Cicero and Seneca on the Fate of the Soul.
Private Feelings and Philosophical Doctrines
Aldo Setaioli
University of Perugia, Italy
1. Though the problem of the fate of the soul after death is an important issue treated in Cicero’s
philosophical works, his personal attitude is anything but easy to ascertain in those writings, which
often present conflicting attitudes and ideas defended by different philosophical schools,1 while his
own Academic leanings prevent him from accepting any one of them as the absolute truth.2 It is
therefore advisable to turn to his philosophical treatises only after we have tried to extract his own
position from the works in which he appears to speak in his own name, although his nonphilosophical writings only sporadically refer to the problem of afterlife.
We should not expect to find much relevant material in his public speeches, since Cicero must
obviously take into account both the expectations of his audience and the specific circumstances in
which a particular speech was delivered. For example, in the speeches against Catilina he predicts
that the conspirators will suffer eternal punishments after death in the first one,3 but presents these
very same afterlife punishments as a politically expedient fiction in the less emotional fourth
speech.4 The same vacillation appears in other speeches too: afterlife punishments are sometimes
denied,5 sometimes upheld, though apparently, once again, because of political expediency.6 In this
case we may confidently assume that Cicero personally rejected the idea, as made clear by some
passages of his philosophical works which for once appear to be unequivocal.7 Things are not so
simple when the issue is immortality itself, rather than the punishments associated with the Hades
of mythology and literature. Among Cicero’s speeches, however, there is one in which we may be
1
Cicero himself warns the reader not to attribute to the author the standpoints defended by the characters of his phi-
losophical treatises: cf. Cic. nat. deor. 1.10 qui autem requirunt quid quaque de re ipsi sentiamus, curiosius id faciunt
quam necesse est.
2
Cf. the words immediately following those quoted in the preceding note.
3
Cic. Catil. 1.33 tu, Iuppiter,… homines bonorum inimicos, hostis patriae, latrones Italiae, scelerum foedere inter
se ac nefaria societate coniunctos, aeternis suppliciis vivos mortuosque mactabis.
4
Cic. Catil. 4.8 itaque, ut aliqua in vita formido improbis esset <pro>posita, apud inferos eius modi quaedam illi
antiqui supplicia impiis constituta esse voluerunt, quod videlicet intellegebant, his remotis, non esse mortem ipsam pertimescendam.
5
Cic. Cluent. 171.
6
Cic. Phil. 14.32 illi igitur impii quos cecidistis etiam ad inferos poenas parricidii luent, vos vero, qui extremum
spiritum in victoria effudistis, piorum estis sedem et locum consecuti. Elsewhere Cicero quotes Plato’s Phaedo and its
doctrine of the immortality of the soul: Scaur. 4.
7
Cf. e.g. Cic. Tusc. 1.10-11, 48; nat. deor. 2.5.
2
reasonably sure that he is expressing his own point of view. I’m referring to his speech Pro Archia,
an entusiastic praise of poetry and literature, in which the theme of the soul’s ontological survival
appears to be fused into, and somehow superseded by, the immortality achieved through fame.8 At
the end of the speech, however, Cicero formulates the so-called “Socratic alternative”, i.e. the dilemma posited by Socrates in the final page of Plato’s Apology,9 according to which death is either
the human being’s total annihilation or a passage to a new and better life.10 Significantly, this position – the acceptance of Socrates’ dilemma, though with a sentimental, non-logical preference for
the thesis of the immortality of the soul – does not basically differ from the standpoint we encounter
even in Cicero’s much later and undoubtedly much more ideologically developed philosophical
works.
We might expect that the writings from which we could gather an inkling of Cicero’s personal
position on the problem should be his letters, especially those to Atticus, in which he expresses
himself in all sincerity. Cicero’s letters have been in fact analyzed for this purpose by several scholars, though diverging conclusions have been reached. Some believe that the letters reveal the author’s leaning towards the belief in the immortality of the soul,11 but in my opinion it is hardly possible to find in them any unequivocal statement upholding that thesis. The perpetua vita Cicero refers to in a letter to Atticus12 obviously hints at the infinity of time as opposed to the shortness of
our life;13 these words surely prove that Cicero was not insensitive to what will happen after our
death,14 but in this earthly world, not in a world beyond our own. On the other hand these words are
clearly explained by a further letter to Atticus,15 a text of the utmost interest to us, inasmuch as it
treats of the fanum, the temple that Cicero was planning to build in order to ensure the survival of
his dead daughter. As in the previous text, the infinity of time is opposed to the shortness of our life,
but this time it is unequivocally stated that after our death we do not exist any more: longum illud
8
Cic. Arch. 29-30. Cf. also Rabir. 29-30.
9
Plat. apol. 40c ff.
10
Cic. Arch. 30 sive a meo sensu post mortem afutura est, sive, ut sapientissimi homines putaverunt, ad aliquam
mei partem pertinebit. Cf. Cic. Sest. 47.
11
E.g. Hooper 1917-1918, 90; Guazzoni Foà 1957, 223.
12
Cic. Att. 10.8.8 id spero vivis nobis fore. Quamquam tempus est nos de illa perpetua iam, non de hac exigua vita
cogitare.
13
Cf. Benkner 1914, 9 n. 12 („das Fortleben in der Geschichte, im Munde der Nachwelt“); Shackleton Bailey 1968,
249 (“it is time for me to be thinking of eternity rather than this brief span”).
14
As rightly remarked by van den Bruwaene 1937, 51-52, polemicizing with Laurand 1914, whose interpretation is
repeated by Sullivan 1943-1944, 17.
15
Cic. Att. 12.18.1 longum illud tempus, cum non ero, magis me movet quam hoc exiguum, quod mihi tamen
nimium longum videtur.
3
tempus cum non ero. If Cicero believed in immortality, we would expect some reference to a reunion after death with his beloved daughter; this was indeed a common topic of consolatory writings,16 and it is used by Cicero himself at the end of his De senectute, where Cato expresses the
wish to be reunited with his son in afterlife.17 We shall return to this letter and those written in the
same period in connection with the Consolatio that Cicero addressed to himself after his daughter’s
death.
Some of Cicero’s letters are themselves consolatory writings addressed to a number of mourning
friends. In two of them, to Sulpicius and to Brutus respectively,18 we do not find the slightest hint at
any afterlife; in another, to Titius,19 Cicero once more formulates the “Socratic alternative”, with no
attempt to solve it either in a way or in the other.20 We shall see that his attitude is quite different
when it comes to the consolation addressed to himself after his own daughter’s death.
2. Cicero’s Consolatio was unique at the time, inasmuch as it was address by the author to himself in order to alleviate his own grief, as he remarks in a letter to Atticus.21 This claim must be assessed as a literary vindication: Cicero is asserting that he has outdone all previous writings belonging to the consolatory genre.22 One hundred years later Seneca implicitly claims to have surpassed
Cicero himself: the latter consoled his own grief, but Seneca consoles his mother’s distress for a
misfortune – the exile to Corsica – that has affected the author himself.23 Cicero’s literary claim
does not, of course, impair his sincerity; but his mood at the time he was writing the Consolatio is
one of the factors that make this work different from most of his literary production. As he tells us
16
Cf. Setaioli 2001a, 58-59.
17
Cic. sen. 84 proficiscar enim… ad Catonem meum… cuius… animus… in ea profecto loca discessit, quo mihi ipsi
cernebat esse veniendum.
18
Cic. fam. 4.5; Cic. ad Brut. 1.9.
19
Cic. fam. 5.16.4.
20
A letter to Cicero by Servius Sulpicius Rufus (Cic. fam. 4.5.6) admits the possibility of an afterlife in order to in-
troduce the topos of the dead person’s dislike of the surviving relatives’ mourning (cf. Plat. Menex. 248b; Menand.
Rhet. III 412, 21 Spengel).
21
Cic. Att. 12.14.3 quin etiam feci, quod profecto ante me nemo, ut ipse me per litteras consolarer… Adfirmo tibi
nullam consolationem esse talem.
22
Cf. Cic. Att. 12.14.3
23
Sen. Helv. 1.2 praeterea, cum omnia clarissimorum ingeniorum monimenta ad compescendos moderandosque
luctus evolverem, non inveniebam exemplum eius qui consolatus suos esset, cum ipse ab illis comploraretur. Just like
Cicero (Att. 12.14.3; 12.21.5), Seneca claims to have read all previous consolatory writings, and to have found none like
his own. Later authors consoling relatives for a misfortune affecting themselves too are Plutarch (Ad uxorem) and Porphyry (Ad Marcellam).
4
himself,24 he was under the pall of his recent loss and resorted to all possible remedies to alleviate
his grief. For this reason the fragments of the Consolatio must be assessed and evaluated in comparison with what Cicero says on the fate of the soul in his philosophical works, mostly written
later, when his grief had somewhat subsided.
Just like his letters, and even more so, Cicero’s philosophical works have been read by several
scholars as the document of his supposed faith in the immortality of the soul;25 but not rarely they
seem to forget that the arguments developed by the supporters of this faith in Cicero’s philosophical
dialogues can hardly be taken as his own beliefs.
The oldest work in which the theme of afterlife is developed is the Somnium Scipionis, concluding the partly lost De republica. A superficial approach to this text might suggest that Cicero unquestionably believed in the immortality of the soul. However, we should remark that Scipio’s vision is presented as a dream. This undoubtedly aimed to avoid the criticisms that had been leveled
at Plato, who had presented his afterlife picture as a report by a man – Er of Pamphylia – who had
risen from the dead, as already observed by Macrobius;26 but we should not forget that, according to
Cicero, the belief in the immortality of the soul based on the appearance of dead people in dreams
was nothing but a primitive and totally groundless idea, as he tells us in the Tusculanae.27 In the
Somnium Scipio’s very dream is physiologically motivated: he dreams of his grandfather because
he had spoken about him with Masinissa.28 At the very end, however, the presence of the first Africanus is suddenly presented as real: ille discessit: ego somno solutus sum.29 Obviously, only someone who has really come can depart; and if the younger Scipio really spoke with his grandfather,
then the latter’s revelation is subreptitiously presented as real, in spite of the dream frame. We shall
see that Seneca resorts to the same device at the end of his Consolation to Marcia: the brilliant picture of a heavenly afterlife is first sketched as an imagination,30 but the very last words suddenly
present it as real.31 So, in the text of the Somnium itself, aside from the very last words, there are
elements pointing to the fact that Cicero’s picture is anything but an objective representation of a
24
Cic. Tusc. 3,76 erat enim in tumore animus, et omnis in eo temptabatur curatio.
