FORUM
The Ecosystem: Model or
Metaphor?
Epistemological Difficulties in Industrial
Ecology
Gérald Hess
Keywords:
analogy
epistemology
ideology
industrial ecology
metaphor
sustainable development
Summary
Industrial ecology offers an original way of looking at economic
activities. The approach is based on an analogy between certain objects studied by the science of ecology (ecosystems,
metabolisms, symbiosis, biocenosis, etc.) and industrial systems. However, this analogical relationship raises difficulties
due to the various interpretations to which it is open. Although there is agreement regarding its heuristic function, the
analogy can nevertheless be understood either as a model
or as a metaphor. The present article first attempts to show
how models differ from metaphors. It then sets out to justify
the epistemological relevance of this distinction for industrial
ecology research. The reflection should thus contribute to clarifying the debate on the (supposed or desired) role of analogy
in the field of industrial ecology and heighten the interest this
field of investigation represents for implementing sustainable
development.
Address correspondence to:
Gérald Hess
Institut de politiques territoriales et
d’environnement humain (IPTEH)
Faculté des géosciences et de
l’environnement
Université de Lausanne (UNIL)
Amphipôle—Quartier Sorge
1015 Lausanne, Switzerland
[email protected]
c 2010 by Yale University
DOI: 10.1111/j.1530-9290.2010.00226.x
Volume 14, Number 2
270
Journal of Industrial Ecology
www.blackwellpublishing.com/jie
FORUM
Introduction
Over the past 20 years or so, industrial ecology has been emerging as an operational strategy
for sustainable development. There is no standard definition for this approach. Nonetheless,
a specialist in this area, Suren Erkman (2004),
has identified several features that set industrial
ecology apart from other ways of representing industrial and economic activity. In summary, industrial ecology strives for a global, integrated
view of all the components of the industrial system and their relations to the biosphere. Drawing
on technological processes, this strategy strives to
optimize material and energy flows in the industrial system in a fashion similar to the way natural
ecosystems function (Erkman 2004, 27).
I focus on two specific elements of this definition: First, industrial ecology defends a holistic perspective expressed by the permeability
between human activities and the biosphere; second, it is largely inspired by scientific ecology.1
Indeed, it tends to organize the industrial system according to the quasi-cyclical functioning
of natural systems. It aims in particular to define industrial activities as biological ecosystems.
It thus contributes to establishing an analogy between biological ecosystems and industrial systems, subjecting the latter to constraints.2
This way of considering activities has spawned
a new terminology. The industrial metabolism, for
instance, refers to the measurement of material
and energy flows resulting from industrial activities; industrial biocenosis3 refers to the idea of associating certain economic agents to optimize the
material and energy flows of their activities; and
the Kalundborg symbiosis has become the stock
expression to refer to the city in Denmark where
certain industrial waste products are systematically converted into resources contributing to the
production of goods by other companies located
within the same territory (Nemerow 1995).4
The industrial ecology strategy is at odds
with a major principle of neoclassical economics,
which holds that value is created when material
and energy flows increase, which ensures economic growth. Industrial ecology forms an interesting alternative to this view of things. By
taking into account environmental limits, it also
provides a way of envisaging limits to material
growth. Such limits are inherent to a certain interpretation of sustainable development as well.
From an epistemological standpoint, the argument can nevertheless be made that the
analogy between natural ecosystems and industrial activities—on which industrial ecology is
based—still remains too vague to be totally operational. This relationship can, in fact, be interpreted in several ways. How, indeed, is one
to understand the use of the notion of a natural
ecosystem (and other ecological concepts) in the
context of industrial ecology? Is it really only an
ordinary usage? And is the term indeed borrowed
from the traditional area of scientific ecology? In
this case, it is simply a matter of extending the
field of application of the concept of ecosystem to
another field—the industrial system—in which
case the analogy is akin to a model.
On the contrary, the use of the notion of
ecosystem could be more than just a borrowing
from classical ecology. It could instead indicate
the emergence of a new meaning expressed by an
inventive metaphor. When industrial ecology researchers take the trouble to think about this relationship to analogy, they often confuse metaphor
and model. This is the case of Ralf Isenmann’s
analysis (2003a, 2003b), for instance.5 And when
the distinction is made, it often lacks a full awareness of the implications. This is the case, for example, with John Ehrenfeld’s (2003, 2007) essays. It seems to me, moreover, that the lively
debate that pits advocates of industrial ecology
against one another on the issue of the (supposed
or desired) role of metaphor—work by Christoph
Bey (2001), Jouni Korhonen (2005), and Peter
E. Wells (2006) provide good examples of this—
would be much clearer if the distinction were
made between model and metaphor.
I maintain that this alternation in the interpretation of the analogy between biological
ecosystems and industrial systems is, in fact, ambiguous. That ambiguity is not without consequence. Without a philosophical clarification, it
is, first of all, likely to lead, as I attempt to show, to
an epistemological error, unbeknownst to those
who base their thinking on this analogy. To my
mind, the error involves confusing what finally
has to do with the objective properties of a state of
things with the representation of a state of things.
In other words, it involves mixing up two levels
Hess, The Ecosystem: Model or Metaphor?
271
FORUM
of discourse, the first of which refers to the real,
and the second of which refers to the vision one
has of it. This error can take several forms. It
can, for instance, take the form of ideology, or it
can damage the coherence and originality of the
industrial ecology approach.
The alternation between model and metaphor
is moreover enlightening as regards another
ambiguity specific to the expression “industrial
ecology.” This ambiguity involves technological
applications and the disagreement between two
interpretations: an “artificialization” of nature
and a “naturalization” of technology. This produces divergent viewpoints among the advocates
of industrial ecology. These are also, more fundamentally, different representations of development. Industrial ecology, as I have said, seems
to be one of the tools available to implement
sustainable development. At least in the current
state of affairs, I believe that the advocates of industrial ecology are fueling the conflict between
the two conceptions—“weak” (Solow 1997) and
“strong” (Daly 1997)—of sustainable development. Yet we are entitled to expect them to help
resolve it instead.
I propose here to tackle the question of analogy in industrial ecology and seek to grasp its
implications from the standpoint of scientific activity. I cannot do this without first making a
short detour through the notions of metaphor and
model. That should enable me to identify the difficulties that I have mentioned above, whether
those difficulties stem from a confusion between
reality and its representation or from an ambiguity of the meaning attributed to technology. I
conclude my analysis with a brief suggestion as to
how these difficulties might be overcome.
Metaphor and Model
To illuminate the difference between
metaphor and model, I must be clear on what I
am talking about. I thus first introduce an initial
distinction among several levels of discourse. By
the expression “industrial ecology,” I mean, in accordance with current usage, the field of study pertaining to certain “objects”: an industrial system,
the flows of substances from an economic activity, the waste it produces, micropollutants, and
so forth. In articulate language, the expression
272
Journal of Industrial Ecology
“industrial ecology” is, as Suren Erkman (2004)
points out, an oxymoron. It follows that expressions such as “industrial ecosystem,” “Kalundborg
symbiosis,” and “industrial biocenosis” refer to objects of study specific to industrial ecology. From a
linguistic standpoint, I define them as metaphors
or models.6
I am indebted to the American philosopher
Max Black (1962, [1979] 1993) for being one of
the first to make the connection between model
and metaphor.7 His analyses constitute essential
and well-known references in this regard. Perhaps less well known is the background to this
debate. In fact, Max Black takes issue with all the
other theories of metaphor that deny this figure
of speech its own signifier function. Translating
a metaphor by a paraphrase, he maintains, allows something irreplaceable to escape that cannot be expressed in any other way. This is precisely what happens, for instance, when in the
sentence “Love is a razor”8 the word razor is replaced by danger or by potential wound. Metaphor
apparently enables one to say something about
something else. But what’s more, the meaning
expressed through it is unexpected, new, and, consequently, unique.
