Gender and Promotion in Executive Office. Cabinet Careers in the world of
Westminster
Jennifer Curtin,1 Matthew Kerby2 and Keith Dowding3
Correspondence to [email protected]
ECPR Joint Session Workshop, Salamanca 10-15 April 2014
Gender, Representation and Power in the Executive Branch
Draft
Introduction
Over the past ten years there has been an increased scholarly interest in the descriptive
representation of women in executives. Particular emphasis has been given to women’s
selection to cabinet, the allocation of portfolios and, more recently, the opportunities for the
substantive representation of women by women ministers (Bauer and Tremblay, 2011;
Curtin, 2008; Davis, 1997; Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005; Siaroff, 2000). A
parallel research trajectory has emerged over the same period exploring the determinants of
ministerial appointment, survival and exit, although there has been relatively limited attention
given to variation by gender (for exceptions see Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor Robinson
2005, 2009; Kerby 2009).
Both literatures have become increasingly interested in the cross-national dimensions
of elite political careers (cf Dowding and Dumont, 2009; Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor
Robinson, 2005; 2009). However, it was Rebecca Howard Davis (1997) who pioneered the
first systematic comparative analysis of women’s access to cabinets in parliamentary
democracies. Davis’ study of 15 European countries from 1968-1992 revealed that women
were most likely to be appointed to cabinets immediately following an election, but once
appointed relatively little is known about their career prospects, the relevance of portfolio
allocation and their likelihood of survival within and across terms of government.
Moreover, Davis’ research focused primarily on consensus democracies: the UK and
Ireland were the only two majoritarian and, more importantly for our study, Westminster
systems included. As Rhodes et al (2009) note, parliamentary government is a broad church:
and Westminster is one specific variant: a variant that has a range of institutional
1
University of Auckland, New Zealand
University of Ottawa, Canada
3
Australian National University, Canberra, Australia
2
1
idiosyncrasies, both in terms of formal constitutional rules and informal norms that make it
an interesting subset to study. Indeed, Bevir, Rhodes and Weller (2003: 202) suggest that
Westminster systems embody traditions that support strong executive government thus
enabling governments to force through reform in response to external pressures in a way that
is rare in European democracies. The notion of ‘cabinet government’ is foremost applied to
Westminster systems (Encel, 1968; James, 1999; Crossman, 1972) (although in more recent
years there is an argument that power has become even more centralized around the office of
prime minister). Putting the latter contest aside, the key point to note is that in Westminster
democracies in particular, cabinet is truly the elite: and becoming the ‘first among equals’
(Weller, 1983) is usually dependent on a strong performance in cabinet (Dogan, 1989; Foley,
2000).
Thus, in this paper, we utilise a ‘most similar’ research design where, aside from
several institutional design features, key aspects relating to cabinet government and the
executive branch are comparatively similar. Although New Zealand has a proportional
representation system, where coalition governments are possible and result in the need to
share cabinet office amongst several parties, in reality formal coalition governments are rare.
Minority governments exist with the support of smaller parties, with the latter allocated only
portfolios outside of cabinet (Miller and Curtin, 2011).4 However, for the most part, Canada,
New Zealand and Australia as settler societies, have adopted and then adapted the
Westminster model, with minor modifications (Patapan et al, 2005). Cabinet is drawn from
the legislature; ministers are usually generalist rather than specialist, at least two terms in
parliament is expected, and party discipline defines the conduct of parliamentarians and
individual and collective responsibility conventions bind ministers. All three are liberal
rather than social democracies, with a long history of majoritarianism (ensuring, for the most
part, two-party dominant systems, although the rise-fall-rise of the conservatives and the
liberals in Canada might confound this point).
The Anglo version of social liberalism (Sawer, 2003) has also underpinned
approaches to the status of women. All three countries have experienced active, autonomous
women’s movements and have a long history of feminist engagement with the state
(Haussman and Sauer, 2007; Squires, 2007; Curtin and Teghtsoonian, 2010; Sawer 1990). All
are signatories to the major women’s rights conventions, but none have invoked the CEDAW
4
Canada has also experienced minority governments on several occasions.
2
special measures clause to increase women’s political representation nor have any
implemented legal gender quotas.5 Yet all have had women prime ministers.
In summary, Westminster cabinet government has been described by both political
scientists and gender politics scholars as centralised and closed - operating as an elected
dictatorship, (Lovenduski, 2005; Mulgan, 1992; Palmer, 1979; Simpson 2001). This lack of
permeability would suggest that promotion to, and within, cabinet might be considerably
difficult for women given the seemingly archaic institutional rules and norms and the
difficulties with attempting to increase the pool of eligible women ministers without
affirmative action strategies.6
Whether this is the case is the subject of this paper. Drawing on original datasets of
ministerial duration for three Westminster countries, Australia, Canada and New Zealand for
the period 1949-2012 our paper examines whether, and to what extent, promotion within
Cabinet is gendered. Our comparative data does not allow us to evaluate selection for
cabinet, but once in Cabinet we can examine the gendered nature of ministerial careers.
