TRANSPARENCY
INTERNATIONAL
UGANDA
Mining Act of Uganda 2003; Proposed Amendments
Developed by a Civil Society Working Group1
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
Mining Act of Uganda 2003; Proposed Amendments
Developed by a Civil Society Working Group1
This submission was developed by a civil society working group led by Transparency International Uganda including
organisations whose logos are displayed above. The submission was developed in part based on generous pro-bono legal
analysis provided by the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment.
1
3
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
4
Civil Society Submission
Section
Section 2
Section 2
Section 2
May 2016
Title
Original
Proposed Change
GOVE RNANCE , RE GULATION AND INSTITUTIONAL STRE NGTHE NING
Interpretation
“Artisanal mining operations” is Define “artisanal mining operations” by
not defined.
providing identifiers and a distinguishing
threshold between artisanal mining
operations (below threshold) and small- scale
mining operations (above threshold.)
Interpretation
Interpretation
“Environmental impact
assessment has the meaning
assigned to it under the National
Environment Statute, 1995
(Statute No. 4 of 1995);”
“Small-scale operations’ means
prospecting or mining
operations, which does not
involve expenditure in excess of
Redefine “environmental impact
assessment” according to the definition in
the new National Environment Bill, when it
is passed into law.
Throughout the act, revise reference to
National Environment Bill, which when
passed into law will significantly affect
environmental provisions of this Act.
Define “small- scale mining operations” in
relation to thresholds distinguishing smallscale mining operations from artisanal
Justification
The mining sector
encompasses a diverse set of
activities that must be
categorized appropriately and
distinguished from one other
so that they are each treated
separately under the law. The
law should identify and
introduce specific regulatory
frameworks for (1) artisanal
mining operations (2) smallscale mining operations, (3)
large- scale or industrial mining
operations.2
The National Environment Act
referenced is currently being
revised; the new mining law
should reference the most
recent version of the Act once
it is finalized.
In order to clearly define the
different types of mining
operations and distinguish
them from one another, certain
For examples of definitions for “artisanal”, “small-scale”, and “large-scale” mining operations, see the Sierra Leone Mines and Minerals Act, 2009 available
from: http://www.parliament.gov.zm/sites/default/files/documents/acts/The%20Mines%20and%20Minerals%20Act,%202015.pdf. This act also provides
separate sections guiding the regulation of holders of artisanal mining licences, small-scale mining licences, and large-scale mining licences separately. An
alternative example of this type of division can be found in Divisions 2 and 3 of the Zambia Mines and Minerals Development Act, 2015 where separate
provisions are made for artisanal, small-scale exploration, small-scale mining, large-scale exploration, and large-scale mining licences. Available from:
http://www.sierra-leone.org/Laws/2009-12.pdf
2
2
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
five hundred currency points or
the use of specialized
technology.”
“Large- scale mining operations”
is not defined.
mining operations (below threshold) and
large- scale mining operations (above).
Section 2
Interpretation
General
Compliance with
environmental
principles
There is no preliminary section
outlining adherence to social
and environmental principles.
Section 3
Ownership of
minerals
Citizens’ interests are not
adequately represented in the
explanation of mineral
ownership in accordance with
Article 244 of the Constitution
(1995).
Amend as follows:
Acquisition of a
mineral right
The fines for undertaking
unlawful mining activity shall
not exceed twenty- five currency
points in the case of an
Throughout the act, make all penalties for
non- compliance more severe so as to
effectively deter unlawful behaviour.
Section 4(3)
Define “large- scale mining operations” in
relation to small- scale mining operations by
placing a threshold between the two
categories and describing identifying
characteristics of large- scale mining
operations.
Insert a preliminary section between sections
2 and 3 that outlines overarching
environmental and social principles to be
followed in all aspects of the act similar to
Section 3 “Compliance with environmental
principles” of the Petroleum (Exploration
Development and Production) Act 2013.
“Subject to any right granted to any person under
this A ct, the entire property in and control of all
minerals in, on or under, any land or waters in
Uganda are and shall be vested in the Government
on behalf of the Republic of Uganda,
notwithstanding any right of ownership of or by any
person in relation to any land in, on or under which
any such minerals are found.”
identifiers and thresholds
between the three categories
should be provided.
Same as above.
5
Section 3 of the Petroleum
(EDP) Act establishes the
importance of compliance with
environmental principles. The
Mining Act should improve
upon Section 3 of the
Upstream Act by establishing
the foremost importance of
compliance with environmental
and social principles in all mineral
activities.
Article 244 of the Constitution
(1995) vests ownership of
minerals in the Republic of
Uganda and stipulates that
mineral rights shall be vested in
the government to manage the
resource on behalf of citizens.
This is an important
distinction. Without this
change, this section is in
contravention with the
Constitution.
The current penalties for
offenses throughout the act are
not strong enough and do not
provide necessary deterrence.
3
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
6
Civil Society Submission
Section 4(4)(b)
Section 4(5)
Acquisition of a
mineral right
Acquisition of a
mineral right
May 2016
individual and fifty currency
points in the case of a body
corporate.
Specifically, penalties should be made more
severe in Sections; 4(3), 15, 17, 32, 59, 88,
94, 107, 111, 115, 116, 117 and 120. Special
attention should be given to Part XIProtection of the Environment. The
penalties in this section are especially
minimal and will not serve to deter
important and potentially irreversible
offences.
Where a person is convicted of
an offense and the court orders
the forfeiture of minerals
unlawfully obtained or their
value, “any minerals or their
value so forfeited shall become
the property of the Government
and shall be disposed of as the
Commissioner may direct.”
Clearly outline protocols for the disposal of
minerals seized in such court proceedings in
the Regulations to the Act.
“Notwithstanding the
provisions of subsection (2) of
this section, the Commissioner
may authorize any person to
undertake exploration or
prospecting operations without
a mineral right in the course of
scientific investigations into the
geological or mineral resources
of Uganda, subject to such
Change to, “[… ] the Commissioner may,
with approval from the Uganda
National Council for Science and
Technology authorize any person to
undertake exploration or prospecting
operations without a mineral right [… ]”
Also insert text so that the disposal of
minerals or their value is in line with Article
244 of the Constitution:
“A ny minerals or their value so forfeited shall
become the property of the Government held on
behalf of the citizens of Uganda and shall
be disposed of to benefit the citizens of
Uganda in a manner… ”
Add to the end of the sub- section, “The
findings of such scientific research shall be made
available to the Geological Survey and Mines
The discretion for the disposal
of seized assets should not be
left with the Commissioner.
Instead, the procedures to be
followed should be explicitly
outlined in the regulations in
the law to prevent potential
corruption or misuse of public
goods. Minerals or their value
disposed of during court
processes are still property of
the Republic of Uganda and
should be treated as such.
The circumstances under which
an individual may undertake
exploration or prospecting
without first obtaining a
mineral right should be strictly
governed and monitored so
that the privilege is not abused.
Therefore, the person seeking
authorization should also seek
approval from the Uganda
4
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
Civil Society Submission
Section 6(3)
Section 6(4)
Section 6
May 2016
conditions as the Commissioner
may determine.”
Department no later than 30 days after the
termination of research.”
Currently, an application for the
approval of the transfer of a
mineral right shall contain
information as may be
prescribed together with
information as the
Commissioner may require.
Amend the section so that where a company
wishes to transfer rights, the new company
must not only meet the requirements of
Section 5 but should also submit details of
their technical and financial standing, work
plans and beneficial ownership as is the case
for new applications.
Transfer of mineral
right
Unclear drafting
As detailed below, the publicly available
cadastre and register should be updated with
the details of the new company that the right
has been transferred to no later than 30 days
after the approval of the transfer.
Amend as follows:
Transfer of mineral
right
Better establish procedural
requirements for approval of a
transfer of mineral rights by the
Commissioner
Transfer of mineral
right
“under joint or common control with, the holder of
the mineral right, and no other provision
under this Act prevents such transferee
from holding the mineral right sought to
be transferred.”
This section should outline a more elaborate
set of procedures to be followed in seeking
authorization from the Ministry for a
transfer of mineral rights or share of such
rights and any relevant restrictions on such
transfer of shares.
National Council for Science
and Technology when such an
authorization is being granted.
Furthermore, a report of the
scientific investigations
undertaken should be
submitted to Government to
ensure that the intended
purpose was achieved.
There are currently insufficient
checks and requirements in
relation to new transferees that
could provide a loophole for
abuse.
The current wording is unclear
and requires further
clarification.
7
While Clauses 15 and 48 of the
regulations mention
applications for consent in the
transfer of shares in an
exploration or mining lease, the
Act does not adequately state
the process for seeking
5
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
8
Civil Society Submission
Section 7(1)
Form and content of
mineral right
May 2016
The power to grant mineral
rights is held exclusively by the
Commissioner.
Section 6(2) should be expanded to include:
“a transfer, cession, assignment, novation,
or other disposal of” a “right or a share or
an interest in that right, or a [direct or
indirect] controlling interest in the
licence holder company.”
authorization and any
restrictions therein.3
The power to grant mineral rights is held
exclusively by the Commissioner with very
little oversight. This discretion must be
checked by introducing an independent
oversight body such as a “Minerals
Authority” tasked with reviewing bids,
approving applications and recommending
actions to the Commissioner in regards to
the granting, renewing, and revoking of
mineral rights as well as other major
decisions as specified in Part II of the Act
on Administration.
Similar to the Petroleum
Authority established under the
Petroleum (EDP) Act, 2013, an
independent body should be
created to oversee the
Commissioner, Inspector of
Mines or other public officers
in the exercise of their duties so
that promotion duties are
separated from monitoring and
enforcement duties.
