sustainability
Article
Public Support for Pro-Environmental Policy
Measures: Examining the Impact of Personal
Values and Ideology
Niklas Harring 1,2, *, Sverker C. Jagers 1,3 and Simon Matti 3
1
2
3
*
Centre for Collective Action Research, Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg,
405 30 Gothenburg, Sweden; [email protected]
Department of Humanities and Social Science Education, Stockholm University, 106 91 Stockholm, Sweden
Political Science Unit, Luleå University of Technology, 971 87 Luleå, Sweden; [email protected]
Correspondence: [email protected]; Tel.: +46-31-786-1223
Academic Editor: Pallav Purohit
Received: 2 March 2017; Accepted: 19 April 2017; Published: 25 April 2017
Abstract: This article explores the relationship between two major explanations of the formation
of positive attitudes towards environmental policy measures. Ideological orientation and personal
values have, in theory, significant overlaps in the sense that they collect general and cross-situational
sentiments used to understand and evaluate a wide range of political issues. However, in the
empirical literature, although they independently have been shown to have rather significant effects
on pro-environmental policy attitudes, they are rarely tested together in order to explore whether they
capture the same basic mechanisms. In this article, two data sets from Sweden are used to demonstrate
both that ideological orientation and personal values independently affect pro-environmental policy
support, as well as that these effects differ across different policy types.
Keywords: environmental attitudes; ideology; values; pro-environmental policy attitudes
1. Introduction
At the very least, overcoming global environmental degradation requires two factors: (a) expedient
policies and policy measures and (b) broad support for these policy measures among those affected by
them. The statement may appear a bit audacious, but the underlying argument is rather straightforward.
As a smallest common denominator, all of the most pressing contemporary environmental problems
can be characterized as (large-scale) collective action problems, that is, situations in which the desirable
outcome is dependent on concerted collective efforts, but in which everyone’s individually rational
behavior will result in a worse outcome for all [1,2]. Furthermore, since uncertainties about the
behavior of other actors increase with the scale of the problem, a cooperative strategy risks becoming
exceedingly costly for the individual if others choose to free-ride by enjoying the good without
substantially contributing to its provision. Thus, unless we can trust other actors to cooperate, we have
rather few incitements to do so ourselves.
From this follows that voluntary large-scale environmental collective action (to be distinguished
from small-scale collective action, cf. [3,4]) is not to be expected. Instead, overcoming large-scale
problems commonly requires third party intervention to generate cooperation that would not otherwise
occur, that is, that the state or some other overarching public authority take measures to lower
uncertainty and produce behavioral regularities through different forms of coordination activities [5,6].
Such intervention is typically conducted through the use of various policy measures: regulations,
taxes, subsidies, and information provision. This certainly requires that technical policy aspects, such
as cost-effectiveness and fit within the current political-administrative system, are considered in both
Sustainability 2017, 9, 679; doi:10.3390/su9050679
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the decision-making and implementation stages. However, in order for government to successfully
combat large-scale collective action problems, policy measures must also enjoy broad public support [7].
In part, unless there is widely held support for the measures among the electorate, it is reasonable to
assume that politicians in representative democracies will be significantly more reluctant to suggest or
implement them (cf. [8]). Furthermore, without public support, we are less likely to find that people
will comply to existing measures, producing high and unnecessary costs associated with monitoring
and sanctioning.
However, of main concern in this paper is not what degree of support various policy measures
enjoy, but rather what factors determine the support. Understanding the antecedents to policy support
is important not the least when it comes to choosing the most passable measures, but also when
developing and designing new measures. In the literature, a broad collection of factors have been
demonstrated to affect pro-environmental policy support, ranging from individuals’ environmental
concern, to people’s level of interpersonal trust and trust in institutions and/or the political system,
to demographic and socioeconomic determinants such as gender, age, socioeconomic background,
and economic conditions (for an overview see [9]). Nonetheless, two explanations dominate the
literature: (a) people’s values and (b) their ideology. A vast number of scholars have shown
that personally held values affect support both for public policy in general (e.g., [10–14]) and for
pro-environmental policies specifically [15–19]. Simultaneously, research has repeatedly found that
a left-right ideological dimension constitutes a crucial determinant of all sorts of environmental
attitudes, including support for pro-environmental policies. For example, it has been demonstrated
that people who consider themselves as being to the right (or conservative) prefer a smaller government,
a free-market economy, tend to deprioritize environmental issues, and display weaker environmental
support [20–31]. Other studies add to this picture, providing evidence for a growing attitudinal
cleavage as right-wing and left-wing sympathizers are gradually moving further and further apart in
matters related to the environment [22,32,33].
However, despite the palpable influence that these two factors respectively enjoy in the literature,
the two seldom meet in studies tapping into the antecedents of pro-environmental policy support.
Instead, we find a bulkhead between scholars proceeding from value-centered theory and those instead
taking their starting point in political-ideological orientations. Theoretically, this is somewhat puzzling
since it is reasonable to assume that a person’s values and his or her ideology should have much
in common—perhaps even capturing the same basic phenomenon (cf. [34,35]). If this possibility is
not ruled out through empirical research, there is a risk that two parallel universes are established,
the primary reason being a lack of theoretical and cross-disciplinary dialogue. Based upon these lines
of reasoning, this study aims to investigate if, and to what degree, values-based models and ideologies
independently serve to explain pro-environmental policy support, and thus to assess whether these
two currently used explanatory frameworks are capturing the same basic mechanisms. Furthermore,
since previous empirical applications have also demonstrated that the explanatory strength varies
considerably across specific policy features, both in terms of policy design and type of behavior being
targeted, this study further examines if the findings are consistent when comparing different types of
policy measures.
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way. First, we introduce relevant research
on values and ideologies individually and we propose our main hypothesis. This is followed
by a discussion of the features of various types of policy measures commonly suggested in the
environmental-political debate and the possible significance of policy design activating different
mechanisms of support. From this, one additional hypothesis is formulated. Thereafter, we describe
the design, methodology, and data used in the study. Lastly, we present and discuss our main empirical
results, before we end the paper with some concluding remarks outlining the significance of our study.
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1.1. Theory and Hypotheses
1.1.1. Ideology
As with many key terms used within the social sciences, the concept of ideology is indeed as
multifaceted as it is widely applied. Similarly, the current literature is overwhelmed with concepts
holding strong conceptual similarities to ideology, such as belief systems and paradigms. Generally,
the basic concept of an ideology is here understood as a set of ideas by which a social group tries to
make sense of the world. An ideology thus consists of logically coherent explanations, predictions, as
well as evaluations of social conditions, and gives its bearers a personal understanding of their relation
to the rest of the world. Similarly, the ideology concept referred to by Rohan [35] (p. 270) is described
as the “rhetorical association or associations between things, people, actions, or activities and the
best possible living” as endorsed or promoted by a group of people, and Jost et al. [36] suggest that
ideologies represent prepackaged units of interpretation that spread because of basic human motives
to understand the world, avoid existential threat, and to maintain valued interpersonal relationships.