This dual aspect of metaphor, both referential
and creative−innovative, which prompts Max
Black (1962, [1979] 1993) to compare metaphor
and model. Indeed, a model always presupposes
two representations, one of which serves precisely
as a description for the other. This is how the
term symbiosis can serve as a model to describe
the web of activities of the companies in Kalundborg. Added to that is the heuristic dimension
of models: These are effectively in service of discovery and invention. When one refers to the
Kalundborg industrial network and its dynamic
as symbiosis, properties are revealed that without
this term would go unnoticed. In the example
of this Danish city, the main point is that the
partners exchange their residual waste.
The Specific Nature of Models
It should be pointed out that this connection is not enough to assimilate the structure of a
model with that of a metaphor. Models have specific characteristics. First of all, they are constructions that, like a filter, aim to simplify phenomena,
FORUM
organize them, and select certain aspects at the
expense of others. In this fashion, the double helix of geneticists James Watson and Francis Crick
can represent the structure of the DNA molecule.
Next, and this is an important point, the ordinary or literal meaning of a model leads to the
creation of a new system of implications of the
state of things in question. The juxtaposition of
the field of reference with the representation that
serves as a model engenders another way of seeing, but a way of seeing reality. It produces an
isomorphism between the thing and the model
that describes it. For instance, modeling the DNA
molecule in the helical form of a double helix
thus enables a new property of this substance to
come to light: It retains and transmits information to the descendants (Nouvel 2000, 98–99).9
The model of the double helix thus reorganizes
the range of implications related to the chromosome substance of a cell by supplying new descriptions of molecular properties.
This is why models have a cognitive dimension, which constitutes their third feature. Not
only does a model describe the real world, but
also and especially it re-describes it and describes
it again differently. The double helix is, indeed,
a redescription of the molecular structure as it
was perceived before Watson and Crick’s breakthrough. It is, indeed, the referent (the reality
described) that changed, so to speak, thanks to
the model through which it is grasped.
The Specific Nature of Metaphors
On the basis of hermeneutical and phenomenological tradition derived from the German and French philosophers Hans Georg
Gadamer ([1960] 1990) and Paul Ricœur (1975),
my conception of metaphor allows one to show
how the metaphor is distinguished from the
model. As I conceive it, metaphor is really different from model on all of the points above.
Moreover, it is not limited to a figure of speech;
it is also a process of thought. As suggested by the
biologist and philosopher of science Pascal Nouvel (2000, 122), metaphor describes first of all the
sudden appearance of a semantic complication that
is expressed in speech, a phenomenon that has
been analyzed in depth by Paul Ricœur (1975).
Suffice it here to recall what Aristotle (1984,
III.10.2.1404b) long ago noted about when a
metaphor is formulated: the oddity and surprise
provoked by a semantic incongruity. These effects lead the interlocutor to seek the true meaning of the utterance. When I refer to love as being a razor, one should not take the word razor
literally. Instead, the word expresses my vision
of love. By using this concept, I convey something of myself with respect to the amorous phenomenon; I am expressing the effect that love
has on me, which a paraphrase—such as danger,
for instance—could not convey. The adequate
meaning of metaphor can be grasped not by inference but by an affective approach. Only such
an approach is sensitive to the qualities of the
unique speech context, the true ingredients of
the new metaphorical meaning.10
In addition, and this comes as a consequence
of what precedes, in my view metaphor refers not
to any sort of state of things but to a perspective.
On this point, my conception differs from that of
Max Black (1962, [1979] 1993). Unlike him, I,
in fact, believe that the semantic content of the
metaphorical image does not refer to the object
of the utterance.11 This is not to say that the object of the utterance is absent, but the metaphoric
relevance does not apply to it; it applies to the
speaker or author of the metaphor. In “Love is
a razor,” the razor is not, despite appearances, a
new objective property of the reality that is love,
a property that the unhappy experience of the
utterer of the metaphor has brought to light. The
metaphor, on the contrary, opacifies the relationship between language and the object to which it
refers by introducing a point of view or subjective
perspective.12
Last, as a corollary, the figure of metaphor
thus refers less to things than it constitutes an
image of things. In the absence of a specific reference, metaphor—as long as it is active or living—
does not have a specific cognitive content. In
other words, it expresses not the relationship of
a speaker to the real world but a speaker’s relationship to his or her own images of reality. It constitutes, as the philosopher Arthur Danto (1981,
207) nicely put it, a work in which a representation is “magically embedded.” When I qualify
love using the word razor, I am expressing only
my view of love, not a quality that is supposedly
independent from my own experience. The use of
Hess, The Ecosystem: Model or Metaphor?
273
FORUM
metaphor is thus a preferred means of manifesting the subjective or, more precisely, phenomenal
aspect of one’s experience of the world.13
The Natural Ecosystem as a
Model for the Industrial System
The preceding epistemological distinctions
now allow us to understand the various implications of certain concepts14 that are specific to
scientific ecology15 to describe industrial activities. Let us examine the first example: What does
it mean to consider the biological ecosystem as a
model?
The biological ecosystem is a complex concept. It refers to many notions, such as ecological
niche, (autotrophic) producer, (heterotrophic)
consumer, trophic web, decomposers, flows of
matter (e.g., carbon and nitrogen), cycles, food
chains, and biocenosis and symbiosis. As soon as
the natural ecosystem is used as a model for the
physical substrates (matter and energy) of industrial activities, obviously, all of the underlying
representations of this concept cannot be transposed item by item. As I said before, it is not a relation of identity but merely one of analogy. Never
will we be able to produce an industrial ecosystem that is identical to the biological ecosystem.
This is why, when perceived as a model, the notion of ecosystem first of all delimits the implicit
representations likely to organize the industrial
system. A delimitation of this sort occurs, for instance, with the circular property of the system,
or else the idea of food chain, which refers to
the fact that one man’s waste is another man’s
resource, or again with the concept of biocenosis.
This web of implications related to the concept of biological ecosystem is then projected on
an area constituted by the industrial system. This
projection induces another way to see industrial
activity. Precisely, it helps to construct a “new”
web of representations implicit in the industrial
system, in that this web intentionally deviates
from the traditional representations associated
with the workings of industry and the economy.
The traditional industrial system fits in with the
linear approach. All processing operations consume raw materials to manufacture a product and
produce waste that is, if not discarded, then at
least stored. Industrial ecology strives to demol274
Journal of Industrial Ecology
ish this linear structure of consuming, manufacturing, and storing (or discarding). To that end, it
uses representations, such as circularity and food
chain, that pertain to natural ecosystems to alter
a conception of industrial activity that does not
take into account the biosphere and its limits.
