MEI-FRS (c) – August 2011
Protracted Displacement in Afghanistan:
Will History Be Repeated?
By Susanne Schmeidl
(August 8, 2011)
Since the late 1970s, Afghanistan has experienced several waves of mass displacement ―
the tragic consequence of over 30 years of conflict. According to the UN High
Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR), three out of ten refugees in the world are
Afghans.1 Though Afghan refugees are scattered among 75 countries, 96% of them are
located in Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran.2 Whereas Pakistan hosts 1.9 million
registered [and an estimated one million unregistered] Afghan refugees,3 Iran hosts just
over one million refugees, almost all of whom are Afghans.4
The ousting of the Taliban from power in 2001 was followed by the largest and most
rapid UNHCR-assisted return programs in “recorded history [...] equivalent to roughly
one-half the current refugee population worldwide.”5 However, optimism that an end to
the protracted Afghan displacement crisis was imminent has long dissipated, lately
replaced by the fear that history may be repeating itself.
The recent spike in violence in Afghanistan has put the 2010 transition plans of the
international community into serious question.6 Ominously, “[m]ore civilians were killed
1
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Global Trends 2010 (Geneva: UNHCR, 2011), p. 14,
http://www.unhcr.org/4dfa11499.html.
2
UNHCR, Global Trends 2010, p. 14. See also F. Grare and W. Maley, “The Afghan Refugees in
Pakistan” (Washington, DC: MEI-FRS, June 30, 2011), p. 2,
http://www.refugeecooperation.org/publications/afghanistan/pdf/09_grare.pdf.
3
M. Tahir, “Pakistan Remains Host to the Largest Refugee Population,” Xinhua (June 19, 2011),
http://big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2011-06/19/c_13938241.htm.
The estimate for unofficial refugees comes from the Pakistani Ministry of States and Frontier Regions. See
also UNHCR, Global Trends 2010: “At the end of 2010, Pakistan had the highest number of refugees
compared to its national economy… hosting 710 refugees per 1 USD GDP (PPP) per capita,” p. 11.
4
UNHCR, Global Trends 2010, p. 14.
5
D. Kronenfeld, “Can Afghanistan Cope with Returnees? Can Returnees Cope in Afghanistan? A Look at
Some New Data.” (Washington D.C.: MEI-FRS, 25 January 2011),
http://www.refugeecooperation.org/publications/afghanistan/pdf/02_kronenfeld.pdf; p. 1. See also D.
Turton and P. Marsden, Taking Refugees for a Ride? The Politics of Refugee Return in Afghanistan (Kabul:
AREU, 2002).
6
S. Schmeidl, “Death of an Uruzgan Journalist,” Afghanistan Analyst Network Blogs (June 31, 2011),
http:/www.aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=1978.
1
MEI-FRS (c) – August 2011
in Afghanistan in May [2010] than in any other month since 2007, raising fears of a
further escalation during the summer with serious humanitarian implications.”7
Reflecting this apprehension, many Afghans are already planning their exit strategies.
Those with resources have already begun to move their family to Dubai,8 or are in the
process of doing so. Others may explore study-abroad options, have their children
married off to Afghans in the West, or pay smugglers to go abroad (with Turkey being
one of the key “thoroughfares”).9
Indeed, Afghanistan’s protracted displacement crisis is unlikely to be resolved anytime
soon. The nine field-research studies commissioned to investigate the displacement crisis
shed light on its origins, dynamics, and consequences with the aim of generating policy
recommendations to enhance cooperation between the United States and the European
Union (EU) to address it. These studies can be divided into three groups.
The first group analyzes the situation of Afghans refugees in the two major countries of
exile and problems related to return. Rostum Shah Mohmand, formerly Pakistan’s
Refugee Commissioner and Ambassador to Afghanistan, discusses the impact of Afghan
refugees on Pakistan as well as Islamabad’s policies vis-à-vis the refugee population and
the feasibility of continuing refugee return.10 Frédéric Grare and William Maley examine
the underlying political causes and politicization of the so-called “humanitarian” problem
of large-scale refugee displacement.11 Bruce Koepke looks at the current situation of
Afghans in Iran (both refugees and migrant workers) in light of Iran’s refugee policies
(especially on voluntary repatriation and work conditions),12 while Mohammad Jalal
Abbasi Shavazi and Rasoul Sadeghi shed light on the situation of second-generation
Afghans in Iran and the impact of their adaptations on the prospects for their return.13
The second group focuses on the problems of return and reintegration in Afghanistan as
well as secondary displacement to urban areas, with particular attention to land and
tenure rights. Daniel A. Kronenfeld argues that return has not been necessarily bad for
Afghanistan nor for Afghan returnees,14 an assessment which is not shared by Ingrid
Macdonald or Nassim Majidi. Macdonald highlights the importance of landlessness and
7
IRIN, “AFGHANISTAN: Worrying Spike in Civilian Deaths” (June 17, 2011),
http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=93000.
8
R. Wigglesworth, “Afghan Elite Enjoys High Life in Dubai,” Financial Times (September 8, 2010);
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4843bd14-bb74-11df-a136-00144feab49a.html#ixzz1TlwbG2mP.
9
Coordination Group of Afghan Refugees in Turkey, “An Open Letter to UNHCR” (June 20, 2011),
http://www.hazarapeople.com/2011/06/22/an-open-letter-from-afghan-refugees-in-turkey-to-unhcr/.
10
R.S. Mohmand, “The Saga of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan” (Washington, DC: MEI-FRS, February 14,
2010); http://www.refugeecooperation.org/publications/afghanistan/pdf/06_mohmand.pdf.
11
Grare and Maley (2011).
12
B. Koepke, “The Situation of Afghans in the Islamic Republic of Iran Nine Years after the Overthrow of
the Taliban Regime in Afghanistan” (Washington DC: MEI-FRS, February 4, 2011);
http://www.refugeecooperation.org/publications/afghanistan/pdf/03_koepke.pdf.
13
M.J. Abbasi Shavazi and R. Sadeghi, “The Adaptation of Second-Generation Afghans in Iran: Empirical
Findings and Policy Implications” (Washington, DC: MEI-FRS, February 9, 2011);
http://www.refugeecooperation.org/publications/afghanistan/pdf/05_jalal.pdf.
14
D. Kronenfeld, “Can Afghanistan Cope with Returnees? Can Returnees Cope in Afghanistan? A Look at
Some New Data” (Washington, DC: MEI-FRS, January 25, 2011),
http://www.refugeecooperation.org/publications/afghanistan/pdf/02_kronenfeld.pdf.
2
MEI-FRS (c) – August 2011
insecurity as obstacles to the reintegration of Afghan returnees,15 while Majidi tackles the
problems faced by returnees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Afghanistan’s
large urban centers, especially Kabul, and how best to assist them.16
The third group deals with the challenges associated with the increasingly large internally
displaced population. Sumbul Rizvi, a Senior Protection Officer with UNHCR, provides
an overview of the current situation of internal displacement in Afghanistan, including
key causes.17 Jacob Rothing recommends policy changes that are likely to mitigate (if not
prevent) protracted displacement in Afghanistan and address protection concerns.18
This paper summarizes the key findings and arguments of these nine field-research
studies. However, it is important to emphasize at the outset a point made emphatically
and repeatedly by all of the authors as well as other analysts19 ― the need for the United
States and the European Union (EU) to bring the growing displacement crisis to the
forefront of discussions and planning for any transition strategy for Afghanistan.
Understanding Afghanistan’s Displacement History
A 2009 study of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) found that three in
four Afghans (76%) have experienced forced displacement at some point in their lifetime,
many repeatedly.20 An Oxfam International-led study conducted the same year supports
this finding, stating that 42% of Afghan interviewees reported having been displaced
abroad at least once in their lives, another 42% as having been internally displaced at
least once over the past three decades, and 17% reporting dual displacement
experiences.21 In contrast, Kronenfeld puts the figure of people with refugee displacement
experience at just 24%, which he argues is supported by the number of returnees cited by
15
I. Macdonald, “Landlessness and Insecurity: Obstacles to Reintegration in Afghanistan,”
(Washington, DC: MEI-FRS; February 9, 2011),
http://www.refugeecooperation.org/publications/afghanistan/pdf/04_macdonald.pdf.
16
N. Majidi, “Urban Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons in Afghanistan.” (Washington, DC: MEIFRS, January 25, 2011); http://www.refugeecooperation.org/publications/afghanistan/pdf/01_majidi.pdf.
17
S. Rizvi, “Internal Displacement in Afghanistan.” (Washington, DC: June 25, 2011);
http://www.refugeecooperation.org/publications/afghanistan/pdf/08_rizvi.pdf.
18
J. Rothing, “Protracted Displacement in Afghanistan Can Be Mitigated by a Change in Policy”
(Washington, DC: MEI-FRS, April 5, 2011),
http://www.refugeecooperation.org/publications/afghanistan/pdf/07_rothing.pdf.
19
L. Yoshikawa and M. Pennington, “Afghanistan: Responsible U.S. Transition Must Address
Displacement Crisis” (Washington, DC: Refugees International, June 28, 2011),
http://www.refugeesinternational.org/policy/field-report/afghanistan-responsible-us-transition-mustaddress-displacement-crisis.
20
ICRC, Our World: Views from Afghanistan, Opinion Survey 2009 (Geneva: ICRC, 2009),
http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/views-from-field-report-240609/$File/Our-WorldViews-from-Afghanistan-I-ICRC.pdf.
21
A. Jackson, The Cost of War: Afghan Experiences of Conflict, 1978–2009, A Joint Report by Nine NGOs
Working in Afghanistan (Kabul: Oxfam International, 2009). It is important to note, however, that due to
the frequency of displacement, many Afghans may not consider smaller movements over short distances as
representing true internal displacement, and hence may not report it as such. See S. Schmeidl and W.
