IEHC 2006 Helsinki Session 60
Agricultural development and impeded growth:
the case of Hungary 1870–1970
Michael Kopsidis
Institute of Agricultural Development in Central and Eastern Europe (IAMO)
Theodor- Lieser-Strasse 2
06120 Halle (Saale)
Germany
[email protected]
Preliminary draft chapter for Agriculture and Economic Development in Europe since 1870,
edited by Pedro Lains and Vicente Pinilla
2
1. Introduction
Until the Second World War agriculture constituted Hungary’s largest economic sector, and
structural transformation from an agricultural to an industrial country proceeded slowly.
Starting at the end of the 1870s, it took nearly a century for agriculture’s proportion of
national product to fall from around 75% to just below 20% in 1970/74 (table 1). During the
seven decades of ca. 1895–1965, Hungary’s structural transformation proceeded under the
condition of poor agricultural growth or stagnation. In addition, industry was not able to
compensate for the poor performance of agriculture until the Second World War.
Explanations for the structural weakness of Hungarian agriculture concentrates on adverse
macroeconomic or political developments, i.e., “external shocks”: the dissolution of the
Austrian-Hungarian Customs Union in 1918 as a result of the break-up of the Habsburg
Empire, extremely unfavourable developments on agricultural world markets during the interwar-period and the Soviet rule of Hungary after 1945.
But concentrating only on external shocks implicitly means that developments within
Hungary’s biggest sector did not affect its economy. In contrast, modern development
economics suggests that agricultural land and labour relations have to be considered when
explaining economic growth in a less-developed agrarian country like Hungary. Both
agricultural growth and rural poverty reduction is difficult when faced with the bimodal
unequal distribution of land characterised by the so-called dual structure of a few latifundias
and a mass of tiny peasant holdings. Findings from development economics substantiate the
idea that due to a lack of competitiveness with the smallholder sector, large Junker (wage)
estates created an unstable form of production relations which demanded intensive lobbying
for protection and systematic discrimination of the more efficient peasant family farms via
control of the state and society by the landed aristocracy [H. P. Binswanger et al., 1995, 2686,
H.P. Binswanger, M. Rosenzweig, 1986, N. L. Johnson, V.M. Ruttan, 1994, B.F. Johnston, P.
Kilby, 1975, M. Lipton, 1989]. This is especially true for the type of pre-industrial, nonmechanised agriculture with very limited economies of scale and high transaction cost of nonfamily labour, which existed in Hungary before the 1960s. The maintenance of such an
inefficient dual farm structure would significantly slow down agricultural growth.
Furthermore, experience has shown that a dual structure is rather inappropriate for adjusting
to structural changes or exogenous shocks.
Until the Second World War, due to the high concentration of landownership Hungary has
often been referred to as “the quintessential home of a landed aristocracy” [S. M. Eddie, 1989,
3
Table 1. Structural Change from 1870–1980
Year
Agricultural
Share of agri-
Share of agri-
Share of agri-
labour force
culture in total
culture in the
cultural
(in 1,000)
labour force
national product
products
in all exports*
Kingdom of Hungary
1870
5,015
70.0–75.0%
1910
5,601
60.0–65.0%
#
ca. 75%
--
43–62%
74.6
Hungary after the Trianon Peace Treaty
+
32.0%
+
80.4
1920
2,128
58.3%
1938
--
--
34.0%
65.3
1949
2,191
55.2%
27.0%
39.2
1960
1,843
38.9%
21.0%
22.1
1970
1,223
26.4%
18.0%
23.0
1980
1,116
22,0%
14.0%
22.4
Notes: B.R. MITCHELL, 2003, 151, 931, T. KOLOSSA, 1965, 141–142, 931, S.M. EDDIE, 1968,
209–212, 1977, table A5, I.T. BEREND, G. RÁNKI, 1970, 15, 1985, 16, 23, L. KATUS, 1970,
110, F. V. FELLNER, 1916, 594, P. GUNST, 1981, 407–408, #M.-S. SCHULZE (2000, 338)
calculated nearly unchanged shares of only around 48% for 1870 and 1910, S. EDDIE, 1977,
337, I.T. BEREND, G. RÁNKI, 1985, 278, *agricultural exports includes processed food, +1924.
249]. Analysing Hungary’s agricultural development using new development economics
improves our understanding of the structural deficiencies of Hungarian agriculture by
highlighting systematically important topics which have thus far been unexplored.
Furthermore, it helps to explain why Hungary’s agricultural crisis continued over seven
decades despite all the fundamental political and economic changes that occurred. Past
research has already intensively analysed the relationship between rural poverty and the
pronounced dual structure of Hungarian agriculture. In addition, impediments to agricultural
growth brought about by preserving extensive large estate farming at the costs of much more
intensive peasant farming have been observed by scholars [S. M. Eddie, 1968, P. Gunst, 1981,
4
401]. However, thoroughly analysing the causes of the growth-reducing effects or
inefficiencies of large estates was often beyond scholarly imagination. By adhering to a NeoMarxist or “Weberian” version of “agrarian fundamentalism” [R. C. Allen, 1992, 1-2]
Hungarian scholars especially still saw large estates as the best engine for “capitalist”
agricultural growth, and considered small-scale peasant farming, in principal, to be backward
and not fit for capitalist agriculture. According to this view, the prime cause of rural poverty
and stagnating growth was not the extremely unequal distribution of land property, but the
inability of the dynamic but too small industrial sector to absorb the fast increasing rural
population [P. Gunst, 1998, 1–5, 125–175]. Until now it has not been systematically
examined how the enforced prevalence of large, if not mammoth, estates as an inefficient
farm type negatively affected Hungarian agricultural growth between 1850 and 1940 and
afterwards.
During the last third of the 19th century, even in East European countries with powerful
landed aristocracies and large estates such as the Tsarist Empire, peasants significantly
augmented their share of land either by buying or renting [H.-D. Löwe, 1987, 101-110].
However, Hungarian large estates held if not strengthened their position as production units,
whereas many European regions saw the rise of the family farm in connection with the
gradual disappearance of large-scale, wage-labour based farming [J. L. van Zanden, 1991,
216, N. Koning, 1994, esp. 25-29]. The consolidation of large, centrally-operated estates in
Hungary before 1914 was unique in Europe, aside from some less-developed parts of
Southern Europe [F. DOVRING, 1965, 240].
This contribution searches for the causes of the long-lasting structural crisis of Hungarian
agriculture from ca. 1895 to 1965. Besides the important and changing exogenous factors, the
sector-immanent endogenous factors should be considered properly when explaining this kind
of path-dependency. Two reasons are important to concentrate on during the decades prior to
the First World War. First, Hungary’s dual agricultural structure fully developed during this
time. Second, during the “long 19th century” agriculture played a central role in Hungary, not
only for the acceleration of economic development, but for its industrial revolution as well.
