State Responses to Energy Transitions: Great Power
Navies and their Transition from Coal to Oil
A dissertation submitted to the
Graduate School
of the University of Cincinnati
In partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
In the Department of Political Science
of the College of Arts and Sciences
by
Robert B. Nestheide, B.A.,
July 2016
Committee Chair: Thomas G. Moore, PhD
1
Abstract
This dissertation examines state and military responses to energy transitions. The research uses a
methodological approach of within-case comparison to examine state and naval policy responses
over time during the transition from coal to oil-fueled naval fleets. This framework for
categorizing and understanding state reactions to new energy technologies explores the
concurrent impact of both systemic and domestic level variables and contributes to the field of
political science by exploring the process of technological diffusion. This approach can be
replicated and applied to both other states and other energy transitions, providing a platform for
future investigations into the impact of energy transitions and the role of state organizations in
shaping the outcomes of such transitions. The dissertation contributes to the various literatures
by filling a gap in the qualitative assessment of state and military experiences during energy
transitions and also by tracing the process by which new energy technology diffused among
different states and militaries.
2
3
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Dr. Thomas G. Moore for his support, advice, and thoughtful feedback,
provided over the course of my time as a graduate student at the University of Cincinnati. I am
also very thankful for the feedback and advice of Dr. Richard Harknett, whose suggestions were
integral to the completion of this project. I am particularly thankful for the support and feedback
from Dr. Joel Wolfe, who was always willing to discuss the project and regularly reminded me to
see the bigger picture. I would also like to thank the Political Science Department, for the years
of support and encouragement they have given. I am thankful for the financial support from The
Charles Phelps Taft Research Center, the Graduate School and also the Department of Political
Science. Lastly, I would like to thank my wife, Shawna Nestheide, and my parents, Dr. Robert
Nestheide and Kathy Nestheide, for continual support and encouragement.
4
Table of Contents
Chapter 1 – Introduction………………………………………………
7
Chapter 2 – Energy, Energy Transitions, and Modern
Military Organizations: A Review of the Literature……..
20
Chapter 3 – Military Organizations, Innovation, and Technological
Diffusion A Review of the Literature:……………………
66
Chapter 4 – The American Navy’s Transition from
Coal to Oil: 1904-1918…………………………………..
108
Chapter 5 – The British Navy’s Transition from
Coal to Oil: 1904-1918…………………………………...
177
Chapter 6 – Comparative Analysis of the U.S. and British
Transition from Coal to Oil……………………………….
228
Bibliography…………………………………………………………….
270
Appendix
282
……………………………………………………………
5
List of Figures and Tables
1.1 – American Energy Consumption by source 1850-2000…………………………
1.2 – American Energy Consumption by source 1949-2011…………………………
1.3 – World Energy Consumption by source 1986-2012…………………………......
5.1 – British Naval expenditure on battleships and cruisers 1889-1904………………
5.2 – United Kingdom Oil Imports by source 1914-1929…………………………….
5.3 – Great Power Navy Battleships built and building 1896-1906…………………..
5.4 – Fuel Oil purchased by the Admiralty 1902-1912……………………………….
5.5 – British, French, and German expenditure on aeronautics 1911-1913…………..
5.6 – British Coal production 1820-present…………………………………………..
5.7 – British Colliers sunk 1914-1918………………………………………………..
5.8 – British Oilers sunk 1914-1918………………………………………………….
6.1 – General Typology of Energy Transition policies……………………………….
22
23
24
181
191
197
200
208
211
217
217
261
Maps
5.1 – German U-Boat attacks around the British Isles 1914-15………………………….
5.2 – German U-Boat attacks around the British Isles 1916………………………….
5.3 – German U-Boat attacks around the British Isles 1917………………………….
5.4 – German U-Boat attacks around the British Isles 1918………………………….
219
219
220
220
6
1
Introduction
The significant role of energy security in state grand strategy is widely acknowledged. However
transitions by state militaries from one energy source to another are understudied. Many scholars
and scientists have noted the likely future transition from fossil fuels to other, more sustainable,
resources. In order to prepare for and manage future likely transitions, it is important that we
examine past transitions as a contribution to security studies. This dissertation focuses on great
power navies and their transition from using coal to using oil to fuel their fleets. This research
will examine state responses to this energy transition and will seek to provide a generalizable
framework for understanding state responses to such transitions.
Overview Of the Research Problem and Existing Literature
Issues of Energy and Energy transitions
The subject of natural resources has received considerable attention within the discipline of
Political Science, especially within the subfield of International Political Economy1 (IPE) but
also in broader security-oriented debates among scholars of international relations involving
1
Simon Bromley, American Hegemony and World Oil (University Park: The Pennsylvania
State University Press, 1991); C.J. Campbell, Oil Crisis (Brentwood: Multi-Science Publishing
Company Ltd., 2005); Frieden and Rogowski in Robert O Keohane, and Helen V. Milner. eds.,
Internationalization and Domestic Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996);
Richard Heinberg, The Party’s Over: Oil, War and the Fate of Industrial Societies (Gabriola
Island: New Society Publishers, 2003); Mary Kaldor, Terry Karl, and Yahia Said. eds., Oil Wars
(London: Pluto Press, 2007); Robert O Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in
the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Michael T Klare,
Blood and Oil (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004); Georg Koopmann, Laus Matthies, and
Beate Reszat, Oil and the International Economy: Lessons From Two Price Shocks (New
Brunswick: Translation Publishers, 1989); Morse in Stiles, Kendall W. Stiles and Tsuneo Akaha
eds. International Political Economy: A Reader (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1991)
7
balance of power theory.2 Fossil fuels, namely coal and oil, with their peculiar importance to
both economic and military affairs, serve as an interesting point of intersection between the two
fields. Indeed, there is a well-established literature that deals with fossils fuels and the role of oil
in particular. At the same time, there also appears to be a lacuna within these literatures relating
to transitions from one major energy source to another.
Given the non-renewable nature of fossil fuel resources,3 as well as the extensive and increasing
consumption of these resources on a global scale, there are occasionally periods of transition
2
On the importance of deciding where to allocate scarce resources see Bull, Hedley. The
Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 3rd ed. London: Palgrave, 2002. pp. 107;
On the matter of differentiating between power as resources and power as capability to realize
ends see Brooks, Stephen G. and William C. Wohlforth. World out of Balance: International
Relations and the challenge of American Primacy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008.
pp. 11 and also on resources and latent power pp. 211; On the preponderance of both power and
resources present within status-quo states see Carr, Edward Hallett. The Twenty Years’ Crisis,
1919-1939: An introduction to the Study of International Relations. New York: Harper Collins,
1946. pp. 119-120; On resource scarcity and its role in his description of a Rawlsian balance of
power system see Midlarsky, Manus I. “The Balance of Power as a “Just” Historical System.”
Polity Vol. 16, (Winter, 1983): pp. 193 & 200; On a shortage of resources hindering internal
balancing in Britain prior to WWII see Papayoanou, Paul A. Power Ties: Economic
Interdependence, Balancing and War. Ann Arbor:The Univeristy of Michigan Press, 1999. pp.
107-108, also on the connection between economic resources and military capabilities see pp.
131, most importantly on US policymakers during WWII as defining power as control over and
access to resources see also pp. 131.
3
Banks, Ferdinand B. The Political Economy of Oil. Lexington: Lexington Books, 1980;
Bromley, Simon. American Hegemony and World Oil. University Park: The Pennsylvania
State University Press, 1991; Campbell, C.J. Oil Crisis. Brentwood: Multi-Science Publishing
Company Ltd., 2005; Hicks, Brian, and Chris Nelder. Profit From the Peak: The End of Oil and
the Greatest Investment Event of the Century. Hoboken: Angel Publishing, 2008; Klare,
Michael T. Blood and Oil. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004; Koopmann, Georg, Laus
Matthies, and Beate Reszat. Oil and the International Economy: Lessons From Two Price
Shocks. New Brunswick: Translation Publishers, 1989; Mabro, Robert. ed. Oil in the 21st
Century: Issues, Challenges and Opportunities; Mills, Robin M. The Myth of the Oil Crisis:
Overcoming the Challenges of Depletion, Geopolitics, and Global Warming. Westport: Prager
Publishers, 2008; Mommer, Bernard. Global Oil and the Nation State. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002; Nore, Peter, and Terisa Turner. Oil and Class Struggle. London: Zed
Press, 1980; Paul, William Henry. Future Energy: How the New Oil Industry Will Change
People, Politics and Portfolios. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 2007.
8
between older, waning resource usage paradigms and newer, increasing resource usage
paradigms. While these events are rare, I contend that they are extremely significant to both the
conduct of international affairs in their time and thus ultimately to the course of world history.
Yet these transitions have also been understudied. Understanding and explaining state responses
to major energy transitions is the central purpose of this study. More specifically, why did the
American and British Navies decide to transition their naval fleets from being fueled by coal to
being fueled by oil?
The Research Question and Existing Literature
Within the literature on organization theory and bureaucratic politics there is some consensus
that military organizations resist change. Due to the basic values and qualities of military
organizations and their attempts to reduce uncertainty, it is argued that they have little interest in
change.4 If militaries are generally resistant to change, then why is it that we see great power
navies make the dramatic change to a new type of fuel for their naval fleets?
The literature indicates that we do see change and innovation within militaries under certain
circumstances. Barry Posen, in an excellent summary of how organization theory views military
innovation and change, states that the literature sees three broad explanations for why militaries
might support radical change; failure (military defeat), outside pressure (civilian), and desire for
expansion.5 With these ideas in mind, the U.S. and British (and other) naval transitions from
coal to oil seem problematic for organizational theory.
4
Posen, Barry R. The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the
World Wars Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. edited by Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1984, pg. 46
5
Ibid, pg. 47; and pg. 55-57
9
Both the U.S. and British navies began to transition to fuel-burning ships prior to WWI and as
such neither power experienced a major defeat at sea (or otherwise) that could explain their
decision to switch to a new fuel for naval propulsion. Also, as the U.S. and British were the first
states to pursue such a change, there was no demonstration of the effectiveness of this new fuel
in wartime. Secondarily, while there was some outside pressure from the oil and gas industry for
such a change it does not seem as though that effort was sufficiently substantial or impactful to
explain this change on its own.6 Regarding a desire for expansion, while this could help explain
the U.S. case, in this time period the British Empire was at its zenith and the maintenance of the
status quo, rather than expansion, would better describe British policy.
Furthermore, both the U.S. and the British were in a strong position as major coal producers
during the coal era and switching to a new, militarily unproven, type of fuel would have
increased uncertainty. While the U.S. was a major oil producer at the time, Great Britain was
not. These issues highlight aspects of the major puzzle that this dissertation hopes to solve.
Current theoretical literature may be helpful in understanding state responses to this energy
transition, yet they are not fully adequate. Thus, I will examine these cases along four important
explanatory variables to answer the central research question: Why did the American and British
Navies decide to transition their naval fleets from being fueled by coal to being fueled by oil?
6
Civilian pressure upon the U.S. government generally came from the private oil and gas sector,
specifically from trade journals such as the Oil and Gas Journal.
10
Explanatory Variables and Questions
Here I will identify the questions and sub-questions that articulate the key explanatory variables
along which state responses to the coal-oil transition may vary. Understanding the specific
manner in which state responses differed in relation to these concepts will allow this study to
better explain not only why states responded in the way they did, but it should also provide
explanatory power for understanding the differences across states. As discussed later,
explanations of the case studies may allow for the creation of a generalizable framework for the
understanding of state responses to energy transitions. Below I describe the several dichotomous
ideational constructs, which encapsulate the scope of possible state responses to energy
transitions. Process-tracing the responses of states to the coal-oil transition should allow me to
classify each state’s response according to each of these different qualitative possibilities.
Policy origins (who) and Policy content (how): What did states conclude was the best approach
for ensuring access to this novel resource? Which branch of each state implemented policies
most related to the energy transition, legislative, executive, or judicial? Which types of policies
were used to shape and steer the process by which this transition took place:
financial/monetary/economic, military/political, or technological/research and development?
Here the goal is to add a depth of policy categorization, and to assess which category of policies
was most impactful throughout the transition. This category will be assessed by determining
articulated state and navy preference for one approach or the other, statements and efforts by
politicians and bureaucrats emphasizing one approach or the other, and also state-private sector
interactions and agreements on the provision of the new resource for state navies.
11
Intense-Relaxed (when/pace): Upon recognition of the need/desire to make the switch from coal
to oil, what was the pace of the transition? Was it rather intense or was it relaxed? Did the states
pursue the transition with a sense of urgency? Was the state response seen as an emergency, as
something that needed to be forced or was it thought that a slower, piecemeal approach was
adequate? How quickly did government and naval officials think the transition should and could
take place? What level of resources was budgeted in order to accomplish this transition; in other
words, who spent the most on what? Also, how was this transition prioritized in relationship to
other state and naval goals? The policies described will be divided into three time periods during
the overall course of the transition: the investigative period, the pre-war transition, and the
wartime transition. This approach will show changes in state transition policies over time, and
will also demonstrate differences between peacetime and wartime policies.
Domestic-International: (location/where) Did states respond by developing production
capability at home or abroad? Did the state encourage acquisition of this resource by its navy
from domestic or foreign sources? Did it develop technological capability through its own
nationals or via cooperation with foreign entities? Did the state possess a natural endowment of
oil or was it forced to go elsewhere to obtain it? Did states pursue domestic or international
prospecting by geologists and oilmen at home, abroad, or both and to what degree? Did states
encourage this activity through domestic legal or foreign diplomatic measures and to what
degree? Also did states and navies seek foreign cooperation on securing the new resource or did
they rely on their own capacity?
12
Offensive-Defensive: (why) Did states see this change as something needed for the projection of
power, or was it viewed as shoring up state positions? Were states hoping to use this to expand
their influence and reach, or simply to maintain the status-quo? Did states believe that such a
change would give them a military advantage over their rivals? Which strategic and tactical
properties of oil over coal were seen as advantageous for the states and their navies? What were
the possible drawbacks or risks? Was this transition seen as altering naval doctrine or was it
simply applied to pre-existing coal-era doctrine? How did this transition impact naval practice?
Research Design and Methodology
As previously stated this study hopes to illuminate the nature of state responses to energy
transitions. Major energy transitions are complex events, and this study is focused on the more
narrow area of how state military organizations respond to broader socio-economic energy
transitions. The methodology utilized is a qualitative case study to process-trace why great
power navies chose to switch the primary type of fuel used by their fleets. In that sense, the case
to be examined is the broader energy transition from coal to oil. Following from this, the
methodological approach consists of a “within-case” comparison of state responses to the
broader energy transition. That broader transition represents my independent variable, while my
dependent variables are the responses to that transition by the various great power navies under
consideration.
On the basis of a detailed process-tracing of the American and British responses to this
transition, I will develop a generalizable framework for the classification of state responses to
energy transitions. I will examine the various policies and strategies implemented by the U.S.
13
and Britain in response to the coal-oil transition by focusing on the previously discussed list of
sub-questions related to the four key explanatory variables. In doing so, I hope to provide
answers to the aforementioned puzzle. I will then utilize this framework to provide brief
commentary on the impact of this transition, state responses to the transition, and also to describe
what lessons can be learned and applied to likely future transitions.
Within Case Comparison: The United States and Great Britain
The central focus of this dissertation is to address my primary research question: Why did the
American and British Navies decide to transition their naval fleets from being fueled by coal to
being fueled by oil? In order to answer this question I will process-trace state policy and policy
discussions related to each state’s navy and their decisions to implement this change. The
specific time period under consideration is roughly from 1900 to 1918. By 1900 the major naval
powers had begun investigating the possibility of using oil to fuel their ships, and the First World
War provides the first great-power battlefield experience with the use of such ships among
modern navies.
Data relevant to this study will be obtained from primary source documentation7 from the
American Navy, Congressional records related to budgetary provisions for the Navy, Executive
7
Many primary source documents related to this period have recently been made available
online by both the United States and Great Britain, including records on the US Navy available
through Congressional Prosearch at
http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/result/pqpresultpage?accountid=2909&groupid
=121082&pgId=cc248636-46a1-4ac6-877b-e07fdb3aaa73&rsId=1460FC1A17C . Also records
from the US Department of State’s Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States,
1914, Supplement The World War, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1914, available at
14
and policy decision-making records, and records from the State Department. For the British case,
the relevant data stems from copious primary source documentation, although those documents
are only available in physical form in London. As such it was necessary to rely on the extensive
secondary literature and unpublished dissertations that detail the contents of those records, as the
author was unable to travel to Britain to examine the records personally due to financial and time
limitations. Also, important sources of information relevant to the transition are available in
each state’s records from the relevant military and bureaucratic bodies during the First World
War.
I will utilize the primary source documentation along with secondary historical literature to
process-trace the state and naval responses to this energy transition with an emphasis on
classifying those responses categorically in terms of the key explanatory variables. In depth case
studies of the U.S. and British experiences will allow for the creation of a generalizable
framework for the understanding of state responses to energy transitions. The goal is to create an
approach to understanding not only the cases studied in this dissertation, but also to understand
and possibly anticipate state responses to future likely energy transitions.
Dissertation Outline and Overview
1) Introduction: State Responses to Energy Transitions
2) Energy and Modern Military Organizations
3) Military Organizations, Innovation, and Technological Diffusion
4) The American Navy’s Transition from Coal to Oil
5) The British Navy’s Transition from Coal to Oil
6) Conclusions and Analysis
Chapter two will focus on the role of energy in political and military affairs. More specifically,
the goal is to understand the reactions by states to major energy transitions. In order to do so, one
http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUSidx?type=header&id=FRUS.FRUS1914Supp&isize=M.
15
must first examine general issues within the field of energy and also understand the general
behavior of modern military organizations. This chapter will provide an overview of the energy
literature and will seek to identify critical concepts that will need to be incorporated into the case
studies at the core of this dissertation. Additionally, this chapter will describe areas of particular
interest to how states navigate periods of energy transition. Modern machines of war require
fuel, or mineral resources, to fulfill their purpose as a substitute for manpower or animal power.
In the case of navies, fossil fuel supplanted the prevailing winds as a source of locomotive
power. With military policy generally sitting atop, or near the top, of any given state’s list of
priorities, ensuring access to resources essential for military activity became a strategic foreign
policy imperative. The nature of human energy source usage indicates that in the future there
will likely be energy transitions that are similar to past transitions. Consequently, this chapter
will provide a summary of the relevant issues and concerns stemming from academic research in
the area of military organizations and their reliance on such energy resources.
Chapter 3 focuses on the processes by which militaries investigate, consider, and either do or do
not adopt new forms of technology into their doctrines and operations. At its core, an energy
transition consists of the diffusion of new forms of energy technology between states and
military organizations. The focus of this chapter is the development of oil-powered machinery
for the purposes of defense and the projection of military power. As oil technology improved,
developed, and became more widespread, military organizations began incorporating that
technology into their arsenal of capabilities. They also began a process of developing and
researching the possibilities presented by such technology and changing their behavior based
upon the new realities of this energy transition. To trace the process of the particular energy
16
transition under examination here, the author must first summarize the relevant theories and
concepts related to the diffusion of technological innovation within militaries more generally.
The next two chapters trace the processes by which the American and British Navies made the
transition from coal to oil. The within-case comparison of these two navies focuses on how and
why these organizations began to research, experiment with, and ultimately purchase and build
the requisite technological implements needed to propel their fleets with oil instead of coal. One
aspect of this work involves the development of an historical narrative detailing the important
individuals, bureaucratic governing bodies, private corporations and others who played an
important role in moving the transition forward. To facilitate analysis, the findings of the case
studies are organized by placing the data within a three-by-three matrix that categorizes policies
according to which branch of government the policy stemmed from and the type of policy that
was implemented. In turn, these policies are then placed within a two-by-two matrix that
categorizes them as either domestic or international in orientation, and as either defensive or
offensive in strategic quality. Finally, these matrixes are organized chronologically by timeperiod within the transition as follows: the investigative period, the pre-war transition, and the
wartime transition.
The final chapter will provide comparative analysis of the American and British navies, and will
describe lessons that can be learned from the process tracing of this transition as well as the
states’ responses to it. The author intends to illuminate these state responses to energy
transitions, and to generate a typology of generalizable propositions about how states are likely
to respond to future transitions.
17
Conclusions
This dissertation is significant for several reasons. First, this particular transition demonstrates
state behavior that seems contradictory to what would be predicted by established theory. This
transition dramatically impacted state capacity for war making and the projection of power. The
technological breakthroughs and improvements created in the immediate aftermath of this
transition still serve as the primary tools of war by state militaries across the globe today. Thus,
a detailed examination of great-power naval transitions from coal to oil should illuminate state
perceptions related to these matters and facilitate the development of a framework for making
generalizations about state responses to energy transitions.
Secondly, this transition serves as the first major energy transition that states experienced after
the initial industrial revolution. Given the widespread consensus that modern industrialized
nations will experience some future transition away from hydrocarbon fuel, common sense
would dictate that scholars make an attempt to understand such transitions to the fullest. While
new technology in renewable energy has begun to permeate the broader economy, militaries are
still firmly entrenched in their reliance on hydrocarbon fuel.
Lastly, this research finds that the primary drivers of the diffusion of oil-based technology are
competition and imitation. States feared the rising power of competitors and sought advantages
through new energy technology. Additionally, navies imitated rival navies, both in building
capital ships, submarines, and aircraft, and also in testing the capabilities of new engines and fuel
sources for battleships and destroyers. These findings directly contribute to the literature on the
diffusion of technology, and in particular help to understand the diffusion of energy technology.
18
Also, the case studies demonstrate a cautious but proactive military approach to the new energy
technology of the time, and thus challenge the conventional wisdom of the military organization
literature that militaries resist new technology, or that militaries must witness or experience a
new technology on the battlefield prior to acceptance and implementation of its use.
Moreover, this research contributes to the literature on energy by tracing the process by which
two great power navies react to, manage, steer, and ultimately promote the transition from coal to
oil for fueling their vessels. While there are endless written works on the importance of energy,
there are very few works focused solely on energy transitions, and this work helps to begin to fill
that gap. This dissertation identifies how the coal-oil transition introduced two new dimensions
to warfare through submarines and aircraft, and demonstrates the myriad and dramatic ways in
which energy transitions can impact military organizations and wars between them. Conversely,
the case studies also demonstrate how military organizations can shape and steer the trajectory of
energy transitions. Due to their function, and their status, militaries are often at the forefront of
technology. From this position military organizations can alter the manner, speed, and direction
in which technology spreads.
A breakthrough in energy usage for the purposes of military power projection along renewable
lines would dramatically alter the position of any of the great powers. Thus, understanding the
possible implications of such a transition is an important goal of this research. Through this
dissertation, it is my intention to provide a framework for assessing state responses to energy
transitions, while contributing to the literature regarding state behavior, international relations,
and also the international political economy.
19
2
Energy, Energy Transitions and Modern Military Organizations
A Review of the Literature
The goal of this dissertation is to understand the reactions by states to major energy transitions.
In order to do so, one must first examine general issues within the field of energy and also
understand the general behavior of modern military organizations. This chapter will provide an
overview of the energy literature and will seek to identify critical concepts that will need to be
incorporated into the case studies at the core of this dissertation. More specifically, I will
describe areas of particular interest to how states navigate periods of energy transition. Before
reviewing that literature, a brief word on energy transitions is necessary.
The subject of natural resources has received considerable attention within the discipline of
Political Science, especially within the subfield of International Political Economy8 (IPE) but
also in broader security-oriented debates among scholars of international relations involving
balance of power theory.9 Since the industrial revolution there has been a complex and intimate
8
Simon Bromley, American Hegemony and World Oil (University Park: The Pennsylvania
State University Press, 1991); C.J. Campbell, Oil Crisis (Brentwood: Multi-Science Publishing
Company Ltd., 2005); Frieden and Rogowski in Robert O Keohane, and Helen V. Milner. Eds.
Internationalization and Domestic Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996);
Richard Heinberg, The Party’s Over: Oil, War and the Fate of Industrial Societies (Gabriola
Island: New Society Publishers, 2003); Mary Kaldor, Terry Karl, and Yahia Said. Eds. Oil Wars
(London: Pluto Press, 2007); Robert O Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in
the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Michael T Klare,
Blood and Oil (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004); Georg Koopmann, Laus Matthies, and
Beate Reszat, Oil and the International Economy: Lessons From Two Price Shocks (New
Brunswick: Translation Publishers, 1989); Morse in Stiles, Kendall W. Stiles and Tsuneo Akaha
eds. International Political Economy: A Reader (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1991)
9
On the importance of deciding where to allocate scarce resources see Bull, Hedley. The
Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 3rd ed. London: Palgrave, 2002. pp. 107;
On the matter of differentiating between power as resources and power as capability to realize
ends see Brooks, Stephen G. and William C. Wohlforth. World out of Balance: International
Relations and the challenge of American Primacy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008.
20
relationship between military organizations and energy and mineral resources. Modern machines
of war require fuel, or mineral resources, to fulfill their purpose as a substitute for manpower or
animal power. In the case of navies, fossil fuel supplanted the prevailing winds as a source of
locomotive power. With military policy generally sitting atop, or near the top, of any given
state’s list of priorities, ensuring access to resources essential for military activity became a
strategic foreign policy imperative.
Over time, as energy technology has developed, states that could afford to do so generally
fielded the newest and most effective pieces of machinery with the goal of acquiring a military
advantage over rivals. Hindsight makes quite clear the fact that those states that possess the best
energy technology, as well the requisite amount of energy resources, are more likely to succeed
on the battlefield compared to those who are not so well equipped. Accomplishing this task
becomes more complicated during periods of energy transition. Such transitions increase
uncertainty about which types of technology should be constructed, or invested in, and also
increase the likelihood of conflict over access to stores of natural resources not already
controlled by belligerents. Fossil fuels, namely coal and oil, with their peculiar importance to
both economic and military affairs, serve as an interesting point of intersection between
International Relations and International Political Economy. Indeed, there is a well-established
pp. 11 and also on resources and latent power pp. 211; On the preponderance of both power and
resources present within status-quo states see Carr, Edward Hallett. The Twenty Years’ Crisis,
1919-1939: An introduction to the Study of International Relations. New York: Harper Collins,
1946. pp. 119-120; On resource scarcity and its role in his description of a Rawlsian balance of
power system see Midlarsky, Manus I. “The Balance of Power as a “Just” Historical System.”
Polity Vol. 16, (Winter, 1983): pp. 193 & 200; On a shortage of resources hindering internal
balancing in Britain prior to WWII see Papayoanou, Paul A. Power Ties: Economic
Interdependence, Balancing and War. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1999. pp.
107-108, also on the connection between economic resources and military capabilities see pp.
131, most importantly on US policymakers during WWII as defining power as control over and
access to resources see also pp. 131.
21
literature that deals with fossils fuels and the role of oil in particular. At the same time, there also
appears to be a lacuna within these literatures relating to transitions from one major energy
source to another. Given the non-renewable nature of fossil fuel resources10, as well as the
extensive and increasing consumption of these resources on a global scale, there are occasionally
periods of transition between older, waning resource usage paradigms and newer, increasing
resource usage paradigms.
While these events are rare, I contend that they are extremely significant to both the conduct of
international affairs in their time and ultimately to the course of world history. Yet, these
transitions have also been understudied. The trajectory of human technological development has
been one of increased efficiency in terms of energy usage. It has also been one of increased
consumption and shifts from one energy source to another as our understanding of how to
harvest and utilize different sources of energy has progressed. A graph of the primary energy
sources used over time in the United States provides a simple visual representation of the type of
energy transition that this dissertation will explore.11
10
Banks, Ferdinand B. The Political Economy of Oil. Lexington: Lexington Books, 1980;
Bromley, Simon. American Hegemony and World Oil. University Park: The Pennsylvania
State University Press, 1991; Campbell, C.J. Oil Crisis. Brentwood: Multi-Science Publishing
Company Ltd., 2005; Hicks, Brian, and Chris Nelder. Profit From the Peak: The End of Oil and
the Greatest Investment Event of the Century. Hoboken: Angel Publishing, 2008; Klare,
Michael T. Blood and Oil. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004; Koopmann, Georg, Laus
Matthies, and Beate Reszat. Oil and the International Economy: Lessons From Two Price
Shocks. New Brunswick: Translation Publishers, 1989; Mabro, Robert. Ed. Oil in the 21st
Century: Issues, Challenges and Opportunities; Mills, Robin M. The Myth of the Oil Crisis:
Overcoming the Challenges of Depletion, Geopolitics, and Global Warming. Westport: Prager
Publishers, 2008; Mommer, Bernard. Global Oil and the Nation State. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002; Nore, Peter, and Terisa Turner. Oil and Class Struggle. London: Zed
Press, 1980; Paul, William Henry. Future Energy: How the New Oil Industry Will Change
People, Politics and Portfolios. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 2007.
11
O'Connor, Peter A. "Energy Transitions," In "The Pardee Papers,"(2010) pg. 9
22
Figure 1.1 – American Energy Consumption by source 1850-2000
(O'Connor, Peter A. "Energy Transitions," In "The Pardee Papers,"(2010) pg. 9)
In studying energy issues in general and energy transitions in particular, one finds that transitions
are particularly messy events that do not fit neatly into schemes of categorization. Energy eras
often overlap and older energy forms often remain in use long after ‘better’ methods for utilizing
various energy resources are found.12 This can be seen below in the large worldwide reliance of
coal for power generation. It is notable that coal still represents roughly one-third of worldwide
energy usage, more than natural gas.13 Despite the technological development of nuclear
capability, petroleum products still dominate human energy usage patterns by a wide margin.
While some nations, namely France and Japan, have made more widespread use of nuclear
power, there are serious limitations to nuclear technology that prevent it from truly supplanting
the role of oil in both economic, and military terms. This is demonstrated by the small overall
12
Vaclav Smil, Energy Transitions: History, Requirements, Prospects. Santa Barbara
California: Praeger, 2010, pg. 225
13
"BP Statistical Review of World Energy." 1-46. London: British Petroleum, 2012, pg. 41
23
usage of nuclear power and can be seen in the graphs below in both U.S.14 and worldwide
consumption.15
Figure 1.2 – American Energy Consumption by source 1949-2011
("Annual Energy Review 2011." edited by Department of Energy, 370. Washington D.C.: Office of Energy Statistics, 2012, pg. 28)
Figure 1.3 – World Energy Consumption by source 1986-2012
("BP Statistical Review of World Energy." 1-46. London: British Petroleum, 2012, pg. 42)
14
"Annual Energy Review 2011." edited by Department of Energy, 370. Washington D.C.:
Office of Energy Statistics, 2012, pg. 28
15
"BP Statistical Review of World Energy." 1-46. London: British Petroleum, 2012, pg. 42
24
The focus in this research is on transitions between energy sources, and not on energy carriers,
such as electricity.16 While the development of electricity is no doubt significant, the focus here
is on the natural resources utilized by state militaries. Those organizations utilize electricity, but
need other natural resources, coal, oil, etc. in order to produce it. Thus, on the one hand this
study is limited to energy source transitions; on the other hand it is limited to understanding
modern military organizations. Consequently the focus of this research will be on military
organizations after the industrial revolution.
Current popular and academic discourse on energy has recently acknowledged the likelihood of
future transitions away from fossil fuels and towards more renewable resources. With this in
mind, the decision was made to examine the first of these modern energy transitions: Great
power navies and their decision to transition their fleets to being powered by oil and away from
being powered by coal encapsulate this transition. Thus, understanding and explaining state
responses to major energy transitions is the central purpose of this study. More specifically, why
did the American and British Navies decide to transition their naval fleets from being fueled by
coal to being fueled by oil? The decision of these navies to commit to a relatively new and
untested technology to utilize petroleum represents a conscious policy response to a changed
environment. Thus, there are lessons to be learned from this experience that are likely to be
quite relevant for current policy makers and scholars.
ENERGY AND ENERGY TRANSITIONS
From the perspective of political science, and more specifically international political economy,
the energy/oil literature may be divided into four groups. The first may be called the oil-boom
16
O'Connor, Peter A. "Energy Transitions," In "The Pardee Papers,"(2010): pg. 8
25
literature, spanning from the earliest modern oil discoveries in the late 1800’s up to the late
1960’s. This catalogue of work details the various developments in oil discovery, exploration,
and the related economic growth and technological development that followed, as well as the
political intrigue, issues of national security and war, and the role of oil in those areas.
Developments in the early 1970s substantially impacted the popular and academic discussions
related to oil, fossil fuels and energy. The most important of these developments were the
various oil embargoes implemented by major producers in the Middle East, the formation of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and the general realization of the
limited nature of oil as a geologic natural resource. The works of this period, which constitute
the second grouping, may be referred to as the oil-scarcity literature. Much of this research
focuses on a litany of scarcity related themes; this includes whether or not scarcity is a geologic
fact or policy induced; whether scarcity can be conquered by technology, the political and
economic implications of the cartelization of the oil market and the politics of OPEC; the role of
the western great powers in providing security to the energy markets, application of the first and
second laws of thermodynamics to economics and politics, and discussions of the possibility of
sustainable economic growth.
The third grouping of literature, spanning from the collapse of oil prices in the early 1980s to the
beginning of the next period of substantial price spike in the early-mid 2000s, may be described
as the second-oil-boom literature, as supply was not a serious issue. This literature varies more
widely than the other two eras and includes optimistic forecasts of the early 1980s, and much
work claiming human responsibility for scarcity problems.
26
The fourth and final grouping is the second oil-scarcity literature, which consists of research that
focuses on the environmental impact of the oil industry and climate change, and some of the
earliest research looking past the oil economy with a focus on energy transitions. This literature
coincides with the higher prices of the modern era between roughly 2003-4 and the present. This
grouping is a rough approximation and is meant to demonstrate the varying, yet overall growing,
role of scarcity in academic discussions of energy resources, and in the opinion of the author
represents a slow ‘coming to terms’ with an impending transition away from fossil fuels.
Below I review the literature from various social science fields relevant to energy and fossil fuels
with the goal of isolating important concepts and elements relevant to understanding state
responses to energy transitions.
The Oil Boom Literature
In order to understand the role of energy in modern military organizations, one must obtain a
sense of how modern energy sources were perceived over time. The Industrial Revolution
brought about a new understanding of how the capability of natural stores of energy in the form
of coal could be utilized through mechanical processes for the benefit of humanity. While the
term ‘Industrial Revolution’ certainly envelops much more than just a technological
development17, in terms of the focus of this research the crux of that revolution was the
utilization of coal for steam powered engines. Vaclav Smil’s overview of energy in human
history outlines the human use of energy from animal dung and simple water and wind systems
to the modern era. His work is much broader than most and clearly articulates the complex
nature of technological development related to energy over time. Smil notes that human
17
Frankel, Eugene. "Energy and Social Change: A Historian's Perspective." Policy Sciences 14,
no. 1 (1981): 59-73
27
understanding of the potential of fossil fuels stretches back to antiquity, in the cases of both
coal18 and liquid petroleum and natural gas19. Yet, it took the steam engine to provide coal the
opportunity to become central to modern industrialization; the most important role for coal was
as fuel for steam engines.20 The impact of the combination of coal as an energy source and the
steam engine to exploit it revolutionized water and land travel, displacing sailing ships and other
traditional modes of land transport, and massively increased human capability for long distance
migration.21
The later development of the internal combustion engine provided a new use for liquid petroleum
and led to an increased importance for that resource in terms of military utilization. Smil
describes the early development of kerosene22, and later the invention of gasoline and how these
advances in refining petroleum in combination along with perfection of the internal combustion
engine allow for oil to supplant coal as the most important source of energy for modern
industrialized states. He also notes that the design of the internal combustion engine remained
relatively unchanged during the first one hundred years of its use and credits the development of
the Daimler engine, electrical ignition (invented by Karl Benz) and the Maybach float feed
carburetor with the launching of the modern automobile industry.23
Helmut Mejcher details the competition over Iraqi oil between 1910 and 1928. Noting that the
conversion of naval ships from coal to oil had already taken place, Mejcher indicates that what
18
Smil, Vaclav. Energy Transitions: History, Requirements, Prospects. Santa Barbara
California: Praeger, 2010, pg. 159
19
Ibid, pg. 167
20
Ibid, pg. 161
21
Smil, Vaclav. Energy Transitions: History, Requirements, Prospects. Santa Barbara
California: Praeger, 2010, pg. 165-166
22
Ibid, pg. 167-168
23
Ibid, pg. 168
28
oil lay in Mesopotamia was considered ‘an indispensible commodity, indeed a strategic
necessity’ by the British navy.24 The area of Mosul was crucial to British war aims
geostrategically both in terms of the land war and in terms of the resources that lay there. The
priority on control over Mosul by the British is demonstrated by several factors, including:
British willingness to act in contrast to the Sykes Picot Agreement of 1916 in their capture of
Mosul, the British geological reconnaissance in February of 1916, and explicit statements on the
part of the Admiralty that ‘physical control’ over oil producing areas was necessary.25 Mejcher
describes the American ‘Open Door’ foreign policy as applying pressure on the British attempts
to monopolize the resources found in the areas under their control. The British retort to American
chants of ‘Open Door’ was ‘Physical Control’. In fact the British Admiralty’s oil expert
explicitly articulated the need for British monopolies to develop these [Mesopotamian] oil
resources to conserve domestic British resources and that this stemmed from the British Navy’s
war-time experience of the importance of fuel for sustaining naval actions.26
Commenting on the same time period, William Stivers provides a detailed history of oil and its
relationship to foreign policy of the Western colonial powers and the United States prior to,
during, and after the First World War. Stivers sheds light on the overlap, both acknowledged
and unacknowledged, between state strategic interest and private corporate interest among the
various powers involved in the struggle over influence in the oil rich territories of the Ottoman
Empire as it became clear that the territorial integrity of that entity was weakening toward the
end of the conflict.
24
Mejcher, Helmut. Imperial Quest for Oil: Iraq 1910-1928. London: Ithaca Press, 1976, pg. 6
Ibid, pg. 28-36
26
Mejcher, Helmut. Imperial Quest for Oil: Iraq 1910-1928. London: Ithaca Press, 1976, pg. 3536
25
29
In particular Stivers examines the diplomatic maneuverings of the British and the United States
over influence in Iraq and Mesopotamia in the aftermath of the war, as well as the role of their
respective oil corporations. Stivers contends forcefully that, at least in the American case, the
State department equated U.S. national interest with private corporate oil interests.27 As for the
British, Stivers demonstrates that they were willing to go to great lengths to ensure their control
over the Iraqi mandate, primarily to ensure access to the oil there, as well as for geostrategic
reasons.28 Conflicting interest between the British and the Americans regarding access to
Mesopotamian oil and diplomatic contention between the two powers in the post WWI period is
often referred to as the “Anglo-American oil war”, and elements of that competition are
highlighted by Fiona Venn, in her work on the Lausanne Conference of 1922-23.29
John Ise’s work on U.S. oil policy represents research contemporaneous to the major oil boom
that took place after the First World War. First published in 1926, his work on U.S. oil policy
delves into the domestic politics surrounding the oil industry from the earliest well discoveries in
the U.S. to the 1920s. Of particular interest is the attempt by the U.S. Navy to ensure a sufficient
supply of oil required for the new ships of the fleet. Ise’s emphasis is often on the alleged waste
and corruption involved in the oil industry, and he highlights the varied established interests
battling for access to federally owned and controlled land in the American West thought to be
rich in oil deposits, including reserves at Elk Hills and Buena Vista in California, the Teapot
Dome reserve in Wyoming, shale reserves in Colorado and Utah, and the reserve set aside by
27
Stivers, William. Supremacy and Oil. London: Cornell University Press, 1982, pg. 194-99
Examples include the British decision to exclude American Geologists from the area and
deception on the part of Lord Curzon related to British aims revealed in the San Remo accord.
See Stivers, pg. 111-112
29
Venn, Fiona. "Oleaginous Diplomacy: Oil, Anglo–American Relations and the Lausanne
Conference, 1922–23." Diplomacy & Statecraft 20, no. 3 (2009): pg. 414-33.
28
30
President Harding in Alaska. 30 This research provides extensive insight into the domestic
wrangling over the management of American oil reserves that took place in the United States
between 1900 and 1918.
John Frey labels the oil powered internal combustion engine as one of the most outstanding
technological changes impacting direct military operations.31 Frey describes the military as
holding the belief that petroleum in general played a key role in the Allied victory in the First
World War through its myriad uses in ships, submarines, planes, tanks and trucks.32 Writing
prior to the end of the Second World War, Frey is quite clear about the preeminence of
petroleum in terms of military priorities, and specifically described the importance of the naval
decision to transition from coal to oil as pushing upward the overall demand for petroleum.33
Walter Voskuil sees a direct relationship between political power in Europe and the control of
coal and oil resources (along with other mineral deposits). He describes the “goal of
Lebensraum” as well as the battle of the Atlantic as directly related to control over resources.
This included “Swedish iron ores, the ores of Lorraine, the Polish coal fields, the Rumanian oil
fields, Yugoslavian bauxite” and others.34 Interestingly, and quite relevant for this research,
Voskuil describes different roles for coal and petroleum during the First World War. Coal is
seen as the backbone of industrial production, or the thick, blunt, backside of the knife, while oil
and its role in power projection is seen as the sharp cutting edge of the knife.35 Voskuil directly
30
Ise, John. The United States Oil Policy. New York: Arno Press, 1972, pg. 356
Frey, John W. "Petroleum Utilization in Peacetime and in Wartime." Annals of the Association
of American Geographers 31, no. 2 (June 1941): pg. 113-18
32
Ibid, pg. 113
33
Frey, John W. "Petroleum Utilization in Peacetime and in Wartime." Annals of the Association
of American Geographers 31, no. 2 (June 1941): pg. 118
34
Voskuil, Walter H. "Coal and Political Power in Europe." Economic Geography 18, no. 3 (July
1942): pg. 247
35
Ibid, pg. 247-248
31
31
correlates control over the coal (and other) resources of mainland Europe to increased bargaining
power among nations with Nazi Germany as a prime example.36
Writing in The Journal of Economic History in 1947, Rezneck sums up the importance of fossil
fuels to modern industrialized nations quite succinctly by stating the coal and oil comprise the
“chief components of the modern power complex”.37 Interestingly, Rezneck notes that as early
as 1867 the Bureau of Navigation of the U.S. Navy had rejected petroleum as a fuel for steamers
citing convenience, economy, and safety. Yet, by 1884 petroleum is recommended as an
emergency fuel for warships as a supplement to coal.38 By 1914 the U.S. Navy has decided to
completely fuel its fleet with petroleum and the era of the U.S. Navy building coal burning ships
was over.39 That represents a relatively quick turnaround in 47 years from rejecting oil as a fuel
for ships in 1867 to stating that all future naval ships would burn oil in 1914. Rezneck cites
several historical important facets of the petroleum industry. This included the central economic
role of fossil fuels and their relationship to American economic development and also that oil
provided one of the first examples of mass production, manifested in the five-gallon oil can.40
Rezneck’s work provides a good overview of the role of fossil fuels in the American economy,
and deals with issues such as monopoly, competition, the chemical relationship between coal and
oil, waste and conservation and the future prospects for atomic energy.
36
Voskuil, Walter H. "Coal and Political Power in Europe." Economic Geography 18, no. 3 (July
1942): pg. 255
37
Rezneck, Samuel. "Coal and Oil in the American Economy." The Journal of Economic History
7 (1947): pg. 56
38
Ibid, pg. 63-64
39
The Navy Department. "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy." edited by The Navy
Department, 526. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1914. pg. 18
40
Rezneck, Samuel. "Coal and Oil in the American Economy." The Journal of Economic History
7 (1947): pg. 65-68
32
John DeNovo, writing in the mid 1950s, provides several pieces of work that are immediately
relevant to understanding state reactions to energy transitions. DeNovo highlights the increased
importance of petroleum in the realm of national security stemming from increased need for oil
by great power navies41, while providing an excellent outline of the process whereby the
American Navy, following actions by the British, begin to convert their fleet from coal-burning
to oil-burning ships42. Several aspects of DeNovo’s research are of particular importance.
First, he states that the technological arguments claiming oil-burning ships as superior to coalburners was ‘overwhelming’ by 1911. Citing debates from the British House of commons, as
well as American Naval documents and information from the American oil sector, DeNovo
elaborates on the various benefits of oil-burning ships including increased speed and steaming
radius, easier refueling, reduction of manpower needed for boiler rooms, tactical
maneuverability, the capability to refuel at sea, reduced crew exhaustion, and lastly increased
weight available for gun power.43 Secondly, DeNovo articulates the role of the private sector in
the United States in protecting their established interests from what was seen as encroachment by
the United States Government into the oil sector. As the Navy, and the Executive Branch
(namely the Department of the Interior), began to realize the role that oil would play in national
security matters, the navy began taking measures to physically secure its own supply. In effect
this debate over oil policy in the U.S. is centered on the role of the state in the economy and
becomes wrapped up in the issue of state regulation of monopolies, such as Standard Oil.44
41
Denovo, John A. "Petroleum and the Us Navy before World War I." The Mississippi Valley
Historical Review 41, no. 4 (1955): pg. 641
42
Ibid, pg. 641-642
43
Denovo, John A. "Petroleum and the Us Navy before World War I." The Mississippi Valley
Historical Review 41, no. 4 (1955): pg. 645
44
Ibid, pg. 652
33
The issue of the relationship between the state and the private sector oil companies is of central
importance to this research, and policy relevant to this matter is handled differently by the two
primary case-study nations. In the U.S., regulation and the forced break-up of the oil
monopolies45 was the chosen path, while in Britain, direct state ownership (albeit partial) was
favored.46 These matters will be investigated in more detail in later chapters of this work. It is
sufficient here to say that the two case-study nations, the U.S. and Britain, took different
approaches in response to this particular energy transition.
While DeNovo’s research represents a narrowly tailored view of the relationship between the
U.S. Navy and petroleum resources, other work, such as that of Gerald Nash, represents a more
comprehensive approach to understanding U.S. oil policy during the early and formative years of
petroleum usage. Nash introduces his work as an attempt to utilize the oil industry as a prism
through which to examine the relationship between government and business. Noting that
between 1890 and 1960 the oil industry consistently ranked as one of the five largest within the
United States, Nash emphasizes that understanding the government-oil-industry relationship will
‘illuminate trends in other industries’.47
Nash describes the era from 1815-1890 as the age of steam and the era after 1890 as the age of
oil and electricity. He attributes the increased role of petroleum during this era to the newly
developed diesel powered ships and locomotives as well as the internal combustion engine.
According to Nash the period of 1890-1917 saw oil output double in the U.S. and a seven-fold
increase in demand for oil products; this increase results in oil supplanting coal as the leading
45
Ibid, pg. 654
Ibid, pg. 655-66
47
Nash, Gerald D. United States Oil Policy 1890-1964. University of Pittsburgh Press, 1968, pg.
vii
46
34
energy source in the United States. 48 Nash, like DeNovo, also saw the crucial role of the U.S.
Navy as well as other marine transport during this transition:
“The magnitude of this shift was greatest in marine transportation, however. Greater
convenience and lower cost were important factors in prompting shipping officials to
make the change from coal to petroleum. By 1914 they had converted about 5 percent of
the world’s merchant fleet. The United States Navy Fuel Oil Board had recommended as
early as 1904 that American war vessels convert to oil. Only ten years later Secretary of
the Navy Josephus Daniels reported that all American battleships and destroyers were
burning fuel [oil]; fuel oil consumption of the United States Navy rose from 360,000
barrels in 1912 to almost 6 million barrels in 1919. Together with about 44 million
barrels consumed by the American merchant marine, these requirements accounted for
about one-fifth of total fuel oil sales.”49
On top of emphasizing the role of the U.S. Navy, Nash extensively details the triangular tug-ofwar over oil policy involving the U.S. Navy, state level economic interests, and the large oil
monopolies. This competition between various interests largely centered on 1) U.S. Naval
concern over consistency and price of oil supply for the fleet;50 2) state concerns related to their
economic rights and those of small independent producers (which were seen as threatened by the
power of large oil monopolies and51); 3) the concern of the oil industry over what was seen as
excessive or ‘socialistic’ state interference in private industry.
The converse of this last point of concern is the view of the federal government that massive
industry monopolies needed to be regulated or even broken up; these two points of view are
essentially different sides of the same coin52. In the first decade of the twentieth century these
battles over energy policy in the United States were largely settled in the courts. Yet over time
48
Ibid, pg. 2-5
Ibid, pg. 5
50
Ibid, pg. 10
51
Ibid, pg. 12
52
Nash, Gerald D. United States Oil Policy 1890-1964. University of Pittsburgh Press, 1968, pg.
13-15
49
35
that approach changed. The role of energy in national security is key to understanding the
developments within this story over time.
For the great powers, most pointedly the great naval powers, continued or increased access to the
fuel necessary for their ships was essentially synonymous with national security. Thus, as war
became increasingly likely, competition over policy in the area of energy slowly gave way to
increased cooperation between the state apparatus and the private oil sector.53 This can be seen
in the formation of the Advisory Committee to the Council on National Defense by the
Woodrow Wilson administration in April of 1916. In July of 1917 Wilson dissolved the council
of National Defense and created the War Industries Board and the Advisory Committee became
the National Petroleum War Service Committee. By early 1918 Wilson had enlarged U.S.
bureaucratic mechanisms for the purposes of managing the American petroleum industry by
creating the United States Fuel Administration along with an Oil Division within that
administration. These various committees were largely comprised of oil industry leaders and the
goal was to ensure access to petroleum for the war effort. In essence, concern over appropriate
levels of competition in domestic oil markets decreased as the need for naval access to product
supply became more urgent with the likely onset of great power war. Nash sums up this change
in strategy by the federal government:
“Thus, the wartime demands for maximum oil production, in addition to changes in the
structure of the oil industry after 1911, forced the Wilson Administration to reorient
federal petroleum policies. Wilson took the initiative in shifting the emphasis of public
policy from antitrust measures to cooperation, from efforts to dissolve large integrated
corporations toward attempts at their more effective regulation. Such a change did not
emanate primarily from ideological considerations. Rather it was worked out
pragmatically by various interest groups in response to specific problems, and reflected
petroleum’s new role in the economy and in national defense.”54
53
Ibid, pg. 24
Nash, Gerald D. United States Oil Policy 1890-1964. University of Pittsburgh Press, 1968, pg.