Maley, “The Case of the Afghan Refugee Population.”
3
MEI-FRS (c) – August 2011
UNHCR to date (about 6 million) proportional to the estimated population figure of
Afghanistan (24–28 million).22
Regardless of these differences in estimates (the reason for which is discussed later), even
the lower estimate of one in four Afghans having lived through a displacement
experience in their life is remarkable. It is therefore not surprising that Afghans fear being
displaced (34%) more than they do losing a loved one (25%) or property (22%).23
Overview of Afghan Displacement Phases
Since 1978 there have been six distinct
phases of Afghan displacement (see Box 1),24
beginning with the Soviet-sponsored Saur
(April) Revolution, which brought to power
the Afghan Communist People’s Democratic
Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).
This first displacement phase was largely
dominated by people fleeing to the
neighboring countries of Pakistan and Iran.
By 1983, due to an intensification of the
conflict in Afghanistan, the refugee
population rapidly grew to 3.9 million and
internal displacement commenced.
Box 1: Overview of Displacement Phases
Phase 1 (1978–1988): Mujahidin against
Soviet-backed
communist
government;
predominantly refugee displacement with
some internal displacement post-1983.
Phase 2 (1989–1995): Soviet withdrawal and
civil war; initial large-scale return followed by
renewed (refugee) displacement.
Phase 3 (1996–2001): Taliban rule; hesitant
return and renewed refugee displacement;
internal displacement due to drought.
The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Phase 4 (2001–2002): Post-9/11 invasion and
Afghanistan in 1989 ushered in Phase 2, renewed displacement (external/internal).
marked by an initial flow of refugee Phase 5 (2002–2004): Rapid and large-scale
returnees, which gained momentum in 1992 return under new government and the rise of
following the defeat of the Afghan secondary displacement.
Communist government (with no fewer than
1.2 million Afghans returning in just six Phase 6 (2004-present): Deterioration of
months).25 Soon thereafter, however, the security and growing internal displacement.
failure of a power-sharing agreement sparked
conflict between mujahidin factions, which
led to state failure, widespread death and destruction, and another mass internal and
international displacement. While those Afghans who had previously been displaced had
largely come from rural areas, as Mohmand points out, fighting between mujahidin
22
D. Kronenfeld (2011), p. 3.
ICRC 2009.
24
See S. Schmeidl, A. Mundt, and N. Miszak, Beyond the Blanket: Towards more Effective Protection for
Internally Displaced Persons in Southern Afghanistan, a Joint Report of the Brookings-Bern Project on
Internal Displacement and The Liaison Office (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, May 2010),
http:/www.brookings.edu/reports/.../05_idp_protection_afghanistan.aspx.
25
R. Colville, “The Biggest Caseload in the World,” Refugees, Vol. 108, No. 2 (1997), pp. 3–9.
23
4
MEI-FRS (c) – August 2011
factions brought the war to Afghanistan’s capital Kabul, leading to mass displacement
from the city.26
Phase 3 is linked to the Taliban taking control of Afghanistan. The new Taliban
government, though credited with restoring security and law and order, employed brutal
and authoritarian methods and engaged in a continuous civil war with the newly formed
Northern Alliance composed of former mujahidin factions. This prompted new waves of
forced internal and refugee displacement. Internal displacement increased dramatically in
2000 when Afghanistan experienced the worst drought in 30 years.27 The drought also
caused massive livestock losses among the nomadic Kuchi population, prompting many
to shift to a more sedentary existence.
The US led military invasion into Afghanistan in early October 2001 in response to the
September 11 attacks initiated Phase 4, during which about 1.5 million Afghans fled their
homes. In addition to some renewed anti-Pashtun violence in parts of the western and
northern Afghanistan,28 many fled aerial bombardments.29
Phase 5 commenced with the ousting of the Taliban from power and the establishment of
a democratic government based on the Bonn Agreement. During this phase, UNHCR
spearheaded the world’s largest assisted repatriation operation, facilitating the return of
over 6 million Afghan refugees from Pakistan, Iran, and other countries of refuge.30 At
the same time, the majority of Afghanistan’s 1.2 million internally displaced persons also
returned home, widely assumed to have satisfactorily reintegrated.31 As successful return
was needed to demonstrate the political recovery and stabilization of Afghanistan, the
growing crisis of internal displacement — often the result of unsustainable return to areas
of origin leading to considerable secondary displacement — was largely ignored.32
26
Mohmand (2011), p. 3.
An estimated 2.5 million Afghans were affected by the 2000 drought (US Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance/Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) International Disaster Database,
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/dbc.nsf/doc104?OpenForm&rc=3&cc=afg.
28
The abuses and violence that accompanied the fall of the Taliban have been well documented by Human
Rights Watch in the four northern provinces of Balkh, Faryab, Samangan, and Baghlan. Human Rights
Watch, “Paying for the Taliban’s Crimes: Abuses Against Ethnic Pashtuns in Northern
Afghanistan” Human Rights Watch Afghanistan Reports, Vol. 14, No. 2 (April 2002), http://www.hrw.org/
legacy/reports/2002/afghan2/afghan0402.pdf.
29
An estimated 3,000–3,400 civilian deaths were attributed to aerial bombardment. M.W. Herold, “A
Dossier on Civilian Victims of United States’ Aerial Bombing of Afghanistan: A Comprehensive
Accounting [revised]” (University of New Hampshire, Durham, NH, 2002),
http://cursor.org/stories/civilian_deaths.htm; Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Cluster Bombs in
Afghanistan,” A Human Rights Watch Backgrounder (October 2001),
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/arms/cluster-bck1031.pdf.
30
Kronenfeld (2011).
31
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), Afghanistan: Increasing Hardship and Limited
Support for Growing Displaced Population (Geneva: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, October
28, 2008).
32
See S. Schmeidl and W. Maley (2008) and K. Koser and S. Schmeidl, “Displacement, Human
Development, and Security in Afghanistan,” in Hady Amr, ed., Displacement in the Muslim World: A
Focus on Afghanistan and Iraq, The Brookings Project on US Relations with the Islamic World, Doha
Discussion Papers, 8–22 (Washington, DC: Saban Center at The Brookings Institution, 2009), pp. 8–22,
http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2009/0216_iraq_ferris.aspx.
27
5
MEI-FRS (c) – August 2011
With the deterioration security situation in Afghanistan post-2004, it became increasingly
hard to ignore the sixth and latest phase in Afghanistan’s displacement experience,
mostly constituting IDPs but also an increasing number of “migrant” workers to Iran,
Pakistan, and the Gulf countries. Unlike in previous phases, Afghans have increasingly
been forced to seek safety within their own country, because the doors to Iran and
Pakistan are closing. In Iran, Afghan refugees face forced deportations, while in Pakistan,
refugee camps are being forcibly closed, and refugees face harassment and an
increasingly unstable security and political situation. This has made major cities in
Afghanistan, especially Kabul, a magnet for the internally displaced, which melt into
sprawling urban squatter settlements.
Despite considerable lobbying by local and international organizations, finally supported
by UNHCR in 2010, the extent of the growing IDP crisis is only slowly being
acknowledged.
A question of numbers
While problems with obtaining exact figures for displaced populations are neither new
nor unique to the Afghan situation,33 the “comfortable” use of different numbers in the
Afghan case is nonetheless startling. Most of the authors of the nine studies
commissioned use different figures, all citing official sources. Clearly, one reason for this
is the fluidity of the situation in Afghanistan (i.e., ongoing return and renewed
displacement mixed with migration movements). Another is the limited ability to
accurately track the substantial portion of the Afghan population that is mobile.
However, figures for Afghan refugees are inexact for two additional reasons: 1) a
combination of definitional issues (i.e., determining who is a refugee or an IDP as well as
determining when does displacement ends) and 2) the politicization of displacement,
particularly regarding refugees. Each of these factors is discussed in more detail below.
1. Definitional issues
Determining who is a “refugee” and who is an “IDP”: Based on the 1951 Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees (and its 1967 Protocol), there is a clear definition of
who a refugee is: “Any person who owing to a well founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his/her nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear,
is unwilling to avail himself/herself of the protection of that country.” However, Pakistan,
the main asylum country for Afghan refugees, is not a signatory to the convention,34 and
has been relying on the Muslim tradition of granting asylum to those displaced in defense
of their religion.35 Iran did much the same until 1993, at which point “Afghans seeking
33
S. Schmeidl, “The Quest for Accuracy in the Estimation of Forced Migration,” in S.C. Lubkemann, L.
Minnear, and T.G. Weiss, eds., Humanitarian Action: Social Science Connections (Providence, RI: Watson
Institute, Occasional Paper Series, 2000), pp. 164–182.
34
Grare and Maley (2011).
35
S. Schmeidl, “(Human) Security Dilemmas: Long-term Implications of the Afghan Refugee Crisis,”
Third World Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 1 (2002), pp. 7–29; see also Schmeidl and Maley (2008), p. 134.
6
MEI-FRS (c) – August 2011
refuge in Iran were no longer considered to be religious migrants, but simply
immigrants.”36 Not until 2007 did Pakistan agree to officially register refugees as such.37
The problem of determining who is a refugee came fully to the fore during the post-2001
assisted repatriation program. During the first four years of return, about half a million
more refugees returned to Afghanistan than previously had been estimated.38 Rather than
attributing this to “recycling,” as some have argued,39 Kronenfeld contends that many
“returnees” were not really refugees but “likely regular migrants who availed themselves
of UNHCR’s repatriation package during one of their trips to Afghanistan.”40 In sum, it is
hardly surprising that Grare and Maley conclude that “exactly who, among the Afghan
population in Pakistan is a refugee, remains a matter of debate.”41
The difficulty of determining who is a refugee is compounded by mixed migration flows.
