger
Staff, 2012).
FORECASTING THE PROBABILITY OF WAR
9
Methods
The current investigation is an application of forecasting under a high degree of
uncertainty. In such a study, it is more appropriate to use a combination of forecasting techniques
than to rely on a single method. Timmermann (2006) notes, “Forecast combinations have
frequently been found in empirical studies to produce better forecasts on average than methods
based on the ex-ante best individual forecasting model.” Goodwin (2009) concludes, “One of the
major findings of forecasting research over the last quarter century has been that greater
predictive accuracy can often be achieved by combining forecasts from different methods or
sources” (p. 33). Armstrong (2001) advises, based on 30 empirical comparisons, to improve
forecasts, “When feasible, use five or more methods” (p. 417). This study, in its early stages,
uses three methods: Delphi, review of the Russian press, and scenario scripting. As a continuing
study, with the objective of creating one or more time series, there may be additional methods,
including quantitative data and prediction markets, a method gaining in popularity among
scholars for forecasting under conditions of a high degree of uncertainty (see, e.g., Wolfers &
Zitzewitz. 2004, 2006).
When sufficient data are collected, over a sufficiently long period of months, the study
will use a statistical forecasting system such as Forecast Pro to create forecasts. Until then, the
study will examine the use of short-term trends, in the horizon of six-to-twelve months.
Delphi.
One of the methods used in this study is the Delphi technique. The theory is that a panel
of informed participants can produce better results than the individuals alone.
FORECASTING THE PROBABILITY OF WAR
10
Rowe & Wright (2001) note that,
Expert opinion is often necessary in forecasting tasks because of a lack of
appropriate or available information for using statistical procedures (p. 125).
…Since its design at the RAND Corporation during the 1950s, the Delphi
technique has been widely used for aiding judgmental forecasting and decision
making in a variety of domains and disciplines (p. 126).
Over a number of months and years, the monthly results will be used to create a time
series. The study will watch for trends and establish thresholds. An inflection point, a change in
direction or a marked change in the rate of change, will bear closer examination.
Review of the Russian press.
A review of articles in the Russian press may reveal the early onset of a build-up in antiGeorgia propaganda. Three analogs suggest the kinds of propaganda that have preceded
invasions: Hitler invades Poland on September 1, 1939; Bush invades Iraq on March 20, 2003;
and Putin invades Georgia on August 8, 2008.
A main criterion for the selection of articles to be captured in the study is mention of
Putin and Saakashvili. The Putin remark to Sarkozy (Bremner, 2008) is an example of the kind
of heightened rhetoric that might signal an attack on Georgia. On the other hand, a report of a
trade deal between Russia and Georgia (Barry, 2011) may signal a lessening of the likelihood of
war in the near-term. A scoring rubric will score an article on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 or 2
indicating a lessening of tension and 4 or 5 indicating an increase of tension and a higher
probability of war in the coming months.
FORECASTING THE PROBABILITY OF WAR
11
Scenario Scripting.
Taleb (2007) asserts that one cannot forecast because of the sudden and unexpected
arrival of a “black swan,” an event that cannot be anticipated and that will have a major impact.
Recent examples might be the collapse of the American housing market during the Bush
administration or the calamitous failure of the Greek financial system and its impact on the
Eurozone. If one cannot predict, then what is left is to envision and prepare for what might
happen. This is the role of scenario scripting, and the current study – forecasting the probability
of war between two states – would seem a likely candidate for this approach.
van der Heijden (1996) notes three forms of uncertainty (pp. 83-84):
1. Risks, where there is enough historical precedent, in the form of similar events, to
enable us to estimate probabilities (even if only judgmentally) for various possible
outcomes.
2. Structural uncertainties, where we are looking at the possibility of an event which is
unique enough not to provide us with an indication of likelihood…
3. Unknowables, where we cannot even imagine the event…
Donald Rumsfeld put it another way:
There are known knowns. These are things we know that we know. There are known
unknowns. That is to say, there are things that we know we don't know. But there are also
unknown unknowns. There are things we don't know we don't know. (Brainyquote,
2012).