29-30
54
36
Nash’s work covers the period from 1890-1964. This represents the golden era of the oil
industry. His overview of the pre-WWI era and the wartime period itself is particularly relevant
for understanding the American case. This work can also be seen as one of the last thorough
overviews of the oil industry that possesses a perspective unaltered by the subsequent oil crises
that take place in the 1970’s.
While the concept of scarcity, and correspondingly conservation, were both present and
impactful in this earlier oil literature, particularly closer to the turn of the century, these issues
dominate the discussion of petroleum and its role in the economy and national security after the
two crises. These events provide a clearly distinguishable boundary between subsets of the
literature related to energy resources in general and fossil fuel resources in particular.
The Oil Scarcity Literature
Scarcity, as a concept related to human usage of natural resources in general, and human usage
of fossil fuels in particular, was not new in the early 1970s. In fact, the initial oil boom of the
early 1900’s was rife with commentary on the need for conservation, the excessive amount of
waste present within the oil industry, and the need to preserve precious natural endowments for
future generations.55 In retrospect, the prevalence of discussions about resource scarcity appear
directly related to price levels of primary resources. Scarcity was a popular theme during periods
of high prices, and as those prices declined, so too did the emphasis on a need to conserve
exhaustible resources. This is important because increased concern for, or attention to, notions
55
Rezneck, Samuel. "Coal and Oil in the American Economy." The Journal of Economic History
7 (1947): pg. 68-69
37
of scarcity relate directly to energy transitions. Increased scarcity, in actuality or perception, is
likely to impact the energy transition process, and reactions to that process by relevant actors.
During the 1970s, political developments in the Middle East led to a resurgence of commentary
on the need to deal with energy scarcity on a political and economic level. This included
discussions of OPEC, its politics and economic impact, as well as its ability to manipulate prices
and supply, introduction of thermodynamic laws into the discussion of human energy usage
patterns, and hypothesizing about the ability to create economic growth in an era of scarce
energy resources. Given the reality of the source of oil scarcity in the aftermath of the oil
embargoes implemented by OPEC, a discussion of cartels and how they impact the international
political economy is appropriate.
Waverman describes what is takes to be a successful cartel in a commodity market including: 1)
low elasticity of demand for the product; 2) high elasticity of demand for the product of any one
producer; 3) similar costs and goals among producers; and 4) a small number of ‘firms’ within
the cartel. Waverman points out that while many have attempted to create commodity cartels,
none have been successful, a point with which one could easily argue. While he may, or may
not, be correct in his assertion that all commodity cartels are unsuccessful, he is most certainly
wrong about his assertion that oil is ‘a perfectly non-differentiated commodity’. Waverman uses
the phrase ‘given the same sulphur content’ as a qualifier to that statement, a substantial qualifier
indeed. There are many sources of oil, and they all differ in their geologic qualities. These
qualities range from ease of extraction, to distance to market, to cost of refining and have a
substantial impact upon the profitability of any given source of petroleum and on the likelihood
of eventual extraction. This fact can be demonstrated by the recent cancellation of some
38
contracts in the America shale oil drilling industry due to substantial drop in prices.56 The fact is
that at less than fifty dollars a barrel, shale oil is not worth extracting and refining. There are
many different types of oil, and they are most certainly not “perfectly non-differentiated”.
Alternatively, Waverman provides some useful analysis related to OPEC, namely that its source
of power stems from certain realities. The two most important are: 1) the lack of a low cost
substitute for oil and; 2) increasing demand for its product.57 He also describes one of the
important consequences of the 1970s price spikes in the form of sovereign wealth funds, yet he
does not think that such enormous sources of financial power will be used for economic warfare
on the part of OPEC nations.58
Robert North, in his analysis of scarcity and conflict, articulates very clearly the fact that the first
and second laws of thermodynamics and their implications, although well known to most people,
are often ignored in the areas of politics and economics.59 North outlines the basic disagreement
over resource scarcity between environmental optimists and the “Neo-Malthusians”. North
states that while both the optimists and pessimists are technically correct on various points of
their arguments, he emphasizes that in the long run the pessimists are more correct and states that
environmental variables require just as much attention from researchers as cognitive and
behavioral variables60. More importantly, he does not think that technology alone can pry
56
“Sub-$50 Oil Has U.S. Shale Producers Cutting Rigs Loose Early.” www.bloomberg.com
January 1, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-08/shale-producers-in-u-scutting-rigs-loose-early-amid-oil-slump
57
Waverman, Leonard. "Oil and the Distribution of International Power." International Journal
29, no. 4 (1974), pg. 628.
58
Ibid, pg. 632
59
North, Robert C. "Toward a Framework for the Analysis of Scarcity and Conflict."
International Studies Quarterly 21, no. 4 (1977), pg. 570
60
Ibid, pg. 573
39
humanity from the grip of scarcity61, arguing that generally technological development results in
both increased consumption and increased expectations from the populace.
Furthermore, he quotes an important conceptual statement from Lasswell, that “Man, pursues
Values, through Institutions, on Resources”.62 This notion, according to North, “implies an
intensive interactive relationship among values, institutions, resources, and behavior. It suggests
that each variable must be critical to an explanation of the other three.” This conceptual
relationship is central to understanding how military organizations might attempt to navigate an
energy transition and will be useful in the analysis of such history. Relating scarcity to conflict,
North indicates that attempts by states to secure foreign supply of resources often leads to
conflict, and that once acquired, such access is generally defended.63 He concludes by noting the
major disparity between industrialized and non-industrialized nations in terms of their resource
consumption, noting that advanced industrialized countries consume ‘20 times more resources
per capita than the poor countries’.64 North’s analysis indicates areas in the literature related to
scarcity that require further attention and improvement, and this dissertation aims to utilize
several of his contributions.
One of the central elements of the scarcity literature consists of a critique of modern capitalistic
economic philosophy and ideology. The scarcity crises of the 1970s and the fear that those
scarcities were likely to be a permanent fixture of future economics and politics, led to a re-
61
North, Robert C. "Toward a Framework for the Analysis of Scarcity and Conflict."
International Studies Quarterly 21, no. 4 (1977): pg. 579-80
62
Ibid, pg. 574
63
Ibid, pg. 580
64
Ibid, pg. 582
40
visitation of Malthus65 with an emphasis on the relationship between economic philosophy of
growth and political reality of finite resources. Jack Salmon provides an example of such
research. Salmon describes modern economics as being based upon infinite growth and labels
that philosophy as the ‘dominant social paradigm’.66 Salmon sees technological optimism as an
attempt by economists and others to find an escape from the reality of resource scarcity, and like
North, he highlights the fact that much of the economics literature ‘cavalierly’ ignores the second
law of thermodynamics.67 This technological optimism is equated by Salmon to defense of
established interests by various institutional authorities and individuals and also notes that if
scarcities persist the likely outcome is war over resources.68
Ferdinand Banks examines the political economy of oil, and the impact of scarcity related to that
resource in a less philosophical fashion than some of the earlier authors. In particular, Banks
highlights the economic impact of the crises of the 1970s in various industries, emphasizing the
broad economic reach of oil as a resource. This includes the possibility of oil scarcity impacting
other non-fuel minerals, as well as the impact of oil scarcity substantially reducing profitability
in major industries such as automobile production.69 He sees the crises of the 1970s as the
beginning of a shift from an era of low cost energy to one that requires high capital inputs.
However, his technological optimism is unabated and he believes that once those capital
investments have been made energy costs overall should remain relatively low.70
65
Much ecological pessimism stems from Malthus, Robert. "An Essay on the Principle of
Population." The Online Library of Liberty: Liberty Fund, Inc., 1826.
66
Salmon, Jack D. "Politics of Scarcity Versus Technological Optimism: A Possible
Reconciliation." International Studies Quarterly 21, no. 4 (1977): pg. 701-02
67
Ibid, pg. 702, 705.
68
Ibid, pg. 704-705
69
Banks, Ferdinand B. The Political Economy of Oil. Lexington: Lexington Books, 1980, pg.
12, 17
70
Ibid, pg. 27
41
Although the technological optimism in Banks’ work is quite clear, his view of the political
impact of scarcity remains pessimistic. He sees increased conflict over resources and
specifically attributes this to different values held in relation to what cooperation in the area of
energy means for energy consuming nations and energy producing nations. Western views of
cooperation mean an outcome that maintains the status quo of low cost and high consumption of
energy resources. The major producers however, believe that higher costs are a way of
encouraging diversification of the energy market as well as conservation. Thus Banks sees “the
outcome of this palpably different way of viewing the same phenomenon” as guaranteeing
“economic and eventually political turmoil throughout the entire world, over an indefinite
future”.71
Robert Lieber provides a glimpse of the impact of energy economics on state security and
alliance politics. He views the oil embargoes as a moment of realization by Western European
states of their vulnerability to energy supply disruptions and traces the various developments and
reactions of states to that awakening. Lieber states that the Yom Kippur War, and the resulting
embargo, revealed to industrialized states that oil and energy had become ‘security issues par
excellence’.72
This was really more of a reminder than a revelation as Lieber recognizes later in
the article, noting that the appearance of energy security on the international ‘chessboard’ was
not unprecedented, and in fact had been used as a casus belli before.73 Lieber uses the example
of Japan and its need for foreign energy sources during its imperial expansion and the role of
71
Banks, Ferdinand B. The Political Economy of Oil. Lexington: Lexington Books, 1980, pg.
126
72
Lieber, Robert J. "Energy, Economics and Security in Alliance Perspective." International
Security 4, no. 4 (1980): pg. 144
73
Ibid, pg. 161-162
42
energy in Japanese entry into World War II. Such issues were present much earlier than that war;
they can for example, be clearly seen in the period prior to, and during, World War I.
In terms of the impact of the oil embargoes and resultant energy scarcity on contemporaneous
state policy, Lieber highlights several important developments. These include the role of
American leadership during the time period74 (foreshadowing a more detailed examination of
that leadership by Robert Keohane), the divisions among traditional allies caused by such
scarcities75 (such as French willingness to halt shipments to the Dutch to comply with the Arab
embargo, and tensions between the Europeans and Americans over American oil import policy)
as well as a shift towards bilateral negotiation (again exemplified by France), and efforts by
various institutions to research long term oil availability, such as the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the
International Energy Agency (IEA)76.
Overall, Lieber sees such scarcity events as having a negative impact on inter-state cooperation,
yet believes that the negative impact of these crises can be cushioned by advance preparation and
that the outcomes likely depend upon the nature of the shortages, indicating that global shortages
will be easier for allies to manage.77 In concluding, Lieber emphasizes the need to deal with
scarcity by reducing demand, indicating that supply-side attempts to manage the impact of
scarcity in the oil availability were unlikely to be available in the short term, and while Lieber
limits his analysis to the decade of the 1980s, his assessment no doubt applies to the future of the
supply of oil in the long term.
74
Ibid, pg. 153
Lieber, Robert J. "Energy, Economics and Security in Alliance Perspective." International
Security 4, no. 4 (1980): pg. 147, 156-57
76
Ibid, pg. 145-46, 156
77
Ibid, pg. 159
75
43
Crawford Goodwin provides several insights in his 1981 article entitled “The Lessons of
History”, with a central theme of an inability on the part of Washington policymakers to find a
happy medium between the economic philosophies of free market and central planning within
the energy industry. Goodwin begins by describing the post World War II testimony of a State
Department official who says “the Allies won because the United States had oil in abundance;
Germany and Japan fought for it in Baku and Kirkuk, in Burma and Indonesia, and they lost
because they were unable to capture it, or to capture it in time.”78 This testimony before the U.S.
Senate took place in 1945 and while Goodwin is right to describe the statement as ‘simplistic’,
he is also correct in calling the implicit warning ‘sound’. This emphasis on the role of oil in
WWII echoes the earlier assertion by Voskuil, correlating political power with control over
mineral resources.79
Examining U.S. oil policy in the aftermath of the oil crises of the 1970s Goodwin is particularly
critical. He highlights the unpredictability of the energy markets and the difficulties present due
to the broad impact of energy as a conceptual framework, the latter of which Goodwin claims
forced the compartmentalization of energy policy to more manageable sub-sectors, slowing and
complicating the policy process.80 His discussion is couched in terms of energy transitions yet
his terminology regarding those transitions is vague. Goodwin points out that post-WWII energy
policy in the United States has often consisted of ad-hoc executive agencies reacting to current
events rather than long-term comprehensive energy policy in the form of legislation from
Congress.81 This is similar to Nash’s description of the various executive bodies created by the
78
Goodwin, Craufurd D. "The Lessons of History." The Wilson Quarterly 5, no. 2 (1981), pg. 91
Voskuil, Walter H. "Coal and Political Power in Europe." Economic Geography 18, no. 3 (July
1942): pg. 255
80
Goodwin, Craufurd D. "The Lessons of History." The Wilson Quarterly 5, no. 2 (1981): 91-97.
81
Ibid, pg. 94
79
44
Wilson administration prior to WWI. The result of these various deficiencies in Washington
have resulted in a bias for the status quo in terms of energy policy, instead of an appropriate
policy response to our long-term energy prospects.
Theodore Moran’s analysis of OPEC behavior is quite representative of oil-scarcity literature
with a central emphasis on the major producing states during the immediate post crises period.
Moran describes OPEC as a ‘diverse oligopoly’ and in particular the role of Saudi Arabia in
controlling the course of OPEC policy, a position conferred upon the Saudi Kingdom by its
ability to act as a swing producer.82 Moran also offers a nod to the general optimist-pessimist
divide within the geological and other academic communities regarding possible recoverable
world supplies.83 Moran models OPEC behavior building off of the work of Harold Hotelling
related to the economics of exhaustible resources. This is combined with assessment of
exogenous variables related to “supply and demand for energy—on the demand side, elasticities
of price, income, and substitution; and on the supply side, elasticity of energy outputs not under
OPEC control—the cost of backstop technology, the extent of nonrenewable reserves possessed
by OPEC, and OPEC’s discount rate”84 This is Moran’s suggested method for predicting price
over time. Moran sees Saudi Arabia as having several preferences stemming from their position
in OPEC, these include a preference for high prices on the low end, prioritization of political
ends over economic ones, and a view that possession of such large reserves provides a tool to
achieve those ends via supply disruptions as messages.85
82
Moran, Theodore H. "Modeling Opec Behavior: Economic and Political Alternatives."
International Organization 35, no. 2 (1981): pg. 272
83
Ibid, pg. 251
84
Ibid, pg. 244
85
Ibid, pg. 269-72
45
Eugene Frankel’s assessment of the relationship between energy and social change provides a
concise message to those aiming to wade into the energy debate. Frankel is critical of the
dominant model of assessing new energy technology and its diffusion, what he describes as the
technology assessment or impact assessment model. Second, he offers some broad guidelines
for learning from the historian’s perspective, specifically: 1) a need for input from a multiplicity
of disciplines 2) modesty in attempts at quantification and prediction and 3) an emphasis on
understanding the technological diffusion process.86 Several of Frankel’s arguments support the
approach used here to examine great power naval transitions from coal to oil. This includes the
methodological approach of process tracing, as well as modesty in causal determination.
Regarding process tracing as methodology and its role in understanding how new technological
developments are introduced, regulated, and spread within and between societies, Frankel is
worth quoting at length. He articulates the need to focus on the social process of technological
development for the purpose of understanding their final social effects, and provides a useful
generalized set of answerable questions directly relevant to this research.
“Historians view the process of the introduction of a technology as an interaction
between individuals, institutions and social groups with different stakes in the new
technical system. That interaction determines the final outcome of the technologyintroduction process and shapes, to a large degree, the final social effects. It resolves
such issues as where facilities get sited, who owns them, what kinds of regulatory
constraints are placed on the systems, what kinds of operating practices are tolerated. It
involves a set of actors who can be identified and a process of interaction that is well
known because it is part of the fabric of the social and political life of a nation. By
following the historian’s lead and focusing on the social process of technological
development and diffusion we can ask questions that are capable of being answered: Who
are the stakeholder groups? What kind[s] of interactions are likely to take place between
them? How will these interactions affect the outcome of the technology-introduction
process? What can we learn about the interests and values of social groups and
institutions that will allow us to analyze the form and content of that interaction? What
constraints do these values and interests place on the likely outcome? The historian’s
86
Frankel, Eugene. "Energy and Social Change: A Historian's Perspective." Policy Sciences 14,
no. 1 (1981): pg. 59
46
emphasis on the social process of technology development and diffusion thus appears to
lead to a more tractable analytical agenda for research in both the field of technology
assessment and that of energy policy analysis.”[Emphasis added]87
Frankel provides an excellent starting point for crafting the relevant research questions to
understand state and military responses to energy transitions. This involves outlining the various
stakeholders and their relationship to one another. In the following case studies of great power
naval transitions from coal to oil, the primary stakeholders are the respective governments, their
navies, and various private corporate interests. More will be said about those institutions and
their qualities and relationships in the next chapter.
Benny Temkin describes the various perspectives present in the debate on the U.S. response (or
lack thereof) to the energy crises of the 1970s. He articulates six differing ideological positions,
providing a basic classification of the various arguments made about how the US ought to
respond to the new post-crisis reality. Those positions consist of: 1) free market; (2) energy
independence; (3) liberal New Deal; (4) liberal conservationist; (5) orthodox leftist and (6) solar
leftist.88 While the terms describing these varying approaches to energy policy are relatively self
explanatory, some clarification and distinction is needed.
The most important disagreement that differentiates between these groups revolves around the
source of scarcity: is scarcity supply or demand driven? In effect, this issue boils down to a
belief that scarcity either stems from a physical lack of supply of petroleum or that scarcity stems
from human, political, and economic deficiencies in its discovery, production and distribution
within our societies. Temkin sums up the point:
87
Ibid, pg. 70
Temkin, Benny. "State, Ecology and Independence: Policy Responses to the Energy Crisis in
the United States." British Journal of Political Science 13, no. 4 (1983), pg. 442-443
88
47
“Four perspectives, free market, energy independence, liberal New Deal and orthodox
leftist shared a supply-oriented view of the energy problem, while the liberal
conservationist and the solar leftist approaches stressed the need for conservation. The
four supply-oriented approaches did not see resource depletion as a serious problem. In
spite of differences in other respects, their advocates agreed that the crisis was not the
result of natural or environmental constraints but the product of either mistaken state
policies, or of self-serving monopolistic practices, conspiracies, and so on. To put it
shortly, the energy crisis was wholly human-made.
The supply-oriented approaches shared also a highly optimistic assessment of the
capability of technology to solve ecological and social problems including those
generated by technology itself…”89
This division among energy perspectives along the lines of where they stand on the source of
scarcity is important, because how one answers that question will likely determine the scope of
policy responses seen as possible, or necessary, to address the problem. Thus, if one sees
physical scarcity as the source, then conservation becomes more important among policy
responses. If one views the problem of scarcity as simply stemming from poor policy, and
human mismanagement, then conservation is seen as less important as a policy prescription.
This is an important structural distinction embedded in the debate over energy resources during
the scarcity period. Temkin indicates two other main areas of disagreement in addition to
environmental constraints: the role of the state as a crisis manager in capitalist societies, and the
realism of policies that hope to achieve resource autarky.90
The crises of the 1970s caused much debate in the political science, economics, and international
political economy literatures. The steadily declining prices of the early 1980s allowed for a
relaxation of concern over supply, yet continued emphasis on the role of oil in political and
economic affairs. The scarcity literature that is born out of the oil price shocks of the 1970s
89
Ibid, pg. 459-460
Temkin, Benny. "State, Ecology and Independence: Policy Responses to the Energy Crisis in
the United States." British Journal of Political Science 13, no. 4 (1983), pg. 461
90
48
provides an important intellectual foundation upon which those who wish to further human
understanding of energy transitions must build.
The Second Oil-Boom Literature
By 1984 the price of oil had dropped significantly from its highs stemming from the oil crises of
the 1970s. Scarcity remained a theme within much of the literature on the political economy of
oil and resources, but lost ground to other areas such as hegemony, the role of the state, how to
manage OPEC, and learning from the crises, the impact of market volatility and a search for
stability. Divisions regarding the source of scarcity remain yet are often not as pronounced
because the low prices of the period (1984-2004) instilled a perception that the price spikes and
concerns about supply of the scarcity period were abnormalities caused by politics and poor
policy, not environmental constraints per se. Structural and environmental concerns existed, and
are present during this period, but are not seen as the cause of the crises. Thus the discussions
during this era often focus on the central importance of oil and issues of managing oil politics
and economics instead of addressing consumption or envisioning a transition away from fossil
fuel usage.
Several authors describe the importance of access to, and management of, petroleum markets on
the part of the United States as a hegemonic power. Robert Keohane describes resource
provision as the work of the hegemon to protect the international political economic order, and
notes its use as a casus belli.91 Keohane ascribes to oil a much more important role than many
other authors at the time, describing oil as “the most important raw material involved in
91
Keohane, Robert O., After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political
Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, pg. 39-40
49
international trade’ and ‘the center of the redistributive system of American hegemony”.92 The
active maintenance and provision of stability to oil markets is seen as one of the fundamental
three benefits provided by American political and economic hegemony to those who participated
within that order. Those three benefits are: a stable international monetary system, the provision
of open markets for goods, and access to oil at stable prices.93
Keohane is not the only author to tie control of oil to American Hegemony. Simon Bromley
describes oil as a strategic commodity and notes high level of state intervention in oil markets as
a result of its strategic importance.94 Bromley is critical of market-based accounts for, in effect,
ignoring the supply limitations of a non-renewable resource and the arguments of ecologists.95
While disagreeing with Keohane as to the decline of American hegemony96 Bromley agrees that
the role of oil to a hegemonic power in the modern industrial age, and its non-renewable nature,
will likely present constraints on such hegemonic power in the future.
Not everyone was as pessimistic as Keohane and Bromley. David Glasner in his discussion of
the political economy of energy argues that free market capitalism will efficiently and effectively
distributes resources and that these resources will not be depleted. He states: “Although there are
to be sure environmental problems that have a strong claim on our attention, the exhaustion of
resources allocated by COE [competition by offers of exchange] is not among them.”97
Glasner’s perspective represents an extreme technological optimism and faith in the ability of
92
Ibid, pg. 140
Ibid, pg. 139
94
Bromley, Simon. American Hegemony and World Oil. University Park: The Pennsylvania
State University Press, 1991, pg. 50
95
Ibid, pg. 50-51
96
Ibid, pg. 66
97
Glasner, David. Politics, Prices and Petroleum: The Political Economy of Energy. San
Francisco: The Pacific Institute for Policy Research, 1985, pg. 19-20
93
50
capitalism to manage what scarcities arise and to prevent actual exhaustion. Ted Gurr, on the
other hand, sees scarcity as directly related to economic decline and fears that the political
consequences are underappreciated. Gurr stakes out a position between the extremes of
technological optimism and ecological pessimism and in particular is critical of what he
describes as a strong optimism about political adaptability.98 Gurr states:
“The general thesis of this essay is that just as there are ultimate ecological constraints on
economic growth, political constraints weigh heavily on what might be achieved
collectively in the face of serious scarcity. Most of the political prescriptions and
possibilities…whether by ecological pessimists or technological optimists, rest on
unexamined premises about the malleability of political values and institutions.”99
Gurr claims that the optimists are most optimistic about the way we deal with scarcity in a
political sense and suggests an increased political realism about the prospects of politically
managed scarcity, arguing that the negative political consequences will only increase as scarcity
becomes more prevalent.100 Gurr warns that one of the historically common manifestations of
these political consequences is imperial aggression, and war.101
John Ikenberry’s Reasons of State provides an interesting examination of U.S. response to the oil
crises of the 1970s, using a two by two typology of adjustment strategies. This typology
describes state strategies as either international/domestic, in terms of the target of policy, and
defensive/offensive in terms of the strategic quality of that policy.102 He argues that the oil crises
forced the United States to ‘explore the scope and limits of its international and domestic
98
Gurr, Ted Robert. "On the Political Consequences of Scarcity and Economic Decline."
International Studies Quarterly 29, no. 1 (1985), pg. 50-52
99
Ibid, pg. 53
100
Ibid, pg. 54
101
Ibid, pg. 65
102
Ikenberry, G. John. Reasons of State: Oil Politics and the Capacities of American
Government. Cornell Studies in Political Economy. Edited by Peter J. Katzenstein Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1988, pg. 16
51
capabilities’.103 His fundamental argument is that state capacity was dictating state policy, and
that this process can be seen both during the two crises and also in the varying policies pursued
by different states with different capabilities.104 Importantly, Ikenberry notes that different state
capacity impacted the likelihood of inter-state cooperation. More specifically, if a state could
take domestic measures to increase their capability to manage a crisis, they were likely to do so,
and thus less likely to participate within an international cooperative framework.105 Another
important issue discussed by Ikenberry is the relationship between the state and the private oil
sector. In particular he describes state reliance on the private energy sector for information and
analysis of market realities and that attempts by American policy makers to increase the role of
the federal government in the energy sector proved futile.106
Ikenberry concludes his discussion by calling for a more nuanced descriptor of state power, one
that differentiates types of capacities between states and their organizational foundations.107 He
concludes his assessment of state power through the lens of state energy adjustment policies by
describing three propositions about state strength: 1) that states (strong or weak108) are tied to
past policy commitments and tools for state intervention can also be used to thwart that
intervention; 2) state inaction can be just as powerful as state action (this is described as
‘imposing the market’); and 3) that flexibility may be just as important as the degree of state
control. Ikenberry juxtaposes his conclusion that these variances in state capability often
preclude state participation in international regime agreements with the conclusion of Keohane.
103
Ibid, pg. 20
Ibid, pg. 198
105
Ibid, pg. 199-200
106
Ibid, pg. 200
107
Ibid, pg. 203
108
Ikenberry is critical of the simplicity of the strong state weak state divide, see pg. 203
104
52
Keohane argues that states would benefit from sacrificing flexibility for the sake of international
rules and stability of mutual expectations.109 Ikenberry’s methodology of crafting a typology of
state energy adjustment policy provides a useful starting point for this dissertation. In this
examination of state responses to energy transitions, more specifically great-power navy
transitions from coal to oil, the author intends to expand on this approach, and build a broader
typology of their responses that can be generalized and applied to other future likely transitions.
Where Ikenberry emphasized the role of energy adjustment policy to understand state strength,
Koopman, Matthies, and Reszat attempt to assess more strictly economic lessons from the two
price shocks of the1970s. The authors emphasize the future forecasts of growth in the
developing world and argue that such growth effectively offsets any conservation efforts that
may be implemented in the west.110 They also describe the financial impact of mass amounts of
liquidity entering the international monetary system as a result of price spikes and the subsequent
profits they create, and are critical of the lack of international protocol for dealing with sovereign
debt crises.111
Koopman, Matthies and Reszat are not alone calling for improved international agreements for
the purposes of stabilizing the oil market, a common theme throughout this period. Edward
Morse calls for a dialogue between producers and consumers as well as a need for an
109
Ikenberry, G. John. Reasons of State: Oil Politics and the Capacities of American
Government. Cornell Studies in Political Economy. Edited by Peter J. Katzenstein Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1988, pg. 204-208
110
Koopmann, Georg, Laus Matthies, and Beate Reszat. Oil and the International Economy:
Lessons From Two Price Shocks. New Brunswick: Translation Publishers, 1989, pg. 38 and 43
111
Ibid, pg. 142
53
international regime to stabilize the oil market.112 Morse calls the oil market ‘out of control’ and
supports direct state intervention in the oil market due to its importance.113 In his analysis of the
price shocks of the 1970s, Stephen Krasner describes three effects of the first shock: 1) increased
concern over supply, 2) loss of economic production due to increased cost and 3) the impact of
recycling of petrodollars.114
The period from the mid to late 1990s to the first few years of the 21st century saw a substantial
amount of literature produced within the field of International Political Economy. While much
of this literature did not focus explicitly on resources or scarcity, it did consistently acknowledge
the central importance of resources, the impact of volatility within resource markets, and the role
of the state in these markets. Peter Evans described the central role of Petrobras in the creation
of the Brazilian petrochemical industry as well as the vulnerability of ‘petro-states’.115
Many of the authors in Robert Keohane and Helen Milner’s Internationalization and Domestic
Politics highlighted the role of oil and its ability to impact both international and domestic
economic policy. Jeffry Frieden and Ronald Rogowski articulated the devastating effect of the
price spikes on oil-importing nations as well as the ripple effect of oil market volatility116;
112
Morse, Edward L., “After the Fall: The Politics of Oil”, pg. 407, in Stiles, Kendall W, and
Tsuneo Akaha. Eds. International Political Economy: A Reader. New York: Harper Collins
Publishers, 1991.
113
Morse, Edward L., “After the Fall: The Politics of Oil”, pg. 407, in Stiles, Kendall W, and
Tsuneo Akaha. Eds. International Political Economy: A Reader. New York: Harper Collins
Publishers, 1991.pg. 412
114
Krasner, Stephen. “Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism”, pg.
415, in Stiles, Kendall W, and Tsuneo Akaha. Eds. International Political Economy: A Reader.
New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1991.
115
Evans, Peter. Embedded Autonomy: States & Industrial Transformation. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1995, pg. 65 and 85
116
Jeffry A. Frieden and Ronold Rogowski, “ The Impact of the International Economy on
National Policies”, pg. 30 and 41, in Keohane, Robert O, and Helen V. Milner. Eds.
Internationalization and Domestic Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
54
Matthew Evangelista described how the volatility of the oil market is even able to penetrate
closed economic systems such as that of the USSR117; Stephan Haggard and Sylvia Maxfield
described the role of oil price shocks in some cases of sovereign debt.118
David Held also highlighted the role of massive pools of liquidity created by the oil price spikes
and subsequent increased pressure on the international financial system. He noted that the
massive transfer of capital that occurred with the price spikes injected roughly $50 billion into
the international banking system between 1974 and 1976 alone.119 Held described the collapse
of the Bretton Woods system as having precipitated an intensification of financial globalization
spurred by neoliberal deregulation, international communications infrastructure and an influx of
petro-dollars, overall increasing global trade and investment.120
Meredith Woo-Cummings investigated the policy responses of several states to the oil crises of
the 1970s, including France, Japan, Korea and Taiwan. The French utilized their capability to
impact supply side issues within the energy markets, namely diversification in the nuclear area.
They increased public investment to keep energy costs down, and used foreign capital markets to
borrow currency for two purposes, to balance against capital flight and to buoy the franc from
117
Matthew Evangelista, “Stalin’s Revenge: Institutional Barriers to Internationalization in the
Soviet Union”, pg.168-69, in Keohane, Robert O, and Helen V. Milner. Eds. Internationalization
and Domestic Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
118
Stephan Haggard and Sylvia Maxfield, “The Political Economy of Financial
Internationalization in the Developing World” pg. 216, in Keohane, Robert O, and Helen V.
Milner. Eds. Internationalization and Domestic Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1996.
119
Held, David, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton. Global
Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999,
pg. 201-202
120
Ibid, pg. 426
55
depreciation against the dollar.121 Woo-Cummings briefly stated the variance of state responses
to the energy crisis among several East Asian nations:
“The export orientation critical to all three economies is centralized in Korea,
decentralized in Taiwan, oligopolistic and highly competitive in Japan. When the 1973
oil crisis struck all three, state responses could not have been more different: Korea
expanded and inflated, while Taiwan contracted and stabilized; Japan confronted massive
inflation but began extensive deficit financing to cover the social costs of inflation
control.”
The varying responses to the 1973 oil crisis among these East Asian economies (as well as the
French) is interesting in that it demonstrates that state policy responses to exogenous shocks are
likely to depend on their domestic circumstances as much as on international economic
conditions. This in turn relates directly to Ikenberry’s analysis of state capacity: states that are
more capable of taking domestic measures to manage exogenous shocks will do so; on the other
hand, states with little room for domestic policy responses are likely to seek international
cooperative arrangements to manage systemic shocks.
Robert Gilpin described the 1973 oil crisis as having an important role in stemming the rapid
economic growth in the post-war era, indicating that dramatic cost increases led to the decline in
economic productivity in Western Europe and the United States.122 Gilpin described the oil
market prior to 1973 as being very favorable towards the advanced industrial economies and
noted that the United States lost control of the oil market as a weapon, control of which shifted
towards OPEC, along with enormous sums of wealth. Like other authors Gilpin saw this
121
Woo-Cumings, Meredith. The Developmental State. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999,
pg. 244
122
Gilpin, Robert. The Challenge of Global Capitalism: The World Economy in the 21st
Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000, pg. 54
56
development as a serious blow to American power and prestige and simultaneously the
beginning of a truly global financial system when the producers began investing that wealth. 123
Gilpin described the central role of a stable oil market and noted that volatility in that market in
terms of relative prices had a ‘disproportionately huge impact’ on international political and
economic affairs.124 In describing the cause of this volatility, Gilpin emphasizes the human
cause of the crisis, and states that without the Yom Kippur War, the huge rise in the cost of oil
would not have occurred.125 Thus Gilpin saw the source of scarcity as one of human policy, and
error, and not a structural supply issue, or as an environmental constraint. With that perspective
in mind he suggests that economic analysis, while important, cannot substitute for “historical,
political, and sociological analysis”.
Overall, the literature of the second-oil-boom era, while it recognized the importance of scarcity,
and the exhaustible nature of fossil fuel resources, saw the crises of the 1970s as problems that
stemmed from supply-side issues of poor policy, planning and distribution. This includes
decisions by producers to dramatically alter the market status quo through embargoes for
political purposes. There is much emphasis on the role of the United States in exercising
influence over the oil markets, the loss of that influence to OPEC as a result of the embargoes,
the financial and economic impact of petro-dollar recycling, and how to best inject stability into
a volatile market that is central to our international political order.
The most recent spike in oil prices shaped the last sub-set of the energy and oil literature.
Beginning in 2003-4 and continuing until 2013-14, the second oil scarcity literature saw a rise in
123
Ibid, pg. 71
Ibid, pg. 58
125
Ibid, pg. 59-60
124
57
an ecological perspective, an emphasis on the need to transition away from fossil fuels, and
increased discussion of the role of fossil fuel usage in global climate change. While there are
still some optimists who insist that scarcity can be solved with technological development, the
debate during this era shifts markedly toward demand driven policy responses and a belief that a
transition towards renewable energy lies in our immediate future.
The Second-Oil-Scarcity Literature
The Second-Oil Scarcity era began around 2003 and continued until the most recent collapse of
oil prices in late 2014. In this period there was a marked increase in emphasis on scarcity,
ecological and structural constraints on energy consumption, conservation, and the need to
transition beyond fossil fuels due to global climate change. There were also optimists who
contended that there existed plenty of oil and gas left to last a long time and technological
developments could assist humanity in using those resources most efficiently. A middle ground
between these positions is sought and issues most relevant to energy transitions are emphasized.
Richard Heinberg represents the far end of the pessimistic spectrum. Taking an energy-centric
approach with an emphasis on the ecological problems present within the oil economy, Heinberg
states that the social sciences are really subcategories of ecology.126 Heinberg views complex
societies as energy-processing structures, building off the ideas of archaeologist Joseph Tainter,
and his conclusion that ‘complex societies tend to collapse because their strategies for energy
capture are subject to the law of diminishing returns.’127 Heinberg argues that our matter-energy
system, which is finite, is fundamentally incompatible with our economic-financial-monetary
126
Heinberg, Richard. The Party’s Over: Oil, War and the Fate of Industrial Societies. Gabriola
Island: New Society Publishers, 2003, pg. 20
127
Ibid, pg. 33
58
system, which is based on continued growth.128 Heinberg is particularly critical of the shale oil
extraction process and the projections for future oil supply published by the United States
Geological Survey.129
For Heinberg, the oil crisis is a matter of physical scarcity and dealing with the problem
appropriately requires tailoring our economic, financial, and monetary systems to better reflect
the finite realities of our resource base. This will require the placement of ecological issues at
the center of our economic philosophy.130 Colin Campbell also finds fault in our economic
ideals and believes that excessive faith in markets as arbiters of economic justice is flawed. For
Campbell our natural resource constraints should be paramount in our economic prescriptions
and evaluations, and as someone who has worked as a geologist within the oil industry for a long
time, his warnings about supply are particularly resonant.131 Others are equally pessimistic about
the future of oil and its role in the international political economy, yet for reasons that are more
political than economic, or philosophical. Michael Klare sees an increased role for the U.S.
military in protecting access and supply routes for the oil markets:
“[S]oldiers from the…regional commands are increasingly being committed to oil-related
operations…Already troops from the Southern Command (Southcom) are helping to
defend Colombia’s Cano Limòn pipeline, a vital link between oil fields in the interior and
refineries on the coast, which has been under recurring attack form leftist guerrillas.
Likewise, soldiers from European Command (Eurocom) are training local forces to
protect the newly constructed Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline in Georgia. Eurocom also
oversees all U.S. forces deployed in Africa (except in the Horn, which falls under
Centcom’s jurisdiction) and has begun seeking bases from which to support future
operations to defend the region’s oil facilities. Finally, the ships and planes of the U.S.
Pacific Command (Pacom) are patrolling vital tanker routes in the Indian Ocean, the
South China Sea, and the western Pacific. Taken together, these developments lead to an
128
Ibid, pg. 91
Ibid, pg. 111-115
130
Ibid, pg. 91
131
Campbell, C.J. Oil Crisis. Brentwood: Multi-Science Publishing Company Ltd., 2005, pg.
227
129
59
inescapable conclusion: that the American military is being used more and more for the
protection of overseas oil fields and the supply routes that connect them to the United
States and its allies. Such endeavors, once largely confined to the Gulf area, are now
being extended to unstable oil regions in other parts of the world. Slowly but surely, the
U.S. military is being converted into a global oil-protection service.”132
For Klare the activity required to protect pipelines and sea routes, and to maintain access and
stability in the oil market is a part of the hidden cost of oil for the U.S. and its allies.
Additionally he sees a direct relationship between global petroleum shortages and economic
recessions133, a view also shared by Jeremy Rifkin.134 Overall Klare argues that increased
reliance on petroleum combined with increased scarcity is likely to increase conflict over that
resource.
Hicks and Nelder also argue that there are hidden costs to oil, arguing that oil takes millions of
years to form geologically and that given this reality, oil’s price tag should be considerably
higher.135 Importantly, Hicks and Nelder highlight the massive oil consumption by the U.S.
military:
“For one thing the sheer scale of the military’s dependence on oil is absolutely immense.
The Department of Defense is the largest single energy consumer in the country and the
single largest oil-consuming government entity in the world. The Defense Department
consumed 132.7 million barrels of oil in 2005; that’s nearly 2 percent of all oil used by
the United States. And thanks to incredibly oil-thirsty machines, the military also has the
unfortunate need to burn a lot of fuel just to move more fuel. More than half of all the
cargo moved by the military is just fuel. And 80 percent of the material transported on
the battlefield is fuel.”136
For Hicks and Nelder, the increasing scarcity of oil resources will present a massive challenge to
militaries and they are pessimistic about our ability to maintain oil consumption at current levels.
132
Klare, Michael T. Blood and Oil. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004, pg. 6-7
Ibid, pg. 9
134
Rifkin, Jeremy. The Third Industrial Revolution: How Lateral Power is Transforming
Energy, the Economy, and the World. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, pg. 13-14
135
Hicks, Brian, and Chris Nelder. Profit From the Peak: The End of Oil and the Greatest
Investment Event of the Century. Hoboken: Angel Publishing, 2008, pg. 72
136
Ibid, pg. 82
133
60
Kaldor, Karl, and Said’s edited work also highlights the relationship between oil and conflict, in
places such as Angola, Chechnya, and Nigeria.137 They see a negative impact domestically on
oil producing countries, including a reduction in non-oil economic production and a disincentive
to work.138 While pessimistic about the future of the oil economy, they see depletion as
stemming from oil becoming obsolete instead of a physical depletion of the resource, citing a
statement from a former Saudi Oil Minister: ‘The Stone Age did not come to an end because we
had a lack of stones, and the oil age will not come to an end because we have a lack of oil.’139
Jeremy Rifkin describes a third industrial revolution shifting away from concentrated resource
distribution in the form of fossil fuels to a lateral production of electricity via renewable
resources.140 In his compelling discussion of the likely impending energy transition, Rifkin
emphasizes a five point plan that he believes will develop based upon the technological prospects
for providing humanities future energy needs.141 He sees such a program as necessary stemming
from his pessimism regarding the capability of the oil industry to maintain production levels for
increased consumption of a growing human population, comparing such prospects to the collapse
of Rome.142
Across the aisle, so to speak, from the pessimists are those who view peak oil, and the likelihood
of future scarcity, quite differently. Robert Mabro remains positive in his outlook on the future
availability of oil resources. He cites statements by Sheikh Ahmad Fahad Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah
137
Kaldor, Mary, Terry Karl, and Yahia Said. Eds. Oil Wars. London: Pluto Press, 2007.
Ibid, pg. 12-13
139
Ibid, pg. 16
140
Rifkin, Jeremy. The Third Industrial Revolution: How Lateral Power is Transforming
Energy, the Economy, and the World. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, pg. 5
141
Ibid, pg. 37
142
Ibid, pg. 80-82
138
61
indicating that proven reserves, reserve growth and new discoveries are plenty to ensure
adequate supply throughout the first half of the twenty-first century and beyond.143 He sees the
impact of peak oil as simply meaning higher prices; an adjustment that will likely reduce demand
and ultimately such a price increase will relieve pressure on the oil market.144 Yet, despite his
acknowledgement of the fundamental geological reality of peak oil, he argues that the when one
assesses the numbers on oil reserves and estimates for future production they will see a more
positive outlook. In short, Mabro sees overall estimates for worldwide oil reserves as being on
the high end of the spectrum, and that, combined with increased capability for extraction due to
unconventional sources and technological developments, peak-oil will not become problematic
for a long time.145
Robyn Mills is equally optimistic, to the point of describing the oil crisis as a ‘myth’. She
emphasizes the capability of technology and human adaptability to manage the impact of
scarcity.146 Mills is critical of claims made by pessimists related to EROEI, or energy returned
on energy invested, arguing that unconventional sources of oil are more feasible than pessimists
claim, and emphasizing that EROEI is based upon profitability.147 As long as such resources are
profitable, they will be utilized. Optimists see pessimists as alarmists, and describe a reserve of
oil resources that is more than capable of continuing to fuel modern industrialization and
economic growth. While they acknowledge the finite nature of fossil fuel resources, they believe
that increasing technological development, increased technological efficiency and
143
Mabro, Robert. Ed. Oil in the 21st Century: Issues, Challenges and Opportunities. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2006, pg. xii
144
Ibid, pg. 9
145
Ibid, pg. 159-161
146
Mills, Robin M. The Myth of the Oil Crisis: Overcoming the Challenges of Depletion,
Geopolitics, and Global Warming. Westport: Prager Publishers, 2008, pg. 219
147
Ibid, pg. 211-212
62
unconventional resource supplies will be plentiful enough for humanity to continue down its
chosen energy path.
Conclusions
What aspects of the body of research on energy and fossil fuels are central to understanding the
ways in which states and their military organizations respond to energy transitions? What central
themes of this literature must guide further exploration of how energy transitions impact state
decision-making and policy? There are several important factors:
1) Fossil fuels are central to current military power
2) Fossil fuels are central to economic growth and prosperity
3) There are no current alternatives for these resources
4) These resources are becoming increasingly scarce
The significance of energy issues for states and their militaries since the Industrial Revolution is
indisputable. Between the late 1890’s and the First World War, great power navies experienced
a transition between their primary source of energy. If a future transition from fossil fuels to
some new, and as yet undetermined, source of energy is likely, scholars will benefit from a
detailed understanding of similar earlier state experiences.
Within political science generally, and International Political Economy more specifically,
energy, its availability, cost, and its central role in our economic and political order, has often
been emphasized. The patterns of our energy usage demonstrate transitional periods that arise as
dominant energy sources become less and less available, and are usually overtaken and
diversified from through new sources of energy or by improved energy technology. Almost
every author cited in the chapter recognizes one fundamental geological reality: Our primary
source of energy, oil, is a finite resource that cannot continue to fuel further industrialization,
63
economic growth and other uses, based upon current consumption patterns. This fact has forced
a realization that a future energy transition is likely, and in many ways is already underway.
Yet the finite nature of fossil fuels is not new. What is new is a consensus that some future
transition away from fossil fuels is likely, if not inevitable. If this is agreed upon, then there
should be a concerted effort to understand these transition periods as much as possible. This
process begins with studying past transitions. The energy literature is lacking in focused
examinations of the impact of energy transitions on economic, political, and military matters. In
this way this dissertation hopes to contribute to that body of scholarly knowledge.
Specifically, the case studies will help scholars to understand the impact of energy transitions on
militaries. Much of the energy literature is not explicitly focused on the relationship between
military organizations and energy technology. However, modern militaries have a unique
relationship with technology in that they regularly can afford to purchase the premier tools and
machines currently available. The energy literature would expect that renewable energy
technologies such as solar, wind, and geothermal or hydro-electric, along with nuclear energy,
will replace fossil fuel dominance in our energy framework. The lack of military emphasis in the
energy literature is evident here, as none of the above energy sources have demonstrated a
capability to improve on what the Department of Defense refers to as operational energy. 148 The
dissertation finds that the next step in the energy transition for operational purposes is likely to
be a bridge technology, or some slightly more renewable liquid fuel to be burned by machines
quite similar to those used now. The case studies demonstrate the significance of the bridge
148
"Annual Energy Review 2011." edited by Department of Energy, 370. Washington D.C.:
Office of Energy Statistics, 2012, pg. 28
64
technology approach to spanning the various energy sources present in any given energy
transition.
This has provided the author with his ultimate goal, to understand modern state responses to
major energy transitions. If scholars are to understand how states cope with a major structural
change, such as an energy source transition, they must begin by examining examples of such
transitions in detail.
This line of reasoning has led the author to propose detailed case studies of such transitions,
beginning with the transition by great power navies from coal to oil as their primary fuel for their
fleets. This transition, which begins with the initial experiments with oil-powered ships and
trains and is solidified by the end of the First World War, represents the first major energy
transition experienced by great powers after the industrial revolution. If scholars hope to
anticipate ways in which states may adapt and change to a future transition away from fossil
fuels, it will be necessary to better understand similar past experiences.
65
3
Military Organizations, Innovation, and Technological Diffusion
A Review of the Literature
As stated throughout the dissertation, the primary aim of this project is to understand state
military responses to energy transitions. More specifically, my focus is the development of oilpowered machinery for the purposes of defense and the projection of military power. As oil
technology improved, developed, and became more widespread, military organizations began
incorporating that technology into their arsenal of capabilities. They also began a process
developing and researching the possibilities presented by such technology and changing their
behavior based upon the new realities of this energy transition.
To those involved in the process, it became clear that petroleum, not coal, was the fuel of the
future for military organizations. Thus, the fundamental phenomenon to be examined in this
research is the diffusion of energy technology within and between military organizations, their
state governments and allies, and corporate oil interests. The goal is to create a typology that
will classify the various responses to this diffusion on the part of the American and British
navies. What developments led to the decision to embrace this new energy technology? How
and by whom was such a decision reached? What individuals, organizations, branches of
government, or corporations were advocating for such a change and which were not? How did
such a change impact military doctrine, policy, and posture? By answering such questions, this
work hopes to shed light on how states perceive the role of energy in terms of military security
and also on how impactful energy transitions can be. Increased understanding of these issues
will provide some guidance on how states and their militaries might respond to likely future
energy transitions.
66
To obtain a clear picture of how this energy transition impacted states, and their respective
military organizations, one must first be familiar with the body of literature centered on military
organizations generally, and on innovation and the diffusion of technology within those
institutions more specifically. Organizations and institutions are critical components of human
interaction and daily life. Much research in political science has focused on the characteristics
and behavior of humans through the social action of organizations. Yet, not all organizations are
created equal, and non-military organizations are significantly different than military
organizations. Military organizations are unique for multiple reasons. First, they possess the
legitimate monopoly on the use of force and the prosecution of wars; secondly, they are
responsible for the survival of the nation they serve. These organizations are also uniquely
situated as case studies for scholars examining phenomena with both domestic and international
variables. Within international relations and domestic level political analysis, the state and its
military serve as the preeminent actor straddling both arenas.149
Militaries have always received plenty of attention from scholars. Military histories fill the
shelves in every university library. In political science the formal study of military
organizations, institutions, firms, and other bureaucracies has long been debated. Scholars have
sought to determine what fundamental principles help shape and determine courses of action,
often with the goal of hoping to explain differences, discrepancies, and outliers to the prevailing
theories of military doctrine and the state. A review of the post-World War II literature on
military organizations is presented here with the goal being to enhance the theoretical clarity of
149
Posen, Barry R. The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the
World Wars Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Edited by Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984.
67
this work. My aim is to demonstrate that the case studies outlined later are interesting cases that
require exploration, and that successful review of state responses to the aforementioned energy
transition will contribute to the lively debates in organizational theory.
In his address to the Academy of Political Science in January 1941, Hanson W. Baldwin, Military
and Naval Correspondent to the New York Times, spoke on the subject of military organization.
Much of that commentary is spent on emphasizing the need for certain improvements due to the
increasing probability of America becoming entangled in the European War. He stressed the
need for open criticism and consideration of military policies and operations, as well as
articulated the need for increased levels of coordination across the branches of the military for
the purposes of comprehensive defense planning.150 Yet it is his discussion of the possibility of
the creation of a third branch of the military, an Air Force, that is emblematic of military reaction
to revolutionary technology. Baldwin emphasizes that the American military has certainly
developed airpower, describes the Navy as the having the world’s best naval air service, and
cites the appointment of Hap Arnold to Deputy Chief of Staff as evidence of the impact of
airpower on military doctrine. Yet, despite the substantial impact of airpower, and its obvious
advantages, Baldwin argues on organizational grounds against creating the ‘third branch’ at the
time.