Both Pakistan and Iran are the recipients of a considerable number of Afghan migrant
workers, most of whom are undocumented.42 According to Koepke, there are twice as
many illegal Afghan migrants (about two million) in Iran than there are refugees.43 An
estimated one million unregistered Afghans live permanently in Pakistan’s large urban
centers;44 many more go to Pakistan temporarily for work, family visits, or to obtain
health care. Kronenfeld estimates that “The number of crossings in a calendar year is
equivalent to well over a third of Afghanistan’s entire population.”45 This situation is
likely to persist for as long as Afghans are able to cross the border without proper
documentation.46
An additional complication is that many refugees in Pakistan have local Pakistani
identification cards, hence could pretend not to be refugees if it suits their purpose (e.g.,
seeking to avoid deportation).47
Determining who is a refugee is even more problematic because of self-definitional
issues (i.e., whether a person identifies him/herself as having been a refugee or not). As
Kronenfeld acknowledges (in seeking to explain the decline among respondents in selfidentifying as returnees), over time the experience of displacement may decrease in
significance for them.48 The fact that not all Afghans count small displacements into their
overall displacement history (e.g., across Kabul) may also suggest that reporting whether
36
Abassi Shavazi and Sadeghi (2011), p. 2.
Schmeidl and Maley (2008), p. 148.
38
D. Kronenfeld, “Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Not All Refugees, Not Always in Pakistan, Not
Necessarily Afghan?” Journal for Refugee Studies, Vol. 21 (2008), pp. 1–21.
39
Schmeidl and Maley (2008), p.167, see also Turton and Marsden (2002).
40
Kronenfeld (2011), p. 5.
41
Grare and Maley (2011), p. 4.
42
Koepke (2011); Grare and Maley (2011), p. 3.
43
Koepke (2011), p. 8.
44
Tahir (2011).
45
Kronenfeld (2011), p. 13, referring to E. Davin and N. Majidi, “Study on Cross Border Population
Movements between Afghanistan and Pakistan” (Kabul: Altai/UNHCR, 2009).
46
I have observed over the years several times at the main border crossing in Torkham that Afghans were
able to cross without an ID card. Similar stories exist about the border crossing in Spin Boldak and at the
numerous unofficial ones scattered alongside the joint border.
47
Schmeidl and Maley (2008) and numerous discussions with Afghan friends and colleagues.
48
Schmeidl and Maley (2008).
37
7
MEI-FRS (c) – August 2011
or not one has been displaced does indeed depend on how salient the displacement
experience for the individual was.49
The case of Afghanistan’s nomads — the Kuchi — raises the question of whether
migratory communities can ever be considered as officially displaced.50 After all, “the
notion of what constitutes ‘home’ or what it means to ‘return home’, after lengthy periods
in exile in Pakistani refugee camps, is particularly difficult for Kuchi populations.”51
No less difficult than determining who is a refugee is determining who is an internally
displaced person (IDP). Majidi brings this problem into sharp focus by asking how can
displaced populations (IDPs or secondary displaced returnees) be distinguished from
traditional “voluntary” rural migrants living in the same urban areas?52 Indeed, 92% of all
IDPs fled from rural areas,53 citing flight as their primary coping strategy “in situations of
violent conflict, harassment, or natural disaster.”54 But who is to say insecurity was the
key reason for their flight? After all, “[i]n practice, most migration has elements of both
coercion and volition, and is likely to be motivated by a mixture of economic and
political factors.” 55
Determining when displacement ends: In theory, displacement ends when a refugee
returns to his/her home country and an IDP returns to his/her place of origin. In
Afghanistan, however, the situation is anything but this clear cut. The
situation in Afghanistan, however, is anything but this clear cut. Many Afghans are
unable to return to their pre-conflict place of origin and, as a result, experience
secondary displacement or again leave the country as migrant workers. Though displaced,
they are not necessarily counted as such.
Kronenfeld points out that, “[t]ens of thousands of Afghans daily cross back and forth
into Pakistan and Iran in search of work, education, health care, and other needs ― a
migration that is symptomatic, some believe, of Afghanistan’s inability to provide basic
services for its population.”56
With respect to IDPs, as opposed to refugees, “the question of when displacement ends,
or more specifically, when IDPs are no longer considered vulnerable as a result of their
displacement, is particularly relevant in the Afghan context and has significant
consequences for the targeting of appropriate assistance and the development of advocacy
strategies that will ultimately lead to durable solutions.”57
49
Kronenfeld (2011), p. 6.
S. Schmeidl and A. Mundt, “Nomads or Internally Displaced? The Transformation of Afghanistan's
Kuchi.” Paper presented at the 51th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association (New
Orleans, LA, February 17–20, 2010).
51
Ibid., p. 2.
52
Majidi (2011), p. 4.
53
Majidi (2011), p. 8.
54
Schmeidl et al. (2010).
55
A. Betts, Forced Migration and Global Politics. (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), p. 4, as cited in Majidi (2011),
p. 5. See also Schmeidl et al. (2010).
56
Kronenfeld (2011), p. 2.
57
Schmeidl et al. (2010), p. xviii.
50
8
MEI-FRS (c) – August 2011
Until the Afghan government is willing to consider local integration in areas other than
pre-displacement place of origin, many Afghans may remain internally displaced for a
long time, even if they have found a new habitat and managed to integrate
economically.58 According to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement59 an IDP
who is unable to find adequate livelihood in his/her habitual place of residence is still
considered displaced even if s/he goes through the motions of return in order to be struck
off official IDP records only to become a migrant laborer.60 Yet, in effect, this strips IDPs
of their basic rights to protection and assistance.
2. The politicization of (refugee) displacement
Although Afghanistan is not the only displacement situation that has been highly
politicized, it has been argued that in this case “the humanitarian and political dimensions
… were [particularly] mutually reinforcing.”61 In the early years of the Afghan refugee
crisis, “big numbers” were used as a means of discrediting the Soviet Union.62 After
2001, refugee return was encouraged in order to demonstrate that Afghanistan had
entered a new, peaceful era.63
According to Grare and Maley, Afghan refugees have been a “strategic asset” and not
“exclusively a potential strategic liability” for Pakistan.64 They contend that, over the
years, Pakistan has used (even fuelled) displacement in Afghanistan to serve its own
regional and international political objectives,65 including continuing to obtain support
from the United States.66 Thus, while Pakistan officially promotes refugee return largely
in order to cater to a domestic constituency, it still needs Afghan refugees both to garner
international support and serve as scapegoats for the expansion of terrorism.67 While
more cautiously than Grare and Maley, Mohmand also argues that the Government of
Pakistan was complicit in the failure to prevent the civil war in Afghanistan that broke
out in 1992,68 leading to renewed displacement.
While Mohmand emphasizes the “Herculean task both administratively and financially”
that Pakistan endured in its quest to care for the Afghan refugees, Grare and Maley
consider Pakistan’s refugee management as “fraught with contradictions” rather than
based on “logical cost-benefit assessments.”69 That being said, Mohmand ultimately
58
Schmeidl et al. (2010).
UNOCHA, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (New York: United Nations Publications,
2001), http://www3.brookings.edu/fp/projects/idp/resources/GPEnglish.pdf.
60
Schmeidl et al. (2010) discusses the example of the Zhari Dasht IDP camp in Kandahar province, pp. 33–
35, 80–83.
61
A.R. Zolberg, A. Suhrke, and S. Aguayo, Escape from Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the
Developing World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 154.
62
F. Grare, “The Geopolitics of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan,” in S.J. Stedman and F. Tanner, eds.,
Refugee Manipulation: War, Politics and the Abuse of Human Suffering (Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution Press, 2003), pp. 57–95.
63
Schmeidl and Maley (2011).
64
Grare and Maley (2011), p. 7.
65
See also Grare (2003).
66
Ibid., p. 7.
67
Ibid.
68
Mohmand (2011), p. 3.
69
Mohmand (2011), p. 5; Grare and Maley (2011), p. 1,
59
9
MEI-FRS (c) – August 2011
concedes that “the world would be different” if Pakistan had not “provided the enabling
conditions“ for Afghan refugees to take their turn in fighting against the Soviet
occupation.70 Yet he does not go as far as making it some implicit and even explicit
policy of the Pakistani governments, as Grare and Maley assert.
The politicization of displacement can have some positive impact on the affected
population. Indeed, Afghan refugees in the early years did benefit from generous
assistance, and most resettlements occurred when it still fit the Cold War mold.71
However, the effects of the politicization of the Afghan refugee situation since 2001
appear to be decidedly negative. Afghan refugees have increasingly been perceived as
having overstayed their welcome in Pakistan and Iran. Donor funds have been viewed as
necessary to rebuild Afghanistan and “absorb returnees,”72 not keep refugees in exile.
Moreover, international actors were much slower to respond to return slowing down and
renewed displacement starting. Kronenfeld observes that “the sharpest decrease in
satisfaction […] occurs between returnees who repatriated before and after 2004.”
Neither of his two explanations (earlier returnees had more resources and time to adjust
to life in Afghanistan), however, link the finding to a turning of the tide in Afghanistan.
Some observers, including Mohmand and myself, saw 2004 as the beginning of when
things in Afghanistan started to slowly go wrong.73 Since 2005 security has deteriorated
across Afghanistan, humanitarian access has decreased and civilian casualties have been
on the rise.74 After 2005, return to Afghanistan also started to slow down; however, it
took UNHCR and the international community until 2008 to acknowledge this trend.75
The role of international military forces is another element that likely played into the
intentional or unintentional ignoring of renewed internal displacement and the
assumption that new “conflict affected” internal displacement is “a short-term
phenomenon, linked only to the more visible aspects of military engagement.”76 Both
Jacob Rothing and Sumbul Rizivi see “the intensifying conflict between the Afghan
government and its international supporter and the insurgency”77 as the principal cause of
renewed displacement. Rothing, however, makes the responsibly of international actors
most explicit:
The US military and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
operations in insurgent strongholds, including the “surge” have been big
contributing factors of renewed displacement. Some IDPs flee
preventively, that is, to escape improvised explosive devices (IEDs), aerial
bombardment, attacks and night raids. Others flee in order to escape
various armed actors whose practices of intimidation and harassment
70
Mohmand (2011), p. 10.