To date the numbers of women promoted to any one Westminster cabinet have been
comparatively low, meaning there is a limited range of political science scholarship from
which to draw. Thus, our study utilises a cross-disciplinary set of literatures and seeks to test
the hypothesis that the rates of intra-cabinet promotion differ for male and female cabinet
ministers. It does so by employing an event history model and estimates the likelihood of
career progression given a minister has “survived” in cabinet up to the point of observation.
By comparing ministers across our three cases we will eventually be able to examine the
effects of institutional variation and differing levels of descriptive representation in the
cabinet and legislature while holding the basic rules and norms of the Westminster system
(eg. collective and individual ministerial responsibility) constant. Our main finding is that
indeed women experience a significantly lower hazard of cabinet promotion than their male
counterparts – the result is statistically significant, although future develop will require the
inclusion of additional control variables in the model.
In the remainder of the paper we provide an overview of our literature and hypotheses, in then we introduce our data and provide some descriptive statistics. In 5
Labour parties in the UK (1993?) Australia (1994), the NZ (2014) have some form of party
quota although implementation is variable and often contested internally.
6
Research demonstrates that there is causal link between the proportion of women in
parliament and women’s representation at executive level (Davis 1997; Siaroff 2000;
Whitford et al 2007).
3
the following section, we describe our empirical specification and then present our results. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the factors our model cannot (yet) account for and some possibilities for future research.
Conceptualising ministerial careers
The expansion of the study of ministerial careers can be described as nothing short of
impressive. Descriptive, insider accounts of political elites’ activities as well as historical
political biographies provide insights on the pathways to political power and the various
institutional rules and norms that govern political aspirations alongside personal ambition.
Alongside these, a range of deductive and inductive studies informed by comprehensive and
comparative longitudinal datasets have sought to increase our understanding of elite behavior.
The European Politics tradition as exemplified by the analyses Blondel and others (Laver and
Schofield, 1990) has been supplemented by research employing sophisticated econometric
techniques or by structured, qualitative studies designed to probe elite motivations with
respect to their careers and the impact on political systems more generally.
This burgeoning scholarship is hardly surprising: Reiterating the work of King (1981)
and Diermeier, Keane, and Merlo (2005), Berlinski et al (2010) remind us that government
ministers in parliamentary democracies are ‘‘career politicians’’: they desire government
service and once appointed wish to remain in office for as long as possible, making them an
obvious target for study for political scientists. Typically, recent studies of ministerial careers
have focused on the entry and exits of ministers to and from cabinets over time and across
space: temporally, these studies track single careers from beginning to end or collectively
across ministries; spatially, they are comparative studies within ministries, across cabinets,
between levels of government and indeed across states. A smaller number of studies focus on
the subject of within-cabinet movement, with an emphasis on demotion, promotion and/or the
consolidation of prime ministerial power and authority (Dandoy and Dumont, 2010; Kam and
Indridason, 2005; Indridason and Kam, 2008).
Central to this approach is the focus on individual ministers and their environment
rather than the decision criteria employed by the government leaders who decide to sack or
retain them. So, rather than asking “why did the leader send the minister to the
backbenches?” the question is rephrased as “what personal, institutional, and politicalenvironmental conditions exist which allow an individual minister to continue serving in
cabinet until a particular point in time?” The econometric models which explore this question
4
emphasize a variety of factors, such as the minister’s age and personal history, as well as the
changing institutional environment in which he serves. Today, this approach has become one
of the more common methods for studying elite careers.
Theoretically, the approach is predicated on principal-agent theory which posits that
cabinet ministers are the agents of the prime minister while (and paradoxically) the prime
minister and the cabinet as a whole, are the agents of the legislature, who in turn are the
agents of the citizenry. Müller (2000) and Strøm (2000) describe this as the chain of
delegation. The test then is to determine the extent to which the principles are able to respond
to moral hazard or adverse selection problems which arise through the democratic and
institutional delegation of authority and responsibility. In the cabinet setting, the appointment
and dismissal of ministers reflects the prime minister’s ability to manage and control the
threats and consequences of moral hazard and adverse selection. In this manner, prime
ministers can use inside and outside cabinet movements as a way to reward and punish
ministers as well as a means to create positive and negative incentives to keep ministers in
line. Indeed, Dewan and Dowding (2005) and Kam and Indridason (2005) demonstrate that
prime ministers have used cabinet reorganization as a means to pin the blame for failed
policies on individual ministers as well as a means to boost public opinion among voters.7
Of course, while cabinet personnel management may appear to be a lucrative and
convenient tool to control and incentivize the “herd of cats” that a cabinet may be, at the
same time, the prime minister cannot come off as too heavy handed or unresponsive without
losing the confidence or support of his own principals – the members of the legislature whose
confidence is needed to remain in government, as well as the electorate whose votes and
public support are also required.