“…[T]he question of a separate air arm should not be forever quashed; it is quite possible
that in quieter times a third separate fighting service should be evolved. But there seem
to me to be compelling reasons against any such change today. First, it would be a
mistake to assume that coördinated operations and unity of action could be achieved
merely by the creation of a third service, when it is obvious that coordination is far from
perfect today when only two fighting services exist. Second, the dislocation to our
defense effort incident to such a sweeping reorganization, coming at this most crucial
time in the history of the world, might jeopardize that effort and even jeopardize the
150
Baldwin, Hanson W. "Military Organization." Paper presented at the Proceedings of the
Academy of Political Science, 1941.
68
nation. Third the service jealousies and heartaches thus created would be a persistent
root of evil for years to come.”151
For Baldwin, the creation of a separate third arm would complicate already imperfect
coordination of the various branches of the military. First, he emphasizes the fact that simply
creating a separate and specialized organization for air power would not necessarily result in
better coordination. More importantly, he stresses that the risk of war meant that there would
likely not be enough time to create, test, and integrate this new military organization with the two
already in existence. While he could not know that Pearl Harbor was just under a year away, he
was correct nonetheless. A drastic overhaul of the U.S. military command structure in a mere
eleven months would certainly strain the capabilities of the most effective state bureaucracy.
The perspective put forward by Baldwin is emblematic of military reactions to technological
change. Militaries have always adapted; they would not survive otherwise. Yet, because of the
unique characteristics of military organizations and their universal, singular purpose (to fight and
survive/win wars and thus preserve the existence of the state and society) they often resist
change, and generally implement change on their own terms. Baldwin concludes by telling the
audience what military organization is, and, from his perspective, what it should be. For
Baldwin, military organization is the skeletal framework of the national war effort, a means to an
end.152 That end is the very survival of a state’s people, and as such changes to military
organization, doctrine, and strategy are treated slowly, carefully, and deliberately. Similar themes
are prevalent throughout the literature on military organizations.
151
Ibid, pg. 16
Baldwin, Hanson W. "Military Organization." Paper presented at the Proceedings of the
Academy of Political Science, 1941, pg. 128
152
69
While Baldwin’s address represents a very grounded approach to military organization of a
specific military at a particular time, Herbert Kaufman provides a more abstract and theoretical
treatment of organization theory and it similarities with much political theory. Writing in 1964,
Kaufman draws attention to the interesting fact that men of “divergent training…differing
objectives, and displaying varied concerns” could study phenomena believed to be “quite
distinct” and yet develop “findings and inferences [that] should turn out to be closely parallel in
many important respects.”153 For Kaufman, organizational theorists and political theorists are
simply studying similar human phenomena manifesting in different disciplines. He points out
that the two disparate areas of study have developed similar approaches to similar phenomena.
Kaufman is describing what he sees as a parallel between organization theory within mid-sixties
sociology and the political theory of the time; between the study of relations of governments and
subjects, as well as inter-state relations studied in political theory, and the study of other forms of
human association, focused on in sociological organization theory. These include understanding
why individuals submit to some higher authority (justified by rationality); how to best achieve
coordination in social activity (hierarchy is conducive to coordination); and similar debates
revolving around reconciling individual goals and interests with collective goals and interests.154
Kaufman stresses that organizations, conceptually, are massively broad, capable of
encompassing almost all daily life. Importantly, he insists that all organizations are in some
sense political, needing to manage the “problems of leadership, policy formation, succession,
strategy, rivalry, resistance, revolution, and influence that this implies.” Military organizations
153
Kaufman, Herbert. "Organization Theory and Political Theory." The American Political
Science Review 58, no. 1 (March 1964): 5-14.
154
Ibid, pg. 5-9
70
present themselves as distinctly political, beyond the inherent political qualities possessed by all
other organizations, manifested in state possession of a monopoly on the legitimate use of force
and responsibility for national survival.
In James March’s Handbook of Organizations Kurt Lang presents a useful introduction to the
basic qualities of military organizations. He describes several of the basic principles of
international relations theory, including the anarchic nature of the state system, the “milieu of
competitive force”, the lack of information and high amount of uncertainty, and the lack of a
supranational authority.155 For Lang, a state’s domestic structure is important and it is generally
reflected in its military organizational makeup, and thus there are perceivable differences
between democratic and totalitarian military organizations.156 Lang highlights the complexity of
military organizations as well as their need for large reserves of resources for sustained
operation. These qualities stem from the core function of militaries, making war. Lang notes
that the ‘normal’ state of operation for a military is peacetime, yet the institutions of the military
must be prepared for war at any time. Thus, they need a large pool of resources and the ability to
quickly alter their operations from peacetime to wartime needs. This requires a large and
complex organizational structure, the resources necessary to maintain it, and the flexibility to act
according to the specific need of the threat of war in a particular instance.157
Lang also comments importantly on an often-cited quality of militaries, a generalized resistance
to change. On this Lang should be quoted at length:
155
Lang, Kurt. Military Organizations, in March, James G., ed. Handbook of Organizations.
Edited by Edgar F. Borgatta, Rand Mcnally Sociology Series. Chicago: Rand McNally &
Company, 1965, pg. 839
156
Ibid, pg. 844
157
Ibid, pg. 856
71
“Major innovations in military technology have usually met with strong resistance from
important segments of the military leadership. The resistance has its source in the
uncertainty of all strategic evaluations and in the need for confidence in existing
procedures. Thus, there is a natural reluctance to scrap older forms before the tactical
and strategic advantages of innovations have received full and complete test. The realism
demanded from the military has its counterpart in the romanticism of the profession, so
that distrust of change may very well be the price paid for the military man’s dedication
to the cultivation of martial arts in peacetime. Moreover, faith in one’s weapons is
essential to the maintenance of espirit de corps and morale. The remote and uncertain
advantages promised from change instituted in peacetime must therefore be balanced
against the costs and disruption that any changeover entails.”158
A ‘full and complete’ test of new technology applicable to warfare can only take place on the
battlefield. Correspondingly, new technology is rarely adopted by militaries prior to evidence of
successful use in war. Lang states that this resistance stems first from uncertainty about
technological performance compared to the current dominant modes of war, and secondly from
“vested interests that develop around established practices”.159
James Q. Wilson, while not describing military organizations per se, provides several important
insights about organizational innovation and change. Wilson begins by pessimistically stating
“little can be said about the correlation between firm [read organization] characteristics and
innovation.”160 Regarding government organizations, he notes that scholars have observed
different patterns of innovation between different bureaucracies, namely the New York City Fire
department, which rarely innovates, and the New York Port Authority, which continually
innovates. Yet despite such observed difference, he claims that the only point in thinking broadly
158
Ibid, pg. 857
Lang, Kurt. Military Organizations, in March, James G., ed. Handbook of Organizations.
Edited by Edgar F. Borgatta, Rand Mcnally Sociology Series. Chicago: Rand McNally &
Company, 1965, pg.857
160
Wilson, James Q. “Innovation in Organization: Notes Toward a Theory”. In Thompson,
James D., ed. Approaches to Organizational Design. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press,
1966, pg. 195
159
72
about innovation may be to demonstrate that “not much can be learned that way.” 161 Wilson is
particularly pessimistic about the likelihood of theorizing about specific organizational
innovation in any specified set of circumstances. In fact he explicitly articulates that his unit of
analysis is the organization and not the organization in its environment. For Wilson the
environmental impact can only be determined to “increase or decrease” the prospect of
innovation, not determine what that likely innovation will be.162 With those limitations in mind,
Wilson provides a few hypotheses on when and why innovation may occur. He describes three
stages of innovation: 1) the conception of the change (invention) 2) the proposing of the change
(discussion/consideration) 3) and adoption, or implementation of the change (action).
The likelihood of change during any of these stages, according to Wilson, is primarily a function
of diversity. He sees diversity as increasing the likelihood of change conception and proposals,
yet sees diversity as an obstacle to the actual implementation of change.163 He concludes that the
implementation of innovation and innovative change within organizations is essentially political
bargaining. The cost-benefit assessments of proposed change within complex and diverse
organizations will be different across sub-units of that organization. Increased complexity and
diversity decrease the likelihood of adoption. Much as Kaufman finds interesting parallels
between organization theory and political theory, Wilson describes the policy innovation process
as essentially political bargaining, requiring reconciliation of disparate claims and interests, the
161
Ibid, pg. 195-196
Ibid, pg. 198
163
Wilson, James Q. “Innovation in Organization: Notes Toward a Theory”. In Thompson,
James D., ed. Approaches to Organizational Design. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press,
1966, pg. 200-203
162
73
possible need for side payments, and information gathering on the tolerability parameters of the
various sub interests.164
Barry Posen compares organization theory with balance of power theory, in an effort to
determine which of the two can better explain military doctrine. Posen likens these two bodies
of theory to various perspectives, lenses, or levels of analysis commonly used to divide
approaches to political analysis. These correspond to political analyses at the individual level,
domestic political analyses, and inter-state analyses. Due to the nature of military organizations,
Posen indicates that understanding the sources of military doctrine will likely require using both
balance of power theory and organization theory in tandem, stating that both theories “abstract
the constraints that affect the behavior of national security decision-makers in the modern
state.”165 This is important because while both theories claim to explain state policy and action,
they differ on the source of motivation for those policies and actions; do they stem from the
internal political bargaining of the military organization, or do they stem from the situational
context of the state relative to other states? Posen concisely describes the cross-forces at work
on military doctrine:
“Military Doctrine, as discussed here is a response to both national and international
influences. It represents the state’s response to the constraints and incentives of the
external world, yet it encompasses means that are in the custody of military
organizations. These are perhaps the most “organized” of organizations. It is from their
basic structure that most subsequent organizations take their inspiration. Thus, military
doctrine provides an excellent ground upon which the two theories can do battle.”166
164
Ibid, pg. 203
Posen, Barry R. The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the
World Wars Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Edited by Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984, pg. 37
166
Posen, Barry R. The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the
World Wars Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Edited by Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984, pg. 38
165
74
In this excellent work, Posen describes the difference between these two sets of theoretical
scholarship on how military organizations innovate. Organizational theory, according to Posen,
stresses the organization’s desire for predictability, stability, and certainty; these values are not
compatible with innovation and change. As he points out, however, we do see large innovative
changes take place within organizations over time, so how is this explained by organization
theory? Posen states that the organization literature suggests that organizations change under
three circumstances: failure, outside pressure, or a desire for expansion.
Posen develops more specific propositions about when a military will likely innovate. He argues
(1) that, due to institutionalization, militaries will rarely sponsor radical change; (2) that doctrinal
innovations will increase uncertainty, (3) that new technology will likely be combined with old
doctrine rather than spawn a new doctrine, and (4) that militaries do not learn well from
observation, but instead require direct experience in battle to induce drastic doctrinal change.167
Thus, there are three likely causes of military doctrinal innovation: failure on the battlefield,
civilian intervention, and direct combat experience with new technology. For Posen, the sources
of innovation are more likely to be found in the balance of power and organizational variables
than to stem from geographical or technological variables. Between the former two he argues
that balance of power theory is more convincing, conceding however that in times of relative
calm organizational determinism is likely to be prevalent. 168
167
Ibid, pg. 55-57
Posen, Barry R. The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the
World Wars Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Edited by Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984, pg. 80
168
75
In downplaying the possibility of direct impact on military doctrine and military innovation by
technology and geography, Posen seems to unnecessarily group the two factors together. In
relation to how militaries change and innovate, this is unfortunate. Technology is constantly
changing, developing and improving. Because of the role of industrialized machinery in modern
warfare the opportunities for technology to directly impact, shift, or render entirely obsolete
existing doctrine is high. This has been shown with countless technological developments and
their impact on the battlefield, from the chariot, to Mongol archery tactics, the pike, the internal
combustion engine, manned flight, and harnessing atomic energy. Technological developments
can also directly impact our relationship to geographical barriers, as has been demonstrated by
cyber-attacks on physical infrastructure.169
As for geography, it is unlikely to directly impact changes or innovations in doctrine, yet it is
certainly more determinative of state grand strategy than Posen indicates. First, geography
dictates the spatial relationships between states, and humanity’s ties to the land are important.
Defense of the homeland, conceptually, is paramount in military organizations. They also derive
most of their required resources from that land and thus are, to some extent, bound by its
provisions. Many of the most well known strategic issues among the states examined by Posen
are directly determined by geography, as he acknowledges, including British reliance on naval
power, the German two-front problem, and the French decision not to fortify its border with
169
Clayton, Mark. "Exclusive: New Thesis on How Stuxnet Infiltrated Iran Nuclear Facility."
The Christian Science Monitor, 2014.
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2014/0225/Exclusive-New-thesis-on-howStuxnet-infiltrated-Iran-nuclear-facility
76
Belgium.170 While Posen certainly concedes the role of technology and geography, he
deemphasizes their role in relation to organization theory and balance of power theory to the
detriment of his argument, particularly in the case of technology.
In his discussion of the effectiveness of military organizations, Alan Millett outlines the four
levels of analysis for military activity. These are political, strategic, operational, and tactical.
Millett argues that military effectiveness must be assessed separately at each level and
demonstrates that varying levels of effectiveness across levels is possible and likely. His measure
for effectiveness is different from military victory. He describes military victory as an outcome,
not an organizational characteristic. Effectiveness is instead a cost/benefit assessment of military
activity at one of the levels of analysis, and there are likely to be interaction effects across levels.
He gives the example of American military effectiveness in South Vietnam, noting that if the
Americans had relied less on indirect firepower and more on engaging the enemy closely on foot,
they could have improved their tactical effectiveness. However, they would have likely incurred
increased casualties and thereby reduced their political effectiveness by creating increased
domestic opposition to the war.171
Millet’s work is an effort to gauge something slightly different than how militaries respond to
change and their likelihood of innovation. Yet in his discussion he provides several interesting
insights into that process. He compares several militaries in similar situations and demonstrates
varying effectiveness in the integration and utilization of the respective states industrial bases for
170
Posen, Barry R. The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the
World Wars Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Edited by Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984, pg. 237-238
171
Allan R. Millett, Williamson Murray, Kenneth H. Watman. "The Effectiveness of Military
Organizations." International Security 11, no. 1 (1986), pg. 38
77
defense purposes. In doing so he shows that militaries indeed can and will adapt and innovate in
response to the development of new technology, but he also shows that militaries do not do so
equally.
Importantly, he demonstrates that failure to appropriately change in the face of new
technological realities can be devastating. Millet compares the Soviet Union and the Italy during
the inter-war period, finding that the Soviets made much better use of their industrial capabilities
than the Italians did, citing the Soviet development of the T-34 tank, and the Italian rejection of
an aerial torpedo.172 He also compares the varying utilization of available industrial capacity
between Germany and the Allies. He argues that the allied strategy and its emphasis on airpower
required continuous technological innovation and mass production, whereas the Germans failed
to fully mobilize “virtually the entire manufacturing capacity of Europe” until late 1941 to early
1942.173 Thus, Millet emphasizes the varying effectiveness of incorporating industrial
technological capability across military organizations.
Millet offers several reasons as to why a military may reject (or only slowly adopt) new
technology. Those reasons include 1) insufficient funding from political authorities; 2) military
assessment that new technology may not be either reliable or significantly superior to existing
technology; 3) a slow acceptance of technology due to high levels of uncertainty; 4) rejection
due to the new technology threatening either the status of a military branch (the way aircraft
172
Allan R. Millett, Williamson Murray, Kenneth H. Watman. "The Effectiveness of Military
Organizations." International Security 11, no. 1 (1986), pg. 41
173
Ibid, pg. 47-48
78
carriers were seen as a threat to the navy, or the way tanks threatened the cavalry) or the social
environment of the military.174
For Millett, rejection of technological development by militaries is an indication of operational
ineffectiveness, and conversely, true effectiveness stems from successful integration of new
technology with operational doctrine. Such effectiveness is exemplified by the RAF’s work with
single engine fighters and radar in the 1930s and 1940s.175
In sum, for Millet, technology can certainly drive military innovation, but only if it is
appropriately integrated with military doctrine; accomplishing this task is likely to result in
overall military effectiveness. On the other hand, his arguments indicate that militaries must
manage technological change and development, and failing to do so can dramatically reduce
military effectiveness.
Stephen Rosen offers a significant contribution to the discussion, in several different works. The
first is an article in International Security. In it he addresses the role of ideology, the need for
appropriate career paths for innovators, and the need for cooperation between military leaders
and civilian authorities to accomplish innovation in military doctrine. He begins by offering a
definition of innovation, or major innovation. A ‘major innovation’ is one that requires a
primary combat arm of the military to change its concepts of operation and its relations to the
other branches.176 In analyzing why militaries innovate, Rosen provides several propositions, 1)
defeat in wartime is not necessary; 2) military ‘mavericks’ do not cause innovation; 3) internal
174
Ibid, pg. 56
Allan R. Millett, Williamson Murray, Kenneth H. Watman. "The Effectiveness of Military
Organizations." International Security 11, no. 1 (1986), 55
176
Rosen, Stephen Peter. "New Ways of War: Understanding Military Innovation." International
Security 13, no. 1 (Summer 1988), pg. 134
175
79
military innovation can occur when supported by senior officers who act in a two part strategy of
A): translation of new capabilities and their implications into new service wide critical tasks and
B): creation of new career paths for officers related to those new capabilities; 4) civilian
intervention is most successful when utilized in combination with number 3.177
Rosen emphasizes the complex political character of military organizations, arguing that these
communities require an ideological shift in order to accept major innovations. Rosen’s emphasis
on the need for appropriate careers for officers with expertise in new technological capabilities is
significant. This point brings to mind earlier work by Thomas Hammond, who demonstrated
that organizational structure could determine the outcome of bureaucratic battles.178 Hammond
points out that one of the primary difference between legislative decision making and
bureaucratic decision making is that often times the crucial decisions within bureaucratic
organizations are made by individuals.179
Thus, it is important that individuals supportive of new technology are able to reach important
decision-making positions of authority within military hierarchical structures. For Rosen,
without these career path possibilities, officers supportive of certain technological developments
who understand the impact they are likely to have on doctrine may never be in a position to
approve their adoption and use. In his book published just a few years later, Rosen takes a
deeper look at innovation in modern militaries. Significantly, he distinguishes between
peacetime and wartime innovation. The “malevolent, violent chaos of war” alters the nature of
177
Ibid, pg. 135-36
Hammond, Thomas H. "Agenda Control, Organizational Structure, and Bureaucratic
Politics." American Journal of Political Science 30, no. 2 (May 1986), pg. 379-382
179
Ibid, pg. 383
178
80
organizational learning and can and should be treated differently than peacetime innovation.
This also means that theories about organizations that do not face war will differ fundamentally
from theories of military organizations.180
Rosen also highlights the impact of technological change on military and organizational
decision-making. He argues that technological change introduces a new component to the
decision making process, namely, scientists. For Rosen there is the possibility for disagreement
regarding who – military men or scientists – is in the best position to assess the impact of
technological innovation, or the likely future impact of possible technological innovation on the
battlefield?181 Rosen delves into several cases of successful, and unsuccessful, innovation in both
peacetime and wartime. Most relevant for this particular study is the comparison of the U.S. and
British naval responses to the emergence of the aircraft carrier.
The nature of aviation in the immediate post WWI years led most to believe that the best military
function for aviation was for reconnaissance and as the ‘eyes of the fleet’. However, as aviation
technology developed during the interwar period the Americans altered their notion of naval
aviation while the British did not. Up to 1938, the British still saw naval aviation as primarily
useful for surveying the battlefield and conveying information to the military leadership, not as a
tool for the projection of power.182
180
Rosen, Stephen Peter. Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military. Cornell
Studies in Security Affairs. Edited by Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1991, pg. 23
181
Rosen, Stephen Peter. Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military. Cornell
Studies in Security Affairs. Edited by Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1991, pg. 40
182
Ibid, pg. 97-98
81
The Americans conceived of naval aviation differently, and as early as 1931, under the direction
of Rear Admiral William Moffett, had reconceived aircraft carriers as a replacement for
battleships, not as adjuncts to battleships.183 This different understanding of how aircraft carriers
would likely alter naval combat was manifest as early as 1928 by which time the Americans had
substantially improved carrier capability and aircraft capacity.
“The reformulation led directly to a new set of military tasks. If an aircraft carrier was
not primarily a part of the battle fleet, to be maneuvered as part of that fleet, but a floating
airfield, it would have to maneuver to take advantage of the wind in order to launch and
recover airplanes most easily. The fleet would have to follow the carrier, not the other
way around. Carrying and launching as many aircraft as possible became the new critical
task of aircraft carriers. It was not by accident, therefore, that Admiral Joseph Mason
Reeves, a battleship admiral who was an ally of Moffett, ordered the Langley, the first
American aircraft carrier, to take on board forty-two aircraft, more than three times her
normal complement, without the knowledge and against the wishes of her captain, prior
to the 1928 fleet exercises off Hawaii. At that time, the Royal Navy was not able to
operate more than a dozen aircraft from a carrier, and British visitors refused to believe
that the Langley operated with even twenty-four aircraft.”184
In his excellent contribution to the discussion of military innovation and adaptation to
technological change, Rosen highlights the importance of several factors. First is the difficulty
of imposing change upon the military from outside by civilians. He indicates that without
cooperative senior officials, civilian attempts to force change onto a military are likely to fail. 185
Secondly, he emphasizes the role of war games and combat simulation in providing the ‘key to
the intellectual breakthrough’ needed to re-conceptualize military doctrine in light of
technological developments. He cites the naval war games in the 1920s as providing the impetus
183
Ibid, pg. 70-71
Rosen, Stephen Peter. "New Ways of War: Understanding Military Innovation." International
Security 13, no. 1 (Summer 1988), pg. 71
185
Regarding the development of helicopter airmobility in the 1960s Rosen notes that there is
some impact by McNamara’s office, but the ‘larger contribution’ is credited to the military
officials in the Army. Ibid, pg. 92
184
82
for naval understanding of the future role of naval aviation and aircraft carriers.186 Rosen’s work
is important in that it demonstrates that two similarly structured military organizations, with
similar goals, and similar governing state structures, reacted differently to the same technological
development. How does one explain such differences in organizational learning and reactions to
technological diffusion? For Rosen the momentum needed to obtain major innovation in
military organizations needs to come from within that organization; while exogenous factors can
and often do play a role, they are unlikely to achieve such innovation in the face of resistance
from military organizations.
In his work on the political economy of international arms transfer systems, Keith Krause
provides several interesting concepts that are directly relevant to this research. The first is an
emphasis on the role of the economic, social and cultural context in which arms transfers, or the
diffusion of military technology, occur.187 Also, he discusses several characteristics of the
military arms economy that are quite important. The first of these characteristics is that any
given paradigm for military arms is generally accompanied by several centers of production.
Early examples include centers of sword and armor production in Northern Italy, the RhineWestphalia region, and the Low Countries.188 Diffusion of military technology tends to emanate
outward geographically from these centers.
186
Rosen, Stephen Peter. "New Ways of War: Understanding Military Innovation." International
Security 13, no. 1 (Summer 1988), pg. 68-69
187
Krause, Keith. "The Political Economy of the International Arms Transfer System: The
Diffusion of Military Technique Via Arms Transfers." International Journal 45, no. 3, Israel &
the Arabs since the Intifadah (Summer 1990), pg. 689
188
Krause, Keith. "The Political Economy of the International Arms Transfer System: The
Diffusion of Military Technique Via Arms Transfers." International Journal 45, no. 3, Israel &
the Arabs since the Intifadah (Summer 1990), pg. 691-696
83
The second characteristic of arms transfer systems is political salience. States are not
likely to allow for a free-market in arms; alliances and enmities are likely to produce winners and
losers in the arms production system. Third, this political salience is likely to impact the nature
of technological diffusion. Essentially, the political nature of arms technology will impact its
diffusion. This stems from a desire by various political authorities to possess some sense of
autarky in terms of military technological production. States, and their militaries, are often not
content to simply buy weaponry. Instead, they generally hope to create some level of domestic
productive capability. Fourth, Krause notes that diffusion of military technology is an imperfect
process involving and impacted by several variables, including technological knowledge, skills
and attitudes, and political will. Krause emphasizes that state support is generally necessary for
such efforts to be successful. Also, Krause describes the role of possessing an adequate ‘social
and cultural infrastructure’ in a state’s ability to ‘sustain production at the technological frontier.’
For Krause, without the requisite socio-cultural context, military technological development is
not likely to be maintained, and improved. Instead such states will likely only be capable of
imitating the true innovators. This leads to his fifth point about the arms transfer system: its
structure.
For Krause, there are four tiers of actors in any given military technological paradigm. First Tier
Producers are states that possess the requisite qualities to be true innovators. Second Tier
Producers are capable of producing arms and military technology at the technological frontier,
but are unable to move that frontier forward on their own. Third Tier Producers are able to copy
technologies through design transfer, yet unable to reproduce the underlying process. In other
words, they might be able to reverse engineer a particular technology, but will have trouble
84
maintaining it, or replicating or changing it. Third tier producers imitate the technological
frontier without truly understanding it. Lastly, Consumers obtain only the tools of war, and are
capable of using them, but not producing them.189 Such a framework for understanding the
structure of diffusion of military technology is quite useful, and can be applied to the diffusion of
petroleum based technology among the great power navies at the turn of the 20th century.
In their 1991 article in The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Karen Rasler and William Thompson
investigate the relationships between technological innovation, capability positional shifts, and
systemic warfare. This article differs from much of the other literature on diffusion of military
technology in that the authors attempt to draw direct connections between the diffusion of
military (particularly naval) technology and the likelihood of great power warfare. Their work
emphasizes the various developmental trajectories of states, as either ascending powers or
powers experiencing relative decline. For the authors, state goals and strategies will likely be
impacted by their position along such a trajectory. Also, states that fall into different positions
along the ascending/declining trajectory are likely to have directly conflicting interests.190 In
particular, they see the mid-way point between naval capability concentration and nonconcentration as periods that are likely to experience great power war.191 Ultimately, attempts to
predict the likelihood of systemic war based upon systemic leadership and relative capabilities
go well beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, several aspects of Rasler and
189
Krause, Keith. "The Political Economy of the International Arms Transfer System: The
Diffusion of Military Technique Via Arms Transfers." International Journal 45, no. 3, Israel &
the Arabs since the Intifadah (Summer 1990), pg. 691-696
190
Karen Rasler, and William R. Thompson. "Technological Innovation, Capability Positional
Shifts, and Systemic War." The Journal of Conflict Resolution 35, no. 3 (September 1991), pg.
412
191
Karen Rasler, and William R. Thompson. "Technological Innovation, Capability Positional
Shifts, and Systemic War." The Journal of Conflict Resolution 35, no. 3 (September 1991), pg.
415
85
Thompson’s work are relevant to understanding energy transitions as diffusions of energy
technology. First, there is the distinction they make between land powers and maritime powers.
The development of oil-based technology for the projection of power is something that takes
place primarily within great power navies; thus understanding the perspectives of naval powers
is important.
“The sea-land power dichotomy assumption is important because some of the processes
in which we are interested work differently for different types of powers. Given their
different strategic perspectives, it sometimes seems as if they are operating in two
separate worlds. The classical continental powers operated almost exclusively in their
immediate regions. The sea powers have been focused predominately on the global
political economy. Occasionally, maritime powers have been forced, if for no other
reason than to protect their home base, to intervene in continental affairs. Otherwise,
only the hybrid powers have sought to operate in both regional and transoceanic worlds
simultaneously, even if not always on a continuous basis.
Accordingly, the concentration/deconcentration [sic] of global reach capability is more
applicable to the transoceanic world of political economy than it is to the realm of
regionally bound territorial concerns. On the European continent, it is the rise and fall of
the large land/hybrid powers (Spain, France, and Germany) that is important to an
assessment of the regional distribution of power.”
With such a distinction in mind, only the naval powers, (including ‘hybrid-type’ powers such as
Germany) are relevant for understanding the diffusion of oil-based technology as it was applied
in the time period under consideration (1900-1918). Also, Rasler and Thompson assume that
technological diffusion is inevitable.192 This inevitability, however, is interfered with by other
factors leading to diminished innovation over time. This interference allows for less-powerful
states to catch up with the leading innovators.
Rasler and Thompson offer several explanations for diminished innovation including
complacency among leadership, institutional rigidities, and increased social wealth, leading to
192
Ibid, pg. 420
86
increased expense for innovation.193 For the authors, these factors slow leader innovation, and
result in relative decline. Like many of the authors that follow in this discussion, Rasler and
Thompson see various social factors as playing an important role in the success/failure of
military innovations.
Jonathan Shimshoni takes aim at the popular offense/defense approach to analyzing the WWI
period. This approach traditionally argues that the policymakers of the time failed to recognize
that technological developments (such as machine guns, razor wire, railroads etc.) had created an
insurmountable advantage for the defender in military conflicts. Shimshoni artfully deconstructs
this perspective and demonstrates several of its major flaws. First, he critiques the assertion that
offense and defense can be neatly separated. Shimshoni argues that both offense and defense are
necessary within military operations as important parts of a state’s grand strategy. He is also
critical of the notion that one could deduce the existence of an offensive/defensive advantage a
priori based upon the qualitative differences in military technology (with the possible exception
of nuclear weaponry).194 The central thesis of his article is that the great powers failed to create
an offensive advantage for themselves based upon the technology available to them. He argues
that advantages do not stem directly from technology, but instead are created by “entrepreneurs”
through how they use technology.195 His analysis of the French, British, and German militaries
activities throughout the war demonstrate this failure. He argues that the British and French
193
Karen Rasler, and William R. Thompson. "Technological Innovation, Capability Positional
Shifts, and Systemic War." The Journal of Conflict Resolution 35, no. 3 (September 1991), pg.
420
194
Shimshoni, Jonathan. "Military Advantage, and World War I: A Case for Military
Entrepreneurship." International Security 15, no. 3 (Winter 1990-1991), pg. 190-191
195
Ibid, pg. 213
87
failed to adapt/adopt new technologies, while the Germans acted in the most entrepreneurial
fashion of the three militaries.
Shimshoni describes the French preparations for the coming war as completely failing to
engineer the battlefield to their advantage. This is best exemplified by their stubborn adherence
to the traditional red trousers of the French military. Also, and more importantly, the French
possessed the largest industrial capacity for motor-car construction, yet failed to utilize this
capacity.196 As for the British, he argues that they failed to adopt several forms of military
technology, despite their knowledge of their effectiveness, namely the machine gun and the
submarine.197 While it is difficult to explain British reticence regarding the machine gun,
Shimshoni fails to mention the moral and maritime law issues that affected several states’
willingness to employ submarines in warfare. As for the Germans, Shimshoni credits them as
being the most entrepreneurial of the great powers in terms of their preparations for the war. He
notes that the Germans innovated in several ways, namely through their heavy use of reserves,
incorporation of heavy artillery and machine guns, and also through their attempts to work
around several problems related to offensive maneuvers.198 Remarkably, he fails to mention the
German innovation of offensive U-boat warfare. Shimshoni is also highly critical of all the
major powers in what he sees as their failure to appropriately incorporate tanks and motor-cars
into their land offensives and doctrine.
“However, all the major actors failed to foresee or apply the opportunities for massive
capitalization of the intended land offensives. The knowledge and basic technology to
produce tanks or armored cars was surely available to all by 1912. But the British only
introduced them in 1916, and only after the original development was pushed, oddly
196
Shimshoni, Jonathan. "Military Advantage, and World War I: A Case for Military
Entrepreneurship." International Security 15, no. 3 (Winter 1990-1991), pg. 208-209
197
Ibid, pg. 209-210
198
Ibid, pg. 211
88
enough, by the Admiralty, while the Germans refused to introduce tanks until the bitter
end. Similarly, all failed to foresee the potential of motorization for logistics and troop
transport in the coming war, despite the well-developed European motorcar industries at
the time.”199
In his conclusion, Shimshoni attributes the failure to act in an entrepreneurial fashion to
organizational factors on the part of the respective great power armies. He cites the propensity
for armies to adhere to doctrines that were successful in the past, as well as their general desire
for the reduction of uncertainty, and the goal of going to war on their own terms. These factors
led armies to choose certain doctrinal options, often at the expense of innovation.200
Chris Demchak provides an interesting analysis of the impact of modernization on states and
their militaries. She argues that advanced technology complicates civilian control and
understanding of military systems, procedures, and war-fighting capabilities and needs. While
modernization is conceptually distinct from military innovation, and is likely often best
described as emulation, her work on modernization remains directly related to the concept of
technological diffusion. Demchak focuses on the fledgling democracies of Eastern Europe and
highlights the negative impact of their acquisition of modern complex military arms systems.
Her primary argument is that these complex systems are likely to strain the capability of newly
created democratic institutions to oversee and control them.201 While it is true that the former
Warsaw Pact states of Eastern Europe have imported democratic institutional structures along the
lines of their Western European neighbors, she notes that such institutional mimicry is not
enough to ensure effective civilian control over such weapons systems. For Demchak, there are
199
Ibid, pg. 211-212
Shimshoni, Jonathan. "Military Advantage, and World War I: A Case for Military
Entrepreneurship." International Security 15, no. 3 (Winter 1990-1991), pg. 214-215
201
Demchak, Chris C. "Modernizing Military Organizations and Political Control in Central
Europe." Journal of Public Policy 15, no. 2 (May - Aug 1995), pg. 113
200
89
deeper cultural properties, such as transparency and governmental openness that are critical to
civilian/democratic control over military budgets, doctrine, and decision-making. These
qualities are not necessarily prevalent in the Eastern European nations. Also, the organizational
propensities of military organizations, it is argued, will likely push them to seek control over the
new weapons system, independent of civilian interference.202
Interestingly, Demchak argues that such modern, complex, and esoteric military equipment is
likely to directly alter the preferred doctrine among the militaries that obtain them. This
argument claims that, at least in part, the military doctrines of Eastern European states will to
some extent be determined by the military equipment they seek to obtain. She describes two
ways in which this is likely to happen. First, the expense of such systems, and heavy reliance on
such systems for security, mean that these militaries will likely alter their military doctrine in
such a way that ensures the survival and viability of the new systems.203 Secondly, she argues
that modern complex systems are likely to induce early mobilization on the part of these
militaries, due to their need to ensure appropriate functionality and also to reduce risk to those
systems.204 Thus, Demchak, unlike other authors, sees doctrinal change as likely to stem directly
from technological diffusion, at least in the case of the modernizing militaries of the former
Warsaw Pact.
Deborah Avant offers a perspective on military innovation that attributes more weight than other
authors to the domestic civilian state structure, taking aim at the civil-military relations model
202
Demchak, Chris C. "Modernizing Military Organizations and Political Control in Central
Europe." Journal of Public Policy 15, no. 2 (May - Aug 1995), pg. 128
203
Ibid, 128-129
204
Ibid, pg. 140
90
articulated by Barry Posen. For Avant, several cases contradict the notions put forward by
Posen, namely the failure of the U.S. military to create an effective counter-insurgency warfare
in Vietnam and the successful adaptation of the British Army to the conditions on the ground in
the Boer War, despite the unpreparedness of the British home government.205
Avant argues that the structure of the civilian governing bodies will have an impact on their
ability to impose ideas or action on military organizations; in particular, she argues that
authoritative divisions among those bodies will have a negative impact on any such attempts. 206
She also argues that military organizations do not possess the same goals based solely on the fact
that they are military organizations, and demonstrates that the U.S. military possesses qualities
that allowed it to resist civilian intervention, namely its isolated professionalization, its
organizational structure, and adherence to the “science of war.” These factors allowed the U.S.
military to take advantage of the division of power between the President as Commander in
Chief and Congress, with its powers of the purse and oversight, to maintain a level of autonomy
from civilian direction not found in Britain.207
In Britain, Avant contends, the unorganized structural quality of the British Military was a
mechanism utilized by those in parliament, and the cabinet, to control the military and ensure
civilian direction was followed. This, along with the centralized authority over military matters
in the Cabinet (which also rewarded military men who followed civilian instruction) meant that
the British military was less able than its American counterpart to resist the goals, changes, and
205
Avant, Deborah D. "The Institutional Sources of Military Doctrine: Hegemons in Peripheral
Wars." International Studies Quarterly 37, no. 4 (December 1993), pg. 412
206
Ibid, pg. 413
207
Ibid, pg. 415-416
91
innovations sought by Britain’s civilian leadership.208 Avant ultimately sees domestic governing
institutions as filters through which international systemic developments impact military
doctrine. Changes and issues become more or less relevant based upon civilian leadership and
its interpretation of those developments. These in turn are impacted by the short-term political
goals of those leaders. Their need for re-election shapes their reactions to those developments
along with the policy changes that are viewed as necessary in light of those developments.
In these ways civilian institutional structure directly impacts the prospect for military change and
innovation.209 To this point, the factors that are claimed to directly impact capacity for military
change and innovation have been traditional balance of power arguments, such as external
threats or competing powers, or organizational arguments related to the structural qualities of
militaries or their domestic state structures. However, during the mid-1990s a third argument
related to culture became increasingly prominent. Again, Stephen Rosen offers an important
contribution to the discussion. In his article "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters,"
Rosen describes the relationship between a society’s cultural properties and the structural
qualities of its military. He argues that cultural factors can create divisive loyalties that create
problems for militaries in terms of domestic order as well as impacting the available surplus
capability for power projection.
More importantly, as military institutions are generally somewhat reflective of the society they
serve, those divisions and fissures present in society are also likely to be found within military
208
Ibid, pg. 416-426
Avant, Deborah D. "The Institutional Sources of Military Doctrine: Hegemons in Peripheral
Wars." International Studies Quarterly 37, no. 4 (December 1993), pg. 427
209
92
organizations themselves. 210 Rosen counters the realist argument of military organizational and
functional alignment by stating that military goals are not limited to survival, but instead are also
concerned with defending a way of life, or culture.211 Posen utilizes the notion of ‘strategic
culture’ to frame the way national decision makers perceive matters of war. He credits Jack
Snyder as having first used the term to describe the differences that became apparent between the
United States and the Soviet Union regarding the possibility of nuclear warfare.
Significantly, Rosen emphasizes the need for scholars to explain how, in using strategic culture
as an explanatory variable, they are able to appropriately understand the ‘subjective preferences’
of the leaders and decision makers within any particular strategic culture. For Rosen, strategic
culture ‘tries to explain the complex behavior of small groups of powerful individuals’. Yet he
points out that there are methodological problems with utilizing culture, and argues that using the
concept of social structures may be simpler and also more amenable to generalized explanations
for state and military behavior. In short, “one can study and assess variations in social structure
more reliably than one can study subjective beliefs,”212 and social structures, their presence or
lack thereof, is an empirical matter that is easily observable. Rosen seems somewhat critical of
utilizing culture on epistemological grounds, arguing that the role of subjective beliefs in
determining ‘culture’ makes it difficult to demonstrate the role of culture in state and military
policy.
“The political unit thus acquires characteristic strengths and weaknesses that are the
result of its internal social structures. Differences in these strengths and weaknesses can
become evident when compared with foreign societies with different social structures. In
210
Rosen, Stephen Peter. "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters." International Security
19, no. 4 (1995), pg. 5
211
Ibid, pg. 6
212
Rosen, Stephen Peter. "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters." International Security
19, no. 4 (1995), pg. 23-25
93
short, the dominant social structures of a group of people might lead to characteristic
strengths and vulnerabilities of each society when making money or making war.
Whether or not the dominant social structures vary or remain constant across cultural
boundaries is an empirical question, not determined a priori or by definition.” 213
It seems that Rosen is arguing that social structural variability can, in effect, substitute for
cultural differences, encompassing cultural variability without addressing the epistemological
and methodological difficulty of defining culture itself or the subjective qualities of beliefs.
With that in mind, Rosen offers several explicit claims about how social structure can impact the
military power of the state.
First, he notes that social structures determine how individuals in societies treat one another.
Second, various military structures will reflect the societal qualities of their nations differently.
Here he cites the differences between, say, a mass conscription army and a small,
professionalized navy or air force. The former is much more likely to bring with it the various
cleavages and fissures present within society at large. Third, “the social structure of the political
unit can affect its ability to generate military power.”214 This can happen both if within a
military there exists the same cleavages and fissures and also if the military has managed to
isolate itself from them.215 Rosen concludes by suggesting that comparative case studies that
control for cultural and socio-organizational qualities could provide some insight into how social
structure, organizational structure, and strategic behavior interact.
Emily O. Goldman and Leslie C. Eliason also provide several important contributions to the
literature on the diffusion of military technology and military innovation. They point out that
213
Ibid, pg. 23-25
Rosen, Stephen Peter. "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters." International Security
19, no. 4 (1995), pg. 27
215
Ibid, pg. 29-30
214
94
emulation by military organizations is not as frequent or certain as much international relations
theory would suggest. Such developments are shaped by local conditions.216 Goldman and
Eliason emphasize the dual aspects of technological innovation describing the ‘hardware’ and
‘software’ components of new technological capability. They argues that how different societies
utilize various hardware is filtered through existing socio-cultural beliefs, norms, and
institutionalized practices. This process can impact the likelihood of technological adoption,
adaptation, emulation, or offsetting responses by state militaries.217 It is also noted that a
distinction is necessary between causes of diffusion and the mechanisms by which diffusion
occurs.
Understanding transmission paths is seen as a way to better understand motives of state and nonstate actors, as well as to either encourage or discourage certain technological diffusions218, and
this has obvious implications in the area of nuclear non-proliferation, as well as intellectual
property rights and cyber-security. More directly relevant to this work is their treatment of
several other authors’ work related to diffusion, in which they coalesce varying terminology used
by the authors into an overall typology.
“The typologies advanced by DiMaggio and Powell, Bennett, and Ikenberry to identify
the causal mechanisms driving diffusion are similar. Bennett’s emulation resembles
DiMaggio and Powell’s mimetic processes and Ikenberry’s policy bandwagoning. Elite
networking and harmonization resemble normative pressures and social learning;
penetration is similar to coercive pressures and external inducement. All concur that
competition, socialization, and coercion are three social mechanisms that help spread
new policy practices across societal boundaries.” [Emphasis Added]219
216
Emily O. Goldman, Leslie C. Eliason, Ed. The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas.
Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2003, pg. 8
217
Ibid, pg. 8-9
218
Emily O. Goldman, Leslie C. Eliason, Ed. The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas.
Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2003, pg.14-15
219
Ibid, pg. 18
95
Beyond the causes of innovation, Goldman and Eliason highlight the various forms taken by
diffusion mechanisms. The concept of hierarchical diffusion, where innovations emanate from
the most advanced nations to the periphery is described as the conventional wisdom.
Hierarchical diffusion differs from spatial diffusion, occurring between states that are geographic
neighbors, and from diffusion stemming from “cultural proximity”, whereby states that share
language or religious beliefs. Thus these shared traits, or shared borders, can serve as conduits
for the diffusion of ideas and technology. The authors point out that these are empirical
questions that would allow scholars to test theories about technological diffusion.220 It would
seem prudent here to add that one mode of transmission not mentioned by Goldman and Eliason
could be described as political/security proximity. Allies are likely to share technological
developments with those states that they have agreed to cooperate with in national defense and
security matters. This would likely overlap with both geographical proximity and cultural
proximity variables.
Goldman and Eliason are critical of assumptions in international relations theory related to the
efficiency and consistency of technological diffusion. They suggest that a middle ground of
conditional and contingent lesson drawing exists between the extremes of cultural and social
obstacles on the one hand, and technological determinism on the other hand. They are emphatic
that finding that middle ground and understanding the process by which states respond to
emerging technological developments requires the utilization of the comparative case study
approach:
“The analytical approach informing this volume is the comparative case study method.
Case studies are used inductively to develop and refine typological theory though a
“building block” approach. This approach is particularly useful in new or emerging
220
Ibid, pg. 18-19
96
research programs to generate theory. The authors in this volume employ methods of
within-case analysis, particularly process tracing, in order to trace the causal pathways for
diffusion… [This] allow[s] us to trace the impact of a variety of factors (cultural,
economic, political, organizational, and technological) affecting how innovations are
assimilated, and their consequences for strategic behavior.”221
Goldman and Eliason offer important contributions to the literature on technological diffusion
and innovation. Their emphasis on methods is highly relevant, and has directly impacted the
methodological approach taken in this dissertation. Their articulation of the typology of causes
of innovation (competition, socialization, coercion) serves as a useful starting point for
discussing possible causes of energy transitions, and their description of the various diffusion
mechanisms provide direction for the research into the diffusion of oil-based technology in the
U.S. and British Navies.
In his article in the Journal of Strategic Studies, Geoffrey Herrera describes the impact of
railroad and rifle technology on military doctrine and the rise of Germany. Herrera demonstrates
that the possession of these technologies alone was not enough for a fighting force to make
effective use of them on the battlefield. An information revolution related to how these
technologies were most effectively employed was necessary, and this process was not uniformly
imitated across militaries in Europe at the time. Herrera begins by stating that rifles and
railroads themselves were not so revolutionary until combined with industrialized steam power
and mass-producing technologies of the industrial revolution, including steel for the railroads.222
221
Emily O. Goldman, Leslie C. Eliason, Ed. The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas.
Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2003, pg.22-23
222
Herrera, Geoffrey L. "Inventing the Railroad and Rifle Revolution: Information, Military
Innovation and the Rise of Germany." The Journal of Strategic Studies 27, no. 2 (2004), pg. 246
97
The argument presented here is one of “hardware” and “software”, similar to that discussed
earlier by Goldman and Eliason. The rifle directly altered military doctrine and tactics through
its ability to spread firepower over a wider distance, reducing the need for tight soldier
formation, and creating quicker, more powerful army units.223 Conceptual and organizational
adaptation was necessary for appropriate and effective utilization of the rifle. The same applies
to military utilization of railroads. This process was more complex for railroads. Herrera points
out that at the time railroads were the most expensive capital projects in society, and that they
were not built with military goals, strategy, and tactics in mind. Instead, the posture and
placement of a nation’s railway system was determined largely by market forces.224 Herrera
provides an interesting contribution in noting the three major organizational changes brought
about by these technological developments: 1) the officer class needed to become more capable
bureaucrats and engineers (instead of brave warriors); 2) military planning had to become more
extensive and technical; and 3) military activities and civilian activities needed to be better
coordinated, even in peacetime.225
It seems that these three organizational responses are more directly related to the development of
rail and the growing size and complexity of militaries in the post-Napoleonic period than the
development of the rifle, yet Herrera is certainly correct that both the rifle and the railway were
technological developments that forced militaries to alter their basic organizational principles.
However, his description of the impact of these technologies on the dimensions of warfare is
more interesting, and relevant, to this research.
223
Ibid, pg. 248
Ibid, pg. 249
225
Ibid, pg. 251-252
224
98
“The railroad transformed the capabilities of armies along three dimensions: force, time
and space. Railroads enabled armies to increase in size and accordingly in power.
Transporting soldiers in rail cars, by carrying more men in a shorter period of time,
increased the feasible size of armies. More troops could be brought to a potential
battlefield in less time; battles could be fought with larger and larger armies. Larger
armies of course meant that battles were more destructive and carried out over larger
expanses of space.”226
This alteration of the dimensions of warfare stems from steam-powered technology and is
equally applicable to naval power as it is to the utilization of railroads on land. Herrera fails to
mention the role of energy itself and the emergence of a new energy technology; instead his
discussion of steam is lumped in with the overall industrial revolution that takes place at the
time. While he misses the obvious energy transition at work in the development of railway
transportation, he does demonstrate its ability to dramatically alter the nature and dimensions of
warfare, something demonstrated again by a different energy transition in the First World War.
If one were searching for a useful summation of the theoretical perceptions on diffusion of
military technology, one would find it in Emily Goldman’s 2006 article, Cultural Foundations of
Military Diffusion. Goldman provides a concise overview of competing theories on military
diffusion including Neorealism, Neo-Institutionalism, Domestic Politics (I & II), Spatial
Diffusion, and Culture (I & II). Goldman identifies three aspects of each of these theories,
namely what they perceive to be the a) drivers of policy change; b) causal chain or mechanisms;
and c) predictions about the nature of diffusion.
Goldman’s emphasis is on demonstrating the role culture can play in determining the likelihood
of innovation. She is critical of attempts to measure and compare culture per se, citing
226
Herrera, Geoffrey L. "Inventing the Railroad and Rifle Revolution: Information, Military
Innovation and the Rise of Germany." The Journal of Strategic Studies 27, no. 2 (2004), pg. 245
99
methodological problems in finding a ‘cultural match’, as well as the problem of variable
cultural resonance.227 Instead she builds on the work of Goldstone, whose work was not focused
on comparing cultural content, but instead on establishing whether or not states enforced certain
cultural norms and practices. In other words, to what degree was there an enforced cultural
orthodoxy?
For Goldman, “When elites enforce an ideological orthodoxy in order to restore or consolidate
existing traditions, diffusion will be partial at best. Broad, deep diffusion occurs only after
official orthodoxies are overturned, paving the way for greater tolerance of new ideas and
practices.”228 Goldman contrasts the examples of Ottoman Turkey and Meiji Japan, with the
former only slowly and painfully adopting innovative military technology and doctrines and the
latter demonstrating a more enthusiastic adoption of Western practices, with dramatically
different outcomes. Goldman demonstrates that cultural factors can both interfere and augment
the diffusion of technology and related organizational principles and doctrines. Any case studies
or research programs intent on contributing to the body of work on the diffusion of military
technology must account for the possible impact of cultural variables.
William Thompson provides a deep historical look at the evolution of military organizations,
tracing the various military revolutions that have been pivotal to the development of what is
described as the “western” military style. Building off of the work of John A. Lynn, Thompson
highlights the relationship between military technology and military organizational type,
extending his analysis further back in history, describing Lynn’s approach as unnecessarily
227
Goldman, Emily O. "Cultural Foundations of Military Diffusion." British International
Studies Association 32 (2006), pg. 74
228
Ibid, pg. 75
100
limiting.229 Thompson seeks to examine the relationship between the co-development of
revolutionary military technology and state organizations. He notes that in some instances
technological developments precede corresponding organizational changes, and yet in others,
revolutionary military technology can only be produced by modern state organizations.