Thus, industrial ecologists no longer speak of
storing waste but now talk of recovering it as
much as possible as a raw material to be consumed for other activities. On the Kalundborg
site, for instance, waste water from the Statoil
refinery is used to cool the Asnaesvaerket power
plant. This, in turn, produces not only electricity
but also steam, which is sold back to the refinery
and other consumers of the “ecosystem” (Erkman 2004, 29–30). The same holds true with the
idea of biocenosis. In this industrial system, it
refers to an assortment of complementary enterprises on the same premises. The aim is to reuse
the by-products of their activities, like a given
combination of species does within a biological
ecosystem.
To conclude this section, I highlight an important aspect of the projection characteristic of
a model. The concept of ecosystem as a model
for industrial activity is envisaged in its original
sense—in other words, as it is understood in scientific ecology. It is precisely in this meaning that
it can be more or less productive for reorganizing
the industrial system in a new way.
Two consequences of the above interpretation are worth drawing attention to. The first
involves an extension of the realm of objects dealt
with in scientific ecology. Indeed, if the biological ecosystem is a model for the industrial system,
what holds true in the field of ecology theoretically also holds true—to a certain extent—for
industrial activity. We attribute the properties related to the borrowed area—scientific ecology—
to another area, that of the economy or industry
henceforth considered as a subsystem of the biosphere.
For instance, certain characteristics of
symbiosis—take, for example, reciprocity, constancy, balance, and interdependence—also
qualify the links between actors in a real industrial system. Of course, not all the characteristics of the objects of ecology allow themselves
to be simply transposed to industrial activities.16
Regularity, abundance, and diversity are not
FORUM
necessarily properties of industrial symbioses, not
to mention the company, which is not a living
organism per se. Furthermore, the extension of
scientific ecology as a field of reference to the
industrial system also means that the major ecological principles—interconnection, totality, integration in the biosphere (holism), complexity,
and the like—also hold true for industrial activity
on the whole.
The second consequence resides in the fact
that models always have a reference. There must
be a reality to which the model applies and by
which it can be described in a different way than
it usually is. In practice, the industrial ecology approach first translates as analyses of the industrial
metabolism or industrial symbioses. The point is
to undertake mass and energy assessments. We
strive to measure the material and energy flows
related to a specific economic activity, on a scale
of the region, a city, for a product or a service. In
the case of industrial symbiosis, one studies the
relations among the various actors in an industrial system. Then, in the action phase, efficiency
strategies are developed, such as product decarbonization or dematerialization.
In summary, the work of industrial ecology
involves starting from a state of things that
one seeks to optimize through an interpretative
framework—that is, the model of the natural
ecosystem. The redescription that is made enables deficits, even opportunities, to be identified in ecological and economic terms and eventually to suggest solutions that are supposed to
bring industrial activity more in line with the
biological ecosystem.17 Here again, we find the
heuristic dimension of models mentioned earlier.
But metaphors can be heuristic, too. It is time
to consider this other scenario, to specify what
distinguishes it from the scenario in which the
ecosystem is perceived as a model.
The Biological Ecosystem as
Metaphor for the Industrial
System
I examine the biological ecosystem as a
metaphor for the industrial or economic system
by drawing on the work of the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953): seeing something as
something else (Wittgenstein 1953, 325ff; Black
[1979] 1993, 32ff; Ricœur 1975, 263ff). Thus,
to see industrial activity as an ecosystem is to
think about it in a certain way, with its standard
conception in the background; it is to conceive
it in this way rather than in a traditional manner. To illustrate this point, Ludwig Wittgenstein
takes up the famous “duck-rabbit” figure used by
the American psychologist Joseph Jastrow: The
drawing of a duck can suddenly be perceived as a
picture of a rabbit, and vice versa. This example
shows how the expression “to see . . . as . . .”
translates the experience of a semantic shift—that
is, a personal experience. Here, the very notion
of ecosystem winds up being invested with a new
meaning inspired by its association with the industrial system.
More precisely, this actual experience is above
all an imaginative experience that enables one to
grasp a congruity between the industrial system
and the ecosystem. Thus, when I bring these two
representations together, I perceive an affinity between them, an affinity manifested, for instance,
by the idea of circularity or a reciprocal dependence among the elements of a system.
Furthermore, the association of these two representations does not make them identical. It is
simply a matter of perceiving a resemblance between them. The perceived circularity between
industrial activity and the ecosystem is not one
of sameness. In fact, the metabolism of a biological ecosystem remains qualitatively different, for
instance, from that of an industrial system, however close its functioning may be to the natural
ecosystem.
Finally, the distinctive aspect of metaphorical
resemblance with regard to a strictly empirical resemblance resides in its affective dimension. The
experience of seeing the industrial system as an
ecosystem does not amount to simply attributing the properties of the ecosystem to industrial
activity. The latter is rather a phenomenon interiorized by the one who “sees . . . as . . .” to be
simultaneously expressed on another level, that
of ecology. This is why the representation used to
express this way of seeing undergoes a semantic
upheaval. The original meaning of the concept of
ecosystem loses its objective relevance, and, on
the basis of this irrelevance, a new meaning then
arises. This meaning, it must be pointed out, is indissociably linked to the imaginative experience
Hess, The Ecosystem: Model or Metaphor?
275
FORUM
of the person who sees the industrial system as an
ecosystem.
The characteristics of biocenosis—one example is that which consists in highly specific associations of populations of organisms from different
species—cannot be applied as-is to the industrial
system. They no longer refer to objective properties independent of the perception that one has.
They are now related to a particular experience
of the industrial system, to a subjective vision of
this state of things.18 Biocenosis becomes a sort
of “embedded representation,” and its meaning is
inseparable from the usage that its user makes of
it, which is a unique usage because it arises from
personal experience.
As soon as the concepts of ecology are used as
metaphors for industrial and economic activity,
one must be clear about the consequences of such
an operation. With metaphorical representation,
one is getting first of all a new and thereby largely
indeterminate meaning. In other words, when
one gives up the literal relevance of ecological
notions, one is no longer referring to a reality—
that very reality to which ecology refers—but instead is referring to a set of unique representations.
These encompass the beliefs, feelings, and desires
of a person or research community that the language borrowed from ecology alone enables them
to express.19
Furthermore, along the same lines, ecological metaphors of industrial ecology do not have
any specific reference per se. Given that the
metaphorical signification is new and unique, it
cannot be distinctly identified in a way that establishes a relation with the circumscribed state of
things. Contrary to appearances, a metaphor such
as “The industrial system is an ecosystem” refers
to no definite referent. Indeed, by semantic innovation, the term ecosystem, as I have said, can no
longer pertain to the object identified by scientific
ecology. And because this semantic innovation
is first of all a subjective experience, neither can
it refer to an objective reality that is universally
recognizable. Probably there is a referential context—the industrial system. I demonstrate later
in this article that some authors, such as John
Ehrenfeld (2003, 2004, 2007), are perfectly aware
of the situation. Conversely, Ehrenfeld is not at
all clear about the effects of the metaphorical
usage of certain concepts of industrial ecology.
276
Journal of Industrial Ecology
Finally, I have just noted that borrowings
of notions from ecology—in the metaphoric
usage—go together with the fact of putting aside
the referential relationship within the field borrowed from. Now, this semantic impertinence
leads logically, moreover, to a similar discontinuity, but as regards scientific ecology principles.
Interconnection or interdependence, integration
into the whole of the biosphere, complexity, cooperation, and so on—all of these principles are
no longer necessarily theoretical assumptions. In
any event, they lose their factual value inasmuch
as they constitute the bases of the science of
ecosystems. The difficulty here concerns the status of knowledge and its coherence. Calling into
question the referential nature of concepts such
as ecosystem has repercussions on other notions
of the theory and a fortiori its basic premises.