Measuring ideology empirically can be executed along several dividing lines [12,36–38]. Individuals’
subjective positioning on a left-right scale (or defining themselves as “liberal” or “conservative” [39]),
where each position on the scale represents conscious beliefs and opinions about characteristics of the
political and economic system, is the most used technique in the previously cited literature. Traveling
to the left on the scale, ideology is manifested as an enhanced support for the active, non-neutral
state, an increasingly regulated market, and universal welfare politics. Conversely, preferences for a
passive, neutral state, an unregulated market, and limited social policy are located on the right-hand
side. There are ample examples of scholars using this left-right dimension to capture ideology and to
explain public preferences on a wide range of issues (e.g., [40–44]).
The left-right dimension is also the most common way to measure and capture ideology in
research on pro-environmentalism. For instance, a consistent finding over time is that right-leaning
individuals are more hesitant to embrace environmentalism and environmental concern compared
to those identifying themselves as belonging to the left-hand side of the scale [22,23,29,30,33,45].
The assumed reasons behind this ideological divide are the strong associations between ideology and
the formation of preferences regarding market regulation and the economic growth paradigm, where
right-leaning individuals are skeptical towards the environmentalist vision of a steady-state economy.
Also from a perspective more readily connected to fundamental visions of state-society relations,
ideology can be expected to affect environmental support in general and support for pro-environmental
policy measures in particular. For example, it is reasonable to assume that individuals positioning
themselves to the left will be less negative to the introduction of environmental policies not only
because such measures are compatible with their conviction that the market economy needs to be
regulated, but also because they believe that government should take a more active role in establishing
a good society.
While there are generally strong effects of ideology on basically all environmental issues, it is
crucial to point out that recent research indicates that the ideological divide in pro-environmental
attitudes differs depending both on country context and the environmental issue in question [46–49].
This variation may be an indication that the effect of ideology on environmental attitudes is conditioned
by how strongly people perceive the link between ideological position and environmental support to
be. These novel results, questioning the link between ideological position and environmental support,
are indeed interesting as they put into question a significant amount of research pointing towards
ideology as one of the most important explanatory factors behind pro-environmentalism [23].
1.1.2. Personal Values
A range of scholars has also examined the value basis of pro-environmental sentiments, here
equating policy support with other forms of low-cost pro-environmental behaviors [18,50–54]. As with
ideology, the concept of values suffers from a fair share of definitional inconsistency. Most scholars
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occupied with values research nevertheless seem to agree with Allport’s [55] (p. 543) description
of values as a cross-situational “dominating force in life,” underpinning the formation of attitudes
and opinions in relation to both familiar and new conditions or social objects [40,54,56,57]. Here,
we acknowledge the application of the values concept in social psychology and define values simply
as abstract, enduring, and trans-situational goals.
Using the Schwartz value survey as a starting point, studies focusing on the value basis of
pro-environmental attitudes show that the more strongly individuals subscribe to a pro-social or
biospheric value domain, that is, values that motivate the restriction of personal interests in favor
of acting for a common good either extended to all people or to all living things [17,18,51,58],
the stronger are their pro-environmental attitudes and the more likely they are to engage in various
pro-environmental behaviors. Conversely, the relation between values that favor personal outcomes
(e.g., wealth, success, or social power) and pro-environmental attitudes are either negative or
insignificant. Similar conclusions are drawn when applying the labels cooperators (pro-socials) and
non-cooperators (pro-selves) within social dilemma research, where the former has been identified as
having more pronounced environmental attitudes and expressing a stronger willingness to engage in
pro-environmental activities [50,59].
In both theory and through empirically driven research, two sets of very basic factors are
thus proposed as fundamentally important determinants of pro-environmental policy support.
How, then, are values and ideology related to each other in their impact on peoples’ attitudes
towards pro-environmental policy measures? Are they clearly distinct from each other, capturing
completely different mechanisms, or are they basically capturing the same characteristics among
people (see discussion in [60–62])? At present, as many scholars apply similar definitions of values
and ideologies as well as describe their significance for (pro-environmental) political preferences in
similar ways, we have reasons to expect both that values and ideologies are indeed capturing the same
concept, albeit going under different names. In this case, the similarities are apparent and we should
expect a grand explanatory overlap between the two factors. Based upon these lines of reasoning, our
main hypothesis suggests that:
Hypothesis 1 (H1 ). A person’s ideology does not have an effect on pro-environmental policy support that is
independent from the effect of personal values.
1.2. Support for Different Pro-Environmental Policies
As stated previously, there are ample reasons to assume that the limits of public support
also constitute the very tangible limits of the policymaking process (e.g., [63–65]). Also, when it
comes to environmental policy, public attitudes seem to govern policy choice [66]. From a global
perspective, a large number of policy measures have been proposed in the attempts to find routes
towards individual-level behavioral change, most basically varying in the amount of coercion that
they imply (cf. [67,68]). However, when comparing different countries’ use of climate policy measures,
clear variations can be detected. Although system of government, path dependency, and economic
entanglements can explain a certain amount of cross-country variation in policy choice (cf. [69,70]),
previous research also points specifically towards the highly politicized nature of environmental
policy measures and their sensitivity to public support as explanatory factors for cross-country
differences [71]. However, most research on pro-environmental policy support is either focused
on one specific policy measure or does not make distinctions between different types (cf. [72,73]), thus
restricting the possibility to detect variations in the drivers behind support of different types of policies.
This motivates us to investigate not only if and how ideology and values affect policy support, but
also to explore whether these effects vary between different policy designs.
The significance of policy design for public support is well established through empirical
studies [17,72,74], suggesting that preferences for a policy measure are intimately tied to the individual’s
evaluation of its attributes in terms of effectiveness [75–77], fairness [59,78–80], freedom [81], as well
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as expected personal costs and benefits [82,83]. Given that these attributes vary with policy design,
and that both values and ideology reasonably affect how these attributes are interpreted and rated
in terms of importance, we assume that the effect of ideology and values on policy support will vary
across different policy measures. For example, some policy measures require more active involvement
of the state in governing behavior (e.g., subsidies, taxes, and regulations), while others involve less
involvement and instead guide the citizens (e.g., information provision). It is then up to the single
individual to decide whether or not to take action. In the same way, environmental taxes are said to
effectively internalize externalities (also global ones), which can be assumed to generate particularly
strong support among people with strong universalistic and biospheric values. At the same time, taxes
are strongly associated with redistributive effects, which also affect public preferences. Therefore, we
suggest as our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 (H2 ). The effects of ideology and values on pro-environmental policy support are different for
different types of policy measures.