Regarding mineral rights, the Minerals
Authority should review and approve
Requiring authorization for a
transfer of shares is important
as it is the Ministry’s right to
approve or disapprove of any
individual applying to hold a
mineral right, as is the case with
new applicants. Under this
logic, changes of control in the
licence- holding company
should be treated as an indirect
transfer and subject to the
Commissioner’s approval.
The Commissioner is currently
allowed to make a number of
critical decisions, particularly
For an example of such protocols established, see Section 11 “Transferability and encumbrance of prospecting rights and mining rights,” of South Africa’s
Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 2002, available from:
https://www.capetown.gov.za/en/EnvironmentalResourceManagement/publications/Documents/Minerals-and-Petroleum-Resources-Development-Act-28-of2002.pdf
3
6
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
applications and forward them to the
Minister for licensing based on a prescribed
procedure for the evaluation of bid
information. (See “Procedures for evaluation
of bids” section below)
Amend as follows:
“A mineral right shall be granted by the
Commissioner upon approval of the
application by the Mineral Authority as
provided for in this A ct and shall be in such form as
may be prescribed.”
related to the granting,
renewing and revoking of rights
without consulting any body or
committee. This means that the
Commissioner has direct and
unfettered discretionary control
over the sector.
Other countries like Zambia
and Ghana have introduced
oversight bodies to provide
additional scrutiny during the
bidding and allocation
processes.4
See also Sections 20(1), 27(1), 36(1), and
42(1), 43(4), 44(1), 57, 59, 70, 73, 74, 116,
and 117.
General
Allocation of mineral
rights
No protocols outlined to ensure
that mineral rights will be
allocated through a prescribed
and standardized process that
ensures fairness and objectivity,
and limits the possibility of
corruption.
For further instruction regarding the
establishment of the Mineral Authority see
Part II-Administration below.
Between Sections 8 and 9, insert a new
section that outlines the bidding processes
to be followed in the allocation of rights for
the different types of licences.
The Ministry should consider establishing a
first come first serve system where
participants are only eligible for bidding on
exploration, prospecting and mining leases if
they meet a publicly available, predetermined
In order to prevent practices of
poor and/or corrupt allocation
in the mining sector, licences
must be granted strictly to
qualified and capable applicants
through transparent and
standardized processes with no
opportunity for political
interference. The Ministry
should establish an allocation
system based in strong pre-
For more information, see Section 6 of the Mines and Minerals Development Act of Zambia, 2015. Available from:
http://www.parliament.gov.zm/sites/default/files/documents/acts/The%20Mines%20and%20Minerals%20Act,%202015.pdf. Also see Section 100 of the
Minerals and Mining Act of Ghana 2006. Available from: http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/gha85046.pdf.
4
9
7
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
10
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
list of financial and technical qualifications
provided in the regulations to the Act.
Alternatively, the government may consider
establishing two bidding systems. (1)
Competitive bidding for areas where the
value of geological reserves are well- known
and adequate documentation exists and (2)
First come first serve bidding as described
above for areas that are unknown or for
which no data has been collected.
General
Procedures for public
announcement
regarding opening of
an area for bidding
The act does not include any
provision requiring the
government to publicly
Include a section akin to Sections 54 and 55
of the Upstream Act, that establishes a
process for public notice of proposed
mining activities in a given area and
qualifications for bidders and
stringent criteria for bid
evaluation.
Based on the current status of
the mining sector, the
government may consider a
system incorporating
competitive bidding in some
cases and first come first serve
in others. Competitive auction
systems are recommended as
the optimal system for
transparent rights allocation in
the extractive industries.5
The government should
consider utilizing this system
for areas where geological
surveys have been undertaken
and adequate documentation
exists. However, the same
principles of fairness and
objectivity can be incorporated
into a strong first come first
serve bidding process as well.
The act must establish a
process for public
announcement so that affected
parties may voice objections
According to the Precept 3 of the Natural Resource Charter, “Well-designed auctions are preferable since competitive bidding should secure greater value for
the country and auctions can also help overcome information deficits that the government may have relative to international companies. Auctions are also
inherently more transparent than direct negotiations, helping to mitigate the risk of inappropriate companies or individual receiving exploration and extraction
rights.” For more information see the Natural Resource Charter, Precept 3 p. 14, available from:
http://www.resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/NRCJ1193_natural_resource_charter_19.6.14.pdf
5
8
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
announce the opening of a new
area for bidding.
General
Procedures for
evaluation of bids
There is currently no section
describing the process of bid
evaluation.
invitations for objections by affected parties
prior to the granting of the right.
before the mineral right has
been granted.
However, unlike the Upstream Act, assign
an independent tribunal or committee to
first hear objections rather than the Minister.
After reviewing objections, the tribunal will
write a judgement shared with the parties
along with a detailed recommendation
submitted to the Minister.
An independent tribunal, rather
than the Minister, should
receive these objections to
ensure an objective and
autonomous review of the
case.6
If the Minister refuses to act according to
the recommendation or a party takes issue
with the recommendations, the aggrieved
parties may appeal the decision of the
committee through the court system.
Insert a section that explains the bid
evaluation process. The bid evaluation
process should include the following steps:
1.
2.
3.
The Commissioner shall forward
applications to the Minerals
Authority.
The Authority shall technically
evaluate the bids based on a set of
objective criteria outlined in the
Regulations or by other statutory
instrument.
The Authority shall, only in cases
where a bid has been approved
based on satisfaction of the
necessary criteria, recommend to
However, this grievance
mechanism should not serve to
obstruct the right of an
aggrieved party to seek remedy
in the courts.
The bid evaluation process
must be transparent and
predictable to ensure that
standard procedures are
followed in all cases to limit
opportunities for corruption
and political interference.
Basing the bid evaluation
process in a pre-determined set
of objective criteria will ensure
that rights are allocated to only
the most qualified bidders
based on their financial and
technical capabilities.
See Section 10, “Consultation with interested and affected parties” of South Africa’s Mineral and Petroleum Development Act 28 of 2002 which sets out a
procedure of notification within 14 days after an application has been lodged. Then, objections are referred to a ‘Regional Mining Development and
Environmental Committee’ that considers the objections and advises the Minister thereon.
6
11
9
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
12
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
the Commissioner that the bidder
be granted a mineral right.
Section 8
Types of mineral
right
Specifies different licences
including a prospecting licence,
exploration licence, retention
licence, mining lease, or location
licence.
Section 10
Further information
in support of
application
The power to request further
information or make necessary
consultations or investigations
regarding an application lies
exclusively with the
Commissioner.
The Commissioner shall grant a licence to
the holder with the best proposed
programme in accordance with the
recommendations of the Minerals Authority.
Divide location license into two levels;
artisanal location licence and small- scale
location licence.
Amend as follows:
“The Commissioner and/ or Mineral
Authority may, for the purpose of, and prior to,
making a decision whether or not to grant an
application for a mineral right [… ]”
4.
Part II
Administration
Currently, there is no
explanation regarding structure,
hierarchy, and delegation of
duties within the DGSM.
In sub- section (a) and (b) include
“reasonably considers necessary.”
The ‘Administration’ part should include
sections outlining all of the powers and roles
of (1) The Commissioners (2) The Minister
(3) The Inspector of Mines (4) The Mineral
Authority, and any necessary additional
information indicating the power structure
and/or hierarchy between these offices.
These two types of mining
activity are very different and
should not be combined in
order to specify nuanced
regulatory frameworks for
each.
If the Mineral Authority is to
assist the Commissioner in
reviewing applications, it
should have the power to seek
more information while
carrying out this process.
However, in order to prevent
this power from being used to
make unreasonable demands of
an applicant that the
Commissioner or Authority
wish to block out of a mineral
right, it should only be
exercised reasonably.
One major purpose of this act
is to outline a clear and
consistent administrative
architecture for the DGSM.
However, the current act fails
to do this.
10
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
Powers and duties of the “Mineral
Authority” should be outlined here
including; monitoring and regulating mining
activities; reviewing and approving any
proposed prospecting, exploration, location,
retention licenses; reviewing and approving
work programmes, appraisal programmes,
production forecasts, field development
plans and budgets submitted by a licensee
and making recommendations to the
Minister for approval, amendment or
rejection of plans; advising the Minister in
the negotiation of mineral agreements and in
the granting and revocation of exploration
and mining leases, etc.
All information outlining the incorporation,
composition and operating modalities of the
Mineral Authority should also be provided
here.
13
Section 13(1)
Commissioner for
Geological Survey
and Mines
Department
The President appoints a
Commissioner for the
Geological Survey and Mines
Department.
Since DGSM currently has more than one
Commissioner, and the Department is now
a Directorate with many directors, titles
should be clarified accordingly regarding
Directors (formerly Commissioners) within
the Directorate.
Amend so that so that this Presidential
appointment requires Parliamentary
approval and that there is a fixed duration of
term for the Commissioner (e.g. 5 years).
General
Inspector of Mines
for Geological Survey
and Mines
Department
No mention of how the
Inspector of Mines is appointed.
This appointment should follow the same
protocols as above.
Powers of each individual
entity as well as limits to those
powers and relationships
between entities should be
made clearer so that the
operations of the DGSM can
be better understood. Setting
out a transparent and
standardized legal and
regulatory framework for the
operations of the DGSM will
help foster accountability.
Without clearly outlining these
roles, responsibilities, powers
and limits, Ministry officials
would have no framework to
adhere to and would be free to
operate in a regulatory vacuum.
Executive appointments
normally require Parliamentary
approval. This appointment
should follow standard
protocol.
Same as above.
11
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
14
Civil Society Submission
Section 17
Section 18
Prohibition of
officers to acquire
interest
Mineral Agreements
May 2016
An officer found to have
acquired a share in a mining
company is liable to a fine not
exceeding one hundred currency
points or imprisonment for a
term not exceeding one year, or
both.