To date, the comparative study of ministerial careers has focused primarily on
appointment and survival in individual countries or by comparing subnational units using the
framework described above (Dumont and Dowding, 2009; Kerby 2009; 2011). However, for
Rhodes et al (2009) argue there are the specific limitations of principal–agent theory when
applied to the study of executives. They argue for a more interpretive approach that can
reveal how ministers are embedded in webs of vertical and horizontal dependences and only
the former can be conceived as principal–agent chains. As such, webs or networks are absent
in our analysis despite Rhodes et al arguing for their centrality to both delegation and
accountability. We recognise the methodological limitations of our model, and that while we
are suggesting cabinet can be defined as a gendered institution, our analysis focuses on sex as
a variable, which can be considered a rather blunt measure of gendered organisational norms
and rules in practice.
7
5
the most part, research on cabinet systems has been framed temporally or spatially in ways
that have made the number of female ministers in the studies too few to allow for crossnational generalisations about the differences in the recruitment of men and women (cf de
winter 1991 and MacDonald 1989). More recently, the comparative gender politics literature
has focused primarily on the recruitment of women, in an attempt to track women’s progress
over time, and to better understand the reasons why women continue to be under-represented
in executive office. There is a clear trend that women continue to be under-represented at
executive level around the world, although this varies across countries and over time (Bauer
and Tremblay 2011; Davis 1997; Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor Robinson, 2005; 2009; Krook
and O’Brien).8 The factors that are considered likely to influence women’s appointment
include symbolic appeasement (Carroll, 1984); the electoral cycle (Davis, 1997), age, socioeconomic status, political resources and political interests (Annesley, 2011; Curtin, 2008;
2011; Tremblay and Stockmeyer, 2013) and the importance of left wing governments to both
the initial selection of women and the contagion effects of women’s appointment on other
political parties (Curtin 2009; Davis 1997). The findings of this small and succinct body of
literature suggest that in parliamentary democracies at least, women are more likely to begin
their executive careers later in life, be more highly qualified yet recruited to lowly-ranked
portfolios (Borelli, 2010; Buckley 2011; Curtin, 2011; Curtin and Sawer, 2011; Buckley
2011; Tremblay 2011; Borelli, 2010). And, according to Davis, most significantly, women
were more likely to be appointed immediately after an election rather during mid-term
reshuffles.
Just as the literature on gender and cabinet recruitment is relatively small (albeit on the
increase) there is still only a small academic industry which explores reshuffles. Reshuffles
include movements up, down and between portfolios, which do not involve a physical
removal from cabinet. On one hand, reshuffles can be interpreted as a form of punishment for
poor performance, as a sanction which does not necessarily demand the full punishment of
dismissal, either because of the severity of the offense or because of institutional or personal
factors in play. Alternatively, promotion within cabinet can be used as a reward for strong
performance, to enhance the prime minister’s station or to satisfy political ambition of
colleagues or potential leadership contenders (Thompson and Tillotsen 1999; Kam and
Indridason 2005).
Although at certain points in time women have been over-represented in cabinet relative to
the proportion of women in parliament (see Studlar and Moncrief 1999; Moon and Fountain,
1997)
8
6
Cabinet reshuffles may also take place for unexpected or unpredictable reasons and
may be linked to the power relationships between the prime minister and senior members of
the cabinet and the party (Arnold, 1986). While Kam and Indridason’s contribution is the
most welcome and innovated contribution to the literature on cabinet reshuffles, the focus of
their study is on the timing and occurrence of promotions and demotions within the cabinet;
they do not address the issue of the cause of promotion or demotion as it relates to individual
ministerial characteristics such as sex.9
The paucity of research on gender and executive promotion required us to extrapolate
from a range of literatures that have dealt with ministerial promotion generally, and gender
and promotion (in politics and the workplace) more specifically. That is to say, we ask, do
men and women advance up the cabinet ladder at an equal rate once they are appointed to
cabinet and, if so, what might account for this? Research conducted in cognate disciplines
suggests that gender should have an impact: drawing on data from the British Household
Panel Survey, Booth, Francesconi and Frank (2003) found that while women are promoted at
the roughly the same rate as men, they tend to receive smaller wage increases than their male
counterparts. This pattern seems to reflect the trend found in the academic sector (Ginter and
Hayes, 1999, 2003; McDowell and Ziliak, 1999; Jonkers, 2011; Long, Allison and McGinnis,
1993; Vàzquez-Cupeiero and Elston, 2006). But outside of academia there appears to be
varying opinions regarding the relationship between gender and the rate of promotion within
specific industries across time and space (Hersch and Ciscusi, 1996; Lazear and Rosen, 1990;
Pekkarinen and Vartianen, 2006, Spilerman and Petersen, 1999; Sharma and Sharma, 2012;
Gorman, 2006; Cannings, 1998). Moreover, while variation for the different rates of pay and
promotion may be explained by the different job types held by men and women– no such bias
should exist in a political cabinet where rates of pay and official job responsibilities are
standardized across ministerial level: unless we use portfolio ranking as a proxy for different
jobs.