Thompson derives six important variables that can impact the co-evolution and diffusion of
technology and state organizations, including war, military technology, threat environment,
political and military organizations, and political-economic milieu.230 Regarding culture,
Thompson would argue that it is an attribute of political and military organizations, and that if it
is not, it is often used as a ‘convenient explanation for behavior that seems different from what
might otherwise be expected.’231 Unlike other authors discussed above, Thompson would not
describe culture as an independent variable impacting a state’s adoption, or rejection, of a
particular military technology or doctrine.
While Thompson’s work on the long term co-evolution of state organizations and military
technological revolutions is particularly broad, and seeks to create an all-inclusive theory of the
relationship between military technology and military organizations, other research is more
narrowly tailored to investigate the nature of technological diffusion. Etel Solingen’s recent
article in International Studies Quarterly seeks to understand the domestic, regional, and
international factors that impact technological diffusion. Solingen seeks to create a common
discourse on diffusion through the introduction of a shared vocabulary of relevant concepts
229
Thompson, William R. "A Test of a Theory of Co-Evolution in War: Lengthening the
Western Eurasian Military Trajectory." The International History Review 28, no. 3 (September
2006), pg. 473-474
230
Thompson, William R. "A Test of a Theory of Co-Evolution in War: Lengthening the
Western Eurasian Military Trajectory." The International History Review 28, no. 3 (September
2006), pg. 480
231
Ibid, pg. 480, see footnote 1
101
important to the diffusion process. These include stimulus, medium, social agents, and,
outcomes of diffusion. Solingen describes a useful, and parsimonious, definition of diffusion
(borrowed from David Strang), and elaborates on the terminology relevant to diffusion:
“A useful starting point in the effort to conceptualize international diffusion is Strang’s
parsimonious definition of diffusion as any process in which prior adoption of a trait or
practice alters the probability of adoption for remaining nonadopters. A more complete
conceptualization of the policies of transnational diffusion, however, requires
identification and characterization of four main ingredients that help transcend purely
structural or purely agent-based formulations of this process:
1. An initial stimulus, trigger, even model, archetype, or innovation.
2. A medium, context, structure, milieu, or environment through which information about
the initial event may or may not travel to given destination.
3. Social agents affected by the positive or negative externalities of the initial stimulus,
who aid or block the stimulus, who aid or block the stimulus’ journey to other
destinations.
4. Outcomes that enable adequate discrimination among different degrees of diffusion
and resulting equilibria.” 232
This set of terms provides a useful starting point for understanding the variables that impact the
process of diffusion. Any attempt to process trace the diffusion of a given concept, policy,
technology, or doctrine must assess these factors. Using this terminology will allow for better
cross-disciplinary discussion and debate of the diffusion process and will make research in any
given field more accessible to those from other fields.
Solingen also describes the importance on non-diffusion. If one hopes to explain how and why a
particular instance of diffusion has occurred, one must also be able to explain how and why a
particular concept, policy, technology, or doctrine did not diffuse. While she points out the
methodological difficulties and counter-factual qualities of studying non-diffusion, she
nonetheless emphasizes its importance. The term firewall plays an important role in this
232
Solingen, Etel. "Of Dominoes and Firewalls: The Domestic, Regional, and Global Politics of
International Diffusion." International Studies Quarterly 56 (2012), pg. 632
102
discussion. While Solingen does not provide a definition of the term, it is presumably some
factor (political, social, organizational, cultural etc.) that hinders the diffusion of a given idea,
technology, or policy. Examples of firewalls described by Solingen include institutions such as
the G20,233 which acted as a firewall against the spread of economic recession among member
states, natural resource endowments234 which acted as a firewall restricting the spread of ‘Arab
Spring’ style protests among GCC states, as well as literal electronic network firewalls which
selectively prevent the spread of information via the internet (examples include Iranian firewalls
as well as the ‘great firewall’ of China). Regarding firewalls, Solingen is worth quoting at
length:
“Crucial in this regard are auxiliary concepts such as firewall, so central to a world of
strategic interaction and political resistance. Political agents with imperfect readings of
the medium’s possibilities cannot always assess the robustness of firewalls accurately,
influencing the incidence of free-riding and increasing uncertainty and unpredictability.
Yet proper estimation of the strength of firewalls is crucial for our ability to gauge a
medium’s relative immunity or vulnerability to diffusion. Weaker firewalls arguably
amplify the original stimulus’ externalities for agents disposed to take action. Stronger
firewalls typically dilute incentives to act, reinforcing a medium’s immunity against
diffusion. Prior diffusion, via different degrees of sedimentation, can alter the nature and
strength of firewalls, and hence the medium’s conductivity. Agents erecting or
dismantling firewalls can change the odds of diffusion by learning from, improving,
diversifying, and adapting causal mechanisms to their medium and to domestic levels of
sedimentation.”235
In sum, Solingen provides several important contributions to the study of diffusion. The first is
her list of common terminology that describes the basic variables involved: stimuli, medium,
social agents, and outcome. To understand any form of diffusion, these basic facts related to that
diffusion must be clearly articulated. Second, non-diffusion is just as important as diffusion, and
although it presents certain methodological difficulties, efforts to improve our understanding of
233
Ibid, pg. 624
Ibid, pg. 633
235
Solingen, Etel. "Of Dominoes and Firewalls: The Domestic, Regional, and Global Politics of
International Diffusion." International Studies Quarterly 56 (2012), pg. 641
234
103
what does not diffuse should be made. Understanding firewalls is also important in this regard,
as are the factors that hinder/allow diffusion to take place. She also emphasizes the ‘coalitional
analysis of regional orders’ and suggests that studying diffusion requires an integration of
domestic, regional and global considerations, highlighting the need for multiple levels of analysis
in studying such phenomena.
Conclusions
Several important themes emerge from this discussion of military organizations and
technological diffusion. First, there are the three basic steps to technological diffusion, namely,
the conception of change or innovation, discussion of the proposed change by the relevant
parties, and ultimate adoption or implementation of the innovation. Process tracing these three
steps should provide a rough picture of the nature of any given technological diffusion among
great power militaries. Situating this information within its socio-political and historical context
should help to explain why and how this diffusion occurs. Rosen’s definition of a major
innovation as one that fundamentally changes the relationship of a military branch towards other
branches helps to distinguish smaller tactical or operational innovations from major
technological innovations. Rosen also points to an important distinction between types of
innovation, namely between peacetime and wartime innovations. The time period under
examination (1900-1918) allows for a comparison of how states differentially treated the
diffusion of oil-based technology both prior to and during the First World War.
Krause provides a useful framework for understanding the structure of diffusion networks based
upon production capabilities of the actors, divided into first, second, and third tier producers, as
104
well as basic consumers of that technology. Rasler and Thompson indicate a need to distinguish
between land, maritime, and hybrid powers, supplying a justification for a narrow emphasis on
those powers possessing the requisite naval capability. Shimshoni and Demchak represent
different perspectives on whether technology can directly alter military doctrine.
Thus, process tracing the diffusion of oil-based technology and the subsequent doctrinal changes
(or lack thereof) will help to illuminate possible answers to that question. All of the authors
discussed here argue that both domestic organizational and structural international variables will
impact the nature of technological diffusion. Examining the U.S. and British (two states with
similar domestic organizational structures) cases may partially control for organizational
structure, offering insight into which variables are most important.
Goldman and Eliason demonstrate that diffusion of military technology and military innovation
is not as straightforward and efficient as many realists would argue. Thus, their work indicates
that other factors must impact diffusion. They describe the role of both hardware and software
components, and like Shimshoni, emphasize that what is important is not just the spread of
technology, but its particular use by humans. This argument opens the door for some discussion
of cultural impact on the diffusion process. Goldman’s discussion of the Ottomans and Meiji
Japan demonstrates clearly that cultural properties can be either a hindrance or a facilitator of
diffusion. Solingen provides four useful properties of the diffusion process as well as useful
terminology that can ease the process of cross-disciplinary discussion and debate in the form of
stimuli, medium, social agents, and outcomes. She also indicates that non-diffusion is just as
105
significant as diffusion itself, noting that understanding firewalls is necessary for studying the
diffusion process.
This research fits uniquely within the body of research on modern military organizations. It
draws directly on Rosen’s conception of major innovations, as oil-technology embodied in more
powerful battleships and destroyers, submarines, and aircraft fundamentally changed the
relationship between the existing military branches. Moreover it assesses the distinctions in
these cases between peacetime and wartime innovations.
By highlighting problems with supply and infrastructure, as well as rejections of new technology
such as the British rejection of the earliest aircraft, the case studies also corroborate the findings
of Goldman and Eliason that technological diffusion is neither straightforward nor efficient. The
research also confirms the work of Goldman and Eliason, as well as the work of Shomshoni, by
demonstrating that “software” components are equally as significant as “hardware” components
as regards new technology. This is demonstrated by the different ways in which the Allies and
Germany utilized the submarine. All major naval powers had submarines, but it was the
Germans who used them most effectively.
Importantly, this research is driven by the role of domestic level variables in shaping and steering
energy transitions. This is demonstrated by several instances, including British efforts to create a
large British owned oil monopoly, American breakup of the Standard Oil monopoly, British
naval emphasis on certain tactical qualities (namely speed), and German decisions related to
tactical use of the submarine. Further understanding of differences between state reactions to
106
energy transitions can be accomplished through extending the approach used here to several
other cases within this energy transition, namely Germany, France, Italy, Japan, and Russia.
The literature related to organization theory and the diffusion of military technology and military
innovation is central to studying energy transitions. These transitions, at their core, represent
instances of international diffusion of oil-based technology utilized for military purposes. This
literature provides useful concepts, frameworks, and terminology around which the author will
construct his case studies of energy transitions within great power navies.
107
4
The American Navy’s Transition from Coal to Oil: 1904-1918
The purpose of this chapter is to trace the process of the U.S. Navy’s transition from coal to oil
in fueling their ships. This energy transition provided a new wave of technological development
that continued the trajectory of innovation begun by the Industrial Revolution. Generating
motive power by harnessing energy stores present in fossil fuels such as coal, as happened
through the development of the steam engine, is often seen as the beginning of the modern
industrial age. This notion of a ‘revolution’ is misleading, however, and fails to encompass the
gradual, incremental, and evolutionary process of industrialization.236 These qualities are often
present in energy transitions, and such transitions generally take place over a generation or more.
The process of replacing an older energy system with a newer one is both slow and experimental.
In this case study, the focus is much more narrow than a society-wide examination of an energy
transition might otherwise be. The aim is to understand how military organizations adapt to an
energy transition. How did the emergence of a new, improved source of motive power affect the
U.S. Navy? Did the organization resist such change? Did the Navy embrace the new
technologies? Was the Navy responding to developments from civil society and the private
sector or was it developing new energy technologies on its own? What degree of cooperation
existed between the Navy and the private companies working on the technologies under
examination? Were there disagreements within various parts of the Navy over the new source of
energy or was there a general consensus? How did this energy transition impact the manner in
which the Navy operated?
236
Smil, Vaclav. Energy in World History. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, pg. 192-193
108
As discussed in the previous chapter, at the core of the idea of an energy transition is the
diffusion of energy related technology. As the requisite technology emerged for fueling engines
with liquid petroleum, including its refined products such as gasoline, and as increasing amounts
of working knowledge relevant to such machines spread to interested parties, the organizations
most heavily involved in engineering became increasingly engaged in the subject. In this
instance, those organizations were primarily great power navies. The earlier developments of
steam-powered marine vessels had prompted navies to appropriate and invest large sums of
money for building steam powered fleets. These early steam fleets presented new abilities to the
Navies that possessed them, while also demonstrating new weaknesses. The need for fuel
actually reduced the radius of action in comparison to ships powered by sail and also meant that
secure line of communications needed to be maintained.237 Yet, despite these difficulties the
benefits to steam power were evident, and by 1869 the British had built their first sail-less
warship, the Devastation.238
For the American Navy, the first major transitional experience involved the building of what are
known as the ABCD ships, so called for their names, the Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, and the
Dolphin. Contracts for the construction of these ships were awarded to John Roach of
Pennsylvania, who subsequently ran into numerous difficulties in the construction process
including staggering cost overruns and other flaws that drew heavy criticism from all sectors.239
Completing the ships construction was a complicated effort best described as a public-private
partnership including various steel interests, work by the U.S. Navy itself, and foreign
237
Brodie, Bernard. Sea Power in the Machine Age. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941,
pg. 110-111
238
Ibid, pg. 111
239
Cooling, Benjamin Franklin. Gray Steel and Blue Water Navy: The Formative Years of
America's Military-Industrial Complex. Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1979, pg. 38-40
109
suppliers.240 This process led to several important developments. First, it led to a rather explicit
self-examination on the part of the U.S. government, the goal of which was to determine the
proper state-private relationships that would be needed to sustain the industrial capability to
build modern machines of war.241 Second, an important part of this process was the building of
some element of state autarky in construction of needed weapons, making the American capital
an important center of modern industrial manufacturing.242 By 1889 the ABCD ships were
operating adequately, and the Dolphin had completed a 58,000-mile world cruise without any
major problems.243
The American victory in the Spanish American War provided further impetus for improvement
of the American Navy. Increased territorial holdings obtained from the Spanish gave the
American Navy increased purpose and importance. The Roosevelt administration pushed hard
for increased naval construction, as well as for an overhaul of the Naval bureaucracy.244
In
these efforts Roosevelt was largely successful. From 1901 to 1905 President Roosevelt was able
to obtain Congressional authorization for ‘ten first class battleships, four armored cruisers, and
seventeen other vessels of different classes.’ 245 While Roosevelt’s attempts to reorganize the
Naval bureaucracy are seen as less successful246, his reorganization and augmentation of the U.S.
240
Ibid, pg. 40-41
Ibid, pg. 41 This came in the form of the Gun Foundry Board, or Simpson Board, established
in the 1883 naval appropriation bill, it was a joint army-navy committee charged with assessing
the most desirable arrangements for industrial military production. This subject is central to this
work and will be addressed again in later chapters.
242
Ibid, pg. 77
243
Miller, Nathan. The U.S. Navy: A History. 3rd ed. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997, pg.
150-151
244
Sprout, Harold and Margret. The Rise of American Naval Power 1776-1918. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1966, pg. 261-276
245
Ibid, pg. 263
246
Ibid, pg. 276
241
110
Navy fleet remains his ultimate Presidential legacy. His reorganization of the American fleet
into two oceanic fighting forces demonstrated an understanding of what naval warfare was, a
contest between big gun ships. For Roosevelt, battleships were made to fight and destroy other
battleships, not to provide a static defense of coastal harbors and towns.247 The cacophony of
naval construction in the Roosevelt era represents the epitome of coal power in naval and marine
terms. The nature of coal as a fuel is limited by its physical form, size and weight. The first
American appropriation for investigating the use of petroleum to power naval vessels came in the
wake of the Spanish American War.248 Under Roosevelt, the experiments on liquid fuel oil to
power marine vessels for naval purposes continued.249
The time period that follows the Roosevelt Administration witnessed a massive outburst of
military technology, and naval ship construction. This naval arms race is coincident with the
emergence and substantial improvement of the utilization of petroleum products for motive
power. In 1899 the US oil demand stood at 12 million barrels per year and twenty years later
that demand had ballooned to 224 million barrels per year.250 Gerald Nash claims that the
‘magnitude of this shift was greatest in marine transportation. For the purpose of understanding
an energy transition, and its impact on institutions, the great power navies during the first twenty
years serve as excellent case studies. These organizations were already largely dependent upon
coal, and were highly industrialized. They generally possessed intimate relationships with their
respective state democratic institutions as well as private sector industrial entities, namely the
247
Ibid, pg. 283
Nash, Gerald D. United States Oil Policy 1890-1964. University of Pittsburgh Press, 1968,
pg. 9-10
249
DeNovo, John, A. “Petroleum and the United States Navy before World War I.”
The Mississippi Valley Historical Review (1955): 41:4,641-642;
250
Nash, Gerald D. United States Oil Policy 1890-1964. University of Pittsburgh Press, 1968,
pg. 5
248
111
steel companies, shipbuilders, and coal and oil companies. As a new energy replaced previously
dominant methods, these institutions were thrust into a new phase of uncertainty, intense
competition, innovation, and war. As such, this transition is ripe for an intellectual exploration
drawing upon comparative international political economic theory, institutional organizational
theory, theories related to the diffusion of military technology, and theories of energy transitions.
The American Navy: 1902-1916
Before any application of the aforementioned theories, one must obtain the requisite data. What
was the experience of the American Navy during this formative period in our modern world?
During this time some of the most significant and influential technological developments in our
history were invented. The submarine, the aircraft, the automobile, wireless telegraphy, the tank
etc. all had an impact on state militaries. Oil based technology, in the form of propulsion for
navies in general, and submarines and aircraft more specifically, dramatically transformed
warfare and sea power, while also creating airpower. It is also worth mentioning that electricity,
as an energy carrier (not an energy source) played an important role during this time period.
However, the focus of this work is to understand energy source transitions.
The diffusion of petroleum-powered machines dramatically altered what militaries could do, how
military branches interacted, as well as where and how they could travel, and project power. In
the following case study, the author aims to trace the process by which the American Navy
transitioned away from powering their machines with coal, replacing it with liquid petroleum
products, including fuel oil and also diesel fuel and gasoline. Correspondingly, the focus of the
case studies revolves around the development and diffusion of oil based technology related to
112
traditional ship propulsion (including small destroyers and large battleships) and also the
revolutionary new machines made possible by oil technology, submarines, and aircraft.
The case study draws its evidence from the annual reports of the Navy Department, which are
generally compiled by the Secretary of the Navy, and include commentary from the Secretary as
well as the respective Bureau heads. While the form of the documents changed slightly over
time with the coming and going of new Naval Secretaries under Roosevelt (there were five of
them), the documents also reflect the longest tenure for a Naval Secretary in U.S. history (up to
that time) in the form of Josephus Daniels (1913-1921). These documents are, in a word,
extensive. They average around 900 pages and demonstrate the copious bureaucratic
recordkeeping common during the period, for which this author is thankful.
The starting point for a concerted effort to examine the use of petroleum by the American Navy
can be found in the year 1902. Naval Secretary William H. Moody describes attempts to utilize
oil for naval purposes as having occurred for the ‘past forty years’.251 Secretary Moody
elaborates briefly on the benefits that are understood to come from this technology, including
reduced labor on board ship, increased steaming radius and he even notes the strategic location
of recent American oil discoveries (presumably in California and Texas), namely that they are
near tidewater. The clarity with which Moody expresses the pressing nature of understanding
the military and political implications of liquid petroleum technology is astounding.
“The following are some of the more urgent problems in the solution of which the Navy
should lead:
(a) The best means of utilizing liquid fuel for naval and maritime purposes. The Naval
power that can successfully install a liquid-fuel plant in a war ship will possess a great
251
The Navy Department, 'Annual Reports of the Navy Department', ed. by The Navy
Department (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1902), pg. 27
113
military advantage. It is not at all improbable that the liquid-fuel problem will have a
very important effect in determining which nation shall possess the carrying trade of the
world.”252
In just a few sentences Moody encapsulates the crux of the issue that would come to dominate
international affairs for the next century. The Navy, however, could not simply adopt such a
new fuel, with an uncertain future supply, and one that had not been thoroughly tested. The
Navy had been prodding Congress to appropriate monies for such experiments and in the
previous session of Congress had obtained a small amount ($20,000) to do just that.253 The
Bureau of Steam Engineering notes in its report that such a sum was only one-sixth of that
estimated necessary by the navy to complete the experimental work. More importantly the
Bureau identifies that the technological breakthrough that was needed to make liquid petroleum
the primary source of motive power for naval vessels had been realized, namely, the atomization
of the oil with either steam or heated air prior to combustion.
“The numerous experiments that have been made by several naval powers during the past
forty years in the attempt to use oil as a fuel show how important this question is
regarded by military experts. It is now plain why success was not attained. There was
too much effort exerted to burn oil in the same manner as coal. It is now realized that the
oil should be atomized (it is impossible to completely gasify it) before ignition, and the
calorimetric area are factors which must be considered. In fact, it is highly probable that
it may be found advisable to design a special boiler for burning oil.” 254
Demonstrating the traditionally assumed military conservatism, the Navy created the Liquid Fuel
Board, operating under the Bureau of Steam Engineering, to oversee experiments designed to
directly compare the relative efficiencies of burning coal versus burning oil.255 While some of
the early findings of the liquid fuel board are discussed in the 1902 and 1903 reports, their full
findings are first published in 1904. Yet despite the tests of the Liquid Fuel Board only having
252
Ibid, pg. 720
Ibid, pg. 717
254
Ibid, pg. 737
255
Ibid, pg. 27
253
114
barely begun, the recommendations of the bureau of steam engineering already described
positively the potential of liquid petroleum fuel. The Bureau recommends that at least one-third
of the torpedo boats and destroyers should be provided with a liquid fuel burning installations.256
Alternatively, there is still a demonstrative uncertainty about the ability of the fuel, which is
shown by the bureau’s reluctance to state that liquid petroleum will propel full size armored
cruisers or battleships in the near future.257
One of the more interesting aspects of the Naval report from 1902 is the issue of experimental
engineering laboratories. Given the state of technological development, this is not surprising.
However, the explicit emphasis in the Navy’s call for such an experimental naval lab on
technological innovation and experimentation belies the notion that militaries are slow to
innovate or incorporate new technologies. The Bureau of Steam Engineering cites the example
of the German experimental naval laboratory in Charlottenburg as proof of the benefits of such
an installation.258 The language related to naval experimental research used in the report
emphasizes the rapidity of technological change, the need to be on the cutting edge of that
development, as well as the need to be able to anticipate future desirable technological
changes.259 In the language of Keith Krause, the Navy wanted to be a first tier producer of
military technology; in other words, a true innovator.260
256
Ibid, pg. 740-741
The Navy Department, 'Annual Reports of the Navy Department', ed. by The Navy
Department (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1902), pg. 740-741
258
Ibid, pg. 715
259
Ibid, pg. 719
260
Krause, Keith. "The Political Economy of the International Arms Transfer System: The
Diffusion of Military Technique Via Arms Transfers." International Journal 45, no. 3, Israel &
the Arabs since the Intifadah (Summer 1990), pg. 691-696
257
115
The Board conducted comparative tests, burning both coal and oil in Hollenstein water tube
boilers, measuring relative evaporative efficiencies of the respective fuels under forced and
natural draft conditions. Admiral George Melvile directed the tests.261 The Board’s report begins
by clearly stating the positive strategic advantages of using oil over coal. These include
economy of space for carrying fuel, ease of refueling, speed in raising steam, capacity for
extreme duty on the part of the boilers, smoke reduction under light duty, reduction of stack
height necessary for exhaust, reduction in labor for firerooms, and lastly a higher maximum
speed with the new fuel.262 The need for larger boilers, thus requiring a larger portion of total
ship volume for oil-only boilers, is offset by the higher fuel efficiency, increased capacity and
greater endurance of the boilers, referred to as the “lungs of the vessel”.263
The oil used for the experiments was provided by Standard Oil,264 which, along with other
private commercial interests had over the previous year expended a large sum of money on
similar tests related to oil burners and steam turbines for marine purposes.265
The data from
those tests was shared with the Liquid Fuel Board.266 While the naval documents do not name
Standard Oil, the phrase “one of the leading oil centers of this country” seems very much to
261
U.S. Naval Liquid Fuel Board. "Report of the U.S. Liquid Fuel Board of Tests Conducted on
the Hollenstein Water Tube Boiler, Showing the Relative Evaporative Efficiencies of Coal and
Liquid Fuel under Forced and Natural Draft Conditions as Determined by an Extended Series of
Tests Made under the Direction of Admiral George W. Melville." edited by The Navy
Department, 512. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1904.
262
Ibid, pg. 309
263
Ibid, pg. 319
264
Ibid, pg. 389
265
Nash, Gerald D. United States Oil Policy 1890-1964. University of Pittsburgh Press, 1968,
pg. 9-10
266
U.S. Naval Liquid Fuel Board. "Report of the U.S. Liquid Fuel Board of Tests Conducted on
the Hollenstein Water Tube Boiler, Showing the Relative Evaporative Efficiencies of Coal and
Liquid Fuel under Forced and Natural Draft Conditions as Determined by an Extended Series of
Tests Made under the Direction of Admiral George W. Melville." edited by The Navy
Department, 512. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1904, pg. 385
116
imply it, and this would make sense in light of Standard’s already public participation in the
naval board’s tests. The oil giant clearly had an interest in a naval decision to use oil to fuel the
fleet and it was obviously willing to spend the needed money to demonstrate the capability of
liquid oil fuel.
The Navy paid special thanks to two gentlemen, Dr. C.T. Deane, secretary of the California
Petroleum Miners’ Association, and Col. W.M. Bunker, Washington Representative of the San
Francisco Chamber of Commerce for the delivery of the needed oil for the naval tests.267 The
availability of the needed oil for the naval tests in California was likely related to recently
increased refinery capacity in that state, including the second biggest oil refinery in the United
States at the time, owned by Standard Oil.268 Thus in its attempt to explore the possibility of
utilizing liquid petroleum the Navy found itself, to a degree, at the mercy of the private sector oil
companies, who controlled production, refinery and delivery of the necessary product.269 This
reliance on the capabilities of the private sector becomes a recurring theme in the Navy’s
attempts to acquire the necessary materiel for construction and supply of its fleet in the years
before the war.
It is that aspect of the economy of oil that the navy saw as potentially problematic. The board
describes the “structural, transportation, and supply features which present the only serious
difficulty to the adoption of the use of liquid fuel by the navies of the world.” The Navy’s chief
267
Ibid, pg. 390
"The Petroleum Industry of California in 1902." The American Gas Light Journal, 1903,
pg.48.
269
U.S. Naval Liquid Fuel Board. "Report of the U.S. Liquid Fuel Board of Tests Conducted on
the Hollenstein Water Tube Boiler, Showing the Relative Evaporative Efficiencies of Coal and
Liquid Fuel under Forced and Natural Draft Conditions as Determined by an Extended Series of
Tests Made under the Direction of Admiral George W. Melville." edited by The Navy
Department, 512. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1904, pg. 394-395
268
117
engineer, writing in 1902, described the complex nature of the problem, indicating that for
military purposes “the oil requirements of naval vessels for service conditions might only be met
by the Government establishing oil-fuel stations.” With the oil industry still in a relatively
undeveloped stage, the largest obstacle seemed to be ensuring appropriate supply, delivery, and
price.
Overall, the Board’s findings on the use of oil are positive, but cautious. There are some
concerns related to the structure of naval vessels and the storage of oil fuel, while the fear of
accidental combustion of the liquid oil also caused some discussion. However these problems
are not dwelled upon, and technologically speaking are solved in a few short years after the
publishing of this report. The Board stressed that the lack of adequate coal along the American
West coast was a strategic weakness of the United States, one that had become particularly
pronounced in the wake of territorial concessions that resulted from the Spanish American
War.270 Correspondingly, it is argued that at least one naval vessel ‘cruising the Pacific’ should
be fitted to burn oil exclusively, and that it be used for experimental purposes related to burning
oil for marine propulsion. In support of this idea, the Board cited the British naval-boiler
commission, noting that the British Admiralty has placed the services of several warships at that
body’s disposal.271 In this, as well as the reference to the German experimental lab at
Charlottenburg, the US Navy seemed to have been imitating rival tactics for naval technological
innovation.
270
U.S. Naval Liquid Fuel Board. "Report of the U.S. Liquid Fuel Board of Tests Conducted on
the Hollenstein Water Tube Boiler, Showing the Relative Evaporative Efficiencies of Coal and
Liquid Fuel under Forced and Natural Draft Conditions as Determined by an Extended Series of
Tests Made under the Direction of Admiral George W. Melville." edited by The Navy
Department, 512. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1904, pg. 421-22
271
Ibid, pg. 423
118
The year of 1904 can be described as an important watershed moment for the oil industry. The
realization by the United States Navy that oil, and not coal, would likely be the predominant fuel
for naval ships in the future, becomes increasingly noticeable in naval documentation. On the
one hand the U.S. Navy is clearly reacting to its surroundings, as it witnesses the use of oil by
other navies, locomotive companies, and domestic power plants, and in a sense being pushed by
socio-economic change toward the future use of oil to power its ships. Comparative investigative
efforts by private shipping on long journeys had demonstrated the capability, economy, and
efficiency of burning oil for marine purposes. 272
On the other hand, the Navy was actively pursuing experimental methods and machines that
were pushing the bounds of what oil-based technology could do for them, as a warfighting
organization. The realities of warfare are the lens through which the Navy viewed this new
source of fuel for motive power. If the Navy intended to convert from coal to oil, it would need
certain conditions to be met. Tests would need to be performed, appropriate understanding of
the positive and negative aspects of the fuel, availability of supply, different methods of burning,
storage and safety problems, and other factors all impacted the process by which the Navy
transitioned from one fuel to the other. The Naval Fuel Board report of 1904, along with the
Annual Navy report of the same year, make clear that if the transition to oil was not certain, it
was extremely likely. The early steps along this transition were small, and took the form of
plans for installation of turbine and water tube boiler installations on the scout cruisers Intrepid
and Alarm. Such plans followed naval investigation of the performance of turbine propulsion on
272
The Navy Department. "Annual Report of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy
Department. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1904, pg. 16
119
three yachts, the Revolution, Lorena, and Tarantula, and also the passenger steamer, the
Turbina.273
Between 1902 and 1904, the U.S. Navy moved from experimenting with oil burning installations
to preparing plans for oil burning scout cruisers and retrofitting other small ships.274 The
American navy had demonstrated a desire to innovate, and improve upon the technologies
required to operate their ships. While the Americans had demonstrated great capability in the
most recent war with Spain, the newfound responsibility for far-flung territories in the Pacific
brought into sharp relief the limitations of the Navy, along with some of the difficulties it might
face in maintaining American gains. Elsewhere in the Pacific, in 1904-1905, the world witnessed
one of the earliest modern naval battles between the Russians and the Japanese. This war
received much attention among navies, and demonstrated several important facets of naval
warfare using modern ships.
Describing the nature of the lessons to be learned from the Russo-Japanese war, U.S. Naval
secretary Charles J. Bonaparte had this to say:
“On other points professional opinion, at least, is practically unanimous. It is universally
recognized by those qualified to speak that morale and gunnery being equal, victory will
usually fall to the heavier battery; that torpedo craft and mines have a real, although a
somewhat restricted, field of usefulness in naval warfare, and that superior speed is of
value in a fleet, not merely because it enables the commander to force or avoid battle, but
because it is a source of strength in actual conflict.
On yet other questions, however, we can not say that any such unanimity exists. The
recent war has taught us little, if anything, about the utility of submarines. It has caused,
or at least left, much difference of opinion as to the value of armored cruisers, and it has
created a still more serious divergence of views respecting the best limit of size for the
future battle ship. As a matter of fact, no battle ship of as much as 16,000 tons
273
274
Ibid, pg. 902
Ibid, pg. 902
120
displacement was used by either belligerent, and while, on the one hand, at least one great
power has determined upon the construction of an 18,000-ton battle ship, and others are
reported to have in contemplation vessels of from 20,000 to 22,000 tons, on the other,
some authorities think these leviathans will prove less formidable and more vulnerable
than battle ships of 16,000 tons, such as our contemplated South Carolina and
Michigan.”275
This reaction seems to support what was conventional wisdom both before and after the 1905
conflict, that big battle ships were still the standard of great naval power, and that such ships are
likely to get bigger, get faster, and wield bigger guns. This was one of the many lessons great
power navies learned from the two major naval battles that effectively ended the war.
Correspondingly, the reaction to the role of sea power, and its immeasurable impact on the
outcome of the war is captured in the comments of a “Russian captain of reputation” who
articulates the relationships between sea power and armored battle squadrons:
“The definite result of the battle—that is to say, the command of the sea—can not be
decided except by the battle between the two divisions of battle ships and armored
cruisers. Battle ships and armored cruisers necessarily compose the real strength of every
squadron. Before this war it was the fashion with us to laugh at these monsters of the sea,
and to try to make believe that a few torpedo-boat flotillas and submarines were sufficient
to sink them. I hope that we have now given up such delusions. I do not say that the
torpedo boats and submarines could not succeed in destroying some battle ships, because
if that were not so they would indeed be of little use, and it would be quite unnecessary to
build any; but I repeat that light flotillas will never be able to contend with squadrons
composed of armored ships, and that in a naval battle a decisive victory will never be
obtained without a squadron of battle ships and armored cruisers.”276
Beyond the battleship, the new technology whose use during this war that was most impactful on
naval practice was the torpedo, and the torpedo boat. While this weapon was not extensively
used in the naval battles of the Russo-Japanese War, it was dramatically effective when it was
used. On the first night of the war, February 8-9, 1904, the Japanese scored an important
275
The Navy Department. "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy." edited by The Navy
Department, 1255. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1905, pg. 19-20
276
Ibid, pg. 392
121
success, which, according to the U.S. Navy, “paralyzed the initiative of one sea power [Russia],
giving the other the command of the sea.’ The report continues to say that, “These successes
alone would more than justify the existence of a large fleet of torpedo vessels…”277 While the
risks of manning a torpedo boat were evident, and their use generally limited to nighttime and
weather induced stealth operations, it was certainly noted that such vessels can dramatically alter
the balance of power at sea, primarily through impacting the state of mind, and willingness to
operate of enemy sea captains. This lesson also increased the likelihood of continued
expenditure on torpedo vessels as well as to support the experimental trials of submarines.
Although it is worth noting that no submarines participated in the war, the Bureau of Ordnance
still called for continued development of American submarines despite the lack progress in their
use.278 Between 1899 and 1904, the U.S. Navy had contracted with two companies, the J.P.
Holland Torpedo Boat Company and the Electric Boat Company, for the building of twelve
submarine craft, 10 of which were built by Holland, and two by the Electric Boat Company.279
Beyond the U.S. Naval reaction and assessment of the technological implications of the RussoJapanese War, 1905 saw some early testing of gasoline engines on small vessels, with some
success.280 The Navy at this time continued to increase utilization of oil fuel for power
generation at its stations and hospitals, particularly along the west coast at locations such as Mare
Island.281 Such installations are often described by the Navy as experiencing increased fuel
efficiency and reduction in cost, and this process became more rapid, and widespread over the
next several years of reports. Despite these technological developments, the real center of
277
Ibid, pg. 393
Ibid, pg. 501
279
Ibid, pg. 690
280
Ibid, pg. 721
281
Ibid, pg. 1202
278
122
attention among navies at this point in time was the emergence of the Dreadnought class of
battleships. These ships were often described as all-big-gun ships. The HMS Dreadnought was
the first of this type to be laid down, although The American version of this type of ship, the
South Carolina class, was also designed in 1905. Due to American construction delays, the
British finished building their version first.282 Opinion on the utility of such large ships was
divided in the U.S. with Admiral Dewey and President Roosevelt supportive of the new designs,
while the legendary Alfred Mahan and some Congressional supporters remained skeptical of
both the utility and the need for such large ships.283
In 1906, Secretary Bonaparte clearly stated that although new inventions (including torpedoes,
torpedo boats, submarines and even dirigible balloons) have been described as bringing about the
end of the dominance of the battleship, he viewed these claims as false. For Bonaparte, the “only
trustworthy safeguard” for U.S. national defense was the battleship.284 The Navy, however,
continued to explore ways to improve their ships and expand upon the positive benefits of
burning oil. The U.S.S. Wyoming was adapted to burn only oil fuel with the purpose of learning
about how this process would impact future ship design. In addition, discussions of doublebottomed structure for the purpose of carrying oil, which would not substantially impact a ships
capacity to carry coal, indicated a hint of caution. Availability of fuel oil is often the most
significant limitation cited throughout the naval reports. Here also, the navy seems to worry that
if it switched to oil completely, or too abruptly, the price for fuel oil would quickly become
282
O'Brien, Phillips Payson. British and American Naval Power: Politics and Policy, 1900-1936.
Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1998, pg. 62
283
Ibid.
284
The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy
Department, 1113. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1906, pg. 20
123
prohibitive. Thus, the Navy calls for a conservative policy of ship design that would allow for
the burning of either coal and/or oil.
“As fuel oil can be obtained in a very limited number of places, as compared with coal,
and as the general use of oil as fuel for steaming purposes would soon reduce the supply
to such an extent that the price would become prohibitive, the Bureau is of the opinion
that the designs for new vessels for the Navy should accord with the practices which now
obtain with regard to the allotment of space for the stowage of coal.
But as the oil carried in the double bottoms of a battleship would be equivalent to several
hundred tons of coal, and increase her steaming radius proportionately without occupying
space required for other purposes, the Bureau recommends that in all future battleships
the double bottoms be constructed with the view of carrying oil in them, and that all
necessary pumps, pipes, and appliances for burning oil be placed on board.”285
In conjunction with preparations for oil carrying capacity in all future ships, submarine
development and experimentation continued apace at this time. The navy obtained appropriation
for comparative performance tests of differing types of submarines to be performed in
Narragansett Bay in early 1907.286 These trials of submarines take place under the purview of
the Bureau of Ordnance, because the submarine was in its origin, a torpedo-boat, and the Bureau
of Ordnance was the appropriate bureau to oversee the development of such a weapon. Notable
technological innovations, experiments, and developments in 1906 include a new submerged
torpedo,287 the aforementioned submarine trials, and also increased use of oil in new ways,
particularly by naval blacksmiths in furnaces and open forges.288
In 1907 the Navy continued to premise its battleship designs on dual fuel capacity, including the
necessary equipment to burn both coal and/or oil. The cautious approach of dual fuel capacity is
285
The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy
Department, 1113. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1906, pg. 370-371
286
Ibid, pg. 19
287
Ibid, pg. 515
288
Ibid, pg. 611
124
indicative of military organizational conservatism, and demonstrates continued uncertainty
regarding availability of fuel oil for naval ships while in service.289 By building battleships that
could burn either fuel, the Navy ensured that in the event of a fuel oil supply disruption coal
could be used to fuel the most important vessels in the fleet. On the other hand, the insistence on
dual fuel capacity, and expressed concern over supply, seem strange given the large share of
world production in the United States at that time. As early as 1904, the Navy itself noted that
the United States accounted for forty eight percent of world petroleum production and that much
of that production was near maritime ports.290 Coincident with Naval uncertainty about building
battleships that run only on oil, was a rapidly spreading practice of replacing coal completely
with oil in myriad ways throughout the institution of the Navy.
“Oil fuel.—Oil Fuel is now used very extensively in this department. In the shipsmith
shop two rotary blowers driven by 40-horsepower electric motors provide the necessary
air for atomizing the oil and for combustion in the forges. Most satisfactory results have
been obtained in not only the furnaces but in open forges, atomizing at 4-pound pressure.
The galvanizing pots, savining oven, coppersmith forges, and core ovens are also heated
by oil. Oil has been burned for several years under the main boilers. The plate and angel
furnaces in the shipfitters’ shop are heated by oil. In the foundry the brass furnaces have
used oil for several years. Lately an experimental furnace for melting pit iron by means
of oil has been installed and is in satisfactory operation. With oil at less than $1 per
barrel and coke at $16 per ton, pig iron can be melted by means of oil at about one-eighth
the fuel cost as compared with coke. The results of also show that a very much better
grade of castings is obtained from the oil furnace than from the cupola. When the
foundry is transferred to the new foundry building, No. 128, it is expected to install an
oil-burning furnace for melting pig iron of about 2,500 pounds capacity. This will enable
a small heat for iron castings to be taken out whenever necessary. With the cupola it is
necessary to get a large heat, which frequently delays pouring iron as much as a week.
At the present time for large heats the cupola will be used, but it is believed that in the
near future the oil furnace will be developed to such an extent as to replace the cupola.
The burning of oil in the forges in the blacksmith shop has resulted in great economy.
Not only is there economy in the fuel cost, but the amount of work gotten out is
289
The Navy Department. "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy." edited by The Navy
Department, 1304. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1907, pg. 17-18
290
The Navy Department. "Annual Report of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy
Department. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1904, pg. 16
125
considerably greater than with coal as a fuel, as the heats are taken very much quicker.
The comfort of the men is also much greater with oil as a fuel than with coal.”291
As can be discerned, the benefits of oil over coal in construction, repair, power production and
other naval installations were substantial, including economy, cleanliness, increased heat/power
generation, speed of reaching needed temperatures, and even in the comfort of the men due to
increased ease of the work. Yet despite these improvements, the Navy was still investigating
various forms of burning coal (briquetted versus raw), to determine comparative evaporative
efficiency,292 and also began early testing and acquisition of small 2-cylinder gasoline motors of
up to 100 horsepower for launching small craft.293 This demonstrates the willingness of the
Navy to explore all options available to it, and also a willingness to gain advantages wherever
they may be found through technological innovation. These experimental tests and trials of
different burners, boilers, fuels, and various new marine technology and machines highlight the
natural innovative tendencies present in the American Navy at that time.
1908 proved a very busy year in the realm of naval technological development. Oil based
technology was also witnessing marked improvement in its capabilities. The great power navies
were expanding the size, speed, and range of their torpedo craft, submarines, and destroyers. The
American Navy claims much of these gains were directly attributable to ‘oil fuel and turbine
machinery’.294 The improvement in German naval technological capability over the previous
few years had instigated a panic and reactionary building program in Britain, and the result was a
291
The Navy Department. "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy." edited by The Navy
Department, 1304. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1907, pg. 616-617
292
Ibid, pg. 766
293
Ibid, pg. 740, 763-764
294
The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy
Department, 1031. Washington D.C. : Governemnt Printing Office, 1908, pg. 8
126
naval arms race.295 The Americans too, were involved in a major naval buildup under the
direction of Theodore Roosevelt, whose administration continually struggled to convince
Congress of the need to continue building more, bigger, and better battleships.296 1908 also saw
the first investigation into the possibility of flight for military purposes when the army was
convinced by Roosevelt to test an advanced model of a Wright brother airplane. While the Army
purchased the machine the Navy sent Lieutenant George Sweet to participate in the first test.
Sweet would have almost certainly died in the crash, had he not given up his place on the test
flight to Army Lieutenant Thomas E. Selfridge. Despite the death of Selfridge, Lieutenant Sweet
came away from the event with a positive impression of the possibility of using flight for
military purposes.297 With oil becoming increasingly ubiquitous throughout the naval world,
submarine development proceeding apace, and the beginning of the age of manned flight, the
world’s most powerful navies were experiencing a major transformation in their technological
capabilities. Correspondingly, these capabilities would impact what those navies could
accomplish, as well as what those navies would want to accomplish. Additionally, these new
technological developments would alter the geostrategic environments in which these military
organizations operated, as well as the very organizational structure of the navies themselves.
The American Navy, while embracing the full utilization of fuel oil on most middle sized and
smaller ships, including the 10 torpedo boat destroyers Nos. 22-31, were still designing
295
Rose, Lisle A. The Age of Navalism 1890-1918. Vol. 1, Columbia: University of Missouri
Press, 2007, pg. 53-54
296
O'Brien, Phillips Payson. British and American Naval Power: Politics and Policy, 1900-1936.
Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1998, pg. 63-65
297
Miller, Nathan. The U.S. Navy: A History. 3rd ed. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997, pg.
175-176
127
battleships to burn both coal and oil fuel.298 Despite uncertainty about the reliability of utilizing
only fuel oil for battleship propulsion, the Navy was still investigating various efficiencies of
new and different technologies. Battleships Nos. 30 and 31, the Utah and Florida, respectively,
included designs for both reciprocating engines and turbine engines. Regarding battleship design
for carrying fuel, since the Navy was unable to definitively choose one fuel over the other, they
simply settled for both.
“XI. The design herewith forwarded provides for a trial speed of 21 knots, and can be
arranged for the installation of either reciprocating or turbine machinery, outline
specifications for both types of machinery having been prepared. Provision is also made
for the stowage of a large amount of oil fuel without in any degree reducing the capacity
of the coal bunkers.”299
This is indicative of the transitional nature of the energy technology of the time. The benefits of
burning oil are relatively clear, but the American Navy (in fact all great power navies) were
operating within a pre-existing system designed to fuel naval vessels with coal. While
technology related to burning oil for naval propulsion developed quickly, the infrastructure
underlying the production, distribution and delivery of that fuel lagged behind. Consequently the
American Navy began to build vessels that could use oil to maximize efficiencies of burning coal
when needed. Oil became at first an adjunct to the already established coal-burning
infrastructure. With the amount of capital, resources, and energy already invested in the network
of coal provisions, it is understandable that the Navy would be slow to completely switch away
from the fuel, which had served them quite well.
While manned flight was just beginning to catch the attention of the world’s militaries,
submarines were nearly accepted as parts of the fleet. How to use those submarines was,
298
Department, The Navy. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy
Department, 1031. Washington D.C. : Government Printing Office, 1908, pg. 665-666
299
Ibid, pg. 467
128
however, still up for debate. In the U.S. Navy it was believed that the primary purpose of
submarines torpedo boats was in coastal and harbor defense.300 There had been recent
improvements in turbo diesel generators, which were used to charge storage batteries needed for
submarine propulsion. The Navy notes that by using the process whereby the destroyers serving
as tender for a small group of submarines charge their batteries using the turbo diesel generators,
an increased level of efficiency and reduced level of wear and tear was accomplished.301 These
improvements ensured that submarine construction would continue to be authorized by
Congress. Competitive bidding was opened by the Navy for eight more submarines in November
of 1908.302
Teddy Roosevelt is widely considered the “godfather” of the U.S. Navy, and this perception is
generally connected with the immense building program that he was able to convince Congress
to approve during his two terms in office. This consisted of the construction of sixteen
battleships (more than a doubling of the U.S. fleet) and the ballooning of the amount of money
spent on the Navy from $48 million in 1899 to $137 million in 1909.303 However, the nature of
this naval buildup is criticized by some for being unbalanced, with an unnecessary emphasis on
capital ships and a lack of adequate auxiliary ships to support them. Another criticism of the
buildup under Roosevelt is that those ships were shortly declared obsolete, due to the emergence
of the Dreadnought class of battleships.304 There are several factors that impacted the nature of
the buildup of the U.S. Navy under Roosevelt, the most important being Roosevelt’s inability to
convince those in Congress that the continuing increase of the size and capability of the U.S.
300
Ibid, pg. 38
Ibid, pg. 301
302
Ibid, pg. 17
303
O'Brien, Phillips Payson. British and American Naval Power: Politics and Policy, 1900-1936.
Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1998, pg. 50
304
Ibid, pg. 51
301
129
Navy was vital to American security and national defense. American geostrategic isolation and
its ever-increasing economic strength, in tandem with the lack of a clear external threat, meant
that there was substantial resistance to the continually rising costs of naval buildup.305
However in March of 1909, when William Howard Taft entered the White House, he chose a
friend of his, and Roosevelt’s, to take the position of U.S. Naval Secretary: George Von
Lengerke Meyer. Unlike Roosevelt, who appointed a new naval secretary almost every year,
Meyer served his term through to its end, in 1913.
“A personal friend of both Roosevelt and Taft, Meyer had served as ambassador to Italy,
ambassador to Russia and postmaster general between 1900 and 1909. When Taft chose
him to be secretary of the navy, Meyer already had some idea of what he wanted to do.
He was able to maintain a personal control over the navy that would have been
unimaginable for one of Roosevelt’s secretaries. Meyer used his power to make some
much-needed changes. He tried to streamline the navy’s bureau system with the
appointment of four aides, one each for operations, personnel, material and inspections.
These aides reported directly to the secretary and, it was hoped, would lead to greater
centralization of the navy’s business. Unfortunately for Meyer, this reform had only
limited impact at the time, as Congress, fearful of anything that smacked of a general
staff, refused to give the aides statutory sanction…
Meyer also proved his worth in the areas of warship maintenance and auxiliary vessel
construction. In 1909 much of the American Navy was badly in need of repair. Fortyfour percent of all American warships were tied up in port or undergoing repairs. By
1912 this figure was down to twelve percent. Battleships were particularly well attended
to. In 1909 seventeen battleships were on active duty, while ten were tied up. By 1912
all American battleships were ready for duty.
Meyer also began to redress the imbalance that had grown up in the American fleet
between capital and auxiliary ships. For instance, in eight years Theodore Roosevelt was
able to coax Congress into authorizing only sixty-three non-capital ships. Meyer,
meanwhile, was able to secure congressional approval for fifty-seven auxiliaries in four
years. For every capital ship approved under Roosevelt, only 3.15 auxiliary vessels were
sanctioned. The corresponding figure for Meyer was one capital ship to 9.5
auxiliaries.”306
305
306
Ibid, pg. 63-65
Ibid, pg. 100-101
130
Meyer focused on several areas where the Navy desperately needed improvement, namely its
organizational structure and the quantity and quality of its auxiliary ships. The concept of a
general staff, able to implement military policy without excessive interference from democratic
institutions, had recently gained favor in many European militaries. Although this move was
resisted by the U.S. Congress, who liked its ability to micro-manage military policy via the
committee system, Meyer was able to begin the process of building a general staff for the Navy.
Also impressive for Meyer was his ability to severely curtail the pork-barrel spending generally
attached to naval appropriation bills related to naval bases, which had become so large that
spending on ship construction had dropped down to only 25% of the total naval expenditures. 307
Thus, in many ways Meyer was a particularly successful naval secretary, but the question
remains, how did Meyer manage the ongoing transition from coal to oil?
