MARTA ALLEGRA RONCHETTI
March 2017
Date of Birth: January 29th 1989
Place of Birth: Busto Arsizio (VA), Italy
Nationality: Italian
martallegraronchetti.wordpress.com
[email protected]
[email protected]
Room C40
Sir Clive Granger Building
School of Economics
University of Nottingham
University Park, NG7 2RD
Nottingham, UK
EDUCATION
• From October 2013 : PhD in Economics (Expected 2017), University of Nottingham, Nottingham
(UK). 10th December 2014 : Upgrade from MPhil to PhD student status
Supervisors: Prof Gianni De Fraja and Dr Matthias Dahm.
Thesis Title: Three essays on Credit Ratings.
• 2013, February: M.Sc. Economics (two years), Univesità Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milano.
Final Grade: 110/110 Magna cum laude Supervisor : Prof. Piero Tedeschi.
Thesis Title: Rating Agencies: theory and matters of concern.
• 2010, October : Bachelor Degree in Economics and Business Management, Università Cattolica del
Sacro Cuore, Milano. Final Grade: 106/110
Thesis Title: Competition and Collusion: two cases from the pharmaceutical-diagnostic industry.
WORKSHOPS AND SUMMER SCHOOLS
• 2016, June: Barcelona GSE Summer School in Banking Theory and Theory of Corporate Finance
• 2015, June: 2nd Corporate Governance Workshop, University of Sussex
• 2015, May: RES York Mini-Courses on Game Theory, University of York
• 2014/15, September : GTA Workshop, UK PSF for teaching and supporting learning in higher
education
• 2010, July: LSE Summer School Programme in International Economics
WORKING PAPER
• Preliminary Credit Ratings and Contact Disclosure (previously circulated as Credit Rating
Agency, Preliminary Ratings and Contact Disclosure CFCM Discussion Paper 15/04 (nominated
for the best paper award in the Trading, Risk and Investment stream at the 2nd Young Finance
Scholars Conference))
Abstract
A recent amendment to the European Regulation on credit rating agencies (CRA) requires
CRAs to disclose any issuers’ request of initial reviews (i.e preliminary ratings). This paper
constructs a model of preliminary ratings and uses it to investigate the effect of contact disclosure.
A CRA issues a preliminary rating. After receiving this confidential rating, the entrepreneur has
the opportunity either to purchase an official rating at a cost or to remain unrated. I identify
a tradeoff between the fee and the CRA’s reputation. When the project is likely to be good,
the CRA issues a good preliminary rating because the risk of loosing reputation is extremely
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low whereas when the project is likely to be bad the CRA prefers to issue a bad preliminary
rating avoiding to risk reputation. I show that when there is disclosure of the contact between
the CRA and the entrepreneur, the CRA issues more often good preliminary ratings then when
there is no evidence of preliminary contact. Disclosure results in a lower probability of stopping
high quality projects but also in a higher probability of financing low quality ones.
WORK IN PROGRESS
• Credit Rating Agencies: Competition for Preliminary Ratings, Effort and Disclosure
Regimes
Abstract
This paper constructs a model preliminary ratings under competition and uses it to investigate
two disclosure regimes. In this setting, the first credit rating agency issues a preliminary rating.
After receiving this preliminary rating, the entrepreneur has the opportunity to either purchase
a final rating at a cost or to ask a second opinion to an other CRA. Comparing the regime with
no mandatory disclosure to a regime mandating the disclosure of the contact between the CRAs
and the entrepreneur, if it is costly for the CRAs to become informed, the equilibrium is unique
and mandatory disclosure has no effect. Conversely when the effort cost is relatively low, the
space of parameters’ combinations for which an informative equilibrium exists becomes smaller.
It is shown that under disclosure there are two types of informative equilibrium, one where
only the first CRA exerts effort and another where only the second CRA invests in information.
Under no disclosure instead, both CRAs would invest in effort. Under the assumption that more
information is beneficial, disclosure never results in more information in the system.
SEMINARS AND CONFERENCES
• 2014/15/16 April : Postgraduate Research Seminar (PhD Presentations), University of Nottingham
• 2015, June: 2nd Young Finance Scholars Conference (speaker), University of Sussex
• 2015, September : 32nd Annual Conference of the European Association of Law and Economics
(speaker and discussant), University of Vienna
• 2015, December : II Annual PhD Conference, University of Leicester (speaker)
• 2017, January: 2017 RES PhD meetings, Westminster Business School (speaker)
• 2017, March: Spring Meeting of Young Economists 2017, University of Halle (scheduled)
AWARDS AND PRIZES
• 2016 : GTA Teaching Excellence Certificate, School of Economics University of Nottingham
• 2016-17 : School of Economics Graduate Teaching Fellowship, University of Nottingham
• 2015 : School of Economics Best Participant in the 2015 PhD presentation, University of Nottingham
• 2013-16 : School of Economics Postgraduate Research Scholarship (covering tuition fees and a
maintenance stipend), University of Nottingham
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TEACHING EXPERIENCE
University of Nottingham
• Graduate Teaching Fellow: tutorials
– 2016-17 : Microeconomic Theory (UG Year 2, autumn term) and Financial Economics (UG
Year 2, spring term)
• Graduate Teaching Assistant: tutorials, feedback essays and examination marking
– 2014-15 : Introduction to Microeconomics and Introduction to Macroeconomics (UG Year 1)
– 2015-16 : Mathematical Economics and Economics Integration II (UG Year 1)
LANGUAGE SKILLS
• Italian (mother tongue), English (fluent), French (basic)
WORK EXPERIENCE
• May - August 2013 : Transfer Pricing Consultant - Interm at KStudio Associato (member of KPMG
international). Role: economic-financial analysis, price and margin estimate, documents draw up.
IT SKILLS
• Windows and Mac OS X operating systems, Wolfram Mathematica, basic knowledge of Stata and
R; LATEXuser.
RESEARCH INTERESTS
• PRIMARY Induatrial Organization, Corporate Finance, Information Economics
• SECONDARY Contract Theory, Economics of Financial Market
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