Drawing on this range of studies then, and from the political science scholarship on
ministerial reshuffles, why might we expect gender to influence intra-cabinet promotion?
Portfolio allocation
Although in some Westminster systems (New Zealand and Australia most notably), the
Labour party caucus elects ministers, the allocation of portfolios lies with the prime minister
9
Kam (2009) discusses the Canadian example of demotion in the wider context of
comparative party discipline but intra cabinet promotion and demotion is not the primary
theme of his contribution
7
irrespective of party. Much of the literature on appointments to cabinet focuses on the first
portfolio women ministers receive, with women often given ‘pink’ or ‘soft’ portfolios of
health, welfare or education, rather than the hard, and potentially more prestigious,
responsibilities of finance, trade or foreign affairs, and defence (Bauer and Tremblay, 2011;
Borelli, 2010; Davis, 1997; Krook and O’Brien, 2012; Tremblay and Stockmeyer 2013). It is
commonly recognised that not all portfolios are created equal (Dogan, 1989; Rose, 1987),
although models of portfolio salience are still under development, and there are clearly
cultural nuances and events in history that prevent a generalised model (Druckman and
Warwick, 2005; Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor Robinson, 2011). Nevertheless, given it is
common for women to receive as their first appointment portfolio’s that are lowly ranked,
and designated ‘feminine’, we might expect them to be promoted at a lower rate than their
male counterparts for a number of reasons.
First, it may be more difficult to demonstrate productivity in a lower-ranked portfolio.
Scholarship on gender and promotion in the academy and business highlights that the
perception of productivity is a critical factor, but what counts as productive may differ
depending on the different jobs women and men hold within a cabinet (cf Ginther and Hayes,
1999; Jonkers, 2011). Moreover, feminist scholars have revealed the gendered nature of
concepts such as merit and productivity, whereby definition and operationalization within
organisations are traditionally derived from masculine norms (Acker, 1992; Burton, 1987; see
also Beckwith, 2005; Lovenduski, 1998).
Second, and related to this point, there are certain portfolios that attract more media
attention, thereby potentially enhancing the perception of productivity, if that media attention
is positive (Laver and Hunt 1992; Rose 1987; Warwick and Druckmann 2006). However, the
literature on female political leaders suggests that media representations often portray women
as a deviation from the norm, trivialise their campaigns, achievements or focus overly on
personal attributes (Murray, 2011). This might mean that the opportunities to demonstrate
publicly-visible productivity are gendered.
Finally, some argue that ‘early career events’ can increase the chances of promotion.
Dannell and Hjerm (2012) argue that the first prestige associated with the first position held
in an organization is an important career signal, especially if the position is highly sought
after. However, if a prestigious position is not won in the first instance, the promotion
chances differ according to gender. That is, women fare worse than men in the promotion
stakes when both are offered lower positions in the first instance. Applying this notion to
cabinet promotion then, we might assume that if both women and men are offered lower
8
ranked (possibly ‘soft’ portfolios), men will be more likely to be promoted faster than
women. If this were the case, then the allocation of portfolio on entry to cabinet will matter
more significantly for women. This is similar to Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor Robinson’s
(2005) finding that women will be less able to use their initial post to gain high-prestige
posts.
Prime ministerial power and symbolic representation
King and Allen argue British prime ministers can appoint and dismiss more or less whomever
they like (2010). The decisions are theirs, and they can make them on more or less whatever
basis they like. We could argue that this claim could be made for all Westminster-derived
cabinets, albeit those with coalition arrangements may mean prime ministerial authority is
somewhat constrained. Thus the prime minister is a key player in the promotion/demotion
process. Carroll argues that leaders may appoint women to cabinets for symbolic reasons; for
example to keep women’s movement demands for representation on issues in check, or to
deflect them by pointing to the selection of women (Carroll, 1984). However, the more often
women are appointed, the less gender segregated a cabinet will become (Borelli, 2010). And
the less gender segregated a cabinet, the more likely women might be to get promoted, and to
be awarded portfolios that are less stereotypically ‘feminine’. Thus, gender may be likely to
have less of an effect on promotion/demotion in recent years compared to earlier periods
because it is now more acceptable to see women both appointed and promoted (cf Krook and
O’Brien, 2012).