2. Materials and Methods
A probable reason why analyses of pro-environmental policy support commonly do not include
both measures of values and ideology is the lack of data, as few datasets include reliable measurements
of personal values, ideological left-right placement, and attitudes towards a range of different
pro-environmental policy measures. For this study, we relied on two Swedish surveys. Primarily, we
make use of a dataset based on a self-administered mail questionnaire sent to a random sample of
3000 Swedes in 2009 (Dataset 1). The response rate was quite modest (36%), however, a comparison
with the annual SOM (Society Opinion Media) survey, also distributed to a random sample of the
Swedish population and performed by University of Gothenburg (response rate around 60%) shows
that our respondents match those of the SOM survey on key socioeconomic and political characteristics,
giving us confidence that our dataset is fairly accurate and representative of the Swedish public. For a
robustness test we also used a survey dataset (N = 1928) from 2014 with information from Swedish
university students in political science, law, and economics (Dataset 2). Among them, 43% are men
and 57% are women. Responding to political position along the left-right dimension, 36% state that
they are “clearly” or “to some extent” to the left, while 47% state that they are “clearly” or “to some
extent” to the right.
2.1. Dependent Variable
To gauge the effects of values and ideology on environmental policy support in general, we
constructed an index based on 11 different policy suggestions [84] in Dataset 1, to which the
respondents were asked to indicate their attitudes on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (a very bad
suggestion) to 5 (a very good suggestion), with 3 labeled as “a neither good nor bad suggestion.”
The index has a good level of internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.82). In order to estimate
whether the effects vary substantially between different policy measures, we also categorized the
11 policy suggestions into four different types: (a) acceptance of taxes (α = 0.75), (b) acceptance of
regulation and bans (α = 0.69), (c) acceptance of information (α = 0.71), and (d) acceptance of tax
rewards/subsidies. The two items making up the latter type are, however, poorly correlated with an
alpha below 0.5. Therefore, we interpreted this index more cautiously. In Dataset 2, the respondents
were asked to rate four different policy instruments [85] using the same five-point scale as in Dataset 1.
We think that using both more specific policy suggestions and perceptions about several policy
measures, capturing environmental support in general, can evaluate the robustness of our results.
2.2. Independent Variables
Both datasets apply the same measurements for the main independent variables. Ideology is
operationalized as people’s subjective placement on the left-right dimension. Three different categories
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are created: left (0–4), center (5), and right (6–10). In Dataset 1, 33% are categorized as left and 37% are
categorized as right.
Personal values are captured by a shortened version of the Schwartz [86] value survey, where
the respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which 26 value items function as guiding
principles in life. From the responses, three different value categories—egoistic (e.g., “power,” “material
wealth,” “authority”), altruistic (e.g., “equality,” “a world in peace,” “social justice”), and biospheric
(e.g., “respect for nature,” “be one with nature,” “protect the environment”)—are deciphered and used
as factors in our regressions.
2.3. Controls
As a range of studies in predominately environmental psychology (e.g., [54,74] follows
Schwartz’ [87] Norm-Activation Model to suggest that the effect of values are channeled through
environmental beliefs and personal norms, we included controls for these in all models. General
environmental beliefs are captured through a shortened version of the New Environmental Paradigm
scale [88] and we used standard items for tapping into awareness of consequences [89], ascription of
responsibility [90], and personal norms [91].
Recently, scholars aiming to explain pro-environmental policy support have emphasized the role
of generalized and institutional trust [46,72,92,93]. Generalized trust is measured by the question,
“Generally, to what extent do you feel that people can be trusted?” (scale ranging from 0 to 10).
Institutional trust is measured by the respondents’ trust in “government,” “parliament,” “politicians,”
and “Swedish authorities,” where the respondents are asked to rate their level of trust in each of these
institutions on a five-point scale from “a great deal of trust” to “very little trust” (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.83).
As some of the policy suggestions are rather specific and clearly signal consequences for the
individual, there are also reasons to include variables that capture self-interest. For example, carnivores
(or vegetarians) are more likely to dislike (or favor) a meat tax, and the same thing applies to taxes on
gas for frequent car users. Therefore, we included controls for food habits (how often the respondents
eat meat) and whether one travels by car to work/school and residence [94]. Furthermore, we included
income, as this determines people’s acceptance of environmental taxes since these have been argued
to disproportionally affect the poor [95]. As has been argued before [93], people’s perceptions of
whether environmental policies are necessary and what they think of the coercion involved also
depends on whether they perceive that others behave in an environmentally friendly manner or not.
An index based on six questions tapping into whether the respondents perceive that other citizens
act environmentally friendly or not was used as a control [96]. Lastly, we also controlled for gender,
as this often is argued to matter for environmentalism in general [53,88].
3. Results
Table 1 presents the first exploration of the data, showing the correlation between the three
different value dimensions and ideology in Dataset 1.
Table 1. Correlation between Ideology and Values in Dataset 1 (N = 989).
Left-Right Ideological Scale *
Egoistic values
Altruistic values
Biospheric values
0.15
−0.27
−0.15
* The scale runs from left to right. Hence, low levels indicate that people place themselves to the left, and high
values denote that people place themselves to the right on the left-right dimension.
The results indicate that there is some overlap between the two independent variables. Respondents
who lean to the right are more likely to load high on the egoistic value scale (0.15) and low on the altruistic
value scale (−0.27). Those respondents who load high on the biospheric value dimension are also more
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likely to lean to the left (−0.15). These results are not surprising based on what we already know from
already know from the extensive research on the ideology-values connection
[86,97].
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the extensive research on the ideology-values connection [86,97]. However, the important
test for this
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presented in Table
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coefficients, standard error in parentheses). Ordinary Least Squares Regression. Dataset 1.
what
Sustainability 2017,
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coefficients, standard error in parentheses). Ordinary Least Squares Regression. Dataset 1.
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Sustainability 2017, 9, 679
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Included
pro-environmental
policy
measures.
When
focusing
values,
2 also
finds
the expected
effects.
note that the
coefficient
negative
(−0.05)
significant
0.001),
indicating
that
the Model
further
support
for is
pro-environmental
policy
When
values,
2toalso finds
the
3.88
*** and
2.88
*** measures.
3.04(p
***<on
1.76focusing
***Modelon
Constant
The
strongereffects.
the respondents
to egoistic
values, the
likely
they
areare
to less
express
support
forto
the right respondents
place
themselves
onthe
the
political
spectrum,
the
less
likely
they
to
show
expected
The stronger
respondents
subscribe
toless
egoistic
values,
the
likely
they are
(0.05)subscribe
(0.08)
(0.09)
(0.19)
pro-environmental
policy
measures
(907
−0.09),
while
the opposite
is true
for both
thefinds
altruistic
(0.05)
support forN
pro-environmental
policy
measures.
When
focusing
on907
values,
Model
2 also
the
express support for
pro-environmental
policy
(−0.09),
while
the
opposite
is true
forand
both
907
907measures
2
biospheric
(0.16)
value
dimensions.
All
thesevalue
effects
are also
significant.
Toeffects
explore
the effectsTo
expected effects.
TheRstronger
the
respondents
subscribe
to egoistic
values,
less
likely
they
are to
the altruistic
(0.05)
and
biospheric
(0.16)
dimensions.
Allthe
these
arewhether
also
significant.
Adjusted
0.038
0.209
0.217
0.426
ofexplore
ideology
and
are**independent
each(−0.09),
other,
as
suggested
by Hypothesis
1, Model
3 placedby
express support
for
pro-environmental
measures
while
the opposite
trueother,
for
both
whether
effects
ideology
and
are
independent
of is
each
as suggested
Note:
*** pvalues
< the
0.001;
p policy
<of0.01;
* p <of0.05;
¤values
p < 0.10.
the
two sets
variables
insets
theofsame
regression.