It will be shown that during the so-called grain invasion [ K. O’Rouke, J. G. Williamson,
1997] the dual structure of Hungarian agriculture made it much more difficult to react to
adverse developments on international commodity markets without slowing down agricultural
growth and thus increasing rural poverty. As will be demonstrated, despite vigorous rural
population growth, the pressure on large estates to practice extensive grain cultivation, and
5
their inability to leave the unprofitable grain sector, significantly reduced the capability of
Hungarian agriculture to absorb labour. In other words, is was not only the low capability of
the small Hungarian industrial sector to employ the growing rural population that was
responsible for the spread of rural poverty after 1890. In fact, the dual structure reduced the
ability of agriculture, which was by far the largest sector of the Hungarian economy, to absorb
population growth and maintain agricultural growth by employing all factors within the
sector.
According to modern development economics, peasant agriculture is much better able to
simultaneously absorb labour and ensure high rates of agricultural growth. This was
especially true for Hungary, whose agricultural boom after 1870/75 proceeded as a very
labour-intensive pre-industrial “Boserupian growth process.” As will be shown, particularly
during such a process, discrimination of the peasant sector has strong negative effects on
agricultural growth.
The following two chapters analyse how the dual structure of Hungarian agriculture
aggravated, until 1940, the negative effects of adverse developments on international markets.
Chapter four deals with the period after 1945, which faced the same structural problems upon
other terms. The fifth chapter presents the conclusions.
2. Agricultural
development
until
1914:
from
outstandingly
dynamic
to
structural crisis
In 1867, the Austrian Empire and the Kingdom of Hungary together formed the Habsburg
Empire, which comprised most parts of Central and large parts of Southeast Europe [I.
Romsics, 1999, 11–17].1 In 1910, 20.9 mio of its 49.5 mio inhabitants lived in the Hungarian
portion of the Empire, and 28.6 mio in the Austrian portion [T. Kolossa, 1965, 137]. Around
1865/70, Hungary’s economy was predominately agrarian, with industry contributing around
just 10% to the Hungarian GDP [T. Berend, G. Ránki, 1970, 15, L. Katus, 1970, 110, M.-S.
Schulze, 2000, 338]. Agriculture very likely contributed to 70% – 80% of Hungarian GDP
(table 1) [J. Komlos, 1983, 209-213]. An agricultural share of more than two-thirds of
Hungarian GDP is a proper estimate, keeping in mind the sustained dynamic growth of
1
The following current states and regions formed the Austrian Empire in 1867: Austria,
Czech Republic and the South of Poland. Hungary, Slovakia, Croatia and the Western half
of Romania made up the Kingdom of Hungary.
6
Hungarian agriculture during the entire 19th century as part of a clear-cut regional
specialisation within the Habsburg Empire [J. Komlos, 1983, D.F. Good, 1991, 224] and
taking into consideration the poor development of urban handicrafts and rural protoindustrialisation compared to the more developed Western half of the Empire. In addition,
virtually all calculations of the Hungarian labour force’s composition assume a share around
75% for the agricultural sector for 1870 (table 1).
Within the Habsburg Empire, regional specialisation driven by comparative cost advantages
developed at the end of the 18th century and accelerated vigorously after 1830 as the AustrianBohemian lands entered the modern industrial phase of economic development [J. Komlos,
1983, 52–147]. At the beginning of the 1870s, Hungary as the Empire’s granary had already
covered a great distance on its way to becoming an export-oriented agricultural economy.
After 1870, export-induced agricultural development further accelerated and reached a new
stage. Hungarian agriculture, which could be described as a “grain” if not a “wheat economy”,
increased 1.4% p.a. between 1789 and 1868/70 (all grain). This rate accelerated to 3.6% for
1869/70–1881/83 (all plant production) [J. Komlos, 1983, 59, also J. Puskás, 1982, 110].
Even if the driving force of Hungarian agricultural growth – export demand – remained the
same before and after 1870, the level of market integration within the Habsburg Empire
reached a new high during the 1870s, creating a nearly perfect environment for demanddriven, market-oriented agricultural growth for the next two decades. Three developments
caused the Customs Union between Austria and Hungary, which was founded in 1850, to
become more important than ever before for Hungarian agricultural development after
1875/80: First, declining prices on international grain markets outside of the Empire during
the “grain invasion”; second, the “transport revolution” which created for the first time an
Empire–wide, unified, domestic agricultural market, and third, the influx of Austrian capital.
The latter largely financed the Hungarian infrastructure boom after 1867, and its
industrialisation, which started during the 1870s. It was strongly based on the expansion of
the milling industry and the existence of a capable infrastructure.
The steady drop of international grain prices and growing agrarian protectionism within
Europe caused the “pricing out” of Hungarian grain and flour on its most important export
markets outside the Empire since the end of the 1870s. The trade of these pivotal commodities
7
was nearly completely diverted into the Austrian market [S. M. Eddie, 1977, 345–352].2 Only
the Austro-Hungarian Customs-Union and its rising agricultural tariffs [S. M. Eddie, 1989b,
824–844] protected this large domestic market and ensured that agricultural products
dominated Hungarian trade between 1870 and 1914 (S. M. Eddie, 1977, 337). Relative prices
of agricultural products, especially of grain, increased substantially within the Empire
compared to the trends on international markets.
Agricultural boom and industrialisation were strongly connected in Hungary. This is clearly
demonstrated by looking at the boost of the Hungarian food and milling industries in the late1870s. Food processing remained by far the most important manufacturing sector until World
War I, and played a vital role for the first wave of Hungary’s industrialisation from 1873–
1896 [J. Komlos, 1983, 132–147]. In 1909/13, flour and all foods accounted for 31.4% and
46.1% of all manufacturing production [own calculation, data from J. Komlos, 1983, 298–
299]. Hungary’s clear comparative advantages in building up a milling industry within the
Habsburg Empire was based on the good quality of its wheat and its relatively low price. But
it was especially the steeply rising flour demand of Austria and Germany during the 1870s
that induced the rapid acceleration in Hungarian grain production. Even Hungary’s
agricultural production started to grow as never before as the “grain-hunger” of the thenrapidly mechanising milling industry could only be satisfied by large imports from the
Balkans, which were based on bilateral trade treaties that allowed duty-free imports for grain
designated for processing. As flour exports outside the Dual Monarchy started to significantly
shrink during the 1880s, Hungary’s exports to Austria boomed, growing at an annual rate of
10% until 1896 [J. Komlos, 1983, 141]. After 1896, the boom of the Hungarian milling
industry ended and it ceased developing as a consequence of simultaneously stagnating
Austrian demand and the nearly complete loss of virtually all markets outside the Customs
Union. The importation of wheat was finally abolished.
Other East European low-cost grain producers such as Romania and Russia were not able to
develop a large flour export trade, thus enhancing the domestic value added within the food
chain as well as domestic capital accumulation due to the fact that they had no access to a
promising West European market. In contrast, the customs union with Austria provided
Hungary’s milling industry with a large market. Without the Customs union, it would have
2
Whereas in 1882/91 two-thirds of all Hungarian grain and flour exports went out of the
Habsburg Empire, this share declined to one-tenth for 1902/1911 [M. Szuhay, 1998, 120].