25
Cf. e.g. Laurand 1914; Guazzoni Foà 1970, 90; Alfonsi 1954; Salinero Portero 1958.
26
Macr. in somn. Scip. 1.1.9-2.1.
27
Cic. Tusc. 1.29 qui nondum ea, quae multis post annis tractari coepta sunt physica didicissent, tantum sibi per-
suaserant quantum natura admonente cognoverant, rationes et causas rerum non tenebant, visis quibusdam saepe movebantur, iisque maxime nocturnis, ut viderentur ei, qui vita excesserant, vivere. More texts in Ronconi 1961, 18-19.
28
This explanation of dreams was widespread: parallels in Ronconi 1961, 18.
29
Cic. somn. Scip. 29.
30
Sen. Marc. 26.1 puta itaque (cf. Sen. ep. 102.28 imaginare tecum).
31
Sen. Marc. 26.7 felicem filium tuum, Marcia, qui ista iam novit!
5
state of things accepted as real.32 The real way in which the Somnium must be interpreted is suggested by Cicero himself almost ten years later, in another work of his, the Laelius, in which he expressly demotes the picture presented in the Somnium Scipionis to a mere literary description of the
positive instance of the “Socratic alternative”, in no way dogmatically asserting the reality of the
immortality of the soul.33 It is true that in this very context of the Laelius,34 as well as in the roughly
contemporary Tusculanae disputationes and De senectute, Cicero’s sentimental leaning toward the
thesis of immortality is clearly apparent, but it is equally true that that in none of these writings this
thesis is proclaimed as unquestioned reality.
In the first book of the Tusculanae disputationes35 the arguments in favor of the immortality of
the soul are preceded and followed by a portion devoted to the opposite hypothesis: the total annihilation of the human being brought about by death. In spite of Cicero’s sentimental attitude we just
hinted at, both theses are not merely equally envisaged, but made subservient to the author’s real
goal: proving that death is not an evil in either case, as expressly stated in the text.36 We shall see
that Seneca’s attitude is no different. Besides, in Cicero’s case, asserting the reality of either hypothesis against the other is totally foreign to his Academic approach, which he confirms in this
work too,37 adding a warning against the errors easily entailed by uncritical fideism.38
32
See the clear picture presented by Görgemanns 1968. We may add that Cicero’s translation from Plato’s
Phaedrus (245c ss.) at somn. Scip. 27 (cf. Tusc. 1.53) skips Plato’s opening words: pasa psych athanatos. Cf. van den
Bruwaene 1939, 129.
33
Cic. Lael. 14 cuius (Scipionis) disputationis fuit extremum de immortalitate animorum, quae se in quiete per vi-
sum ex Africano audisse dicebat. Id si ita est, ut optimi cuiusque animus in morte facillime evolet tamquam e custodia
vinclisque corporis, cui censemus cursum ad deos faciliorem fuisse quam Scipioni? Quocirca maerere eius eventu vereor ne invidi magis quam amici sit. Si autem illa veriora, ut idem interitus sit animorum et corporum nec ullus sensus
maneat, ut nihil boni est in morte, sic certe nihil mali; sensu enim amisso fit idem, quasi natus non sit.
34
Cic. Lael. 13-14.
35
Even van den Bruwaene 1937, 54-83 believes that in this text Cicero unconditionally accepts the thesis of immor-
tality. Ciafardini 1921 appears to realize that this merely corresponds to a sentimental need of Cicero’s, but he too believes that it finally turned into faith.
36
Cic. Tusc. 1.82 ff.
37
Cic. Tusc. 1.17 geram tibi morem et ea quae vis, ut potero, explicabo, nec tamen quasi Pythius Apollo, certa ut
sint et fixa, quae dixero, sed ut homunculus unus e multis probabilia coniectura sequens. Ultra enim quo progrediar,
quam ut veri similia videam, non habeo; certa dicent i, qui et percipi ea posse dicunt et se sapientis esse profitentur;
1.23 harum sententiarum quae vera sit deus aliquis viderit; quae veri simillima, magna quaestio est.
38
Cic. Tusc. 1.77 ‘ut videtur, sed me nemo de immortalitate depellet’. 78 ‘Laudo id quidem, etsi nihil nimis oportet
confidere. Movemur enim saepe aliquo acute concluso, labamus mutamusque sententiam clarioribus etiam in rebus; in
his est enim aliqua obscuritas. Id igitur si acciderit, simus armati’.
6
In the De senectute we first encounter the idea of the heavenly origin of the soul39 and shortly
after the theme of the body as a prison for the soul, which will finally be freed by death40 – ideas
frequently found in his writings;41 but the “Socratic alternative”, which had been previously formulated in this work,42 reappears totally unsolved in the very final words, though they do express,
through the speaking Cato, Cicero’s sentimental leaning towards immortality, while at the same
time this is declared to be a mere hypothesis: “if I am mistaken, my mistake gives me joy”, quod si
in hoc erro… libenter erro.43 Powell is quite right, when he remarks in his commentary: “Cicero the
rhetorician… triumphs over Cicero the philosopher”.44
The frequently repeated theme of the divine origin of the soul does not unquestionably prove its
immortality in Cicero’s other works any more than it does in the De senectute. In the De legibus the
soul is repeatedly declared not merely divine,45 but explicitly immortal;46 but a fragment from a lost
part of the same writing, transmitted by Lactantius, proves that the “Socratic alternative” reappeared
totally unscathed in this work too.47 At most, the idea of the divine origin of the soul is associated
with the positive instance of the “Socratic alternative”, as was the case in the Hortensius, where this
association appeared at the end of the work,48 i.e. in the same position as in the De senectute.
3. The “Socratic alternative”, as formulated by Plato’s Socrates and by Cicero himself in the
works so far analyzed, makes provision for just two hypotheses: total annihilation or passage to a
new and better life. Cicero takes pains to rule out a third, unsettling hypothesis, which, as we saw,
he does envisage in some non-philosophical works:49 eternal punishments after death.50 Already on
39
Cic. sen. 77-78.
40
Cic. sen. 81.
41
On the heavenly origin of the soul cf. Cic. somn. Scip. 15; Hortens. 115 Grilli; Tusc. 1.51; consol. F 21 Vitelli;
leg. 1.26 (for the soul as a particle of god cf. nat. deor. 1.27; Tusc. 5.38; divin. 1.70; somn. Scip. 16; 26; Tim. 4). On the
body as a prison for the soul cf. e.g. somn. Scip. 14; Tusc. 1.75; divin. 1.110; Lael. 14. Cf. Ronconi 1961, 78-79; Powell
1988, 252; 254; 260.
42
Cic. sen. 66-67.
43
Cic. sen. 85.
44
Powell 1988, 265.
45
Cic. leg. 1.24; 1.59.
46
Cic. leg. 2.27.
47
Cic. leg. fr. 4 (Lact. inst. 3.19.2) mors aut meliorem… aut certe non deteriorem adlatura est statum; nam sine
corpore animo vigente divina vita est, sensu carente nihil est mali.
48
Cic. Hortens. 115 Grilli aut si hoc quo sentimus et sapimus mortale et caducum est… aut si, ut antiquis philoso-
phis iisque maximis longeque clarissimis placuit, aeternos animos ac divinos haberemus…; cf. nat deor. 3.12.
49
Cf. notes 3 and 5 above.
7
this account we may confidently assume that the Consolatio differs from those works, since one
important fragment expressly states that after death the soul receives punishments or rewards.51
Strictly speaking Cicero’s attitude in this text does not greatly differ from the one we encounter in a
fragment of the Hortensius,52 since the doctrine is in both cases attributed to previous thinkers and
the eternity of retribution is more implied than explicitly stated. But in the Consolatio at least we
may be fairly sure that it reflects Cicero’s own positions – which strike us as different from those
defended in other works. At any rate, this text was perceived as different from others by ancient
readers, as proved by Lactantius’ remarks as he reports this precious fragment. The Christian writer
expressly states that here Cicero envisages an instance he does not consider in other writings,
namely that the soul may receive not merely a reward, but also a punishment after death.53 Obviously, then, the Consolatio differs from the works previously examined; if these punishments are
eternal, as remarked by Lactantius and as everything seems to suggests, we are very far from the eschatological picture sketched in the Somnium Scipionis, where no eternal punishments are envisaged.54 The alternative posited by the Consolatio is different from the “Socratic alternative” found
in other writings: both instances – eternal reward or eternal punishment – are placed within an encompassing frame in which the survival of the soul is unquestionably assumed.
The Consolatio is indeed Cicero’s only work in which the immortality of the soul is unreservedly asserted. An important reason must of course be sought in the personal and private sphere; a
loving father’s grief can only be soothed by cherishing a picture in which his beloved daughter survives in a state of happiness, actually – as we shall soon see – of deification.55 On the other hand,
though, this attitude had been recognized and received in the rhetorical modes applying to the consolatory genre.56
50
Cic. sen. 67 tertium certe nihil inveniri potest; cf. Tusc. 1.118.
51
Cic. consol. F 22 Vitelli nec enim omnibus… idem illi sapientes arbitrati sunt eundem cursum in caelum patere.
Nam vitiis et sceleribus contaminatos deprimi in tenebras atque in caeno iacere docuerunt, castos autem animos, puros
integros incorruptos, bonis etiam studiis atque artibus expolitos leni quodam et facili lapsu ad deos id est ad naturam
similem sui pervolare.
52
Cic. Hortens. 114 Grilli. Here the idea of the rewards and punishments after death is presented as the doctrine of
consulares philosophi.