There is no mention of a Model
Mineral Agreement to be used
in negotiations.
Include a forward- looking prohibition:
“While in office and for a period of not less than five
years thereafter, no officer shall directly or indirectly
acquire… ”
Explicitly include all employees of the
Mining Ministry including consultants and
those seconded to the Ministry from
international donor agencies.
This prohibition should also include parent
companies of companies that hold licences.
Between 18(1) and (2) insert another subsection to state the use of a Model Mineral
Agreement that will form the basis of any
mineral agreement, to be included as a
Schedule to the Act.
The penalties prohibiting an
officer from acquiring interest
must be made stronger in order
to deter the practice. The
phrase “officer” should be
more explicitly defined so as to
include all employees and
consultants in the prohibition
to acquire interest.7
International best practice
encourages the use of model
contracts.8 In this case, a model
mineral agreement would help
provide structure to licence
negotiations. Rather than
requiring Parliamentary
approval of every licence,
Parliament may approve the
templates and fixed terms to be
used in negotiation so that the
general terms may be approved.
This prevents negotiators from
making discretionary
Section 4.2 of the Liberia Minerals and Mining Law, 2000 also prohibits the president, vice president, members of the National Legislature, Justices of the
Supreme Court and subordinate courts, Cabinet Ministers, and Managing Directors of Public Corporations from becoming holders of mineral licences. For more
information see p. 7, http://www.eisourcebook.org/cms/Liberia%20Minerals%20and%20Mining%20Law%202000.pdf.
8
According to international best practice, negotiation processes that are guided by a set of fixed terms outlined prior to the negotiation process have the most
positive outcomes for the country. According to the IMF Guide on Resource Revenue Transparency, “At the best practice end of the spectrum, it should be
possible to define the resource industry tax baseline regime as those normal taxes applied to all corporations, plus a few policy variations that form an integral
part of the regime.” For more information, see the IMF Guide, available from: https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/2007/eng/051507g.pdf
7
12
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
concessions that may not be in
the public interest.
Section 21(1)(b)
Restriction on a
prospecting licence
“No prospecting licence shall
authorise the holder of the
licence to prospect over an area
of land that is, or forms part ofa forest reserve, game reserve,
national park… unless the holder
of the prospecting licence has
first given notice to and
obtained permission from the
relevant authorities… ”
Relevant authorities should be consulted and
provide their decision regarding approval
prior to the granting of rights. Evidence of
consultation and approval from the relevant
authority should be included in the
application materials when submitted for
review. The act should establish this
procedure and the Regulations should
provide details necessary for
implementation.
This should also be applied to Section
78(1)(g)(h), “Restrictions on exercise of
mineral rights.”
Requiring that the model
mineral agreement be included
as a Schedule to the Act will
ensure that the Parliament must
scrutinize and approve it during
the passing of the new Act.
Under the current wording,
“the holder of a licence” is
seemingly issued a licence to
operate inside a protected area
but cannot operate there
without permission from the
relevant authorities.
15
This means that the person
applying to the relevant
authority for approval has
already obtained a licence even
though the relevant authority
has not approved the holder to
operate within that given area.
This process means that an
applicant can be given a licence
but then be denied approval to
operate in their licence area,
which seems backward. This
could also put unnecessary
pressure on the relevant
authorities to approve activities
since the individual or company
has already been provided with
a licence. This could bias their
decision.
13
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
16
Civil Society Submission
Section 21(1)(b)
Restriction on a
prospecting licence
May 2016
“No prospecting licence shall
authorise the holder of the
licence to prospect over an area
of land that is, or forms part ofa forest reserve, game reserve,
national park… unless the holder
of the prospecting licence has
first given notice to and
obtained permission from the
relevant authorities… ”
If the relevant authority has approved the
proposed operations, the authority should
also be granted oversight and monitoring
rights to ensure the licence holder abides by
the conditions on which permission was
granted.
This should also be applied to Section
78(1)(g)(h), “Restrictions on exercise of
mineral rights.”
Section 26 & 27
Application for and
Grant of an
exploration licence
There is no section outlining the
full content of an exploration
licence.
Akin to Section 45 “Contents of a mining
lease”, a section should be inserted to list the
standard contents of an exploration licence.
Section 26
Application for an
exploration licence
Information regarding plans to
manage environmental impacts
is currently not included in the
application materials for an
exploration license.
Amend so that an applicant is required to
include the completed environmental impact
assessment with certificate approval from
NEMA as well as their environmental
management and restoration plans in their
application for an exploration license.
Consultation with the relevant
authorities should occur before
an application is submitted,
similar to the EIA and other
preliminary environmental
consultations that should
contribute to the decision as to
whether the right should be
granted.
Forest reserves, game reserves,
and national parks are all
endowed with specific
authorities to oversee and
manage their territories.
Therefore, these authorities
should have rights to monitor
mining activities occurring
within the territory to ensure
continuous compliance with
the conditions on which the
permission to mine was
granted.
The contents of an exploration
licence should be standardized
as is the case for the mining
lease.
Environmental and social
impact assessments are
supposed to be conducted
prior to the allocation of rights.
That way, the environmental
and social impacts as well as
planned mitigation strategies
are taken into account as
14
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
Civil Society Submission
Section 28(3)
Restriction on
exploration license
May 2016
“No exploration license shall be
granted to an applicant unless
the Commissioner is satisfied
that- “
This should also apply to Section 41,
“Application for mining lease.”
Amend as follows:
“No ex ploration license shall be granted to an
applicant unless the Mineral A uthority is
reasonably satisfied that-… ”
important criteria during the
decision to allocate the rights.9
The changes reflect the
introduction of the Mineral
Authority as the body
responsible for evaluating
applications.
After subsection (f), add:
“The Mineral A uthority shall in every case make
best efforts to determine whether the above criteria
have been met.”
Section 28(3)(c)
Restrictions on
exploration licence
“No exploration licence shall be
granted to an applicant unless
the Commissioner is satisfied
that… the applicant’s proposal
for exploration operations has
provided for the employment
and training of Ugandan
citizens.
This also applies to Section 43(3),
“Restriction on grant of mining lease.”
The regulations to the act should provide
specifications to be followed for the ratios
of Ugandan nationals to be employed by
different sized licensees throughout different
phases of the project based on the license or
leaseholders number of overall employees.
These requirements should also identify the
positions that Ugandan nationals will hold
within the internal structure of the company.
These requirements should also specifically
outline the ratio of Ugandan nationals from
the local communities, disaggregated from
the total number of overall Ugandan
Countries around the world are
ensuring that citizens benefit
from resource extraction by
introducing local content
requirements for foreign
operators. According to the
UN Conference on Trade and
Development, this helps
“foster the development of an
industrial and manufacturing
capacity in host countries.” 10
While the Act cannot put a
blanket requirement on the
employment of nationals for all
Section 8.4 of the Minerals and Mining Law of Liberia, 2000 requires applicants to submit a completed environmental impact assessment study “prior to the
grant of any such application.”
10
For more information, see Extractive Industries: Optimizing Value Retention in Host Countries, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
available from: http://unctadxiii.org/en/SessionDocument/suc2012d1_en.pdf.
9
17
15
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
18
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
employees, to be employed at different
levels within the company structure.
This should be also be applied to Section
43(3)(e).
Section 31(2)
Section 33
Rights of an
exploration licence
holder
Amendment of
exploration
programme
“For the purposes of exercising
the right under subsection (1),
the holder of an exploration
license may… enter the
exploration area and erect
camps and temporary buildings,
including installations in any
waters forming part of the
exploration area… ”
“The holder of an exploration
licence may from time to time
notify the Commissioner of
amendments he or she wishes to
make to his or her programme
of exploration operations; and
the amendments shall, unless
rejected by the Commissioner
within two months after being
notified, have effect after such
period.”
Limit to those strictly necessary and as set
out in the programme of proposed
exploration operations.
Amend as follows:
“… erect only such camps and temporary buildings,
including installations in any waters forming part of
the ex ploration area; as are strictly necessary for this
ex ercise of the right and as are detailed in the
programme of proposed ex ploration operations or
otherwise approved in writing by the Commissioner
following consultation with the Mineral A uthority.”
licence holders, the regulations
could set out basic relative
guidelines to be followed by
different licence holders based
on the size and makeup of the
company holding the licence.
Licence holders should be
limited to erect camps,
buildings and installations only
in cases where they are
necessary and have been
previously approved so as to
prevent licence holders from
erecting unapproved and/or
superfluous structures. This
will help limit and minimize the
environmental and social
impacts of the project.
The same should be applied to Section 49,
“Rights of a mining lease holder.”
Amend section as follows:
Based on the current wording,
amendments to the programme
“the holder of an ex ploration license may from time
of exploration operations can
to time notify the Commissioner of amendments he or occur without any scrutiny.
she wishes to make to his or her programme of
This should be changed so that
ex ploration operations. No amendments shall be
changes cannot occur without
permitted without ex press authorisation of the
Ministerial approval.
Commissioner. The Commissioner shall, along with Amendments to the
the Mineral A uthority, consider any proposed
programme signify a deviation
amendments along with documents and information for a previously approved plan
previously submitted under Section 26 as if they
and therefore must require
together formed a fresh application for an
explicit approval.
ex ploration license and shall notify the holder of the`
license of the outcome of the application to amend the
16
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
programme of ex ploration operations within two
months of being notified.”
Section 41
Application for
mining lease
Section 42
Disposal of
application for
mining lease by
holder of exploration
licence
Section 43(3)
Restriction on grant
of mining lease
The required content for a
mining lease application does
not include the name and
nationality of each person
making the application and in
the case of the body corporate,
the name and place of
incorporation, the names and
nationality of directors,
managers and other officers of a
similar rank and the name of
any person who is the beneficial
owner of more than five per
cent of the issued share capital.