8
been difficult if not impossible for Hungary to find a similarly large market for its flour [J.
Komlos, 1983, 143–144].
The export-oriented agricultural upswing after 1830, and its transition into a two decade-long
boom after 1870, was strongly connected to inland navigation, and above all, a railway-based
“transport revolution” [L. Katus, 1983] After 1870, for the first time most parts of Hungary,
not only the river areas, were well connected with Austrian and European markets. In contrast
to most European countries before 1880, the needs of the agricultural export sector, not the
requirements of the industrial sector, determined the routing of the so-called grain railways.
Starting in the 1850s, three labour-demanding developments absorbed, for three decades, the
bulk of unskilled labour provided by a fast-growing agricultural population: the rapid
construction of modern infrastructure, the extension of farmland, and the diffusion of
intensive farming systems [P. Gunst, 1998, 26]. The pace of agrarian intensification strictly
followed the development of export demand, especially on the Austrian market. It had been
gaining momentum since the 1830s, decades before the peasant emancipation, and strongly
accelerated during the late-1870s and early-1880s. During the 1870s, due to geographic
differences in the pace of market integration, agricultural development started to vary greatly
by region, and a clear West-East difference emerged [A. Voros, 1980, 61–64].
According to van Zanden, Hungary achieved outstanding growth in agricultural gross output
from 1870–1910, far above the European average [J.L. van Zanden, 1991, 229].3 But, unlike
in developed European countries, the “Green Revolution” that started in Hungary around
1870 proceeded similar to a Boserup-like process of pre-industrial agricultural growth,
heavily dependent on rising labour intensity and an increasing “frequency of cropping” that
reduced all types of fallow as well as the vigorous enlargement of high-value agricultural area
such as arable land [P. Gunst, 1998, 106–109, J. Puskás, 1982, 110, J. Komlos, 1983, 137].
Hungary’s exceptional performance, even when compared to leading European countries, was
mainly achieved during the 1870s and 1880s, and was accomplished within the framework of
pre-industrial agriculture. It was hardly touched by the “first European green revolution” [J.L.
van Zanden, 1991] mainly based on industrial inputs. Purchased inputs played only a
negligible role; most mechanical technical change concentrated on the improvement of
3
According to van Zanden, Hungarian GAO increased 1870–1910 by 1.61% p.a. compared to
1.06% for Europe (Belgium: 0.97%, France: 0,37%, Sweden and Netherlands: 1.29%,
Britain: 0.15%, Germany: 1.68%).
9
traditional hand tools or better draft animals. Only threshing was mechanised significantly.
Labour intensive, biological, technical change concentrated on the diffusion of fallowreducing intensive agricultural systems and high-yielding animals. Mineral fertilisers as the
main productivity-enhancing, land-saving technical innovation of the time were nearly
unknown before 1900 [A. Voros, 1980, 65–66, M. Szuhay, 1998, 105]. The extraordinary
growth that was realised after 1870, which in contrast to more developed parts of Europe was
not induced by the diffusion of industrial inputs, can be explained by the exceptional extensity
of Hungary’s agriculture.4
According to Boserup’s theory of pre-industrial agricultural growth, low intensity farming
provides, for a certain time, a large scope for high output and productivity gains, even under
the conditions of poor technical change [E. Boserup, 1965, 65–69, 88–94, 116–121]. In the
first phase of accelerated growth, the marginal product of every additional labour unit is
relatively high compared to the following stages of intensification. The more intensive
agricultural production becomes, the more difficult and costly it is to further increase labour
productivity and output. Without dynamic technical change and under an increasing profitorientation in agriculture, labour intensity and output will only further increase if agricultural
prices follow an upward trend. Furthermore, different types of farms, in the Hungarian case
large wage estates and small family farms, face quite different labour costs. According to the
results of modern development economics, wage labour on large estates is connected with
extremely high transaction costs, giving an edge to peasant farms dependent on family labour
(Y. Hayami, 1998, H.P. Binswanger et. al., 1995, 2685–2706]. Due to significantly lower
transaction costs and a ‘labour market dualism’ caused by different farm-type dependent
optimisation principles, even fully market-oriented peasant households in general face much
lower ‘internal wage’ or labour costs than large wage estates. This is the main reason why
family farms realise higher labour-inputs and output increases than large wage estates, and
why the latter had to rely on much more extensive farming systems to maximise their profit
[F. Ellis, 1996, 203–217]. Thus, under labour-intensive Boserupian growth, especially if a
declining price-trend prevails, the ability of agriculture to absorb labour and simultaneously
enhance output strongly depends on the scope of the more competitive farm type, the family
4
Even around 1870, the intensity of agriculture in most parts of Hungary was rather low,
equivalent to a less-developed medieval three- or two-field system. In contrast to most parts
of Europe, manuring of arable land was not practised, and animal husbandry often took
place within a semi-nomadic system [A. Voros, 1980, 21–56].
10
farm, to displace inefficient large estates. If the latter are preserved by systematic
discrimination against peasants and privileged by public support in manifold ways,
decelerated growth and soaring rural unemployment are the consequences.
In light of the experience of modern, less-developed countries, Hungary’s agricultural
structure developed in the most unfavourable way after 1850. It was the deliberate aim of
serf-emancipation to transfer as much land as possible to the former feudal landlords and to
prevent the emergence of full-time family farms to provide the emerging estates with
sufficient wage labour [E. Niederhauser, 1998, I. Orosz, 1998]. Thus, the expansion of fulltime family farms between 5 and 50 hectares, which efficiently used wage labour without
reaching the point of disproportional growing marginal transaction costs, and which was the
most competitive type of farm in Europe during the second half of the 19th century [H. P.
Binswanger, M. Elgin, 1998, 319, P. Gunst, 1998, 25, G. Grantham, 1989, 14, F. Ellis, 1996,
218–220], was systematically obstructed.
Instead, an unstable and inefficient dual structure emerged, characterised by large estates on
the one hand, and a mass of small part-time holdings on the other. The manifold measures that
the large landowners used to conserve the large estate system that resulted from the strict
control of the state - measures such as massive credit subsidies, expanding mortmain
holdings, and above all a protective grain tariff policy after 1878 - were rather effective [M.
Szuhay, 1998, 99–101, 103, J. Komlos, 1983, 149, 205, S. M. Eddie, 1967, 296–299, 1989b,
824–844, P. Gunst, 1981, 398–402]. Despite an overwhelming peasant demand for land – the
legendary ‘land hunger’ – the effective market supply of land was severely restricted and
extremely uneven land distribution did not change significantly.