In addition, prime ministers will often reshuffle and promote/demote ministers in
advance of election to signal to voters that generational change and fresh ideas are being
considered, and that they are ‘gender friendly’. Ryan and Haslam’s (2007) research has
demonstrated that companies will often promote women in order to shift the direction of a
company or ‘save’ it from some kind of crisis. Labelled the ‘glass cliff’, the argument is that
leaders view women as sufficiently ‘different’ from the normal board, thereby likely to inject
renewed confidence in the company. A similar argument might be made about the promotion
of Kim Campbell (date) and Julia Gillard (in 2010); their promotion was in part a result of the
party leadership deciding that a new (woman) leader might just save the party from electoral
decimation. Thus, although Davis (1997) suggested reshuffles do not tend to lead to
increased female recruitment into cabinet, depending on how the government is faring in the
polls generally, but also amongst women voters, pre-election reshuffles might lead to the
promotion of women (Borelli, 2010).
9
Finally, if women are more likely to be appointed to cabinet when there is a left-party
in government (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor Robinson, 2005) or when there is a female
prime minister (Bauer and Tremblay, 2011), then we might assume that these factors will also
impact on the promotion rates of women.
Individual characteristics
There are several differences between women and men at an individual level that might also
lead us to expect a relationship between gender and cabinet promotion. For example, we
know that women have tended to be older when elected to parliament, and so older when
appointed to cabinet (Curtin, 2011). This may in turn undermine their promotion prospects,
especially if the purpose of the reshuffle is to demonstrate rejuvenation. We also know that
women tend to be less explicit in their ambition for higher office. Lawless and Fox’s work
(2005) reveals that, in terms of candidate selection in the United States, women are less likely
than men to explicitly demonstrate personal ambition and a drive to self-nominate for open
seats. And Probert’s (2004) research on gender and academic promotion suggests men
appear to be more aggressive at seeking promotion than women. Thus, there may be gender
differences in the extent to which women demonstrate their ambition within the cabinet
setting.
It is not possible in this paper to ‘test’ these theoretical determinants. Rather our goal is to
reveal the extent to which gender and promotion rates are related. The research from other
disciplines suggests that we should expect to find a sex difference. It appears that in all
previously male-dominated professions, the career prospects for women remain worse are
than for their male counterparts. Moreover, some research suggests that despite the
increasing number of women in such professions, the gender differences in promotion rates
have not decreased over time. We explore whether a similar result is apparent for
Westminster cabinets.
Descriptive data on Women in Westminster Cabinets
Figure 1 provides a visual representation of how women’s presence in a selection of
Westminster parliaments and cabinets has changed over time. What is evident is that
women’s parliamentary representation has marginally increased over the past 10 while the
increase in women’s cabinet representation is more dramatic. This is most striking in the
case of New Zealand and Australia, while Ireland and the UK also show modest increases the
women’s cabinet representation. In four of the five countries represented here, women’s
10
cabinet representation reflects the proportion of women elected to parliament (the exception
here is Australia).
Figure 1: Proportion of Women in Parliament and Cabinet (Westminster Democracies)
70
60
50
%
40
30
20
10
0
Ireld 94-98 Ireland 04-07 Canada 94- Canada 0498
07
NZ 94-98
NZ 04-07
Austrl 94-98 Austrl 04-07
UK 94-98
UK 04-07
Country / Year
women in Parliament
women in Cabinet
Sources: Siaroff (2000); Keesings (2008)
Approach
In order to get a handle on the phenomenon of intra-cabinet ministerial promotion and
demotion, we introduce a Cox proportional event history model as a means to estimate the
likelihood that minister will be promoted in cabinet conditional on sex . Event history
analysis is a frequently used econometric technique, borrowed from epidemiology and
applied by social scientists to study a variety of subjects which involve estimating the
likelihood of an event occurring given that that subject under observation has “survived” until
the point at which it is being observed, For example, one might be interested in the effect of
electoral system on the durability of governments or the impact of external third parties on
the speed by which post conflict peace negotiations are concluded. The main variable of
11
interest in event history analysis is the hazard rate, which refers to the instantaneous
probability of an event occurring given at time t given that the subject has not experienced the
event prior to time t.