The Commissioner is currently
obliged to grant a mining lease
to holders of exploration
licenses on terms he shall
determine.
The criteria contain many
subjective decisions with little
detailed information as to the
content of the requirement, e.g.
that things are “satisfactory” and
“adequate.”
This should also be applied to Section 48,
“Amendment of programme of operations
of mining lease.”
Amend Section 41, akin to Section 26
(d)(i)(ii) “Application for exploration
licence”, so that applicants for a mining
lease are required to provide critical
ownership information.
All applications for mining leases should be
required to go through the same process in
terms of scrutiny e.g. business plan,
operational model, EIA, etc.
This section should be amended so that this
full application process cannot be subverted.
Revise criteria to include objective tests and
minimum conditions to be satisfied where
possible to limit over discretion. e.g. (f)
provides no guidance as to what
“satisfactory” would entail.
19
In particular, stronger objective criteria are
required in relation to the environment,
There is no reason why
information pertaining to the
identify of the applicant,
and/or incorporation and
ownership information
regarding a body corporate
would be required for an
application for an exploration
licence but not a mining lease.
This information is critical in
both cases and should be
disclosed in both types of
applications.
This clause must be changed so
that people cannot move
straight to a mining lease upon
discover of an ore body,
especially considering that the
criteria for an exploration
license are less stringent than a
mining lease.
The evaluation of bids should
follow a set of objective criteria
that is made transparent and is
consistently followed in the
evaluation of all bids. This will
reduce opportunities for abuse
in the granting of rights.
17
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
20
Civil Society Submission
Section 47
Renewal of mining
lease
Part IVLocation Licence
Location Licence
Part IVLocation Licence
Location Licence
May 2016
“Subject to subsection (4) of
this section, where an
application is duly made under
this section for the renewal of a
mining lease, the Commissioner
shall renew… ”
“The Commissioner shall refuse
to renew a mining lease if… the
programme of mining
operations proposed to be
carried out is not adequate or
satisfactory and the renewal will
be contrary to the national
interest;”
Location license holders are
addressed as one group and the
regulatory framework designed
accordingly.
Neither location licence
applicants nor licence holders
are required to undertake any
preliminary environmental
assessments, impact
management procedures, or risk
mitigation strategies.
where Section 43(3)(b) builds in significant
discretion and requires only that the
proposed operations “take proper account
of” the EIA and other environmental
information.
Amend this section so that there is not a
default position that “the Commissioner
shall renew” a licence where an application
is duly made. Rather, the renewal process
should include extensive oversight including
full consideration and review.
In light of the aforementioned
recommendation to distinguish artisanal
miners from small scale miners, make
additions to this part so that it provides all
information necessary to understanding the
application for, granting, regulation and
revocation of two types of location licenses;
one for artisanal miners and one for smallscale miners.
Considering that location licence holders are
formally exempted from undertaking EIAs
according to Section 108(4), this section
should outline the alternative procedures
location licence applicants and licence
holders must follow to assess and manage
The current wording states a
default position that the
Commissioner will renew a
lease unless a condition in 47(4)
applies. The renewal process
should be guided by more
oversight and thorough review.
The Commissioner should by
no means be obliged to renew a
licence or an application for
renewal is duly made as the
current wording implies.
Based on the logic presented
above, the law should identify
and introduce specific
regulatory frameworks for
three different types of mining
so as to adequately address
each type. Location licences
can be split into two types to
serve this purpose.
While it may be appropriate to
exempt location licence
applicants from undertaking
the same environmental impact
assessment process as industrial
size applicants, artisanal and
small- scale applicants must still
18
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
environmental impacts prior to and
throughout the duration of licence.
Once two tiers of location licences are
created for artisanal and small- scale,
consider requiring environmental impact
assessments for small- scale location licence
applicants.
Section 56(1)
Section 57
Application for
location licence
Grant of location
licence
An application for a location
licence shall be made to the
Commissioner.
The Commissioner is obliged to
grant location licences for smallscale operations if the applicant
provides correct paperwork.
Individuals applying for an artisanal location
license should be able to apply at the local or
regional level. To this end, Regional Mines
Inspectors or other regional officers so
placed should receive applications for
artisanal location licences and forward them
to the Commissioner for review by the
Authority.
Consider whether stricter criteria and or
more requirements should be introduced in
the granting of a location licence.
undertake procedures to assess
and manage environmental
impacts.
While they may be considered
smaller in scale, ASM
operations may still contribute
to severe environmental
impacts. These impacts, as well
as management and mitigation
plans must be taken into
account before the allocation of
rights.
Artisanal miners currently lack
adequate access to Ministry
officials and cannot realistically
afford to undertake the
centralized application
requirements. This, among
other things, leads to high
levels of illegal mining.
The application process should
be made more accessible for
individuals interested in mining
at the artisanal level.11
The current requirements are
very few and may not be
sufficient to ensure that
incapable applicants do not
receive a location licence and
that licence holders will adhere
The South Africa Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act, 2002 instructs all applicants to submit their applications at the office of the Regional
Manager who accepts applications and then forwards them to the Minister for consideration. A similar process is outlined in Section 8 of the Zambia Mines and
Minerals Development Act 2015.
11
21
19
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
22
Civil Society Submission
Sections 61, 62
Inquiry into disputes
& Inquiry
proceedings
Section 74
Retail shopkeepers
Section 79
Right under mineral
right to be exercised
reasonably
Section 93
Register
May 2016
“The Commissioner or an
authorised officer may inquire
into and decide any dispute
between persons engaged in
small- scale mining operations,
either amongst themselves or as
between themselves and third
parties… ”
“The Commissioner may in his
or her discretion… authorise any
retail shopkeeper to
manufacture and sell articles
partly manufactured from
precious minerals without being
licensed as a goldsmith, if the
shopkeeper satisfies the
Commissioner that the selling of
such articles shall not constitute
the sole or principal portion of
his or her business.”
“The rights conferred by a
mineral right shall be exercised
reasonably and in such a manner
as not to adversely affect the
interests of any owner or
occupier of the land on which
the rights are exercised.”
Records of mineral rights and
any dealings with or affecting
every such mineral right “to be
kept in a register, in this Part
referred to as ‘the register.”
An adjudication tribunal or committee or
perhaps a separate Ombudsman should
preside over small- scale disputes rather than
the Commissioner.
However, aggrieved parties must retain their
right to appeal the decision of the
committee through the court system.
Remove this exception so that all
shopkeepers manufacturing or selling
articles partly manufactured from precious
minerals must be licensed as a goldsmith.
Add to the section:
“and in such manner as not to adversely affect the
environment.”
While there may be a physical register
housed at the Ministry, an online, publicly
available version of this information should
be made available through the online Mining
Cadastre.
to strong performance
standards.
The current set- up is a breach
of the separation of powers.
The Commissioner, as an
executive, should not be
involved in judicial matters.
This exception should be
reconsidered given the
preponderance of gold
smuggling in Uganda. It creates
a loophole that risks effective
enforcement of the licensing
regime.
It should be made clear that the
licence holder should strive to
undertake operations with
minimal environmental impacts
in the short and long term.
Contract transparency and
associated access to
information efforts have been
recognized as critical keys to
20
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
Amend the entire section so that whenever
information is to be recorded in the register,
it is also to be posted on the Mining
Cadastre.
Section 93(2)
Register
Only the name of the person to
whom the mineral right is
granted shall be recorded in the
After 93(2) insert another sub- section that
reads:
success in the extractive
industries.12
While Uganda has not yet made
extractive industry contracts
public, government has
committed to publishing
contracts as well as signing
onto the EITI Global Standard
many times.
In order to bring the act up to
date with international
standards, an online database
of mining contracts should be
established. The current
register system is inadequate as
it is not accessible for most
citizens. To provide true access
to important documents
regarding mineral sector
activity, contracts and all
accompanying documents
should be made available
online.
According to international best
practice, extractive industry
licenses should be made
publicly available and accessible
For best practice guidance on the topic, see the IMF Guide on Resource Revenue Transparency (2007) available from:
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/2007/eng/051507g.pdf. This guide suggests that the obligation to publish contracts may strengthen government performance
in contract negotiation and enable governments to negotiate better deals. The Natural Resource Charter (2014) also advocates for full information transparency
throughout the entire extractive industry decision chain to best engage citizens and help ensure good governance. Also see Contract Disclosure in the Extractive
Industries (2016) published by Open Contracting Partnership, Natural Resource Governance Institute, Oxfam Americas, and Columbia Center on Sustainable
Investment, available from: http://www.open-contracting.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/OCP2016_EITI_brief.pdf
12
23
21
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
24
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
register as the registered holder
of that mineral right.
“When a mineral right, other than a prospecting
licence, is granted, the Commissioner shall cause the
contents of the licence (and all annexes
including the work plan) as well as
details of the beneficial ownership
information to be recorded in the register
and also published, accessible online
through the Mining Cadastre and on
district and sub-county notice boards in
the relevant areas.”
In order to protect commercially sensitive
information, the government should
establish tightly defined exemptions for
genuinely commercially sensitive
information such as proprietary technology.
Unless the information falls within narrowly
and clearly defined exemptions, it should be
made public.
Notification regarding the granting of a
mineral right should be sent to the District
CAO no later than 30 days after the granting
of the right along with copies of the above
information with instructions that the CAO
retain a copy of the information and also
post the information on the appropriate
notice boards.
so that citizens may understand
the nature of the agreement
entered into between the
company and government and
can monitor adherence to
contract terms.
International consensus
increasingly recognizes that
beneficial ownership
information should be made
publicly available so that the
true owners of companies can
be publicly identified.13
If contracts are made available
online and at the district and
sub-county level, there is a
greater chance that citizens may
view the documents and learn
about the mining activity in
their areas.