53
Lact. inst. 3.9.3-5 argute, ut sibi videtur, quasi nihil esse aliud possit. Atquin utrumque falsum est. Docent enim
divinae litterae non extingui animos, sed aut pro iustitia praemio adfici aut poena pro sceleribus sempiterna… Quod
adeo verum est, ut idem Tullius in Consolatione non easdem sedes incolere iustos atque impios praedicaverit. Cic. consol. F 22 follows.
54
Cic. somn. Scip. 29: even guilty souls finally return to heaven, though multis agitati saeculis.
55
Cf. Cumont 1949, 163; Kumaniecki 1968, 43.
56
Cf. e.g. Menand. Rhet. III 414, 16-27; 421, 14-17 Spengel.
8
The rhetoricians appropriated many philosophical ideas concerning the fate of the souls after
death, but subjected them to their own pre-eminently literary goals, with little concern for doctrinal
consistency, and at times for logic itself. Ps. Dionysius of Halicarnassos, for example, adopts as his
own the doctrine of the body as a grave and a prison for the soul, which is set free by death;57 but
advises the authors of Consolations to resort to it only when writing about people who died
young.58 In this way this very philosophical doctrine, as well as the connected idea of earthly life as
a punishment for the soul, ran the risk to become a mere device used to introduce and justify the
rhetorical topos of the lamentatio vitae, the “lamentation over life”, aimed at alleviating the grief for
a loved one’s death by insisting on life’s negative sides, and was thus sharply separated from the
consistent eschatological picture of which the idea of the immortality of the soul was part. The concept of the survival of the soul was in fact given a central role in consolatory writings – as testified
for instance by the outline sketched by Menander Rhetor59 – but to the detriment of any real philosophical significance.
As a matter of fact the ancient theme of earthly life as a punishment for the soul,60 which can be
found in many consolatory writings, from Crantor’s Peri Penthous61 down to Seneca’s Consolatio
ad Polybium,62 played a central role in Cicero’s Consolatio,63 and also appeared in the Hortensius.64
But it should not escape us that this idea can hardly be logically separated not merely from the immortality of the soul, but also – and most of all – from the doctrine of reincarnation.
In his Hortensius, which has no consolatory purposes, Cicero has no problem in stressing this
connection: human beings are born, he says, in order to atone for faults incurred in a previous life:
ob aliqua scelera suscepta in vita superiore poenarum luendarum causa. We do not know how
Cicero reconciled this assertion with the “Socratic alternative” which, as we saw, appeared at the
end of the Hortensius,65 but it cannot be doubted that in this work several successive reincarnations
of the soul were envisaged. By contrast, in the fragments of the Consolatio, as well as in the rhe57
Ps. Dionys. Hal. ars rhet. 6.5, II 282, 11-14 U.-R.
58
Ps. Dionys. Hal. ars rhet. 6.4, II 282, 6 ff. U.-R.
59
Cf. the texts quoted at note 56.
60
At least as old as Philolaos (44 B 14 D.-K.); cf e.g Aristot. protr. fr. 10b Walzer; etc.
61
Crantor, F 6a Mette (= Ps. Plut. cons. ad Apoll. 27, 115B).
62
Sen. Pol. 9.6. Cf. below, note 94.
63
Cic. consol. F 1 Vitelli luendorum scelerum causa nasci homines; F 7 Vitelli iteravit id ipsum postea quasi obi-
urgans eum qui vitam non esse poenam putet.
64
Cic. Hortens. 112 Grilli ex quibus humanae... vitae erroribus fit ut interdum veteres illi vates sive in sacris ini-
tiisque tradendis divinae mentis interpretes, qui nos ob aliqua scelera suscepta in vita superiore poenarum luendarum
causa natos esse dixerunt, aliquid dixisse videantur...
65
Cic. Hortens. 115 Grilli, quoted above (note 48).
9
torical outlines of consolatory writings sketched by both Menander Rhetor and Ps. Dionysius, no
trace of the doctrine of reincarnation can be detected; and also a complete, non-fragmentary consolatory writing like Seneca’s Consolatio ad Polybium does indeed contain the idea of earthly life
as a punishment for the soul, but not the slightest hint at reincarnation.66 It is true that Cicero mentions not merely eternal rewards, like Menander’s and Ps. Dionysius’ rhetorical outlines, but also
eternal punisments; but he does not succeed in reconciling his eschatological picture with the idea
of earthly life as a punishment for the soul not including the doctrine of reincarnation any more than
the two rhetoricians do. Obviously, writers of Consolations could not afford to charge the dead person they were celebrating with any fault, even if incurred in a previous life – which might have offended, rather than consoled, his mourning relatives. Cicero can make the connection in the Hortensius, which has no consolatory aims, but hardly in the Consolation addressed to himself for the loss
of his beloved daughter. As we have already remarked, in consolatory writings the theme of earthly
life as a punishment for the soul ended up by being reduced to the function of introducing the rhetorical topos of the lamentation over, and devaluation of, earthly life as a means of assuaging the
mourners’ grief. In Cicero’s Consolatio, then, there is no mention of reincarnation as retribution and
punishment for faults incurred during earthly life. These are punished in a different way, namely
through an eternal hell sketched with archaic traits, such as darkness, lying in the mud, and so forth.
All the more inconsistent is then the persistence of such an incompatible idea as the punishment of
the very same faults through being born in an earthly body. The rhetorical, rather than philosophical, approach of the Consolatio is impossible to miss. This does not in any way imply a lack of sincerity on the part of Cicero.
4. The fragment 22 of the Consolatio we have been examining so far contains the assertion of
the divine nature of the soul, which naturally entails its return to a godly state after death.67 This
was one of the “philosophical” ideas borrowed by the rhetoricians in connection with consolatory
writing.68 In Cicero it appears frequently, in several works,69 even though, as he says in the part of
the Tusculanae disputationes which contains arguments in favor of immortality, he considers neither possible nor important to establish the exact nature of the soul, provided his affinity with godliness be accepted.70 But in the Consolatio Cicero strives to prove the immortality of the soul by
66
For the case of Crantor see Setaioli 1999, 145-156.
67
Cic. consol. F 22 Vitelli ad deos id est ad naturam similem sui pervolare.
68
Menand. Rhet. III 414, 21-23 Spengel.
69
Cf. above, note 41.
70
Cic. Tusc. 1.70 quae est eius natura? Propria, puto, et sua. Sed fac igneam, fac spirabilem: nihil ad id de quo a-
gimus.
10
connecting it with Aristotle’s quinta natura. The soul’s “quintessential” nature is what quite literally makes it divine and immortal.71 The difficult problems entailed by this connection as well as by
Cicero’s references to this supposedly Aristotelian doctrine are too intricate to be addressed here. I
will only refer to the detailed treatment I have provided elsewhere.72 Here we shall only remark that
the ascent of the soul after death to the godly upper regions which, as we saw, is sketched elsewhere
in the Consolatio73 closely reminds us of the description of the return of the soul to the heavens in
force of merely physical factors found in the Tusculanae disputationes,74 where we also find the
same movement attributed to the soul after death, even if it is made of quinta... natura.75 Clearly,
this vertical ascent can hardly be reconciled with the circular movement typically ascribed to this
substance. Cicero obviously mixes the Aristotelian element with later Stoic ideas. But, as we just
remarked, Cicero himself stresses the importance of the point to be proven, rather than the means by
which it is proven. What should retain our attention here is that in the Consolatio he resorts to this
theory to support the unreserved assertion of the immortality of the soul, which has no real parallel
in his other writings.
The last fragment of the Consolatio is of the utmost interest, in that it prompts a veritable apotheosis of Tullia.76 This too was an idea received in the rhetorical outlines, which make provision
for both themes developed in the fragment: the comparison of the dead person with the deified heroes of yore and his apotheosis through the efforts of the surviving relatives;77 but in Cicero it acquires special depth through his personal involvement.78 The immortality he wishes to grant Tullia
can hardly be regarded as ontological; on the one hand it is assumed on the basis of beliefs and religious customs, on the other it takes for granted that the living have the power to bestow immortality
71
Cic. consol. F 21 Vitelli.
72
Cf. Setaioli 1999, 163-167; Setaioli 2001b, 505-515.
73
Cic. consol. F 22 (quoted above, note 67).
74
Cic. Tusc. 1.42-43.
75
Cic. Tusc. 1.41 si vero aut numerus quidam est animus... aut quinta quaedam... natura, multo etiam integriora ac
puriora sunt, ut e terra longissime se ecferant.
76
Cic. consol. F 23 Vitelli cum vero... et mares et feminas compluris ex hominibus in deorum numero esse videa-
mus et eorum in urbibus atque agris augustissima delubra veneremur, adsentiamur eorum sapientiae quorum ingeniis
et inventis omnem vitam legibus et institutis excultam constitutamque habemus. Quod si ullum umquam animal consecrandum fuit, illud profecto fuit. Si Cadmi progenies aut Tyndari in caelum tollenda fama fuit, huic idem honos certe
dicandus est. Quod quidem faciam teque omnium optimam doctissimam adprobantibus dis immortalibus ipsis in eorum
coetu locatam ad opinionem omnium mortalium consecrabo.
77
Menand. Rhet. III 414, 23-27 Spengel.
78
The one parallel that can be quoted is found in a writing by the late rhetorician Himerius, who expresses his will
to make his dead son immortal: Himer. or. 8.23, 73, 207-216 Colonna. Cf. Setaioli 2001a, 64-65.
11
and godly state upon the dead.79 Some scholars believe that Cicero is referring to the doctrines of
Euhemerus;80 but the widespread theme of the attainment of divine status through culture is more
clearly recognizable.81 Cicero calls Tullia doctissima, which manifestly refers to the attainment of
divine status that is promised to the souls of those who are bonis… studiis atque artibus expolitos,
in the phrasing of the previous fragment of the Consolatio.82 It may be worth reminding that Cicero
had already developed this theme a long time before his daughter’s death: in the Somnium Scipionis
the way to heaven is open not merely to great statesmen, but also to artists and scholars.83 Cicero’s
reference to general customs and beliefs probably implies the acceptance of the Stoic doctrine of the
koinai ennoiai,84 but it is clear that what he is really interested in is not so much objective reality as
the recognition of the generality of people, from which the deification and immortality of Tullia is
made to depend. As always, Cicero cannot really renounce the need for such recognition. But in this
way the concept of the immortality of the soul draws dangerously near the idea of the survival of
fame after death – a theme strongly stressed and almost ubiquitous in Cicero’s works.