Noteare
that
in significant.
the
combined
the altruistic
(0.05)
andof
biospheric
value
dimensions.
All
these effects
To model
Hypothesis
1,independent
Model 3 (0.16)
placed
the two
independent
variables
inalso
the
same
regression.
Notethe
that
effects
ofcombined
both
ideology
and
values
retain
their
significance
(pthe
< 0.001),
with
the
exception of
explore
whether
the
effects
ofregressions
ideology
and
values
areand
independent
of each for
other,
as
suggested
by
the
model
thepersonal
effects
of
both
ideology
and
personal
values
retain
significance
(p <
Models
1 and
2inshow
bivariate
for ideology
values
in
support
index
oftheir
the
altruistic
value
dimension,
which
is
only
significant
at
the
90%
level.
The
effects
of
the
egoistic
Hypothesis
1,0.001),
Modelwith
3 placed
the
two
sets
of independent
variables
in the
same
Note that
the
oftaken
the
altruistic
value
dimension,
which
isregression.
onlygoing
significant
at the 90% level.
policy measures,
demonstrating
thatexception
they,
each
separately,
have
rather
strong
effects
in
(−The
0.08)
and
the
biospheric
(0.16)
value
dimensions
are
more
orretain
less
the
same
as we
in are
Model
in the direction.
combined
model
the
effects
of both
ideology
and
personal
their
significance
(p <2, however,
effects
of1,
the
egoistic
(−0.08)
and
the
biospheric
(0.16)
value
dimensions
more
or less the
he expected
In
Model
although
the
explained
variance
for values
ideology
is low
(0.038),
isisas
anegative
decrease
in2,the
effect
ofthere
the dimension,
altruistic
value
(0.03)
and
ofthe
ideology
(0.02).
0.001),
withthere
the
exception
of the
altruistic
value
which
is only
at
90%
same
in Model
however,
is a(pdecrease
indimension
the
effectsignificant
of
thethe
altruistic
value
dimension
(0.03)
note that
the coefficient
(−0.05)
and significant
< 0.001),
indicating
that
further
to level.
Finally,
in Model
4on
we
included
a number
of important
control
variables:
gender,
and
The
effects ofand
the
(−0.08)
and
the
biospheric
(0.16)
value
are
or lessgeneralized
the
ofegoistic
ideology
(0.02).
he right
respondents
place
themselves
the
political
spectrum,
the
lessdimensions
likely
they
aremore
to show
trust,
perceptions
of
other’s
environmentally
friendly
behavior,
habits,
income,
as in institutional
ModelFinally,
2, however,
there
a decrease
inathe
effect
of
the altruistic
dimension
(0.03)
in Model
4iswe
included
number
important
control
generalized
supportsame
for pro-environmental
policy
measures.
When
focusing
on of
values,
Model
2value
alsovariables:
findsdietary
the gender,
general
environmental
beliefs,
and personal
norms.
The latter
twolikely
are
particularly
controls
and
of ideology
(0.02).
and
institutional
trust,
perceptions
of egoistic
other’s
environmentally
friendly
behavior,
dietary
habits,
expected
effects.
The
stronger
the respondents
subscribe
to
values,
the less
they are
toimportant
because
thegeneral
ofenvironmental
values
argued
be channeled
environmental
beliefs
and
feelings
Finally,
in
Model
4effect
we included
number
ofto
important
control
variables:
gender,
generalized
income,
beliefs,
and
personal
norms.
latter
two are
particularly
express support
for
pro-environmental
policya is
measures
(−0.09),
while
thethrough
opposite
is The
true
for
both
moral
obligation
tobecause
take
[58]).
This
also
corresponds
well
with
our
findings.
When the
and institutional
trust,
perceptions
ofaction
other’s
environmentally
friendly
behavior,
dietary
habits,
important
controls
the (cf.
effect
ofAll
values
iseffects
argued
be
channeled
through
environmental
he altruistic
(0.05)ofand
biospheric
(0.16)
value
dimensions.
these
aretoalso
significant.
To
controls
are
in
the model,
the to
effect
ofaction
all
dimensions
decreases
−0.03;
environmental
beliefs,
and
norms.
The
latterThis
arecorresponds
particularly
beliefs
and
feelings of
moral
obligation
take
(cf.other,
[58]).
also
well=with
our
exploreincome,
whether general
the
effects
of introduced
ideology
and
values
are personal
independent
of value
each
astwo
suggested
by (egoistic
altruistic
= When
0.01;two
biospheric
= are
0.07).
However,
importantly,
the
of
ideological
important
controls
because
the
effect
of
values
isvariables
argued
to
channeled
through
environmental
findings.
controls
introduced
in most
the
model,
the
effect
of effect
all
value
dimensionsposition
decreases
Hypothesis
1, Model
3 placed
the
sets
of independent
in be
the
same
regression.
Note
that
remains
alsoideology
when
for values
a[58]).
range
of also
other
variables.
is clearly
beliefs and
feelings
of
to= controlling
take
(cf.
This
corresponds
well
ourthe
(egoistic
=moral
−0.03;
altruistic
0.01;
biospheric
= 0.07).
However,
most Although
importantly,
effect of
n the combined
model
theunchanged
effects
of obligation
both
andaction
personal
retain
their
significance
(p with
< there
anideological
overlap
between
values
and
ideology,
and
the
contribution
of
ideology
todecreases
the
explained
findings.
When
theofcontrols
are introduced
in
the model,
the
effect
ofcontrolling
all value
position
remains
unchanged
also
when
for90%
a range
oftotal
other
variables.
0.001), with
the exception
the
altruistic
value
dimension,
which
is
only
significant
atdimensions
the
level.
(egoistic
−0.03;
altruistic
=is 0.01;
biospheric
= between
0.07).
However,
most
importantly,
the
Although
thereand
clearly
an overlap
values
and
ideology,
contribution
The effects
of the= egoistic
(−0.08)
the biospheric
(0.16)
value
dimensions
are
moreand
or the
less
theeffect of of ideology
remains
when ofcontrolling
forvalue
asignificant
range
of effect
other
to
the total
explained
variance
is modest,
the altruistic
remaining
isvariables.
an indication that a
same asideological
in Model 2,position
however,
there
is unchanged
a decrease
inalso
the
effect
dimension
(0.03)
Although(0.02).
there is clearly an overlap between values and ideology, and the contribution of ideology
and of ideology
to theintotal
explained
variance
is modest,
the remaining
significant
effect
is an
indication that a
Finally,
Model
4 we included
a number
of important
control
variables:
gender,
generalized
and institutional trust, perceptions of other’s environmentally friendly behavior, dietary habits,
Sustainability 2017, 9, 679
8 of 14
variance is modest, the remaining significant effect is an indication that a person’s ideology affects
pro-environmental policy support independently of his or her personal values. We can therefore
dismiss Hypothesis 1.