For more information on the importance of beneficial ownership transparency in the extractive industries, see Disclosing beneficial ownership information in
the natural resource sector (2016), published by the Natural Resource Governance Institute, Open Government Partnership and World Resources institute,
available from: http://www.opengovpartnership.org/sites/default/files/FIN%20OGP%20Issue%20Brief%20BO%20Disc.pdf. Also see Owning up: Options for
disclosing the identities of beneficial owners of extractive companies (2015), published by the Natural Resource Governance Institute, available from:
http://www.resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/nrgi_beneficial_owners20150820.pdf
13
22
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
Section 93(4)
Register
“The grant, renewal, suspension
or termination of any mineral
right… shall be published in the
Gazette.”
Section 115
Disposal of minerals
“No minerals shall be disposed
of… except- with the written
consent of the Commissioner.”
Amend the section so that such changes are
published on the Mining Cadastre.
Notifications should also be sent to the
CAO of the District no later than 30 days
after the change so that the information can
be posted on local notice boards.
Amend this section so that no minerals may
be removed or disposed of without written
consent of the Commissioner.
Section 118 &
119
Administrative
review by Minister
“Any person aggrieved by any
decision of the Commissioner
may… request, in writing, an
administrative review of the
decision by the Minister.”
An independent adjudication tribunal or
committee should receive requests for
review of a Commissioner’s decision and
carry out such reviews rather than the
Minister.
Section 121
Regulations
“The Minister may make
regulations for the conservation
and development of mines and
minerals on new areas or areas
already gazetted as such and
otherwise for the purpose of
Amend so that criteria is outlined which
could constrain the Minister’s, the
Commissioner’s or any other public officer’s
discretion when making major decisions.
The Cadastre and local
information sharing system
must be kept up to date so that
citizens have a tool to inform
them about actual current
mineral sector activity.
This section restricts the
disposal of minerals without
written consent of the
Commissioner but does not
also restrict removal. The
Ministry may better control this
practice especially regarding
minerals removed and disposed
of for sampling purposes,
through explicit authorization
of removal and disposal.14
The current set- up is a breach
of the separation of powers.
The Minister, as an executive,
directly oversees the
Commissioner’s decisions.
Therefore, it may not be
possible for the Minister to be
an objective judge in an
administrative review case.
When a public official is given
room to exercise discretion in a
given decision, the exercise of
discretion should be in
See Section 20, “Permission to remove and dispose of minerals” of the South Africa Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act of 2002 which
restricts a holder of a prospecting license from removing and disposing of minerals without written permission from the Minister. See also Section 13(10) of the
Ghana Minerals and Mining Act, 2006.
14
25
23
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
26
Civil Society Submission
General
General
Section 78
Restrictions on
exercise of mineral
rights
May 2016
giving effect to the provisions of
this Act.”
accordance with specific
criteria.15
The use of “etc.” in section
headings.
The use of the term
“Commissioner”
Etc. is not preferred.
Substitute “etc.” for a more legally
appropriate word
The Commissioner has been replaced by the
position of the Director. Where powers have
been conferred to the Commissioner, now it
should be conferred to a managing
individual within the Directorate, which
includes the Director and Departmental
Commissioners.
SURFACE RIGHTS & LAND ACQUISITION
In the case of written
Amend as follows:
permission granted by the
appropriate Minister or other
“The holder of a mineral right shall not ex ercise any
relevant authority, there is no
of his or her rights under that mineral right [… ]
provision requiring public
ex cept with the written consent of the appropriate
hearing.
Minister or other relevant authority subject to
public hearing with the relevant
stakeholders involved.”
Additionally, this section should be amended
so that the holder of a mineral right shall be
mandated to undertake community
consultations in order to secure free, prior
Update the Act so that it
reflects current Ministry
practices and administrative
changes incorporated since the
passing of the last act.
Free, Prior and Informed
Consent, as well as other forms
of pre- project community
consultation are recognized as
international best practice that
must be undertaken prior to
any project related land
acquisition or land use.16
An applicant should not be
granted a mineral right in any
case without obtaining
community consent. Licence
For instance, see Section 110 of the Ghana Minerals Act which allows the Minister to promulgate regulations which provide for circumstances where the
minister is exercising a discretionary power.”
16
While official guidelines for “Free, Prior and Informed Consent” are currently only required when engaging with indigenous peoples, the three-point
framework should be used to guide mining sector investors in their engagement with project affected communities. The law should mandate that investors must
obtain free, prior and informed consent from affected communities before the mineral right can be granted. For more information, see the UN-REDD Guidelines
on Free, Prior and Informed Consent (2013) available from: http://www.un-redd.org/Newsletter39/FPIC_GuidelinesLaunch/tabid/129671/Default.aspx. Also see
FPIC and the extractive industries (2013) published by International Institute for Environment and Development (UK), available from:
http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/16530IIED.pdf
15
24
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
and informed consent from the affected
communities before applying for a mineral
right. Evidence of this consent must be
submitted to the Ministry as part of the
application process. The regulations to the
act should outline the necessary components
and procedures to be included in the
consultation process as well as options for
dispute resolution and grievance
mechanisms.
Section 78
Part VII
(general)
The law does not clearly state
the right of the landowner or
lawful occupier to withhold
their consent.
Mineral rights and
surface rights
There is no mention of a
mediation process in the event
of stalemate between the
landowner or lawful occupier
and the mineral rights holder
apart from vague reference to
arbitration in Sections 81(1) and
82(3).
holders need a social licence to
operate. Without community
consent, this cannot be
secured. Requiring such
community consultations will
prevent negative relations
between the community and
the licence holder and will
ensure that the community is
aware and in support of an
upcoming project.
As a part of Section 78, insert a clause
It is critical that community
outlining the rights of landowners and lawful members do not feel coerced
occupiers to withhold consent:
or strong- armed into providing
consent.
“Notwithstanding the above subsections the relevant
owners or lawful occupiers shall under no
The community consultation
circumstances be obliged to provide consent to provide process must be carried out
the holder of a mining lease the ex clusive use of the
sincerely so that the community
whole or any part of the mining area concerned.”
is consulted and permission is
sought and earned. This is
much different than simply
informing community
members of an upcoming
planned project.
A section should be inserted that provides
Arbitration is not a realistic
for an independent mediation tribunal or
option for all landowners or
committee to handle disagreements between lawful occupiers because it is
the landowner and the mineral right holder.
cost prohibitive.
However, aggrieved parties must retain their
right to appeal the decision of the
committee through the court system.
27
If an applicant is interested in
undertaking mining operations
in a certain area and there is a
stalemate with the local
community over land rights,
the Ministry should provide for
25
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
28
Civil Society Submission
Section 80(1)(a)
Right to graze stock
and cultivate
Section 80(1)(b)
Right to graze stock
and cultivate
Section 81
Acquisition of
exclusive right by
holder of mining
lease
May 2016
“Any loss or damage to stock or
crops arising out of the exercise
of such right shall be borne by
the owner or lawful occupier of
the land”
“Any interference by the owner
or lawful occupier with the
proper working or operation in
such area for prospecting,
exploration or mining purposes
shall be a ground for
terminating such right.”
Amend this section so that the cost is borne
by the licence or leaseholder.
“… as may be agreed between
the holder and the owner or
lawful occupier of the land in
question, or failing an
agreement, as may be
determined by arbitration.”
Insert a new subsection, 81(3) to the effect
that:
Amend this section so that the termination
of such a right must be decided upon by an
independent mediation committee or
tribunal.
However, aggrieved parties must retain their
right to appeal the decision of the
committee through the court system.
“Notwithstanding the above subsections 81(1) and
81(b), the relevant owner or lawful occupier shall
under no circumstances be obliged to enter into any
agreement providing the holder of a mining lease the
ex clusive use of the whole or any part of the mining
area concerned.”
an independent party to
mediate the issue free of charge
to the community. However,
this should not restrict
aggrieved parties from seeking
justice through the court
system.
It is inappropriate to charge the
owner or lawful occupier for
this damage since the loss or
damage has arisen from mining
activity.
The section currently does not
explain how this right may be
terminated. It must be made
clear that the request to
terminate such a right must go
through an independent judicial
body, in line with the
Constitution. If this process is
not followed, a citizen may be
unduly denied of their right to
property.
Again, it is critical that
community members do not
feel coerced or strong- armed
into providing consent. An
applicant for a mineral right
must approach the community
in willing- seller, willing- buyer
negotiations in the hopes of
reaching a settlement.
However, if the community is
unwilling to sell their land, this
must be respected.
26
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
Civil Society Submission
Section 82(1)
Compensation for
disturbance of rights
May 2016
“The holder of a mineral right
shall on demand made by the
owner or lawful occupier of any
land subject to such mineral
right, pay the owner or lawful
occupier fair and reasonable
compensation for any
disturbance of the rights of the
owner or occupier.”
Amend the section as follows:
“The holder of a mineral right shall on demand
made by the owner or lawful occupier of any land
subject to such mineral right and no later than
90 days after the formal demand has
been made, pay the owner or lawful occupier fair
and reasonable compensation… ”
A 90-day timeline for the
payment of compensation must
be explicitly stated so that
payments to the community
may not be unnecessarily
delayed.
Alternatively, if the parties cannot agree, the
license holder must submit a request for
mediation to the Ministry before the 90- day
period has expired.
Section 82(1)
Compensation for
disturbance of rights
“The holder of a mineral right
shall… pay the owner or lawful
occupier fair and
reasonable compensation for
any disturbance of the rights of
the owner or occupier; and for
any damage done to the surface
of the land by the holder’s
operations; and shall on demand
made by the owner of any
crops, trees, buildings or works
damaged during the course of
such operations, pay
compensation for any crops,
Consider introducing a penalty for delay of
payment that includes payment of an
additional late fee to the community if the
deadline for payment or submission of a
mediation request is not met.