The key to the correct interpretation of this text is provided by Cicero himself; the object of his
efforts to promote Tullia’s apotheosis is clearly stated: he aims to succeed in having everyone accept and recognize her divine status: ad opinionem omnium mortalium. We have already mentioned
Cicero’s intention to build a temple (fanum) to honor his deified daughter, as revealed by numerous
letters he wrote after her death.85 A similar intention is expressed in several ancient texts,86 but what
79
A similar attitude can be found in the Epitaphios attributed to Demosthenes: [Dem.] 60.34. Cf. Setaioli 2001a,
80
For example Vitelli 1977, 40-41. We believe Boyancé 1944, 180-181 to be closer to the truth.
81
Cf. Boyancé 1937; Cumont 1942 (espec. Chapt. IV). On the related theme of poetry as source of immortality cf.
35.
Setaioli 1995a, 63-65.
82
Cic. consol. F 22 Vitelli (cf. above, note 51).
83
Cic. somn. Scip. 18 quod docti homines nervis imitati atque cantibus aperuerunt sibi reditum in hunc locum, sicut
alii qui praestantibus ingeniis in vita humana divina studia coluerunt.
84
The doubt expressed by Benkner 1914, 7 is probably groundless. Cicero undoubtedly refers to this doctrine to
support the immortality of the soul in the part of the first book of the Tusculanae disputationes devoted to prove this
point: Cic. Tusc. 1.27-30, 36.
85
Cf. Boyancé 1944; Shackleton Bailey 1966, 404-413; Lepage 1976.
86
With no need to mention Simonides’ b mos d’ho taphos, parallels can be found in funerary inscriptions (e.g. CE
1551e.1-2 templa viri pietas fecit p[ro] munere magno / Pomptillae: meruit [femi]na casta coli). Cf. Lattimore 1942,
102; Boyancé 1937, 331-334. Cicero himself (Att. 12.18.1) testifies that some consolatory writers encouraged the building of temples to honor the dead. Menand. Rhet. III 414, 23-27 Spengel recommends the making of cultic images of the
dead. In view of this the remark of Shackleton Bailey 1966, 404 n. 1 (“who put this idea into Cicero’s head there is no
telling”) cannot but appear rather startling.
12
is peculiar to Cicero is his concern with what will happen after his own death: cum non ero.87
Rather than hoping to be reunited with his daughter, he is afraid that people may forget Tullia, when
he is not there to prevent this from happening. Immortality appears to depend solely on the memory
of those who survived.88 This of course implies that even in his most earnest effort to supply the
thesis of the immortality of the soul with a somewhat solid basis Cicero is not able to go beyond an
attitude of mere voluntarism. He does his best to convince himself and the others that his daughter
survives after death. It is hardly an exaggeration to assert that this amounts to a potentially religious
need, which, however, does not develop into fervent faith. Surely the fragments of the Consolatio
do not reveal the least trace of the negative instance of the “Socratic alternative”, that of the total
annihilation after death, which never totally disappears in his other writings. He resorts to all possible arguments in favor of the immortality of the soul, with no great care for philosophical consistency. He strives to convince himself more than anybody else; as he says himself in the Tusculanae
disputationes,89 in the Consolatio he resorts to all means at his disposal to console himself; but the
letter to Atticus previously quoted proves that he could not imagine a real and objective immortality
which could nurture man’s hope to be reunited with his loved ones after death. He cannot make his
own the attitude he lends to his Cato at the end of the De senectute – who, it should not be forgotten, places the hope to be reunited with his son after death within the frame of the positive instance
of the persisting “Socratic alternative”, which at least disappears in the Consolatio.
In conclusion, Cicero’s attitude concerning the fate of the soul after death never goes beyond a
sentimental leaning: he longs for immortality, but harbors no unquestioning faith in it. When he is
touched in his own paternal feelings he makes an earnest effort to convince himself and the others
that his daughter survives after death. If we compare the Consolatio with the consolatory letters he
wrote to some bereaved correspondents of his,90 we realize that he tries to convince himself that her
fate is different from that of all the others. It is a rhetorical rather than philosophical attempt, which
in no way affects the deep sincerity of the author.
5. Though Seneca’s attitude to death and the fate of the soul constitutes one of the problems
most hotly debated by scholars,91 it is at least clear that, like Cicero, he is mainly concerned with
proving that death is no evil. His multifarious, and often discordant, statements become consistent
when they are seen in the light of this purpose, one of the main goals of his moral adhortatio. We
87
Cic. Att. 12.18.1. Cf. above, note 15 and text to notes 15-17.
88
This is a rather common idea in funerary inscriptions and in consolatory writings. Cf. Setaioli 2001a, 63-65.
89
Cic. Tusc. 3.76 (= consol. F 16 Vitelli) erat enim in tumore animus et omnis in eo temptabatur curatio.
90
See text to notes 18-20.
91
Traina 19874, 90 rightly remarks that the relevant bibliography is as extensive as it is inconclusive.
13
should also never lose sight of the fact that Seneca was, or meant to be, a consistent Stoic, whereas
Cicero’s Academic leanings did not prevent him from eclectically borrowing doctrines and ideas
suiting his goals wherever he could find them.
It is well known that for Seneca death, and particularly voluntary death – suicide –, is the guarantee of man’s freedom. This is not the place for a detailed discussion of this truly crucial Senecan
idea,92 but the texts in which death is presented as the only remedy against the supplicium of earthly
life should retain our attention. In a passage of the Consolatio ad Polybium Seneca clearly hints at
the same mystical doctrines presenting life as a punishment for the soul, which we have already encountered,93 as made clear by his reference to “those who saw most deeply into the truth” and by his
Platonizing language.94 The same idea is found in the Consolatio ad Marciam,95 but the whole context makes it clear that the “punishment” of the soul does not consist in being severed from higher,
noetic entities, but rather in the material worries and hardships of earthly life.96 Seneca’s third Consolatio, addressed to his own mather, provides a clear confirmation: only the body is liable to the
supplicia, whereas the soul is way above them.97 It is clear, then, that in Seneca, like in Cicero, the
idea that earthly life is a punishment for the soul has been detached from its philosophical background, that, to be consistent, had to make provision for reincarnation, since birth in the body could
be a punishment only of faults incurred in a previous life; and, in fact, there is no hint at reincarnation in any of Seneca’s Consolations. This further provides the proper clue for the correct
interpretation of the frequent Platonizing expressions with which Seneca describes the relationship
between the body and the soul. The former is called the burden, the chain, the veil, the temporary
abode, the cage, and the prison of the soul, or downright the “punishment” (poena)98 of the latter.
These are undoubtedly Platonic ideas, but, as we have already hinted, in Seneca a material meaning,
92
I may refer to the literature quoted in Setaioli 2000, 277 n. 17.
93
See above, text to notes 60-66.
94
Sen. Pol. 9.6 si velis credere altius veritatem intuentibus, omnis vita supplicium est. In hoc profundum inquie-
tumque proiecti mare, alternis aestibus reciprocum et modo adlevans nos subitis incrementis, modo maioribus damnis
deferens adsidueque iactans, numquam stabili consistimus loco, pendemus et fluctuamur et alter in alterum inlidimur et
aliquando naufragium facimus, semper timemus; in hoc tam procelloso et ad omnes tempestates exposito mari navigantibus nullus portus nisi mortis est.
95
Sen. Marc. 20,2 haec (mors) est, inquam, quae efficit ut nasci non sit supplicium.
96
Tiranny is one of the most prominent of these worries: cf. Marc. 20.3. This is a current theme in the Consolatio
ad Marciam (19.4) and elsewhere (e.g. ep. 91.21).
97
Sen. Helv. 11.7 corpusculum hoc, custodia et vinculum animi, huc atque illuc iactatur; in hoc supplicia, in hoc
morbi exercentur: animus quidem ipse sacer et aeternus est et cui non possit inici manus. Cf. ep. 24.17.
98
Sen. ep. 65.16 corpus hoc animi pondus et poena est. Cf. besides Sen. ep. 24.17-18; 26.12; 65.16; 102.26; Marc.
24.5 (burden); Marc. 24.5; Pol. 9.8; Helv. 11.7; ep. 65.21; nat. 1 pr. 12 (chain or fetters); Marc. 25.1 (veil or garment);
ep. 120.14 (temporary abode); ep. 88.34 (cage); Pol. 9.3; Helv. 11.7; ep. 79.12; cf. 76.25 (prison).
14
undoubtedly Platonic ideas, but, as we have already hinted, in Seneca a material meaning, more in
keeping with Stoic monism, tends to superimpose itself upon the metaphysical import of the original conception, as confirmed by Seneca’s own statement that the supposed “punishment” ends up
affecting the body rather than the soul. Though at times this brings about a rather incongruous philosophical blend,99 we shall see that Seneca’s Stoicism is not basically impaired by this undeniable
Platonizing strain.
In order to achieve his goal of freeing his public from the fear of death, Seneca must of course,
first of all, do away with the terrors of the Hades of poetry and mythology.100 Once more, he agrees
with Cicero, who, as we have seen, resorted to these only for reasons of political expediency, but
did not believe in their reality.101 Like Cicero,102 he purports to have nothing but contempt for the
Epicurean rigmarole on the vanity of afterlife terrors,103 because no one in his right mind would believe in, and be scared by, such fantastic tales.