In order to test Hypothesis 2, that the effect of ideology and personal values on pro-environmental
policy support varies across different policy designs, we ran a set of regression models where a
distinctive type of policy measure constitutes the dependent variable in each model. The results
are reported in Table 3, which demonstrates how the effect of ideology is significant for the level
of support for taxes, while insignificant for the remaining policy types. As the negative coefficient
indicates (−0.05), people with ideological preferences further to the right are less supportive of the use
of environmental taxes, which is an expected result. Also for the three value dimensions, the results
vary across the different policy types. Whereas the egoistic and altruistic value dimensions display
79
of 14
rather weak and, for regulation and subsidies, insignificant7effects,
the effects of the biospheric value
dimension is clearly more pronounced and highly significant in support for both regulative and
know from the extensive
research
on the ideology-values connection [86,97].
Sustainability
2017, 9, 679
7 of 14
informative
measures. In fact, biospheric values display the only significant effect for regulative
ortant test for this article is whether, and to what extent, these two individual-level
measures, and across-the-board positive signs for all of the four policy types. Based on Dataset 1, we
what we already policy
know support.
from theHence,
extensive
research
on
the ideology-values connection [86,97].
endent
effects on pro-environmental
in order
to test
9
7 ofour
14
can thus far confirm our second hypothesis: The effect of ideology
(and values) varies across different
However,
the important
test
forresults
this article
whether,
and to
e performed a number
of regression
models.
The
fromisthese
analyses
arewhat extent, these two individual-level
pro-environmental policy measures
know
from the extensive
research
on the ideology-values
connection [86,97].
facets have
independent
effects on pro-environmental
policy support. Hence, in order to test our
2.
rtant test for this article
is
whether,
and
to
what
extent,
these
two
individual-level
first
hypothesis,
we
performed
a
number
of
regression
models.
The
results from these
analyses are
(Unstandardized
coefficients,
Table 3. The Acceptance of Different Kinds of Policy Instruments
ffect of effects
Ideology
Values
on Pro-Environmental
Policy Hence,
Support in
(Unstandardized
ndent
onand
pro-environmental
policy
support.
order
to
test
our
presented
in
Table
2.
standard error in parentheses). OLS Regression. Dataset 1.
error inaparentheses).
Ordinary Least
Squares
Regression.
Dataset
1. analyses are
endard
performed
number of regression
models.
The
results from
these
Table 2. The Effect of Ideology andTaxes
Values onRegulation
Pro-Environmental
Policy Support
(Unstandardized
2.
Subsidies
Information
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model
4
Sustainability 2017, 9, 679
coefficients, standard error in parentheses). Ordinary Least Squares Regression. Dataset 1.
7−
of0.00
14
−0.05 ***
−0.02
−0.01
−0.05 *** Ideology (left-right)
−0.02 ** −0.03
fect of Ideology
and Values on Pro-Environmental
Policy Support
(Unstandardized
Ideology
(left-right)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
ndard
error
in parentheses).
Ordinary
Least
Squaresresearch
Regression.
Dataset
1.
what
we
already
know
from
the
extensive
on
the
ideology-values
connection
Values
−0.05
***
−0.02 ** [86,97].
−0.03 ***
Values
Ideology
(left-right)
However, the important
test
for
this
article
is
whether,
and
to
what
extent,
these
two
individual-level
Model 1 Model
2 Model
3 Model
(0.01) −0.00
(0.01)
−
0.04 4
−(0.01)
0.01
−0.04*
−0.09
***
−0.08
***
−0.03
¤
Egoistic
Egoistic
acets
have independent
pro-environmental
policy
support.
Hence, in (0.02)
order to test (0.02)
our
(0.02)
(0.02)
−0.05effects
*** on(0.01)
**
−0.03
***
Values−0.02
(0.02)
(0.01)
deology
(left-right)
irst hypothesis, we performed
of (0.01)
regression models.
The results from these analyses are
(0.01) a number
(0.01)
−0.01
0.01
0.01
0.04 ***
0.04 ¤
−0.09 *** −0.08
−0.03
0.05 **
0.03 ¤
Altruistic Egoistic
Altruistic
presented
in
Table
2.
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.02)
Values
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
0.05***
0.090.05
*** **
0.03
0.10
−0.09
¤
0.03 ¤
0.01***
0.16 ***
*** −0.08
0.16 ***
*** −0.03
0.07
Biospheric
Table 2. The Effect of Ideology
and Values
on Pro-Environmental
Policy
Support (Unstandardized
Egoistic
Altruistic
Biospheric
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
coefficients, standard error in parentheses). Ordinary Least Squares Regression. Dataset 1.
Controls
Included
Included
Included
0.05 **
0.03 ¤
0.01
0.16 *** Included
0.16 ***
0.07
***
Controls
Included
Altruistic
Biospheric
1 ***Model
2 ***
3 (0.02)
Model 43.15
(0.02)***Model
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
0.95
**Model 2.23
***
***
1.54 ***
3.88 ***
2.88
3.04
1.76
Constant
Constant
(0.33)
(0.20)
−0.05
******
−0.03 *** (0.24)
0.16
***
0.16
0.07
*** −0.02 **(0.26)
Controls
Included
(0.05)
(0.08)
(0.09)
(0.19)
Ideology
(left-right)
Biospheric
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.02)
N (0.02)
7973.88
842 ***
*** 879
2.88
***
3.04
1.76834
***
N
907
907 (0.01)
907
907
Constant
2
0.318
0.207
0.097
0.363
Adjusted
R
2
Values
Controls
Included
(0.05)
(0.08)
(0.09)
(0.19)
Adjusted R
0.038
0.209
0.217
0.426
*** p1.76
<***
0.001;
**
p < 0.01;
< 0.05; ¤ p < 0.10.
−0.09
*** * p 907
−0.03
3.88**
***p < 0.01;
2.88****
3.04¤Note:
***
***−0.08
N
907
907
907
Note:
***
p
<
0.001;
p
<
0.05;
p
<
0.10.
Egoistic
Constant
(0.02)
(0.01)
(0.05)
(0.08)
(0.09)
(0.19) 0.038
Adjusted
R2 (0.01)
0.209
0.217
0.426
0.05
0.03
¤<Dataset
Robustness
testing
our
results
with
the use
2,
and
values
support
the index
offound
N 2 show bivariate regressions
907 for ideology
907
907
907
Note:
***
pin<**
0.001;
**of
pfor
0.01;
*0.01
p <we
0.05;
¤ p <even
0.10.more pronounced effects.
Altruistic
2
(0.02)
(0.02)
4each
shows
the
results from
the (0.02)
Ordinary
Least
Squares
(OLS)
demonstrating
thatTable
they,
taken
separately,
have
rather
strong
effects
going
in regression models [98]. The effect
Adjusted
R
0.038
0.209
0.217
0.426
of
ideology
is
stronger
for
push
instruments
(taxation
=
−
0.18
and
= −0.11)for
than
pullof
0.16
***
0.16
***
0.07
***
Models
1
and
2
show
bivariate
regressions
for
ideology
andregulation
values in support
thefor
index
tion. InNote:
Model
1,
although
the
explained
variance
for
ideology
is
low
(0.038),
we
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; ¤ p < 0.10.