In other words, when concepts are picked up
from the field of ecology and used in a metaphorical sense, the principles from which the concepts result are no longer beneficial as evidence
of their context of origin. Such principles can
no longer be taken for granted. They require rethinking.20 That cannot be done further along
in the scientific framework of ecology; another
type of discourse takes over. In this discourse as
well, concepts are not independent from the one
who forges them. Such language brings into play
a specifically philosophical level that the epistemologist Gilles-Gaston Granger (1988) refers to
as meta-conceptual.21 It moreover cannot be dissociated from actual experience.
The argument above should now suffice to
demonstrate in what way this dual usage of analogy is indeed the source of an epistemological
error.
The Epistemological Issue
A large part of the practical work in industrial ecology involves, as previously mentioned,
making mass and energy assessments (industrial
metabolism) or analyzing exchanges between actors of a set of industrial activities (industrial
symbiosis). This situation clearly corresponds to
a model-based conception of ecological notions.
And at this point, I do not see any problem.
Industrial ecology also has a more theoretical
aspect that concerns its foundations, its issues, its
use of technology, its ties with other disciplines,
FORUM
and so on. In short, industrial ecology is not
limited to the studies of industrial symbiosis or
metabolism. Theoretically speaking, on the contrary, John Ehrenfeld (2007) has perfectly grasped
this aspect: Scientific ecology concepts cannot
be reduced to models. They express a unique vision of a researcher or research community (Hess
2003). Unless one is clear about the difference
between model and metaphor, one is inevitably
bound to make mistakes.
The Trap of Ideology
The first mistake is to confuse two uses of discourse and mistake metaphor for model. In that
case, a real semantic shift would occur. It would
enable a particular viewpoint about industrial activity to pass for an objective property of this
activity. This confusion, one of the flaws of ideology, is all the more pernicious in that it is often
unintentional.
An article by Brad Allenby (1999b), one
of the pioneers of industrial ecology, supplies a
good example of such a semantic shift. In his
groundbreaking essay on geo-engineering (Allenby 1999b), the author sets out to demonstrate how industrial ecology can contribute
to engineering principles applied to the system
Earth.22 Applications can include, for instance,
enhancing carbon dioxide sequestration in the
ocean’s depths or injecting sulfur dioxide into the
stratosphere.
Throughout Allenby’s (1999a, 1999b) thinking, industrial ecology—and the concepts it
forges—seems to be naturally envisaged as an
integrated, expanded, and multidisciplinary approach to industrial systems. Allenby’s suggestion, if I understand it properly, also involves
applying this approach to systems that geoengineering deals with. The author does not say so
explicitly, but he suggests that, to his mind,
geoengineering systems are particular industrial
ecosystems in which the intricate connection between man and nature is of a complexity that far
exceeds traditional industrial activities.
By this assimilation, the author alters, apparently without realizing it, the epistemological status of the concepts of industrial ecology. Why?
This is what I try to make clear. Models, as I
have said, differ from metaphor on at least two
essential points. Models’ primary objective is to
simplify phenomena; by this simplification, they
extend the field of application of scientific ecology to the field of industrial and economic activities. All models refer to an existing state of things;
they refer to a system of activities that they strive
to reorganize.
Nothing of the sort occurs in geoengineering. In fact, the notion of natural ecosystem does
not seem to be capable of serving as a model for
the activities implicated on the scale of the system Earth. Acting on the system Earth, in fact,
presents much greater difficulty than acting on an
industrial activity that is clearly delimited at the
regional level or for a product. The scale is qualitatively different. The problem here is indeed to
envision the complexity of geoengineering systems. The knowledge engendered by the model
seems theoretically unsuited to such complexity.
To satisfy the demand for knowledge required
by the complexity of the activities discussed, the
model has to be complex in itself, yet, although
it is complex, the model is still a simplification of
the state of things.23
Moreover, management on the scale of the
oceans or the stratosphere, for instance, is not
(yet) a reality. And it may turn out that, even if
it becomes possible, it is not ethically desirable.
One thing hardly seems debatable: For the moment, geoengineering systems only exist in the
minds of those who conceive them.
So if Allenby’s (1999b) suggestion makes any
sense, it cannot be attributed to a model-based
interpretation of industrial ecology concepts. In
the absence of any other alternative, one could
even consider it as an illusion. The distinction between model and metaphor, however, offers a third solution. In fact, in light of what
precedes, Allenby uses—voluntarily or not—the
notions of industrial ecology not as models but,
indeed, as metaphors. This metaphoric usage
enables the author to express his personal representation of technological activity.24 This representation stems primarily from a vision of humanity as an integral part of nature (the biosphere),
where the separation between the natural world
and human world is perceived as artificial
(Allenby 1999b, 75).
Furthermore, implicitly, Allenby’s (1999b)
conception of technology is one of outrageous
Hess, The Ecosystem: Model or Metaphor?
277
FORUM
human interference with nature. It tends to “artificialize” nature rather than “naturalize” technology. Poles apart from an attitude seeking to reduce human impact on nature, Allenby (1999b)
instead advocates a posture in which, he writes, “I
am actively responsible for the world and everything in it, and I will decide what lives and dies
through active intervention and management of
fundamental natural systems” (83).
But where in this case does ideology lurk? According to one definition, ideology25 defines a
situation in which the concepts of a discipline
make a claim to scientific objectivity, whereas
they are used in a context in which such a claim
has no place. In the case at hand, it appears when
industrial ecology and its concepts are in the service of a worldview, such as that advocated by
Allenby (1999a, 1999b). Indeed, he clearly defends industrial ecology as an objective approach
to industrial activities, including in their economic, social, and cultural dimensions (Allenby
1999a). One consequently deduces that for Allenby, the analogies at the basis of industrial ecology fit within a model and not a metaphor. One
should remember that only models ensure a degree of objectivity in understanding the phenomena in question.
I have, however, pointed out that for geoengineering systems, the descriptive scale changes
and, with it, also the context. Using the concepts of industrial ecology in this new framework
no longer involves describing an objective property of a system. These concepts are reused in another manner—metaphorical this time—which
one can deem more or less relevant depending
on the changes it induces (Hess 2003). But the
concepts now depend on a subjective viewpoint.
To claim the contrary is precisely to fall into the
trap of ideology and commit a semantic shift. In
my opinion, this is what Allenby (1999b) does
when he uses the industrial ecology approach to
justify maximal technological interference and
economics in the environment on a global scale
of the Earth.
A Problem of Coherence
I come now to another error. Respecting the
difference between metaphor and model is one
thing; maintaining its epistemological distinction
down to its consequences is another. The confu278
Journal of Industrial Ecology
sion this time is based on an omission. It involves
masking the impact of a metaphorical use of concepts of industrial ecology on the factual status of
underlying ecological principles.
By suspending the ordinary usage of ecological notions to apply them to the field of industrial and economic activities—a suspension that
inevitably occurs in a metaphor—we are also
perforce led, I recall, to bracketing off the validity of scientific ecology principles. That is because what basically belongs to this category temporarily loses its validity when one of the other
elements that depends on it comes to express
something other than what the traditional area
of reference allows one to assert. That does not
mean that such principles are excluded from the
discussion within industrial ecology—quite the
opposite. It simply means that they have lost the
legitimacy as facts that scientific ecology had afforded them. They will now be examined in the
light of a perspective other than scientific—in
other words, from a philosophical standpoint.