In fact, though Seneca at times adopts an “Epicurean” position by denying the very idea of the
survival of the soul together with the terrors of Hades, he goes beyond Epicurus – and Lucretius –
in that he is fully aware that even when we are convinced that these terrors are vain fictions we will
nevertheless be anguished at the thought of total annihilation.104 We may indeed distinguish two
strains which reappear time and again in Seneca’s writings: one may be conventionally called “Epicurean”, in the sense that death is assumed to bring about total annihilation105 – which entails that
the dead are no more liable to be affected by any evil; in this connection Seneca also revalues folkloric themes antedating Epicurus, though frequently incorporated into Epicureanism, such as the
idea that death brings us back to our state before birth: nonexistence.106 This of course denies the
99
E.g. Sen. ep. 120.14 habebat perfectum animum et ad summam sui adductum, supra quam nihil est nisi mens dei,
ex quo pars et in hoc pectus mortale defluxit, quod numquam magis divinum est quam ubi mortalitatem suam cogitat et
scit in hoc natum hominem, ut vita defungeretur, nec domum esse hoc corpus sed hospitium, et quidem breve hospitium,
quod relinquendum est ubi te gravem esse hospiti videas. Platonic ideas mix with the apology of suicide, which Plato
condemns.
100
E.g. Sen. Marc. 19.4; ira 2.35.2; ep. 82.16.
101
See above, text to notes 3-7.
102
Cic. Tusc. 1.10-11, 48; nat. deor. 2.5 (cf. above, note 7).
103
Sen. ep. 24.18.
104
Sen. ep. 82.16 etiam cum persuaseris istas fabulas esse nec quicquam defunctis superesse quod timeant, subit a-
lius metus: aeque enim timent ne apud inferos sint quam ne nusquam.
105
E.g. Sen. ep.36.9; 54.4; Troad. 397; fr. 28 Haase = 63a Vottero.
106
Cf. e.g. Sen. Marc. 19.5 mors dolorum omnium exsolutio est et finis ultra quem mala nostra non exeunt, quae
nos in illam tranquillitatem in qua antequam nasceremur iacuimus reponit. Si mortuorum aliquis miseretur, et non natorum misereatur; id enim potest aut bonum aut malum esse quod aliquid est; quod vero ipsum nihil est et omnia in ni-
15
existence of metaphysical entities, in keeping with Stoic monism, but also with Epicurean materialism. The other strain may be identified with the “Socratic alternative”: death is either total annihilation or the passage to a new and better life.107 This is more comprehensive, in that it includes the
first strain; but its real point is that death is no evil in either case.
As this is what Seneca is striving to prove, there is no real contradiction between the standpoints
we have just illustrated and a text in which Seneca incidentally asserts the immortality of the soul
on the basis of the doctrine of the koinai ennoiai,108 just as Cicero had done a century before.109
Actually, Seneca – again like Cicero, in his works other than the Consolatio – never steps out of
the bounds defined by the “Socratic alternative”, which is formulated time and again in his writings:110 mors quid est? aut finis aut transitus.111 The positive instance of the “Socratic alternative”,
for Seneca as well as for Socrates himself in Plato’s Apology, and for Cicero in his writings other
than the Consolatio, cannot be but an afterlife better than earthly existence.112 At times, as we shall
see, Seneca appears to be carried away by this “beautiful dream”, but a sobering afterthought invariably brings him back to the reality of Socrates’ unsolved dilemma. He never unreservedly endorses the thesis of the immortality of the soul.
We have seen that there is no hint at the doctrine of reincarnation even in Seneca’s consolatory
writings, where the idea that earthly life is a punishment for the soul would have requested its acceptance in order to sketch a philosophically consistent picture.113 Some scholars have maintained
hilum redigit, nulli nos fortunae tradit… nec potest miser esse qui nullus est. The same idea is expressed – in the frame
of the neagative instance of the “Socratic alternative” – at Pol. 9.2. It is older than Epicureanism, as it appears in Bion
of Borysthenes, F 67 Kindstrand, and also in Eurip. Troad. 636. It was accepted by Epicureanism, as shown by Lucr.
3.832-842; Philod. de morte 24.5. Cf. Epic. ad Menoec. 125; rat. sent. 2; but it had become a commonplace: it is repeatedly found in Cicero too: Tusc. 1.13, 91; fin. 1.49; Lael. 14 (above, note 33). In Seneca again at ep. 54.4-5; 65.24;
77.11. The theme had become a consolatory commonplace: cf. e.g. [Plut] ad Apollon. 15, 109EF.
107
Cf. e.g. Sen. ep. 24.18 mors nos aut consumit aut exuit; emissis meliora restant onere detracto, consumptis nihil
restat, bona pariter malaque summota sunt.
108
Sen. ep. 117.6 multum dare solemus praesumptioni omnium hominum et apud nos veritatis argumentum est
aliquid omnibus videri; tamquam deos esse inter alia hoc colligimus, quod omnibus insita de dis opinio est nec ulla
gens umquam est adeo extra leges moresque proiecta ut non aliquos deos credat. Cum de animarum aeternitate disserimus, non leve momentum apud nos habet consensus hominum aut timentium inferos aut colentium. On this passage
see Cumont 1949, 165; Hoven 1971, 124-125; Scarpat 19702, 293 and n. 34.
109
Cf. above, text to note 84. There are clear similarities between Sen. ep. 117.6 and Cic. Tusc. 1.27-30, 36.
110
E.g. Sen. ep. 24.18; 65.24; 71.16; 76.25; 93.9-10; 99.29; Pol. 5.1-2; 9.2-3.
111
Sen. prov. 6.6.
112
Sen. ep. 24.18; 71.16; 76.25. Cf. Cic. Tusc. 1.118; sen. 66-67.
113
Cf. above, text to notes 93-98.
16
that Seneca did accept reincarnation on the basis of a text from the Epistulae morales,114 which in
reality refers to an orthodox Stoic idea, even though the language may sound vaguely Lucretian. In
fact, it may remind us of the expressions Seneca uses to describe the attitude toward death of his
Epicurean friend Bassus, who referred to the cycle of matter, eternally shaping bodies bound to be
dissolved and reformed anew.115 But in the passage from which Seneca’s acceptance of reincarnation has been wrongly assumed he is clearly referring to the Stoic doctrine of apokatastasis or palingenesia, i.e. the reappearance, in a new cosmic cycle, of individuals corresponding to those that
existed in the previous one.116 Another reference to the same doctrine, again with a Lucretian ring in
the language, may be found in another text that might remind us of Bassus’ Epicurean conception, if
the mention of god’s providential plan did not assure us that we are firmly on Stoic ground.117 There
is no doubt, however, that the Epicurean doctrine of the eternal aggregation and dissolution of matter did bear some resemblance to the Stoic theory of apokatastasis. If a Platonizing element can be
detected in Seneca’s formulation of this idea, it should be seen in his reference to the “forgetfulness” of those who accept to return to life: quem multi recusarent, nisi oblitos reduceret.118 If oblitos (obviously implying oblivion of a former life) is taken as a reference to the interruption of consciousness between two successive existences,119 it becomes difficult to explain Seneca’s recusarent, which seems to imply that those who return to life have a freedom of choice, of which they
would avail themselves except for their “forgetfulness”, as it is the case in well-known Platonizing
114
Sen. ep. 36.10 quod si tanta cupiditas te longioris aevi tenet, cogita nihil eorum quae ab oculis abeunt et in re-
rum naturam, ex qua prodierunt ac mox processura sunt, reconduntur consumi: desinunt ista, non pereunt, et mors,
quam pertimescimus et recusamus, intermittit vitam, non eripit; veniet iterum qui nos in lucem reponat dies, quem multi
recusarent nisi oblitos reduceret. Motto 1955, 188 n. 35 believes this passage to prove Seneca’s acceptance of reincarnation. Mazzoli 1967, 231 thinks the reference to be to the palingenesia of Pythagoreanism and to prove the immortality of the soul (but at note 66 more correctly suggests that it may hint at the apokatastasis of Stoicism). Benoit 1948,
42-43 is quite right in esserting that ep. 108 proves that Seneca never believed in reincarnation, in spite of the enthusiasm for Pythagoreanism he went through in his youth.
115
Cf. Sen. ep. 30.11 sed nunc supervacuum est naturae causam agere, quae non aliam voluit legem nostram esse
quam suam: quidquid composuit resolvit, et quidquid resolvit componit iterum.
116
Cf. SVF II 623.Like in Sen. ep. 36.9, in this Chrysippus fragment the first person plural is employed (nos ~ h -
mas).
117
Sen. ep. 71.14 nobis solvi perire est; proxima enim intuemur… alioqui fortius finem sui suorumque pateretur, si
speraret, <ut> omnia illa, sic vitam mortemque per vices ire et composita dissolvi, dissoluta componi, in hoc opere aeternam artem cuncta temperantis dei verti. A further reference to the Stoic doctrine of apokatastasis is probably to be
seen at ep. 65.20 semel haec mihi videnda sint an saepe nascendum.
118
Sen. ep. 36.10 (above, note 114).
119
In Lucretian terms, the interruption of the repetentia nostri (Lucr. 3.851).
17
conceptions.120 Seneca is probably influenced by these, as can be gathered from a further passage in
which oblivion of a former life is expressly mentioned and the body is described as the cage of the
soul.121
We should not forget, however, that the Stoics debated whether an individual of a new cosmic
cycle and the one corresponding to him in the preceding cycle were to be conceived as one and the
same or not,122 and it appears that the answer varied in time.123 The problem of the continuity or interruption of their consciousness we encounter in Seneca may appear as the natural development of
this dispute, even though a Platonizing element is apparent in his formulation. There can be no
doubt, however, that the “forgetfulness” or oblivion of those who return to life is Seneca’s way to
emphasize the interruption of consciousness. There can be no doubt, then, that the end of the cosmic
cycle is the limit of the individual’s conservation and survival. This is again in agreement with orthodox Stoicism: Cleanthes believed that the soul survived until the end of the cycle, whereas Chrysippus accorded this privilege only to the souls of the wise.124
6. The most lively description of the fate of the soul after death to be found in Seneca – the final
pages of the Consolatio ad Marciam, whose closeness to Cicero’s Somnium Scipionis is unanimously recognized125 – refers precisely to this doctrine of Chrysippus’: the souls of Metilius,
Marcia’s son, of his grandfather Cremutius Cordus, and of the great and wise men surrounding
them are the only ones that will survive until the conflagration marking the end of the cosmic cycle.126 In this writing there are numerous Platonizing elements:127 for example, the body is described
120
For a detailed discussion of these I refer to Setaioli 1995b, 52-62.