Biospheric
(subsidies
=
Furthermore,
for taken
the
information
as a policy
measure,
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)to of have
policyand
measures,
demonstrating
that
they, each
separately,
rather strong
effects
going in
icient is negative instruments
(−0.05)
significant
(p−<0.07).
0.001),
indicating
that
the acceptance
further
the
effect
of for
ideology
is weak
and
insignificant.
Consistent
the results
Dataset
1, the
furtherwe
2 show
bivariate
regressions
ideology
and
values
inalthough
support
for
ofvariance
the
expected
direction.
In Model
1,
the the
explained
forfrom
ideology
is low
(0.038),
ents
place
themselves
on
the
political
spectrum,
the
less
likely they
areindex
to with
show
Controls
Included
to
the
right
theWhen
respondents
place
themselves
oneffects
left-right
ideological
dimension,that
the the
more
likelyto
emonstrating that
they,
each
separately,
have
rather
going
in
note
that taken
coefficient
negative
(−0.05)
and
significant
(p
< 0.001), indicating
further
nvironmental
policy
measures.
focusing
on values,
Model
2the
also
finds
the
3.88is***
2.88
***strong
3.04
***
1.76 ***
Constant
they
to
be
averseto
tovariance
push
and
to political
taxes
in
particular,
while
they
are they
not as
likely
to
ion.
In Model
although
thesubscribe
explained
for(0.08)
ideology
isthe
low
(0.038),
weto
theare
right
respondents
placeinstruments,
themselves
spectrum,
the
less
likely
are
to show
he stronger
the1,respondents
egoistic
values,
the on
less
likely
they
are
(0.05)
(0.09)
(0.19)
be
averse
to
pull
instruments.
Moreover,
although
the
models
in
Table
4
include
beliefs
and
personal
cient
is negative (−0.05)
and
significant
(p
<
0.001),
indicating
that
the
further
to
support
for
pro-environmental
policy
measures.
When
focusing
on
values,
Model
2
also
finds
the
or
pro-environmental
policy
measures
(−0.09),
while
the
opposite
is
true
for
both
N
907
907
907
907
2
norms
(coefficients
not
shown)
through
which
most
of
the
effects
of
values
are
canalized,
the
varying
place
themselves
on
theR political
spectrum,
the
less
likely
they
are to0.426
show
expected
effects.
The
stronger
the
respondents
subscribe
to To
egoistic values, the less likely they are to
)nts
and
biospheric
(0.16)
value
dimensions.
All these
effects
are also
significant.
Adjusted
0.038
0.209
0.217
effects
of
personal
on
types
also
in Dataset
2. Biospheric
vironmental
policy
measures.
When
focusing
on
values,
also
findsconfirmed
the
express
support
for
pro-environmental
policy
(−0.09),
the opposite
is true values
for both
he
effects of ideology
and
values
independent
of each
other,
suggested
by while
Note:
*** are
p <values
0.001;
** pdifferent
< 0.01;
* policy
p <Model
0.05;
¤2as
pmeasures
<are
0.10.
drive
forto
all
policy
types,
effects
are
stronger
forthese
push effects
instruments.
Egoistic
values,To
he stronger
subscribe
egoistic
values,
thethe
less
likely
they
arethat
toAll
the preferences
altruistic
(0.05)
and
biospheric
(0.16)
value
dimensions.
are also
significant.
del
3 placed the
the respondents
two
sets
of independent
variables
in thebut
same
regression.
Note
r pro-environmental
policy
measures
(−0.09),
while
the
opposite
is
trueare
for
both
whether
the
effects
of
and
independent
of index
each other,
as suggested by
model
the effects
of both
ideology
andregressions
personal
values
retain
their
significance
(p < for the
Models
1 and
2explore
show
bivariate
forideology
ideology
andvalues
values
in support
of
and biospheric
(0.16)
value
All
these
effects
are of
also
To
Hypothesis
1,that
Model
3which
placed
the
two
sets
independent
variables
in the
sameinregression. Note that
ception
of the altruistic
valuedimensions.
dimension,
is
only
significant
atsignificant.
therather
90% level.
policy
measures,
demonstrating
they,
each
taken
separately,
have
strong
effects
going
ehe
effects
of ideology
and
values
independent
of each
other,
as
suggested
by
the
combined
model
the
effects
of both
ideology
and
personal
values
retain
their significance (p <
egoistic
(−0.08)
andinthe
(0.16)
value
dimensions
are
more
less
the is low
expected
direction.
Inbiospheric
Model are
1, although
the
explained
variance
foror
ideology
(0.038),
we
el
placed
the
twoissets
ofisindependent
variables
inaltruistic
the
same(p
regression.
Note(0.03)
that
0.001),
within
the
exception
the
altruistic
value
dimension,
which
only
significant
at the 90% level.
2, 3however,
there
a decrease
the
effect
of of
the
value
dimension
note
that the
coefficient
negative
(−0.05)
and
significant
< 0.001),
indicating
that is
the
further
to
odel
the effects
of both
ideology
retain
their
significance
(p <value
Theplace
effects
ofand
thepersonal
egoistic
(−0.08)
and
the
biospheric
.02).
he right
respondents
themselves
on thevalues
political
spectrum,
the less(0.16)
likely
theydimensions
are to showare more or less the
eption
offor
the
altruistic
value
dimension,
which
is only
significant
atonthe
90%
level.
same
as in
Model
2,measures.
however,
there
is
a decrease
ingeneralized
the effect
of the
altruistic
value dimension (0.03)
odel
4 we
included
a number
of
important
control
variables:
gender,
support
pro-environmental
policy
When
focusing
values,
Model
2 also
finds the
egoistic
(−0.08) andofand
the
biospheric
(0.16)
dimensions
are more
or less
the
of ideology
(0.02).value friendly
trust, perceptions
other’s
environmentally
behavior,
dietary
habits,
Sustainability
2017, 9, 679
Sustainability 2017,
9, 679
7 of 14
9 of 14
what we already know from the extensive research on the ideology-values connection [86,97].
on the other hand, are overall negatively connected to governmental coercion. Thus, also when using
However, the important test for this article is whether, and to what extent, these two individual-level
Dataset 2, we dismiss Hypothesis 1 and confirm Hypothesis 2.
facets have independent effects on pro-environmental policy support. Hence, in order to test our
first hypothesis, we
performed
a number of
of Different
regression
models.
The Instruments
results from(Unstandardized
these analyses are
Kinds
of Policy
coefficients,
Table
4. The Acceptance
presented in Table
2.
standard
error in parentheses). OLS Regression. Dataset 2.
Table 2. The Effect of Ideology and Values on Pro-Environmental
Policy Support
(Unstandardized
Taxes
Regulation
Subsidies
Information
coefficients, standard error in parentheses). Ordinary Least Squares Regression. Dataset 1.