I would like to clarify this point by drawing
on the work of John Ehrenfeld (2007) regarding the relationship that he establishes between
industrial ecology and sustainable development.
His thinking perfectly illustrates what I mean.
In a manner similar to mine, the author is careful
to distinguish two usages of ecological concepts—
analogy and metaphor (Ehrenfeld 2003). And the
respective use he makes of them seems to me to
correspond to what I call model and metaphor.26
Nevertheless, in reading his essay, one realizes
that he neglects to draw the consequences—
important from an epistemological standpoint—
associated with this distinction.
According to Ehrenfeld (2007), the standard
concept of biological ecosystem does not allow a connection to be made between industrial ecology and sustainable development. This
is why he suggests an idea of ecosystem that strays
from the traditional concept of scientific ecology.
When one adopts this new idea of ecosystem—
Ehrenfeld is perfectly aware of it—the ecosystem becomes a metaphor within the industrial
ecology discourse. It is significant, for instance,
that Ehrenfeld explicitly asserts a personal idea of
ecosystem: “My own normative vision for industrial ecology is based on metaphor of ecosystems
as flourishing or sustainable” (Ehrenfeld 2007,
FORUM
76). Or, again, “Sustainability is nature at work”
(Ehrenfeld 2007, 76). In this spirit, Ehrenfeld
makes the perfectly coherent suggestion of replacing classical ecological theory by a theory
of emerging self-organizing systems. He believes
this would better account for the complexity
and the partially unpredictable behavior of natural ecosystems. Indeed, the classical notion of
ecological balance has great difficulty describing
their evolution.
What the author does not seem to be aware
of, however, is that the metaphorical process in
which he is engaged still implies a referential
opacity of the underlying principles of the notion
examined. As we have just seen, in keeping with
the requirement of coherent scientific knowledge, semantic irrelevance in fact suspends the
factual relevance of these principles and presupposes a prior critical examination of them from
a philosophical standpoint. This is why I cannot help wondering how Ehrenfeld (2007) can,
in the same momentum—and hardly a few lines
after the above-mentioned excerpts—continue
to base his argument on the de facto legitimacy
of interdependence as if, because it is a principle of classical ecology, it could still be taken
for granted?27 Is this not an incidence of the
incoherence mentioned earlier, the very same
one involved in moving surreptitiously from a
model-based use to a metaphorical use of certain
concepts?
Actually, the problem is not so much interdependency per se as its justification. This concept also plays a fundamental role in the theory
of emerging self-organizing systems advocated by
John Ehrenfeld (2007). But does it really have, if
not the same referent, at least the same meaning as in classical ecological theory?28 In any
event, the author uses it, suggesting that it is
a phenomenon of classical ecology within a discourse that, however, challenges this very form
of ecology. If interdependence remains a worthwhile principle, it can no longer be one from a
classical ecological standpoint—which one is attempting precisely to discard—but must be from
the meta-conceptual standpoint of philosophy.
One might answer that this is a minor detail.
In truth, it is no longer one from an epistemological standpoint, because the interdependence
one is talking about no longer has to do with
fact but with norms. There has been a shift from
(re-)description to prescription. Allow me to
drive home this essential point: The phase under discussion here should not be confused with
the predictive function models provide, because,
as I have already emphasized with regard to biological ecosystems conceived as a model, the predictive function of the model indeed fits within
the factual contingency of phenomena. Norms,
conversely, have to do with the realm of what
ought to be. And one does not prescribe on the
basis of the more or less objective redescription
and prediction of the state of things by a model;
one prescribes on the basis of something that does
not exist independently from a point of view, a
worldview, and a set of values. It is thus on this
level that one must seek the validity of a norm.29
After all, is that not what John Ehrenfeld (2004,
2007) himself suggests, for instance, with regard
to sustainability? His remarks on love and hope of
a prosperous and sustainable world in the future
lead one to believe so.30
The Ambiguous Use of
Technology in Industrial
Ecology
The distinction between model and metaphor
does not only shed light on possible errors in
industrial ecology, whether they are semantic
shifts or confusions between different types of
discourse. It also shows its fecundity by pinpointing another ambiguity—that is, its interpretation
of technology. We know that technology plays
an important role in industrial ecology. “The
technological dynamics,” writes Suren Erkman
(2004), for instance, “. . . constitutes a crucial
(but not exclusive) factor to favor the transition
of the industrial system toward a viable system
inspired by the functioning of biological ecosystems” (27).
We can probably also agree with Erkman
(2004) when he asserts that “the distinction between environmental technologies and the others disappears because all are technologies that
should tend to become more and more ‘clean’
by optimizing matter and energy flows” (125).
Very well, but there again, depending on whether
the “functioning” is conceived on the basis of either a model or a metaphor, the technological
Hess, The Ecosystem: Model or Metaphor?
279
FORUM
breakthrough, however “environmental” it may
be, can take a different orientation.
It seems to me that technological development, when viewed from the perspective of a
model, fosters what I have previously called the
“naturalization” of technology. This orientation
is illustrated, for instance, by ecological engineering. This technology attempts to associate an artificial system with a natural ecosystem. Waste
water or sewage (artificial system) is treated with
areas that have particular vegetation, such as
marshes (natural ecosystem) (See also Tilley
2003). This technological development option
is likely to soon reach its limits, however, for the
functions of ecosystems are not all capable of handling the full array of environmental problems
generated by industrial and economic activities.
Technological development perspectives can
prove to be very different if one observes things
through the prism of metaphor. In this case, it
is not at all certain that technology is leaning
toward naturalization. It can also be oriented toward the artificialization of nature. Let’s take as
an example a major principle of industrial ecology: holism. This principle originally referred to
the integration of biological ecosystems into the
broader system of the biosphere. After all, ecosystems not only are interrelated but also interact
with the atmosphere, the lithosphere, and the
hydrosphere. When one applies this notion to
industrial activities, the aim is primarily to draw
attention to the systemic aspect of these activities
within the biosphere.
In holism, however, one can also detect a
metaphor for the industrial system. The principle no longer refers to a property of the system
but instead expresses a conception of integration
pertaining to human activities. I have already
reviewed the interventionist vision of Allenby
(1999a, 1999b). This vision advocates maximal
management of biological ecosystems through
technology. The philosopher Dominique Bourg
(2003; Bourg and Keitsch 2006), conversely, defends the idea that
therefore, the ultimate goal is no longer to
replace the biosphere with an hypothetical
technosphere but to loop the technosphere
onto itself—to the largest extent possible—so
as to disturb life’s great bio-geo-chemical cy280
Journal of Industrial Ecology
cles as little as possible. (2003, 59; also Bourg
and Keitsch 2006, 169)
Who is right? I have noted that industrial
ecology is not in a position to settle the issue
without undertaking a philosophical investigation. Perhaps the problem finally is poorly posed.
Certainly, technology in itself can give the impression of developing in an autonomous fashion.
But both its meaning and its orientation depend
one way or another on the role that we believe we
should ascribe to it. This belief is merely the crystallization of a still more fundamental inquiry—
that is, into our relationship to nature. With regard to environmental problems, it attempts to
find answers to questions such as this: Is technology really our salvation? Can it help us rethink
our needs in a limited world?31
Conclusion: Industrial Ecology
and Sustainable Development
I have tried to show that the distinction between model and metaphor is relevant to detecting epistemological errors that representatives
of the field of industrial ecology may commit.