In that context, Rumsfeld famously (or infamously) said at the outset of the Iraq war in
2003, “It is unknowable how long that conflict [the war in Iraq] will last. It could last six days,
FORECASTING THE PROBABILITY OF WAR
12
six weeks. I doubt six months.” What is clear is that Rumsfeld had scripted no scenario that
would have that war drag on for a decade.
Quantitative measures.
Although difficult to determine, a valuable indicator of Russian intentions toward
Georgia is the area in square kilometers of the sovereign territory of Georgia occupied by Russia.
Abkhazia and South Ossetia are fully occupied by Russian military forces and are under the
control of Vladimir Putin. These are breakaway provinces of Georgia that have undergone ethnic
cleansing since the end of the Soviet Union. Ethnic majorities in those provinces have forced out
the minority ethnic Georgians, creating a population of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in
other parts of Georgia.
Another quantitative measure, equally difficult to keep track of, is the number of Russian
troops on Georgian soil, including Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and in other areas along the
Russia-Georgia border. Attempts to ascertain these numbers from the European Union
Monitoring Mission, NATO, Ministry of Defense, and others have been fruitless. The study,
however, will continue to press for transparency in order to collect and maintain relevant data.
Results
Delphi.
Question 1. In your judgment, what is the probability of a war between Russia and
Georgia in the next six (6) months? Choose a number between zero (no possibility of a war) and
100 (absolute certainty of war). Results are shown in Table 1.
FORECASTING THE PROBABILITY OF WAR
13
Table 1
Delphi results for Question 1
Round
N
Mean
s.d.
Median
1
14
19
23.4
20
2
13
18
16.8
25
3
14
16
17.2
40
4
6
22
11.0
20
5
6
17
12.0
20
Note. Rounds 1 and 2 were conducted in November, 2011. Subsequent rounds were done
monthly.
Question 2. In your judgment, what is the probability of a war between Russia and
Georgia in the next twelve (12) months? Choose a number between zero (no possibility of a war)
and 100 (absolute certainty of war). Results are shown in Table 2.
Table 2
Delphi results for Question 2
Round
N
Mean
s.d.
Median
1
13
25
25.5
20
2
13
25
19.7
40
3
13
27
21.7
40
4
6
26
11.0
30
5
6
21
11.9
25
Note. Rounds 1 and 2 were conducted in November, 2011. Subsequent rounds were done
monthly.
Review of the Russian press.
Review of Russian press articles has been inconclusive. During the course of the study,
there have been no significant events reported in the Russian press regarding Georgia. The study
FORECASTING THE PROBABILITY OF WAR
14
will, however, continue to monitor the Russian press for any signs of lessening or raising
tensions.
Scenario Scripting.
While the current base of data for Russian press articles is lean, one can envision a set of
scenarios. Three such scenarios are depicted in Figure 1. The scale used here is from 0 to 10, 0
indicating no signs of any tension between the two countries and, indeed, a détente similar to that
that prevailed between France and Germany after World War II, a détente that eventually
resulted in the European Union. A downward trend would indicate a movement in such a
direction. On the other end, 10 portends an imminent invasion by Russia, as was the case in
August, 2008. An upward trend would indicate a build-up in anti-Georgian rhetoric on the part of
Kremlin officials of the sort seen prior to Hitler’s invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939,
Bush’s invasion of Iraq on March 20, 2003, and Putin’s invasion of Georgia on August 8, 2008.
a. Low-level scenario
b. Medium-level scenario
c. High-level scenario
Press Low
Press Medium
Press High
6.0
10.0
5.0
5.0
8.0
4.0
4.0
3.0
3.0
2.0
2.0
1.0
1.0
2.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
6.0
1
16
31
46
61
76
91
4.0
1
14
27
40
53
66
79
92
1
14
27
40
53
66
79
92
6.0
Figure 1. Scenarios for possible outcomes of reviews of Russian press articles.