Schmeidl and Maley (2008), p. 161.
72
Kronenfeld (2011), p. 9.
73
Mohmand (2011); S. Schmeidl, “The Emperor’s New Cloth: The Unravelling of Peacebuilding in
Afghanistan,” Friedens-Warte – Journal of International Peace and Organizations, Nos. 1–2(2007), pp.
69–86.
74
Macdonald (2011), p. 7.
75
Schmeidl (2007).
76
Schmeidl et al. (2008), p. 52.
77
Rizvi (2011), p. 3.
71
10
MEI-FRS (c) – August 2011
include extortion, forced recruitment, and the feeding and caring for
wounded combatants. Still others are unable to fend for themselves: their
homes, fields and other productive assets have all been destroyed.78
A new displacement crisis simply did not fit the Western narrative of reconstruction,
development, and state-building.79 Nor does it really fit at present the international efforts
for transition in 2014. Rothing notes: “While such politicization of displacement is by no
means new, […], the pendulum seems to have swung from accommodating displacement
to trying to downplay it, with dangerous consequences for displaced populations.”80
(Un)sustainable Return: The Holy Grail of Durable Solutions
There are generally three durable solutions to resolve refugee situations (which are fairly
similar for IDPs): return to the country of origin, local integration in the country of first
asylum and third-country resettlement. In the Afghan case, return has been the preferred
solution for both refugees and IDPs.
Indeed there has been little willingness to offer third-country resettlement aside from
high-risk cases, despite the fact that Afghans have shown successful integration in most
of the countries of resettlement.81 While many Afghans may hope that this option is again
made available, the size of the Afghan refugee population is likely not conducive and
probably never was.
There were fewer Afghan asylum-seekers in 2010 than in the previous year, which
“could, in part, be due to tighter immigration controls in destination countries, according
to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the Afghan Ministry of Refugees and
Returnees.”82 Afghan asylum seekers make up only 7% of the world total, a drop by 2%
from 2009.
Local integration is practiced in Iran and Pakistan, However, neither country has favored
or encouraged it. While fearing the adverse economic and environmental consequences of
local integration, they seldom acknowledge the positive impact of refugees upon their
countries.83 Mohmand argues that the Afghan refugee presence had “many wholesome
effects, which generally have been ignored by the mainstream Pakistani media.”84 He
cites their work ethic (which benefitted the construction industry) and entrepreneurship.
He specifically mentions their contributions to the carpet industry and, more generally, to
ushering in a new trade culture that ultimately helped Peshawar to become a more
sophisticated urban center.85 Similarly, Koepke cites the Afghan refugees’ positive
impact on Iran: “Despite the high costs incurred by Iran as host to one million refugees,
and more than twice that number of illegal migrants, there is no doubt that it also benefits
78
Rothing (2011), p. 2.
Schmeidl et al. (2010), p. 57.
80
Ibid., p. 58.
81
Schmeidl and Maley (2008), p. 162.
82
IRIN, “MIGRATION: Afghan Asylum-seekers Hit by Tighter Immigration Rules” (March 31, 2011),
http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=92329.
83
Koepke (2011), Maley and Grare (2011), and Mohmand (2011).
84
Mohmand (2011), p. 6.
85
Ibid., pp. 6–8.
79
11
MEI-FRS (c) – August 2011
from the presence of Afghans, primarily in terms of easy access to blue-collar laborers
who are willing to work.”86
Nevertheless, neighboring countries and international actors alike have pursued refugee
return as the preferred durable solution. Similarly, the Afghan government has favored
return over other options for IDPs,87 though whether return can be considered a
sustainable durable solution is open to question.88
The post-2001 repatriation to Afghanistan was not the first such experience for Afghan
refugees. None previously had proven sustainable. That being said, optimism in 2002 was
high. Initially, as Mohmand notes, “it appeared as possibly the Afghan refugee crisis had
come to an end.”89
The first large-scale return movement occurred following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989
and when the communist government finally fell in 1992. According to Mohmand, “in a
span of six months, more than one million Afghan refugees returned to their country of
origin.”90 Maley and Grare put the figure at 1.2 million.91 When civil war broke out,
return stopped.
The second return movement, albeit on a much smaller scale (about 120,000), began in
1996 when the Taliban took power.92 This return movement, too, was short-lived (though
Mohmand claims it sped up between 1999 and 2000), largely due to the brutal
authoritarian methods employed by the Taliban regime and the atrocities committed
against minorities.93
The third and largest return movement was initiated in late 2001, following the fall of the
Taliban. According to Koepke, “[i]n the circa eight-year time-frame since the
commencement of the voluntary repatriation program for Afghan refugees in April 2002
until January 2010, approximately 1.9 million Afghans returned to Afghanistan both with
the assistance of UNHCR and as spontaneous returns (i.e., undocumented Afghans who
returned without the assistance of UNHCR).”94 By early 2011, this figure had increased
86
Koepke (2011), p. 8. See also F. Adelkhah and Z. Olszewska, “The Iranian Afghans,” Iranian Studies,
Vol. 49, No. 2 (2007), pp.137–165.
87
Schmeidl and Maley (2008); Schmeidl et al. (2010).
88
Schmeidl and Maley (2008); S. Schmeidl, “Repatriation to Afghanistan: Durable Solution or
Responsibility Shifting?” Forced Migration Review, Protracted Displacement Issue 33 (September 2009),
pp. 20–22, http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR33/20-22.pdf; A. Bialczyk, “Voluntary Repatriation
and the Case of Afghanistan: A Critical Examination.” University of Oxford Refugee Studies Center
Working Paper, No. 46 (Oxford: Department of International Development, 2008); A. Monsutti, “Afghan
Transnational Networks: Looking Beyond Repatriation” (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation
Unit, 2006); A. Monsutti, “Afghan Migratory Strategies and the Three Solutions to the Refugee Problem,”
Refugee Survey Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 1 (2008), pp. 58–73.
89
Mohmand (2011), p. 4.
90
Ibid., p. 2.
91
Grare and Maley (2011), p. 2.
92
Ibid.
93
Grare and Maley (2011).
94
Koepke (2011), p. 6.
12
MEI-FRS (c) – August 2011
to nearly 2.3 million. 95 There were an estimated four million returnees from Pakistan,
bringing the total to slightly over six million returnees.96
By 2005 return had slowed and coercion increasingly played a role.97 However, it was not
until 2008 that UNHCR stated that, “… the era of mass voluntary return of Afghan
refugees is over.”98 By then, those who had wanted to go back home had done so, and
future voluntary return would likely remain small and linked to elements of coercion.99
According to UNHCR, “[a]chieving sustainable return and reintegration is becoming
more challenging in the current context. Voluntary repatriation has as a consequence
slowed down. A more gradual return at this juncture supports a more sustainable return as
the capacity of Afghanistan to absorb more returnees is stretched.”100
Mohmand observes that “[t]he biggest hurdle in the voluntary repatriation of the Afghan
refugees has been the non-conducive environment in Afghanistan, mainly due to conflict
and the Government of Afghanistan’s lack of infrastructure capacity and required level of
focus on returnee issues.”101 Macdonald explores two key obstacles to voluntary return:
lack of access to land and the lack of access by humanitarian actors to assist refugees due
to the complex and insecure environment.102
Authors disagree about Afghanistan’s capacity to provide services to the returnees,
especially in an increasingly insecure environment. However, in 2008 UNHCR already
had conceded that “the Afghanistan experience has highlighted the complexity of the
repatriation and reintegration process, which has proven to be a much more sustained and
complex challenge than initially anticipated.”103
Contrary to several authors, including most of those who prepared studies for this
project,104 Kronenfeld concludes that “returnees are no worse off for having returned”
and that “Afghanistan as a country is not necessarily worse off as a result of the record
returns.”105 Majidi and Macdonald, in particular, disagree with Kronenfeld’s positive
95
Kronenfeld (2011), p. 4, citing UNHCR figures.
Ibid.
97
Schmeidl and Maley (2008).
98
Macdonald (2011), p. 2.
99
Schmeidl and Maley (2008), Schmeidl (2009); K. Koser and S. Schmeidl, “Displacement, Human
Development, and Security in Afghanistan,” in H. Amr, ed., Displacement in the Muslim World: A Focus
on Afghanistan and Iraq. The Brookings Project on US Relations with the Islamic World, Doha Discussion
Papers (Washington, DC: Saban Center at The Brookings Institution, 2009), pp. 18–22,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2009/0216_iraq_ferris/0216_iraq_ferris.pdf.
100
2011 UNHCR country operations profile – Afghanistan, http://www.unhcr.org/cgibin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e486eb6.
101
Mohmand (2011), p. 9.
102
Macdonald (2011), p. 3.
103
UNHCR, “Protracted Refugee Situations: A discussion Paper Prepared for the High Commissioner’s
Dialogue on Protection Challenges” (November 20, 2008), p. 9,
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/492fb92d2.html.
104
Monsutti (2006 and 2008); Schmeidl and Maley (2008); Bialczyk (2008); Schmeidl (2009); Koser and
Schmeidl (2009).