7 of 14
−0.15 ***
−0.09
***
−0.04 *
0.04 *
Ideology (left right)
[0.02] 3 Model
[0.02]4
[0.01]
Model 1 [0.02]
Model 2 Model
rom the extensive research onValues
the ideology-values
−0.05 *** connection [86,97].
−0.02 ** −0.03 ***
Ideology
(left-right)
st for this article is whether,
and to
what extent,(0.01)
these two individual-level
(0.01)
−0.01
−(0.01)
0.01
0.04 *
−0.03 *
Egoistic
effects on pro-environmental
policy
support.
Hence,
in
order
to
test
our
[0.02]
[0.02]
[0.02]
[−0.01]
Values
med a number of regression models. The results from these analyses are
0.01
** ***
0.04 ¤
0.07 ***
−0.09 *** 0.06
−0.08
−0.03
Altruistic
Egoistic
[0.02]
[0.02]
[0.02]
[0.02]
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.01)
0.09 ***
***¤
0.01
0.06 ***
0.05 ** 0.09
0.03
0.01
Biospheric
deology and Values on Pro-Environmental
Policy Support (Unstandardized
Altruistic
[0.02]
[0.02]
[0.02]
[0.01]
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
ror in parentheses). Ordinary Least Squares Regression. Dataset 1.
Controls
included
included
included
0.16 *** included
0.16 ***
0.07
***
Biospheric
Model 1 Model
2 Model 3 Model1.00
4 ***
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
1.66 ***
1.57 ***
2.13 ***
Constant
[0.21]
[0.22]
[0.17]
−0.05 *** Controls
−0.02 ** −0.03 ***[0.22]
Included
y (left-right)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
N
1709 ***
1706
1711
3.88
*** 1709
2.88 ***
3.04
1.76
***
ConstantAdjusted R2
0.274
0.196
0.142
0.212
(0.05)
(0.08)
(0.09)
(0.19)
Note:
*** p ***
< 0.001;−0.08
** p < ***
0.01; * p −0.03
<
0.05, ¤ p < 0.10.
Included control
variables:
gender, generalized trust, institutional
−0.09
N
907
907
907
907
ic
trust, ascription2 of personal environmental norm, discipline (economics, law, political science).
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.01)
Adjusted R
0.038
0.209
0.217
0.426
0.05 **
0.03
¤ 0.001; 0.01
Note:
***
p
<
**
p
<
0.01;
*
p
<
0.05;
¤
p
<
0.10.
stic
4. Discussion
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
***
0.16the
***
0.07 ***forimportance
Models 1 and
20.16
show
regressions
ideology and
valuespolicy
in support
forfor
thesuccessfully
index of governing
Starting
offbivariate
from
undisputable
of public
support
heric
(0.02)
(0.02)taken
policy measures,
demonstrating
that they,
each
have rather
effects
in explore the
towards
collective (0.02)
action
behavior
in theseparately,
environmental
field, strong
this article
setgoing
out to
the expectedrelationship
direction. Inbetween
Model 1, two
although
the
explained variance
ideologyofis positive
low (0.038),
we
major
explanations
for the for
formation
attitudes
towards
Included
note that 3.88
theenvironmental
coefficient
(−0.05)1.76
and
significant
(p < 0.001),
indicating
that
the further
to overlaps in
policy
measures.
These
two explanations
have,
at least in
theory,
significant
***
2.88 is
***negative
3.04
***
***
t
the right respondents
place
themselves
on(0.19)
theand
political
spectrum, the
less likely
they
are to showand evaluate
the sense(0.08)
that
they
collect
cross-situational
sentiments
used
to understand
(0.05)
(0.09) general
support for907
pro-environmental
policy
measures.
Wheninfocusing
on values,
Modelalthough
2 also finds
a
wide range
However,
the empirical
literature,
theythe
independently
907 of political
907 issues.
907
stronger
respondents
subscribe to
egoistic
values, the less likely
they attitudes,
are to
haveThe
been
shown the
to0.217
have
rather
significant
effects
on pro-environmental
policy
they are
d R2 expected effects.
0.038
0.209
0.426
express
support
for
pro-environmental
policy
measures
(−0.09),
while
the
opposite
is
true
for
both
rarely
tested
together.
To
date,
we
have
not
known
whether
and
to
what
extent
the
noticeable
effect
Note: *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; ¤ p < 0.10.
the altruisticof(0.05)
and biospheric
value
dimensions.
All basic
thesemechanisms.
effects are also
significant.
To is, however,
personal
values and(0.16)
ideology
capture
the same
This
knowledge
explore
whether
theideology
effects
ofand
ideology
values are
each other,
as suggested
by the way for
imperative
in order
to values
better and
understand
the
drivers
behind
support,
and thus pave
bivariate
regressions
for
in support
for independent
the
index
of ofpolicy
Hypothesis
1,
Model
3
placed
the
two
sets
of
independent
variables
in
the
same
regression.
Note
that
the
implementation
of
effective
and
legitimate
governmental
coercion
in
the
environmental
field.
rating that they, each taken separately, have rather strong effects going in
in1,the
combined
the effects
both
ideology
personal
values
retain
their significance
(p < of left-right
Using
items
fromofthe
Schwartz
value
survey
and
self-reported
measures
Model
although
themodel
explained
variance
for
ideology
isand
low
(0.038),
westandard
0.001),
with and
the
exception
altruistic
value
which is
only
at the
90% level. Rather, we
ideology,
ourofresults
suggest
that dimension,
our
two
are
notsignificant
completely
overlapping.
negative
(−0.05)
significant
(pthe
< 0.001),
indicating
that
thevariables
further
to
The effects
egoistic
(−0.08)
value
dimensions
areremain
more or
less the both when
find
that
ideology
hasand
independent
effects
on
support,
which
significant
ce themselves
on of
thethe
political
spectrum,
thethe
lessbiospheric
likely
they(0.16)
arepolicy
to
show
in Model
2,
however,
there
isvalues,
a decrease
in the
effect
of the
value
dimension
incorporating
personal
values
in the
model
controlling
for a range
of other
factors.(0.03)
These results are
ental same
policyasmeasures.
When
focusing
on
Model
2 and
also
finds
thealtruistic
and
of ideology
(0.02).
alsosubscribe
verified when
examining
single
policy
ger the
respondents
to egoistic
values,support
the lessfor
likely
they
are tomeasures, rather than an index. Furthermore,
Finally,
in measures
Model with
4 we
included
number
of important
variables:
gender,
generalized
consistent
theory,
ouraresults
suggest
effects
values and
ideology
differ between types
nvironmental
policy
(−0.09),
while
the
opposite
isthat
truethe
forcontrol
both of
and(0.16)
institutional
trust,
perceptions
other’s
friendly
behavior,
dietary
habits,
of policy
measures.
the
biospheric
value domain,
support
is stronger
for push
measures that
ospheric
value
dimensions.
All Within
theseofeffects
areenvironmentally
also significant.
To
income,
general
environmental
beliefs,
and
personal
norms.
The
latter
two
are
particularly
generally
understood of
as being
more effective
in governing
individual behavior due to the amount
s of ideology andare
values
are independent
each other,
as suggested
by
important
controls
because
the
effect
of values
isthe
argued
to be
channeleddimension
through environmental
of
coercion
they
imply.