Just prior to Meyer assuming his position with the Navy, there had been revisions to the Navy
regulations that had placed the Bureau of Navigation in charge with transporting, storage,
handling of all coal utilized for naval purposes.308 The Bureau of Navigation would also be in
charge of building and maintaining fuel oil depots, as well as arranging for contracts to purchase
fuel oil.309 Once in office, Meyer began to expand the design and construction of fuel oil depot’s
in several locations along the U.S. east coast, from Bradford, Rhode Island to Guantanamo,
Cuba, citing the need for such depots in light of the fact that ‘all battleships and a large
proportion of the destroyers and submarines now building will burn oil.’310
307
Ibid, pg. 102, 111
The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy
Department, 1063. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1909, pg. 307
309
Ibid, 746
310
Ibid, pg. 311
308
131
The day after he took office Meyer signed the contracts awarded to the Electric Boat Company
for the construction of submarines Nos. 20-23, and later in April signed the contracts for
submarines Nos. 24-27, with the latter vessels divided between the Lake Torpedo Boat
Company, the American Laurenti Company, and the Electric Boat Company. 311 And while the
dreadnought class battleships the Wyoming and the Arkansas were still built for dual fuel
capacity, the plans for the next five American destroyers indicated that their propulsion
machinery would burn only oil.312 The commentary on the performance of oil burning
installations in 1909 is generally positive, the one exception being a complaint about the size and
weight of air compressors needed for the oil atomization process.313
Under Meyer the Navy continued to experiment with new ways of producing the requisite
propulsion power needed for its fleet as well as the needed power on land at the various naval
bases. For smaller vessels the utilization of gasoline motors had become more prevalent, and the
Navy sought to test new designs of such motors provided by private companies in the summer of
1909.314 The Navy was also experimenting with coal-gas power plants on land and insisted that
more investigation into this form of power generation be conducted. Interestingly, it is noted in
the 1909 report that the private sector had not been able to provide such machinery adapted for
naval use on the open market.315 Thus in the first year of Meyer’s tenure as Secretary of the
Navy, the policy of dual fuel capacity battleships remained firm, yet innovation and
experimentation with other forms of propulsion, from small gasoline engines to large coal-gas
power plants continued. In some instances the Navy relied on the capacities of the private sector,
311
Ibid, pg. 458
Ibid, pg. 672
313
Ibid, pg. 714
314
Ibid, pg. 672-673, 682
315
Ibid, pg. 714
312
132
while in others the Navy could not find what it wanted in the private sector. The Navy continued
to push forward in the area of fuel oil, and petroleum powered propulsion, while at the same time
ensuring continued ability to burn coal.
By 1910 the amount of oil used by the U.S. Navy was picking up steam. Practically all navy
vessels were being designed and built to burn primarily oil as fuel, with only the large battleships
built with dual fuel capacity. Correspondingly the Navy was increasing the amount of physical
storage capacity for naval oil supplies. The Navy found itself dangerously reliant on private oil
companies for supply of the fuel and argued that the Navy itself must build fueling depots and
stations at outlying strategic locations where such commercial supply did not exist.316 Also, the
Navy had established a special standard quality of fuel oil necessary for naval use, a type of fuel
oil that was not readily available in the needed amounts at commercial fueling stations.317
Moreover, the Navy was conducting comparative tests between reciprocating boilers and turbine
type engines in similarly sized ships assessing comparative efficiencies. These ships included
the Scout Cruisers Birmingham [reciprocating], and the ships Chester [Parsons turbines], and
Salem [Curtis turbines], and the tests provided ‘an authoritative indication of the relative backing
power of the three types of machinery.’ Testing the use of fuel oil as a coal auxiliary on
battleships was also conducted, using the battleships Delaware and North Dakota, with the navy
reporting some difficulty with the process. 318
316
Department, The Navy. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy
Department, 832. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1910, pg. 25
317
Ibid, pg. 520-521
318
Ibid, pg. 488
133
One of the most impressive developments in naval technological innovation in 1910 was the
success of Mr. Eugene Ely in taking off of the U.S.S. Birmingham in a Curtiss biplane. This
experiment demonstrated the practicality of operating airplanes from ships for scouting purposes,
and the report from 1910 is worth quoting at length:
“November 14 Mr. Eugene Ely made an experiment at Hampton Roads in flying in a
Curtiss biplane from the deck of the U.S.S. Birmingham, which had been furnished by the
department. The object was to demonstrate the possibility of an aeroplane of the existing
type leaving a ship for scout purposes. A temporary platform was placed forward on the
Birmingham for the purpose of assisting the aviator with the ship’s speed by steaming
ahead to wind. Mr. Ely did not, however, need this help, and easily succeeded in making
the flight while the ship was at anchor, thereby increasing the value of the experiment.
This experiment demonstrated the conditions governing the location of future platforms
on shipboard for this purpose, and showed that they could be installed without interfering
seriously with the other features of the ship.
Landing on or near a ship on returning with information after a scouting trip appears to be
practicable.
This experiment and the advances which have been made in aviation seem to demonstrate
that it is destined to perform some part in the naval warfare of the future. It appears
likely that this will be limited to scouting. A scout which is not strong enough to pierce
the enemy’s line can get as near as possible and then send an aeroplane 30 or 40 miles,
obtain valuable information and then return to the scout. Even if the aviator did not land
on the scout he could be brought on board and deliver his information. The loss of an
aeroplane would be of no moment, as the ship may easily carry others. The distinct value
of service of this kind is easily seen.
The department contemplates further experiments along these lines, with the belief that it
will be necessary in the near future to equip all scouts with one or more aeroplanes to
increase the distance at which information can be secured.”319
While this early example of using ships to launch planes certainly provided a justification of
naval expense on planes for the purposes of scouting, the process was rudimentary and, given the
state of the technology, would likely require the sacrifice of the plane once launched. On the
319
Department, The Navy. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy
Department, 832. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1910, pg. 23
134
other hand, the navy had clearly demonstrated that manned flight would certainly have military
applications for navies in the very near future.
Submarine construction continued with the awarding of contracts for vessels Nos. 28-31, three of
which were built by the Electric Boat Company and one built by the Lake Torpedo Boat
Company.320 Increased usage of submarines by the U.S. Navy led to understanding more
completely the hazards entailed in such work, namely the difficult sanitation and air quality
conditions generally present on submarines.321 This issue receives increasing attention over the
next several years by naval medical officers.
In 1911 the Navy sought to improve overall performance of the fleet by instituting competitive
awards for achieving top marks for fuel efficiency on the part of the various crews. These tests
placed ‘practically all the vessels of the Navy’ on a competitive standing, with bragging rights
and even trophies on the line.322 While efficiency and economy are always issues of concern for
modern steaming navies, at the time the United States Navy was warning in its annual report
about ‘fatal’ shortages of fuel storage capacity at several of its strategically important bases, such
as Guantanamo, Puget Sound, and Pearl Harbor. Secretary Meyer thus called for $500,000 in
funding to build the needed storage depots.323
Oil fuel technology for large ship propulsion continued to advance and the Navy had seen
improvements in capabilities in ships using oil as an auxiliary, such as the U.S.S. Delaware. The
Delaware had made the trip from the U.S. to England and back without taking on any extra fuel,
320
Ibid, pg. 378
Ibid, pg. 733
322
The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy
Department, 551. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1911, pg. 9-10
323
Ibid, pg. 32
321
135
and apparently it even had 660 tons of coal left over when it finished.324 On top of that, the
transition from coal to oil had been completed for the largest of battleships. The machinery
designs of the battleships that were appropriated in the previous congress are described “as
mark[ing] a distinct advance over any previous machinery of this or any other Government.
These vessels will be oil burners and will carry no coal.”325 Thus the U.S.S. New York and the
U.S.S. Texas would be the last American battleships built with the capability to burn coal, and
the U.S.S. Nevada and the U.S.S. Oklahoma the first that could only burn oil.
Comparing the nature of the Nevada and the Oklahoma to the Delaware, the Navy stated:
“As compared with the Delaware, of equal power, the machinery weights in the boiler
compartments have been reduced by 300 tons, or about 30 per cent. The length of the
space required for boilers has been reduced one-half, and the fireroom force required is
one-half that of the Delaware. The tactical qualities of the vessels have improved by
diverging the shafts from aft forward, this having been made possible by a radical change
in the arrangement of engine-room auxiliaries. Each main engine will be fitted with two
condensers, instead of one as heretofore, and provision is made for running on one
condenser in the event of trouble with the other. As a result of the reduction in
machinery weights of the boiler rooms of these vessels, it has been possible greatly to
increase their armor protection. It has been possible to group the boilers of these vessels
under one smoke pipe, thus clearing the upper deck and improving the arc of train of the
turrets.” 326
In addition to these benefits, it would be possible to reduce the crew of the fire by half the
number of men.327 Those sailors that would remain in the fire rooms of battleships, and other
vessels, would need to be trained and educated in the science of burning liquid petroleum. As
such, the Navy articulated a need for schools to train sailors for this purpose, and announced/
declared that preparations were being made to create such a school at the Philadelphia naval
yard.
324
Ibid, pg. 47
Ibid, pg. 48
326
Ibid.
327
Ibid, pg. 47
325
136
While fuel oil had just become the primary mover of the future for the U.S. Navy, other
mechanisms by which to utilize the energy stored in petroleum products was also advancing.
The internal combustion engine burning gasoline was receiving much attention, and its use was
spreading. The British Navy had begun using internal combustion engines in tandem with
turbine installations in their destroyers.328 The Americans too had begun to prefer gasoline
powered internal combustion engines over heavy fuel oil models for various purposes.
During the year the fitting of sailing launches, dories, and other service types of boats
with gasoline engines has been proceeded with. The collective horsepower of these boat
installations now exceeds 4,250, exclusive of installations in submarine boats. The
manufacture of a service design of gasoline motor has been undertaken at the navy yard,
Norfolk, with a view of standardizing all installations. The substitution of oil engines for
gasoline engines is very desirable, but thus far it has been impossible to obtain these in
small units suitable for boat installations. Three types of motors suitable for aeronautical
work have been purchased and will be tested during the coming year.329
The Navy often found it difficult to find these new types of engines in the specifications needed
for naval and marine purposes, and through the experimentation of its own engineers, as well as
through its interactions with those in the private sector, it continually pushed and prodded oil
technology forward. Alternatively, the Navy was also closely following the technological
developments in Europe. There, Diesel model engines were having more success and seeing
more development than in the United States. The U.S. Navy was using some Diesel engines for
submarines, and was hopeful that future development would allow for use of these engines on
larger vessels.330 The relatively limited adoption of Diesel type engines in the United States is a
fascinating story revolving around Adolphus Busch’s failed attempt to establish an American
monopoly on Diesel patents.331 Busch’s efforts, along with other factors such as rapid
328
Ibid, pg. 42
Ibid, pg. 261
330
Ibid, pg. 262
331
Lytle, Richard H. "The Introduction of Diesel Power in the United States, 1897-1912." The
Business History Review 42, no. Summer (1968): 115-48.
329
137
technological development of the time, plentiful fuel supply and competition, resulted in
America lagging behind Europe substantially in Diesel development.332
Despite these general difficulties the Navy continued to explore every new energy technology
available, Diesel included. And while the Navy was realizing that oil was its fuel of the future,
other institutions of the U.S. Government were taking measures to ensure fair competition in the
oil market. The battle between the U.S. Government and Standard Oil concerning Standard’s
business practices and monopoly had been dragging out since the turn of the century, and the
Bureau of Corporations report on Standard’s business practices published in May of 1906
alleged widespread monopolization by Standard primarily through its rebate scheme with the
railroads, but also included charges of discrimination, price-cutting and bribery.333 That year the
United States Attorney General filed a bill in equity against Standard for violation of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act, and by 1911 this case had reached the Supreme Court. The following
excerpt from the majority opinion written by Chief Justice White demonstrates, despite the ruling
of the court, the mixed perceptions of Standard. The result was incredulity toward their
monopolistic practices on the one hand, and on the other hand an appreciation for their role in
bringing about the age of oil in the United States.
“Both as to the law and as to the facts, the opposing contentions pressed in the argument
are numerous, and, in all their aspects, are so irreconcilable that it is difficult to reduce
them to some fundamental generalization which, by being disposed of, would decide
them all. For instance, as to the law. While both sides agree that the determination of the
controversy rests upon the correct construction and application of the first and second
sections of the Anti-Trust Act, yet the views as to the meaning of the act are as wide apart
as the poles, since there is no real point of agreement on any view of the act. And this
also is the case as to the scope and effect of authorities relied upon, even although, in
some instances, one and the same authority is asserted to be controlling.
332
Ibid, pg. 147-148
Nash, Gerald D. United States Oil Policy 1890-1964. University of Pittsburgh Press, 1968,
pg. 13-15
333
138
So also is it as to the facts. Thus, on the one hand, with relentless pertinacity and
minuteness of analysis, it is insisted that the facts establish that the assailed combination
took its birth in a purpose to unlawfully acquire wealth by oppressing the public and
destroying the just rights of others, and that its entire career exemplifies an inexorable
carrying out of such wrongful intents, since, it is asserted, the pathway of the
combination, from the beginning to the time of the filing of the bill, is marked with
constant proofs of wrong inflicted upon the public, and is strewn with the wrecks
resulting from crushing out, without regard to law, the individual rights of others. Indeed,
so conclusive, it is urged, is the proof on these subjects that it is asserted that the
existence of the principal corporate defendant -- the Standard Oil Company of New
Jersey -- with the vast accumulation of property which it owns or controls, because of its
infinite potency for harm and the dangerous example which its continued existence
affords, is an open and enduring menace to all freedom of trade, and is a byword and
reproach to modern economic methods. On the other hand, in a powerful analysis of the
facts, it is insisted that they demonstrate that the origin and development of the vast
business which the defendants control was but the result of lawful competitive methods,
guided by economic genius of the highest order, sustained by courage, by a keen insight
into commercial situations, resulting in the acquisition of great wealth, but at the same
time serving to stimulate and increase production, to widely extend the distribution of the
products of petroleum at a cost largely below that which would have otherwise prevailed,
thus proving to be, at one and the same time, a benefaction to the general public as well
as of enormous advantage to individuals. It is not denied that, in the enormous volume of
proof contained in the record in the period of almost a lifetime to which that proof is
addressed, there may be found acts of wrongdoing, but the insistence is that they were
rather the exception than the rule, and, in most cases, were either the result of too great
individual zeal in the keen rivalries of business or of the methods and habits of dealing
which, even if wrong, were commonly practised at the time.”334
Chief Justice White here encapsulates U.S. policy at this time toward the large industrial
monopolies. While there was a general sentiment that monopolization is bad, there was also an
understanding that those large industrial interests provided important goods and services to the
public, and to the state. Throughout this time period, and up to the beginning of the First World
War, the Navy found itself caught between national security imperatives and the need for the
industrial products large corporations could provide, and the belief that more competition in
334
Standard Oil Co. Of New Jersey V. United States, 221 1 (1910).
139
those industries could reduce the price of those goods, thereby saving the American public a
substantial amount of money.335
The efforts to have the U.S. government provide the needed industrial products for its Navy
often led to suggestions that the state itself enter those industries to provide for its needs. This is
clearly seen in the petroleum industry,336 as well as in the steel armor and shipbuilding
industries.337 As the need for oil in the Navy grew, the concern over undue influence over
markets by large corporations subsided. As the likelihood of war became greater, the focus on
continued supply became more prevalent. The focus of U.S. government efforts also shifted,
from combating monopoly to creating a cooperative atmosphere between private producers and
the government.
The last two years of the Taft Administration saw a continued increase in oil consumption,
including increased number of battleships and destroyers burning solely oil, increased capability
in aviation, the first tandem deployment of submarines and aircraft in naval maneuvers, and
continued innovation in naval technologies, such as the airboat. The Navy was at the time
experiencing adequate supply of oil products, and Secretary Meyer was anticipating a reduction
335
"Government Oil for Navy: Would Result in Saving of Nearly 50 Per Cent., Expert Figures."
The New York Times, February 5 1914, 8.
336
In the petroleum industry the Navy begins seeking to physically control its own oil reserves
by 1909, see Ise, John. The United States Oil Policy. New York: Arno Press, 1972, pg. 356; and
by 1914 the USG was seeking to build its own pipeline, and refineries, to produce and maintain
its oil for naval use, see "Will Uncle Sam Produce Oil." Oil and Gas Journal (January 22 1914):
4., and also Special to The New York Times. (1914, Jan 25). U.S. to look deeper into oil
ownership. New York Times (1857-1922). Retrieved from
http://search.proquest.com/docview/97583536?accountid=2909. Accessed on 4/16/13.
337
For a detailed examination of the U.S. Navy’s relationship with the steel industry from the
1880s to WWI, see Cooling, Benjamin Franklin. Gray Steel and Blue Water Navy: The
Formative Years of America's Military-Industrial Complex. Hamden, Connecticut: Archon
Books, 1979.
140
in price of oil in the near future, as the upcoming opening of the Panama canal, which was
almost finished, would make west coast oil supplies more readily available for Naval
installations in the Gulf as well as along the Atlantic.338 Meyer describes a need for more vessels
for oil transport, while T.J. Cowie, the Paymaster General, states that during the fiscal year of
1912, Naval vessels had consumed over 16 million gallons of fuel oil.339
The most significant area of innovation in 1912 for the U.S. Navy was in aviation. The Report
of Capt. W.I. Chambers to the Bureau of Navigation provides one of the earliest American
articulations for naval doctrine concerning the use of aircraft in war. Captain Chambers begins
his report by noting that experimental aviation work had moved substantially past the initial
pioneering stage, and that although the state of aviation engineering was not at “the state of
perfection required by all of the work contemplated for it in naval warfare,” it was certainly
close.340
The work contemplated by the Navy for manned flight included to reconnoiter enemy ports and
advanced bases and to assist in blockade operations, to locate and destroy submarine mines,
submarines, dirigibles, and to operate in support of torpedo boats and destroyers, to damage
enemy dock, and harbor installations, and to act as the ‘eyes of the fleet’ by scouting.341 Here
Captain Chambers described using aircraft for limited attack, and work to create requisite
weaponry for aircraft was also a part of the Navy’s efforts, albeit at the time the Bureau of
Ordnance stated that such work was not satisfactory.342 This exemplified how the Navy was not
338
The Navy Department. "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy." edited by The Navy
Department, 608. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1912, pg. 47
339
Ibid, pg. 266
340
Ibid, pg. 144
341
Ibid, pg. 156
342
Ibid, pg. 214
141
just responding to private technological developments, but pushing innovation forward by
seeking to shape new technology for its specific purposes. While the Navy noted that the
Europeans were intensely interested in improving and developing aviation, particularly the
French343, the American achievements at this time are impressive. These include pursuit of
hydro-aviation and discussion of “ships as hangars” for “hydro-aeroplanes”, or in other words
one of the earliest articulations of the concept of an aircraft carrier, or ships as mobile air
bases344; high altitude flights of over 3,000 feet,345 and experimentation using catapults to launch
aircraft from a ship346 (which, it should be noted, is how aircraft are launched from carriers
today, albeit with drastic improvements). Along with these advances, improvements in the air
compass and aircraft motors made the work of the early aviators safer.347
The Naval buildup that had begun under Teddy Roosevelt, and slowed only slightly under Taft,
ultimately ran headlong into partisan Congressional politics. The Republicans were generally
the champions of the Navy, and as their fortunes declined, so did the likelihood of continued
naval buildup. The losses of the Republicans in the midterm elections of 1910 marked the rise of
the Democrats, a development described as the “waterloo” of Taft’s naval policy.348 The
Republicans managed to maintain a slim majority in the Senate, and used this advantage to hold
off Democratic attacks on the construction programs advocated by the Navy and the Taft
administration.349 The election of 1912 put the entirety of the Congress and the White House
343
Ibid, pg. 156
Ibid, pg. 157
345
Ibid, pg. 158
346
Ibid, pg. 159-160
347
Ibid, pg. 160-161
348
O'Brien, Phillips Payson. British and American Naval Power: Politics and Policy, 1900-1936.
Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1998, pg. 104
349
Ibid, pg. 105
344
142
firmly into Democratic hands, and brought about a change in the position of secretary of the
Navy. Josephus Daniels was relatively unknown, at least in naval circles; however, he was well
known and liked among the Democratic congressmen, and his influence helped Woodrow
Wilson obtain the Democratic nomination for President.350 Daniels faced rather stiff resistance
and criticism of his ability to manage the U.S. Navy from both the Navy and influential
individuals such as Colonel Edward House, and was even accused of failing to prepare the fleet
for WWI.351 Daniels was criticized for neglecting broad strategic matters important to the
Navy,352 and much of his interest and effort in managing the service seemed provincial, focusing
on issues such as sailor education and training. On the other hand, Daniels was adamant about
obtaining fair prices on the resources and machinery needed for the use of the Navy. In addition,
in the words of Harold and Margaret Sprout:
“He had ambitious plans for reopening and expanding all the government navy yards, and
for establishing publicly owned armor-plate, ordnance, and powder factories, oil
refineries, and coal mines, as a means of breaking the grip of powerful industrial
corporations which, he maintained, were exploiting the government by means of
collusive bidding for contracts, and by “exorbitant” prices charged for equipment,
supplies, and services.”353
Here his approach to the state-private sector relationships was firmly in line with the economic
policies of the Democratic Party of the time. For Daniels, there was more to this relationship
than just fair prices. Daniels sought state autarky and control for much of the essential industrial
needs of the Navy, and this was made abundantly clear in his first annual report. This applies not
only to provision of oil fuel needed for the navy, but also to steel production needed for ships
and guns.
350
Ibid, pg. 107-108
Ibid, pg. 108
352
Ibid, pg. 109, see also Sprout, Harold and Margret. The Rise of American Naval Power 17761918. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966, pg. 309-310
353
Sprout, Harold and Margret. The Rise of American Naval Power 1776-1918. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1966, pg. 309-310
351
143
Regarding the transition from coal to oil, Daniels viewed the matter as settled, and saw Naval
control of its own oil reserves, production, and refining as crucial to keeping Naval expenses
manageable.354 Daniels cites the decision of the British to switch to oil and even describes that
the British have taken this step despite its “geographic handicap.” Furthermore, he notes that if
Britain has made this important decision despite not possessing substantial oil deposits, that the
United States would be wise to follow suit, given its immense natural petroleum resources.355
R.S. Griffin, writing from the Bureau of Steam Engineering, shared the belief that Naval
ownership, and production of petroleum would result in substantial savings for taxpayers,
indicating that the sale of byproducts of refining fuel oil, such as gasoline and illuminating oils,
could further reduce cost.356 Daniels’ emphasis on the important role of fuel oil belies the
criticism that he ignored strategic matters.
Elsewhere in the Navy, experimentation with the bounds of oil technology continued. In
Philadelphia, at the naval fuel testing plant, improvements in efficiency and smoke reduction
were being obtained.357 Increasing numbers of large oil fuel tanks at naval stations were being
built and installed at locations such as Pearl Harbor, Guantanamo, Charleston, Key West,
Newport, and Norfolk.358 The Navy’s increasing oil fuel consumption also required the
construction of fleet oilers, including the Kanawha and the Maumee, the latter being one of the
first large ships to be propelled by an internal combustion engine installation.359 Undoubtedly oil
fuel usage was consistently increasing, but this energy transition was still in its early stages. This
354
The Navy Department. "The Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy." edited by The
Navy Department, 558. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1913, pg. 14-15
355
Ibid, pg. 15
356
Ibid, pg. 227
357
Ibid, pg. 43
358
Ibid, pg. 102-107
359
Ibid, pg. 218
144
is attested to by the figures of total cost for the two fuels at the time reported by the Navy. The
amount of money spent on coal was over $4.5 million dollars, while the total cost of fuel oil for
naval purposes was just under $500,000.360
Meanwhile the advancement of aircraft technologies and submarines marched forward. The
Navy was aware that European nations had been more aggressive in their development of aircraft
for military purposes. However, they also state that the scientific community had agreed that
aviation could not be ignored. The Europeans, for whom the threat of war was more tangible,
had a more urgent need to stay ahead of the curve in developing aircraft, while the distance
between the United States and the European theatre allowed for a more relaxed approach to the
militarization of flight. An American naval officer was sent to Europe to obtain information on
aviation from those nations and the Navy was taking requisite precautions to ensure a reserve of
aircraft was ready if needed in the event of a war.361
Additionally, the Navy sought to streamline the process of technological development
and innovation taking place in this new field of engineering. Organizationally, the Navy sought
to institute an atmosphere of cooperation and information sharing across and within existing state
institutions, as well as across sectors, reaching into the private corporate and academic spheres.
This approach was certainly proactive and demonstrates concerted efforts to ensure the Navy
was at the front line of technological innovation.
“The continuance of the Langley Aerodynamic Laboratory has been authorized by the
Regents of the Smithsonian Institution on certain limited funds available by endowment,
and the President has approved of cooperation between the various Government
departments and this laboratory.
360
361
Ibid, pg. 239
Ibid, pg. 17
145
An “advisory committee on aeronautics” has been appointed, the Navy having two
representatives, the functions of which are to advise in relation to the work of the
laboratory and the coordination of its activities with those of other governmental and
private laboratories in which questions concerning the problems of aeronautics can be
experimentally investigated.
A broad scheme of cooperation has been inaugurated and is now in cooperation, whereby
all institutions in the country, public and private, are enabled to work together in
harmony, all fully informed of the work done by each on problems involving the
scientific development of aerial navigation. It is now possible to coordinate the work so
that all can pull together and so that all technical institutions of learning throughout the
country may be able to educate that element most lacking at the present moment, a body
of scientific and practical aeronautical engineers, instead of many minds working
separately, many going over the same ground uselessly, and all working with separate
objects in view. The Navy Department has taken the initiative in this cooperation by
detailing an officer to visit Europe to obtain information about the latest laboratory
methods and developments, not only to facilitate the experimental work of the Navy, but
to actively cooperate with the Langley Laboratory and the Institute of Technology in their
efforts to build up an effective course of instruction on the science of aeronautics.”362
How the Navy was likely to use aircraft in future warfare was becoming increasingly clear. Fleet
exercises in Guantanamo Bay in 1913 showed that naval aviators could spot submerged
submarines, sight enemy vessels undetected and also take photographs from as high as 1,000
feet.363 Continued progress utilizing both submarines and aircraft prompted references to both
Tennyson and Jules Verne, indicating a realization of the technological transformation from
science fiction to science fact.364
By 1914 war had erupted in Europe. Woodrow Wilson, who had won the Presidency by
campaigning to keep the United States out of any war that might break out in Europe,365 declared
362
The Navy Department. "The Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy." edited by The
Navy Department, 558. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1913, pg. 126-127
363
Miller, Nathan. The U.S. Navy: A History. 3rd ed. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997, pg.
177
364
The Navy Department. "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy." edited by The Navy
Department, 526. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1914, pg. 6
365
Miller, Nathan. The U.S. Navy: A History. 3rd ed. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997, pg.
182
146
American neutrality, with the goal of acting as an impartial arbiter.366 In his address, President
Wilson implored American citizens to remain neutral, and also imposed restrictions on providing
supplies, including coal, to any belligerent vessels.367 Despite its neutrality, the American Navy
was able to witness the early performance of much of the new technology that had been
developed prior to the war’s outbreak. In its recommendation for further naval construction,
which included two dreadnaughts, six destroyers, eight submarines, one gunboat and one oiler,
secretary Daniels described the ways in which new technology had impacted the progression of
the conflict. In particular, it was the submarine that emerged as the most effective new machine
of war. Yet despite this effectiveness, Daniels reiterates the position of the General Board:
“There are many (very many more than a few weeks ago) who believe the time has come
when the advice of Sir Percy Scott should be taken. Months ago that able English officer
declared that the submarine was the most effective ship of the navy of the future and
advised a cessation in the rapid construction of dreadnaughts and the utilization of the
money thus spent in building large numbers of submarines. The lay mind has accepted
this view of the policy, but the trained naval officers making up the general board are
convinced that, while the submarines have a large part to play in naval warfare, they do
not replace the larger craft, and the board makes recommendation to the department for
an increase in the Navy, embracing four dreadnaughts and the usual complement of
destroyers, submarines, and auxiliaries. These naval statesmen hold to the opinion that
the dreadnaught remains the central and chief fighting force of a well-proportioned navy.
The General Board reiterates the opinion it has always held that “command of the sea can
only be gained and held by vessels that can take and keep the sea in all times and in all
weathers and overcome the strongest enemies that can be brought against them.” It
declares “other types are valuable and have their particular uses,” but “the backbone of
any navy that can command the sea consists of the strongest seagoing, sea-keeping ships
of its day, or, of its battleships.””368
Clearly the Navy, while acknowledging the impressive abilities of submarines, remained
committed to the dreadnaught. However, it also clearly called for increased construction of
366
Tuchman, Barbara. The Guns of August. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1962, pg. 370
Wilson, Woodrow. "Warning against Violations of Neutrality During War between AustriaHungary and Servia, and Germany with Russia and France. August 4, 1914." Washington D.C.,
1914.
368
The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy
Department, 526. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1914, pg. 8-9
367
147
submarines and saw them as a necessary tool for any great navy.369 While at this point the war
was still young, and much of the impact of the submarine was to come later, it was clear such an
impact would come.
Daniels also clearly recognized the energy transition that had been developing. In fact he
does so quite explicitly.
“Each year marks more distinctly the passing of coal, with its attendant discomfort and
engineering and military inferiority as fuel for ships of war. Henceforth, all the fighting
ships which are added to the fleet will use oil, and the transition from coal to oil will
mark an era in our naval development almost comparable with the change from black
powder to smokeless powder four our guns. The ease with which oil can be handled, its
superior steam-producing properties, the reduced number of men required for handling it,
and the decreased exertion required from the firemen, to say nothing of the ease with
which the cleanliness of the ship can be maintained, all combine to make oil the ideal fuel
for naval use.”370
On top of his explicit declaration of the passing of the age of coal, Daniels continued with his
efforts to develop governmental ownership, production, transport, and refining of the needed oil
for naval purposes. Under Daniels, the Navy began to investigate the cost, feasibility and
desirability of constructing a government owned pipeline to carry oil from the midcontinent field
in Oklahoma to the Gulf of Mexico.371 These efforts received much attention from the press in
general and oil industry journals in particular, and were not particularly well received. In January
1914, the New York Times described the efforts of the U.S. government to deal with the
monopoly over oil pipelines in the United States controlled by Standard Oil.372 Despite the
recent ruling of the Supreme Court, forcing the breakup of the Standard Oil empire, the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) continued to describe the monopolistic control over oil prices and
369
Ibid, pg. 9
Ibid, pg. 17-18
371
The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy
Department, 526. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1914, pg. 18
372
Special to The New York Times. (1914, Jan 25). “U.S. to look deeper into oil ownership”.
New York Times (1857-1922). Retrieved from
http://search.proquest.com/docview/97583536?accountid=2909. Accessed on 4/16/13.
370
148
supply held by Standard. Also, at the time this article was written, Congress had attempted to
declare oil pipelines as common carriers. Standard appealed and won an injunction against the
ruling.373 The newspaper also described the investigation into the Oklahoma situation, to be led
by Commissioner Cato Sells of the Indian Office and Lieutenant Commander David F. Boyd of
the Navy.
This investigation came in response to the passing of the Gore resolution (S. 5559) calling for the
regulation of the transportation of oil via pipelines by the ICC. By February of 1914, Sells and
Boyd had begun to hear commentary on the possibility of state owned and operated production,
transport, and refining of oil, from men in the oil industry in Oklahoma.374 Boyd, in his
estimates of what the government could accomplish in terms of production, had made public the
figures of his own calculation stating that the Oklahoma project could produce up to one million
barrels of oil annually.375 These figures were criticized by those in the oil industry as ignoring
the realities of the industry and much of the cost that is required in this type of work.
“The purpose, as set forth in the report of one of the members of the board of
investigation is to provide the United States Navy with cheap fuel oil. On theoretical
figures a very good showing was made for the Government, but everyone acquainted
with the business realizes how little dependence can be placed on theory in the oil trade.
The producing end of it is wholly speculative, and it is upon this speculative side(?) that
the other branches of transportation and refining has to depend.
The Government’s plan is to provide for 1,000,000 barrels a year, or about 3,000 barrels
a day. This is not a large amount of the total produced, but many a producer and
producing firm has never been able to obtain that much in a life’s effort. Most of those
who have that much have obtained it largely by purchase rather than by wildcat work.”376
373
Ibid, paragraph 6
"Will Hear Oil Men on Friday." Oil and Gas Journal (February 5 1914): 1-2, 30-31.
375
K., C. H. "Lieut.-Com Boyd's Figures." Oil and Gas Journal (February 5 1914): 30-31.
376
"Public Oil Dealers." Oil and Gas Journal (February 19 1914): 4-5.
374
149
More so than criticism of the technical specifics of the government plan, the industry was critical
of the philosophical and ideological spirit of the venture. Claims of socialism were rife and
prominent oilmen were opposed to the venture ideologically, believing that the duty of the
government was to regulate the business, not enter said business as a competitor.377
Additionally, the National Petroleum Association dismissed the notion that the oil industry
suffered from excessive monopolization, albeit they seemed to only count for the number of
business entities, rather than the size and influence of any one of those entities, e.g. Standard Oil.
“The above is the list as published by the National Petroleum Association, with a few
added since it was complied. The figures of capacity are also those of the association in
most instances, A total of 129 independent refineries are here represented besides those
of Wyoming, covering the whole territory from the Atlantic to the Pacific and from the
Gulf to the Lakes. Surely here is enough competition to warrant the Government giving
it encouragement, and likewise sufficient to expect the bottom prices for the product
without plunging the Government into an expensive and hazardous scheme.”378
As the commission moved forward with its investigation, it planned to make inspections of the
oil fields of Oklahoma in March of 1914. In addition to inspecting the fields in Oklahoma, they
intended to inspect the likely route of the proposed pipeline from Oklahoma to the Gulf.379
Much of the testimony and committee proceedings related to this process were confidential, per a
decision by Commissioner Sells. This approach received much criticism, which took aim not
only with Sells, but the Department of the Interior more broadly.380
377
"Is Opposed to Government Pipe Line: W. H. Gray, a Prominent Citizen of Texas Tell Why
He Does Not Approve of Governmental Activity in the Oil Business. An Interesting Interview."
(February 19 1914): 30-31.
378
"Public Oil Dealers." Oil and Gas Journal (February 19 1914): 4-5.
379
"To Make Inspection in March." Oil and Gas Journal (March 12 1914): 2.
380
"Secret Pipeline Hearings." Oil and Gas Journal (March 19 1914): 5.
150
By May, Lieutenant Boyd was ordered back to active duty at sea in connection with the U.S.
Navy’s activities in Mexico, and Lieutenant J.O. Richardson was appointed to take his place.381
By July, it had been announced that the report from Sells and Richardson had been postponed
until December of the following year, however, the entire project had lost its importance in the
wake of the Supreme Court ruling which declared that oil pipelines would be common carriers,
thus removing the monopolistic control over said pipelines by Standard Oil.382 Domestic
wrangling related to state vs. private sector control of oil supplies continued through the 1920s,
particularly over the naval oil reserves, which had been created between 1909 and 1923.383
Despite difficulties in achieving its ends in the area of oil production and refining, the Navy
under Daniels continued to search for ways to ensure its own control over the resources,
materials, and machinery needed to ensure its ability to defend the country at sea. This applied
to oil384, submarine construction385, and later steel for armor and guns need for navy ships.386
Submarines and aircraft continued to progress in their capabilities while impressing navy men
around the world, including Daniels. So-called fleet submarines, which were larger, with
increased sailing radius and the ability to act in tactical tandem with the other large ships of the
fleet, were beginning to be produced. The earlier construction of such vessels by the U.S. Navy
had been stymied by the lack of an appropriately capable internal combustion engines. By 1914
Daniels claimed that such problems had been overcome. Daniels stated that the value of such
381
"Appoints Lieutenant Richardson." Oil and Gas Journal (May 7 1914): 4.
"Has Lost Its Force." Oil and Gas Journal (July 2 1914): 34.
383
Ise, John. The United States Oil Policy. New York: Arno Press, 1972, pg. 356-358
382
384
The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy
Department, 526. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1914, pg. 19
385
Ibid, pg. 27-28
386
Cooling, Benjamin Franklin. Gray Steel and Blue Water Navy: The Formative Years of
America's Military-Industrial Complex. Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1979, pg. 201203
151
vessels “can hardly be overestimated.” Consequently, the Navy called for the construction of a
fleet of four such vessels to be built, the latter three of which would be apart of the 1916
construction program.387
Meanwhile, aircraft development in Europe was seen as outdistancing similar work in the United
States. The General Board report of 1914 described the lack of aircraft available to the Navy as
“deplorable.” The Navy was adamant that in the current environment, the utilization of aircraft
were essential for warfare on both land and sea, and that in any contest against a state that
possessed the requisite air power, the U.S. would not only be blind, but that its operations would
be an open book to the enemy. The Navy further supported its strong statements with a
recommendation of Congressional appropriation of $5,000,000 for the purposes of establishing a
“proper air service.”388 When viewed alongside the massive size of the proposed 1916
construction program, it is clear that the onset of war in Europe spurred the General Board to call
for increased preparedness on the part of the Navy. That building program included 4
battleships, 16 destroyers, 3 fleet submarines, 16 coast submarines, 4 scouts, 4 gunboats, 2 oilfuel ships, 1destroyer tender, 1 submarine tender, 1 transport ship, 1 hospital ship, 1 supply ship,
and the needed money to create a proper air service.389
With the war continuing in Europe, the U.S. Navy continued to increase ship construction,
submarine and aircraft experimentation and construction, and also continued to push for Navy
control of the oil resources needed to fuel these machines. The Navy had also completed the
387
The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy
Department, 526. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1914, pg. 63-64
388
Ibid, pg. 64-65
389
Ibid, pg. 67
152
transition from coal to oil for battleship propulsion, and while much of the fleet still burned coal,
all future capital ships would be designed to only burn oil. The first of such ships was the U.S.S.
Nevada. Daniels emphasized in the 1915 annual report that once the switch to oil for motive
power has been made, switching back to coal would be impossible. He also reiterated his belief
that state control of physical oil reserves, where they lay in the ground, is the only way to ensure
the needed supply for the navy.
Taking a long view of the need of the navy, Daniels describes the importance of Naval control
and ownership of actual oil producing land along with long term contracts for purchase of oil
currently available on market. His stated goal was to ensure adequate supply for at least 25
years, and he indicates that the primary purpose of the naval reserves set aside by Presidential
decree was to protect that supply from possible leakage, fire, or evaporation. As Daniels saw it,
oil was absolutely essential for warmaking, and the lack of Naval control over a substantial
supply of this particular product was a national security risk.390
Submarine and aircraft development continued at a quickening pace. The appropriations bill for
1914 had provided one million dollars towards an aircraft service for the Navy, the first
appropriation specifically for naval aeronautics. While pleased with this development the Navy
was requesting double that amount for the next appropriations bill. A naval aeronautics base had
been created at Pensacola and included over seven million dollars of investment in that Navy
yard. The Navy continued to push the bounds of aircraft technology through experimentation
390
The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy
Department, 796. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1915, pg. 62-65
153
and innovation. Such experimentation, included tests on different types of lubricating oils,
grades of gasoline, floats for hydro-aircraft and other specialized equipment for aviators.
The war had disrupted the ability of the Navy to obtain European aircraft engines, and as a result
the Navy was forced to seek the requisite engines and motors for aircraft domestically. At this
time the Navy’s outlook on obtaining engines powerful enough for its aeronautical purposes
(about 200 horsepower) was “rapidly improving.” Moreover, the weaponization of aircraft was
progressing dramatically. This included testing on types of bombs and bomb dropping
appliances to be attached to aircraft. 391 1915 was the year that the Navy built its first airplane
independently of private interests. This was accomplished at the Washington Naval Yard and
demonstrated the desire on the part of the Navy for self-sufficiency. Interestingly, the Navy,
while describing its difficulty in obtaining needed planes and aircraft engines, noted that from
the beginning of the war in Europe to July 31st 1915, 288 airplanes (valued at 1.8 million dollars)
and over $650,000 worth of airplane parts had been exported by American companies overseas
to Europe.392 Here also, the Navy articulated its vision for the limitations on how it intended to
utilize aircraft tactically. The Navy specifically stated that its institutional purview is the sea,
and that it did not intend to fly aircraft extensively over land, reflecting both the limited
capability of the new machines, and also a limited vision on the part of naval leaders.
“It is not in the purview of the Navy to utilize air craft except in connection with the fleet
or for strictly naval purposes. It is because the Navy intends to restrict its air craft to
over-sea service or as eyes of the fleet that it has not asked for as large an appropriation
as would have been required if it had in view, as some erroneously suppose, the use of
these new scouts of the air on land as well as on water. Land utilization is not a function
391
392
Ibid, pg. 40
Ibid, pg. 40-42
154
of the Navy. The Navy is an institution afloat and must leave land flying to other
departments and agencies.”393
While European Armies were increasingly driving demand for aircraft technology, this
newfound ability to fight from the air impacted the trajectory of the war much less than did the
submarine. In describing the lessons learned from the war up to that point, the General Board
tells of the ‘spectacular’ successes of submarines, although it should be noted that these
successes were attributed to the novelty of the submarine, as well as to surprise, rather than to
any inherent combat superiority. The Board reports that allied navies had been learning how to
defend against submarine attacks, and it was emphatic that, in terms of naval combat, the
battleship remained supreme. Additionally, the utilization of submarines against merchant
shipping on the part of the Germans had begun, and up to mid 1915, had sunk 183 merchant
vessels and 175 trawlers.394
The General Board appeared at this time optimistic that such losses were not fatal to the allied
naval effort; a view that would turn out to be short lived. The Navy, much as it sought the ability
to build its own aircraft, also had begun to design its own submarines. These vessels had
generally been designed and built by private sector companies, yet after almost a decade of
experimentation and use, the Navy believed that it had the needed experience to design its own
submarines, and bid out the construction process.395 Given these successes on the part of the
German submarines, the U.S. Navy sought to improve the capabilities of their own submarines,
seeking to increase their size and radius of operation. The Navy called for construction of a large
fleet submarine of over 1000 tons displacement, describing such a vessel as the first of its kind
393
The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy
Department, 796. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1915, pg. 42
394
Ibid, pg. 74-75
395
Ibid, pg. 318
155
worldwide.396 In calling for increased submarine construction, the Navy urged Congress to take
the wartime developments in Europe into consideration, specifically in terms of the impact of the
submarine. Congress responded enthusiastically, by passing the largest naval appropriations bill
in American History.397
Furthermore, the Navy responded to how the war altered its threat environment by seeking
longer-term construction and appropriation programs. Previously, the Navy made annual
recommendations and Congress would make annual appropriations. Yet, this process generally
resulted in partisan wrangling, consuming a large amount of effort and man-hours in the process.
Consequently, the Navy altered its approach and requested a five-year building program, which
was described as “a distinct innovation.”
“Thorough consideration of the present and future requirements of the service has led to
the recommendation of the five-year program, to which reference is made in my report of
this year. The adoption of a continuing program by the executive department of the
Government is a distinct innovation. No previous administration has espoused a program
looking to meet the needs of the service beyond the current year, and, as the foregoing
résumé of recommendations demonstrates so conclusively, the only continuing program
which has heretofore existed, that of the General Board, has, almost without exception,
been disregarded by both the legislative and executive departments of the
Government.”398
In addition to the attempt to institute long-term building programs, the Navy was pursuing other
organizational innovations. This was primarily focused on building the Navy’s cooperative
relationship with civilian scientists as well as with the Army.399 The Navy recognized that much
396
Ibid, pg. 93
Ibid.
398
Ibid.
399
The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy
Department, 831. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1916, pg. 26-27
397
156
of the initial technological innovations and inventions that it appropriated for its purposes had
their origins in the private sector.
However, the Navy viewed these developments generally as needing improvement and
perfection, a process that took place within the Navy. The Navy sought a way to institutionalize
and streamline the process whereby it could utilize the natural talent, and inventive genius
present within American society. However, it found itself without any capability to offer
compensation for such efforts on the part of civilian scientists.
“One of the imperative needs of the Navy is facilities for utilizing the natural inventive
genius of the country to meet the new conditions of warfare as illustrated by the lessons
of the war in Europe. When new engines and new devices came to our notice in the
summer, I determined to establish a department of inventions and development to which
all ideas and suggestions from the service or from civilian inventors could be referred for
determination as to whether they were practical enough for us to take up and perfect.
Some of the greatest improvements utilized by the Navy came from civilian inventors
and civilian engineers. It was a civilian who gave us the Monitor, who built the first
submarine, who mastered the science of flight, who perfected wireless communication,
who invented the gyroscope compass, electric steering gear and electrical propulsion, and
silk floss life preservers. Most of the developments of the larger naval ships, throbbing
with electricity and delicate engines of all sorts, were perfected by naval officers. There
has been a feeling among civilians that their suggestions did not receive friendly
consideration from naval experts. This feeling was not well founded, but it was
widespread, and doubtless grew up because there was no well-organized method of
getting the naval expert and civilian expert together. How can the Navy obtain the united
service of civilian and service experts? There was no provision of law authorizing the
payment even of the necessary expenses of civilians whose patriotism might impel them
to serve their country by helping in the improvement of the Navy. Indeed, there is a
congressional prohibition against the use of public money for such purpose.”400
In an attempt to rectify this problem, the Navy sought the assistance of Thomas Edison, asking
him to lead a board consisting of members of eleven leading scientific societies. Called the
Naval Consulting Board, this body would be a voluntary one, depending on the patriotism and
willingness of those involved to offer their services in exchange for nothing other than the
400
The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy
Department, 796. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1915, pg. 45-46
157
gratitude of the Navy, and the American people.401 Thus by 1915, roughly two years prior to
American entry into the war, the Navy found itself awash with innovation, both technological
and organizational.
Innovation and related efforts to develop and obtain newer and better technologies for Naval use
continued, as did efforts to improve the organizational structure managing this process. With oil
firmly established as the new fuel of naval vessels of all types, a level of urgency related to
ensuring supply began to develop. The Navy expected future oil requirements to be over 6
million barrels per annum in peacetime, and estimated a need of triple that amount in the event of
war.402 In 1913 the Navy requested assurances from the Department of the Interior that such a
supply would be available before definitively altering ship design to use only oil as fuel. The
Department of the Interior had replied that while it was most likely to be necessary for the Navy
to own and develop its own reserves, existing supplies would be adequate to cover the needs of
the Navy for the next decade.403
However, the agreement between the Navy Department and the Department of the Interior on the
issue of naval oil reserves prompted an articulation in the 1916 annual report of the difficulties
experienced in naval efforts to obtain legal ownership of the previously set aside tracts of oil
producing land. These difficulties stemmed primarily from Congress, which according to the
Navy had turned a blind eye to the need for naval reserves.
“Since the withdrawal of September, 1909, scores of bills have been introduced in
Congress bearing upon the withdrawal and the administration and disposition of the
public lands containing oil and gas deposits, but few of them have recognized the Navy’s
401
Ibid, pg. 46
The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy
Department, 831. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1916, pg. 31
403
Ibid.
402
158
rights and none of them have offered adequate protection to the deposits of oil which
have been set aside for the exclusive use and benefit of the Navy.”404
The Navy explicitly outlined the various factors that had complicated the process by which it
hoped to establish legal and physical control over the various naval oil reserves. In this
commentary the position of the navy was as clear as its frustration, and it was evident that the
Navy saw Congress as acting against its interests.
“The status of the naval petroleum reserves is now complicated by the following
conditions:
1. The existence of numerous claimants to these lands whose claims are asserted
notwithstanding the provision of the Pickett Act, which were initiated in defiance of the
withdrawal order or are more or less fraudulent.
2. The suits in progress, about to be instituted, or contemplated.
3. The proposed legislative action which in the form of the “general leasing bill” (H.R.
406) passed the House of Representatives and is to be considered by the Senate when it
meets.
This “general leasing bill” passed the House of Representatives but was so amended by
the Senate Committee on the Public Lands as to omit all reference to coal lands and, as
presented to the Senate was virtually an act nullifying the decision of the Supreme Court
in the Mid-West case, abolishing the naval petroleum reserves, dismissing all suits
instituted, and leasing or patenting outright to the claimants the lands claimed. This bill
was so amended in spite of the fact that, first, the Navy Department fully presented its
claims; second, that the Department of Justice pointed out that few of the beneficiaries
possessed even equitable claims, that many were fraudulent, and that the chief
beneficiaries were very large corporations and not the poor, hard-working prospector
pictured by the oil-land claimants; and third, that individuals pointed out that many of the
claimants had already recovered in the value of the oil extracted far more money than
they had expended, and further that some of them had willfully and irreparably damage
the oil-bearing formations. It is to be hoped the litigation will be soon terminated and
that Congress will turn a deaf ear to all pleas to give relief to those who have no legal
claim to the Naval reserve lands.”405
In making its case for naval control over these reserves, the Navy clearly articulated the many
reasons why oil was the fuel of the future, including more speed per unit of fuel, absolute control
over smoke emission, greater radius of action, reduction of fire room manpower by over half,
increased ability to refuel at sea with a consequent improvement of fleet efficiency by twenty404
405
Ibid, pg. 31-33
Ibid, pg. 33-34
159
five percent, greater flexibility in acceleration and deceleration, and also reduction in likelihood
of a ship sinking due to the increased ability to subdivide the ship.406
The Navy continued by describing the broad impact on national security of building an oilburning fleet. Amazingly, the Navy explicitly charged Congress with putting forward legislation
that was designed to benefit not only individuals, but also large corporations (presumably
Standard Oil). For the Navy, failure on the part of Congress to act accordingly to protect these
reserves for naval use would have been a “national calamity”:
“The conditions may be succinctly stated as follows:
An oil-burning naval vessel is incomparably superior to a coal burning vessel of the same
class.
If this Republic is to maintain a Navy, it is worse than useless to have that Navy made up
of inferior vessels.
We have adopted the policy of building exclusively oil-burning vessels, relying for the
future supply of fuel oil upon naval petroleum reserves created under the authority of an
act of Congress.
This future supply of fuel oil for the fleet is threatened by legislation designed to benefit
certain large corporations, other companies and individuals possessing no legal title to the
lands claimed.
Shall such legislation be enacted, thereby forcing the Navy to decide whether it shall
continue to build oil-burning vessels, which will depend for their usefulness to the
country in time of danger upon an uncertain commercial supply of fuel, or build coalburning vessels which will be admittedly inferior to those of a nations that can control the
supply of oil? or
Shall the national good be placed above private interests without legal rights? The legal
rights of claimants can be recognized and cared for without prejudice to the rights of the
Navy and the need of the country for an adequate available supply of fuel oil for the fleet.