121
Sen. ep. 88.34 quomodo libertate sua usurus cum ex hac effugerit cavea; an obliviscatur priorum et illinc nosse
se incipiat unde corpori abductus in sublime secessit. Doignon 1984, 254-256 has misunderstood this passage. Cf. Setaioli 2000, 293 n. 105.
122
SVF II 627.
123
Chrysippus asserted their complete identity (SVF II 624); later they were assumed to be “undistinguishable”, or
“slightly different”, and therefore not the same (SVF II 626).
124
Cf. SVF I 522; II 811.
125
E.g. by Badstübner 1901, 1-18; Rogge 1921, 39; Cumont 1949, 164-170; Abel 1964, 240; Mazzoli 1967, 218
and n. 41; Mazzoli 1984, 974; Johann 1968, 125; Bocciolini Palagi 1979, 165 and n. 1; Manning 1981, 133; 145.
126
Sen. Marc. 23.1; 24.5-26.7. The final words of the the Consolatio (26.6-7) leave no doubt: cum tempus advenerit
quo se mundus renovaturus extinguat… omni flagrante materia uno igni quidquid nunc ex disposito lucet ardebit. Nos
quoque felices animae et aeterna sortitae, cum deo visum erit iterum ista moliri, labentibus cunctis et ipsae parva ruinae ingentis accessio in antiqua elementa vertemur. Manning 1981, 135; 152 is wrong in stating that it cannot be determined whether Seneca follows Cleanthes or Chrysippus. Clearly, Seneca accepts the latter’s doctrine.
127
Plato’s Phaedo is indeed quoted at Marc. 23.2.
18
as the burden of the soul, which must wage an unceasing fight with it;128 and as in Plato the soul is
conceived as divine129 and as man’s real self;130 but we have already seen that this does not affect
Seneca’s basic Stoic orthodoxy.131
The most remarkable of these elements is probably Seneca’s mention of the necessity of a period of purgation in the space above the earth but below the heavenly spheres before the souls can
be admitted to heavenly bliss,132 although in Metilius’ case this period will be brief, since he died
young and his soul had no time to defile itself deeply through the contact with matter.133 This was
probably a topos typical of consolatory writings, as suggested by its presence in Plutarch’s Consolatio ad uxorem;134 but the idea of purgation after death also appears in Cicero’s Somnium Scipionis135 and in the sixth book of the Aeneid.136
The idea of the need for purgation137 obviously implies a negative conception of the body and of
matter; it is hardly surprising that no appropriate parallel can be found in the Stoic tradition. This is
the only unquestionable trace of retribution for faults incurred during earthly life that can be found
in Seneca. Significantly, it occurs in a Consolation, which is also the oldest of his preserved writings.
Like the younger Scipio in Cicero’s Somnium Scipionis, Metilius is received and instructed in
the heavens by his grandfather, who dwells in the high spheres,138 possibly in the Milky Way, like
the souls of the blessed in Cicero.139 Also like the younger Scipio, Metilius looks down toward the
128
Sen. Marc. 24.5.
129
Sen. Marc. 23.1; 24.5.
130
Sen. Marc. 24.5; 25.1. Cf. Plat. Alcib. I 130a-c; Phaedo 115c-e; [Plat.] Axioch. 365e. Cf. also Sen. ep. 24.17;
65.21; 102.22, 27; 120.14.
131
It may be worthwhile to remind that the ancients themselves were aware of the mixing of Stoic and Platonizing
elements in such descriptions. The Bern scholiast, commenting on Lucan’s picture of the survival of Pompey’s soul,
which is closely related to Seneca’s description in the Consolatio ad Marciam, remarks: mixtum dogma cum Platonico
Stoicum (Comm. Bern. in Lucan. 9.6).
132
Sen. Marc. 23.1 paulumque supra nos commoratus, dum expurgatur et inhaerentia vitia situmque omne mortalis
aevi excutit...
133
Sen. Marc. 23.1 (on those who die young) facilius quidquid est illud obsoleti inlitique eluunt.
134
Plut. ad uxor. 10, 611EF.
135
Cic. somn. Scip. 29.
136
Verg. Aen. 6.739-742.
137
For this idea see the detailed treatment in Setaioli 1995b, 207-237, with the literature quoted and discussed.
138
Cf. Sen. Marc. 25.1: ad excelsa sublatus is clearly opposed to the lower region (supra nos) in which Metilius
must go through his purgation. Cf. Marc. 26.1 arx caelestis. Seneca however does not specify: cf. Pol. 9.8 locum, quisquis ille est, qui solutas vinculis animas beato recipit sinu.
139
Cic. somn. Scip. 16.
19
earth, but due to the changed political situation he addresses his interest to his surviving loved
ones,140 rather than to the Roman state.
Cremutius’ final words141 refer to Chrysippus’ doctrine: the souls of the wise survive only until
the end of the cosmic cycle. His statement, however, seems to be self-contradictory. At the same
time he is saying that those souls will dissolve into the whole, he asserts that their lot is eternity:
aeterna sortitae. In order to make this statement consistent, the adjective aeternus must be understood in a relative sense: as enduring as one whole cosmic cycle.142 Possible instances of this meaning of the word can indeed be adduced;143 but there are many more Senecan texts in which the same
adjective is used in reference to the human soul apparently with no such limitation,144 including a
passage from the Consolatio ad Marciam coming shortly before the one we are discussing.145 The
possibility that Seneca’s sentimental longing for an unlimited immortality of the soul may have superimposed itself upon orthodox Stoic doctrine cannot therefore be ruled out. This may have been
favored also by the model Seneca is obviously following in this part of the Consolatio ad Marciam,
and also in some letters to Lucilius:146 the Somnium Scipionis. In the final analysis, however, this
sentimental longing does not entail a breach in Seneca’s orthodox Stoicism. As he tells us in a letter, at the end of each cosmic cycle all divine entities are dissolved into the one cosmic godhead.147
No doubt, this is also the fate of those particles of god that are human souls. This way the inevitable
interruption of their consciousness is confirmed.
As already hinted, some elements of the description of afterlife bliss at the end of the Consolatio
ad Marciam are paralleled in other Senecan texts. One is the light eternally surrounding the souls of
the blessed,148 which is opposed to the darkness of life in the body.149 Seneca is clearly taking up
the Platonic image of darkness (cave, prison, grave) connected with the state of the embodied soul,
140
Sen. Marc. 25.2-3.
141
Sen. Marc. 26.7 (above, note 125).
142
As done, e.g., by Benoit 1948, 43 n. 26; Hoven 1971, 45 n. 5; 110 n. 7; 120.
143
Cf. Philippson 1941, 20 and n. 2; 29; 32; 36. As he remarks, in Cicero sempiternus (nat. deor. 2.16), aeternus
(nat. deor. 2.36) and aeternitas (nat. deor. 2.43, 51) are referred to one cosmic cycle.
144
As remarked by Benoit 1948, 43; Hoven 1971, 120; Manning 1981, 152. None of these scholars mentions the
passage of the Consolatio ad Marciam quoted in the following note.
145
Sen. Marc. 24.5 ipse quidem aeternus meliorisque nunc status est… illum aeterna quies manet.
146
E.g. Sen. ep. 86; 102. In the first letter the connection is guaranteed by the figure of Scipio, in the second by the
opening image of the dream (102.2 tam bellum somnium).
147
Sen. ep. 9.16 resoluto mundo et dis in unum confusis… (Iuppiter) acquiescit sibi cogitationibus suis traditus.
148
Sen. Marc. 25.2; 26.3.
149
Sen. Marc. 24.5; cf. Pol. 9.8; ep. 71.16; 79.12; 102.28. Cf. also the description of Seneca’s nephew: Lucan.
9.11-14.
20
as opposed to the light surrounding them when they are finally freed. It must be remarked, however,
that what Seneca has in mind is no transcendent, noetic light: Stoic monism superimposes itself
upon Platonic dualism; there can be no doubt that for Seneca the light in which the souls of the
blessed are immersed comes from the stars surrounding them.150 In this, again, Seneca is following
Cicero’s Somnium Scipionis;151 but it is also a clear reminder of the limits which his “Platonism”
never exceeds.
In a passage of the important letter in which Seneca describes the “beautiful dream” of immortality he says that thanks to this otherworldly life we shall be able to grasp the secrets of nature
(naturae arcana) that the darkness of the earthly world did not permit us to penetrate.152 The very
same expression (arcana naturae) also appears in the final scene of the Consolatio ad Marciam, to
describe the secrets of the universe that are revealed to Metilius under his grandfather’s guidance.153
In the same way, Cremutius himself, as a historian, is no more restricted to a short period of time or
to a small-scale geographic environment, but is able to grasp the whole cycle of past, present, and
future.154 It is immediately evident that the object of this contemplation of the blessed are not transcendent realities, such as Platonic ideas, but rather the marvels and the secrets of our own universe,
which, according to the Stoics, is no doubt divine, but also tangible and material. It is the same universe that we try to investigate during our lifetime, though only after death shall we be able to grasp
and comprehend it in its entirety;155 and the time Cremutius’ soul ranges over from his heavenly
abode is not transcendent eternity, but clearly the scene of the history of the world.
7. It is interesting to observe that the theme of the contemplation of the cosmos – one of Seneca’s most typical – reappears only once in unquestioned connection with afterlife outside the
Consolatio ad Marciam, and – what’s more – in another consolatory writing: the Consolatio ad
150
Sen. Marc. 25.2 nepotem suum… adplicat sibi nova luce gaudentem et vicinorum siderum meatus docet; and,
even more clearly, ep. 102.28 imaginare tecum quantus ille sit fulgor tot sideribus inter se lumen miscentibus.
151
Cic. somn. Scip. 16 erat autem is splendidissimo candore inter flammas circus elucens… erant autem eae stellae
quas numquam ex hoc loco vidimus…
152
Sen. ep. 102.28 aliquando naturae arcana retegentur, discutietur illa caligo et lux undique clara percutiet.