Placement
left-right
ideological
also matters in preferences
ced the
two sets of
independent
variables
in
the
sameon
regression.
Note
that
beliefs
andideology
feelings
of moral
obligation
to
take their
action
(cf. [58]). are
This
also predisposed
corresponds well
with our
for different
measures.
Right-leaning
individuals
to support
pull measures,
e effects
of both
and
personal
values
retain
significance
(p <more
findings.
When
the
controls
are
introduced
in
the
model,
the
effect
of
all
value
dimensions
decreases
where
the individual’s
of choiceatisthe
retained
and the direct involvement of the state is limited.
of the altruistic value
dimension,
which isfreedom
only significant
90% level.
(egoistic
−0.03; altruistic
0.01; dimensions
biospheric are
= 0.07).
(−0.08)
and the= biospheric
(0.16) =value
moreHowever,
or less themost importantly, the effect of
ideological
position
remains
also
when
controlling
ver, there
is a decrease
in the
effect ofunchanged
the altruistic
value
dimension
(0.03)for a range of other variables.
Although there is clearly an overlap between values and ideology, and the contribution of ideology
to the atotal
explained
variance
is modest,
the remaining
significant effect is an indication that a
e included
number
of important
control
variables:
gender, generalized
erceptions of other’s environmentally friendly behavior, dietary habits,
mental beliefs, and personal norms. The latter two are particularly
e the effect of values is argued to be channeled through environmental
ral obligation to take action (cf. [58]). This also corresponds well with our
Sustainability 2017, 9, 679
10 of 14
5. Conclusions
In this paper we have been concerned with the degree to which people’s values and ideology
affect support for pro-environmental policy measures. More substantially, we have asked if these
two dominating factors basically capture the same characteristics, that is, if they actually measure the
same thing. Although hypothesizing the contrary, we find that they both have significant effects on
policy support and furthermore that these effects are independent. Thereby, we can conclude that
they are, both simultaneously and in isolation, crucial variables determining pro-environmental policy
support. Yet, in line with our hypothesis, we find that values and ideology differ in how and what
they affect. Ideology has a significant effect on all policy measures aside from information. At the
same time, there is a great variation in how different value dimensions affect support for the various
policy measures that we have included in the study. It is also important to emphasize that neither
values nor ideology explain the major part of the variance in support for pro-environmental policy
measures in our models. Thus, adding further instruments and/or including additional personal and
contextual variables can potentially help us better understand the variation that we have found in
people’s policy support.
In addition, when contemplating our results, it is of importance to note that the values-based
models that we have used have not been developed to explain pro-environmental policy support
specifically, but rather to explain pro-environmental behavior in general. Thus, elsewhere, it has
been shown that by complementing values-based models with, for example, trust and policy-specific
beliefs, pro-environmental policy support is more successfully explained [81,93]. As we have found
that ideology also has independent effects on policy support, future studies should investigate what
actually constitutes this effect: Simply, what are the causal mechanisms behind the effect of ideology on
pro-environmental support? Our proposition is that this effect is moderated by policy-specific beliefs.
Acknowledgments: We would like to thank Cecilia Lundholm, Tomas Torbjörnsson and Felicia Robertson.
We would also like to express our appreciation to the participant in the Environmental Politics Group at the
Annual Meeting of Swedish Political Science Association, Stockholm, October 2015, and The Centre for Political
Studies, Gothenburg, November 2015, where we presented early drafts of the paper. This work was supported by
the Swedish Research Council [2011-1844, 2011-5991].
Author Contributions: The authors contributed equally to this work and are listed alphabetically.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
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The 11 policy suggestions are “Increased CO2 tax on petrol”; “Work more actively to ban environmentally
hazardous products”: “Reduced tax on fuels that do not affect the world’s climate”; “Reduce the tax on
foods with little environmental impact”; “Increased information about the effects of transportation on the
climate”; “Focus more on environmental labelling of products”; “Focus more on information about how
different foods affect the climate”; “Ban sale of appliances that are not energy efficient”; “Increased tax on
vehicles with large engines (large cylinder volume)”; “Increase the tax on household electricity”; “Impose a
meat tax to reduce the climatic effect of our food consumption”.
The exact formulation of the question is “There are various ways to get ordinary people in Sweden to protect
the environment. What do you think about the following suggestions?”: “Impose consumption taxes on
polluting consumption”, “Impose more regulations and prohibitions to prevent people from harming the
environment”, “Subsidize environmentally friendly consumption”, and “Provide more information and
education to people about the benefits of protecting the environment.”
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Survey items: “This section deals with the current state of the global environment and what the consequences
may be. To what extent do you agree with the following statements?” “The damages already made
to the natural environment may be irreparable”; “Eventually, most environmental problems will solve
themselves”; “The global climate is about to change drastically”; “Statements such as that the present levels
of environmental pollutants are changing the global climate are exaggerated”; “Thousands of different
species will become extinct over the next few decades”. The scale ranges from 1 (do not agree at all) to 7
(agree completely). The items are reversed accordingly.
Survey items: “To what extent do you agree with the following statements about what causes environmental
problems?” “My own lifestyle has contributed to the current environmental problems.”. “This section lists a
variety of statements. To what extent do you agree with each of them?” “I am co-responsible for protecting
the world’s environment”; “I have no personal responsibility to protect the environment.” The scale ranges
from 1 (do not agree at all) to 7 (agree completely). The items are reversed accordingly.
Survey items: “Below you will find a few statements about how a person can feel about the environment
and about other people. To what extent do you agree with each statement?” “I believe I should consider the
environment”; “I don’t care about the environmental problems”; “I feel bad if I don’t live environmentally
friendly”; “I feel I have a moral duty to do something about the environmental problems”. The scale ranges
from 1 (do not agree at all) to (agree completely). The items are reversed accordingly.
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Survey item: “People who live in the countryside generally have limited access to public transportation
and are more dependent on cars, and people who state that they often go by car are more affected by an
increased CO2 tax”.
Income is coded into three different categories: Low-income earners (15,000 SEK/month or less),
middle-income earners (15,001–25,000 SEK/month), and high-income earners (25,001 SEK/month or more).
Survey items “This section has nothing to do with you. Instead, it deals with what you believe other
people do and how you believe they feel. To what extent do you agree with the following statements?”
“Many people try to do something in daily life about the environmental problems”; “For the sake of the
environment, many people frequently choose not to use a car”; “Most people don’t care about trying to live
environmentally friendly”; “People generally try to limit their car use”; “Most people don’t care about trying
to decrease their car use for the sake of the environment”; “Many people behave environmentally friendly to
a large degree”. The index has a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.67. The scale ranges from 1–7.
Caprara, G.V.; Schwartz, S.; Capanna, C.; Vecchione, M.; Barbaranelli, C. Personality and politics: Values,
traits, and political choice. Political Psychol. 2006, 27, 1–28. [CrossRef]
We have also performed ordered logit models, and the results from these point in the same direction as the
OLS regressions.
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