If private parties have any equities that should be preserved, the Navy Department would
not stand in the way of adjustment of such rights. But to legislate to give title to oil lands
set apart as a naval reserve might jeopardize national defense. Against legislation which
would defeat the Naval Reserve orders, affirmed by the Supreme Court, the Navy
Department has protested and will continue to protest. Failure to oppose any steps to
deprive the Navy of these oil reserves would be to neglect the highest interest of the
Navy. If oil can not be obtained at reasonable figures now and in future years, the Navy
may be compelled to end the construction of oil-burning ships, losing the manifold
406
Ibid, pg. 34
160
advantages which make them superior to those ships which burn coal. Foreign nations,
looking to this country and to Mexico for their oil supply, are constructing ships which
burn oil. It would be a national calamity for this country to fail to preserve the oil
reserves already set aside and to find and set aside other oil-bearing reserves. Present
local interests in producing oil ought not to be permitted to stand in the way of this
conservation for preparedness, particularly in cases where those asking relief have no
legal claim to the lands for which they are seeking titles. National preparedness in an oil
reserve is essential to the highest efficiency of the greater Navy.”407
The Navy was not pleased by the efforts of Congress to support individual and corporate claims
to tracts of land within the boundaries of the oil reserves, and disagreements on this issue
dragged out well into the 1920s. The story of competitive efforts to obtain access to these
reserves is long and fascinating, involving corruption, scandal, the forced removal of Mammoth
Oil Company from the Teapot Dome reserve (Reserve no. 3),408 the investigations of the Walsh
committee, and even several important oil men fleeing to Europe to avoid providing testimony
and possible prosecution.409 Unfortunately, the large majority of this story lies outside the scope
of this work.410
As America crept closer to war, preparations for such a development by the Naval Consulting
Board intensified. The Navy had convinced Congress to allow for monetary compensation of
those scientists working for the Board with the appropriation of $25,000 for such a purpose.411
Also, $1.5 million was appropriated for the construction of an experimental laboratory for the
explicit use of the Board. The focus of this experimental laboratory consisted of gun erosion,
torpedo motive power, the gyroscope, submarine guns, protection against submarines, torpedo
and mine attack, improvement in submarine attachments, improvement and development of
407
The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy
Department, 831. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1916, pg. 35-36
408
Ise, John. The United States Oil Policy. New York: Arno Press, 1972, pg. 369
409
Ibid, pg. 382
410
For a detailed account of the issue of the Naval oil reserves, see Ise, John. The United States
Oil Policy. New York: Arno Press, 1972, chapter 25
411
The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy
Department, 831. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1916, pg. 67-68
161
submarine defense, storage batteries and propulsion, aeroplanes and aircraft, and radio
installation research. 412
1916 also witnessed the creation of the committees of industrial preparedness, which consisted of
over 240 members, with members of various academic and business societies from each of the
states as well as the territory of Alaska and the District of Columbia. These individuals were
considered associate members of the Naval Consulting Board, and were specifically engaged in
providing an industrial inventory of the various materials and supplies that the United States
would likely need during a war. These state level committees were sub-units of the Organization
for Industrial Preparedness, and their directors were officially designated “State Directors” of the
Organization.413 Secretary Daniels sums up the purpose of these committees.
“This means that if it were ever necessary to mobilize to defend our country against
foreign aggression, at least this number of concerns might, when prepared by this
Government with proper gauges and drawings, be counted on at short notice to transfer
the energies and machinery of industrial peace into the manufacturing of munitions of
war. In other words, it means that America can never be caught off her guard with an
insufficient number of shells and cartridges and other implements of defense, as was the
case with some of the countries of Europe at the beginning of the present conflict.”414
The committees of industrial preparedness shortly became subsumed under the Council of
National Defense, which was created to coordinate the industry and resources of the United
States in preparation for its probable entrance into the war. Throughout 1916 and 1917 the
United States created multiple committees, boards, and other bureaucratic entities designed to
provide organizational leadership and manage the war effort. The Council of National Defense
would not be the last. The Council of National Defense was replaced with the War Industries
412
Ibid, pg. 69
The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy
Department, 831. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1916, pg. 68
414
Ibid, pg. 68
413
162
Board on July 28, 1917, within which, the Petroleum War Service Committee had replaced the
earlier Petroleum Advisory Committee.415 The War Industries Board, under its chairman, A.C.
Bedford, would become the most powerful of all the wartime government agencies.416 Under a
month later, Congress passed the Food and Fuel Control Act (known as the Lever Act), which
gave the president broad powers over the direction of the petroleum industry through wartime
planning.417 Through the authority granted under this legislation, President Wilson created the
U.S. Fuel Administration and within that organization was created an Oil Division, headed by
Mark Requa.418 Requa, who had been one of the leading voices of the Independent Oil
Producers Agency, was widely respected within the oil industry. In cooperation with Bedford,
Requa managed to introduce a “voluntary” crude oil price ceiling, regulations on wellhead
prices, government involvement in exploration and production, regulation of market entry by
new firms, mandatory conservation, exemptions from military service for drilling personnel,
price limits on certain drilling equipment, as well as special tax breaks for production.419 These
provisions covered the period after May 17, 1918, and were extended until after the war.
In 1916, the Navy began to express its disappointment in the progress of aeronautical
development. The Navy indicated that much of the progress in aeronautics had taken place
within the framework of traditional ‘over-land’ flight, and that there had been a particular
absence of progress in the specific area of ‘sea-flight.’ Its description of naval aeronautics
emphasized the several peculiarities of this type of manned flight, including the differences in
415
Jr., Robert L. Bradley. Oil, Gas & Government: The U.S. Experience. 2 vols. Vol. 1: Rowman
& Littlefield Publishers, 1996, pg. 224
416
Ibid
417
Ibid, pg. 225
418
Ibid
419
Jr., Robert L. Bradley. Oil, Gas & Government: The U.S. Experience. 2 vols. Vol. 1: Rowman
& Littlefield Publishers, 1996, pg. 227-28
163
landing and takeoff and a lack of development of sea planes.420 The Navy was working to
address these deficiencies and by this time had three ships, the North Carolina, the West
Virginia, and the Washington, fitted with catapults for launching airplanes at sea. These ships
were cooperating in fleet work to develop ‘the tactics of aircraft at sea.’421
Submarine development in 1916 also experienced some difficulties, albeit less serious ones. The
previous year the Navy had completed its own design for a fleet submarine, but did not receive
any bids to build the vessel from the various submarine building companies. By November of
1916 the Navy had altered its design and opened bids for submarines nos. 78 to 104 (the 27
coastal submarines approved in August of that year) and nos. 105 to 106 (the fleet submarines).
While the Navy was hopeful to build one of the fleet submarines in a Navy Yard, the two 800 ton
fleet submarines described here were to be designed and built by outside contractors.422 In
submarine construction, although the Navy had begun to attempt construction itself in a minimal
number of instances, the service was very much reliant on a small number of companies, namely
the Electric Boat Company, the Lake Torpedo Boat Company, and the California Shipbuilding
Company of Longbeach. This was often the case with cutting edge technologies and can be seen
in aeronautics, submarines, steel armor for battleships and general battleship construction.
While the U.S. Navy was pushing forward in the oil-fueled technologies of both aircraft and
submarines, the first of the all oil-burning battleships had completed its trial run successfully and
420
The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy
Department, 831. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1916, pg. 88
421
Ibid.
422
Ibid, pg. 307
164
had joined the fleet.423 Other demonstrations of the onset of the age of oil had appeared, namely,
the plans for the first large oil tanker built to the specifications necessary to sail with the fleet.424
Also, the Navy’s almost obsessive emphasis on oil supply became justified in light of a sudden
jump in prices in mid-1916. In this matter, much of the Navy’s planning and efforts to obtain
long-term supply contracts at reasonable rates began to pay off.
“The sudden advance in the price of fuel oil, gasoline and other products of crude
petroleum has been the subject of much discussion, even to the extent of congressional
inquiries; but, long before these investigations began, action had been taken toward
laying in large stocks under the advantageous contracts then in force.
During the year, oil was purchased at 64 cents per barrel delivered at Port Arthur, Texas;
and, prior to the expiration of those contracts, practically all tankage under Navy control
was filled to capacity.
This oil, taken in bulk from the contractor’s pipe line, cost the Government less than onethird of the price that would have been asked for the same oil delivered at the various
fuel-oil stations under the prevailing market prices. At the end of June 1916 there was in
storage more than half a million barrels. Navy tankers were used in delivering a large
part of this.” 425
The Navy had consistently expressed its concern about oil availability since 1913, and in the
process it had taken multiple measures to build up storage capability as well as supply. The
Navy was continually working to improve its technological capabilities, most specifically in
technologies related to oil fueled propulsion. Large oil burners and turbine technology for the
battleships and destroyers, heavy oil internal combustion and electric propulsion for submarines,
and small gasoline powered engines for aircraft were the new weapons changing the nature of
the battlefield. All of these technologies are developed prior to the outbreak of war in 1914.
423
Ibid, pg. 341
Ibid, pg. 308
425
Ibid, pg. 349
424
165
While the large capital ships were certainly improvements on their predecessors, it was the new
technologies of submarine vessels and aircraft that altered the dimensions of armed conflict.
Between aircraft and submarines, it was the submarines that had the most dramatic impact on the
First World War. On land the war had ground to a halt in the form of trench warfare, and aircraft
of the time were simply not powerful enough to alter that situation. As the war dragged on, the
British blockade of Germany and Germany’s unrestricted submarine warfare response were
where the battle truly balanced. In February of 1917 Germany ordered the resumption of this
effort and by April the United States would formally enter the war.426
The American Navy: 1917-1918
Just prior to its entry into World War I, in March, Congress passed its last pre-war appropriations
bill. That bill called for three battleships, a battle cruiser, three scout cruisers, fifteen destroyers,
and eighteen submarines.427 This building program represented an idealized version of what the
Navy needed prior to actual war experience. Upon its entry into the war in April of 1917, the
United States was immediately focused on the submarine problem and required more ships
specifically designed to deal with that threat. While all of the great navies had built submarines,
only Germany had truly utilized the vessels to the fullest extent of their potential as offensive
weapons. The clamor and uproar over the nature of the submarine included questions of morals,
ethics, international law and war. The Navy needed to provide certain protections to merchant
ships, which were being sunk without warning.
426
Miller, Nathan. The U.S. Navy: A History. 3rd ed. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997, pg.
182
427
Cooling, Benjamin Franklin. Gray Steel and Blue Water Navy: The Formative Years of
America's Military-Industrial Complex. Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1979, pg. 209
166
“Many of the problems encountered have been due to the novel developments of marine
warfare, and particularly the breach by Germany of the accepted principles of
international law as regards naval war and the indiscriminate sinking of merchant ships
without warning. As a minor case may be cited the fact that life-saving appliances and
methods suited to recognized conditions of naval warfare had to be materially modified
in the case of vessels primarily engaged in opposing submarines. To cite a major
instance, the Navy had a moderate provision of guns and ammunition for arming naval
auxiliaries to be taken into service in time of war. When Germany undertook early this
year the indiscriminate sinking of merchant vessels, it soon became evident that all
merchant vessels should be armed and ready to fight submarines. This involved not only
providing guns but also providing skilled gun-crews. The Navy has taken care of this,
the guns being placed first on the most important merchant vessels and on others as fast
as available.
The nature of the necessary naval operations today has emphasized the necessity for
vessels of greatest value against the submarine. In view of united naval opinion that, all
things considered, the destroyer is the most desirable type for this purpose, particular
efforts have been devoted to increasing the number of our destroyers.”428
The navy utilized emergency provisions to alter the nature of construction, putting more
emphasis on the destroyer. This need for destroyers was so great that the Navy was willing to
delay further construction of capital ships.429 Given the limited contact between belligerent
fleets, and the massive destruction of the U-boat campaign, the effort to combat submarines was
most vital. In combination with German efforts in the air, the U-boat campaign represented
German dominance of the new dimensions of warfare. In the spring of 1917 the British fleet was
in a state of crisis, and they explicitly acknowledged that these two new dimensions of warfare
could destroy traditional British naval dominance. This message is conveyed to the Admiralty
by Sir John Jellicoe.
“In a memorandum to First Lord of the Admiralty Eric Geddes near the end of April
1917, with the Americans just in the war, Jellicoe wrote of the necessity to make clear to
His Majesty’s government “the very serious nature of the naval position….the real fact of
the matter is this: We are carrying on this war…as if we had the absolute command of the
sea. We have not—and have not had for many months…or anything approaching.” The
Grand Fleet remained “absolute masters of the situation as far as surface ships are
428
The Navy Department. "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy." edited by The Navy
Department, 872. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1917, pg. 3
429
Ibid, pg. 28-29
167
concerned,” but in the aggregate, practical German control of the skies above the North
Sea together with the rapidly growing enemy submarine offensive had stretched the
Royal Navy beyond its breaking point. There were simply too few resources to cover too
many commitments. Naval policy had to be changed and reshaped “to conform with the
fact that we have neither the undisputed command of the sea, nor even a reasonable
measure of this command.”…
Britain’s loss of command did not imply that mastery had shifted to Germany. But by the
spring of 1917 Germany clearly ruled the skies above the North Sea and the depths
beneath it, their submarine campaign now extending into the Irish Sea and out into the
eastern Atlantic as well.”430
The seriousness of the U-boat threat prompted intensified efforts to counter the vessels. The
Naval Consulting Board had increased the frequency of its meetings in an attempt to find some
sort of solution to the problem.431 The most effective weapon developed to combat the
submarine was the depth charge, although other means for dealing with submarines were being
explored, including submarine nets and aerial bombardment with specialized shells.432 While the
U-boat campaign and respective counter-efforts get much of the attention, aviation was also
witnessing ramped up efforts and qualitative improvements.
The amount of appropriated monies in the previous year for naval aviation was a staggering
$63,633,000.433 Although the Navy had suffered the unfortunate destruction of the Pensacola
flying school by a hurricane, it had made substantial progress in the development of an American
engine powerful enough for its purposes. The ‘Liberty’ engine, which had been developed by
the Aircraft Board, had shown itself to be satisfactory in preliminary tests.434 Development in
aircraft technologies was being promoted with cross military cooperation among the allies
430
Rose, Lisle A. The Age of Navalism 1890-1918. Vol. 1, Columbia: University of Missouri
Press, 2007, pg. 237-238
431
The Navy Department. "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy." edited by The Navy
Department, 872. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1917, pg. 70-71
432
Ibid, pg. 225-229
433
Ibid, pg. 35
434
Ibid, pg. 36
168
fighting Germany. The Americans had been testing an engine of French design, although they
found it lacking. The Navy had also sent technical officers to visit England, France, and Italy, to
study the latest aeronautical developments.435 The importance of aircraft to warfare was
beginning to have organizational impact. It was clear that both services, the Army and the Navy,
would operate independent flying divisions, and the Aircraft Board was created to coordinate
between the two services as well as with the civilian sector. Its membership was divided into
thirds representing those different interests and, unsurprisingly, the Aircraft Board did not
recommend a separate aeronautic department.436
The Navy also, in its 1917 report, reflected on its decision to transition its fleet from coal to oil,
and commented on the performance of these new machines in their first real wartime application.
Analysis of this performance prompted a reiteration of the Navy’s position regarding the naval
oil reserves issue:
“The present war has demonstrated that our Navy to be of the maximum efficiency must
be composed of oil-burning units. The splendid work which has been accomplished by
our destroyers could not have been carried out by coal-burning vessels. Neither could
other tactical units of the fleet be constructed with their necessary military characteristics
except by the employment of oil-burning boilers or internal-combustion engines. No
other power is in sight and we can not assume that other power suitable for ship
propulsion will be discovered.
In order that the Navy may be justified in building oil-burning vessels, no matter what
may be their military advantages, it must be assured of the future supply or fuel. This
supply has been a most serious problem during the present war for the European nations,
which are blessed with the natural supply which this country enjoys. But the supply of
oil in the ground is being rapidly depleted and, according to the most reliable estimates,
will be exhausted in less than 20 years.
In order that this vital supply of oil might be assured, the President of the United States
set aside Naval Petroleum Reserves No. 1 and No. 2 in California and No. 3 in Wyoming.
Of these No. 2 only is a proven field. The orders creating these reserves stated that the
area “shall be held for the exclusive use or benefit of the United States Navy.” The
validity of the withdrawals was upheld by the Supreme Court in its decision in the
435
436
Ibid, pg. 37
Ibid, pg. 38
169
Midwest case in February, 1915. In the belief that the question of future supply was thus
settled, the naval program has provided almost exclusively for oil-burning vessels.”437
For the American Navy, as well as the other great navies, even before the war had ended there
was an understanding that the new oil-based technologies would dominate war in the future. If
one intended to have a great navy, one needed a rather large supply of oil with which to operate
it. Figures for the U.S. Navy’s consumption of fuel oil and other products such as gasoline in
1918 are staggering: 4.5 million barrels of oil fuel, and over 11.5 million gallons of gasoline.438
Modern warfare was absolutely dependent upon oil-based machines for transportation, and in a
few short years this technology had gone from experimental to central.
“The war on sea and in the air as well as on land has depended so much on transportation
that it can be laid down as a basic principle that no nation that does not control an
adequate oil supply can successfully maintain its forces in the field; the Navy must be
supplied with fuel oil and lubricants and the air forces with gasoline and lubricating oil if
operations are to be successfully conducted.
The Nation and the Navy can view with pride the work of our ships, but our vessels,
especially the destroyers and other patrol craft engaged in antisubmarine warfare, could
not have proved so effective if they had not been equipped with oil-burning boilers or
internal-combustion engines. Our most powerful dreadnaughts are oil burners, as will be
the huge new battle cruisers. That the Navy may be justified in building oil-burning
vessels possessing such great military advantages, it must be assured of an adequate
future supply of fuel. Oil supply was one of the most serious problems of the war for
European nations which do not possess the natural sources found in this country.
However, this resource is not unlimited and if the present increase in consumption
continues it will not be many years before it is depleted.”439
With substantial increase in demand for all types of fuel,440 the issue of supply was of serious
concern for the U.S. Navy. However, comparatively, the American situation was much less dire,
due to its large domestic supply of all types of fuel. In addition to the problem of obtaining an
adequate supply of the various fuels themselves, the Navy also found itself short on the requisite
437
Ibid, pg. 59
The Navy Department. "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy." edited by The Navy
Department, 1766. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1918, pg. 99
439
Ibid, pg. 138-139
440
Ibid, pg. 634-635
438
170
fueling vessels, particularly for fuel oil. In an effort to rectify this problem the Navy found it
necessary to requisition six vessels of the oil tanker variety from the commercial oil suppliers.441
The fuel problem was made worse by the increasing intensity of Germany’s U-boat campaign.
In April 1917 alone U-boats sent over 860,000 tons of shipping to the bottom of the ocean, and
concerns about tankers being sunk by U-boats had prompted the construction of an oil pipeline
across Scotland:
“The destruction of tankers carrying oil to our own ships and the British fleet in the North
Sea gave much anxiety, and in order to avert the submarine menace in sending the
tankers around the north of Scotland it was determined by the American and British Navy
to build a pipe line across Scotland. Our naval experts undertook the big task, and
thereby reduced the distance and danger of supplying the fleet with oil.”442
In the end, the answer to the threat of the U-boat was not technological, as much as it was
organizational. The convoy system, by grouping ships together, was able to substantially reduce
the effectiveness of U-boats. While the convoy system was operational, from the summer of
1917443 to the end of the war, the allies were able to reduce by around half the number of vessels
sunk by German U-boats. From September 1917 to April 1918 submarines sank 548 allied
ships. From May 1st 1918 to November 1918 the number of allied vessels sunk by U-boats
decreased to 252. 444
While the convoy system was strategically successful for the allies, the U.S. Navy continued to
seek technological answers to the tactical problem of destroying submarines at sea. This
included research into electronic devices designed to locate subs in cooperation with General
441
Ibid, pg. 638
Ibid, pg. 12
443
Ibid, pg. 14-15
444
Rose, Lisle A. The Age of Navalism 1890-1918. Vol. 1, Columbia: University of Missouri
Press, 2007, pg. 260-261
442
171
Electric and the Western Electric and Submarine Company.445 Additionally, the Navy was
developing improved bombs for the purpose of aerial bombardment of submarines by aviators.
“Formerly, bombs were of a more or less delicate nature and impact with the surface of
the water was sufficient to detonate them. A submarine running below the surface was
therefore practically immune from damage from aircraft attack; but these bombs can be
set to explode at considerable depth below the surface and in all they make the aeroplane
a much more formidable antisubmarine asset than ever before.446
By 1918 the allies had also turned to submarines themselves, as well as aircraft, as tools to
combat the German U-boats. Regarding the development of the naval air service, Secretary
Daniels articulated the impressive growth of that area along with its increased needs. While in
July of 1917 there were only 45 naval aviators, by that same date the next year, there were 823
active aviators, over 2,500 student officers, and over 400 ground officers involved in naval
aviation.447
The Liberty engine continued to see increased use, including in an improved flying boat, and
cemented itself as the preferred aircraft engine of the Navy during the war.448 Rose describes the
air services of both Britain and the U.S. as having ‘swelled to enormous’ size, and describes their
‘chief contribution’ as being the ‘drastic curtailment of submarine operations near convoys and
in coastal areas.’449 Rose’s summary of the massive growth and role of the air services is fitting:
“Perhaps the chief contribution made by Allied aircraft was their drastic curtailment of
submarine operations near convoys and in coastal areas. “When aircraft could provide
aerial cover for a convoy, the convoy was virtually immune.” British and American
445
The Navy Department. "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy." edited by The Navy
Department, 1766. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1918, pg. 21
446
Ibid, pg. 52-53
447
The Navy Department. "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy." edited by The Navy
Department, 1766. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1918, pg. (page number
needed)
448
Ibid, pg. 511-512
449
Rose, Lisle A. The Age of Navalism 1890-1918. Vol. 1, Columbia: University of Missouri
Press, 2007, pg. 274-275
172
airmen detected enemy submarines in a broad arc from the southern North Sea through
the Channel and the Dover Straits around to the Irish Sea. Initially, U-boats operating at
the limit of their range in the eastern Atlantic off Ireland were immune to detection and
assault from the air due to the limited range of British and U.S. aircraft. But the
inauguration of the convoy system forced the U-boats to seek independently steaming
prey in the coastal waters around the British Isles. Here flying boats, the smaller
seaplanes, and land-based naval aircraft, together with reconnaissance blimps, could spot
them readily and send them beneath the surface for hours at a time while shipping was
rerouted or nearby antisubmarine vessels were directed against them. The average daily
strength of the Royal Air Force (RAF) against the U-boats during the last six months of
the war was impressive: 85 large flying boats, 216 seaplanes, 189 land-based aircraft, and
75 airships. America’s naval-aviation buildup in the European theater was nothing short
of stupendous. On April 6, 1917, the day Congress formally declared war against
Germany, the United States Navy and Marine Corps possessed 54 aircraft—45 seaplanes,
6 flying boats, and 3 land based aircraft. Nineteen months later, on Armistice Day, the
navy and marine corps squadrons had 2,107 machines in hand: 695 seaplanes, 1,170
flying boats, and 242 land-based aircraft. The navy established hasty, forced-draft
training programs on university campuses, on new air bases, and even in private industry.
Most of the aviators and ground-support personnel were naval reservists. Twenty-five
hundred officers and twenty-two thousand enlisted men flew or serviced the aircraft,
auxiliary kite balloons, and the 3 dirigibles operating from three large bases in France and
Britain aw well as smaller installations in the Azores. U.S. naval aircraft flew more than
three million nautical miles and attacked and damaged a dozen U-boats. Not only did
American seaplanes and flying boats provide essential aerial reconnaissance and
protection over the convoys, but land-based naval and marine corps aircraft also
participated (with the RAF’s new Handley Page heavy bombers) in major air raids
against German U-boat facilities at Zeebrugge, Ostend, and Brugge, and for a time air
units near Calais and Dunkirk directly supported the British Army in Flanders.”450
By the end of the war, allied militaries possessed multiple new tools for the purpose of projecting
military power. The submarine dramatically altered the balance of sea power, and while
Germany never truly threatened to dominate the sea and control it the way the British had, it
certainly threatened to limit the control the British could exercise. If Germany had practiced
unrestricted U-boat warfare beginning in 1914 and maintaining it throughout the war, it is
450
Ibid.
173
possible that the British would have conceded, or otherwise come to terms before the Americans
entered the war.451
Aircraft too altered the nature of sea power. The impressive show of skill made in the air above
the battlefields of Europe by the (often quite young) aviators of the First World War mark the
first effective use of manned flight in combat in human history. The way in which flight would
change naval tactics and strategy were still only beginning to be understood. The light weight
and limited carrying capacity of these early planes fundamentally limited the amount of damage
that they could cause. Regardless, it was obvious to participants and observers alike that these
oil-based technologies had dramatically changed what warfare would look like in the future.
The American Navy demonstrated several characteristics in the time period covered in this
chapter. While the technological breakthroughs that so dramatically impacted this period and its
wars were almost always invented by private scientists and engineers, they were generally
purchased, tested and substantially improved by the Navy. Utilization of liquid fuel oil in the
private sector demonstrated its usefulness to the Navy, and the Navy demonstrated its ability to
improve and innovate in that area of technology to achieve its standard of readiness for
warmaking. The Navy consistently demonstrated its ability to push forward the bounds of
technology through experimental laboratories and cooperative agreements with other military
branches, civilian scientists, and inventors.
The Navy also found a need to innovate organizationally, by providing career opportunities for
those in the engineering sector of the Navy, as well as through the creation of subject matter
451
Alternatively, it must be said that such a maneuver would likely have simply dragged the
United States into the war sooner, and hastened a German defeat. This is representative of the
inherent danger of counterfactual arguments.
174
specific committees and boards designed to direct efforts at mastering new technological
developments. While in the future a third branch of the U.S. military would be created, that was
still a long way off, and both the Army and the Navy, through their cooperation in the form of
the Aircraft Board, articulated a desire to control aviation within their branches.
The Navy demonstrated several characteristics consistently throughout this energy transition.
First, there was a desire to test out all available options and methods for fueling ships, and any
possible improvement or advantage that could be gained was investigated. Secondly, as the
benefits of oil-fueled machinery became more widely known, organizational bodies were created
to streamline the learning process. Third, they found it necessary to utilize both the old form of
propulsion (coal) along with the new (oil) for a time as a bridge from one era to the next. This
occurred for several reasons.
First, the perfection of methods to burn oil developed over time and it was first used as an
auxiliary to the already established coal system. Second, there was an inherent uncertainty
regarding the necessary supply of oil and dual fuel ships were seen as an insurance policy against
possible disruption or depletion of oil supply. Third, there was already a fleet that burned coal,
and construction of an all-oil fleet would take a long time (25-30 years) so even as the Navy
decided that all its future ships would burn strictly oil, they were still in possession of a large
number of ships that used coal. These factors of technological improvement and change,
uncertainty of supply and stability of new energy sources, and periods of overlap between energy
systems, are likely to be common in any energy transition. Fundamentally, energy systems are
central to the socio-economic-military orders of humans, and replacing one with another entails
175
risks, and rewards. The United States found itself as the world’s leading producer of a newly
recognized dominant form of energy used for machine power and ship, submarine, and
ultimately aircraft propulsion. This was indeed a fortuitous position, one not shared by the
European great powers.
176
5
The British Navy’s transition from Coal to Oil: 1904-1918
The purpose of this chapter is to trace the process of the British Navy’s transition from coal to oil
in fueling their ships. The historical period under examination here is one in which Britain was
at the apex of its power and global influence, due primarily to the British Navy. As such Britain
was at the forefront of research and development of new naval technologies. More so than the
other great powers, Britain was heavily reliant on naval power for national defense and the
maintenance of economic relations with its empire. This reliance, and fear of rising competitors,
spurred Britain to consistently strive for naval dominance, both quantitatively and qualitatively.
To understand the nature of the transition from coal to oil by the British Navy, the author will
address the same questions that were explored in the American case. How did the emergence of a
new, improved source of motive power affect the British Navy? Did the Admiralty resist such
change? Did the British Navy embrace or resist new technologies? Did the British respond to
developments in civil society or the private sector, or did it develop new energy technologies on
its own? What degree of cooperation existed between the Royal Navy and the private sector in
the realm of technological development and innovation? Was there disagreement or consensus
among the various parts of the Navy? How did this energy transition impact the manner in
which the Navy operated?
As in the previous chapter, this case study will briefly describe the British energy situation
around the turn of the century, with a particular emphasis on the relationship between the British
Navy and coal. From there, the focus turns to the transition from coal to oil, both before and
during the First World War. The emergence of engines powered by fossil fuels had already
177
transformed the face of naval power. The use of coal-fired steam engines in the mid-to-late
1800’s had put an end to the age of sail.
This technological innovation favored Britain far more than it did any other great power navy.
The British Islands were rich in coal, and in particular, they were rich in the right type of coal.
Welsh steam coal possessed the most desirable qualities for burning in marine steam engines; it
did not burn too hot, it was not too dirty and lastly it was not too fragile.452 Tests by the
Admiralty in 1848-1849 conducted by Sir Henry De La Bèche and Dr. Lyon Playfair
demonstrated the superiority of Welsh coal, and these results were corroborated for the British
during the Crimean War.453 Britain’s first sail-less ship was built in 1869.454 The diffusion of
coal mining proceeded slowly to areas outside Britain.455 The British dominated the coal industry
throughout the period, producing more than all other nations combined up to 1880.456
Production of Welsh coal in the area of Rhondda’s Valleys grew dramatically, with thirty-seven
collieries by 1861, and four million tons of coal exported by 1874.457
The technological developments that accompanied increased use of steam powered engines and
iron ships imposed new advantages, as well as new difficulties. Difficulties arose in
management of reserve parts and tools, storage and record-keeping, and forced revision of naval
452
Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from
Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003. pg. 12
453
Ibid, pg. 13
454
Brodie, Bernard. Sea Power in the Machine Age. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941,
pg. 110-111
455
Smil, Vaclav. Energy Transitions: History, Requirements, Prospects. Santa Barbara
California: Praeger, 2010, pg. 161
456
Brodie, Bernard. Sea Power in the Machine Age. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941,
pg. 115
457
Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from
Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 16
178
practices that began in 1875 and dragged on until 1882.458 Increased complexity of naval needs
due to technological advancement also drove a need for more labor, complicated and burdened
the planning process, and also dramatically altered ship construction processes.459 There were
also difficulties in the area of energy technology. Coal presented several problems to the navies
that used it. Using coal to fuel ships can best be described as laborious, dirty, dangerous and
time consuming. The British Navy was constantly seeking to reduce coaling time and labor via
organizational changes, introduction of new equipment, and inter-ship competitions for prestige
and prizes.460 The Navy was actively seeking solutions, organizational or technological, to any
problem that it viewed as hindering satisfactory performance. This practice reflected sentiment
about the relationship between science and war. Former War Office civil servant Sir Norman
Lockyer remarked in a speech in 1902 that
“Every scientific advance is now, and will be in the future more and more, applied to
war. It is no longer a question of an armed force with scientific corps; it is a question of
an armed force scientific from top to bottom. Thank God the navy has already found this
out. Science will ultimately rule all the operations both of peace and war, and therefore
the industrial and the fighting population must both have a common ground of
education.”461
While negative aspects of using coal were present, and constantly examined, reliance and
expenditure on the fuel continued to grow. By 1903-1904 the Admiralty was spending
458
Hamilton, C. I. The Making of the Modern Admiralty: British Naval Policy-Making 18051927. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, pg. 160-161
459
Ibid, pg. 162
460
Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from
Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 16-17; Snyder,
David Allan. "Petroleum and Power: Naval Fuel Technology and the Anglo-American Struggle
for Core Hegemony, 1889-1922." Texas A&M University, 2001, pg. 66
461
Paul Forman, Jose M. Sanchez-Ron, ed. National Military Establishments and the
Advancement of Science and Technology: Studies in 20th Century History. edited by Robet S.
Cohen, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
1996, pg. 6
179
£1,604,501 per year on coal, equating to 4.79% of “total effective services”.462 Other qualities of
the coal industry conferred substantial advantages to Britain. Its domestic supply was seen as a
serious strategic advantage in wartime.463 The structure of the coal industry itself in Great
Britain was one that the Admiralty viewed as favorable, meaning diversity in supply and a lack
of large coal monopolies.464 Additionally, the British controlled the vast majority of the world’s
coaling ports and coal infrastructure.465 This infrastructure had been the strategic vision of
Captain John Charles Ready Colomb, and implementation of construction of British worldwide
coaling stations had proceeded under Admiral Sir Alexander Milne.466
“Slowly, link by link,” Britain “Forged a wonderful chain, binding India, the Yellow Sea,
Australia, and the Cape to the mother country.” Over a fifty year period, the British
government spent an estimated $500 million on acquiring, developing, and fortifying
coaling stations. As one British naval authority commented, any power that hoped to
compete with the Royal Navy for control of the seas would “have to pour out money like
water” to build a logistical infrastructure on a par with that of the British Empire.”467
The British were able to use control of this infrastructure to limit the availability of coal to
enemies, as they did during the Russian journey to Japan in 1905.468 Supplementing these
advantages was the private fleet of British colliers, the largest in the world.469 The net effect of
these conditions allowed the British to do two things; first in normal conditions the Admiralty
462
Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from
Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 23. Total effective
services consist of total naval expenditure minus payments for pension and gratuities. See
Brown footnote 57
463
Ibid, pg. 24
464
Ibid, 25-26
465
Brodie, Bernard. Sea Power in the Machine Age. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941,
pg. 116
466
Snyder, David Allan. "Petroleum and Power: Naval Fuel Technology and the AngloAmerican Struggle for Core Hegemony, 1889-1922." Texas A&M University, 2001, pg. 52-53
467
Ibid, pg. 76
468
Black, Jeremy. Naval Power: A History of Warfare and The Sea from 1500. New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, pg. 149
469
Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from
Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 29
180
could allow the large majority of logistics and fuel supply operations to be managed by the
private sector, and secondly the Admiralty could feel secure that in time of war they could take
control of the coal industry by force if necessary.470 Thus, around the turn of the century the
British energy situation could not have been any better. Control over a large portion of the
world’s coal production (and, moreover, qualitatively superior coal), control over most of the
world’s naval coaling infrastructure, and possession of the world’s largest private collier fleet
added up to a very secure British navy, and Empire. Yet despite all this, the details of British
policymaking reveal very worried British officials, both in the Admiralty and in the Cabinet.
The rising power of Germany and the United States, as well as increased construction from
France and Russia, seemed to threaten Britain’s privileged position.471 The British were losing
their enormous lead in naval power, and facing a period of relative decline.472
The British Navy: 1902-1914
The competition in building bigger, faster, more powerful, and more deadly battleships was
driven by rapid technological change and improvement in various industrial technologies,
including engine design, steel armor techniques, improved steel tube design for big guns, rangefinding and automatic gun-aiming technologies. British efforts to maintain her traditional
advantage in ship quantity and quality can be seen clearly in expenditures on battleships and first
class cruisers, as well as expenditures on naval works.473 British spending on battleships
between 1897-1904 almost doubled what was spent between 1889-1896. British spending on
470
Ibid, pg. 40.
Snyder, David Allan. "Petroleum and Power: Naval Fuel Technology and the AngloAmerican Struggle for Core Hegemony, 1889-1922." Texas A&M University, 2001, pg. 53-54
472
Friedberg, Aaron L. The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 18951905 Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988, pg. 152
473
Sumida, Jon Tetsuro. In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology, and British
Naval Policy, 1889-1914. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989, pg. 21 and 22
471
181
first class cruisers in that time period more than tripled. Naval works spending during the same
period increased by more than £20,000,000.
Figure 5.1 – British Naval expenditure on battleships and cruisers 1889-1904
(Sumida, Jon Tetsuro. In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology, and British Naval Policy, 1889-1914. Boston: Unwin Hyman,
1989, pg. 21).
The trajectory of such spending was unsustainable and was decried as early as 1901 by Sir
Michael Hicks Beach, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who claimed it would lead to Britain’s
financial ruin.474 By 1903, the First Lord Selborne described Britain’s continued spending
increases as reaching the limits of British capabilities, and was subsequently forced to promise
dramatic cuts in the naval estimates for the years 1905-1906.475 Selborne continued to warn the
Sea Lords that they must reign in spending and increase efficiency, and was presented with an
opportunity to effect real change with the retirement of the First Naval Lord, Lord Walter Kerr,
474
475
Ibid, pg. 23
Ibid, pg. 24-25
182
in 1904.476 Kerr’s replacement, Admiral Sir John Arbuthnot Fisher, was seen as someone who
could impose appropriate measures of economy and efficiency on the Navy.477 Additionally he
played a substantial role in the decision to transition the British Navy from coal to oil, and had
been working to convince Lord Selborne of oil’s advantages since 1901.478
Two of the earliest proponents for burning oil to fuel British naval vessels were J.H. Selwyn and
a Mr. Richardson, who convinced the Admiralty to investigate using oil fuel as early as 1865.479
While this trial, as well as others conducted in the United States, demonstrated the increased
evaporative efficiency of oil, the technology needed was large and cumbersome. Moreover, the
price of the fuel was not competitive with coal, and some of the critical technological
components (such as the hardware needed to vaporize the oil for most efficient burning) were
still rudimentary.480 Yet by the beginning of the new century the advantages to burning oil were
becoming more widely known, and naval minds such as Jack Fisher and the Italian Cuniberti
were advocating for the use of oil for naval purposes.481 Those advantages included the
following: less fuel per pound of water was evaporated, an ability to pump the fuel for quicker
loading, fuel tanks could be more completely filled (up to 11% more fuel per tank by volume),
tanks could easily be measured by wall markings or dipsticks, reduction of smoke, ships could
more quickly raise steam, more precise control over ship speed, reduction in engine damage due
476
Ibid, pg. 26
Ibid, pg. 26
478
Mackay, Ruddock F. Fisher of Kilverstone. London: Oxford University Press, 1973, pg. 269
479
Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from
Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 42
480
Ibid, pg. 42-43.
481
Sumida, Jon Tetsuro. In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology, and British
Naval Policy, 1889-1914. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989. See footnote 161 on page 69
477
183
to less corrosive qualities in oil, and lastly a reduction in the needed crew to manage and
maintain the engines.482
Yet, despite the increasingly obvious technical superiority of oil, other factors remained that
hindered its adoption, as one would expect of any major technological change. One of the most
concerning issues to the Admiralty was risk of fire from oil’s lower flash point.483 Additionally,
stowing oil fuel instead of coal was believed to reduce ship defenses from the impact of
incoming fire, the force of which was dissipated and absorbed by full bunkers of coal.484 Using
oil also required improved construction techniques for ships to prevent leaks, a problem only
solved by the introduction of welding. Since oil fuel also needed to be kept warm, requiring
heating contributed to the fact that fuel depots for oil were more expensive to build and maintain
than coal depots.485
Nonetheless, the British began to investigate the possibility of burning only oil to propel ships of
war. Several developments played a role in this decision. The first included new methods of
supply, namely the use of large ocean going oil tankers; such tankers were first used by Marcus
Samuel, and this change is described as having ‘revolutionised’ the oil industry.486 Samuel had
been developing the Kutei fields in Borneo, and the oil there was a heavy variety that produced a
larger percentage of fuel oil to kerosene. Samuel’s need to find a market for this product drove
482
Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from
Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 44-47
483
Ibid, pg. 46-47
484
Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from
Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 46-47
485
Ibid, pg. 46-47
486
Ibid, pg. 47
184
him to adapt the burners on his large tankers, and he became a strong advocate for the use of fuel
oil for marine purposes.487
Also, the improvement of burner technology, spurred on by French, Italian, and Russian torpedo
boat development, increased the prospects for British use of oil for its fleet.488 More importantly,
there were several major oil field discoveries at this time that dramatically altered the supply
situation. This included discoveries at Sumatra (1885), Borneo (1897), Burma (1889-1901),
California, Texas, and Oklahoma (1900-1905).489 According to Michael Warwick Brown, these
conditions substantially increased the likelihood of the great power navies transitioning to oil
fuel. In Britain, however, there were still hurdles to its adoption, including the required
emergence of a personality of great force and determination who also happened to hold the
appropriate position of influence within the Admiralty.
Although John Fisher never commanded a fleet in combat, his influence on the dramatic changes
in the Royal Navy are second to none. Fisher aimed to concentrate the forces of the Royal Navy,
focus on technologically superior ships, and increase overall fleet efficiency. He was also the
first member of the Admiralty to advocate forcefully for the use of oil fuel, diesel engines, and
also turbine propulsion.490 Fisher’s main tactical reasoning for the need to adopt oil fuel was that
it had been shown to increase the steaming speed of naval vessels.491 Fisher had supported early
487
Snyder, David Allan. "Petroleum and Power: Naval Fuel Technology and the AngloAmerican Struggle for Core Hegemony, 1889-1922." Texas A&M University, 2001, pg. 150
488
Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from
Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 47
489
Ibid, pg. 49
490
Snyder, David Allan. "Petroleum and Power: Naval Fuel Technology and the AngloAmerican Struggle for Core Hegemony, 1889-1922." Texas A&M University, 2001, pg. 125
491
Ibid, pg. 125
185
tests on oil fuel in late 1898, early 1899, and June 1901 when he was Controller of the Navy.492
These tests demonstrated the effectiveness of oil’s evaporative capacity, and thus prompted not
only further tests, but also the building of a preliminary experimental plant at Devonport.493
Over the next few years the British navy embarked on an intensive and focused examination of
what course of action should be taken on liquid petroleum as a source for fuel for the Royal
Navy. In July 1902, the Admiralty Fuel Experiment Station (AFES) was established and
according to Snyder, the AFES was to serve as both an experimental laboratory, as well as a
‘clearinghouse for information pertaining to the use of liquid fuel in other navies.’494
The lack of domestic or even British imperial control over major oil resources was a recurring
strategic headache for the Admiralty, prompting occasional cautious policy suggestions in the
form of burning coal/oil mixtures.495 In 1904 the navy completed work on its own oil burning
system, one that importantly did not require compressed air or steam for atomization prior to
burning.496 This was a significant improvement as the air compressors and machinery needed to
produce steam were large and heavy. Accordingly, this new method was treated as a state secret,
and in June a secret patent for this technology was granted.497
1905 saw the creation of the first all oil burning ships of the Royal Navy, the Tribal F class of
destroyers.498 However, the ‘G’ class was reverted to coal burning, primarily due to fear of
492
Ibid, pg. 126
Ibid, pg. 127
494
Ibid, pg. 129
495
Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from
Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 51
496
Ibid, pg. 51
497
Ibid, pg. 51
498
Ibid, pg. 52
493
186
supply during wartime, but there were also more complex reasons, namely the structure of the oil
market abroad, conflict of interests between current producers and the Admiralty, and a lack of
trust between the British and those who had the oil.499 It is here that one finds the true beginning
of the transition in Britain. Initial moves to build oil burning ships were cautioned by fear of a
lack of supply during war, and this fear translated into dual-firing ships, as well as limitations on
the circumstances in which British ships would rely on its on-board oil supply for propulsion.500
In addition to concerns about supply, there were other factors that were problematic for
implementing a transition to oil. These included costs related to increasing prices for oil (as
well as its generally higher price relative to coal), and also the cost associated with increasing oil
storage.501
While by 1905 naval policy on the actual use of oil fuel was cautious and conservative, the
British government’s search for a stable and affordable supply had begun in earnest, and only
increased in intensity over time. After the Admiralty tests conducted in 1904, all major navy
ships in service were converted to dual-firing ships, and correspondingly, a committee was
established to investigate the matter of supply, known as the Pretyman Committee, named after
committee president Financial Secretary to the Admiralty E.G. Pretyman.502 C.I. Hamilton notes
that one of Fisher’s preferred mechanisms for accomplishing his ends was through appointing
499
Ibid, pg. 52
Ibid, pg. 55
501
Jones, Geoffrey. The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry. Studies in Business
History. edited by and Leslie Pressnell Leslie Hannah London: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1981,
pg. 13
502
Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from
Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 52-53
500
187
committees503, and although Fisher did not create the Pretyman Committee, he did substantially
influence the work of the Committee on Designs,504 the Decentralisation Committee, and the
Naval Establishments Committee.505
Through the creation and direction of various committees, as well as skillful delegation of
authority to what is called the “Fishpond” (a cadre of naval officers and staff loyal to Fisher and
his ideas), Fisher was able to exert an inordinate amount of influence on Britain’s naval
policy.506 His ideas on ship construction were revolutionary, including developing the
Dreadnaught class of capital ship and the concept of the fast battle cruiser.507 Fisher was
obsessed with the role of speed in naval warfare, and this was the source of his adamant support
for using oil as fuel, as well as his belief that there was very little need for thicker armor.508 For
Fisher, speed was a better defense than thick armor. Despite Fisher’s appointment to the position
of First Sea Lord corresponding to a decrease in oil purchased by the Admiralty, cited by Jones
as evidence that Fisher’s tenure as First Sea Lord was not a ‘great advance in the use of oil,’
503
Hamilton, C. I. The Making of the Modern Admiralty: British Naval Policy-Making 18051927. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, pg. 215
504
Drolet, Marc. "The Anatomy of the British Battle Cruiser and British Naval Policy, 19041920." McGill University, 1993.
505
Hamilton, C. I. The Making of the Modern Admiralty: British Naval Policy-Making 18051927. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, pg. 215-216
506
Ibid, pg. 221
507
Jones, Geoffrey. The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry. Studies in Business
History. edited by and Leslie Pressnell Leslie Hannah London: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1981,
pg. 15
508
Fisher saw thicker armor as counterproductive in regards to achieving high speeds, and
argued that if you were faster than the enemy, they would be unable to hit you, see Sumida, Jon
Tetsuro. In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology, and British Naval Policy, 18891914. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989, pg. 258-59
188
somehow Jones ignores the dramatic increase in Admiralty oil purchases between 1905-1910.509
In 1905 the Admiralty purchased roughly 10,000 long tons of fuel oil, and by the time of Fisher’s
retirement from the position of First Sea Lord that number had increased over ten-fold, to
roughly 130,000 long tons.510
Fisher also had contact with several of the most important British oilmen of the day; in 1903 he
met William D’Arcy who shared with him maps and documents related to his recent oil
concession acquisition in Persia.511 Fisher also met Marcus Samuel, a man eager to sell oil to the
Admiralty and founder of Shell Transport, in 1899.512 Despite not having created the Pretyman
Committee, Fisher was in the appropriate position within the Admiralty to influence
interpretation of its results. The Committee is explicit in its two primary concerns about reliance
on fuel oil, price stability, and supply.513 In mid-1904 the Committee, working with the Colonial
office, developed policies that would encourage commercial production of fields that produced
the heavy fuel oil.514 Here we have the first real instance of British state intervention in the
petroleum industry, a practice that would increase substantially over time.
The Committee explicitly placed an emphasis on private commercial development of oil fields,
and later even suggested that the British Government act as a lender of last resort by acquiring
509
Jones, Geoffrey. The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry. Studies in Business
History. edited by and Leslie Pressnell Leslie Hannah London: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1981,
pg. 14-16
510
Ibid, pg. 12
511
Jones, Geoffrey. The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry. Studies in Business
History. edited by and Leslie Pressnell Leslie Hannah London: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1981,
pg. 15
512
Ibid
513
Snyder, David Allan. "Petroleum and Power: Naval Fuel Technology and the AngloAmerican Struggle for Core Hegemony, 1889-1922." Texas A&M University, 2001, pg. 159
514
Ibid, pg. 160
189
oil fields directly and leasing them to private companies for development.515 This intervention
into the oil markets, which included other provisions such as right of first refusal to purchase
production, was codified in the Oil Mines Act of Barbados.516 As Snyder points out, however,
such laws and practices did the British little good, as oil-production within the Empire was
almost non-existent.517 Notably, the Oil Fuel Committee believed that state involvement in the
oil industry was needed to counter the influence of Standard Oil.518 This fear led to efforts by
the British Government to thwart Standard’s access to oil bearing lands in the Empire; in
particular, the Committee and the Admiralty supported the Indian government’s position denying
oil concessions to Standard’s subsidiary, the Asiatic Petroleum Company.519 These efforts led to
the British government entering negotiations with the Scottish owned Burmah Oil Company, and
on the advice of Sir Boverton Redwood, the two parties began to work out terms for a long-term
supply contract.520 On November 21, 1905, the Admiralty signed its first long term contract for
fuel oil with the Burmah Oil Company, and by 1907 the company was required to create the
capacity of supplying the Admiralty with 80,000 tons of fuel oil annually, with a price set on a
sliding scale between 20-25 shillings per ton, and lastly, the contract included a clause that there
would be no alterations in Company ownership without the consent of the Admiralty.521 While
this deal did not solve the supply problem faced by the Admiralty, it did represent a first step
toward securing a stable supply and developing a capacity for wartime reserves. Additionally,
this contract – and the efforts invested to ensure its success on the part of the Admiralty – mark
the beginning of a period of substantial willingness on the part of the British government to
515
Ibid, pg. 160-161
Ibid
517
Ibid, pg. 162
518
Ibid, pg. 161
519
Ibid, pg. 162-63
520
Ibid, pg. 164-67
521
Ibid, pg. 178-179
516
190
interfere in the private oil industry. The heavy lobbying of the Indian government for not only
preferential access within the Empire, but also for the exclusion of rival interests, set the
precedent for likely future British state involvement in the oil industry.