Even if large estates introduced the first crop rotation farming to enhance their grain
production [M. Szuhay, 1998, 108] the intensification of farming after 1870 was strongly
based on export-oriented peasant agriculture. The enormous qualitative improvements in
animal husbandry and its significant expansion to meet a growing demand on urban-industrial
export markets, as well as the boost of fruit and vegetable cultivation, was mostly carried out
by peasants. Peasants were much more able to diversify their production and to adjust to the
increasing demand for high value-added animal and horticulture products, both of which
showed a greater income elasticity of demand compared to cereals [S. M. Eddie, 1968, 220–
221, P. Gunst, 1981, 401, M. Szuhay, 1998, 113–118]. Production and exports of the abovementioned “peasant products” increased much faster between 1880–1910 than grain and even
flour [J. Puskás, 1982, 122–123, S. M. Eddie, 1968, 203, 207, J. Komlos, 1983, 256–264].
11
Additionally, intensive grain farming was widely adopted by peasants as well [J. Puskás,
1982, 128].
All available evidence not only supports the existence, but even the sharpening, of a
pronounced inverse relationship between farm size and factor intensity, as well as
productivity (physical output and income per hectare) [S. M. Eddie, 1968, 218, S. M. Eddie,
1989a, 247, for 1929–1941: P. Gunst, 1998, 216–223, J. HELD, 1980, 312–313]. It seems very
likely that, fully in line with results of modern development economics, large Hungarian
landowners under-utilised the total land area at their disposal compared to small farms
because of the much lower implicit price of land for larger than for smaller farms [F. Ellis,
1996, 209]. In addition, according to modern experience, land reforms enhance agricultural
growth only when they support the substitution of compulsory and wage labour, which are
connected with extremely high transaction costs, by much more efficient family labour (H.
Binswanger et al., 1995, 2687). Following this argumentation, Hungarian agricultural growth
and its capability to absorb labour was very likely hampered in the long run by the fact that
serf emancipation transformed serf labour mainly into inefficient wage labour, and that
heavily distorted land markets prevented the transfer of land to the more efficient peasant
producers. The structural weakness of Hungarian agriculture was concealed during the
agricultural boom, but fully manifested itself in the post-1890 crisis.
The outstanding dynamics of Hungarian agriculture slowly diminished after 1885. Instead,
after 1895/1900 agriculture “became a major drag on economic growth, effectively preventing
a return to the high growth rates of expansion prevalent during the 1870s and 1880s” [M.-S.
Schulze, 2000, 327, table 2]. Until around 1895, Hungary’s export-dependent “grain
economy” could compensate for its shrinking share on international markets by increasing its
agricultural exports to the Austrian portion of the customs union. After 1895, even growing
animal exports could not offset the “grain decline” [S. M. Eddie, 1977, 350, 335, 349, J.
Puskás, 1965, 218–223]. To sum up, agricultural growth significantly slowed after 1890/95,
since for the first time shrinking international exports coincided with a stagnating domestic
market. Yield and total crop output increases slowed significantly after 1885/1890 [J. Puskás,
1982, 110]. The downward slide of the Hungarian grain economy dragged the whole
agricultural sector with it. It must be asked why Hungarian agriculture could not overcome its
grain dependency by diversifying much more of its production and finding new markets.
The main reason seems to be that the large estate owners persisted in their dependence on
cereal grains [S. M. Eddie, 1968, 221]. Whereas after 1880, Hungarian peasants reacted to the
12
Table 2. Annual Agricultural Growth 1850–1980
Period
Grain
Period
Gross Agricultural Output
Kingdom of Hungary
1.4%1)
1870–1912
2.08%2)
1869/70–1881/83 3.6%1)
1871–1895
2.41%2)
1881/83–1911/13 1.4%1)
1895–1912
1.59%2)
1850–1868/70
Hungary after the Trianon Peace Treaty
1924–1938
0.5%3)
1950–1980
2.4%4)
1950–1965
1.6%4)
1965–1980
3.3%4)
Notes: 1) J. KOMLOS, 1983, 59 (1913 prices), 2) M.-S. SCHULZE,
2000, 319 (1913 prices), 3) P. GUNST, 1981, 70 (rough estimation
based on output volumes supported by B.R. MITCHELL, 2003, 283–284, 350),
4) P. ROMÁNY, 1998, 360 (own calculation based on a production index
at comparative prices).
grain invasion and promising urban-industrial markets in Austria by strongly expanding
intensive livestock breeding and commercial horticulture, and by significantly improving
product quality to meet international standards [M. Szuhay, 1998, 113–118], large estate
owners strictly resisted diversification and stuck to grain. As flour exports began to stagnate
after 1895 and grain prices on the world market induced further decline within the Empire, the
large estate owners preferred to use their political power to enforce, after a deep political
crisis, prohibitive grain tariffs in 1906, thus isolating the large Habsburg Empire from the
world market.
This political victory saved the endangered grain-dependent large estate system [P. Gunst,
1981, 397–402, S. M. Eddie, 1967, 308] and as a result of this protective tariff policy, the
severe social tensions in rural areas were reduced. At the end of the 1880s, the lessening
infrastructural and agricultural boom led to a strongly growing labour surplus in rural areas,
which could not be absorbed by the dynamic but smaller industrial sector. In addition, grain
producers reacted to cost pressures by cutting wages and other labour-saving measures. The
coincidence of shrinking agrarian and non-agrarian demand for unskilled labour in the face of
13
an expanding rural population caused political radicalisation in the agrarian population. Thus,
severe social unrest increasingly resembled a pre-revolutionary situation during the 1890s [P.
Gunst, 1998, 140–165, B.K. Kiraly, 1980, S. M. Eddie, 1967, 306–309]. After 1906, due to
rising grain prices within the Empire, agricultural wages and employment stabilised, if not
increased and social tensions lessened significantly. But a real solution of the severe structural
problems in Hungarian agriculture would be postponed.
Only an increased capability of the agricultural sector to absorb the expanding rural
population could have overcome the agrarian crisis. As in many modern, less-developed
countries, an expanding market-oriented peasant sector would have improved the situation.
Because large estates were nearly completely unable to compete with family farms in careintensive branches of agricultural production such as dairy farming, a market-oriented
diversification of the entire Hungarian agriculture sector as a result of more open markets
would have inevitably led to significantly smaller production units. Bearing in mind the
highly critical economic situation of many large estates without prohibitive grain tariffs,
peasants would have significantly enhanced the share of land under their control [P. Gunst,
1981, 399–402]. The latifundia system would very likely have been replaced by a more stable
and competitive diversified peasant farm structure resembling contemporary Western
European conditions. Even with stagnating agricultural prices, labour-intensive Boserupian
growth could have been realised, very likely, at distinctly higher rates if the dual structure of
Hungarian agriculture would have disappeared under the pressure of more open markets.
3. A period of crisis: agricultural development from 1919–1938
After tremendous war damage, Hungary’s agricultural recovery lasted until 1928/29. During
the agricultural crisis of 1928/29–1933/34, output diminished by only one–tenth, but
agricultural prices nearly halved [J. HELD, 1980, 214, P. GUNST, 1981, 407, 412, B.R.