105
Kronenfeld (2011), p. 3. His analysis is based on survey data collected by the Afghan Center for Socioeconomic Opinion Research through a total of 4,607 interviews from each of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces
over a period of seven days (July 29–August 4, 2010). The survey was commissioned by the US
Department of State’s Office of Opinion Research and claims representative sampling, which in itself is
96
13
MEI-FRS (c) – August 2011
assessment that “71.8% [returnees] say their lives have improved since returning to
Afghanistan.”106 Kronenfeld does acknowledge, however, that “[e]arlier returnees are
marginally more positive than later returnees, indicating a potential point of diminishing
returns in the repatriation process.”107
To Kronenfeld’s credit, he does consider
alternative explanations for his somewhat
provocative findings: “There are a number
of reasons why respondents may look back
positively on their decision to return: to
express patriotism, or to avoid appearing
unpatriotic; to appear grateful to an
interviewer whom the respondent may
associate with international donors or aid
agencies who helped with repatriation; or,
on a deeper level, to reduce cognitive
dissonance
following
a
difficult
108
He also acknowledges that
decision.”
“Afghanistan remains one of the poorest
countries in the world, and many returnees,
like the rest of the population, experience
very serious economic challenges.”109
Afghans are increasingly caught in situation
where neither their home country nor the
two main countries of asylum are very
appealing (see Box 2).110 Thus, it is not
surprising that internal displacement in
Afghanistan is rising, as is labor migration
to other countries, such as the United Arab
Emirates (UAE).
Iran, undeterred by the situation in
Afghanistan (after briefly wavering in 2008
when voluntary return slowed), “reiterated
its main refugee policy, that is, the
continued voluntary repatriation of refugees
to Afghanistan …”111 The June 28, 2010
Tripartite Commission meeting, “among a
Box 2: Key development barriers to durable
solutions for refugees and IDPs:
•
•
•
•
Rights to land, property and houses that
belonged to the displaced are in many
return situations contested, or the assets
of the returnees have been taken over by
others.
Livelihoods are disrupted or dependent
on humanitarian aid, and livelihood
rehabilitation is critical if solutions to
displacement are to become sustainable,
both if the displaced return home or if
they have to integrate elsewhere.
Delivery of services such as security,
education and health along with basic
infrastructure are frequently inadequate
or absent both in places of exile and upon
return.
Accountable and responsive governance
and rule of law are often weak particularly
at the local level, government capacity is
limited, its legitimacy damaged, and social
capital at the community level is impaired.
Source: N. Harild and A. Christensen, “The
Development Challenge of finding Durable
Solutions for Refugees and Internally
Displaced People,” World Development
Report 2011 Background Note (Washington,
DC: The World Bank, July 30, 2010), p.4,
http://wdr2011.worldbank.org/sites/default/fi
les/pdfs/WDR%20Background%20Note%20on.
questionable given the lack of adequate census data in Afghanistan, something Kronenfeld acknowledges in
his paper.
106
Ibid., p. 7.
107
Ibid., p. 7.
108
Kronenfeld (2011), pp. 7–8.
109
Ibid., p. 9.
110
Schmeidl et al. (2010) and Schmeidl (2009).
111
Abassi Shavazi and Sadeghi (2011) and Koepke (2011).
14
MEI-FRS (c) – August 2011
range of other outcomes, … resulted in an agreement for UNHCR to reopen four
voluntary repatriation centers.”112 In an effort to keep the number of Afghans in Iran in
check, the Iranian government has not refrained from forceful deportations, largely of
what they consider illegal immigrants.113
Similarly, Pakistan signed a Tripartite Agreement114 in which “the UNHCR agreed to
continue to assist the voluntary repatriation of Afghan refugees from Pakistan for three
years starting in 2003.”115 This has been subsequently extended twice, “once up to
December 2009 and a second time until the end of 2012.”116 Thus, in theory, “there
should be no Afghan refugees in Pakistan after 2012.” 117
In the opinion of Abbasi Shavazi and Sadeghi, however, the success or failure of Iran’s
repatriation policy hinges very much on the second-generation Afghan refugee
population, which is considerable, as they have undergone great identity changes due to
their adaptation into Iranian society. 118 According to Abbasi Shavazi and Sadeghi,
“[o]nly 6% of the second generation stated that they intend to return to Afghanistan
immediately,119 with the overwhelming majority wanting to remain in Iran for the time
being.120 While Mohmand focuses mostly on the non-conducive environment as an
impediment refugee return from Pakistan, others121 have found trends among secondgeneration Afghans in Pakistan similar to those described by Abassi Shavazi and Sadeghi
in Iran.122 The decision for young Afghans in Pakistan, however, does not seem to be as
clear cut as for their counterparts in Iran. According to a 2007 study by Saito and Hunte,
a majority is inactive and struggles with their decision (70%), with only 8% having no
112
Koepke (2011), p. 7.
Schmeidl and Maley (2008); A. Quraishi, “Iran Expels Thousands of Afghan Refugees,” Kabul:
Pajhwok Afghan News (February 7, 2011), http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2011/02/07/iran-expels-thousandsafghan-refugees.
114
“Afghans in Pakistan: Broadening the Focus” (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit,
Briefing Paper, January 2006); http://www.researchcollective.org/Documents/Afghans_in_Pakistan.pdf.
115
Mohmand (2011), p. 9.
116
Ibid.
117
Ibid., p. 10.
118
“A comparative analysis of intention and plans among various social and demographic groups indicated
that females, those with lower education, those with low economic status of the family, those with legal
residence documents, and those with higher satisfaction with life and conditions in Iran, and those lacking
experience of discrimination experience and having longer periods of family residence in Iran were more
willing to remain in Iran as compared with their counterparts. On the other hand, those who were educated,
those who experienced discrimination, those who had a low level of satisfaction, and those whose family
had a shorter period of residence in Iran were more willing to return to Afghanistan.” Abassi Shavazi and
Sadeghi (2011), p. 10.
119
Ibid. (2011), p. 8.
120
Ibid., p. 10.
121
M. Saito and P. Hunte, “To Return or to Remain: The Dilemma of Second-generation Afghans in
Pakistan” (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2007).
122
A. Monsutti (in collaboration with M.J. Abbasi Shavazi, D. Glazebrook, G. Habibi, G. Jamshidiha, H.
Mahmoudian, R. Sadeghi, and E. Stigter), Afghan Translational Networks: Looking Beyond Repatriation
(Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2006); UNHCR, “Humanitarian Consideration With
Regard to Return to Afghanistan” (May 2006), http://www.unhcr.org/cgibin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=4561c4094. See also Grare (2003) and Turton and Marsden (2002).
113
15
MEI-FRS (c) – August 2011
intention to return in the near future; 14% are planning to go abroad while about 15% are
taking action to return to Afghanistan.123
Koepke points out that, “[f]or many [Afghans in Iran], the idea of returning to rural areas
in Afghanistan which most commonly offer extremely basic infrastructure, social services
and employment opportunities, is daunting. In addition, Iranian-educated graduates are
not infrequently exposed to varying degrees of prejudice upon their return to
Afghanistan.”124 Similarly, many younger Afghans have become accustomed to living in
Pakistan,125 with “[p]ractical environmental conditions such as availability of services,
shelter and work, and social factors all affect[ing] attitudes toward return. 126 In general,
the experience abroad, “especially the exposure to a semi-urban lifestyle, higher
standards of living, better public services (health, education) and employment
opportunities, all [make] refugees more reluctant to go home, irrespective of the situation
at home.”127
Abbasi Shavazi and
disproportionately:
Sadeghi
emphasize
that
this
affects
young
women
[D]espite their families’ control over their contacts with the host society,
[female Afghan refugees] have experienced a significant increase in their
level of literacy and education, are more integrated into Iranian society,
have a greater sense of attachment to Iran, and are thus less willing to
return to Afghanistan. It seems that Afghan women have a better situation
and relatively better access to a gender equitable environment in Iran than
they do in Afghanistan. Given the discrimination in Afghanistan against
women, they have a feeling of greater freedom in Iran, and are thus fearful
of returning to Afghanistan.128
In light of the above, Kronenfeld concludes that,
[t]he questionable sustainability of returns and the fluidity of cross-border
movement ― whether seen as negative or positive ― have given rise to
calls for a reevaluation of the focus on voluntary returns in Afghanistan
and an exploration of alternative means of ensuring protection for
Afghans. These include promoting temporary rather than durable
solutions, sanctioning new frameworks for migration, reconsidering
UNHCR’s institutional environment, and revising refugee legal
protections to more faithfully serve a varied and mobile population.
Ultimately, the implications of such changes in approach would extend
well beyond Afghanistan.129
123
Saito and Hunte (2007), p. x.
Koepke (2011), p. 6.
125
E. Stigter, “Afghan Migration Strategies — An Assessment of Repatriation and Sustainable Return in
Response to the Convention Plus,” Refugee Survey Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2 (2006), pp. 109–122.
126
Saito and Hunte (2007), p. 17.
127
Schmeidl and Maley (2010), p. 170.
128
Abassi Shavazi and Sadeghi (2011), p. 12.
129
Kronenfeld (2011), p. 2.