Figure 1a illustrates a scenario in which the Russian press reports stories of reconciliation
between Russia and Georgia. So long as Vladimir Putin remains in power as de facto autocrat,
this scenario is highly unlikely. It is possible, however, that some lowering of the index could be
FORECASTING THE PROBABILITY OF WAR
15
seen following the transition of the Georgian presidency, as Putin’s hatred of the current
president is palpable. The implication of Scenario 1a is that Georgia should initiate actions to
achieve reconciliation with Russia and long-term détente, short of jeopardizing its security and
abandoning its aspirations for territorial integrity. This might mean talks to increase cross-border
trade, invitations to Russian tourists, teaching Russian language in schools, and hosting
international scholarly, trade, and cultural conferences and trade shows.
Figure 1b illustrates a long-term status quo. The level is arbitrarily set at 5, but the
important aspect of the scenario is that there is no change. This is the most likely scenario, or
“base case.” Georgia welcomes Russian visitors, but Russia does not welcome Georgian visitors.
Georgians are free to import goods from Russia, but Putin bans imports of Georgian goods into
Russia. The implication of this scenario for Georgian policy makers is that, in the absence of a
“black swan,” such as an international incident precipitated by Vladimir Putin, the modus
vivendi, while not ideal, is, at least, not traumatic for the Georgian people. If Putin can be made
to restrain his erratic behavior, Russian and Georgian leaders can agree to disagree on a range of
policies without resorting to armed conflict. And there may, in time, be some rapprochement.
Figure 1c illustrates a deterioration in relations between Russia and Georgia. More
precisely, it signals a build-up in negative rhetoric – propaganda – on the part of the Putin
regime. Remarks of the type Putin notoriously made to Sarkozy as he invaded Georgia (Bremner,
2008) would elevate the level. This scenario may be seen in the analogs of Hitler in 1939, Bush
in 2003, and Putin in 2008. As Taleb suggests, one cannot predict the events that might lead to
this unhappy development, but Georgia could prepare. Georgia, in fact, is preparing. It is on
track to become a member of NATO, having complied with the letter and spirit of NATO’s
requirements.
FORECASTING THE PROBABILITY OF WAR
16
Conclusion
In an interview on D-Day, June 6, 2012, United States Secretary of State Hilary Rodham
Clinton was asked, “And what should be expected in terms of Georgia-NATO integration [in]
the next two years? And can Georgia become a member with Russian troops on [its] soil?
Because we all remember President Medvedev saying that with the war of 2008, Russia stopped
Georgia’s NATO integration process.” Secretary Clinton replied, in part, “Obviously, from our
perspective, we think it’s a bedrock principle that any country should have the right to choose its
own alliances, including security alliances.” At the same time, Clinton noted that entry into
NATO must be unanimous on the parts of the current members (Clinton, 2012). Those members
will have to gauge the risk to themselves should Georgia become a member and Russia once
again attacks Georgia, for under Article 5 of the Washington treaty, an attack on one NATO
member is considered an attack on all (NATO, 2012). NATO membership may be Georgia’s best
insurance against such an attack; in other words, a significantly reduced probability of another
war between Russia and Georgia in the coming years.
FORECASTING THE PROBABILITY OF WAR
17
References
Armstrong, J.S. (2001). Combining forecasts. In J.S. Armstrong (Ed.), Principles of
Forecasting: A Handbook for Researchers and Practitioners, Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 417-439.
Army War College. (2010). Defining War for the 21st Century. Retrieved June 3, 2012,
from http://www.carlisle.army.mil/banner/article.cfm?id=1369.
Åslund, A. (2012, May 15). Kick Russia Out of the G-8. Foreign Policy. Retrieved June
17, 2012, from http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/05/15/kick_russia_out_of_the_g_8.