Insert a subsequent clause at the end of the
sentence:
“and shall on demand made by the owner or occupier
pay for the complete remediation of any other
environmental harm caused or significantly
contributed to by the holder’s operations.”
Mining operations may lead to
significant environmental
damage and degradation. The
mineral holder should be held
liable for any contributions to
social and environmental harm.
The rights holder should pay
appropriate compensation not
only for certain disturbances,
but any disturbance or negative
environmental impact caused
by mining operations if and
when they arise.17
For guidance, see Section 87 of the Zambia Minerals Act which outlines a mineral rights holder’s liability for harm or damage caused by operations including
harm or damage caused to the environment, biological diversity, human and animal health and socio-economic conditions.
17
29
27
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
30
Civil Society Submission
Section 82(3)
Compensation for
disturbance of rights
Section 85(3)
Access to public
roads
Section 89
General
Surrender of area
covered by a mineral
right
May 2016
trees, buildings or works so
damaged.”
An individual is limited to
claiming compensation to within
“one year from the date when
the act which is the basis for
such claim occurred.”
“… either party may lodge a
complaint with the Minister for
his or her decision on the
dispute.”
“Subject to section 53 of this
Act and the regulations, the
holder of a mineral right may,
subject to any conditions of his
or her licence, surrender the
area covered by his or her
mineral right or part of such
right [… ]”
The phrase “owner or lawful
occupier” of land is used
throughout the Act but is not
defined anywhere.
Amend the sub- section to allow claims for
compensation within four years from the
date when the “claimant first became aware of, or
should reasonably have become aware of, the harm
resulting from the act which is the basis for such
claim.”
This type of case should also be referred to
the independent mediation committee
recommended above.
However, aggrieved parties must retain their
right to appeal the decision of the
committee through the court system.
Lawful surrender of an area covered by a
mineral right must also be subject to Section
110 of this Act.
In the Interpretation section of the Act,
define these terms to provide explicit
clarification. These terms should be defined
with respect to the forms of land ownership
and lawful occupation outlined in Section 2
of the Land Act Cap 227. The Act should
also provide for adjudication regarding
dispute over lawful ownership or
occupation.
Section 139(3) of the
Petroleum (EDP) Act
establishes a four-year window
for compensation claims to be
made. The Mining Act should
also allow for a four year
statute of limitations at a
minimum.
As an executive, the Minister is
not the appropriate party to
adjudicate such a dispute. All
matters requiring adjudication
or mediation must be referred
to a tribunal to preside over the
matter.
A license holder should not be
permitted to surrender any area
covered by a mineral right until
the license holder has executed
the terms of their
environmental restoration plan
with respect to the area to be
surrendered.
The Act must explicitly define
these terms so as to provide
conceptual clarity.
See also First Schedule to the Act.
28
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
Civil Society Submission
Section 71
Part X
May 2016
MINE RAL REVE NUE MANAGE ME NT & FINANCIAL PROVISIONS
Liability of minerals
“Every holder of a mineral
Replace “the Commissioner” with
dealers for royalties
dealer’s licence shall be liable for “Government” to be specified further in the
the due payment to the
regulations. The Commissioner should not
Commissioner of all royalties
receive royalty payments.
due on any minerals… ”
Financial Provisions
No mention of particular
procedures to be followed for
the collection and management
of mineral revenues.
A Minerals Fund and a Minerals Investment
Reserve should be established in the Bank of
Uganda to hold revenues generated from
mining activity. This fund should be
managed according to same mechanisms
outlined in the Petroleum Section of the
Public Finance Management Act 2015.
The Commissioner is not the
appropriate officer to receive
payments. Similar to section
154 of the Upstream Act,
royalties should be payable to
“government.” The procedures
for payment should be outlined
in the regulations to the Act.
Similar to the Petroleum Fund
established in the Public
Finance Management Act 2015,
mineral returns should be paid
into a central minerals
account.18
Returns from mineral activity
should be collected and
tracked. The government
should establish a transparent
and pre- determined spending
and investment plan for
mineral revenues.
All activity of the account
should be included in a publicly
available annual report that
disaggregates payments into the
account on a project- by- project
basis and provides detailed
For detailed recommendations on the operations of a natural resource fund(s) in Uganda, please see Recommendations and comments on the Public Finance
Bill (2013) published by the Civil Society Coalition on Oil & Gas. Available from:
http://csco.ug/files/downloads/CSCO%20Recommendations%20on%20the%20Public%20Finance%20Bill.pdf. Also see, Comments on petroleum revenue
management in the draft Ugandan Public Finance Bill 2012 (2012), published by Revenue Watch Institute. Available from:
http://www.resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/RWI_comments_PRM_bill_Uganda.pdf.
18
31
29
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
32
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
Section 98(2)
Royalties
“Royalty shall be shared by the
Government, Local
Governments and owners or
lawful occupiers of land, subject
to mineral rights as specified in
the Second Schedule to this
Act.” 19
“Local governments” should be defined
more specifically as district governments.
Another schedule should be added to
prescribe the formula district governments
are to use to transfer royalty dispersals to
sub-counties based on various levels of
mining activity within the sub- counties.
Section 98(3)
Royalties
“Samples of minerals for the
purposes of assay, analysis or
other examination, and in such
quantities as shall be determined
by the Commissioner, shall be
exempted from the payment of
any royalty.”
After 98(3) insert another sub- section which
reads:
“Samples of minerals for the
purposes of assay, analysis or
other examination, and in such
quantities as shall be determined
by the Commissioner, shall be
exempted from the payment of
any royalty.”
Add to this section a stipulation that mineral
samples exempt from royalty payment may
not be exported without an export permit
granted by the Ministry, as is the practice for
non- exempted minerals.
Section 98(3)
“For the avoidance of doubt, any mineral rights
holder found selling for commercial purposes,
‘sample’ minerals ex empted from royalties by the
Commissioner will face a financial penalty and
potential imprisonment.”
information regarding any
withdrawals of funds.
The royalty system currently
suffers from many operational
failures as well as information
asymmetries that lead to
dysfunction. The new act must
explicitly outline the
procedures to be followed to
improve understanding at the
district level and prevent
inconsistencies.
Smuggling and
misrepresentation of minerals
as “samples” is a significant
problem in Uganda. The act
must acknowledge this problem
and try to limit the practice of
misrepresentation by imposing
explicit penalties to deter the
practice.
The practice of extracting
minerals for sampling purposes
must be better regulated so that
the sample minerals are not
sold for commercial purposes.
Licences should also provide detail regarding
restrictions and maximum quantities of
minerals that may be extracted, transported
and exported as samples.
According to the Second Schedule to the Mining Act, “government” takes 80% from royalties, “local governments” take 17% and “owners or lawful occupiers
of land subject to mineral rights” take 3% from royalties.
19
30
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
Section 99
Waiver of royalty,
etc.
The Minister may waive in
whole or in part any royalty
payable with the approval of the
Cabinet.
In line with the protocol for the granting of
tax exemptions, the section must require the
Minister to seek approval from Parliament,
rather than Cabinet, before waiving royalties.
Section 101
Valuation of minerals
Section 106(1)
Annual mineral rents
Section 107(5)
Commissioner’s
power to require for
information
“The value of any mineral,
Amend section to identify the specific
whether for export or for
instrument that will be used to determine
domestic consumption, shall be mineral values e.g. regulations, licences, etc.
determined in such a manner as
shall be prescribed.”
“There shall be payable to the
Replace “the Commissioner” with
Commissioner by an applicant
“Government” to be specified further in the
for, or the holder of, a mining
regulations.
lease, a location licence, a
retention licence or an
exploration licence, an annual
mineral rent of such amount as
shall be prescribed.”
“Any person who contravenes
Section to be amended so that a person
subsection (4) of this section
found to contravene subsection (4)(c)(d) is
commits an offence and is liable liable to a fine as well as full repayment of
on conviction to a fine of not
principal figure that was falsified.
less than one hundred and fifty
currency points or to a term of
imprisonment not exceeding
one year, or both.”
E NVIRONME NTAL & SOCIAL ISSUES
Such types of exemptions
require Parliamentary approval.
A waiver of royalty is similar in
nature. Such a decision should
require Parliamentary approval
to ensure that the Minister’s
power to waive a royalty
obligation is not abused or
misused.
As much as possible, valuation
should be standardized to
provide consistency and
predictability for all
leaseholders.
The Commissioner should not
receive annual rental fee
payments. This is not an
appropriate role for the
Commissioner. The procedures
for payment should be outlined
in the regulations to the Act.
The money principally owed to
government should be repaid
with an additional penalty for
the offense of failure of
payment.
33
31
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
34
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
Section 51
Wasteful mining and
treatment practices
No information provided
regarding the determination of
wasteful mining and treatment
practices.
Better define “wasteful mining and
treatment practices” and provide more detail
to the term. The regulations should clearly
outline offenses considered to be “wasteful
mining and treatment practices” and
industry standards to be followed so as to
assist the rights holder in avoiding the
offense.
Section 87(2)
Grant of water rights
Requires a water permit to be
obtained in the pursuance of
water rights.
This section should establish a “zero mine
wastewater discharge” requirement for all
mining leaseholders.
Water permits must only be granted upon
consultation with the relevant environmental
authority and upon verification that the
mining lease holder has used its best effort
to maximize water efficiency in mine water
use, including through recycling and reuse of
mine water, water treatment, and the careful
management of tailings. If this has not been
found, a water permit should not be granted.