124
16
MEI-FRS (c) – August 2011
Internal Displacement: The New Face of Afghan Forced Migration
Sumbul Rizvi, a UNHCR Senior Protection Officer and Afghanistan Protection Cluster
Coordinator, notes the steady rise of conflict-inducted IDPS in Afghanistan. She
introduces the term “conflict-induced IDPs,” signifying “civilians fleeing active combat
between the Afghan National Army (ANA), international military forces (IM), and a
diverse insurgency as well as to those fleeing due to fear of persecution and intimidation
by parties to the conflict and other armed groups.”130
As of March 2011, UNHCR reports a total of 416,593 conflict-induced IDPS (or 68,151
IDP families).131 Furthermore, according to Jacob Rothing from the Internal
Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), “between 2006 and 2010, on average, 400
Afghans were displaced daily, but only 18 returns of internally displaced people (IDPs)
were verified and assisted.132 This brings the total of recorded conflict-induced IDPs
since 2006 to about 730,000.133
A recent study by IDMC, however, concedes that “[t]he true figures could be far higher”
due to the problems of humanitarian access and “regulated” camp environments which
would facilitate the counting.134 The 2010 study of displacement in Kandahar by the
Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement and The Liaison Office provides a
glimpse of the possible size of underestimation. It identifies 3–4 times more IDPs in
Kandahar than in UNHCR records, albeit some were “old caseloads.”135
Rizvi observes that, “[d]espite the limitations on IDP tracking due to shrinking
humanitarian space, […] the first quarter of 2011 (January–March 2011) witnessed a
rapid rise in conflict-induced displacements, with a total of 57,290 persons estimated as
new IDPs across the country.”136
The majority (59%) of all these conflict-induced IDPs can be found in Afghanistan’s
southern region, which is bearing the brunt of the international military “surge” against
the Taliban insurgency. For example, “The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) confirmed
that of the 3,800 families displaced from Nad Ali and Marjah districts [in Helmand]
during a major counterinsurgency operation in February 2010, about 900 (300 from Nad
Ali and 600 from Marjah) still remain in Lashkargah.”137
The second largest increase in IDPs (26%) was witnessed in northern and northwestern
Afghanistan (especially Baghlan, Kunduz, and Faryab) due to an ever-expanding
130
Rizvi (2011), p. 1.
Ibid., p. 2.
132
Rothing (2011), p. 1.
133
IDMC, “Armed conflict forces increasing numbers of Afghans to flee their homes: A profile of the
internal displacement situation” (Geneva: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and Norwegian
Refugee Council, April 11, 2011); p. 5, http://www.internaldisplacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/%28httpInfoFiles%29/3E5B840FE3A6D72BC125786F003FF157/$
file/Afghanistan+-+April+2011.pdf.
134
Ibid., p. 7.
135
Schmeidl et al. (2010), pp. 20–24.
136
Rizvi (2011), p. 2.
137
IRIN, “Afghanistan: Call for Help for IDPs, Deportees in Helmand” (January 10, 2011),
http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=91592.
131
17
MEI-FRS (c) – August 2011
insurgency, but also to the proliferation of local irregular militia. This process is ongoing
as a June 6, 2011 IRIN report highlights: “Clashes between government forces and the
Taliban have displaced at least 12,000 people in Afghanistan's remote northwestern
province of Faryab.”138
The East, traditionally having more IDPs (or at least returnees), only witnessed an
increase of 10%, but more displacement is expected with the current clashes in Nuristan
and Kunar. According to a BBC report, “Afghan intelligence officials in the province of
Nuristan have accused the central government and NATO forces in particular of ignoring
insurgents there and in other strategically important areas close to the Pakistani border.
They say that increasing violence in Nuristan ― and in the provinces of Laghman, Kunar
and Nangarhar ― poses a significant security threat.”139
According to both Rizvi and Rothing, internal displacement in Afghanistan is rising, due
to an increasingly deteriorating security situation in large parts linked to the intensifying
conflict between a resilient insurgency and Afghan National Security Forces and
International Military.140 Rizvi reports that, “[i]n 2010, a 43% increase in civilian deaths
was reported in the South, which witnessed over 50% of all assassinations and executions
nation-wide, killing over 100 Afghan civilians.”141
The first half of 2011 witnessed 51% more security incidents than during the same period
in 2010. “Suicide attacks have increased significantly since March 2011, with 17 suicide
attacks in April, including five complex attacks, a higher number than any month in
2010.”142 This trend continued in May, which registered more civilian casualties than any
other month since 2007. Georgette Gagnon, the human rights director of the UN
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), expressed concern that violence would
escalate even further and continue throughout the summer.143 Events in June and July
confirmed that such concern was justified.144
Afghans are increasingly caught, especially in contested areas, between an insurgency
willing to embed with civilians and/or use civilian targets and an international military
stepping up their capture/kill missions through night raids.145 On the one hand,
communities suffer intimidation and forced taxation by the insurgency while on the other
138
IRIN, “Afghanistan: Clashes Displace 12,000 in Faryab Province” (June 26, 2011),
http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=92909.
139
B. Sarwary, “Afghan-Pakistan Border Like ‘House Without Door,’” BBC News (June 22, 2011),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13856997.
140
Rothing (2011) and Rizvi (2011).
141
Rizvi (2011), p. 4.
142
UN Security Council, “The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and
Security.” Sixty-fifth session Sixty-sixth year, Agenda item 38; A/65/873–S/2011/381 (New York: United
Nations, June 23, 2011), p. 1, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_1534.pdf.
143
IRIN, “AFGHANISTAN: Worrying Spike in Civilian Deaths.”
144
Ibid.
145
Schmeidl (2011); Schmeidl et al. 2010; S. Schmeidl and A. Mundt, “The Failure to Protect: BattleAffected IDPs in Southern Afghanistan” (Washington, DC/Kabul: The Brookings-Bern Project on Internal
Displacement/The Liaison Office, 2009),
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/0622_afghanistan_mundt.aspx.
18
MEI-FRS (c) – August 2011
hand they endure aerial attacks and Special Forces operations by international military
forces.146
A second cause of displacement (including secondary displacement of returnees) is the
increasing number of conflicts over land and other resources (as Macdonald observes).
Formal courts are often either non-existent, lack capacity, or fraught with corruption.
Thus a majority of such disputes are resolved, if at all, in the informal domain where
traditional dispute mechanisms themselves have progressively weakened.147
Last but not least, increasing levels of crime such as abductions, and continuing poor
socio-economic opportunities at home have led to “a growing sense of anxiety about the
future of their country are the main push factors for Afghan asylum-seekers and migrants,
according to aid agencies.”148
While in the past, however, displaced populations often went abroad, another
development has been the closing of exit options. As already mentioned, tighter
migration control in Western countries of asylum have been implemented, and both Iran
and Pakistan are no longer as welcoming as they once were, both for a mix of political
and economic reasons. Grare and Maley observe that refugees “are facing increasing
constraints ... and the new generation of refugees does not enjoy the same degree of
protection.”149 Furthermore, “while continuing its policy of voluntary repatriation, the
Iranian government is now taking positive steps to constructively address the ongoing
problem of illegal Afghan migrant labor in Iran,”150 but, as noted earlier, is also still using
deportations as a deterrent.
In Pakistan, however, an added element has been the deteriorating security situation.
“Many parts of Pakistan are insecure, and Quetta is a dangerous place for Shiite Hazara
refugees as it has become a hotbed for the Afghan Taliban.”151 Grare and Maley thus
conclude that “[g]iven current developments in Pakistan, it is obvious that the Afghan
refugee problem is likely to become increasingly unmanageable.”152
146
Rizvi (2011), p. 4. See also IDMC (2011).
Rothing (2011), p. 7. See also S. Schmeidl, “Engaging Traditional Justice Mechanisms in Afghanistan:
State-building Opportunity or Dangerous Liaison?” in W. Mason, ed., The Rule of Law in Afghanistan: The
Rule of Law in Afghanistan: Missing in Inaction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 149–
172.
148
IRIN, “MIGRATION: Afghan Asylum-seekers Hit by Tighter Immigration Rules,” (March 31, 2011),
http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=92329.
149
Grare and Maley (2011) , p. 5.
150
Koepke (2011), p. 10.
151
Grare and Maley (2011), p. 4.
152
Ibid., p. 8.
147
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MEI-FRS (c) – August 2011
Protracted Urbanized Displacement
Insecurity and lack of service delivery are driving more and more returnees and IDPs to
seek refuge in Afghanistan’s large urban centers, above all Kabul.153 Afghanistan’s
capital, considered to be “one of the fastest growing cities in the region,”154 has gown
three-fold over the past six years, “from 1.5 million in 2001 to 4.5 million in 2007, and
estimates reaching over 5 million people today.”155
As Majidi notes, the problem with displaced populations in urban settings is
distinguishing them from rural-urban economic migrants and more generally the urban
poor,156 albeit this is generally more difficult in the big urban sprawl of Kabul than in
other Afghan cities.157 She goes on to argue, “[w]hile the line between voluntary
migration and forced displacement is often blurred at the field level, it remains important
to distinguish between migration and displacement given the different risks and
vulnerabilities associated with each and the corresponding responses required.” 158
A majority of the urban displaced (76%) are relatively recent arrivals (post-2002), with
over 40% having been displaced for more than five years159 (hence counting as
protracted). About a quarter (26%) is secondary displaced due to insecurity and the
inability to find adequate livelihoods in their areas of origin.160 Most urban returnees
surveyed by Majidi had lived an average of 15 years as refugees in Iran or Pakistan.161
A recently launched study by The World Bank and UNHCR in three urban centers in
Afghanistan (Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat) in 2010 concludes that people are drawn to
cities primarily in the search for security (63%), and only secondarily to gain improved
employment opportunities (11%) and access to services (11%).162 That being said, a 2010
study by the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement and the The Liaison
Office also noted that “pull factors (e.g., economic/livelihood options, relative security,
and the existence of IDP enclaves/kinship networks and shared cultural characteristics
with host communities) … mainly influence where IDPs go — not whether they feel
forced to leave their places of origin.”163
A key difference between the urban displaced and their counterparts in camps is that they
former “are most likely to stay where they are, putting an end to the myth of return. Once
153
Other key destinations include Jalalabad to the East, Kandahar to the South, and to a lesser extent Herat
to the West and Kunduz to the North. That being said many other major cities also draw in returnees, IDPs
and migrants; see Majidi (2011), Macdonald (2011) and Research Study on IDPs in Urban Settings ―
Afghanistan 2011
154
J. Beall and D. Esser,” Shaping Urban Futures: Challenges to Governing and Managing Afghan Cities”
(Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, March 2005), p. 11.