Associated Press (2005). Putin: Soviet collapse a ‘genuine tragedy.’ Retrieved May 30,
2012, from http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7632057/ns/world_news/t/putin-soviet-collapsegenuine-tragedy/#.T8WPl7Atgl8.
Barry, E. (2011, November 9). Georgia and Russia sign trade deal. The New York Times,
p. A15. Retrieved November 26, 2011, from
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/10/world/europe/georgia-and-russia-sign-trade-deal.html
Bartlett, R. C., & Collins, S. D., Trans. (2011). Nicomachean Ethics. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
Blainey, G. (1988). The causes of war. New York: The Free Press.
Brainyquote. (2012). Donald Rumsfeld quotes. Retrieved May 31, 2012, from http://
www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/d/donaldrums148142.html#6cpTTgOAtQHDsXz8.99
Bremner, C. (2008, November 13). Vladimir Putin 'wanted to hang Georgian President
Saakashvili by the balls'. The London Times. Retrieved November 26, 2011, from
http://www.alausa.org/new.php?lang=en&news=2&id=491.
FORECASTING THE PROBABILITY OF WAR
18
CIS. (1991). About Commonwealth of Independent States. Retrieved May 31, 2012, from
http://www.cisstat.com/eng/cis.htm.
Civil Georgia. (2009). Saakashvili: Putin is Georgia’s Enemy. Retrieved May 30, 2012,
from http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=20311.
Clausewitz, C. (1832). On war. Howard, M., & Paret, P. (Eds./Trans.) (1976). Princeton:
Princeton UP.
Clinton, H. R. (2012, June 6). Personal Interview with E. Kvesitadze, Batumi, Georgia.
Retrieved June 7, 2012, from http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/06/191878.htm#.T8xlJeHieM.facebook.
Dupuy, T. N. (1979). Numbers, prediction, and war: Using history to evaluate combat
factors and predict the outcome of battles. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill.
Economist. (2005, September 15). And now, the war forecast. Technology Quarterly: Q3.
Retrieved June 4, 2012, from http://www.economist.com/node/4368226.
Elliott, G., Granger, C. W. J., and Timmermann, A. (2006). Handbook of economic
forecasting, Volume 1. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Erwin, S. I. (2009). Predicting the outcome of war: Can science help? National Defense.
Arlington, VA: NDIA. Retrieved June 4, 2012, from http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/
archive/2009/June/Pages/PredictingtheOutcomeofWarCanScienceHelp.aspx.
Gessen, M. (2012, March 2). The wrath of Putin. Vanity Fair. Retrieved June 17, 2012,
from http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/2012/04/vladimir-putin-mikhail-khodorkovsky-russia.
Goodwin, P. (2009). New Evidence on the Value of Combining Forecasts. Foresight,
Winter, Issue 12, 33-35.
FORECASTING THE PROBABILITY OF WAR
19
Gvosdev, N. K. (2000). Imperial policies and perspectives towards Georgia: 1760–1819,
London: Macmillan.
Halper, D. (2011, November 16). Condoleezza Rice blames Putin for war with Georgia.
The Weekly Standard. Retrieved November 26, 2011, from
http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/condoleeza-rice-blames-putin-war-georgia_609118.html.
Harrison, T. (2011, August 24). Is the market forecasting war? Wall Street Journal.
Retrieved June 4, 2012, from http://articles.marketwatch.com/2011-0824/commentary/30715549_1_financial-crisis-class-war-financial-storm.
Larison, D. (2012). Putin, the Bucharest NATO Summit, and the August 2008 War. The
American Conservative. Retrieved June 17, 2012, from http://www.theamericanconservative.
com/larison/putin-the-bucharest-nato-summit-and-the-august-2008-war.
Lectric Law Library. (2011). Lectric Law Library Lexicon: War. Retrieved November 26,
2011, from http://www.lectlaw.com/def2/w038.htm.