MITCHELL, 2003, 283–284, 350]. After 1933/34 which saw a slight recovery in agricultural
prices, production and agricultural exports again started to increase slowly, but hardly reached
pre-war levels. All in all, from 1924–1938, Hungary’s export-led agricultural growth nearly
came to a halt, measuring only roughly 0.5% p.a. [production in terms of volume, P. GUNST,
1969, 70]. As a result Hungary belonged to the most slowly developing countries during the
inter-war period [I.T. BEREND, G. RÁNKI, 1985, 289].
The loss of the large Austria-Hungarian market is the prime cause for the lasting stagnation of
Hungarian agriculture and economy during the interwar-period [D.H ALDCROFT, S.
14
MOREWOOD, 1995, 46–52, P. GUNST, 1981, 1974, 130, M. SZUHAY, 1998, 177–178, A.
TEICHOVA, 1989, 889–890]. When the Habsburg Empire collapsed in 1918, the AustrianHungarian Customs Union area was divided unto eight states, and in 1920, the Trianon Peace
Treaty reduced Hungary to one-third of its previous territory, and roughly 40% of its former
population [I. ROMSICS, 1999, 117–125, F.
VON
FELLNER, 1923]. The disruption of intense
regional agricultural trade within Central Europe strongly hit Hungary. During the interwarperiod, crisis-ridden international markets could not compensate for shrinking regional trade.
One reason for this was that all successor states, as well as other European countries,
implemented more and more protectionist agricultural policies. Without the Customs Union,
the development of Hungary’s important flour milling industry was seriously hampered.
Whereas before 1914, semi-manufactured and finished food products played an important role
in Hungary’s exports, unprocessed agricultural commodities replaced them after 1918 [P.
GUNST, 1981, 409, 1969, 4–5, A. TEICHOVA, 1989, 890]. Thus, the growth-stimulating
linkages between agriculture and industry, which had heavily relied on the Customs Union,
weakened significantly. In contrast to the pre-1914 period, agriculture did not trigger any
more growth impulses in industry. Quite the opposite was true. Concerning capital
accumulation, dept-ridden agriculture acted as a drag on the rest of the economy and not as a
source of capital [D.H ALDCROFT, S. MOREWOOD, 1995, 46–47, 73, J. HELD, 1980, 210–214].
After the demise of the Customs Union, adverse developments on international markets
affected Hungarian agricultural prices without any buffer. The overwhelming dependency on
primary exports, and especially on cereals, left Hungary very exposed to the risks of
international agricultural markets. During the world-wide agricultural overproduction crisis,
[W. MALENBAUM, 1953, 3–11] price transmission from international markets led to a 50% cut
in Hungary’s agricultural prices from 1928–1933, most dramatically for wheat [P. GUNST,
1981, 410–412, M. SZUHAY, 1998, 181].
Farming intensity decreased as prices collapsed. After 1928, the use of purchased inputs such
as mineral fertilisers or machines significantly diminished or virtually stopped [M. SZUHAY,
1998, 187–188, P. GUNST, 1981, 413–414]. Nevertheless, during the Great Depression,
extremely low real wages allowed it to prevent sharp declines in crop production by
substituting labour and land for purchased inputs. The entire sown area increased at the
expense of fallow area, which was nearly halved between 1925/28 and 1928/33; nutrient
supply per acre also strongly dropped as a result of falling livestock numbers. Yields per area
declined slightly from 1928–1934 and reached pre-war levels again only at the end of the
1930s [M. SZUHAY, 1998, 185–186, P. GUNST, 1981, 412–413, 1969, 1974].
15
When mass migration to the United States had come to a halt and Hungary’s industrial
development had slowed down, [P. GUNST, 1998, 225, F. DOVRING, 1965, 101] a continuously
expanding excess supply of rural labour made it possible for large estate owners to respond to
the world market-induced cost pressure, mainly by cutting wages. During the Great
Depression, real agricultural wages declined strongly and reached, in 1931/34, only 40% of
their already low pre-1929-level. Even after four years of recovery, real agricultural wages
were still almost 30% lower in 1938 than before the agricultural crisis, and well below the
levels that prevailed before the First World War [J. HELD, 1980, 226–228, P. GUNST, 1998,
212–224, D.H ALDCROFT, S. MOREWOOD, 1995, 72]. Thus, no economic incentive for
mechanisation existed even on 1,000 ha farms, and Hungarian agriculture remained preindustrial.
To sum up, due to radically changing relative factor costs in favour of labour, and under the
conditions of imperfect agricultural credit markets, the aggravated cost pressure on Hungarian
agriculture did not lead to modernisation. Instead, quite the opposite occurred. The relatively
expensive factor of capital was widely substituted by the drastically cheapened factor of
labour. Nonetheless, total labour input decreased in 1911/15 compared to 1931/35 due to
shrinking output [F. DOVRING, 1965, 101].
Against the upward European trend and in stark contrast to the less-developed Mediterranean
and strongly intensifying Balkan countries, the intensity of Hungarian farming stagnated, if
not slightly diminished from 1910–1939 [F. DOVRING, 1965, 90–112]. The Hungarian farm
structure likely aggravated the labour-reducing effects of the agricultural crisis, whereas small
family farms in the Balkans functioned much more as a social buffer as opportunity costs of
labour outside agriculture fell to zero. This phenomenon is well-known from modern Central
and Eastern Europe during the transition crisis.
Agriculture’s severe structural deficiencies, mainly the latifundia system, were concentrated
in Trianon-Hungary, whereas the peasant-dominated areas were assigned to the neighbourstates. The importance of extensive, pre-industrial grain farming on, even by English
standards, very large farms of 500–1000 ha was much greater than before 1914 [D.
WARRINER, 1964, 107, M. SZUHAY, 1998, 178]. Despite an expanding labour surplus - a
necessary precondition for running large, wage estates - the inefficient and inflexible
Hungarian latifundia system could only survive because the landed aristocracy further
controlled state and society. The main purpose of agricultural policy was to preserve the
latifundia system at all costs by implementing only very moderate land reform and by
16
perpetuating the entailed property. Although export-dependent large grain estates faced the
most pressure from international markets, land distribution did not change in Hungary [D.H
ALDCROFT, S. MOREWOOD, 1995, 17–20, M. SZUHAY, 1998, 178, P. GUNST, 1998, 199–200,
A. TEICHOVA, 1989, 897–904]. During the Great Depression, the grain producing large estate
sector nearly exclusively benefited from newly-introduced governmental measures (public
procurement, price interventions, export promotion). In addition, the taxation of large estates
was relieved. Virtually no measures were undertaken to support the peasant sector which was
also strongly market-oriented and whose market quota amounted to around 60% [J. HELD,
1980, 227, 232, 295–307, M. SZUHAY, 1998, 182–185, P. GUNST 1981, 412, 415].