They can only avoid such errors by elucidating
the uses made of notions borrowed from classical scientific ecology or even, as Ehrenfeld (2003,
2004) suggests, more contemporary but also more
controversial life science theories. Without such
clarification, they are highly likely to commit
a confusion. One such confusion involves using
metaphor as if it were a model. This tends to produce an ideological discourse. Another problem
involves intermixing two different levels of industrial ecology discourse. This confusion occurs to
the detriment of the coherence of this approach
and an adequate justification of its principles.
The examples of Allenby (1999a, 1999b) and
Ehrenfeld (2003, 2004) have shown, however,
that in the field of industrial ecology itself, it
is difficult to avoid these pitfalls. On one hand,
the distinction between model and metaphor is
of a philosophical or, more precisely, an epistemological order. And for the moment it has little
currency among researchers in industrial ecology.
On the other hand, the introduction of this distinction does not prevent levels of discourse from
FORUM
being confused, as Ehrenfeld’s otherwise very interesting thinking illustrates.
Even more so, the distinction between model
and metaphor shows that industrial ecology is not
at all a uniform approach. Disagreements, such
as the one between Bourg (2003) and Allenby
(1999a, 1999b), for instance, put members of the
same research community at odds. This is why
I believe that this approach can only develop if
it is accompanied by a philosophical—in other
words, critical—inquiry. And if that is the case,
it is mainly because the metaphorical use of notions borrowed from ecology directly calls up a
philosophical inquiry, be it epistemological, ethical, political, or economic in nature.
There is another reason to reinforce industrial ecology discourse with philosophy. Industrial ecology regularly presents itself as one possible way to implement sustainable development.
This notion is, however, far from being univocal.
There is a generally agreed upon distinction today
between a weak version and a strong version of
sustainable development. In the weak version, it
is acceptable practice to substitute natural capital
with a reproducible capital; this tends to fall on
the side of neoclassical economics (Solow 1997).
The strong version of sustainability has its partisans mainly among ecologists convinced by the
idea that natural capital is irreplaceable (Daly
1997).
As for myself, I believe that without an effort to clarify things, the advocates of industrial
ecology are finally maintaining the semantic divergence between weak and strong versions that
is crippling the concept of sustainable development.32 Are they not in this way working counter
to their own ideal? The fact remains that when
they draw on philosophical inquiry, they have
concepts and argumentative resources available
to support a strong version of sustainable development. Such a version is based on ecological
principles that are not factual but normative—in
other words, those very concepts that philosophy
has the task of justifying, including in industrial
ecology.33
Like it or not, we must admit that all these
questions appeal to a real philosophical anthropology whose task is to rethink humanity’s relation to nature in the perspective of current environmental challenges and technological issues.
Acknowledgements
I thank professors Dominique Bourg and
Suren Erkman from the University of Lausanne for their remarks on drafts of this article,
Théodore Besson and Frédéric Piguet for their
bibliographic suggestions, and Muriel Gilbert for
her careful editing of this article. Further thanks
goes to three reviewers of the Journal of Industrial Ecology and to Reid J. Lifset for their helpful
comments.
Notes
1. Another inspiration for industrial ecology comes
from economic science (e.g., Ayres and Kneese
1969).
2. By analogy, I generally mean, as the philosopher
of science Mary Hesse (1966) says, a connection between two different representations based
on “their common properties”—in other words, a
“positive analogy” (58). Hesse adds that in respect
to other properties, the two representations are
different (“negative analogy”). Positive and negative analogies mean exactly a relation of similarity. Therefore, analogy is a general category that
is adapted as well to a model as to a metaphor, as
both are founded on similarities. So far, it is possible to understand models and metaphors as analogies without more precision—especially in science. Nevertheless, in a well-known book chapter,
the psychologist Dedre Gentner (1982) makes a
difference between explanatory−predictive analogies (models) and expressive−descriptive analogies
(metaphors). Structurally, the former—if they are
good models—are high in clarity and low in richness, and the latter—if they are good metaphors—
are high in richness and may be high in clarity. In
my opinion, those structural differences are helpful
for many cases but not very useful in the present
discussion. In fact, one can find scientific models, in
industrial ecology, for instance, whose function is
first to describe and not to predict: Are they therefore models or metaphors? Moreover, such differences do not point out a property of crucial importance for scientific discourse, namely the cognitive
dimension of models versus the noncognitive dimension of metaphors. I develop this distinction
further in the present article.
3. Biocenosis is a community of organisms that live
together according to a specific order; the organisms are not split into terrritory by chance.
I use the word biocenosis to point out the characteristic associations of organisms. Symbiosis, by
Hess, The Ecosystem: Model or Metaphor?
281
FORUM
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
contrast, means interdependent relations between
organisms; furthermore, those relations are beneficial for both organisms.
Kalundborg is the best known site (see, e.g., Jacobsen 2006), but there are many others: Kwinana in
Australia, Guitang in China, and Devens Planned
Community in north central Massachussetts, for
example.
Ralf Isenmann (2003a, 2003b) rightly emphasizes
the relevance of metaphor in a context of discovery
(as opposed to a context of justification). Nevertheless, we are not in a position to understand why and
how metaphor is important in a context of application: What sort of metaphor are we talking about
here? Does not the heuristic aspect also have a role
to play in this context? And if so, in what form does
it manifest itself? Responses to such questions need
the distinction between metaphor and model.
I should point out that the expression “circular
economy,” which some would like to substitute for
“industrial ecology,” in no way changes the present
argument. In both cases, the presupposition behind
the expression draws inspiration from the practically cyclical functioning of biological ecosystems
to describe and understand economic and industrial activities from a sustainable perspective.
Max Black (1979) distinguishes between “active”
and “dormant” metaphors. Unlike the latter, the
former are invested with a new meaning. The analysis in the remainder of this article is limited to active metaphors, which some authors also call “living” (Ricœur 1975), “native” (Nouvel 2000), or
even “new” metaphors (Lakoff and Johnson 1980).
I borrow this example from Lakoff and Johnson
(1980). It perfectly illustrates the element of surprise that new metaphors produce.
To be specific, Crick and Watson’s double helix with matching bases is a simplified
representation—a model—that helps to clarify
Chargaff’s rules, according to which there are, in
different sorts of DNA molecules, equal parts of cytosine and guanine as well as quantities of adenine
and thymine (Nouvel 2000).
An affective approach is not necessarily limited
to an evaluation based on elementary conditions,
such as pleasure or pain. The philosopher Maurice
Merleau-Ponty (1945, 180) has shown, in reference
to humans, that affects “internalize intelligence,”
as, in fact, they are associated with representations.
They create in this way “secondary or third values”
without direct relation to pleasure or pain. I would
like to underline the incapacity of the ordinary rational (regulated) conduct to elaborate or to grasp
the metaphorical meaning.
282
Journal of Industrial Ecology
11. I had the opportunity to discuss my point of view in
this regard in a previous publication (Hess 2004).
12. If a “living” or “native” metaphor is first characterized by a subjective point of view, it may develop in
such a way that it is progressively related to a state
of things. It then becomes empirically testable in
that it creates a context of justification (eventually
also a context of application) and does not differ
anymore from a model (Hess 2003).