Levy, J. S. (1989). The causes of war: A review of theories and evidence. In Tetlock, P.
E., et al., Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War, Vol. I. New York: Oxford UP.
Messenger Staff. (2012, January 5). Will Russia attack Georgia again? The Messenger.
Retrieved June 4, 2012, from http://www.messenger.com.ge/issues/2518_january_5_2012/
2518_edit.html.
NATO. (2008). Bucharest Summit Declaration: Issued by the Heads of State and
Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April
2008. Bucharest, Romania: NATO.
NATO. (2012). Official text of the Washington Treaty. Retrieved June 7, 2012, from
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm
FORECASTING THE PROBABILITY OF WAR
20
Olbrich, A., & Hergovich, A. (2001). A neural net for predicting war and peace. Paper
presented at Seventh European Congress of Psychology, London.
Orwell, G. (1949). 1984. London: Secker and Warburg.
Pozhidaev, E. (2011). Gaza - the future of the Caucasus? Rosbalt: Federation. Retrieved
November 26, 2011, from http://www.rosbalt.ru/federal/2011/11/16/913100.html.
Pravda. (2008). Georgia opts out of ex-Soviet military cooperation body. Retrieved May
31, 2012, from http://english.pravda.ru/news/world/03-02-2006/75406-georgia-0.
Richelson, J. (Ed.). (2004). Iraq and weapons of mass destruction. National Security
Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 80. Washington: George Washington University.
Rowe, G., & Wright, G. (2001): Expert Opinions in Forecasting. Role of the Delphi
Technique. In: Armstrong, S. (Ed.). Principles of forecasting: A handbook of researchers and
practitioners, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Rowley, C. (2012). Vladimir Putin: the last Tsar of all the Russias. Retrieved May 31,
2012, from http://charlesrowley.wordpress.com/2012/03/11/vladimir-putin-the-last-tsar-of-allthe-russias.
Rummel, R. J. (1991). The Conflict Helix: Principles and practices of interpersonal,
social, and international conflict and cooperation. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
Rummel, R. J. (2005). Can we predict war and is it inevitable? Retrieved June 4, 2012,
from http://democraticpeace.wordpress.com/2009/05/18/can-we-predict-war-and-is-itinevitablecan-we-predict-war-and-is-it-inevitable.
Strong’s Greek Dictionary. (2012). Retrieved May 30, 2012, from
http://www.htmlbible.com/sacrednamebiblecom/kjvstrongs/STRGRK41.htm.
FORECASTING THE PROBABILITY OF WAR
21
Taleb, N. N. (2007). The black swan: The impact of the highly improbable. New York:
Random House.
Thrane, H. (2009). Aggression, territory, and boundary. In L. H. Olausson & M.
Olausson (Eds.), The martial society (pp. 11-24). Stockholm: Stockholm University.
Thucydides. (431 B.C.E.). The History of the Peloponnesian War. Tr. by Richard
Crawley. Full text retrieved May 30, 2012, from http://classics.mit.edu/Thucydides/pelopwar.html.
Timmermann, A. (2006). Forecast Combinations. In G. Elliott, C. Granger, & A.
Timmermann. Handbook of economic forecasting, Volume 1, Chapter 4, pp. 135-196..
Amsterdam: North-Holland.
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. (1994).
Commonwealth of Independent States Free Trade Agreement. Retrieved May 31, 2012, from
http://www.unescap.org/tid/aptiad/viewagreement.aspx?id=CISFTA.
van der Heijden, K. (1996). Scenarios: The art of strategic conversation. Chichester:
Wiley.
Wilson, E. O. (1975). Sociobiology: The new synthesis. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Wolfers, J., & Zitzewitz, E. (2004). Prediction markets. Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 18(2).
Wolfers, J., & Zitzewitz, E. (2006). Prediction markets in theory and practice. Working
Paper 12083. Cambridge, MA: NBER.
FORECASTING THE PROBABILITY OF WAR
22