155
Majidi (2011), p. 1; Macdonald (2010), citing International Crisis Group Report No. 175, Afghanistan:
What Now for Refugees? (August 31, 2009).
156
Majidi (2011).
157
Schmeidl et al. (2010).
158
Majidi 2011, p. 1.
159
Research Study on IDPs in Urban Settings ― Afghanistan (2011), p. 20.
160
Ibid., pp. 20–21.
161
Majidi (2011), p. 1.
162
Ibid., p. 20.
163
Schmeidl et al. (2010), pp. xvi–xvii.
20
MEI-FRS (c) – August 2011
they have moved all their belongings, lost their sources of livelihoods and often their
homes, there is little for these families to return to; in the case of returnees, coming back
after an average of 15 years of exile, they might not have any land or homes to go back
to, even in their areas of origin.”164
Addressing the Protection and Assistance Gap
Refugees, returnees, and IDPs have the right to protection and humanitarian assistance. It
is here, however, where large gaps exist. The context — “a complex insurgency, the lack
of governmental capacity, an insufficient legal framework to protect the rights of IDPs, a
multiplicity of international actors with differing interpretations of protection”165 —
while difficult is not unique.
Indeed, the Afghan government has been labeled more than once as being either
unwilling or unable to assist its displaced populations and returnees.166 According to
Macdonald, a major problem is that the Ministry of Refugees and Returns, “is one of the
most poorly resourced and challenged of all government Ministries in Afghanistan.”167
Furthermore, hardly any key development programs at the sub-national governance level
cater to the displaced, and often only to returnees if they go back to their pre-conflict
habitat. There is a need to better assess how Afghan government programs can provide
better assistance for IDPs. In 2010 the Ministry for Rural Rehabilitation and
Development did tender a study in order to determine whether its flagship program, the
National Solidarity Program (NSP), was catering to IDPs, but this study either was
abandoned or is still ongoing. An earlier study, however, found that most NSP shuras
excluded displaced populations as they saw the latter as temporary guests and not
permanent community members.168
Macdonald discusses the problems with the existing Land Allocation Scheme (LAS),
“established by the Government of Afghanistan in 2005 under Presidential Decree No.
104 whereby intact and uncultivated government land is supposed to be redistributed to
landless returnees and IDPs.”169 This includes corruption, mismanagement,
misinformation or misinterpretation, bureaucratic delays, and availability generally
limited to those that can demonstrate they are originally from the area where the scheme
is rolled out.170
Rizvi also notes that “[t]he absence of timely information on IDPs displaced within
conflict zones has a critical impact on any possible humanitarian redress of material
assistance and other protection needs.”171 Obtaining such information, however, has been
hampered by two issues. One is the increasingly limited access of humanitarian actors.
164
Majidi (2011), p. 11. See also Schmeidl et al. (2010) and Macdonald (2011).
Schmeidl et al. (2010), p. 50.
166
Rothing (2011), IDMC (2011), and Schmeidl et al. (2010).
167
Macdonald (2011), p. 6.
168
Schmeidl et al. (2011).
169
Macdonald (2011), pp. 5–6.
170
Macdonald (2011), Schmeidl et al. (2010), and IDMC (2011), pp. 51–52.
171
Rizvi (2011), p. 5. (This was also observed in the Iraqi case.)
165
21
MEI-FRS (c) – August 2011
This creates a vicious cycle ― the same violence and insecurity that continues to fuel
internal displacement also impedes the knowledge needed to develop and deliver
adequate assistance schemes. The other is the problem of displaced populations “blending
in” with the urban poor and rural-urban migrants driven by economic motives. As Majidi
demonstrated, however, this problem can be overcome through detailed studies.
Last but not least, there are “distinct challenges for military and humanitarian actors in
trying to balance civilian protection with larger geopolitical goals.”172 There are
somewhat irrational fears of making displaced populations aid-dependent, which seem a
strange concern coming from a rentier state and an international community having
shown ample willingness to shower funds on development projects for the purpose of
buying “hearts and minds” in support of their military campaign.
Furthermore, it is indeed a tragic “irony of the current security situation in Afghanistan
… that foreign forces, whose ostensible aim is to protect civilians while fighting the
Taliban, may be responsible ― directly or indirectly ― for the bulk of internally
displaced persons (IDPs) in the country, whose number is rising.”173 Despite a steep
learning curve in terms of minimizing civilian deaths, “[t]he possible negative
repercussions of increased population displacement seems at times [still] an afterthought
in the current political and military discourse.”174
In light of the above, while the fact that there is a growing IDP crisis in Afghanistan
seems to slowly be sinking in, assistance and protection failures have left a majority of
(conflict-induced) IDPs to fend for themselves. This has created coping schemes that are
not necessarily in the interest of international actors, such as seeking protection from
local strongmen or even from the insurgency. 175
Conclusion
In June 2011, a journalist pitched the failure of sustainable reintegration in Afghanistan in
typically provocative fashion: “International assistance gives returning Afghans shelter,
but no way to make a living.”176 The article goes on to quote the current director of
UNHCR: “‘The problem in Afghanistan is not only transition and the war against the
Taliban. There is another problem which is the integration of a huge number of people—
we are talking more than 10 percent of the population who need targeted international
assistance ― otherwise they become a risk factor.’”177 This applies in practice to both
returnees and internally displaced and has lead to a protracted displacement situation and
the rise of urban IDPs and returnees/secondary displaced.
172
Schmeidl et al. (2010), p. 50.
IRIN, “Conflict Leads to Afghan Displacement, But Which Side Most to Blame?” (April 21, 2011),
http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=92548.
174
Schmeidl et al. (2010), p. 52.
175
Schmeidl et al. (2010).
176
T. Schultz, “Why Afghan Returnees Could Become Taliban Recruits,” Global Post (June 20, 2011),
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/afghanistan/110619/afghanistan-unhcrtaliban.
177
Ibid.
173
22
MEI-FRS (c) – August 2011
Thus, nearly ten years after assisted refugee returns to Afghanistan began, the once
success story no longer is one, and maybe never was. Kronenfeld concludes that “analysts
are certainly correct that repatriation has not been the panacea some had initially hoped.
Afghanistan’s immense poverty, its ongoing security difficulties, and the massive
continuing migration across its borders all suggest an exclusive emphasis on repatriation
is neither ‘feasible nor desirable.’”178
Yet, Kronenfeld might also be correct in arguing that the “returns program may not have
been as ruinous as some feared,”179 as the current insurgency is not necessarily driven by
development gone awry, but by poor governance, which is something neither refugees
nor their return can be faulted with. That being said, as Afghanistan also continues to be
poor and underdeveloped, the singling out of displaced population for assistance can
backfire in situations where they compete with the needs of host populations both in
Afghanistan (for returnees and IDPs) and in countries of asylum (especially Pakistan and
Iran).
Kronenfeld points out: “As long as the economies of Afghanistan and Pakistan remain
weak, there may be little the international community can do in the short term to improve
economic conditions for Afghans who live and work in both countries. What it can do is
recognize regional realities so that conditions are not made worse.”180 This also applies
especially to the larger urban areas of Afghanistan, where it is important to consider
comprehensive and integrative assistance schemes that could improve the livelihoods of
the urban poor regardless of their displacement status.181
But the fact that Afghans remain mobile need not be viewed in a negative light. Mobility
has been a way for Afghans to spread their risk; therefore, the current movement between
Afghanistan and neighboring countries may continue an old pattern. As Kronenfeld notes,
“[t]his [mobility] has been both a source of strength and a weakness for Afghans. On the
one hand, this mobility has given Afghan an important tool for coping with adversity. On
the other, it has clouded their legal status, making it difficult to provide for their
protection and search for durable solutions. Many of these people are neither refugees nor
returnees, strictly speaking, and neither permanent local resettlement nor permanent
refugee return are entirely appropriate outcomes.” 182
A displacement background can also potentially benefit Afghans, as “their experience
living in countries of asylum may be seen as a resource rather than an impediment,
resulting in economic and social ties that help sustain them during future difficulties.”183
They also are likely to benefit from remittances from abroad, especially if part of the
family has not yet returned or has established networks that aid labor migration.
178
Kronenfeld (2011), p. 14. See also A. Monsutti, “Afghan Migratory Strategies and the
Three Solutions to the Refugee Problem,” Refugee Survey Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 1 (2008), pp. 58–73.
179
Kronenfeld (2011), p. 14. See also A. Monsutti, “Afghan Migratory Strategies and the
Three Solutions to the Refugee Problem.”
180
Kronenfeld (2011), p. 15.
181
Majidi (2011).
182
Kronenfeld (2011), p. 15.
183
Kronenfeld (2011), p. 2.
23
MEI-FRS (c) – August 2011
Trickier is finding a solution for second-generation young Afghans who were either born
or raised in exile, are deeply assimilated and integrated there, and may no longer want to
return home. Here local integration schemes should be explored, as it seems unlikely that
many of them will return or easily integrate back home.
Finally, returning to the issue of politicization, Grare and Maley touch upon a key
dilemma of Afghan displacement: “It is simply impossible to solve a problem which is
political in essence by non-political means.”184 They argue further:
Pakistan has taken advantage for too long of the existing gap in the
refugee and security regimes, aiding and abetting manipulation when it is
in its own security interests, yet treating the problem as a humanitarian
concern when it has to face the consequences of this manipulation. True,
the international community bears part of the responsibility in this
situation by accepting the fiction according to which Pakistan faces such
problems exclusively because it is the ‘frontline state’ against whatever is
the problem of the moment, be it the Soviet presence in Afghanistan or
terrorism.185
Guiding Principles for International Actors
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
184
185
Stability/insecurity in Afghanistan must be seen as key to resolve the remaining
refugee population, as well as economic recovery (which is again hampered by
insecurity).