Agriculture started to recover in 1934 when Hungary became more and more part of the
economic and geo-political sphere of war-preparing Germany, which wanted to tie Central
and Southeast Europe to itself and thereby secure its supply with agricultural goods and raw
materials for the planned war [J. HELD, 1980, 227–233, M. SZUHAY, 1998, 184–185]. A
system of bilateral or even multilateral trade agreements opened new export markets for
Hungarian agriculture under very favourable conditions. Generous export quotas and higher
purchase prices, subsidised by Germany, were guaranteed. Governmental trade agencies more
and more monopolised agricultural export trade. In Hungary, the government assigned the
organisation of the booming state trade to the large estate owners’ associations. Thus, nearly
exclusively, the large estate sector benefited from these effective market interventions, which
led to a stabilisation of prices and a recovery of export incomes after 1934 [P. GUNST, 1969,
4–5, 1981, 410]. However, only in 1940 was the pre-depression-level of agricultural output
again reached as Hungary supplied the axis armies.
During the interwar-period, structural transformation nearly came to a halt and the agrarian
population fell from around 55% to 50%, while absolute numbers slightly increased [P.
GUNST, 1998, 201–204]. At around 33%, agriculture’s share of GDP oscillated in TrianonHungary, the most industrialised part of the former Hungarian Kingdom, and industry’s share
stayed constant despite efforts to foster industrialisation by a mainly tariff-based importsubstitution-policy, which favoured the industrial at the expense of the agricultural sector. In
spite of the stronger industrial base of Trianon-Hungary and the deteriorating terms of trade
for agriculture, exports continued to be dominated by agricultural commodities, with a share
of 67% for 1935/38 [P. GUNST, 1980, 407–408]. Even if adverse international developments
created extremely unfavourable conditions for agricultural and economic growth, radical land
reform in favour of the peasants would have alleviated, for most groups of the agrarian
population, the catastrophic effects of both the Customs Union’s dissolution and the Great
17
Depression. Furthermore, it would have significantly reduced the grain-dependency of the
Hungarian “wheat-economy”. Indeed, a more diversified agricultural production and structure
would have created more scope for growth and flexible adjustments to the great agricultural
crisis.
4. The primacy of politics: agricultural development from 1945–1975
Agricultural growth from 1948–1975 was strongly influenced by political struggle between
the more moderate and dogmatic wings within the ruling communist party [Z. VARGA, 2004,
S. SZAKÁCS, 1998, D.H ALDCROFT, S. MOREWOOD, 1995, 110–124, J. SOKOLOVSKY, 1990,
87–150, I. VOLGYES, 1980]. Until the 1960s, hardliners believed that the only way to rapidly
modernise backward Hungary was to accomplish a soviet-style collectivisation at any costs
and to drain as many resources as possible out of agriculture and into heavy industry. Later
on, they insisted in the supremacy of heavy industry over all other economic activities. The
moderate wing refused a purely Stalinist development policy and wanted to first improve the
catastrophic supply situation by ceasing the “war against the peasants” which had started with
collectivisation, and to reanimate the agriculture and consumer industries with more
individual incentives and not through administrative coercion or total control. After crushing
the Hungarian revolution in 1956, the communist party tried to stabilise its regime by
reconciling the party and the overall population without fundamentally changing the system.
The result was the Hungarian “consumer socialism”, which consciously integrated market
elements into a centrally-planned economy and was unique in the Soviet orbit.
During phases of enforced collectivation (1950/53, 1955, 1958/61) and after its
accomplishment, agricultural production slowed dramatically 1961/65 [P. ROMÁNY, 1998,
360]. The mass exodus of young workers away from rural areas and the total negligence of
agricultural investments led to supply shortages in agricultural commodities. Hungary
became, for the first time, a net grain importer and was not able to feed itself. Whereas the
majority of the Eastern Bloc states tried to solve their agricultural problems by reorganising
the state and party apparatus to make central planning more efficient, Hungary started to
rigorously reshape the cooperatives; they were not abolished to avoid conflicts with the
Soviets, but after the economic reforms of 1963–1968, they resembled autonomous
enterprises much more than in any other state in the Soviet orbit [Z. VARGA, 251–263].
In addition to much more independent farm management, the reforms, which culminated in
1968 with the introduction of the “New Economic Mechanism”, included a significant rise of
18
procurement prices, a remission of farm debts and the introduction of a free input market.
Although five-year plans continued to be made, they were no longer broken down to company
level. Indirect economic regulators (taxes, credits, non-repayable subsidies, etc.) replaced
direct command. Publicly-funded farm investments soared and rural infrastructure
significantly extended. The results were impressive; Hungary experienced an agricultural
boom from ca. 1965–1980, rural incomes improved significantly, industrial agriculture was
fully established and agricultural products again played an important role for Hungarian
exports [Z. VARGA, 265–273]. Still, around 1970 agriculture produced nearly 20% of
Hungarian GDP and employed ca. 25% of the labour force (table 1).
Nevertheless, limited market reforms within the socialist system could only stabilize the
economy in the short run, and the economic decline during the 1980s included agriculture.
Despite limited market elements, the absence of a real market pricing system, a lacking pricebased mechanism to allocate investments, the strong preference for present consumption, and
the existence of only soft budget restraints preventing the failure of inefficient cooperative
farms all culminated in a deep crisis of agriculture which fully unfolded as Hungary became
an open economy again during the transition period.
5. Conclusions
In the European context, Hungary’s agricultural growth from 1870/75–1970/75 followed a
unique pattern characterised by a long-lasting period of stagnation from 1890/00–1961/65.
Hungarian crop (especially wheat) yields remained constant over these seven decades as well
[P. GUNST, 1974, 128, 132]. Thus, most structural transformation took place under the
conditions of sluggish agricultural growth, which formed a major drag on economic growth.
The maintenance of an inefficient dual agricultural structure by a powerful, landed aristocracy
and their strict adherence to grain cultivation, even as its competitiveness severely
deteriorated, seemed to be the prime cause for the exceptionally long stagnation period. After
1945, the communists abolished the large estate system and replaced it with the even more
inefficient Soviet-style large farming. Only after 1965 did market-oriented economic reforms
and strongly increasing economies of scale, as a result of a quickly “industrialising”
agriculture, cease the stagnation period that had started at the end of the 19th century.
In addition, Hungary from 1880–1940 seems to prove an important finding of modern
development economics, namely, that no self-induced equilibrium process existed between
rural population growth, agricultural labour demand and output expansion. Disequilibria,
19
which are responsible for an increasing gap between rural population expansion or agrarian
labour supply and lagging labour demand, are often caused by a dual farm structure with
dominating large estates [M. Lipton, 1990]. In Hungary, the premature release of labour from
agriculture in 1885/90 did not accelerate industrialisation. Instead, it only further swelled a
rural “labour surplus economy” and caused nothing but poverty. This situation mirrors
England’s experience during the rise of large-scale farming in the 18th century [R.C. Allen,
1992, 262]. Modern development economics delivers a thorough and empirically wellfounded explanation for the enduring existence of rather inefficient and non-competitive
large-scale farming in many less-developed countries. Its increased application on the
Hungarian case would significantly deepen our understanding of its crisis-ridden historical
agricultural development.