In this study the event we are “waiting for” is ministerial promotion in a single government,
as distinguished from a ministry. That is to say, we are interested in those occurrences when a
minister moves from a junior position to a more senior position in cabinet. While it is
tempting to consider those instances when one moves from a lowly to a more prestigious
portfolio, we consider, in this instance, that the ability to rank the importance, prestige or
significance of a portfolio over time and across cases is a herculean task which is likely to
invite only criticism and net little reward given the subjectivity associated with labeling
anything political as “important”: after all, a rose is a rose is a rose. For a portfolio which on
one day may seem to someone flat and routine it needs only a shocking event and in a matter
of seconds it can become the most “important”/desirable/loathed portfolio in the cabinet – as
was the case with the Canadian transport portfolio following the 2013 train derailment
disaster at Lac Mégantic which killed 42 people. To be sure, the Minister of Transport has
been busy since the explosion, but the “importance” of that portfolio in the cabinet has waned
as time distances the present day from July 6, 2013. Portfolio salience is probably better
conceived of as a moving average than an ideal point fixed in time by a response to an expert
survey.10 The same holds true to the identification of so-called “pink “portfolios which have
the potential to turn deep crimson in the event of a crisis or natural disaster or change colour
altogether as attitudes, norms and beliefs change over time.
10
Of course, the expert surveys which pinpoint portfolio saliencies are the best instruments
available to researchers.
12
All this to say, we do not attempt to make a methodological contribution by providing a
better mousetrap to harvest portfolio rankings across country cases and across time. Rather,
we identify those instances when a minister moves up from one defined strata in the cabinet
hierarchy to another. In this case, when a junior minister is promoted to a full member of the
cabinet. We take this approach because these changes are easily identifiable: they usually
involve an official change in title, stature and an increase in remuneration. We feel that we
can safely say that such a move is a qualitative and quantitative step up the cabinet ladder
without having to dirty our hands in a portfolio salience beauty contest. In order to identify
portfolio ranking, we turn to the SEDEPE codebook and variable V.09 Ministerial Position in
particular (see appendix for SEDEPE portfolio ranking codes). Any upward movement in the
cabinet is coded as 1; non-movements and demotions are coded as 0. To simplify matters we
pool ranks 2, 3, 4 and 5 into a single “junior” category given the absence and/or near absence
of variation of this value among our cases.
Our longitudinally organized dataset consists of 2358 ministers drawn from three
Westminster-derived parliamentary systems: Australia, Canada and New Zealand for the
period 1945-2012. Note that these ministers are cloned by individual government such that a
Jean Chretien who serves in Pearson’s 1965-68 government is distinct from a Jean Chretien
who served in Trudeau’s 1980-84 government. Each individual minister’s duration in
government is recorded and segmented by monthly (30 day) intervals. By taking this
approach we are then able to record whether or not a minister “experienced” a promotion in
any one of the monthly intervals over the course of their duration in government. We find
that there are 76 instances of promotion from the junior minister level to the full cabinet
minister level. Of course, there are also those cases where no movement occurred at all. For
example when a minister is appointed initially as a full minister (1848 instances) , or when he
13
or she remains a junior minister 434 instances). We also treat those ministers who hold both
junior and full cabinet portfolios as full cabinet ministers and those full cabinet ministers who
are assigned an additional junior portfolio are not treated have having experienced a
demotion. Intra-cabinet ministerial demotions, more closely related to ministerial
resignations, are a subject for later research and are not addressed in this paper.
We also record our primary variable of interest, sex of the minister, using a dummy variable
(1 = female, 0 otherwise). Of the 2358 ministers, 232 (9.84 percent) are coded as female.
When we turn our eye to some basic descriptive statistics Table 1 indicates that 57.76 percent
of women are appointed to cabinet at the level of full minister; 42 percent are appointed at a
junior minister level. This contrasts with men, for whom 80.62 percent are appointed at the
full minister level and 19.83 are appointed at the junior minister level. A chi square test with
one degree of freedom produces a statistic of 64.5, which is statistically significant at the 0.05
level. When we compare sex and ministerial ranks on the date of appointment with the last
day of service (end of government or individual resignation)(see Table 2), we find only a
small increase in the proportion of ministers serving at the full minister level for both sexes,
as well as a corresponding decrease at the junior level. The chi square test is also statistically
significant at the 0.05 level.
Table 3 shows that of the 98 female junior ministers eligible for promotion to full cabinet
minister only 8.16 (19 percent) were ultimately promoted. This contrasts with the 16.46 of
male junior ministers who were promoted to full cabinet minister. The chi square was
statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
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To summarize: female cabinet ministers appear to be underrepresented in the senior ranks of
the cabinet regardless of the portfolio they might hold, both at the point at which they are
appointed to cabinet and at the point when their role in cabinet comes to an end. More
worrisome, we find that the proportion of women who are promoted from the junior ranks to
the senior ranks in cabinet is half of that of their male counterparts. In each of these examples
the differences between male and female ministers with respect to both rank and promotion
does not appear to be occurring as a result of sampling error.