Outside of the Empire, the Admiralty relied heavily on American sources of oil, namely Texas
and California, although it was conceded that California was not a secure wartime source.522
Between 1902-1906 the small amounts of oil being purchased by the Admiralty came solely
from the United States, and even by 1912, as Admiralty purchases increased dramatically, the
United States provided well over half of this oil.523 Between 1902 and 1929, the United States
was the largest supplier of oil to the United Kingdom by a substantial margin.524 Despite
consistent reliance of Britain on American supply, the Committee remained committed to
developing a British controlled and owned source, and for this reason was particularly interested
in the Persian oil concessions owned by William Knox D’Arcy.525
522
Snyder, David Allan. "Petroleum and Power: Naval Fuel Technology and the AngloAmerican Struggle for Core Hegemony, 1889-1922." Texas A&M University, 2001, pg. 186
523
See Figure 3; Jones, Geoffrey. The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry.
Studies in Business History. edited by and Leslie Pressnell Leslie Hannah London: The
Macmillan Press LTD, 1981.
524
Ibid, pg. 232
525
Snyder, David Allan. "Petroleum and Power: Naval Fuel Technology and the AngloAmerican Struggle for Core Hegemony, 1889-1922." Texas A&M University, 2001, pg.187
191
Figure 5.2 – United Kingdom Oil Imports by source 1914-1929
(Jones, Geoffrey. The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry. Studies in Business History. edited by and Leslie Pressnell Leslie
Hannah London: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1981, pg. 232)
D’Arcy had first obtained his Persian concessions in May 1901.526 The nature of the deal is best
described as remarkable. D’Arcy obtained exclusive rights to all of Persian territory (excluding
five northern provinces) for the next 60 years, was authorized for pipeline construction, exempt
from taxation and customs, and the Persian government only took a 16% annual royalty.527 The
526
Jones, Geoffrey. The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry. Studies in Business
History. edited by and Leslie Pressnell Leslie Hannah London: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1981,
pg. 130
527
Jones, Geoffrey. The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry. Studies in Business
History. edited by and Leslie Pressnell Leslie Hannah London: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1981,
pg. 130
192
concession produced its first oil in 1903-04.528 When these first wells started to dry up, D’Arcy
considered selling off his concession to Standard Oil and Rothschild interests.529 Pretyman
himself suggested to D’Arcy that he write officially to the Admiralty to ask for help, and through
the efforts of Pretyman, Lord Selborne, and Sir Boverton Redwood, the Persian concession
remained in British hands.530
Such advice turned out to be very advantageous to the British. The first gushers to rupture in the
D’arcy concession did so on May 26th 1908 at Maidan-i-Naftun, and represented a landmark
development in oil history.531 The Anglo Persian Oil Company (APOC) was incorporated in
April 1909.532 Despite early difficulties in construction of infrastructure and pipelines, refining
difficulties533 and also major marketing hurdles,534 the prospects for this upstart oil venture were
quite good.535 Most importantly, the quality of the petroleum discoveries in the Persian
concession were very favorable for the production of a high quality fuel oil for naval purposes.536
By 1912 the A.P.O.C was in need of capital, and found itself with a need to rely on an agreement
with Shell in order to market the majority of its production.537 This situation was not palatable to
528
Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from
Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 89
529
Ibid, pg. 89
530
Ibid, pg. 91
531
Jones, Geoffrey. The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry. Studies in Business
History. edited by and Leslie Pressnell Leslie Hannah London: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1981,
pg. 138-40
532
Ibid, pg. 141
533
Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from
Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 91
534
Jones, Geoffrey. The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry. Studies in Business
History. edited by and Leslie Pressnell Leslie Hannah London: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1981,
pg. 142-143
535
Ibid, pg. 144-145
536
Ibid, pg. 145
537
Ibid
193
Charles Greenway, formerly involved in Burmah Oil, who had some experience in dealing with
the Admiralty.538 Greenway played an important role in convincing the Admiralty that the large
oil monopolies of Shell and Standard were collaborating against British interests, and displayed a
serious distaste for the large oil combines.539
“Greenway always regarded the Admiralty as the most promising market. The Admiralty
had involved itself in the Persian company’s affairs in 1904/5 and in 1909, and on both
occasions the question of the company’s future role as a supplier of fuel oil to the Royal
Navy held a central place in the discussions. Greenway made considerable use of these
precedents in his negotiations with the Admiralty after 1912, though since a strong
departmental memory and consistency of policy were not the Admiralty’s most notable
characteristics, the argument carried less weight than one might have expected.”540
Throughout the first decade of the twentieth century, the British had been working diligently to
discover a secure supply of petroleum. The discovery of large quantities in Persia under a British
controlled company increased the region’s relative importance for British national security. The
British Admiralty was fearful of being taken advantage of by the large oil monopolies due to
their lack of domestic supply and almost total reliance on imports. Greenway was able, through
his various sales pitches to the Admiralty, to leverage this fear of the large oil monopolies to
secure an agreement with the British government.541
That agreement, signed on 20 May 1914, consisted of £2,200,000 investment (£2,000,000
ordinary shares, and £1,000 preference shares, the difference made up of debentures).542
Additionally, the Treasury was granted two ex officio directors on A.P.O.C’s board, as well as all
538
Ibid, pg. 95-96
Ibid, pg. 96
540
Ibid, pg. 146
541
Jones, Geoffrey. The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry. Studies in Business
History. edited by and Leslie Pressnell Leslie Hannah London: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1981,
pg. 151-52
542
Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from
Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 97
539
194
of its subsidiary companies, one of which was nominated by the Admiralty.543 Two other
conditions of the agreement that are of importance include the British Government’s right to veto
an action viewed as harmful to their interests, and the stipulation that the company remain British
in ownership and not enter any form of trust or combination.544 Britain had just obtained a
controlling share of its first national oil company.545 To better understand this decision one must
understand the work of the Packenham committee and the role of both Jack Fisher and Winston
Churchill.
By 1910 oil burning on its own in destroyers and in adjunct to coal in battleships was firmly
established, and the concerns about supply were beginning to be mitigated by diversity of
sources as well as increasing tanker storage needed for domestic emergency stocks. 546
Additionally the fact that oil did not break down over time when stored also alleviated some
supply concerns and made it easier to store large amounts in reserve.547 In less than ten years the
British Navy had taken the lead in oil-burning technology, and demonstrated that its use was
possible, as well as beneficial, in all classes of warships.548
However concerns about not only supply, but more importantly, supply that would not be
interrupted in the case of war, forced the British into a period of building dual-fired battleships,
while building destroyers that burned only oil. Brown sees this process as an effective means of
543
Ibid
Ibid
545
Snyder, David Allan. "Petroleum and Power: Naval Fuel Technology and the AngloAmerican Struggle for Core Hegemony, 1889-1922." Texas A&M University, 2001, pg. 191
546
Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from
Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 58-61
547
Ibid
548
Ibid
544
195
matching consumption with supply, thus mitigating possible negative consequences of the
transition from coal to oil.549 A similar process was implemented in the Unites States.550 The
function of dual-burning technology served as an important bridge between two different sources
of fuel. This can be seen as a form of insurance policy during times of uncertainty, and is a
crucial element to state strategy during energy transitions.
At this time Jack Fisher had retired as First Sea Lord. He was replaced by Admiral Sir A.K.
Wilson, and although retired he continued to agitate from the outside for the use of oil fuel, and
was consistently ahead of the curve in supporting improved oil burning technologies, namely
internal combustion engines, diesel engines, and turbine propulsion.551 Fisher first met Winston
Churchill in 1907, during Churchill’s time as the Under Secretary at the Colonial Office, and
clearly had an impact on Churchill’s views.552 Churchill himself stated: “…as soon as I knew for
certain I was to go to the Admiralty I sent for Fisher.”553
The period of 1895-1905 was one in which the British had lost a clear-cut naval supremacy over
its European rivals.554 Correspondingly, Fisher was brought in as First Sea Lord in May 1904,
with the aim of reforming and restructuring the Navy.555 In Fisher’s scheme four pre-conditions
were needed to accomplish such reforms. Those pre-conditions were a reconsideration of
549
Ibid, pg. 63
The Navy Department. "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy." edited by The Navy
Department, 1304. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1907, pg. 17-18
551
Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from
Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 64-65
552
Ibid, pg. 65
553
Churchill, Winston S. The World in Crisis. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1928, pg. 56
(double check page number here)
554
Friedberg, Aaron L. The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 18951905 Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988, pg. 152
555
Ibid, pg. 192
550
196
strategy, the elimination of out of date vessels, a rearranging of the fleets and squadrons, and
lastly a reduction in the number of ships in commission, without a corresponding reduction in the
fighting value of the overall fleet.556 Winston Churchill came to the Admiralty with a similarly
reform oriented purpose and state of mind, being brought in as the First Lord of the Admiralty by
Prime Minister Asquith in October of 1911 with the goal of instituting a naval staff.557 In
addition to his role in the creation of the Chief of War Staff, as well as separate Intelligence,
Mobilization, and Operations divisions, Churchill had a substantial influence on the British
decision to convert their navy completely to an oil burning fleet.558
After Churchill’s appointment in late 1911, the First Lord of the Admiralty had initially planned
on bringing Fisher back to serve as First Sea Lord, but instead hired Francis Bridgman; although
Churchill kept in regular contact with Fisher on naval matters.559 Through the influence of
Fisher, War College studies that emphasized speed for capital ships, and also the influence of
both Charles Greenway and Marcus Samuel, Churchill was convinced that naval supremacy
could only be achieved through an all oil-fired navy.560 At this time the Admiralty was
specifically considering whether or not to completely transition all naval vessels to oil burning
technology and Churchill sought the advice of Fisher on the matter.561 These factors along with
556
Ibid, pg. 193
Hamilton, C. I. The Making of the Modern Admiralty: British Naval Policy-Making 18051927. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, pg. 224
558
Ibid, pg. 225
559
Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from
Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 66
560
Ibid, pg. 66-67
561
Sumida, Jon Tetsuro. In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology, and British
Naval Policy, 1889-1914. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989, pg. 258
557
197
increased great power Battleship construction, led to the creation of the Pakenham Committee in
December of 1911. 562
Figure 5.3 – Great Power Navy Battleships built and building 1896-1906
Friedberg, Aaron L. The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905 Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988, pg. 153) (From left to right, Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany, the
United States, Japan, Italy)
The goals of the Pakenham committee were laid out:
“1) How can a sufficient supply of oil be obtained and a sufficient reserve stored in the
United Kingdom to enable us to use oil fuel only in all new construction.
2) What steps should be taken to establish the reserve of Oil? From what sources, in what
ship, and along what routes should it be obtained?
3) In what circumstances, at what expense and up to what date will it be possible to
convert the four battleships and one cruiser of the 1911-1912 programmes into “oil
only”? What addition to the existing reserves of oil would be necessary on this account
alone?
4) Generally to report on the advantages, or otherwise, of relying upon oil for Naval
Service including effects on personnel and cost.”563
The Pakenham report recommended no less than a year’s worth of wartime petroleum reserves,
and also suggested a re-examination of naval fuel specifications, which had often been seen by
men in the industry as too stringent.564 More importantly the committee failed to endorse an
562
Friedberg, Aaron L. The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 18951905 Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988, pg. 153
563
Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from
Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 67-68
564
Ibid
198
expansion of the use of oil, and in the process ensured that the programmes of 1911-1912 and
1913-1914 remained dual-firing ships.565 Churchill believed that these ships needed to be oil
burning ships, and moved to secure support for this policy by forming a Royal Commission, The
Royal Commission on Fuel and Engines, and chose Fisher to head the inquiry. Fisher’s position
on the imperative of oil for fueling the fleet was directly tied to his perception of naval tactics of
the time, and he was substantially affected by consistent changes and improvements in
technology. Specifically, he called for fast battle cruisers (26-30 knots), powered by oil, light on
armament, and armed with the largest guns possible.566 Later, Fisher’s stance would prove to be
supported by early naval engagements in the War, a point noted by Jellicoe, who had been
supportive of the same concepts as Fisher at the time of the Royal Commission.567 Churchill was
using every policy option available to him to convince the Admiralty of his position on oil. The
Pakenham Committee did not give him exactly what he wanted, so he created the Royal
Commission.568 Also Churchill ensured that the Commission would be advisory in nature, not
executive, and its work was to be secret, and separate from the Admiralty bureaucracy.569 These
political maneuverings allowed Churchill use various conclusions and suggestions of the
Commission as he needed, and ultimately to present to Parliament policies that the Commission
disagreed with. The primary point of disagreement between the conclusions of the Commission
and Churchill had to do with the ability of Britain to import food and oil in wartime.
565
Ibid
Sumida, Jon Tetsuro. In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology, and British
Naval Policy, 1889-1914. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989, pg. 258-262
567
Ibid, pg. 209-291
568
Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from
Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 68
569
Ibid, pg. 69
566
199
Other circumstances increased the urgency of the supply problem for Britain, namely the major
increase in prices for fuel oil in the year after February 1912.570 This factor, in tandem with the
Admiralty’s desire for long-term contracts for supply, and its fear of being at the mercy of the
two large oil monopolies, Standard Oil and Royal Dutch Shell, limited British options to AngloMexican Petroleum Products and APOC.571 In March 1913 the Commission recommended that
the government should take whatever steps necessary to make the Persian supplies of A.P.O.C.
available, yet stopped short of calling for direct state ownership of an oil company.572 Churchill
was to go a step further with his announced policy of July 1913, in which he explained to the
Parliament the…
“logic behind the ‘fast division’ of battleships. Tactically they were an innovation.
Historically, they were the latest manifestation of a long line of battleships that
technically stole a march on the opposition, as the ‘Dreadnought’ and the ‘SuperDreadnoughts’ had done before. When Churchill came to mention oil supplies he
diverged from the Commission’s views, in fact he almost ignored them completely.
Instead, he argued that as long as Britain retained command of the sea she could import
oil…Churchill’s solution to the supply problem diverged from the previous policy in
which private industry competed for one-off tenders to supply oil. Nor was it that
recommended by the Fisher Commission. Instead he announced two policies – an
interim and an ultimate. The interim involved a series of forward contracts lasting about
five years ‘to secure a regular and adequate supply,’…[]… ‘while the complicated,
administrative, scientific and financial questions involved in the ultimate policy are
settled.’ Inspired by the operation of the Government-owned Naval Dockyards and
Cordite Factories he said, ‘the Admiralty should become the independent owner and
producer of its own supplies of liquid fuel.” Initially, the creation of a large reserve
would give the Admiralty ample supplies in wartime and the ability to ride out price
fluctuations in the market. Ultimately, the Admiralty was to refine its own fuel. In short,
the Admiralty was to become a speculative oil trader and create its own chemical
industry.”573
570
Ibid, pg. 75
Ibid
572
Ibid
573
Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from
Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 76-77
571
200
The policy announced by Churchill was politically palatable to both the Socialists and the
Tories,574 and although described by Brown as ‘parliamentary hyperbole,’ the figures on British
consumption of Persian oil relative to other sources at the time support the assertion that this was
a momentous change in policy. On 17 June 1914 the contract between Anglo-Persian Oil
Company and His Majesty’s Government was submitted at the Registry Office. 575 In 1912 the
Admiralty imported oil from the United States, Borneo, Burma, Rumania, and utilized some
domestic shale oil, the total amount of which was just over 270,000 long tons.576
Figure 5.4 – Fuel Oil purchased by the Admiralty 1902-1912
(Jones,
Geoffrey. The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry. Studies in Business History, edited by and Leslie Pressnell Leslie Hannah
London: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1981, pg. 12)
By June 1913 A.P.O.C.’s Abadan refinery had begun production of fuel oil to Admiralty
specifications and for their use.577 In wartime Abadan produced fuel oil principally for the
574
Ibid, pg. 77-78
Ferrier, R. W. The History of the British Petroleum Company: The Developing Years 19011932. Vol. 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982, pg. 202
576
Jones, Geoffrey. The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry. Studies in Business
History. edited by and Leslie Pressnell Leslie Hannah London: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1981,
pg. 12
577
Ferrier, R. W. The History of the British Petroleum Company: The Developing Years 19011932. Vol. 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982, pg. 274
575
201
Admiralty, which consumed 65% of the total output of the refinery.578 In 1914-1915, that output
was 255,000 long tons.579 Sixty-five percent of Abadan’s total output equated to just over sixtyone percent of total Admiralty imports for 1912.580 The British saw state control over production
of this particular resource as imperative for its national security, and were scrambling for
physical control of a major source of the fuel.
In addition to the serious concern of British Admiralty regarding source and supply of this new
and important naval fuel, the impact of oil technology and its diffusion can be directly observed
in the form of new naval technologies that emerged at the time. Both the Submarine and the
airplane were developed into critical tools of war. Both types of vessels were made possible by
propulsion capabilities, as well as the particular qualities of petroleum fuels. British (and
French) interest in submarines was first piqued by Robert Fulton’s Nautilus, which was built in
France in 1800 and supported by Napoleon.581 After the Peace of Amiens dissipated, Fulton was
to become a consultant for the British Admiralty, although British interest in the submersible
waned after the victory of Trafalgar.582 Interestingly, although the British did not pursue
submersible development at that time, they did purchase the Nautilus from Fulton, and, more
importantly, offered him $75,000 to ‘refrain from providing his services to other European
countries.’583
The age of steam propulsion did not substantially improve the possibility of effective submarines.
Despite its improvements over manpower, its properties made underwater use of coal-fired steam
578
Ibid, pg. 275
Ibid, pg. 278
580
This is based upon the author’s own rough calculations.
581
Douglas, Lawrence Henry. "Submarine Disarmament: 1919-1936." Syracuse University,
1970, pg. 7
582
Ibid, pg. 8
583
Ibid, pg. 9
579
202
power particularly difficult. Yet, steam powered submarines were built and some of them
operated up until the 1930’s.584 It was the development of oil fuel, the internal combustion
engine, as well as electric motors and generators that truly brought about the age of the
submarine.585 By 1900, seven nations possessed at least one submarine, and Great Britain was
not among them. Those nations were France, Italy, the United States, Spain, Portugal, Greece
and Turkey.586 Although Britain was not among the earliest nations to develop steam powered
submarines, she certainly understood the implications of sub-surface sea power. British member
of parliament H. O. Arnold Foster articulated the idea that Britain’s reliance on seafaring
commerce meant that Britain had the most to fear from such technology, a grim foreshadowing
of the impact of the submarine in the First World War.587
The First British built submarine was the H-1, one of the Holland type vessels, and was
completed in February of 1902.588 By the end of that year the British had four more delivered;
Britain ordered an additional four vessels in the 1902-1903 program, and by 1907 had
systematically developed her submarine fleet to a ‘high degree of qualitative excellence.’589 Jack
Fisher had describe the impact of the submarine in 1904 as revolutionary, and by 1911, the
British had overtaken the French as the leader in submarine ownership.590
584
Ibid, pg. 14
Douglas, Lawrence Henry. "Submarine Disarmament: 1919-1936." Syracuse University,
1970, pg. 14
586
Ibid, pg. 15
587
Ibid, pg. 17-18
588
Ibid, pg. 31
589
Ibid, pg. 32
590
Ibid, pg. 39-40
585
203
By the outbreak of the war, Britain had developed submarine technology that was superior to
most of its rivals.591 Jack Fisher was again ahead of the curve in his appreciation of the dangers
that such vessels posed to the Empire, and he saw a direct connection between oil technology
and submarine technology.
“I have been unceasingly and assiduously devoting both my waking and even my
sleeping thoughts to submarines, and oil and the oil engine is the germ of their
vitality…..The oil engine will govern all sea-fighting, and all sea-fighting is going to be
governed by submarines…”592
The British demonstrated patience when implementing new naval technology, relying upon their
capability to build ships quickly, and cost-effectively, to ensure naval dominance. By 1913 the
British had not only taken the lead in submarine construction, they had built a two to one margin.
“On 29 November 1913, Fisher informed Julian Corbett that “we have 3,000 trained
submarine officers and men, and are 2 keels to 1 against Germany and MORE SO.” A
week later, however, he warned Churchill that the German construction of submarines for
foreign nations would give them the capacity to out-build Britain in war.”593
By July 1914, the Germans possessed twenty-eight submarines and were building twelve, while
the British had seventy-six, with twenty more under construction.594 Quantitatively the British
had again demonstrated their dominance in the construction of naval vessels, yet Britain, along
with the other allies, had underestimated the qualitative developments of the Germans, whose
U19 class had a range of operation four times larger than the best submarines built by France or
Britain.595 This underestimation contributed to the belief among the allies that the submarine
was still predominately a defensive weapons, and as Douglas describes it:
591
Ibid, pg. 18
quoted in Sumida, Jon Tetsuro. In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology, and
British Naval Policy, 1889-1914. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989, pg. 263
593
Ibid, pg. 264
594
Douglas, Lawrence Henry. "Submarine Disarmament: 1919-1936." Syracuse University,
1970, pg. 40-41
595
Ibid, pg. 41
592
204
“All the major naval powers were unaware of the full potential of this weapon, and it was
only after the early phase of employment of the German U-Boats in a strictly military
fashion-the adolescent period of the submarine-had ended that the awesome power of this
weapon wrought in the arsenals of the world was fully realized.”596
During the war the submarine was “by far the most serious problem of a maritime nature faced
by Britain”, and this threat prompted the creation of the Board of Invention and Research.597
While this body played an important role in the understanding and introduction of new
technology during the war, the submarine problem for Britain was solved by more traditional
approaches, among them, the convoy.598 Before continuing to discuss the role of oil during the
war, the author must briefly describe the emergence of another oil-dependent weapon, the
aircraft.
More so than the submarine, the airplane, as a critical tool of war, was brought on by the war, not
achieved prior to the war. Unlike submarines, aircraft began to find use in both Armies and
Navies. Unlike her position in relative naval terms, Britain was relatively behind the pack in
terms of experimentation with airships and airplanes. In 1907 the Wright Brothers offered their
patents to the British Navy, but were rejected, being told by Lord Tweedmouth that the
Admiralty thought there was no practical use for such machines in the naval service.599
Opportunities for early naval support for experimentation in aviation were limited due to limits
on spending, the naval arms race in progress at the time, and also by the belief that the aircraft of
596
Douglas, Lawrence Henry. "Submarine Disarmament: 1919-1936." Syracuse University,
1970, pg. 43
597
Gusewelle, Jack Keeney. "The Board of Invention and Research: A Case Study in the
Relations between Academic Science and the Royal Navy in Great Britain During the First
World War." University of California Irvine, 1971, pg. 42
598
Ibid
599
Pulsipher, Lewis Errol. "Aircraft and the Royal Navy, 1908-1918." Duke University, 1981,
pg. 29
205
the time had minimal military applications.600 The Committee for Imperial Defense SubCommittee on Aerial Navigation was created in October 1908 to assess how Britain should react
to increased expenditure on aeronautics by both the continental powers but also the United
States; it concluded that Britain could leave the experimentation to the private sector.601 Both
France and Germany had provided official support to their respective private aircraft
manufacturers, whereas complications in the British contractual relationships with various small
producers, and lack of state support for private development of aircraft, hindered British
progress.602 While British spending on aviation did increase from £9,000 in 1909-1910 to
£52,000 in 1910-1911, by 1910 the French had flown the first seaplane, and the United States
had seen Eugene Ely take off from, and land, a plane on a US Navy ship.603 At the time the
Navy was not even training its own pilots, outsourcing experimental training to the Royal Aero
Club in Eastchurch604 and other naval men obtaining pilots certificates “in their own time and at
their own expense.”605 After the pilots who had trained at Eastchurch completed their training,
one of the pilots, a Commander Samson, managed to convince First Sea Lord Wilson that naval
support for aviation was needed, resulting in the Admiralty’s purchase of one of the planes that
had been used at Eastchurch as well as a few experimental machines from the Short Brothers.606
600
Ibid, pg. 30-31
Cooper, Malcolm. The Birth of Independent Air Power: British Air Policy in the First World
War. London: Allen & Unwin, 1986, pg. 3
602
Ibid, pg. 4
603
Pulsipher, Lewis Errol. "Aircraft and the Royal Navy, 1908-1918." Duke University, 1981,
pg. 30-31
604
Cooper, Malcolm. The Birth of Independent Air Power: British Air Policy in the First World
War. London: Allen & Unwin, 1986, pg. 6
605
Pulsipher, Lewis Errol. "Aircraft and the Royal Navy, 1908-1918." Duke University, 1981,
pg. 35
606
Ibid, pg. 39
601
206
By late 1911 the Naval Flying School was officially organized, supervised by Commander
Samson.607
“The government’s response to increasing pressure for decisive action was to charge the
Standing Sub-Committee of the CID, chaired by Haldane, ‘to consider the future
development of aerial navigation for naval and military purposes, and the measures
which might be taken to secure to this country an efficient aerial service’. The SubCommittee responded by recommending the creation of a Royal Flying Corps, consisting
of a Military Wing, a Naval Wing and a Central Flying School. The report, considered
by the prime minister as a matter of some ‘urgency’, was approved in April 1912 and an
Air Committee of the CID established under Haldane to preside over the experiment in
inter-service co-operation.”608
The Air Committee was given no executive power and its role was considered advisory, similar
to the nature of the Royal Commission on Fuel and Engines, under Fisher.609 Cooper’s
description of this committee and its relationship to British military organizational change
stemming from the coal-oil transition is particularly relevant.
“The official historian spoke of it [the Air Committee] fading away ‘like the Ghost in
Hamlet’ having fulfilled its task of prompting the army and the navy into action. It is
crucial to any understanding of early British air policy to realize that the prewar
organization of the Flying Corps was not in any way a blueprint for the Royal Air Force
[created 1918]. While there already existed a vocal minority, both inside Parliament and
without, arguing for a stronger air organization, the bulk of official opinion was
concerned merely to put aviation on a sound footing within the existing two-service
structure.”610
Effectively, British aviation for military purposes before the war was pulled in two different
directions by the gravity of the two service organizations. The Army and the Navy had different
conceptions about the possible strategic and tactical uses of this new technology, and
correspondingly they held different opinions about how best to design, order, and build the new
607
Ibid
Cooper, Malcolm. The Birth of Independent Air Power: British Air Policy in the First World
War. London: Allen & Unwin, 1986, pg. 7
609
Ibid
610
Ibid
608
207
machines.611 While cross services complications impacted British aviation development, the role
of the Air Department at the Admiralty was also uncertain. The Director Air Department
(D.A.D) was not an official member of the board of the Admiralty, and consequently, had
limited access to its leaders and limited influence.612 Pulshiper states this reality clearly, writing
that “aircraft were not important enough to be given a separate vertical organization; instead
D.A.D. was required to arrange with each more or less independent Admiralty department to
fulfill his needs, competing with the established services and the battle fleet for attention.”613
Pulshiper argues that between the two services, it was the Navy who was better positioned to
investigate, experiment with, and implement new mechanical weapons systems such as aircraft
due to its previous experience with such processes as in the cases of steam, torpedoes,
dreadnoughts, battle cruisers, and submarines.614 For Pulshiper, “…the Navy had entered the
machine age, but the Army had not.”615 Britain had begun to turn substantial effort toward the
development of air technology for its military, but even by the start of the War in 1914 it had not
reached parity with its continental rivals in terms of the number of airplanes sent to the fighting
front.616 Prior to the War, Britain’s air industry was underdeveloped, as Cooper notes:
“The air industry was underdeveloped in comparison to its French and German
counterparts, [and] did not possess adequate research or production facilities to allow for
rapid expansion. The two air services were proceeding about their business without
reference to each other and were already showing signs of coming into conflict over areas
of responsibility and allocation of resources.”617
611
Cooper, Malcolm. The Birth of Independent Air Power: British Air Policy in the First World
War. London: Allen & Unwin, 1986, pg. 8
612
Pulsipher, Lewis Errol. "Aircraft and the Royal Navy, 1908-1918." Duke University, 1981,
pg. 42
613
Ibid
614
Ibid, pg. 45-46
615
Ibid, pg. 45
616
Graham, Glenn William. ""We Shall Deliver the Goods": The Developement of British Air
Power During the Great War, 1914-1918." Simon Fraser University, 2003, pg. 4
617
Cooper, Malcolm. The Birth of Independent Air Power: British Air Policy in the First World
War. London: Allen & Unwin, 1986, pg. 10
208
When comparing British support for aviation development one must keep in mind that the
earliest planes were best suited for land use. Consequently, states with large armies tended to
invest more in the early aviation technology, and as Britain traditionally did not maintain a large
army, its air investment was less robust.618 Additionally, the British Navy outspent the French
and German navies in aeronautic expenditure (See table below). Also, as Pulsipher notes the
Cabinet memorandum on total aeronautic expenditure does not include almost £450,000 that the
British devoted to rigid airships (Zeppelins). When this sum is included in the British overall
aeronautic expenditure total, overall British aviation expenditure is almost the same as France,
falling short by around £120,000.619
Figure 5.5 – British, French, and German expenditure on aeronautics 1911-1913
(Pulsipher, Lewis Errol. "Aircraft and the Royal Navy, 1908-1918." Duke University, 1981, pg. 55)
While submarine and aircraft development prior to the War had not been completed, nor
perfected, the military use of these technologies certainly had a substantial impact on the Royal
Navy, as well as the British war effort. Submarines undoubtedly had a larger impact on the War
itself, while the development of aircraft had a larger impact on British military organization,
618
Pulsipher, Lewis Errol. "Aircraft and the Royal Navy, 1908-1918." Duke University, 1981,
pg. 55
619
Author’s own calculations.
209
resulting in the separate Royal Air Force. As John Abbatiello describes the impact of these
technologies: “Most importantly, aircraft and submarines pushed naval warfare into three
dimensions, adding height and depth to the two-dimensional naval engagements of the past.”620
The British Navy During the War: 1914-1918
By summer of 1914 Britain was in a precarious position regarding its oil supply. Oil technology
had proven itself very capable of replacing coal, and there was no technical reason why all naval
ships could not burn oil.621 Both Fisher and Churchill had attempted to utilize various
committees and commissions to produce reports that he could leverage to convince the
Parliament that not only should Britain make this transition but also that enough supply could be
secured to ensure wartime needs would be met. Both the Pakenham Committee, and the Royal
Commission led by Fisher, had supported the conceptual use of the fuel, but demanded larger
reserves than Churchill thought necessary.622 Additionally, the British were not confident that
they could rely on the market to provide the necessary supply due to the influence of the large oil
monopolies, Standard Oil and Royal Dutch Shell.
Part of the British policy response to this situation was to purchase controlling shares in, and
otherwise support and provide capital investment to, the Anglo-Persian-Oil Company. While
A.P.O.C.’s survival was a central aim of Churchill’s oil policy, the upstart British Oil Company
620
Abbatiello, John J. Anti-Submarine Warfare in World War I. Cass Series: Naval Policy and
History. edited by Geoffrey Till New York: Routledge, 2006, pg. 12
621
Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from
Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 87
622
Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from
Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 87
210
could not provide all the oil needed by the Admiralty, who sought to diversify supplies.623 Two
other important pre-war suppliers for Britain were the Anglo-Saxon Oil Company and AngloMexican Petroleum Products Company Limited.624 It was the Pakenham Committee that had
explicitly examined issues of supply and needed reserves, and the figures provided from its
report were pessimistic. On the eve of the war Britain imported 93 percent of its oil fuel, and
storage facilities to hold reserves were minimal.625 The Pakenham report noted that by the end
of 1914 Britain was estimated to complete enough storage for 471,000 tons of oil, and
considered the need to build enough storage for at least 1,000,000 more tons essential.626
“If Pakenham’s recommendations were fully implemented the Admiralty would have to
find at least an additional £8,079,000 for 2,190,000 tons of oil over the next eight years,
on top of the £9,152,000 required for normal consumption and a reserve of four months’
war expenditure…The practicality of paying for it all was not considered by the
Pakenham, a luxury the First Lord could not ignore.”627
Churchill had not obtained his desired results from the Pakenham Committee or the Royal
Commission, and found he needed to reject the conclusions of these bodies and instead rely on
the newly created Naval War Staff (NWS).628 Thus, Churchill placed tighter restrictions on the
work of the NWS; in particular, he limited the assumptions to be made about oil price, oil
availability, and Britain’s ability to retain command of the sea in wartime.629 Churchill’s various
maneuverings represented an attempt to reconcile two factors, the extremely large and expensive
reserve requirements demanded by the Navy, and the limits on spending demanded by the
623
Ibid, pg. 100-101
Ibid, pg. 101-102
625
Ibid, pg. 102
626
Ibid
627
Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from
Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 103
628
Ibid, pg. 107
629
Ibid, pg. 108
624
211
Cabinet.630 Churchill’s achievement was to convince Parliament to fund an increase in the oil
reserves from four months estimated consumption to six months estimated consumption.631
The beginning of hostilities in August tipped the scales in Churchill’s favor regarding the British
coal-to-oil transition, particularly when it came to new construction of capital ships, as the R
Class was converted from a dual-firing class to a strictly oil burning class.632 Churchill’s retort
to concerns about cost and the price of oil was that during a war, money would be no object.633
The First World War witnessed a dramatic increase in the use of petroleum fuel for all involved,
Britain in particular.634 Also, the beginning of the War represents the high water mark for British
domestic coal production.635
Figure 5.6 – British Coal production 1820-present
(Rutledge, David. "Estimating Long-Term World Coal Production with Logit and Probit Transforms." International Journal of Coal Geology
85, 2011)
630
Ibid, pg. 114
Ibid
632
Ibid, pg. 106
633
Ibid, pg. 134
634
Snyder, David Allan. "Petroleum and Power: Naval Fuel Technology and the AngloAmerican Struggle for Core Hegemony, 1889-1922." Texas A&M University, 2001, pg. 240
635
Rutledge, David. "Estimating Long-Term World Coal Production with Logit and Probit
Transforms." International Journal of Coal Geology 85 (2011): pg. 24
631
212
British overall oil imports doubled between 1914 and 1917, from roughly 2.5 million tons to 5
million tons, and 70% of all British oil imports by 1917 were fuel oil for naval use.636 All of the
recently developed vehicles utilized in the war effort relied on petroleum, including 60,000
trucks, and 22,000 airplanes, while oil even became a crucial component of munitions, supplying
toluol needed for TNT.637 British dependence on imported oil was particularly acute, however
oil was not extraordinarily unique in this sense. The British populace relied upon imports for
roughly one-half of its daily caloric intake.638 British grain consumption was made up of fourfifths imported grain.639 Much raw material for the British Steel industry was also imported,
including iron and manganese.640 This reality highlights why the assumption that Britain could
maintain command of the seas during a war was such a contentious one between Churchill,
Fisher, Pakenham, and others at the Admiralty. The Germans, aware of these vulnerabilities,
aimed to disrupt this trade and force Britain to sue for peace, a policy that culminated in
unrestricted submarine warfare; and it almost succeeded.
The British need to protect a global network of trade would have been difficult to administer
even in peacetime, and with the fleet concentrated in home waters to manage the conflict with
Germany, using any part of the fleet to protect far flung trade ships and routes was not practical.
The British strategy entailed calling on Imperial governments (including India, the Gold Coast,
636
Snyder, David Allan. "Petroleum and Power: Naval Fuel Technology and the AngloAmerican Struggle for Core Hegemony, 1889-1922." Texas A&M University, 2001, pg. 240
637
Jones, Geoffrey. The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry. Studies in Business
History. edited by and Leslie Pressnell Leslie Hannah London: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1981,
pg. 177
638
Patee, Phillip G. "A Great and Urgent Imperial Service: British Strategy for Imperial Defense
During the Great War, 1914-1918." Temple University, 2010, pg. 2
639
Ibid, pg. 4
640
Ibid, pg. 7
213
South Africa, Australia, New Zealand,) and allies such as Japan, to lead efforts to take control of,
or destroy, German outposts and radio stations in their colonial territories.641
“These campaigns, the British hoped, would keep German commerce raiding
disorganized, and probably curtail it altogether by denying advanced-base support to
German naval operations. Success would enhance British control of the seas without
drawing essential naval resources away from the North Sea. Great Britain would
maintain its crucial flow of food, raw materials and oil, and still concentrate its
professional army in Europe. In addition to providing an economy-of-force method of
protecting British interests, this strategy simultaneously struck a blow at Germany by
curtailing German sea commerce.”642
British capacity for tracking the world’s ships on the high seas was impressive, and in part, this
was because of British experience as the world’s leading coal producer. The Naval Intelligence
Department, by pooling its efforts with the Trade division, was able to effectively track all the
world’s ships of war.643 This was made possible in part because of the predictable needs for
coaling, and British control of much of the coaling industry provided experience and relevant
information regarding trade routes and coaling stops of ships.644 With the speed of
communications increased by wireless radio, the British could direct ships out of harm’s way
preventatively, instead of using naval ships to respond to merchant ships after they had been
attacked.
“The Board of Trade pooled economic intelligence with Admiralty intelligence. The Post
Office, which controlled most of the world’s telegraphic communications, shared any
intercepted and decrypted foreign communications with British Intelligence services.
The NID Trade and Intelligence divisions pooled their efforts and maintained a daily
track of every ship of war, foreign and British, worldwide…Sighting reports from
regional intelligence officers, customs, consular and diplomatic sources, and of course,
the Lloyds signal stations were collated with other relevant data and the results plotted
daily on a large wall chart in what quickly became known as the “war room.” This was
not all. War room plotting factored in predictions of likely movements based on analysis
641
Patee, Phillip G. "A Great and Urgent Imperial Service: British Strategy for Imperial Defense
During the Great War, 1914-1918." Temple University, 2010, pg. xvii - xix
642
Ibid
643
Ibid, pg. 119
644
Ibid
214
of ship logistics. The Admiralty also tracked the world’s colliers, about 75 percent of
them being British; coal supply largely governed the destination of any ship and assisted
the Admiralty in forecasting a potential enemy’s strategy. In 1905, the plot was updated
daily, by 1908, every four hours. By 1914, the process had been refined so that a plot
was maintained almost in real time.”645
Yet even this level of efficiency could not track ships that could not be seen. The German
utilization of submarines in an unrestricted manner began to decimate British and Allied
shipping, and the success of the German U-boats negatively impacted British ability to import
goods to the point of crisis.
Germany had not been among the early pioneers of submarine technology, due in part to the
order of Alfred von Tirpitz that no money was to be spent on experimental vessels until their
effectiveness had been completely proven.646 Additionally, the British, as well as her allies,
generally underestimated the capability and endurance of German U-boats prior to the beginning
of unrestricted submarine warfare in February of 1917.647 There were four types of German Uboats; patrol U-boats, fleet U-boats, coastal U-boat minelayers (UC class), and coastal patrol Uboats.648 Increase in German U-boat construction during the war was dramatic and the Germans
appeared to be the only belligerent insistent on using these craft in an offensive manner.
“In August 1914, the Germans had 24 operational U-boats, all base with the High Seas
Fleet in north-western Germany. A rapid expansion of the U-boat Construction
programme coupled with opportunities for service in other theatres meant that by
February 1917, the start of the unrestricted campaign, the Germans had 105 operational
boats: 46 of these served with the High Seas Fleet flotillas, 23 were in Flanders, 26
worked from the Mediterranean bases at Pola, Cattaro, and Constantinople, and 10 more
served in the Baltic. If training units are added, the total number of U-boats in
645
Ibid, pg. 28
Douglas, Lawrence Henry. "Submarine Disarmament: 1919-1936." Syracuse University,
1970, pg. 39
647
Ibid, pg. 41
648
Abbatiello, John J. Anti-Submarine Warfare in World War I. Cass Series: Naval Policy and
History. edited by Geoffrey Till New York: Routledge, 2006, pg. 36-37
646
215
commission during that time was 152. This total U-boat strength peaked in mid-1918
with about 175 commissioned boats in German service.”649
During early 1915 the loss of the German battle-cruiser Blucher at Dogger Bank led to a new
German Commander in Chief of the High Sea Fleet, Admiral Von Pohl, and a week later the
Kaiser announced that the territorial waters around the British Isles would be considered a war
zone.650 The Germans intended to sink any merchant ship they encountered, beginning the first
round of unrestricted U-boat warfare.651 In the spring of 1915 the German U-boat inspectorate
made plans to dramatically increase U-boat construction over the next year.652 In September
1915, amongst serious policy disagreements in the German leadership over U-boat policy,
Henning von Hotzendorff was appointed by the Kaiser to the position of German Navy Chief of
Admiralty Staff.653 On August 27th, 1916, Holtzendorff submitted his memorandum advocating
the advantages of removing the restraints on U-boat warfare.654 Based on the research of Dr.
Richard Fuss, Holtzendorff believed that Germany could compel Britain to sue for peace in as
quickly as six months by sinking roughly 630,000 tons of merchant shipping per month.655 If
this strategy were to be successful, increased U-boat construction would likely be necessary.
Gary Weir argues that the wait-and-see approach that the Germans took to U-boat technology in
the decade prior to the war had a serious negative impact on German ability to accomplish the
649
Ibid, pg. 37
Douglas, Lawrence Henry. "Submarine Disarmament: 1919-1936." Syracuse University,
1970, pg. 46
651
Ibid
652
Weir, Gary E. "Tirpitz, Technology, and Building U-Boats, 1897-1916." The International
History Review 6, no. No. 2 (May 1984), pg. 185-186
653
Steffen, Dirk. "The Holtzendorff Memorandum of 22 December 1916 and Germany's
Declaration of Unrestricted U-Boat Warfare." The Journal of Military History 68, no. 1 (2004),
pg. 215-16
654
Ibid, pg. 216
655
Ibid
650
216
construction goals that had been set out.656 Nonetheless, the periods of unrestricted submarine
warfare, particularly after February 1917, had a tremendous impact on Britain’s ability to import
needed resources and supplies, in particular, supplies of oil.657 By May 1917, British petroleum
reserves were at 60% of their preferred level, and by the beginning of the summer:
“…the situation had grown critical. German Submarines had sunk tankers totaling sixty
thousand tons of cargo capacity in just the first three weeks of June 1917, leaving Britain
with but six weeks worth of oil fuel. Officials in London requested that the United States
take drastic action, including diverting oil shipments bound for neutral ports to the United
Kingdom instead.”658
Jones describes this crisis as fully revealing the British Navy’s dependence on foreign fuels, and
that the situation forced the British to send “urgent and humiliating” messages to the United
States that if the Americans did not send more oil, the Royal Navy would be immobilized.659
This situation resulted in various responses by the British, as well as the Allies. First, the
increased use of ballast tanks on cargo steamers and liners as “double-bottoms,” authorized by
the Cabinet in June 1917, helped to improve the supply situation by successfully bringing in over
240,000 tons of oil.660 Yet the most significant solution to the submarine menace itself was the
use of the convoy system, which reduced the tactical efficiency of the submarine.661 The convoy
system is credited with the reduction in U-boat sinking of oil tankers from three per month in
656
Weir, Gary E. "Tirpitz, Technology, and Building U-Boats, 1897-1916." The International
History Review 6, no. No. 2 (May 1984), pg. 186
657
Snyder, David Allan. "Petroleum and Power: Naval Fuel Technology and the AngloAmerican Struggle for Core Hegemony, 1889-1922." Texas A&M University, 2001, pg. 240,
See also Jones, G. Gareth. "The British Government and the Oil Companies 1912-1924: The
Search for an Oil Policy." The Historical Journal 20, no. 3 (September 1977), pg. 657
658
Snyder, David Allan. "Petroleum and Power: Naval Fuel Technology and the AngloAmerican Struggle for Core Hegemony, 1889-1922." Texas A&M University, 2001, pg. 240
659
Jones, G. Gareth. "The British Government and the Oil Companies 1912-1924: The Search
for an Oil Policy." The Historical Journal 20, no. 3 (September 1977), pg. 657-58
660
Ibid, 664
661
Snyder, David Allan. "Petroleum and Power: Naval Fuel Technology and the AngloAmerican Struggle for Core Hegemony, 1889-1922." Texas A&M University, 2001, pg. 248,
See also Jones, G. Gareth. "The British Government and the Oil Companies 1912-1924: The
Search for an Oil Policy." The Historical Journal 20, no. 3 (September 1977), pg. 664
217
mid 1917, down to an average of only one per month.662 The figures on colliers and oil tankers
lost to submarine attacks clearly demonstrate the increased effectiveness of unrestricted
submarine warfare.
Figure 5.7 – British Colliers sunk 1914-1918
(Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from Coal to Oil." Doctoral
Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg 301)
Figure 5.8 – British Oilers sunk 1914-1918
(Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from Coal to Oil." Doctoral
Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 302)
The number of tanker and collier sinkings demonstrate clearly that unrestricted warfare could be
terribly successful. The amount of total mercantile tonnage sunk by German U-boats was
662
Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from
Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 153
218
astounding, even before January 1917; in the last part of 1914 only four merchant ships were
sunk by U-boats, yet by the end of 1915 that number was 568.663 Political Science Quarterly
published data on the first two years of the war indicating that the Germans had sunk 2,400
ships, with a gross tonnage of 4,000,000 tons, equating to roughly 8.5% of the world’s total
mercantile tonnage.664 The high water mark in the unrestricted U-boat campaign was in April
1917, during which 423 vessels were destroyed.665 The total number of allied losses due to Uboats during the war were staggering, tallied at 5,711 vessels, or roughly 12,000,000 tons, and
over 20,000 non-combatant lives.666 Jellicoe was convinced that if something were not done to
counter the U-boat, the Germans would win the war.667 While the number of ships lost are
frankly astounding, a visualization of the U-boat war prosecuted by the Germans can more
readily demonstrate the scope and impact advantage of using new energy technologies in new
ways, as these maps of U-boat attacks throughout the war demonstrate (Red dots represent
passenger ships, blue dots military ships, and orange dots commercial ships).668
663
Douglas, Lawrence Henry. "Submarine Disarmament: 1919-1936." Syracuse University,
1970, pg. 49
664
"I. The European War." Political Science Quarterly 32, no. 3 (September 1917), pg. 12
665
Douglas, Lawrence Henry. "Submarine Disarmament: 1919-1936." Syracuse University,
1970, pg. 50
666
Ibid
667
Ibid, pg. 51
668
All maps are screenshots from an interactive map of submarine attacks during world war one
which may be found at http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/map-shows-full-extentdevastation-wrought-uboats-world-war-i-180955191/?no-ist, on the website of the Smithsonian.
219
Map 5.1 – German U-Boat attacks around the British Isles 1914-15
1914-1915
Map 5.2 – German U-Boat attacks around the British Isles 1916
1916
220
Map 5.3 – German U-Boat attacks around the British Isles 1917
1917
Map 5.4 – German U-Boat attacks around the British Isles 1918
1918
(all maps from www.smithsonian.com, interactive map application can be found at
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/map-shows-full-extent-devastation-wrought-uboats-world-war-i-180955191/?no-ist;
accessed on June 21, 2016)
221
The British Government was convinced by this crisis to dramatically re-organize its “ramshackle
organization” responsible for the control and regulation of petroleum supplies.669 Responsibility
for this re-organization fell to Walter Long and John Cadman, who in December 1917 created
the Petroleum Executive and planned for a full ministry of petroleum affairs.670 Snyder
describes the various bureaucratic bodies created by the British as “bewildering”; such bodies
included the Mineral and Oil Production Department (domestic production), the Pool Board
(allied effort regarding distribution), the Petrol Control Department (concerning conservation
efforts),671 and the Petroleum Imperial Policy Committee (tasked to develop a long term oil
strategy).672 The Petroleum Executive was charged with overseeing all general matters regarding
oil policy.673
Through the Petroleum Executive, Long and Cadman instigated a change of view toward the
Shell group among those in the British government, and in the process agitated Charles
Greenway and Admiral Slade, who saw this as likely to erode the position of privilege held by
A.P.O.C.674 Slade had resigned from his government position to become director and vicechairman of A.P.O.C. and yet continued to advise the Admiralty on matters related to oil.675
669
Jones, Geoffrey. The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry. Studies in Business
History. edited by and Leslie Pressnell Leslie Hannah London: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1981,
pg. 195
670
Ibid, pg. 196
671
Snyder, David Allan. "Petroleum and Power: Naval Fuel Technology and the AngloAmerican Struggle for Core Hegemony, 1889-1922." Texas A&M University, 2001, pg. 242
672
Jones, G. Gareth. "The British Government and the Oil Companies 1912-1924: The Search
for an Oil Policy." The Historical Journal 20, no. 3 (September 1977), pg. 665
673
Snyder, David Allan. "Petroleum and Power: Naval Fuel Technology and the AngloAmerican Struggle for Core Hegemony, 1889-1922." Texas A&M University, 2001, pg. 242
674
Jones, Geoffrey. The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry. Studies in Business
History. edited by and Leslie Pressnell Leslie Hannah London: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1981,
pg.196-97
675
Ibid, pg. 197
222
Slade took advantage of his unique position to place a memorandum in front of the War Cabinet
that appeared to be an official Admiralty memorandum, the content of which included two
important aspects: 1) it stressed that the Persian and Mesopotamian oil fields were likely the
largest undeveloped oil resources on the planet and 2) it urged that the Shell group ought not be
allowed to participate in the development of these fields.676
This maneuver by Slade irritated the Admiralty, as Slade had bypassed several Admiralty
officers who should have had a role in reviewing any memorandum prior to it being sent to the
War Cabinet, namely, the Fourth Sea Lord as well as the Civil Lord E.G. Pretyman.677
Additionally, this move by Slade annoyed the newly created Petroleum Executive, and Cadman
expressed irritation that an oil company vice-chairman was able to write such a memorandum
directly from the Admiralty.678
In the end, Slade’s attempt to ensure the Shell Group did not obtain an interest in the
Mesopotamian oil field development backfired, and although the deal was not signed until after
the War, the British government ultimately decided to purchase a controlling stake in the Shell
group.679 The British were able to leverage their strong geopolitical position in Mesopotamia at
the end of the War to procure financial control over Shell.
“The attempts at securing British Control of the Shell Group were intensified with the
support of the Petroleum Executive…At first the negotiations with Shell were difficult,
and the committee rejected a Shell proposal to acquire the governments shares in APOC.