153
Sen. Marc. 25.2 ille nepotem suum… vicinorum siderum meatus docet, nec ex coniectura sed ex vero peritus in
arcana naturae libens ducit.
154
Sen. Marc. 26.5 iuvabat unius me saeculi facta componere in parte ultima mundi et inter paucissimos gesta: tot
saecula, tot aetatium contextum, seriem, quidquid annorum est, licet visere; licet surrectura, licet ruitura regna prospicere et magnarum urbium lapsus et maris novos cursus.
155
Cf. also, e.g., Pol. 9.3 divina vero, quorum rationem tam diu frustra quaesierat, propius intuetur.
21
Polybium.156 Elsewhere it refers to the contemplation of the beauty and secrets of the cosmos the
wise carry out during their earthly lifetime, even though it is not rarely accompanied by the remark
that this is nothing but an anticipation of their activity in the next life, in which it will no more be
hindered in any way.157 Like in the final description of the Consolatio ad Marciam the object of this
earthly contemplation are the cosmos and the time of history.158
Seneca’s position can once more be elucidated through a comparison with Cicero.159 His reference to time seems to be peculiar to him; but in two works of Cicero’s which present numerous
similarities with Seneca’s thought on the fate of the soul, namely the Tusculanae disputationes and
the Somnium Scipionis, we find the idea that the contemplation of nature during earthly life will
make the soul’s ascent to heaven, where it will be free to pursue this object with no hindrances,
quicker and easier.160 Like in Seneca, the wise does not contemplate transcendent realities, but this
very universe of which we are part.
This drive of the soul toward the contemplation of heavenly realities and its detachment from
the material bonds of the body may or may not be inherited from Posidonius; undoubtedly, however, it is one of Seneca’s most deeply felt ideas, which not rarely is expressed in vibrantly religious
tones.161 Sometimes these tones are undeniably Platonic, as in the letter in which Seneca asserts that
the soul, though united with the body, remains nevertheless in heaven with its better part, just like
the sun, though illuminating the earth, remains in the sky.162 The same image reappears over three
centuries later in a Roman Neoplatonist: Macrobius.163 Similar ideas may be found in Plotinus,164
156
Besides the passage quoted in the preceding note, cf. also Sen. Pol. 9.8 omniaque rerum naturae bona cum
summa voluptae perspicit.
157
Sen. Helv. 11.6 quandoque emissus fuerit ad summa emicaturus; interim… celeri et volucri cogitatione divina
perlustrat; ep. 79.12 erit autem illic antequam hac custodia exsolvatur. More indirectly at Helv. 8.6; 20.2; ep. 65.16, 20;
102.2, 20-22; nat. 3 pr. 18. Cf. Doignon 1984, 255-257.
158
Sen. Helv. 8.6; ep. 65.16, 20; 79.12; nat. 3 pr. 18 (cosmos); brev. 14.1-5; ep. 102.2 (time); Helv. 11.6-7; 20.2; ep.
102.21-22 (both).
159
Doignon 1984, l. c. compares Cic. leg. 1.61 and Tusc. 5.69-70. The two passages quoted in the following note
appear to me to be even more important.
160
Cic. Tusc. 1.44-47; somn. Scip. 29 idque ocius faciet, si iam tum cum erit inclusus in corpore, eminebit foras, et
ea quae extra erunt contemplans quam maxime se a corpore abstrahet; cf. 20.
161
See the masterful treatment by Mazzoli 1967.
162
Sen. ep. 41.5 (animus) maiore sui parte illic est unde discendit. Quemadmodum radii solis contingunt quidem
terram sed ibi sunt unde mittuntur, sic animus magnus ac sacer… conversatur quidem nobiscum, sed haeret origini
suae; illinc pendet, illuc spectat ac nititur, nostris tamquam melior interest. Cf. also ep. 65.18; ben. 3.20.1.
163
Macr. in somn. Scip. 1.21.34 sicut solem in terris esse dicere solemus, cuius radius advenit et recedit, ita animo-
rum origo caelestis est, sed lege temporalis hospitalitatis hic exulat. Minucius Felix (Oct. 32.7-9) had already transferred the image to god.
22
and – with striking similarities with Seneca – in his pupil Porphyry.165 In Porphyry, however, the
image is immediately followed by the pointed remark that the soul is a transcendent entity, which
makes it radically different from the sun or any other source of material light. Seneca, by contrast,
often asserts that the soul is akin to the cosmos, or even its most magnificent part, and for this reason it tends to invesigate higher realities.166 This, again, should warn us against attributing to Seneca a type of Platonic dualism opposing spirit and matter. When everything is said and done, it
must be recognized that he basically sticks to the monistic positions of his own philosophical
school: Stoicism.
In the final analysis, the contemplation of nature and the cosmos, for Seneca, can hardly be distinguished from scientific research. In the flight of his fancy, it may anticipate the activity of the
blessed in afterlife, but, in a more sobering attitude, it is more often seen as carried out during
earthly life, and is addressed to the whole realm of nature, including even the inquiry concerning the
fate of the soul after death.167 He reports the attitude of Julius Canus, who, after being condemned
by Caligula, planned to use his own death as a scientific experiment enabling him to learn for sure
about the fate of the soul: vos quaeritis an immortales animae sint: ego iam sciam.168 It should not
escape us, however, that at the same time as he praises Julius Canus and calls him worthy of eternal
life, he seems to conceive of this only as stemming from the memory of the survivors, and devoid of
any metaphysical or ontological reality.169 We cannot help being reminded of Cicero’s attitude to
Tullia, whose survival, in the final analysis, depended on her father’s efforts to keep her memory
alive – in spite of his attempts to convince himself of her objectively real immortality.
The two texts in which the theme of the drive of the soul toward higher realities is developed in
greatest detail can be found in the Naturales quaestiones and in the De brevitate vitae. In the preface to the first book of the Naturales quaestiones not only every single theme of the final description in the Consolatio ad Marciam is taken up, but the influence of Cicero’s Somnium Scipionis can
be as clearly recognized as in that Consolation. All those themes, however, are transferred from the
picture of a fantastic afterlife to the inebriating state of mind of those who contemplate the cosmos
164
Plot. 4.3.22, 1-7. See Setaioli 1995b, 29 n. 164, with more Neoplatonic texts and bibliography.
165
Porph. fr. 261F, pp. 288-289 Smith.
166
E.g. Sen. Helv. 8.4, 6; nat. 1 pr. 12.
167
Sen. ep. 65.20; 82.6; 102.2; brev. 19.1; ot. 5.5.
168
Sen. tranq. 14.8.
169
Sen. tranq. 14.10 ecce animus aeternitate dignus… dabimus te in omnem memoriam. Seneca is aware of his abil-
ity to bestow immortality through his own writings: cf. ep. 21.5. Immortality through memory also at Pol. 18.2; ep.
93.4; 102.30.
23
during earthly life: their soul roams through the stars;170 it looks down to earth;171 it goes back to its
own origin;172 it can observe all the phenomaena of the cosmos at close range;173 it finally learns
what it had long investigated.174 The conclusion, therefore, does not ring unexpected: all this is tantamount to overcoming our mortal state.175 Through the linguistic and stylistic means of metaphorical expression176 everything is transferred to the level of real, earthly experience: the living wise
man’s contemplation is not so much a prefiguration of a future activity in an afterlife as it is its
equivalent in our life and in our world, inevitably pushing the eschatological picture to the background. The soul’s drive toward higher realities corresponds to heavenly immortality; the purification from vices obtained through it is the equivalent of the purgation after death described in the
Consolatio ad Marciam;177 the asceticism through which the wise man’s soul is freed from the burden of material yearnings ethically corresponds to the soul’s physical lightness, which makes it ascend to heaven after death.178
This interpretation is confirmed by the De brevitate vitae.179 A crucial passage develops a theme
we have already encountered: the wise man is lord of the totality of time and can communicate with
all great souls. Thus he overcomes his mortality, and actually changes it to immortality. Clearly, the
free ranging of the wise man’s soul through the whole series of time is not so much the anticipation
as it is the equivalent of, and the substitute for, eschatological immortality.
Seneca’s rationalism is apparent in this approach. If Cicero had already substituted the resurrection of Plato’s Er of Pamphylia through the dream of his own Scipio, Seneca proceeds beyond. Both
170
Sen. nat. 1 pr. 7 inter sidera vagantem.
171
Sen. nat. 1 pr. 8-11.
172
Sen. nat. 1 pr. 12 in originem redit.
173
Sen. nat. 1 pr. 12.
174
Sen. nat. 1 pr. 13 demum discit quod diu quaesiit.
175
Sen. nat. 1 pr. 17 haec inspicere, haec discere, his incubare, nonne transilire est mortalitatem suam…? (cf. 13
domicilii p r io r is angustias).
176
Cf. the masterful treatment by Mazzoli 1984, 974-975.
177
Cf. Sen. nat. 1 pr. 11 si secum minimum ex corpore tulit, si sordidum omne detersit. Cf. also ep. 79.12 erit autem
illic… cum vitia disiecerit purusque et levis in cogitationes divinas emicuerit.
178
Sen. nat. 1 pr. 11 expeditus levisque et contentus modico emicuit. The ascent of the soul after death due to its
physical lightness is an idea accepted by Sen. Pol. 9.8; Helv. 11.6; ep. 57.8. It is a Stoic doctrine (cf. SVF II 812) fully
developed by Cicero in a famous passage (Tusc. 1.42-43). Cf. above, text to note 74.
179
Sen. brev. 15.4-5 hi (the great thinkers of the past) tibi dabunt ad perpetuitatem iter et te in illum locum ex quo
nemo deicitur sublevabunt. Haec una ratio est extenuandae mortalitatis, immo in immortalitatem vertendae… omnia illi
(= sapienti) saecula ut deo serviunt. Transit tempus aliquod, hoc recordatione comprendit; instat, hoc utitur; venturum
est, hoc praecipit. Longam illi vitam facit omnium temporum in unum conlatio. Cf. also ep. 98.9; fr. 27 Haase = F 62
Vottero.
