UN peace operations veer toward peace enforcement

UN peace operations veer toward peace enforcement
Two recent decisions by the UN Security Council are raising questions about the challenges they pose
to an already overstretched UN peacekeeping system. Both decisions – one regarding the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC) and another on Mali – stretch the conceptual and political boundaries of
UN peace operations by involving peacekeepers in missions that require “peace enforcement.”
MONUSCO’s intervention brigade
On March 28, the Security Council authorized the deployment of an intervention brigade within the
new mandate for MONUSCO (the UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC).
The intervention brigade will carry out targeted offensive operations against armed groups that threaten
peace in the eastern part of DRC, a region that has been prone to cycles of violence for many years.
MONUSCO is the UN’s largest peace operation, with more than 22,000 troops, police and civilian
personnel. The intervention brigade will be made up of 3,069 peacekeepers. Troops from South Africa,
Malawi and Tanzania are expected to contribute to the brigade, which will function within the overall
command structure for MONUSCO, under force commander Lieut. Gen. Chander Prakash of India.
The UN was embarrassed last year when a rebel group known as M23 took control of the city of Goma,
overrunning MONUSCO troops in the process. Subsequent negotiations led to M23’s withdrawal from
Goma. In February, 11 central African governments plus the UN signed yet-another peace agreement,
paving the way for the creation of the intervention brigade as part of the newly-mandated MONUSCO.
Earlier in March, following factional in-fighting among the rebel groups, one of the M23 leaders,
Bosco Ntaganda, turned himself in at the U.S. embassy in Rwanda, and was transferred to The Hague
for trial before the International Criminal Court.
Despite the current disarray among rebel groups, media reports questioned whether the new
intervention brigade was at a sufficient strength to make a significant difference. The greater challenge
in the DRC is the failure, following successive efforts at peace and reconstruction over the years, to
bring about a credible, functioning state and a monopoly on force that can advance the rule of law and
security in the DRC.
MINUSMA… with French support
On April 25, the UN Security Council authorized the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization
Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). This mission will take over from the African-led International Support
Mission in Mali (AFISMA) and the current UN multidimensional presence in Mali (UNOM). At a
projected 12,600 military, police and civilian personnel, it will be larger than the combined AFISMA
and UNOM. The transfer of authority from AFISMA to MINUSMA is scheduled for July 1, 2013,
pending a Security Council decision regarding current security conditions in the north of Mali.
Mali has been in turmoil since March 2012 when Islamist militant Tuareg rebels seized the northern
part of the country and ousted the sitting president and later the prime minister. France, with the
assistance of approximately 2,000 Chadian troops, has pushed most of the Islamist extremists out of the
cities and main hubs, and into the desert.
Canada provided one C-17 transport aircraft and support personnel to assist the French mission from
January to mid-April of this year. WFM–Canada has called for Canada to contribute troops to the UN
peace operation in Mali.
The key components of MINUSMA’s mandate are:
• stabilizing key population centres and supporting the re-establishment of state authority throughout the
country;
• supporting the implementation of the transitional roadmap, a set of political objectives set out by Mali’s
transitional government that aims to restore democracy and support reconciliation;
• protecting civilians and UN personnel;
• promoting and protecting human rights; and
• supporting humanitarian assistance, cultural preservation and national and international justice.
Discussions at the Security Council related to the DRC cast a shadow over subsequent negotiation of a
mandate for Mali.
UN officials stressed that the creation of MONUSCO’s “intervention brigade” was not precedentsetting. The new MONUSCO mandate was agreed “on an exceptional basis and without creating a
precedent or any prejudice to the agreed principles of peacekeeping.”
According to Security Council Report, when operations in Mali were discussed, Argentina, Guatemala,
and Pakistan, along with Russia, introduced language that more clearly defined tasks MINUSMA was
mandated to undertake. They also successfully pushed for a reference in the resolution reaffirming the
basic principles of peacekeeping, including consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force,
except in self-defence and defence of the mandate, with the intention of more clearly distinguishing
between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement.
Nevertheless, it is also clear that the new peace operation in Mali is being deployed in a context where
hostilities are far from over. While UN peacekeepers will perform stabilization operations, the
resolution also mentions (and relies upon) the fact that French troops will carry out combat and
counter-terrorism activities in northern Mali.
So, while combat operations are not, strictly speaking, part of the mandate of the peace operation, they
are nevertheless essential to its success. Many are wondering whether these fine distinctions, so
important to UN diplomats, will matter a great deal to the various rebel groups in northern Mali, or
whether they will target UN personnel as well as their French adversaries.
Unlike the DRC, prospects for success of the Mali operation are reasonably good, primarily because
the country has a tradition of democratic governance and functioning state authority, which the UN
mission and the international community will be at pains to rebuild.