The section currently does not
explain or provide any detail
necessary to understanding
what actions may be considered
“wasteful mining and treatment
practices.” The Act, and
regulations, must provide
enough information so that the
rights holder may know how to
prevent the offense.
Water permits should only be
granted in cases of absolute
necessity. Zero water discharge
systems and other techniques
for mine site water recycling
and reuse have now become
commonplace.20 Leaseholders
must prove that they have the
mechanisms in place to recycle
and reuse the maximum
amount of mine site water
before seeking a water permit
for additional resources.
A leaseholder should be mandated to renew
their water permit at regular intervals so that
the conditions upon which the permit was
granted may be inspected and verified
regularly by the relevant authority for the
purposes of renewal.
For more information please see the Columbia Center on Sustainable Development Policy Paper, Leveraging mining investments in water infrastructure for
broad economic development: Models opportunities and challenges. Available from: http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/05/CCSI-Policy-Paper-LeveragingMining-Related-Water-Infrastructure-for-Development-March-2014.pdf. Also see Section 1.4 “Water Conservation” in the IFC Environmental, Health, and
Safety Guidelines, available from: http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/554e8d80488658e4b76af76a6515bb18/Final%2B%2BGeneral%2BEHS%2BGuidelines.pdf?MOD=AJPERES
20
32
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
Civil Society Submission
Section 87(2)
Grant of water rights
May 2016
Does not include obligations to
minimize negative impacts for
downstream users.
Unless stated in the Water Statute, 1999
(Statute No. 9 of 1995), this section should
establish that a water permit related to
mining operations should be granted only if
the applicant has undertaken extensive
community consultations regarding the
application resulting in a signed
Memorandum of Understanding between
the leaseholder and downstream
communities where the communities have
consented to the water permit based on a set
of agreed upon conditions. This MOU must
be approved by NEMA and the relevant
Commissioner and attached in the
application for the water permit.
This section is silent on the risk
posed by competition for water
between mines and other users
including downstream
communities.
The leaseholder must
undertake community
consultations informing
downstream users of the
intended application and
negotiate terms for their
consent of the permit that
include agreements on
continued access, pollution
prevention strategies, and
compensation in the case of
disturbance of access or other
unintended consequences
restricting communities access
to clean and safe water.
Otherwise, downstream
communities may be negatively
impacted without their consent,
or even knowledge of the
reason for disturbance.21
According to the IFC Environmental, Health and Safety Guidelines, “Project activities involving wastewater discharges, water extraction, diversion or
impoundment should prevent adverse impacts on the quality and availability of groundwater and surface water resources.” In order for a water permit to be
21
35
33
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
36
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
Section 87(2)
Grant of water rights
No mention of the relationship
between a water permit and the
environmental impact
assessment
If a water permit is granted, NEMA should
require that the environmental impact
assessment for the project be updated and
resubmitted to incorporate this.
Section 90(1)
Conditions for
suspension or
cancellation of
mineral rights
The section does not expressly
mention failure to use a mineral
right or comply with work plans
as a ground for cancellation of
rights.
Insert another section under 90(1) to read as
follows;
Section 108
Environmental
impact assessment
and environmental
audits
The scope of the environmental
impact assessment is not
defined.
Unless stated in the update to the NEMA
Statute, an environmental impact assessment
must include assessment of all
environmental and social impacts of a
project.
Section 108
Environmental
impact assessment
and environmental
audits
“A holder of an exploration
licence or a mining lease shall
carry out an environmental
impact assessment.”
Amend this section as follows:
(f) If the holder of such rights fails to make
full beneficial use of the license as per the
approved work plan with two (2) years from
the date of the granting of rights.
“E very applicant for an ex ploration licence or a
mining lease shall carry out an environmental impact
assessment.”
This will provide that the
environmental impact
assessment is comprehensive
and exhaustive and that the
annual audits incorporate the
new set of impacts associated
with the water permit.
This will help to reduce cases
of speculators holding licences
for the full period of the license
without undertaking activity. By
adding this section, the
Ministry has recourse to
intervene before the expiry of
the licence.
The act only refers to an
“environmental impact
assessment” and while this
label is fine, there must be
clarification that the EIA
includes environmental and
social impacts.22
Environmental and social
impacts must be considered
during the decision of whether
to grant a mineral right.
Therefore, EIAs must be
granted, the applicant must demonstrate commitment to this principle and explain mechanisms to ensure continuous prevention of adverse impacts. For
additional information, see: http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/554e8d80488658e4b76af76a6515bb18/Final%2B%2BGeneral%2BEHS%2BGuidelines.pdf?MOD=AJPERES
22
Applicants should be required to undertake a comprehensive assessment of environment and social impacts. For more information on E(S)IA components, see
Chapter 5.1 of the Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance Standard for Responsible Mining Draft v1.0 (2014), available from: Also see the IFC
Performance Standard 1: Assessment and management of environmental and social risks and impacts (2012), available from:
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/c8f524004a73daeca09afdf998895a12/IFC_Performance_Standards.pdf?MOD=AJPERES
34
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
carried out before the mineral
right is granted.
Section 108
Environmental
impact assessment
and environmental
audits
A holder of a mineral license
must submit an EIA in order to
“commence his or her
operations.”
The holder of a mineral license should be
required to submit updated EIAs not only
once but periodically throughout the
duration of the lifetime of the licence.
Section 108
Environmental
impact assessment
and environmental
audits
There are currently no
requirements for engagement
with affected community
members or other stakeholders
during the EIA process.
This section should establish requirements
for stakeholder engagement and community
consultation to be carried out during the
initial EIAs and also during periodic EIA
updating procedures.
If an element of the initial
environmental and social
impact assessment changes, the
applicant should revise the
ESIA document to either
include the new impact and
mitigation strategy or remove
sections that become irrelevant.
This allows the Ministry to be
updated on the project and the
evolving impact mitigation
strategies of the licence holder
throughout the duration of
operations.
It is critical that all relevant
stakeholders are engaged
during the environmental
impact assessment and that
their perspectives and feedback
are included in the assessment.
Stakeholder engagement has
become a standard requirement
during EIA development. For
instance, the World Bank
requires clients to create a
37
35
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
38
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
Stakeholder Management Plan
as part of the EIA process.23
Section 108(3)
Environmental
impact assessment
and environmental
audits
“the holder of a license… shall
carry out an annual
environmental audit, and shall
keep records describing how far
the operations conform to the
approved environmental impact
assessment.”
Amend so that the licence holder must
submit an annual environmental audit to
NEMA for certification. If NEMA refuses
to certify an audit, NEMA must provide the
explanation for refusal in writing and
provide the licence holder with 30 days to
rectify the problem and resubmit the audit.
The environmental audits as
currently established, may not
serve the intended goal. The
section must clarify NEMA’s
powers to use the information
presented in the audit to
require remedial action.
NEMA should be given the right to request
the license holder to commission an
independent third party to conduct an
environmental audit to be submitted to
NEMA for review in cases where NEMA
has credible cause for concern that the
license holder may be non- compliant and
the request for such audit has been
approved by the Commissioner.
The act currently does not
stipulate than an audit must be
undertaken by an independent
third party. While that may be
permissible, NEMA should
reserve the right to require an
independent audit should
concern arise over the integrity
of the audit or the capacity of
the licence holder.
Environmental audits are
critical tools that allow the
Ministry and licence holder
work together to continuously
mitigate environmental harm if
the right processes are in place.
If the audit results in the finding of noncompliance with the environmental impact
assessment, NEMA may require certain
actions to be taken by the licence holder to
reach compliance and resubmit the audit.
At all times, a licence holder is required to
have their most recent environmental audit
According to the World Bank, “Stakeholder engagement is the basis for building strong, constructive, and responsive relationships that are essential for the
successful management of a project’s environmental and social impacts.” For more information see the IFC Performance Standard 1: Assessment and
management of environmental and social risks and impacts.
23
36
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
on file and available. Failure to undertake an
annual environmental audit or failure to
obtain NEMA certification for an
environmental audit will result in strong
penalty.
Section 109
Environmental
protection standards
“The holder of an exploration
licence or a mining lease shall
submit to the Commissioner
and the Executive Director of
the National Environment
Management Authority… ”
The act must clarify the roles between the
Commissioner and Executive Director of
NEMA in these cases, especially in cases
where the two actors disagree.
Section 109
Environmental
protection standards
“The holder of an exploration
license shall submit to the
Commissioner and the
Executive Director of the
National Environmental
Management Authority an
environmental management
plan… ”
109(4) should be amended to provide for
reports on and updates to the environmental
management plan to be regularly submitted
to the Commissioner and NEMA, possibly
annually along with the annual
environmental audit.
NEMA should be given the right to request
the license holder to commission an
independent third party to conduct a
compliance audit of the environmental
management plan to be submitted to
NEMA for review in cases where NEMA
has credible and legitimate cause for concern
that the license holder may be noncompliant and the request for audit has been
approved by the Commissioner.
The relationship between the
two entities is not clear. The
rights and roles of NEMA
should be explicitly outlined in
relation to the Ministry. Care
should be taken so that NEMA
is given a strong role in
handling environmental issues
related to mining activity.
There is no further information
indicating the enforcement or
monitoring of the
environmental management
plan. This section should
specify the purpose of the
Environmental Management
Plan and how it will be used to
regulate waste generation and
disposal.
39
37
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
40
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
Section 109
Environmental
protection standards
The scope of the environmental
management plan is not
established.
Clarify this section to establish that the
environmental management plan should
cover both environmental and social risk
management.
Section 110(3)
Environmental
restoration plan
“In making a decision whether
to accept the environmental
restoration plan, the
Commissioner shall take into
account- “
Amend to align with the previous section so
that the environmental restoration plan is
submitted to the Commissioner and the
Executive Director of NEMA.