24
in the Consolation to Marcia and in the letter on the “beautiful dream” of immortality he develops
the cherished picture of a blessed afterlife by appealing to imagination. Puta itaque, he says to
Marcia.180 So, all the beautiful description is only the bereaved mother’s imagination. Only at the
end, in the very last words of the writing (“how happy is your son, Marcia, who already knows
these realities!”),181 it is subreptitiously presented as reality, just like Cicero had done at the end of
his Somnium Scipionis. And the dream of the letter, though reminiscent of Scipio’s dream in Cicero,
is nevertheless a dream with eyes wide open.182 This rationalistic attitude culminates in the transposition of the images associated with a blessed afterlife to the earthly experience of philosophical
contemplation.
So, the elaborate picture at the end of the Consolatio ad Marciam is exposed for what it really
is: the transposition to a fanciful afterlife of an all too earthly philosophical ideal, which is not, and
cannot be, the solution of the “Socratic alternative”, but merely a vivid and colorful presentation of
its positive instance. When so understood, it is no more felt as contradictory in relation to the formulation, in Epicurean colors, of the negative instance, which can be found in the same writing only
a few pages before.183 The same juxtaposition can also be found in the Consolatio ad Polybium,
where the two opposed instances of the “Socratic alternative” are used to prove that death is no evil
in the very same chapter.184
A further confirmation comes from a letter to Lucilius we have already repeatedly hinted at:
epistle 102, which vividly describes what Seneca himself calls the “beautiful dream” of immortality.185 Many of the themes related to the eschatological picture we have sketched above reappear in
this letter: unrestrained command of all time and space;186 the conception of the body as a burden
and of the soul as man’s real self;187 the darkness of earthly life as against the light of the abode of
the blessed, which enables them to descry hidden truths impossible to reach in this lower world.188
But, when all is said and done, Seneca takes it for granted that death amounts to the total annihila-
180
Sen. Marc. 26.1.
181
Sen. Marc. 26.7 felicem filum tuum, Marcia, qui ista iam novit! Cf. above, text to notes 27-33.
182
Sen. ep. 102.28 imaginare tecum.
183
Sen. Marc. 19.4-5. Cf. above, note 106.
184
Sen. Pol. 9.2 as against 9.6-8. Something similar can be observed at Marc. 19.1 dimisimus illos, immo consecu-
turi praemisimus as against 19.4-6.
185
Sen. ep. 102.2 iuvabat de aeternitate animarum quaerere, immo mehercules credere… cum subito experrectus
sum epistula tua et tam bellum somnium perdidi.
186
Sen. ep. 102.2, 21-22.
187
Sen. ep. 102.22, 26, 27.
188
Sen. ep. 102.28.
25
tion of man, and says unequivocally so in this very same letter.189 As Bocciolini Palagi190 has
clearly demonstrated, the paragraphs devoted to the “beautiful dream” in this letter appear to testify
Seneca’s belief in the immortality of the soul only if separated from the writing’s living body and
context. In reality, as far as ontological immortality is concerned, Seneca does not differ from
Cicero’s agnosticism: there are philosophers, he says, that promise immortality, but cannot prove it.
This is a “beautiful dream” we can indulge to, as long as we are aware that it only fulfills a sentimental need, just as done by Cicero’s Cato at the end of the De senectute.191 Not surprisingly, the
letter ends with the sobering remark that real immortality can only be secured by the memory that
virtue leaves behind.192
This is the immortality Seneca personally longs for as far as he himself is concerned. In a letter
in which some autobiographical experiences are vibrantly alluded to193 he says that he will not die
as long as the friends to whom he has transmitted his thoughts and ideas are alive, because he will
live through them, per illos.194
On the other hand, the text in which Seneca’s philosophical position, as far as the place and
function of the eschatological theme in his moral philosophy is concerned, is most lucidly revealed
is probably to be found in a letter,195 in which, within the persistent frame of the “Socratic alterna-
189
Sen. ep. 102.4 itaque illam partem rectam et ad mores pertinentem tractavi, numquid stultum sit ac superva-
cuum ultra extremum diem curas transmittere, an cadant bona nostra nobiscum nihilque sit eius qui nullus est, an ex eo
quod, cum erit, sensuri non sumus, antequam sit aliquis fructus percipi aut peti possit.
190
Bocciolini Palagi 1979.
191
Cic. sen. 85 quod si in hoc erro, qui animos hominum immortales esse credam, libenter erro, nec mihi hunc er-
rorem, quo delector, dum vivo, extorqueri volo. Cf. Tusc. 1.39.
192
Sen. ep. 102.30 quamvis enim ipse ereptus sit oculis, tamen ‘multa viri virtus animo multusque recursat / gentis
honos’ (Verg. Aen. 4.3-4). Cogita quantum nobis exempla bona prosint: scies magnorum virorum non minus praesentiam esse utilem quam memoriam.
193
Sen. ep. 78.6 multorum mortem distulit morbus et saluti illis fuit videri perire. It is impossible not to think of
Seneca’s own experience under the realm of Caligola, when he escaped capital punishment only because his sickly constitution seemed to portend his imminent death.
194
Sen. ep. 78.6 non iudicabam me, cum illos superstites relinquerem, mori. Putabam, inquam, me victurum non
cum illis, sed per illos; non effundere mihi spiritum videbar, sed tradere.
195
Sen. ep. 93.9-10 et tamen quousque vivimus? Omnium rerum cognitione fruiti sumus: scimus a quibus principiis
natura se attollat, quemadmodum ordinet mundum, per quas annum vices revocet, quemadmodum omnia quae usquam
erunt cluserit et se ipsam finem sui fecerit; scimus sidera impetu suo vadere, praeter terram nihil stare, cetera continua
velocitate decurrere; scimus quemadmodum solem luna praetereat, quare tardior velociorem post se relinquat, quomodo lumen accipiat aut perdat, quae causa inducat noctem, quae reducat diem: illuc eundum est ubi ista propius aspicias. ‘Nec hac spe’ inquit sapiens ille ‘fortius exeo, quod patere mihi ad deos meos iter iudico. Merui quidem admitti et
26
tive”, we again encounter most of the ideas we already know. Contemplation during earthly life is
once more pronounced to be an anticipation of heavenly bliss, and the secrets of the cosmos are
again declared to be fully accessible only to the unhindered contemplation of the blessed. Here,
however, a new theme is grafted onto this idea, namely the concept, well attested in the tradition of
diatribe, that no feat accomplished by man can save him from inevitable death. At Rome this idea
had been expressed by illustrious forerunners, such as Lucretius and Horace.196 In this text the contemplation of the cosmos, though still considered to be an anticipation of eternal bliss, does not exempt the wise from the common fate of all mortals: eundum est ubi ista propius aspicias. But at the
same time we encounter a manly acceptance not merely of death, but also of the possible mortality
of the soul. In the wise man’s speech that follows immediately the possibility of immortality is
surely not denied; he even seems to consider it more probable than the opposite hypotesis. But
surely the wise man does not see immortality as indispensable to his own happiness, which can only
stem from his own virtue. We have just seen that Seneca is anything but insensible to the memory
he shall leave after his death; but, quite differently from Cicero,197 his wise man can do without it.
When he is certain of having acted rightly, posthumosus glory is totally irrelevant. Much more: any
eschatological reward is both unnecessary and unmeaningful.198 Immortality is not relevant, in that
the perfection of virtue is totally independent of duration in time199 and it must be pursued in this
earthly life. The perfect ethical action is a value in itself and is in need of no sanction in another
life.200
We now understand why Seneca never needs to solve the “Socratic alternative”. Once he has
proved that death is no evil in either case, the ethical significance to be attached to the mortality or
immortality of the soul is void and irrelevant: immortality is nothing but an “indifferent”, a Stoic
iam inter illos fui animumque illo meum misi et ad me illi suum miserant. Sed tolli me de medio puta et post mortem nihil ex homine restare: aeque magnum animum habeo, etiam si nusquam transiturus excedo’.
196
Cf. Setaioli 1995a, 62-63. Like Horace (c. 1.28.1-11) Seneca asserts here that scientific discoveries do no save
from death. There are also some Horatian stylistic modes (Sen. ep. 93.9 eundum est ~ Hor. c. 2.14.17-18 visendus
ater… / Cocytos).
197
Cf. e.g. Cic. Tusc. 1.91 itaque non deterret sapiens mors… quo minus in omne tempus rei publicae suisque
consulat, cum posteritatem ipsam, cuius sensum habiturus non est, ad se putet pertinere. Quare licet etiam mortalem
esse animum iudicantem aeterna moliri, non gloriae cupiditate, quam sensurus non sit, sed virtutis, quam necessario
gloria, etiamsi tu id non agas, consequatur.
198
Cf. Dagura Mara 1961, 152. This is a perfectly orthodox Stoic position: cf. Benoit 1948, 45; Hoven 1971, 84.
199
This idea is expressed by Seneca so often as to make it unnecessary to quote any text. Cf. nonetheless ep. 73.13;
93.2; ben. 5.17.6; the whole De brevitate vitae, etc.
200
Cf. e.g. Sen. ben. 4.22.1-2 nihil iam superest, quo spes porrigatur… est videlicet magna in ipso opere merces et
ad alliciendas mentes hominum ingens honesti potentia.
27
adiaphoron, just like death.201 Ordinary people, Seneca’s proficientes, to whom Seneca’s moral philosophy is primarily addressed, must be convinced that death is no evil, whatever the subsequent
fate of the soul; as for the wise, neither death nor whatever may come after can in any way affect
their demeanor. Seneca’s thinking on afterlife, therefore, cannot in any way be called inconsistent.
His undeniable longing for immortality does not breach his Stoic monism and his basically rationalistic frame of mind.
Though at the personal level he shares most of Cicero’s attitudes, in the final analysis Seneca’s
Stoicism makes him more consistent; his longing for immortality does not lead him to claim or assume individual exceptions to the general rule, as Cicero could not help doing when he was personally faced with a circumstance similar to those which had elicited from his pen consolations to others, which made no provision for eternal bliss in a heavenly afterlife.
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