The next step in this process involves developing a model of ministerial promotion where we
can ascertain the direction and the magnitude of the effect of sex on positive intra-cabinet
movement. To accomplish this task we first present the non-parametric Kaplan Meier
survival curves which provides an indication of the rate at which ministers accelerate towards
promotion. We follow this with a simple but effective Cox proportional hazards model which
estimates the instantaneous probability of promotion in cabinet given that a minister has
survived up until the point of observation. A unique feature of hazard models in general
entails the ability to specify the parametric shape of the baseline hazard over time: it may be
constant, rising, falling, rising then falling or falling then rising. However, and in the case of
human and social behavior it is often difficult to theorize what shape the hazard should take.
The Cox approach circumvents this challenge and provides good estimates of the regression
coefficients which come close to the results which would be generated by the correct
parametric model (for more see Box Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).
Figure 2 presents the Kaplan Meier survival curve for all junior ministers in the dataset. The
median survival time (that is time until promotion) is 47 months. However, the median is
being unduly influenced by the the longer government durations in Canada, which are not
15
experienced in Australia and New Zealand due to fixed election dates which produce shorter
governments. Indeed this becomes evident when we break down the pooled graph by country
case (Figure 3). However, by distinguishing the country cases, we are also able to see that
ministers accelerate towards promotion fastest in Canada, followed by Australia and then
New Zealand. When we plot the Kaplan Meier survival curve to compare the survival rates
between males and females we find that the survival curves for males are steeper than those
for females which indicates that male junior ministers exit their status as junior ministers in
order to become full ministers at a faster rate than female ministers, all else equal. A log rank
test of the null hypothesis of a common survival curve for males and females produces a chi
sq statistic of 5.79 which is statistically significant at the .05 level; the curves for males and
female are different and the difference is not likely attributed to chance.
Table 4 presents the Cox proportional hazard model of ministerial promotion. The model is
intentionally simple at this stage in the research process: we include a sex dummy variable as
our main independent variable, a country indicator variable which we use to control for
country specific political cultures and we employ a shared frailty specification to account for
unobserved heterogeneity; the frailty variable is individual government: eg. Mulroney 1,
Mulroney 2, Campbell 1, Chretien 1. The results of the model are encouraging, at least with
respect to our expectations; less so with respect to the normative assumptions regarding the
relationship between sex and cabinet promotion. The hazard ratio of 0.41 for the sex (female
= 1) variable tells that female junior ministers have hazards of cabinet promotion which are
.41 that of their male counterparts. Or put another way, the likelihood of promotion for
female cabinet ministers is 59 percent lower for female ministers than for male ministers.
This confirms our expectation that female ministers appear to be working at a disadvantage,
all else equal, when working their way up the cabinet hierarchy.
16
Full blown conclusions and recommendations for further research and the generalizability of
our model for other cases are probably premature at this stage in the research process. We are
encourage that our initial hunch has been demonstrated to accurate, albeit in the simplied
model that we present above. The next stage in the research process will involve collecting
and coding data to test the hypotheses that we set out in the literature review. More important
however, this research on intra-cabinet promotions points to the need to have a more serious
discussion about how portfolio salience and ranking can be used when working with
comparative longitudinal data structures. The assignment of what constitutes “important” or
“pink” across time and space should be replaced by a more systematic, replicable or at the
very least repeatable approach to ranking portfolios if this avenue of research is to advance in
the future.
17
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23
Appendix 1.
SEDEPE CODEBOOK
v.09: MINISTERIAL POSITION
1 Minister in the cabinet (full minister)
2 Minister outside the cabinet / Minister of State
3 Vice Minister (when he/she can vote substituting the Minister)
4 Junior Minister (delegated undersecretary with no vote in cabinet)
5 Other
24
Table 1: Proportion of Male and Female Ministers on their first day in
cabinet, by ministerial rank.
. tab min_ministerial_rank female,col row chi
+-------------------+
| Key
|
|-------------------|
|
frequency
|
| row percentage
|
| column percentage |
+-------------------+
|
female
min_ministerial_rank |
0
1 |
Total
----------------------+----------------------+---------Minister in the cabin |
1,714
134 |
1,848
|
92.75
7.25 |
100.00
|
80.62
57.76 |
78.37
----------------------+----------------------+---------Minister outside the |
412
98 |
510
|
80.78
19.22 |
100.00
|
19.38
42.24 |
21.63
----------------------+----------------------+---------Total |
2,126
232 |
2,358
|
90.16
9.84 |
100.00
|
100.00
100.00 |
100.00
Pearson chi2(1) =
64.5002
Pr = 0.000
Description: In this table we find that on the first day (so 2358 first days) that any cabinet
minister serves in a government, 57.76 percent of women who are serving in cabinet serve at
the level of full cabinet minister; 42 percent of women serve as junior ministers. Contrast this
with 80.62 percent of men who serve as full cabinet ministers and 19.38 percent who serve as
junior ministers. The differences between these categories are stastistically significant at the
.05 level.