13. The chemical engineer and philosopher Michel
Polanyi (1962) speaks of the passion that motivates the research of a scientist. Such passion leads
the scientist’s attention to what is scientifically interesting in facts. With regard to the example of
discovery of new properties of the DNA substance
by Crick and Watson, Pascal Nouvel (2000, 149–
153), by the way, states that the affective condition of a researcher is precisely translated in the
semantic complication of “native” metaphor, with
consideration given to the ambiguity and the
“preference” of the scientist to understand the
metaphorical meaning (even though he or she
could understand it differently).
14. In what follows, I restrict myself to the concept
of biological ecosystem, without prejudging the interest there may be in extending the analogy to
other scientific ecology concepts, as Peter E. Wells
(2006a, 2006b) suggests.
15. Ecology, indeed, is not a field without controversies. I assume it knows two levels of discourse, as
does every discipline of science. These two levels are often mixed, but they are epistemologically
distinct. The first level, which I qualify as basic,
is the object of limited consensus and the object
of teaching. On this level, such terms as ecosystem, tropic web, and biogenesis are generally used.
But there is also a high level in the field—which,
however, is not opposed to the “normal science”
of Thomas Kuhn (1970)—where new concepts are
developed, clarified, or revised or where sometimes
a new paradigm is engaged. If ecological concepts
can be used to characterize the industrial system,
obviously it will be extracted from the basic level,
where clearness and distinction prevail.
16. Stephen H. Levine (1999, 2003) has explored some
of the limits of the biological ecosystem—as systems ecology as well as population ecology—as a
model for the industrial system. For instance, the
industrial system focuses primarily on the demand
for a product (output) that determines the necessary resources to produce it. The natural ecosystem, conversely, is more resource oriented (input),
and the product is determined by those available
resources (e.g., a lion’s survival depends on the
FORUM
17.
18.
19.
20.
available prey). A distinction must be made, however, between what is not analogous and cannot
be (cf. the above example) and what is currently
not analogous but could be (e.g., the production of
nonrecycled waste). The latter concerns the predictive function of models (Hesse 1966).
In this sense, models have never had only a descriptive or explanatory function. They are also
supposed to enable one to anticipate the evolution of a situation that the model redescribes (the
predictive function). And it is important not to
confuse this aspect with what some call the normative register of industrial ecology. This predictive function must nevertheless be qualified. For if
one is placed in the perspective of the theory of
complex self-organizing systems, such prediction
is really no longer possible (see the discussion of
Ehrenfeld [2007], further on).
If metaphor indeed expresses a subjective vision
of things, it should not necessarily be restricted
to the point of view of a person. Given that the
underlying affective approach is very often mixed
with representations (cf. note 10), a metaphor is
necessarily shared by several persons, such as a research community. Finally, this situation is similar to a lecture on a poem (and the metaphors
that compose it). Some readers—but certainly
not all of them—will understand and appreciate
the meaning of a poem because they share the
point of view of the poet, although the creation
is the invention of latter and explains first his
or her sensibility. Transposed to industrial ecology, the correlation is approximatively as follows:
the equivalents of the poet are the authors Robert
Frosch and Nicholas Gallopoulos, and the equivalent of the poem is the 1989 article in the Scientific
American, “Strategies of Manufacturing” (Erkman
2004).
Other latent semantic fields are naturally perturbed
as a consequence, whether these have to do with
scientific ecology or with those that ecologists draw
on.
This is an application of epistemological holism
defended in his time by Pierre Duhem in the field
of physics and expanded to the whole of knowledge
by the philosopher W. V. Quine (Soler 2009, 127–
131). Epistemological holism affirms that when a
hypothesis is contradicted with experience, the latter condemns not only the former but the whole
of the theoretical corpus in which the hypothesis takes place. I think that the situation is the
same in industrial ecology: The metaphorical use
of a concept from ecology—which is equal to a
hypothesis—cannot be isolated from the whole of
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
the theory of which the concept is part. In particular, the principles from which the concept initially
derives are, as well, affected by this new usage.
Epistemological holism implies at the very least a
reexamination of the basic concepts of the scientific theory in question.
Such reexamination is, indeed, situated at a level
that duplicates the theoretical level at the start.
This duplication refers to a metaconceptual dimension of thinking that the epistemologist GillesGaston Granger (1988) defines precisely as belonging to the discipline of philosophy.
Geoengineering, as I mean it here, has to do with
the intentional application of technology to the
system Earth on a global scale. It does not include local technological applications of which the
(nonintentional) effects are global, such as global
warming.
Even if classical analytical models are inadequate
to handle complexity, one might think that complex models are, however, in a position to supply
a satisfactory response to this type of problem. But
this is not the case. Complex models also constitute a simplification of reality, in that their development is not controllable. Such unpredictability
paradoxically obliges one to return to the real system that the complex model is supposed to represent. Philosopher Jean-Pierre Dupuy (2002) draws
from this an argument in support of a theory of
inherent uncertainty. This applies in particular to
the environmental phenomena that geoengineering deals with.
In the context of delineating industrial ecology as a
field of study (cf. Allenby 1999b), it is worth reading a similar criticism of Allenby by Frank Boons
and Nigel Roome (2001), whose conclusions are
similar to my own (cf. below).
The term ideology is here used with the (Marxist) meaning of a concealment—most of the time
unconscious—as a whole of representations and
beliefs, which are presented as if they are objective.
“An ideology,” says the German philosopher Karl
Jaspers (1949), “is a complex of ideas and representations which are for the subject an interpretation
of the world and of his own situation. For him, this
interpretation represents the absolute truth, but in
the way of an illusion, by which he justifies himself, hides himself, shies away one way or another”
(170, my translation).
I should point out, however, that John Ehrenfeld
(2007) does not explicitly mention the heuristic
aspect of metaphor and model. But, first of all, this
aspect seems essential to me to industrial ecology
investigations. And I believe that it is precisely
Hess, The Ecosystem: Model or Metaphor?
283
FORUM
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
at the root of the epistemological error that I am
trying to describe.
See Ehrenfeld (2007, 78).
We know, for instance, that in the theory of selforganizing systems, the interaction of an organism
with its environment combines with the idea of
a closed circuit (cf. Brenner 2007, 100, who in
this regard quotes the Chilean biologist Humberto
Maturana). That lends the concept of interdependence a particular meaning that it does not have in
classical ecology and that may better correspond,
for the one referring to it, to industrial and economic activities. In any event, this simple comparison shows that the level of reflection at stake here
is metaconceptual—in other words, philosophical.
Several authors, including Jouni Korhonen (2004)
and Frank Boons and Nigel Roome (2001), also admit the distinction between fact and norm within
industrial ecology. But I do not believe they really perceive the epistemological stakes. For instance, the latter two authors immediately qualify
this distinction by admitting that the normative
is part of objectivity. This assertion then raises
the objection of natural paralogism, by which I
mean that a norm cannot be deduced directly from
an objective contingent fact. In other words, one
needs additional arguments for leading to a norm;
to exhibit merely natural facts is insufficient. The
boundary between model and metaphor as I have
attempted to outline it precisely shows that by going from one to the other, one surrenders scientific
objectivity. The explicit passage to another type
of discourse—philosophical—thus guards against
paralogism, therefore enabling a justification of the
norm.
See Ehrenfeld (2007, 82).