Section 111
Direction for the
protection of the
environment
“The Commissioner may, by
notice served on the person
who was the last holder of the
exploration licence...”
The language must be made stronger so that
the license holder must restore land upon
termination of the license or lease in all
cases.
According to international
standards, environmental and
social performance must be
managed throughout the
lifetime of any project. The
World Bank suggests
establishment of an
Environmental and Social
Management System (ESMS)
for all projects.24
In the previous section,
environmental materials must
be submitted to the
Commissioner and the
Executive Director of NEMA.
The same should apply here.
There should not be any case
where a leaseholder is not
required to restore the land
upon terminating operations.
Proper site restoration is one of
the most important obligations
of a rights holder and should
not be lifted in any
circumstance.25
In Performance Standard 1 of the Operational Manual, the World Bank underscores the importance of establishing an Environmental and Social Management
System to continuously monitor and manage “environmental and social risks and impacts in a structured way on an ongoing basis.” For more information, see
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/OPSMANUAL/Resources/OP4.03_PS1.pdf
25
For further guidance, see Chapter 4.1 of the Standard for Responsible Mining Draft v1.0 (2014) published by the Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance,
available from: http://www.responsiblemining.net/images/uploads/IRMA_Standard_Draft_v1.0(07-14).pdf
24
38
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
Civil Society Submission
Section 112
Environmental
performance bond
Section 113(1)
Preference for
Ugandan products
and employment of
Uganda citizens
Section 114
Underground work
for women etc.
May 2016
“The Commissioner may
require the holder of an
exploration licence or a mining
lease to execute an
environmental performance
bond to ensure the fulfilment of
all the environmental
requirements under this Act.”
The sub-section only mentions
requirements for the preferential
procurement for local goods
and services, “to the maximum
extent possible and consistent
with safety, efficiency and
economy.”
“A woman may be employed in
any underground work in any
mine or in any operation or
activity relating to or associated
with mining.”
Amend so that execution of an
environmental performance bond is required
by the license or leaseholder in all cases.
According to international best
practice, the government must
require financial assurance so
that the operator secures
financial resources to meet
mine closure requirements in
all cases.26
The provision should specifically state that
companies should only procure goods and
services out of the country in the case that
they cannot be locally sourced.
Countries around the world are
ensuring that citizens benefit
from resource extraction by
introducing local content
requirements for foreign
operators. According to the
UN Conference on Trade and
Development, this helps
“foster the development of an
industrial and manufacturing
capacity in host countries.” 27
Akin to Section 25 of the Upstream Act, the
licensee should be required to submit an
annual report detailing it’s achievements in
utilizing Ugandan goods and services with a
list accompanied by justifications for cases in
which the licensee failed to procure a local
good and/or service and had to procure the
good abroad.
This section should be amended to clearly
specify that companies must enact
affirmative action policies to employ women
in an adequate ratio to overall employees.
The act must introduce local
content requirements in order
to maximize use of Ugandan
goods and services as much as
possible.
Women face many barriers to
employment in the mining
sector despite their capabilities.
Companies must enact a policy
to hire women staff in different
type of work on the mine site.
For more information, please see the Financial assurance for mine closure and reclamation study prepared by the International Council on Mining and Metals
(2005), available from: https://www.icmm.com/document/282.
27
For more information, see Extractive Industries: Optimizing Value Retention in Host Countries, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
available from: http://unctadxiii.org/en/SessionDocument/suc2012d1_en.pdf.
26
41
39
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
42
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
Also, include a section unequivocally
prohibiting child labour in mining and
introducing penalties for the offence.
General
Occupational health
and safety
requirements
The act fails to establish any
requirements for occupational
health and safety to be followed
by licensees.
General
Licensee liability for
security firms
employed
The law is silent on the issue of
private security firms employed
by licensees or military officials
working on behalf of the
licensee.
A section should be introduced which
specifies occupational health and safety
requirements to be followed by all licensees
in regards to their employees and labourers
e.g. ensuring general workplace health and
safety, protection from hazardous materials
etc.
Introduce a section that details licensee
liability for the actions of security firms
employed by the licensee as well as members
of the military where they are shown to be
acting on behalf of the licensee.
Due to the commonality of
child labour in the mining
sector in Uganda, the act must
unequivocally prohibit such a
practice and enforce penalties
for the offence.
Mining is a potentially
dangerous and hazardous form
of employment and licence
holders must be required to
protect their workers (including
employees and labourers) from
unnecessary harm.28
According to the UN Guiding
Principles on Business and
Human Rights, businesses are
responsible for any human
rights violations due to a
company’s activities or are
“directly linked to their
operations, products or services
by their business relationships,
even if they have not
contributed to those impacts.”
The Guiding Principles place
responsibility on business
enterprises to “avoid causing or
contributing to adverse human
rights impacts.”29
For more information regarding occupational health and safety guidelines, please see the International Finance Corporation’s Environmental, Health and
Safety Guidelines for Mining available from: http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/1f4dc28048855af4879cd76a6515bb18/Final%2B%2BMining.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&id=1323153264157
29
For further guidance, please see the UN’s Guiding principles on business and human rights (2011), available from:
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf
28
40
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
References
Buxton, A., & Wilson E., “FPIC and the extractive industries,” International Institute for
Environment and Development, 2013, available from: http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/16530IIED.pdf
“Comments on petroleum revenue management in the draft Ugandan Public Finance Bill
2012”, Revenue Watch Institute, 2012, available from: http://www.resourcegovernance.org/sites/
default/files/RWI_comments_PRM_bill_Uganda.pdf
“Contract Disclosure in the Extractive Industries”, Open Contracting Partnership, 2016, Available
at: http://www.open-contracting.org/wp content/uploads/2016/02/OCP2016_EITI_brief.
pdf
“Disclosing beneficial ownership information in the natural resource sector”, OGP
Openness in Natural Resources Working Group, Issue Brief, 2016, available from: http://www.
opengovpartnership.org/sites/default/files/FIN%20OGP%20Issue%20Brief%20BO%20Disc.
pdf
“Environmental, health, and safety general guidelines”, International Finance Corporation, 2007,
available from: http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/554e8d80488658e4b76af76a6515bb18/
Final%2B-%2BGeneral%2BEHS%2BGuidelines.pdf ?MOD=AJPERES
“Environmental, health and safety guidelines for mining”, International Finance Corporation, 2007,
available from: http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/1f4dc28048855af4879cd76a6515bb18/
Final%2B-%2BMining.pdf ?MOD=AJPERES&id=1323153264157
Government of Ghana, Minerals and Mining Act, 2006, available from: http://faolex.fao.org/
docs/pdf/gha85046.pdf
Government of Liberia, Minerals and Mining Law, 2000, available from: http://www.
eisourcebook.org/cms/Liberia%20Minerals%20and%20Mining%20Law%202000.pdf
Government of Sierra Leone, Mines and Minerals Act, 2009, available from: http://www.
parliament.gov.zm/sites/default/files/documents/acts/The%20Mines%20and%20
Minerals%20Act,%202015.pdf
Government of South Africa, Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act, 2002, available
from: https://www.capetown.gov.za/en/EnvironmentalResourceManagement/publications/
Documents/Minerals-and-Petroleum-Resources-Development-Act-28-of-2002.pdf
43
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
Government of Zambia, Mines and Minerals Development Act, 2015, available from: http://www.
sierra-leone.org/Laws/2009-12.pdf
“Guide on Resource Revenue Transparency”, International Monetary Fund, 2007, available from:
https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/2007/eng/051507g.pdf
“Guiding principles on business and human rights”, United Nations, 2011, available from:
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf
“Guidelines on free, prior and informed consent”, UN-REDD Programme, 2013, available from:
http://www.un-redd.org/Newsletter39/FPIC_GuidelinesLaunch/tabid/129671/Default.aspx
“IFC performance standards on environmental and social sustainability”, International
Finance Corporation, 2012, available from: http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/
c8f524004a73daeca09afdf998895a12/IFC_Performance_Standards.pdf ?MOD=AJPERES
Miller, C.G., “Financial assurance for mine closure and reclamation”, International Council on
Mining and Metals, 2005, available from: https://www.icmm.com/document/282
“Natural Resource Charter”, 2nd ed., Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2014, Available from:
http://www.resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/NRCJ1193_natural_resource_
charter_19.6.14.pdf
“Performance Standard 1: Assessment and management of environmental and social risks and
impacts”, World Bank Operational Manual, 2013, available from: http://siteresources.worldbank.
org/OPSMANUAL/Resources/OP4.03_PS1.pdf
“Proposed comments on the Public Finance Bill 2012”, Civil Society Coalition on Oil
& Gas in Uganda, 2012, available from: http://csco.ug/files/downloads/CSCO%20
Recommendations%20on%20the%20Public%20Finance%20Bill.pdf
Sayne, A., Westenberg E., & A. Shafaie, “Owning up: Options for disclosing the identities of
beneficial owners of extractive companies, Natural Resource Governance Institute, Briefing, 2015,
available from: http://www.resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/nrgi_
beneficial_owners20150820.pdf
Sigam, C., & Garcia, L., “Extractive industries: Optimizing value retention in host countries”,
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2012, Available from: http://unctadxiii.org/
en/SessionDocument/suc2012d1_en.pdf
44
Civil Society Submission
May 2016
“Standard for responsible mining draft v1.0”, Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance,
2014, available from: http://www.responsiblemining.net/images/uploads/IRMA_Standard_
Draft_v1.0(07-14).pdf
Toledano, P., & Roorda, C., “Leveraging mining investments in water infrastructure for broad
economic development; Models, opportunities and challenges”, Columbia Center on Sustainable
Investment, 2014, available from: http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/05/CCSI-Policy-PaperLeveraging-Mining-Related-Water-Infrastructure-for-Development-March-2014.pdf
45
46