Political issues require political solutions.
How best to address the protracted displacement situation (for refugees and IDPs)
must be an integral part of the international transition strategy/plan.
Efforts must be made to reconcile the seemingly contradictory perspectives taken by
the national authorities, line ministries, and municipalities on the one hand, and the
internal and ongoing debate between agencies on the ground on the other.
Refugee assistance could be considered as “neutral ground” in terms of engaging with
Iran.
Afghanistan must not be regarded as a post-conflict situation but as a country that
remains in a state of conflict, thus requiring the strengthening of humanitarian and
development programs alike.
While prevention of displacement in the current context remains beyond the control
of humanitarian actors in the current context, intensive advocacy with parties to the
conflict, including international military forces, should be a priority.
Grare and Maley (2011), p. 9.
Grare and Maley (2011), p. 9.
24
MEI-FRS (c) – August 2011
Recommendations for International Actors
•
Consider aid conditionality when it comes to assisting both the Afghan government
in their support for IDPs and returnees and the Pakistani government for continuing
to host Afghan refugees.
•
Encourage the Pakistani government:
o To sign the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol.
o To accede to a serious independent assessment of the displacement situation in
the country.
o To review its strategy, which currently prohibits an Afghan refugee from
prolonging his/her stay in Pakistan beyond 2012.
o To refrain from ordering the closure of refugee camps until the security
situation in Afghanistan has improved.
o To ensure that refugee returns which do occur are safe, voluntary, and in
conditions of human dignity.
o To refrain from harassing refugees (e.g., arresting them on charges such as not
having “travel documents,” which they are not required to carry).
o To grant Pakistani nationality to second-generation refugees who were born in
Pakistan or have lived there for most of their lives, have acquired education,
and are settled in urban areas.
•
Encourage the Iranian government:
o To ensure that no refoulement takes place in regions where Afghans have been
asked to relocate but for a variety reasons may not have been able to do so in a
timely manner.
o To ensure that refugee returns that do occur are safe, voluntary, and in
conditions of human dignity.
o To continue its serious attempts to regularize the employment of all Afghans
living in Iran.186
o To permit all documented Afghans to apply for drivers’ licenses, bank
accounts, and insurance policies.
o To ensure that the living and working conditions of Afghans meet minimum
international standards.
o To legalize migrant labor, which could help reduce illegal migration.
o To accelerate the issuance of longer-term work permits for Afghan refugees
and clarify the process of obtaining work permits and labor visas for Afghans
living in Iran.
•
Encourage the Afghan government:
o To accept the full range of options to find durable solutions for IDPs (i.e.,
return, local integration, and/or resettlement) and develop appropriate measures
to implement them.
186
Koepke (2011) , p. 12.
25
MEI-FRS (c) – August 2011
o To assume their responsibility in developing comprehensive IDP legislation
and polices to better respond to people who have been displaced since 2005.187
o To make reintegration of returnees and IDPs part of the Afghanistan Peace and
Reintegration Program, especially where displacement was caused by
ethnic/tribal conflict.
o To revise national development initiatives and specifically targeted
community-based interventions, such as the National Solidarity Program
(NSP), the National Area-Based Development Program (NABDP), and the
National Rural Access Program (NRAP), in order to ensure access by
displaced populations.
o To devise specific joint programs between the Ministry of Refugees and
Returnees and other government ministry that the local integration (temporary
and permanent) of IDPs and returnees.
•
Address land issues and improve settlement strategies for the landless by supporting
the Afghanistan Land Authority attached to the Ministry of Agriculture in:
o Developing a comprehensive land policy and mechanisms for enforcement in
order to address the competing land laws and regulations and customary
interpretations of land ownership, access, and usage.
- revising the land allocation scheme for IDPs and Kuchi nomads,
through resolving the ambiguities in Presidential Decree No. 104,
including the reform of provisions and practices that discriminate
against the most vulnerable and impoverished landless returnees;
- amending Presidential Decree 104 on land allocation so that IDPs
can qualify for land allocation sites in areas of displacement;
- considering a new presidential decree or law on land allocation that
allows for the resettlement of IDPs in suitable locations and/or
- issuing a presidential decree on land allocation for members of the
Kuchi population who need parcels of land on which to settle; and
- increasing the transparency of beneficiary selection, location,
planning, and consideration of comprehensive service provision of
Land Allocation Schemes.
o Making available viable government land in order to support comprehensive
reintegration programs for the landless with livelihoods strategies to ensure
sustainability.
o Ensuring support of customary conflict resolution systems for the resolution of
land disputes and registration of decision with the Afghan government, along
with building the capacity of such institutions in order to ensure adherence to
state and shari‘a law and prevent discrimination against female
owners/claimants within the traditional system.
187
The Brookings Project on Internal Displacement and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) finalized a
review of Afghan laws and policies in 2010, based on national responsibility benchmarks—“Addressing
Internal Displacement: A Framework for National Responsibility”— which provides an excellent guideline.
26
MEI-FRS (c) – August 2011
•
Support the development of a comprehensive reintegration/durable solutions strategy
for Afghanistan to address the needs of all returnees irrespective of when and where
they have returned by:
o Encouraging efforts to develop and sustain a more integrated approach among
UN agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and government
partners to plan and implement a comprehensive strategy for those IDPs
affected by loss of livelihoods.
o Focusing more resources and support to relevant humanitarian organizations to
undertake targeted, coordinated, and adequately funded reintegration programs
that transcend initial transit support and remain firmly outside counterinsurgency stabilization strategies.
o Prioritizing issues of landlessness and urbanization as well as the application of
the Durable Solutions Framework.
o Supporting the development of a comprehensive and integrated assistance
packages that allow support for IDPs and returnees alongside host communities
in order to decrease negative competition.
o Ensuring that gender is mainstreamed in a comprehensive strategy in order to
address the specific vulnerability of women and children.
•
Continue to support the research needed in order to:
o Profile returnee/IDP population and their needs in order to develop better
assistance/durable solutions.
o Improve our understanding of protracted displacement in urban and peri-urban
areas.
o Review the protection needs and vulnerabilities of displaced and urban poor
populations.
o Develop field assessment guidelines that can be used as an agreed upon set of
tools for stakeholders in order to arrive at a more thorough and coherent means
of estimating and profiling the displaced populations in urban areas.
o Investigate the mechanisms by which integration and re-integration policies
can be formulated and implemented by the host and home countries.
o Ensure displacement assistance becomes a participatory approach where the
views of displace communities are heard.
•
Build/strengthen the capacity of Afghan government actors in order to:
o Improve monitoring of the inflows and outflows of displaced populations and
assessments of their needs.
o Improve the leverage of the Ministry of Refugees and Returnees (MoRR) with
other national ministries and inter-ministerial coordination.
o Ensure that IDPs’ protection is mainstreamed into national development
programs.
o Increase the transparency and accountability of the MoRR and that of its
provincial and district departments.
27
MEI-FRS (c) – August 2011
•
Develop regional approaches that make mobility part of the solution, not part of the
problem by:
o Working towards bilateral migrant labor regulations that would be of benefit to
both Afghan and Iranian/Pakistani economies.
o Spurring collaboration between international actors, the UN, and other relevant
organizations, as well as the Afghan government in developing mechanisms to
increase voluntary repatriation of Afghan refugees in the spirit of regional
cooperation.
o Framing repatriation as a transnational process in which both integration and
reintegration policies are also included and made an integral part of
development programs.
o Advocating for flexible definitions and intermediate solutions for Afghans in
the border regions, including accepting that refugee returns are not final in the
traditional sense, and that this is not necessarily a bad thing.
o Recognizing that mobility is the rule rather than the exception, and looking for
ways to monitor and regulate it to maintain security.
o Exploring ways to guarantee refugee and returnee rights within a broader
human rights framework.
o Focusing and coordinating development strategies simultaneously on both
sides of the border.
•
Develop a broader urban approach to displacement with components of humanitarian
response, early recovery, livelihood and infrastructure rehabilitation, and
development.
o Given the common urban challenges faced after return or after displacement by
the populations, there are a set of predictable risks (related to land, housing,
employment, food security, access to public and social services) that can be
remedied by planning for responses.
o The EU and US should jointly develop a model of risks and risk avoidance in
urban settings.
o Strengthening the funding and mandate of UN agencies such as OCHA and
UNHCR, which have proven willing to take the lead on urban displacement.
•
Improve the protection of displaced population by international military actors by:
o Ensuring that the line between civilian and military actors is not blurred.
o Minimizing new displacements caused by US and ISAF forces. This can be
achieved through the adoption of standard operating procedures that oblige
troops to take concrete action to protect civilians and their needs before,
during, and after military activities, and by the development of monitoring and
reporting mechanisms on forced internal displacement.
o Ensuring that internally displaced people will not be associated or implicated
with the military efforts of their forces, thereby protect returning IDPs from
future targeting by armed opposition groups.
o Decoupling COIN/military action from development programs and
humanitarian assistance.
28
MEI-FRS (c) – August 2011
o Facilitating secure freedom of movement for civilians wanting to move out of
insecure zones.
o Ensuring independent assessments of damage to IDPs’ property and
compensate those whose losses have resulted from operations by national and
international forces.
•
Work with both Pakistan and Iran on addressing the needs of second- and even thirdgeneration refugees who are unlikely to remain by:
o Exploring the granting citizenship or more permanent local integration.
o Considering how to extend educational and health policies for third-generation
refugees.
o Increasing financial support for vocational training programs for Afghans.
o Restoring and reviving the system of providing basic education and health care
to all Afghan refugees who still reside in camps.
29