Having said that, I do not assert that the solution
is only a philosophical one. Whether one chooses
the option of Bourg’s (2003) “technosphere looping onto itself” or the option of Allenby (1999a,
1999b), it is also a physical issue. But under given
physical conditions, we have to make a choice that
is justified on the level of philosophical discourse.
I think Allenby’s (1999b) use of industrial ecology
to justify the development of geoengineering is an
example of the difficulty people have admitting
that technology cannot replace natural resources.
A discussion of this hypothesis would exceed the
framework of this article.
References
Aristotle. 1984. Rhetoric. Trans. W. Rhys Roberts. New
York: Modern Library.
284
Journal of Industrial Ecology
Allenby, B. 1999a. Culture and industrial ecology. Journal of Industrial Ecology 3(1): 2–4.
Allenby, B. 1999b. Earth systems engineering: The role
of industrial ecology in an engineered world. Journal of Industrial Ecology 2(3): 73–93.
Ayres, R. U. and A. V. Kneese. 1969. Production, consumption & externalities. American Economic Review 59(3): 282–296.
Bey, Ch. 2001. Quo vadis industrial ecology? Realigning the discipline with its roots. Greener Management International 34: 35–42.
Black, M. 1962. Models and metaphors. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Black, M. [1979] 1993. More about metaphor. In
Metaphor and thought, edited by A. Ortony. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Boons, F. and N. Roome. 2001. Industrial ecology as
a cultural phenomenon: On objectivity as a normative position. Journal of Industrial Ecology 4(2):
49–54.
Bourg, D. 2003. Industrial ecology: Philosophical and
political meanings. In Perspectives on industrial
ecology, edited by S. Erkman and D. Bourg.
Sheffield, UK: Greenleaf.
Bourg, D. and M. M. Keitsch. 2006. Commentary: Industrial ecology—seen from a philosophical point
of view. Its break with the Baconian programme.
Progress in Industrial Ecology: An International Journal 3(1–2): 163–172.
Brenner, A. 2007. Leben: Eine philosophische Untersuchung [Life: A philosophical investigation].
Bern, Switzerland: Eidgenössische Ethikkommission für Biotechnologie im Ausserhumanen Bereich EKAH (Beiträge zur Ethik und Biotechnologie).
Daly, H. E. 1997. Georgescu-Roegen versus
Solow/Stiglitz. Ecological Economics 22(3):
261–266.
Danto, A. 1981. The transfiguration of commonplace: A
philosophy of art. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Dupuy, J.-P. 2002. Pour un catastrophisme éclairé : Quand
l’impossible est certain [For an enlightened conception of disaster : When impossible becomes certain]. Paris: Seuil.
Ehrenfeld, J. 2003. Putting a spotlight on metaphors
and analogies in industrial ecology. Journal of
Industrial Ecology 7(1): 1–4.
Ehrenfeld, J. 2004. Can industrial ecology be the “science of sustainability”? Journal of Industrial Ecology
8(1–2): 1–3.
Ehrenfeld, J. 2007. Would industrial ecology exist without sustainability in the background? Journal of
Industrial Ecology 11(1): 73–84.
FORUM
Erkman, S. 2004. Vers une écologie industrielle : Comment mettre en pratique le développement durable
dans une société hyper-industrielle [Toward an industrial ecology : How do we apply sustainability
in a hyper-industrial society?]. Paris: Ed. Charles
Léopold Mayer.
Gadamer, H.-G. 1960. Wahrheit und Methode:
Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik
[Truth and method: Main features of a philosophical hermeneutic]. Tübingen, Germany: Mohr
Siebeck.
Gentner, D. 1982. Are scientific analogies metaphors?
In Metaphor: Problems and perspectives, edited by
D. S. Miall. Brighton, UK: Harvester.
Granger, G. G. 1988. Pour la connaissance philosophique
[For a philosophical knowledge]. Paris: Odile
Jacob.
Hess, G. 2003. Métaphore, science, philosophie
[Metaphor, science, philosophy]. Revue de
théologie et de philosophie 135: 115–135.
Hess, G. 2004. L’innovation métaphorique et la
référence selon Paul Ricoeur et Max Black: Une
antinomie philosophique [Creation of metaphorical meaning and reference according to Paul Ricoeur and Max Black: A philosophical antinomy].
Revue philosophique de Louvain 102: 630–659.
Hesse, M. B. 1966. Models and analogies in science. Notre
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
Isenmann, R. 2003a. Further efforts to clarify industrial
ecology’s hidden philosophy of nature. Journal of
Industrial Ecology 6(3–4): 27–48.
Isenmann, R. 2003b. Industrial ecology: Shedding
more light on its perspective of understanding
nature as model. Sustainable Development 11: 143–
158.
Jacobsen, N. B. 2006. Industrial symbiosis in Kalundborg, Denmark: A quantitative assessment of economic and environmental aspects. Journal of Industrial Ecology 10(1–2): 239–255.
Jaspers, K. 1949. Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte
[About the origin and goal of history]. Zürich,
Switzerland: Artemis-Verlag.
Korhonen, J. 2004. Theory of industrial ecology.
Progress in Industrial Ecology: An International Journal 1(1–3): 61–85.
Korhonen, J. 2005. Do we really need the debate on the
natural ecosystem metaphor in technology management and sustainable development literature?
Clean Technical Environmental Policy 7(1): 33–41.
Kuhn, S. T. 1970. The structure of scientific revolutions.
Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Lakoff, G. and M. Johnson. 1980. Metaphors we live by.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Levine, S. H. 1999. Products and ecological models: A
population ecology perspective. Journal of Industrial Ecology 3(2–3): 47–62.
Levine, S. H. 2003. Comparing products and production in ecological and industrial systems. Journal
of Industrial Ecology 7(2): 33–42.
Merleau-Ponty, M. 1945. Phénoménologie de la perception [Phenomenology of perception]. Paris: Gallimard.
Nemerow N. 1995. Zero pollution for industry : Waste
minimization through industrial complexes. New
York: Wiley.
Nouvel, P. 2000. L’art d’aimer la science [The art to love
science]. Paris: PUF.
Polanyi, M. 1962. Personal knowledge. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Ricœur, P. 1975. La métaphore vive [The rule of
metaphor: Multi-disciplinary studies in the creation of meaning in language]. Paris: Seuil.
Soler, L. 2009. Introduction à l’epistémologie. Préface de
Bernard d’Espagnat, Paris: Ellipses.
Solow, R. M. 1997. Reply: Georgescu-Roegen versus
Solow/Stiglitz. Ecological Economics 22(3): 267–
268.
Tilley, D. R. 2003. Industrial ecology and ecological
engineering: Opportunities for symbiosis. Journal
of Industrial Ecology 7(2): 13–32.
Wells, P. E. 2006. Re-writing the ecological metaphor:
Part 1. Progress in Industrial Ecology: An International Journal 3(1–2): 115–128.
Wells, P. E. and L. Darby. 2006. Re-writing the ecological metaphor: Part 2. The example of diversity.
Progress in Industrial Ecology: An International Journal 3(1–2): 129–147.
Wittgenstein, L. 1953. Philosophische Untersuchungen
[Philosophical investigations]. Frankfurt, Germany: Suhrkamp.
About the Author
Gérald Hess is senior lecturer at the Institut
des politiques territoriales et de l’environnement
humain (IPTEH), University of Lausanne,
Switzerland.
Hess, The Ecosystem: Model or Metaphor?
285