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A1. Agricultural land in the territory of present-day Hungary, 1853–1999* (in 1,000 ha)
Year
Arable
land
Pasture
And Agricultural
Horticul- Vineyard
land
meadow
tural land
1853
1867
1883
1895
1913
1915
1918
1921
1923
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1945
3,452.8
3,758.9
4,849.4
5,103.0
5,577.6
5,506.4
5,514,7
5,578.2
5,599.4
5,590.3
5,588.4
5,588.6
5,586.2
5,589.3
5,586.7
5,588.2
5,589.0
5,593.3
5,595.7
5,601.1
5,611.4
5,613.9
5,618.1
5,611.5
5,616.9
5,567.1
80.6
86.3
89.2
95.0
97.5
95.8
96.1
99.4
99.4
102.2
102.6
104.0
106.0
107.2
107.0
108.4
108.9
110.3
112.4
113.9
116.5
117.8
119.6
119.6
119.6
115.1
201.4
202.6
216.9
175.0
214.7
215.8
216.4
218.2
218.0
215.9
215.2
214.5
215.8
215.3
214.2
212.4
211.9
210.4
207.8
206.8
207.2
208.1
208.3
209.6
211.7
215.4
2,681.6
2,732.3
2,173.0
2,065.7
1,682.9
1,670.3
1,672.8
1,678.3
1,677.0
1,681.0
1,680.1
1,678.4
1,677.1
1,670.4
1,668.6
1,668.5
1,665.6
1,661.5
1,655.7
1,644.4
1,631.1
1,622.3
1,610.7
1,603.1
1,604.5
1,600.7
6,416.4
6,780.1
7,328.5
7,438.7
7,572.7
7,488.3
7,500.0
7,574.1
7,593.8
7,589.4
7,586.3
7,585.5
7,585.1
7,582.2
7,576.5
7,577.5
7,575.4
7,575.5
7,571.6
7,566.2
7,566.2
7,562.1
7,556.7
7,543.8
7,552.7
7,498.3
1950
1951
1955
1960
1965
1970
1980
1990
1999
5,518.1
5,518.7
5,402.9
5,309.8
5,084.5
5,046.2
4,734.7
4,712.8
4,708.0
152.5
145.6
169.8
189.8
318.6
317.9
429.8
436.2
204.1
230.2
228.5
201.4
203.6
246.6
229.7
167.8
138.5
127.0
1,474.7
1,455.3
1,471.4
1,437.9
1,303.9
1,281.3
1,294.2
1,185.6
1,147.2
7,375.5
7,348.1
7,245.5
7,141.1
6,953.6
6,875.1
6,626.5
6,473.1
6,186.3
Notes: HUNGARIAN CENTRAL STATISTICAL OFFICE (2000),
Hungarian Agriculture 1851–2000, Budapest 2000 (CD-ROM).
*Area of present-day Hungary (in 1,000 ha): 9,303.0.
A2. Index of Hungarian agricultural production, 1870–1915 (Hungarian Kingdom without
Croatia)
Grains
All Crops
Grains
All Crops
ProductionYear
Index
ProductionYear
Productionindex
1913=100
index
index
1913=100
1913=100
1913=100
(Gross Output)
1870
36.1
45.7
1893
72.8
93.4
1871
32.1
36.4
1894
64.6
78.3
1872
31.4
36.6
1895
79.8
91.5
1873
31.6
36.0
1896
73.0
88.0
1874
30.2
38.1
1897
60.6
56.4
1875
33.9
38.5
1898
68.8
74.4
1876
30.2
39.3
1899
75.7
82.8
1877
39.3
47.6
1900
76.1
80.8
1878
56.8
71.1
1901
71.6
75.4
1879
34.4
38.5
1902
80.5
89.6
1880
46.7
59.3
1903
84.4
92.1
1881
54.6
57.5
1904
59.3
68.7
1882
64.5
80.4
1905
78.1
84.1
1883
57.2
59.2
1906
95.9
107.5
1884
60.3
65.1
1907
78.7
81.4
1885
60.6
71.2
1908
78.9
87.5
1886
54.9
61.2
1909
81.5
84.0
1887
64.7
78.8
1910
94.2
99.0
1888
64.9
75.1
1911
89.1
94.3
1889
56.9
59.0
1912
100.8
101.8
1890
66.9
79.8
1913
100.0
100.0
1891
70.9
83.4
1914
84.7
80.8
1892
68.2
81.8
1915
89.3
89.8
Notes: J. KOMLOS, 1983, 260–261. According to FELLNER (1916, 24, 31), the value added in
the agricultural sector corresponds very closely with the production of all crops or gross
output in columns 2 and 5 [J. KOMLOS, 1983, 257].
A3. Crop production in the territory of present-day Hungary, 1921–1999 (in 1000 tons)
Year
Main
cerelas1)
Main
fodder
crops
1921
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1945
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1980
1990
1999
3,613
4,396
5,936
5,696
5,240
5,855
5,726
5,286
4,713
5,991
6,587
5,285
5,241
6,617
6,168
7,189
6,609
3,446
5,431
6,884
4,114
6,266
5,428
6,558
5,193
6,904
5,617
7,259
6,815
6,071
6,691
6,321
6,778
7,370
7,464
7,771
8,326
9,555
7,496
13,774
12,164
11,051
4,158
5,410
5,830
6,084
5,529
4,384
4,347
3,881
3,654
4,439
4,678
4,478
3,280
5,094
5,182
5,586
5,372
3,412
3,616
3,871
2,517
3,388
3,909
4,220
4,031
4,764
4,208
5,621
6,118
4,841
5,849
6,590
6,209
6,457
7,305
6,066
6,365
7,922
6,659
9,080
7,225
5,426
Sugar
beets
543
1,274
1,527
1,445
1,455
1,438
1,607
1,461
966
849
944
922
769
1,124
1,013
969
918
177
1,640
2,712
1,307
2,523
1,924
2,241
1,948
1,878
2,070
2,679
3,370
2,356
2,653
3,434
3,554
3,452
3,570
3,356
3,471
3,301
2,174
3,927
4,741
2,934
Potatoes
Fresh
vegetabels
1,249
1,535
2,310
1,875
2,005
1,471
2,168
1,841
1,447
1,557
1,856
2,119
1,393
2,451
2,559
2,141
2,026
1,691
1,350
2,052
1,170
1,901
1,991
2,467
2,055
2,707
2,600
2,366
2,656
1,630
1,882
2,026
1,650
1,485
2,433
1,507
1,335
1,590
1,430
941
746
1,199
295
223
309
251
290
263
357
301
379
476
378
388
249
468
449
500
477
292
362
787
398
749
681
790
607
891
607
702
632
557
686
969
830
790
980
1,070
968
1,017
820
1,119
910
922
Total Crop
Production2)
10,400
13,075
16,457
15,595
14,841
13,902
14,637
13,438
11,809
13,932
14,979
13,689
11,461
16,574
16,204
17,051
16,183
9,721
13,412
17,388
10,274
15,653
14,621
17,251
14,609
18,006
16,279
19,582
20,372
16,389
18,694
20,497
20,347
20,393
22,745
20,989
21,609
24,761
19,719
30,538
27,817
23,434
Crop
production
index
(1925=100)3)
63.2
79.4
100.0
94.8
90.2
84.5
88.9
81.7
71.8
84.7
91.0
83.2
69.6
100.7
98.5
103.6
98.3
59.1
81.5
105.7
62.4
95.1
88.8
104.8
88.8
109.4
98.9
119.0
123.8
99.6
113.6
124.5
123.6
123.9
138.2
127.5
131.3
150.5
119.8
185.6
169.0
142.4
Notes: HUNGARIAN CENTRAL STATISTICAL OFFICE (2000), Hungarian Agriculture 1851–2000,
Budapest 2000 (CD-ROM), 1) wheat, maize, barley, rye, oats, 2) colums 2–5 plus dried
pulses, grapes, oil seeds, soy beans, hemp, flax and tobacco, 3) 1925 roughly meets average
crop production around 1913 [J. HELD, 1980, 214].