25
Table 2: Proportion of Male and Female Ministers on their last day in
cabinet, by ministerial rank.
. tab min_ministerial_rank female, col row chi
+-------------------+
| Key
|
|-------------------|
|
frequency
|
| row percentage
|
| column percentage |
+-------------------+
|
female
min_ministerial_rank |
0
1 |
Total
----------------------+----------------------+---------Minister in the cabin |
1,794
143 |
1,937
|
92.62
7.38 |
100.00
|
84.38
61.64 |
82.15
----------------------+----------------------+---------Minister outside the |
332
89 |
421
|
78.86
21.14 |
100.00
|
15.62
38.36 |
17.85
----------------------+----------------------+---------Total |
2,126
232 |
2,358
|
90.16
9.84 |
100.00
|
100.00
100.00 |
100.00
Pearson chi2(1) =
73.7886
Pr = 0.000
Description: This frequency table show us that on the last day of any minister’s duration in
cabinet (prior to the end of a government) 82.15 percent of ministers serve at the rank of full
cabinet minister; 17.85 percent serve at the rank of junior minister. On that last day, 61.64
percent of women serve as full ministers compared to 84.38 of men who serve as full
ministers. Relatedly, 38.36 percent of women serve at the junior level compared to 15.62 of
men. A chi square test which tests the differences in the categories is statistically significant
at the 0.05 level.
26
Table 3: Eligible for promotion and promoted, by sex
. tab promoted female, col row chi
+-------------------+
| Key
|
|-------------------|
|
frequency
|
| row percentage
|
| column percentage |
+-------------------+
promoted
|
female
|
0
1 |
Total
-----------+----------------------+---------0 |
345
90 |
435
|
79.31
20.69 |
100.00
|
83.54
91.84 |
85.13
-----------+----------------------+---------1 |
68
8 |
76
|
89.47
10.53 |
100.00
|
16.46
8.16 |
14.87
-----------+----------------------+---------Total |
413
98 |
511
|
80.82
19.18 |
100.00
|
100.00
100.00 |
100.00
Pearson chi2(1) =
4.3114
Pr = 0.038
Description: This table tells us that of the 511 ministers who held the rank of junior minister,
19.18 percent were women, 80.82 were men. Of the women 8.16 were promoted to full
cabinet minister at some point over the course of a government, whereas 16.46 of the men
were promoted. A chi square test is statistically significant at the 0.05 level; we can reject the
null hypothesis that women and men are the same with respect to promotion and nonpromotion.
27
Ministers who remain static in rank (referred to in paper, but designated
table)
. tab max_promoted min_ministerial_rank
max_promot | min_ministerial_rank
ed | Minister
Minister |
Total
-----------+----------------------+---------0 |
1,848
434 |
2,282
1 |
43
33 |
76
-----------+----------------------+---------Total |
1,891
467 |
2,358
28
Table 4: Cox Proportional Hazard Model of Intra-cabinet promotion
. stcox female i.country2, shared(v03) forceshared
== 2
noshow, if min_ministerial_rank
Fitting comparison Cox model:
Estimating frailty variance:
<< output omitted >>
Cox regression -Breslow method for ties
Gamma shared frailty
Group variable: v03
Number of obs
Number of groups
=
=
11899
46
No. of subjects =
No. of failures =
Time at risk
=
Obs per group: min =
avg =
max =
2
258.6739
1013
Log likelihood
=
11899
76
11899
-404.74135
Wald chi2(3)
Prob > chi2
=
=
16.21
0.0010
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------_t | Haz. Ratio
Std. Err.
z
P>|z|
[95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------female |
.4052389
.1537098
-2.38
0.017
.1926836
.8522705
|
country211 |
Canada |
2.252043
.6795949
2.69
0.007
1.246554
4.068574
New Zealand |
.4209827
.2696041
-1.35
0.177
.1199889
1.477023
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------theta |
.1353353
.1647863
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------Likelihood-ratio test of theta=0: chibar2(01) =
1.14 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.143
Note: Standard errors of hazard ratios are conditional on theta.
11
Baseline = Australia
29
Figure 2: Kaplan Meier Survival Estimates (all junior ministers pooled)
Kaplan-Meier survival estimate
junior minister--> full minister
1.00
0.75
0.50
0.25
0.00
0
20
40
60
Months
30
Figure 3: Kaplan Meier Survival Estimates, by country case
Kaplan-Meier survival estimates
junior minister--> full minister
by country
1.00
0.75
0.50
0.25
Australia
Canada
New Zealand
0.00
0
20
40
60
Months
31
Figure 4: Kaplan Meier Survival Estimates, by sex
Kaplan-Meier survival estimates
junior minister--> full minister
by sex
1.00
0.75
0.50
0.25
Male
Female
0.00
0
20
40
60
Months
32