A4. Animal production in the territory of present-day Hungary, 1857–1998 (in 1,000 tons)
Year
1857
1895
1928
1938
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1985
1988
1989
1990
1994
1995
1998
Milk
(mio.
Litres)
335,0
610,0
1590,0
1585,8
1466,9
1464,7
1470,8
1442,1
1387,2
1475,6
1538,3
1530,1
1787,0
1953,1
1989,6
1959,8
1908,4
1819,8
1823,1
1882,8
1781,4
1872,5
1997,2
1959,1
1916,2
1895,7
1826,6
1822,2
1960,9
2021,6
1973,6
2077,9
2134,8
2266,0
2383,0
2540,0
2631,0
2787,0
2779,0
2763,0
1878,2
1919,6
2045,2
MilkEggMeatEggs
Meat
production- production- production(mio. (1000 tons)
index
index
Index
pieces)
(1938=100) (1938=100) (1938=100)
--777
892,2
994,1
1029,3
1013,8
1116
690,4
1039,9
1350,1
1566,3
1615,7
1742,2
1886,7
1881,5
1932,1
1875,9
1924,5
2251,8
2427,8
2464,5
2745,1
2821,8
2745,6
3327,2
3506,2
3256,4
3325,7
3666,6
4047,2
4041
4588,3
4748
4721
4437,7
4228,2
4584,7
4576
4679,1
3877
3466,5
3387,7
---438,1
-597,4
502,9
595,6
431,3
546,7
633,8
699,5
658,9
722,7
818,1
781,9
812,6
830,7
839,7
392,1
411,7
419,5
415,3
458,8
432,1
479,5
559,5
592
549,2
625
633,4
608,9
665
683
689,2
732,6
820,7
890,1
850,6
852,5
586,2
617,4
1082,1
21,1
38,5
100,3
100,0
92,5
92,4
92,7
90,9
87,5
93,1
97,0
96,5
112,7
123,2
125,5
123,6
120,3
114,8
115,0
118,7
112,3
118,1
125,9
123,5
120,8
119,5
115,2
114,9
123,7
127,5
124,5
131,0
134,6
142,9
150,3
160,2
165,9
175,7
175,2
174,2
118,4
121,0
129,0
---
---
87,1
100,0
111,4
115,4
113,6
125,1
77,4
116,6
151,3
175,6
181,1
195,3
211,5
210,9
216,6
210,3
215,7
252,4
272,1
276,2
307,7
316,3
307,7
372,9
393,0
365,0
372,8
411,0
453,6
452,9
514,3
532,2
529,1
497,4
473,9
513,9
512,9
524,4
434,5
388,5
379,7
100.0
0.0
136.4
114.8
136.0
98.4
124.8
144.7
159.7
150.4
165.0
186.7
178.5
185.5
189.6
191.7
89.5
94.0
95.8
94.8
104.7
98.6
109.4
127.7
135.1
125.4
142.7
144.6
139.0
151.8
155.9
157.3
167.2
187.3
203.2
194.2
194.6
133.8
140.9
247.0
Notes: HUNGARIAN CENTRAL STATISTICAL OFFICE (2000), Hungarian Agriculture 1851–2000,
Budapest 2000 (CD-ROM), own calculation of the indices.
A5. Agricultural labour force for the territory of present day Hungary, 1900–1999*
(in 1,000 heads)
Year
Hungary's
population
Economically
active
population
1900
1910
1920
1930
1941
6,854
7,612
7,987
8,685
9,316
2,901.3
3,144.0
3,652.5
3,822.1
4,297.4
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1975b/
c/
1975
1980
1990
1992
1993d/
1999
9,205
9,293
9,383
9,463
9,545
9,645
9,767
9,883
9,829
9,850
9,913
9,961
10,007
10,052
10,074
10,108
10,140
10,166
10,203
10,244
10,284
10,322
10,501
10,501
10,709
10,375
10,337
10,310
10,092
3,969.6
4,106.8
4,254.2
4,306.4
4,349.0
4,400.0
4,470.0
4,563.0
4,520.0
4,582.0
4,652.0
4,735.0
4,626.1
4,543.6
4,569.3
4,634.7
4,649.2
4,665.6
4,710.2
4,767.3
4,887.1
4,980.2
5,085.5
5,085.5
5,073.6
4,652.1
4,162.2
3,866.9
3,690.2
population
involved in
agriculture
and
forestry
1,734.9
1,685.3
2,128.0
2,030.8
2,165.0
2,190.9
2,134.7
2,111.6
2,053.4
1,934.0
1,910.0
1,952.4
1,990.1
2,031.9
2,006.0
1,976.0
1,842.6
1,661.3
1,533.5
1,468.7
1,423.3
1,382.1
1,348.3
1,344.1
1,340.1
1,325.0
1,313.3
1,156.8
1,150.0
1,115.6
938.0
588.9
391.9
294.1
population
involved in
forestry
only
-----32.6
42.2
29.7
38.2
40.6
43.7
43.6
45.1
40.5
47.8
52.0
47.7
64.9
56.7
53.6
62.1
59.2
59.6
57.0
56.6
49.1
60.1
49.5
49.5
50.0
50.0
59.5
32.1
13.9
share of
agriculture
and
forestry
(in %)
59.8
53.6
58.3
53.1
50.4
55.2
52.0
49.6
47.7
44.5
43.4
43.7
43.6
45.0
43.8
42.5
38.9
35.9
33.8
32.1
30.7
29.7
28.9
28.5
28.1
27.1
26.4
22.7
22.6
22.0
20.2
15.6
10.1
8.0
Notes: HUNGARIAN CENTRAL STATISTICAL OFFICE (2000), Hungarian Agriculture
1851–2000, Budapest 2000 (CD-ROM).
b) According to the branch classification effective until 1975.
c) According to the branch classification effective from 1976.
d) According to the branch classification effective from 1993.