Progress began to be made after the Armistice. The British domination of most of the
areas in the Middle East where oil was suspected proved a strong incentive to the Group
676
Ibid, pg. 197
Ibid, pg. 199
678
Ibid, pg. 200
679
Jones, G. Gareth. "The British Government and the Oil Companies 1912-1924: The Search
for an Oil Policy." The Historical Journal 20, no. 3 (September 1977), pg. 666
677
223
to make itself amenable to the government’s wishes. The promises of oil concessions,
above all in Mesopotamia, were made conditional on the rearrangement of the Group in
such a way as to give British interests a majority shareholding. The prospect of Shell’s
management of the Mesopotamian oilfields, Deterding wrote to Cadman in January 1919,
was ‘the main thing which induced [him] to all the other considerations. The agreement,
as initialed between Lord Harcourt and Henri Deterding in March 1919, did indeed reestablish the Group’s strong position in the TPC which it had lost because of the British
government in 1914. The Shell Group was to have an equal 34% share with APOC in
any company formed to exploit the Mesopotamian oil-fields, as well as control of that
company for the first seven years of its existence. In return, the Shell Transport and
Trading Company and a certain number of the Group’s operating companies in various
parts of the world were to become controlled by British subjects with a government
nominee, the governor of the Bank of England, on their boards.”680
British efforts to ensure their control over large oil companies stemmed from anxiety about a
lack of domestic supply, and a desire to develop some sense of independence from the influence
and supply of the large oil monopolies. Many of these decisions and policies were aimed at the
long-term supply situation and could not impact the immediate fuel crisis brought on by
unrestricted submarine warfare. Thus, cooperation with the allies, and cooperation with the large
oil companies was ultimately needed to ensure success of the war effort.681 The Allies created
the Inter-Allied Petroleum Conference (IAPC) in early 1918 in order to centralize and pool the
oil supplies among themselves.682 However, the “inescapable reality”, as described by Snyder, is
that the United States provided 80% of the oil used by the Allies.683 The percentage of oil
imports to the UK provided by the United States was even higher.684
680
Ibid
Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from
Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 174
682
Snyder, David Allan. "Petroleum and Power: Naval Fuel Technology and the AngloAmerican Struggle for Core Hegemony, 1889-1922." Texas A&M University, 2001, pg. 242-243
683
Ibid, pg. 243
684
Jones, Geoffrey. The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry. Studies in Business
History. edited by and Leslie Pressnell Leslie Hannah London: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1981,
pg. 232
681
224
British domestic regulatory measures to ensure state influence over the oil markets also
proceeded, with a bill introduced in August 1917 that reserved to the Crown the exclusive right
to explore for oil in the British Isles.685 Although this legislation was rejected, it was replaced in
1918 by the Petroleum Production Act, which allowed the British government to control oil
drilling through the provision of licenses.686 Yet, British domestic regulatory policies could have
only minimal impact on Britain’s oil security, as physical supply lay elsewhere. The British
were left with financial control over those corporate entities that could access oil as their ultimate
recourse in their attempt to reduce their reliance on the Americans, and the large oil monopolies.
From 1914-1920, A.P.O.C. shipped 1,625,000 long tons of fuel oil to Britain, primarily from its
Abadan refinery.687 The United States shipped some 55 million barrels of oil to Britain prior to
the American entry into the war, which equates to 7,401,248 long tons.688 After the Americans
joined the Allies, its role in supplying allied oil increased further.689
Britain had taken quite a leap of faith in its transition from coal to oil for fueling its Navy. The
Admiralty did not need convincing of the usefulness of the resource; instead, consistent and
secure supply in wartime was the primary obstacle. Even this issue was not resolved fully until
well after the war. The development and diffusion of oil based technology by competitors, as
well as research and development domestically, pushed Britain into a compromising position.
Naval technology had been the cornerstone of British national security for hundreds of years, and
at this time that technology was being revolutionized by the utilization of a resource that Britain
685
Ibid, pg. 202
Ibid, pg. 202-203
687
Snyder, David Allan. "Petroleum and Power: Naval Fuel Technology and the AngloAmerican Struggle for Core Hegemony, 1889-1922." Texas A&M University, 2001, pg. 257
688
Ibid; barrels to long tons conversion calculated by the author
689
Ibid
686
225
did not possess. During the war attacks on the importation of this resource (by a newly created,
oil centric technology) came dangerously close to being an “Achilles heel” for the British. This
was dramatically different than the circumstances Britain experienced in the age of coal fired
vessels, and rectifying what was seen as a serious strategic weakness drove British oil politics
and policy.
Conclusions
The transition from coal to oil for fueling industrial machinery began in force among the world’s
naval organizations. The British, with their historical reliance on the Royal Navy for national
security and protection of the Empire, in many ways were ahead of their competitors in exploring
and implementing this transition. In designing and building modern oil-burning warships, both
battleships and cruisers, the British had a substantial edge. In exploring the new modes of travel
spurred by oil technological developments prior to the war, the British led the world in
submarine construction, with seventy-six boats built and twenty building by 1914.690 Ironically,
it was the German use of submarines that was to cause the greatest threat to the British during the
war, despite German delay in initially constructing the new vessels. As for aircraft, while the
British had been initially slow to see the potential of such craft, they did ultimately create the
Royal Flying Corps by 1912, launched seaplanes off of the Hermes,691 as well as launched a
torpedo from a seaplane before the war began.692 These events represent examples of relatively
rapid diffusion of oil-based technology, and in the case of submarines, the British demonstrated a
commitment to building such vessels in large numbers prior to the outbreak of war.
690
Douglas, Lawrence Henry. "Submarine Disarmament: 1919-1936." Syracuse University,
1970, pg. 40-41
691
The Americans had accomplished this feat a few years earlier, see chapter 3
692
Pulsipher, Lewis Errol. "Aircraft and the Royal Navy, 1908-1918." Duke University, 1981,
pg. 369-370
226
British commitment to oil technology was slowed by several factors. The first was the enjoyable
position the British held in terms of coal. Britain exercised a large degree of control over the
coal industry, and in particular control over the type coal preferred for Naval use. To transition
away from such a favorable circumstance seemed dangerous to many. Yet the British did
transition the large majority of its major ships to oil-burning prior to the war, with the exception
of the building program of 1913-1914, which was converted late in construction to be oilburning after War broke out.693 The second factor was geologic in nature. The British Isles
simply did not possess any major competitive source of oil. Differing views about the degree to
which this should impact the decision to transition were held by various individuals, including
Jack Fisher, William Pakenham, Ernest Prettyman, and Winston Churchill. It is this second
factor that prompted a change in how the British government interacted with the oil market and
major oil companies, and this substantially impacted overall British oil policy. In the concluding
chapter, the author will compare and contrast the policy decisions and actions of the Navies and
governments of the United States and Great Britain. The objective is to highlight the impact of
this energy transition on the relationship between the respective states, their naval organizations,
the oil industry and its primary corporate actors.
693
Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from
Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 106
227
6
Comparative Analysis of the U.S. and British transition from Coal to Oil
Overarching goal of the research
The larger goal of this dissertation is to understand the reactions by states to major energy
transitions. Current popular and academic discourse on energy has recently acknowledged the
likelihood of future transitions away from fossil fuels and towards more renewable resources.
With this in mind, the decision was made to examine the first of these modern energy transitions:
from coal to oil. Great power navies and their decision to transition their fleets to being powered
by oil encapsulate this transition.
The more specific goal of this dissertation is to create a typology of state responses to energy
transitions. The author has traced the process by which the US and British navies and their
respective governments investigated, debated, and decided to leave coal behind, choosing to
build their primary tools for power projection on oil based technology. In doing so the author
hopes to illuminate these state responses to energy transitions, and to generate a typology of
generalizable propositions about how states are likely to responds to future transitions. The
primary case studies are the United States Navy and the British Navy. From these case studies a
typology will be created, and then used to briefly discuss other state navies, namely the German,
Japanese, French and the Russians. First, I will briefly reiterate my methodological approach,
and describe the role of the comparative case study.
The approach used here to understand state responses – and military responses in particular – to
energy transitions has followed the lead of historians and political scientists in focusing on the
228
social process of technological development.694 Relevant questions that this research has aimed
to answer in investigating the nature of energy transition from coal to oil include:
“Who are the stakeholder groups? What kind[s] of interactions are likely to take place
between them? How will these interactions affect the outcome of the technologyintroduction process? What can we learn about the interests and values of social groups
and institutions that will allow us to analyze the form and content of that interaction?
What constraints do these values and interests place on the likely outcome?”695
More specifically, the goal is to create a typology that will classify the various responses to this
diffusion on the part of the American and British navies. What developments led to the decision
to embrace this new energy technology? How and by whom was such a decision reached? What
individuals, organizations, branches of government, or corporations were advocating for such a
change and which were not? How did such a change impact military doctrine, policy, and
posture? By addressing such questions, this work hopes to shed light on how states perceive the
role of energy in terms of military security and also on how impactful energy transitions can be.
Increased understanding of these issues will provide some guidance on how states and their
militaries might respond to likely future energy transitions. This type of research is well suited
for the methodology of comparative case studies. Detailed, historical, qualitative case studies
can be used as building blocks to develop and refine typological theory.
“The analytical approach informing this volume is the comparative case study method.
Case studies are used inductively to develop and refine typological theory though a
“building block” approach. This approach is particularly useful in new or emerging
research programs to generate theory. The authors in this volume employ methods of
within-case analysis, particularly process tracing, in order to trace the causal pathways for
diffusion… [This] allow[s] us to trace the impact of a variety of factors (cultural,
economic, political, organizational, and technological) affecting how innovations are
assimilated, and their consequences for strategic behavior.”696
694
Frankel, Eugene. "Energy and Social Change: A Historian's Perspective." Policy Sciences 14,
no. 1 (1981): pg. 80
695
Ibid
696
Emily O. Goldman, Leslie C. Eliason, Ed. The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas.
Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2003, pg.22-23
229
In this study, the case under examination is the transition from coal to oil as the primary energy
resource used for machine power by state navies. My examination and “tracing” of this process
entails explication and description of the various governmental and naval policies that were both
reactions to aspects of this transition, and also in some instances actions that propelled the
transition forward. The British and American navies were at times re-active, and at other times
pro-active, in their relationship with the broader energy transition. Accordingly, this research
can be described as a within-case comparison of state and naval energy policies during an energy
transition. The independent variable is the overall socio-economic and technological transition.
The dependent variables consist of the litany of policies implemented in relation to that
transition.
The Typology
The various policy actions taken by states and their navies during this energy transition will be
outlined and categorized by type, and then will be placed within the two-by-two typology
described in chapter two. This typology originates in John Ikenberry’s work on state reactions to
the oil crises of the 1970s.697 In that work he categorizes state adjustments to the dramatically
different energy environment of that time. Such adjustments are categorized based upon policy
location (international/domestic) and strategic objective (defensive/offensive). Ikenberry used
this framework to analyze the American and international cooperative adjustment policies
utilized in reaction to the price spikes in oil during the 1970s; here the same framework will be
applied to the various policies of the U.S. and Britain during the transition from coal to oil.
Several factors justify the use of this typology, most importantly that it was created with the
697
Ikenberry, G. John. Reasons of State: Oil Politics and the Capacities of American
Government. Cornell Studies in Political Economy. Edited by Peter J. Katzenstein Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1988.
230
purpose of categorizing state responses to major change in the energy sector, and also that this
typology was created to analyze and assess state power and capability. Additionally, each of the
four categories created by this typology represent substantially different types of policy options
that often entail substantially different actions, possibilities, difficulties, and chances for success.
For example, Ikenberry notes that international offensive strategies, such as creation of
international institutions, are the most ambitious, requiring high levels of international
cooperation and institutionalization and often involve the creation of new “rules of the game.”698
Conversely, domestic defensive strategies, such as the erection of trade barriers or tariffs, can be
implemented unilaterally. By using this typology, the aim is to situate my research on state and
naval reactions to energy transitions within the broader debate about energy policy, national
security policy, and the theoretical debates described in chapter 3, as well as to make an original
contribution to that debate about the role of energy transitions. Lastly, another layer of
categorization must be added to this framework to better understand how the U.S. and Britain
navigated the transition from coal to oil.
Types of policy responses and transition eras
States have a variety of tools and mechanisms to affect policy change. In addition to
categorizing policies by their location (international/domestic), and their strategic objective
(offensive/defensive), one may categorize policies along different lines. Ikenberry’s typology
accounts for the where and the why of adjustment policies, but it does not account for the who
and the how of adjustment policies. Thus, my approach will first label policies as legislative,
executive, judicial, financial/monetary, political/military, or technological/research and
development policies. Once organized along these lines policies can be placed within the two698
Ibid, pg. 16
231
by-two matrix, and subsequent analysis will provide a more nuanced understanding of the overall
strategies taken by the U.S. and Britain during this energy transition, as well as of how state
strategies changed over time. Additionally, the historical narrative covered in this research is
divided into three stages, the investigative era from 1898-1905, the prewar transition from 19051913, and the wartime transition from 1914-1918. Matrices of categorized policies will be
created for each of the three eras, and will demonstrate how policies of state reaction changed
over time, as well as how they differed prior to, and during, World War I.
Comparative Analysis of US and British transition policies
The United States and Britain occupied different positions among the great powers at the turn of
the century. The U.S., having won the Spanish American war, had recently obtained its first
overseas colonial possessions, and was only beginning to come to terms with the realities of
being a global, colonial power. The British, on the other hand, were at the peak of their power,
with a vast global empire stretching from the North Sea to the Indian Ocean. Different concerns,
interests, and strategies accompanied these different positions. However, there was one major
quality shared by these two states, their geographic separation from mainland Europe. In
comparison to their French, German, and Russian counterparts, the British and Americans were
primarily maritime powers. As such, responsibility for their national security was mostly in the
hands of their respective navies. In this section, I will summarize the process by which these
navies transitioned away from coal, and towards the use of oil as the primary fuel for their fleet,
including the creation of oil burning fleets, and the development of oil-dependent submarines
and aircraft.
232
The United States
The Spanish American War prompted the first Congressional authorization of funding for the
purpose of exploration of the use of oil fuel to power naval vessels. Naval Secretary William H.
Moody described attempts at the use of oil for naval purpose as having occurred for forty years
prior to 1902.699 Moody clearly understood the implications of successful use of oil for
powering ships, and forecast that whichever military accomplishes this feat first would possess a
substantial military, and economic, advantage.700 In 1902 the Navy created the Liquid Fuel
Board under the Board of Steam Engineering to examine the relative qualities of coal and oil,
publishing their first report in 1904. One of the first achievements of this Board was the
realization that new methods for burning this fuel were necessary, and that many of the past
failures were the result of attempts to burn oil in the same fashion as coal.701 The Board also
emphasized the need for state support of experimental facilities, a need that stemmed from the
rapid nature of technological change at the time. The Board believed that the U.S. Navy needed
to be able to anticipate future desirable technological changes.702 At this stage, the Navy had a
cooperative relationship with certain private oil interests, interests that provided the needed oil
for experimental purposes. Additionally, in 1902 Congress appropriated $20,000 for further
experimentation.703
By 1904 the Navy recommended that one-third of U.S. torpedo boats and destroyers should burn
oil, and had begun planning for oil burning installations on various ships, namely the scout
699
The Navy Department, 'Annual Reports of the Navy Department', ed. by The Navy
Department (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1902), pg. 27
700
Ibid, pg. 720
701
Ibid, pg. 737
702
Ibid, pg. 719
703
Ibid, pg. 717
233
cruisers Intrepid and Alarm.704 Also in 1904 the U.S. had completed the contracts for 12
submarine boats, most of which were built by Holland company.705 In 1905 the U.S. completed
the designs for its first “Dreadnaught” class ship, the South Carolina, following the lead of the
British in capital ship design. In 1906 the US converted the U.S.S. Wyoming to oil burning, with
the expressed purpose of learning how burning oil might impact ship design, and also began
discussing the use of double-bottoms so that ships could carry oil as well as their regular
complement of coal.706 This marks the beginning of the “dual-firing” ship design period,
whereby navies understood the benefits of oil, but were unable, or unwilling, to forego the use of
coal. Outside of the Navy, in 1906 the Bureau of Corporations alleged illegal activity on the part
of Standard Oil, which led to legal action by the Attorney General, and ultimately led to the
forced breakup of Standard Oil in 1911. While the ruling of the Supreme Court in United States
v. Standard Oil Company of New Jersey was lauded by most at the time, it likely had negative
effects on petroleum market coordination and cooperation, qualities that the U.S. government
found itself attempting to induce during the war.707
In 1907 the Navy continued testing various submarine designs,708 and also continued designing
capital ships as “dual-firing.”709 Outside of fueling ships and submarines, the Navy noted by
704
The Navy Department. "Annual Report of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy
Department. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1904, pg. 902
705
The Navy Department. "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy." edited by The Navy
Department, 1255. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1905, pg. 690
706
The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy
Department, 1113. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1906, pg. 20
707
Jr., Robert L. Bradley. Oil, Gas & Government: The U.S. Experience. 2 vols. Vol. 1: Rowman
& Littlefield Publishers, 1996, pg. 230
708
The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy
Department, 1113. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1906, pg. 19
709
The Navy Department. "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy." edited by The Navy
Department, 1304. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1907, pg. 17-18
234
1907 an increased general use of oil for various purposes, including use in furnaces, foundries
and by blacksmiths.710 Also, in 1907 the Navy first began testing the use of small gasoline
engines.711 1908 saw the first investigation into the possibility of manned flight for military
purposes, and although, this initial test was sponsored by the Army, the Navy came away from
the test impressed by the possibilities that manned flight offered it.712 While experimentation
with flight on the part of the world’s militaries was in its infancy, submarines had become
accepted as a part of the fleet, although their usefulness was considered primarily defensive.713
The navy did continue to improve its use of submarines, however, and progress was achieved in
the utilization of turbo-diesel engines on submarine tenders for the purpose of charging
submarine batteries.714 By 1909 George Von Lengerke Meyer had taken several steps to prepare
for the ultimate conversion from coal to oil by the U.S. Navy, including increased construction of
oil depots and storage, and consolidation of the bureaucratic management of oil matters in the
hands of the Bureau of Navigation.715 By 1909, Meyer notes in the annual report that all future
battleships, and most destroyers, would be oil burning.716 Although this was not exactly the
case, as large battleships would be “dual-firing” until 1911, by 1910 practically all naval vessels
were built as oil burners and as a result the Navy began to discuss the need to build even more oil
storage facilities at outlying strategic locations.717 Moreover, in 1910, the U.S. Navy became the
710
Ibid, pg. 616-617
Ibid, pg. 740, 763-764
712
Miller, Nathan. The U.S. Navy: A History. 3rd ed. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997, pg.
175-176
713
The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy
Department, 1031. Washington D.C. : Government Printing Office, 1908, pg. 38
714
Ibid, pg. 301
715
The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy
Department, 1063. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1909, pg. 307
716
Ibid
717
The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy
Department, 832. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1910, pg. 25
711
235
first to have a plane successfully take off from a ship, demonstrating proof of concept for the
aircraft carrier.718
In 1911 the Navy sought to increase the efficiency of its crews, and instituted competitive testing
for fuel efficiency, while the U.S.S. Delaware demonstrated the efficiency of using oil as an
adjunct to coal by steaming to England and back without the need to take on extra fuel in the
process. Moreover, Congress provided appropriations for the first American battleships to burn
only oil, the U.S.S. Nevada and the U.S.S. Oklahoma, both subsequently laid down in 1912.719
Naval fuel oil consumption at this time stood at 16 million gallons in the fiscal year of 1912, and
as this number rose Naval Secretary Meyer called for more oil transport vessels, which indicated
a need for improvement in oil infrastructure.720 1912 saw substantial progress in the articulation
of Naval air doctrine, including discussion of ships as mobile air bases, development of catapults
for launching planes from ships and high altitude flight tests of up to 3,000 feet.721 At this time
the Navy still saw the primary purpose of planes as that of reconnaissance, yet the annual reports
began describing the possibility of using airplanes for attack purposes.722 1913 saw the
beginning of cooperation between the Navy and the Langley Aerodynamic Lab, as well as the
creation of the Advisory Committee on Aeronautics. Also in this year, the U.S. Navy discovered
that it could use airplanes to spot submarines during fleet exercises in Guantanamo Bay.723
718
Ibid, pg. 23
The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy
Department, 551. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1911, pg. 48
720
The Navy Department. "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy." edited by The Navy
Department, 608. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1912, pg. 266
721
Ibid, pg. 159-160
722
Ibid, pg. 156
723
The Navy Department. "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy." edited by The Navy
Department, 526. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1914, pg. 6
719
236
The elections of 1912 obtained for the Democrats control of both Congress and the White House.
President Wilson nominated a naval outsider, Josephus Daniels, as naval secretary. While
Secretary Daniels had been criticized for ignoring strategic matters, he did not ignore the
importance of the transition from coal to oil. In 1914 Daniels explicitly described coal as the
fuel of the past and in his first annual report extolled the benefits to be had from switching to
oil.724 Moreover, Daniels believed that it was crucial that the Navy independently control the
necessary resources to provide for the national defense, including oil.725 Under Daniels, the
Navy began to investigate the cost, feasibility and desirability of constructing a government
owned pipeline to carry oil from the midcontinent field in Oklahoma to the Gulf of Mexico.726
This project never came to pass, however, due to the Supreme Court ruling in 1914 that declared
oil pipelines as common carriers.
By 1914 the U.S. had launched its first all oil burning battleships, while continuing to pour
money into the new oil-dependent technologies of submarines and aircraft. The Navy designed
its first “fleet submarines” which were intended to operate in tandem with the larger fleet, the
development of which relied upon appropriately capable internal combustion engines.727
Meanwhile the Navy was pursuing a large investment of $5,000,000 for the purpose of
developing a “proper air service,” as aircraft development in Europe was seen as more advanced
than in the United States.728 While the Navy did not receive this amount of funding at this time,
such funding increased dramatically over the next several years, with $1.5 million appropriated
724
The Navy Department. "The Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy." edited by The
Navy Department, 558. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1913, pg. 227
725
Ibid, pg. 14-15
726
The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy
Department, 526. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1914, pg. 18
727
Ibid, pg. 63-64
728
Ibid, pg. 64-65
237
for the Naval Consulting Board, although only part of that Board’s work was focused on
aeronautics.729 It was America’s entry into the war that ultimately opened up the coffers for
aviation, and during the fiscal year beginning July 1 1916, total expenditure on aviation for the
Navy was an astounding $67,633,000.730
During the last two years of American neutrality there were several important developments
related to the transition from coal to oil. In 1915 the Navy designed and built its first airplane
independent of private interests.731 Congress passed the largest naval appropriations bill in
American history, while it was also agreed that the Navy should operate on five-year building
programs, instead of legislation being required annually. 732 Additionally, the Navy recruited
Thomas Edison to help lead the newly created Naval Consulting Board. This is significant as it
can be seen as a concerted effort by the Navy to harness the inventive and innovative capabilities
of the American scientific community. While at first these scientists were required to operate
voluntarily, by 1916 Congress had appropriated funds ($25,000) to ensure that these patriots
were paid for their endeavors.733 In addition to the Naval Consulting Board, the Committees of
Industrial Preparedness was created to provide an industrial inventory of various materials and
supplies that would likely be needed in wartime.734 In many ways the Committees of Industrial
729
The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy
Department, 831. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1916, pg. 68
730
The Navy Department. "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy." edited by The Navy
Department, 872. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1917, pg. 35
731
The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy
Department, 796. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1915, pg. 40
732
The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy
Department, 796. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1915, pg. 93
733
The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy
Department, 796. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1915, pg. 45-46
734
The Navy Department. "Annual Reports of the Navy Department." edited by The Navy
Department, 831. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1916, pg. 68
238
Preparedness can be seen as an important part of the mobilization process. This could also be
described as lesson-drawing, as the Americans had witnessed European nations fall short on
important industrial products needed for their war efforts such as shells and cartridges, a point
explicitly made by Secretary Daniels.735
In mid 1917 President Wilson created the War Industries Board, which replaced the Council of
National Defense. Within that bureaucratic structure, the Petroleum Advisory Committee was
replaced with the Petroleum War Service Committee.736 The War Industries Board, described as
the most powerful of all wartime agencies, was chaired by the former President of Standard Oil
of New Jersey, A.C. Bedford.737 This represents a rather dramatic shift in policy toward
Standard, from charges of corruption and the forced breakup of the monopoly in 1911 to
cooperative market regulation under the leadership of the former Standard President in 1917.
Under the authority of the Lever Act, President Wilson created the U.S. Fuel Administration, and
its sub-division, the Oil Division, which was headed by Mark Requa, an oil producer.738 Requa
was unable to implement price controls as head of the Oil Division, and thus was required to
persuade the industry to accept the current price quotations (of May 1918) as effective price
ceilings. This was a reversal of Requa’s previous laissez-faire position on the matter of
regulatory price controls for oil prices.739 This system was the first effective federal regulation
of the oil industry since its inception.740
735
Ibid
Robert L. Bradley Jr. Oil, Gas & Government: The U.S. Experience. 2 vols. Vol. 1: Rowman
& Littlefield Publishers, 1996, pg. 224
737
Ibid
738
Ibid, pg. 226-227
739
Ibid
740
Ibid
736
239
During the War, much of the activity of the U.S. Navy was focused on the threat of German
submarines, which was appropriate given that German use of submarines to attack merchant
shipping without warning had initially drawn the United States into the war. The Navy utilized
emergency provisions to alter the nature of vessel construction, putting more emphasis on the
destroyer. The need for destroyers was so great that the Navy was willing to delay further
construction of capital ships.741 The submarine had proven itself the most destructive new
weapon of the war, and prompted substantial efforts to create effective tools to counter it,
including depth charges, nets, specialized shells and the use of airplanes for spotting subs.742 In
its work on aviation, the Navy had developed the Liberty engine, which proved quite
satisfactory, becoming the Navy’s preferred engine for aviation during the war.743 Also,
America’s official status as a belligerent eased the process of cross-military cooperation and
information sharing on new developments in aviation among the allies.744 The progress of
aeronautical science prompted discussions of the creation of a third military branch by the
Aircraft Board, although this was ultimately rejected.745 Instead the Aircraft Board continued to
serve as a coordinating body between the Army, the Navy, and their respective aviation units.
In the summer of 1917 the implementation of the convoy system by the allies managed to
dramatically reduce the number of vessels sunk by German U-boats.746 As this campaign by the
Germans had substantially impacted the availability of oil tankers, the U.S. found a need to
741
The Navy Department. "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy." edited by The Navy
Department, 872. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1917, pg. 28-29
742
Ibid, pg. 225-229
743
Ibid, pg. 511-512
744
Ibid, pg. 36-37
745
Ibid, pg. 38
746
Rose, Lisle A. The Age of Navalism 1890-1918. Vol. 1, Columbia: University of Missouri
Press, 2007, pg. 260-261
240
requisition six such vessels from the private sector.747 The magnitude of this problem is evident
in the staggering level of oil consumption reached by allied navies during the war; the U.S. Navy
alone in 1918 consumed 4.5 million barrels of oil fuel, and over 11.5 million gallons of
gasoline.748 Fear that the Germans would continue to sink oil tankers even prompted the
construction of a trans-Scottish oil pipeline to shorten the distance that oil tankers needed to
travel.749
Before the war had ended, the role of petroleum in the provision of American national security
had become widely understood. While coal would still be needed for those ships built prior to
the transition to oil, the American navy would never again build vessels of war that required coal
for propulsion. The strategic qualities of the energy industry had changed. To sum up this point
in the Navy’s own words: “[A] nation that does not control an adequate oil supply can[not]
successfully maintain its forces in the field; the Navy must be supplied with fuel oil and
lubricants and the air forces with gasoline and lubricating oils if operations are to be successfully
conducted.”750 This statement equally applies to current military organizations.
The British Navy
At the beginning of the twentieth century, Great Britain was at the apex of her power but also
experiencing a period of relative decline. Other powers, namely the United States and Germany,
were beginning to erode the industrial dominance that the British had enjoyed since the industrial
747
The Navy Department. "Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy." edited by The Navy
Department, 1766. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1918, pg. 638
748
Ibid, pg. 99
749
Ibid, pg. 12
750
Ibid, pg. 138-139
241
revolution. 751 The major theme in British naval circles from the turn of the century until the
First World War was a focus on how Britain could maintain its naval dominance, and thus
protect its empire. This manifested itself in the form of the “two-power standard,” or the idea
that the British Navy should be greater in size and capability than the next two greatest navies.
Although this idea had been implicit in British naval planning for “well over a century,” it
became official British policy after joint maneuvers with the French navy in 1888.752 This idea
drove the British to consistently seek ways to improve their naval capabilities, both qualitatively
and quantitatively. As early as 1865 the British had experimented with oil as a fuel for naval
vessels.753 Yet it was not until tests led by Jack Fisher in 1898, 1899, and 1901, that the British
began to seriously examine the feasibility of an oil-powered navy.754
Fisher was a particularly important individual in the British transition from coal to oil, and he
was consistently ahead of his time in understanding the implications of technological change on
naval warfare. His experimental testing while he served as Controller of the Navy led to the
creation of the Admiralty Fuel Experiment Station at Davenport in 1902. Significantly, he had
social interactions with several of the most important oil-men of the time, meeting Marcus
Samuel in 1899 and William D’Arcy in 1903.755 In 1902 the British began testing oil-burning
751
Friedberg, Aaron L. The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 18951905 Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988, pg. 24
752
Hamilton, C. I. The Making of the Modern Admiralty: British Naval Policy-Making 18051927. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, pg. 210
753
Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from
Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 42
754
Snyder, David Allan. "Petroleum and Power: Naval Fuel Technology and the AngloAmerican Struggle for Core Hegemony, 1889-1922." Texas A&M University, 2001, pg. 125-126
755
Jones, Geoffrey. The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry. Studies in Business
History. edited by and Leslie Pressnell Leslie Hannah London: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1981,
pg. 15
242
machinery on destroyers, and also built their first submarine.756 The next year the British ordered
eight more submarines, demonstrating their commitment to being at the cutting edge of naval
technology.
In 1904 Fisher was made First Sea Lord. Considered an “oil-maniac,” Fisher worked tirelessly
to convince the admiralty and cabinet that oil was the fuel of the future.757 That same year the
British developed a process by which oil could be atomized without the use of compressed air
and made this technology a state secret by granting a secret patent for the device. This
development prompted Britain to adopt oil as an auxiliary fuel on all of its vessels, making the
royal fleet a “dual-burning” navy. 758 This decision cemented oil’s future use by the royal navy,
at a minimum as an adjunct to coal, and prompted official investigation of matters of oil supply.
The Prettyman Committee discovered what was likely known to many in the oil industry at the
time, namely that the British Empire produced very little oil, and also that the oil market was
dominated by large monopolies. Thus the Committee worked with the Colonial Office to create
policies that would encourage oil production.759 The Committee explicitly placed an emphasis
on private commercial development of oil fields, and later even suggested that the British
Government act as a lender of last resort by acquiring oil fields directly and leasing them to
private companies for development.760 This intervention into the oil markets, which included
other provisions such as right of first refusal to purchase production, was codified in the Oil
756
Douglas, Lawrence Henry. "Submarine Disarmament: 1919-1936." Syracuse University,
1970, pg. 31
757
Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from
Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 105
758
Ibid, pg. 51
759
Snyder, David Allan. "Petroleum and Power: Naval Fuel Technology and the AngloAmerican Struggle for Core Hegemony, 1889-1922." Texas A&M University, 2001, pg. 159-160
760
Ibid, pg. 160-161
243
Mines Act of Barbados.761 Britain found a need to intervene in the oil market, a practice that was
not necessary for coal. From 1905 on, Britain began implementing increasingly interventionist
policies for the purposes of ensuring access to oil for its Navy. The Admiralty and the Indian
government, took steps to exclude a subsidiary of Standard Oil, Asiatic Petroleum Company,
from the Indian Oil Market, while at the same time the Admiralty signed its first long term
contract with the Burmah Oil Company.762 This agreement with Burmah oil demonstrates
British concern over the nature of its oil suppliers, particularly that the British wanted to work
with British owned companies and feared that foreign oil interests would not be reliable suppliers
in wartime. As a result the contract with Burmah oil included the stipulation that there be no
alterations to the ownership of the company without the consent of the Admiralty.763
In 1907 the Admiralty rejected an offer from the Wright brothers, which would have given the
British the patents on the Wright’s planes. The Committee for Imperial Defense sub-committee
on aerial navigation was created in 1908, but concluded that aircraft development should be left
to the private sector due to minimal military applications for the technology.764 In hindsight
these decisions are difficult to understand, and Britain’s pre-war aeronautical development was
lacking in comparison to other powers, as Britain entered the war with only “200 ill assorted
aircraft.”765 The army dominated British air policy, and substantial airpower development in
761
Ibid
Ibid, pg. 164-167
763
Ibid, pg. 178-179
764
Pulsipher, Lewis Errol. "Aircraft and the Royal Navy, 1908-1918." Duke University, 1981,
pg. 29
765
Cooper, Malcolm. The Birth of Independent Air Power: British Air Policy in the First World
War. London: Allen & Unwin, 1986, pg. xv
762
244
Britain was only brought on by the war, by the end of which the British were producing 2,000
aircraft per month.766
In 1907 Jack Fisher first met Winston Churchill, and over time Fisher managed to convince
Churchill on the importance of transitioning the navy from coal to oil. 1908 saw the rupturing of
the first gusher oil well within the D’Arcy concession in Persia, a development that prompted the
incorporation of the Anglo Persian Oil Company in 1909.767 British desire for physical control
of a major oil supply led to the purchase of a controlling share of this company in 1914.768 By
1910, British destroyers were all oil burning ships, while battleships continued to use oil as an
auxiliary to coal.769 British funding for experimental aviation, while still lagging behind other
nations, was beginning to catch up, and in 1911 the Naval Flying School was organized.770
Where the British did not lag behind was in submarine construction. In 1911 the British had
become the leading builder of submarines in the world.771 By 1913 the British had a two to one
lead in submarines over the Germans, although it was the Germans who most effectively used
this new weapon during the war.772
766
Ibid, pg. xviii-xix
Jones, Geoffrey. The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry. Studies in Business
History. edited by and Leslie Pressnell Leslie Hannah London: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1981,
pg. 138-141
768
Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from
Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 97
769
Ibid, pg. 58-61
770
Pulsipher, Lewis Errol. "Aircraft and the Royal Navy, 1908-1918." Duke University, 1981,
pg. 39
771
Douglas, Lawrence Henry. "Submarine Disarmament: 1919-1936." Syracuse University,
1970, pg. 39-40
772
Sumida, Jon Tetsuro. In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology, and British
Naval Policy, 1889-1914. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989, pg. 264
767
245
Churchill became the First Lord of the Admiralty in 1911. He was determined by this time that
the Royal Navy would need to become an all oil-burning navy. When the Pakenham committee
failed to recommend such a transition, Churchill created the Royal Commission on Fuel and
Engines, appointing Fisher to head the effort. Displeased with the Royal Commission
recommendations regarding reserve supply necessary, Churchill turned to the newly created
Naval War Staff. Explaining his position to Parliament, Churchill boldly declared that the
British government should directly enter the oil business, thus arguing for a state created petrochemical industry.773
The 1913-1914 R-Class of British battleships was initially designed to burn coal, however after
the beginning of hostilities in 1914, these ships were converted to oil-burners.774 These would be
the last coal-burning ship designs ever produced by the British navy. Throughout the war, the
primary supplier of oil to the British was the United States. This was due to several factors.
First, the United States was simply the world’s largest producer at the time. Secondly, the U.S.
was conveniently located geographically so that such a supply was not particularly interrupted by
the war. Third, the U.S. and Britain were allies once the Americans joined the war, so
Washington had a vested interest in ensuring that the British had the supply they needed. This
third point likely explains the dramatic spike in U.S. oil imported to the U.K. in 1917 (see chart
on page 15 of chapter 5). Also at that time in the war, the British were experiencing reduced
supplies as a result of Germany’s unrestricted submarine warfare. By May of 1917 British oil
reserves were at 60 percent of their preferred levels and by June Britain had only six weeks of
773
Brown, Michael Warwick. "The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1889-1939; the Transition from
Coal to Oil." Doctoral Thesis, Kings College University of London, 2003, pg. 103-114
774
Ibid, pg. 106
246
supply left.775 The allied response included increased use of double bottoms for oil transport,
and more importantly, the implementation of the convoy system, the latter of which dramatically
reduced the effectiveness of the German submarine campaign.
In 1916 the British had agreed to particular spheres of influence in Mesopotamia with the French
in the infamous Sykes-Picot Treaty. By 1918 the British no longer supported the arrangement,
and instead sought to take control of the oil producing areas in Mesopotamia directly. The
British were aware that imperial conquest of this region was unlikely to be palatable to the other
powers, much less to the region’s inhabitants. Consequently, the British articulated their interest
in the region in terms that would appear more favorable to world opinion, while working to
ensure that they would control the mandate for the newly created state of Iraq after the war.
British political maneuvering over Iraq continued until well after the war’s end, however there
can be no doubt that early in the war the British were aware that oil reserves in the area were
likely the world’s largest, and that official British war policy was to maintain physical control
from Mosul to Basra.776
By the end of the war Britain had created the Petroleum Executive (PE). Overseen by John
Cadman, the PE was responsible for control and regulation of petroleum supplies, and was
planning for a full ministry of petroleum affairs.777 The number of other bureaucratic bodies
created by Britain related to oil is described by one scholar as “bewildering,” and included the
775
Snyder, David Allan. "Petroleum and Power: Naval Fuel Technology and the AngloAmerican Struggle for Core Hegemony, 1889-1922." Texas A&M University, 2001, pg. 240
776
For an excellent discussion of British policy in Iraq/Mesopotamia during this period see
Mejcher, Helmut. Imperial Quest for Oil: Iraq 1910-1928. London: Ithaca Press, 1976.
777
Jones, Geoffrey. The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry. Studies in Business
History. edited by and Leslie Pressnell Leslie Hannah London: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1981,
pg. 195-196
247
Mineral and Oil Production Department (domestic production), the Pool Board (allied effort
regarding distribution), the Petrol Control Department (concerning conservation efforts),778 and
the Petroleum Imperial Policy Committee (tasked to develop a long term oil strategy). 779 Lastly,
in 1918 Britain passed the Petroleum Production Act, which allowed the British government to
control oil drilling through the provision of licenses.780
The transition from coal to oil for fueling industrial machinery began in force among the world’s
naval organizations. The British, with their historical reliance on the Royal Navy for national
security and protection of the Empire, in many ways were ahead of their competitors in exploring
and implementing this transition. In designing and building modern oil-burning warships, both
battleships and cruisers, the British had a substantial edge. In exploring the new modes of travel
spurred by oil technological developments prior to the war, the British led the world in
submarine construction, with seventy-six boats built and twenty building by 1914.781 Ironically,
it was the German use of submarines that was to cause the greatest threat to the British during the
war, despite German delay in initially constructing the new vessels. As for aircraft, while the
British had initially been slow to see the potential of such craft, they did ultimately create the
Royal Flying Corps by 1912, launched seaplanes off of the Hermes,782 as well as launched a
torpedo from a seaplane before the war began.783 These events represent examples of relatively
778
Snyder, David Allan. "Petroleum and Power: Naval Fuel Technology and the AngloAmerican Struggle for Core Hegemony, 1889-1922." Texas A&M University, 2001, pg. 242
779
Jones, G. Gareth. "The British Government and the Oil Companies 1912-1924: The Search
for an Oil Policy." The Historical Journal 20, no. 3 (September 1977), pg. 665
780
Ibid, pg. 202-203
781
Douglas, Lawrence Henry. "Submarine Disarmament: 1919-1936." Syracuse University,
1970, pg. 40-41
782
The Americans had accomplished this feat a few years earlier, see chapter 3
783
Pulsipher, Lewis Errol. "Aircraft and the Royal Navy, 1908-1918." Duke University, 1981,
pg. 369-370
248
rapid diffusion of oil-based technology, and in the case of submarines, the British demonstrated a
commitment to building such vessels in large numbers prior to the outbreak of war.
Britain’s reliance on naval power led to an early start to its transition from coal to oil, and yet
lack of British domestic supply, and corresponding uncertainty about access to oil in wartime,
slowed this process. Thus the British relied on financial control, direct company ownership, and
imperial conquest to ensure physical control of supply, although the British were primarily
dependent upon the United States for the oil it needed throughout the period examined in this
work. The national security imperatives involved in fueling the Royal Navy led the British state
to directly and extensively interfere in the petroleum market, a dramatic change from the
relationship that had existed between the British state and the coal industry.
The research presented here traces the events between roughly 1900 and the end of the First
World War related to the transition from coal to oil made by great power navies of the time.
Using the American and British navies as within case comparison, one can distinguish between
different types of strategies used by these two maritime powers to navigate this transition and
best provide for their own national security. The development and diffusion of oil based
technology occurred primarily in the area of maritime propulsion technology used by navies for
power projection, the protection of sea trade routes and overseas possessions, the blockade of
enemies, and the attempted destruction of other similar fleets. By systematically classifying and
categorizing the litany of policy responses to this energy transition, I hope to provide a more
vivid picture of the impact of such transitions, and the strategies states may find useful in
reacting to them. Additionally, the research intends to show changes in these policy responses
249
over time, and through the different periods of the transition itself. Those periods are the
Investigative period from 1898-1905, the Pre-War Transition period from 1906-1913, and the
Wartime Transition period from 1914-1918. Moreover, I will seek to apply some lessons learned
from this research to the anticipated future energy transition away from oil and other fossil fuels,
toward more renewable and sustainable alternative.
The Investigative Period: 1898-1905
In this period the United States and Britain began examining whether or not fuel oil was a viable
alternative to using coal to power their ships. The United States obtained small amounts of
money from Congress for the purpose of experimental tests and in general these tests were seen
as demonstrating the great potential of fuel oil, albeit there were some difficulties. The U.S.
created the Liquid Fuel Board to examine oil-burning technology in 1902, which conducted the
Hollenstein water tube boiler tests in 1904. This led to the installation of oil burning engines on
scout cruisers, as well as retrofitting smaller ships for oil burning. Also, in 1904 the U.S. made
its first major submarine purchase, and designed its first “dreadnaught” battleship, representing
the zenith in coal powered ship technology.
Early recommendations that smaller ships should burn oil occurred in both navies. Britain’s
earliest thorough oil engine testing had come earlier than in the U.S., administered by Jack Fisher
between 1898 and 1901. This process instigated the building of two experiential laboratories for
developing oil burning technology, in Davenport in 1901 and at Haslar in 1902. These testing
facilities and their results led to a wholesale implementation of “dual-firing” ships, with its
policy of using oil as an auxiliary to coal on all vessels by 1904. Additionally the British had
250
developed a major innovation by inventing a way to atomize fuel oil without the use of steam or
compressed air, granting a secret patent for the device in 1904. Britain had also obtained its first
effective submarines earlier than in the United States, building its first Holland submarine in
1902, and ordering eight more the following year. In comparison with the United States it was
Britain’s policies designed to increase British control over supply that truly differentiated the two
states. The lack of British domestic supply induced policies intended to allow for state control
and manipulation of the oil industry, a process that was not as evident in American policy. The
British passed the Oil Mines Act of Barbados in 1904, giving the Admiralty certain privileges
and rights in terms of access to supply developed by private entities. Additionally the Admiralty
and British government encouraged British corporate control, and development of supplies
outside of the Empire, for example by ensuring requisite capital to keep the D’arcy concession in
British hands, and by signing long term contracts with British owned oil producers such as
Burmah Oil. Those contracts also included mercantilist clauses that ensured continued British
ownership of Burmah Oil Company.
Both states sought to be on the cutting edge of naval technology, yet for different reasons. The
United States was a rising power, and a newly colonial power, and thus needed to improve naval
capability to protect its new possessions. The British were losing their traditional edge in naval
power and spent an enormous amount of capital and effort to maintain that lead. Both states
created new bureaucratic organization and committees to establish how best to use this new fuel
for their own purposes, and in doing so, they impacted the trajectory of the transition. The oil
industry had been focused primarily on kerosene for illumination since the 1860s. As the
American and British navies began to increase their use of heavier fuel oil, they substantially
251
increased the market demand for something that had previously been a little used by-product of
kerosene refining. Additionally, as these navies continued to build more impressive, larger,
faster, and more powerful battleships, the problems with coal became more manifest, increasing
efforts to develop an alternative to the dirty and difficult-to-manage fuel.
The Pre-War Transition Period: 1906-1913
Between 1906 and 1913, the superior performance of burning oil for maritime purposes became
widely acknowledged. Accordingly, the American and British Navies sought to utilize oil as
widely as possible, where it was feasible and affordable. The United States, despite being the
world’s largest producer of oil at the time, was still concerned about cost and supply, and felt as
though it was at the mercy of large oil monopolies, such as Standard Oil. Such sentiment was
not new, having had existed in U.S. government and naval relations with the steel companies
during ship construction in the late 1800’s. To ensure supply the U.S. set aside certain oil
producing lands for the purposes of naval oil reserves, an issue that was to become a contentious
one between Congress and the Navy. The U.S. government also began taking measures to
reduce the amount of influence that Standard Oil had in the oil industry, with charges of
corruption and illegal activity coming from the Board of Corporations, and a lawsuit brought by
the Attorney General in 1906 that ultimately led to a Supreme Court ruling forcing the breakup
of Standard in 1911. The U.S. Navy continued to experiment with submarines, seeking
improved performance and capability, and also began to experiment with small internal
combustion gasoline engines. The latter of these developments related directly to the emergence
of manned flight, which was first accomplished in 1903. Within seven years of the Wright
brothers’ accomplishment, the Navy had managed to have a plane take off from a ship.
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The U.S. Navy performed a litany of technological tests and experiments, including on 2cylinder engines, and also on the comparative efficiencies of reciprocating engines and turbines.
Where it could not develop the technology on its own the Navy sometimes turned to the private
sector, as it did in 1909 when seeking new gasoline engine designs. It sent officers on
cooperative missions seeking new knowledge from European nations while also beginning
official cooperation with the Langley aeronautics labs. By the end of this period several policies
were firmly established. By 1909 it was believed by the Naval secretary that all future ships
would burn oil, not coal. Submarines were accepted as regular elements of the fleet, and a
doctrine based around coastal defense had developed. Aircraft were still primarily experimental,
yet it was firmly accepted by naval leaders that such machines would play an important role in
reconnaissance. In 1913 naval exercises in the Caribbean demonstrated that airplane pilots could
easily spot submarines, foreshadowing their role in anti-submarine operations in World War I.
Importantly, by 1913, the Navy was calling for direct control over the oil resources that it needed
for its operations, and as demonstrated by the breakup of Standard Oil in 1911, the U.S.
government felt that market competition was more conducive to its interests than
monopolization. Also, construction of needed oil infrastructure began in earnest during this
period, the logical corollary of the decision to switch the fleet to oil.
During the pre-war transition period, the British had firmly committed to being a leading
submarine power, having more of the submersible vessels than any other nation by 1911. This is
in contrast to their earlier rejection of manned flight technologies in 1907, although they quickly
253
reversed course on airpower by 1912. Moreover the Air Committee recommended the creation
of the Royal Flying Corps in 1912, which included both military and naval sections. In terms of
the Royal fleet, all but the largest battleships were burning only oil, yet Britain was not ready to
completely transition its battleships to oil. Britain favored dual-firing ships for several reasons.
First, Britain possessed a particularly large amount of coal. This supply was seen as completely
secure, even in wartime, and as long as its ships still possessed coal-burning machinery, Britain
could ensure that its fleet could operate, a strategic necessity for the island nation. Secondly,
Britain’s lack of domestic oil supplies produced substantial anxiety among the Admiralty as well
as the government, and induced caution in transitional policies. Maintaining dual-burning ships
was seen as an insurance policy against supply disruption. However, there were those who felt
that the benefits from making the transition complete were so great that it was risky for Britain to
fall behind rising competitors. Thus Churchill expended substantial effort, through the
Pakenham Committee, the Royal Commission of Fuel and Engines, and ultimately the Naval
War Staff, to convince the government and Parliament that such a transition was necessary,
regardless of the nature of the supply question. Much of Britain’s policy efforts to ensure
physical control of supply were financial and otherwise economic in nature. Through restrictive
contract agreements the British sought a long-term supply of oil, and also imposed ownership
requirements upon several suppliers that would ensure these corporate entities remained
quintessentially British. Churchill called for direct state participation in the oil industry, arguing
that the British government already owned businesses that produced other implements needed for
war. Over time, Churchill’s idea would come to pass, with British purchase of several oil
companies.
254
The Wartime Transition: 1914-1918
The onset of hostilities in Europe accelerated the transition from coal to oil, as control of, access
to, and the capability to utilize this new resource took on added urgency. In 1914 Britain
purchased controlling shares in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. The British also reversed its
decision to fuel the 1913-1914 class of battleships with coal, and converted them to oil-burning,
as, in the face of war, improved performance would carry elevated significance. By 1916 Britain
had established that conquest of oil producing areas of Mesopotamia would be first class war
aims, and set out to take control of the region from Mosul in the north to Basra in the south. The
unrestricted U-boat campaign took an extraordinary toll on British shipping, most importantly on
oil tankers bringing in oil supply, leading to a severe shortage in which Britain only possessed
six weeks of supply. In response the British began using double-bottom ships in earnest, and
also implemented the convoy system to reduce U-boat effectiveness. It is difficult to overstate
the dangerousness of this situation for Britain, and many Naval leaders, including Jellicoe, felt
that the U-boats might win the war for Germany. In 1918 the allies created the Inter-Allied
Petroleum Conference to coordinate supply sharing between the Americans, the British, and the
French. While the majority of allied oil came from the United States, Britain continued to try
and improve its own domestic control of supply, including the passage of the 1918 Petroleum
Production Act, creating a licensure system for any oil production at home. Technologically,
this period saw a dramatic increase of investment and production in airpower for Britain,
including the construction of 2,000 aircraft monthly. Organizationally, the British had several
bodies with specific jurisdiction related to oil matters, all of which fell under the Petroleum
Executive.
255
The United States did not join the war until April 1917, dragged into the conflict by the
unrestricted German U-boat Campaign. Yet the war’s beginning clearly impacted American
policy. In 1914 the U.S. government began examining the feasibility of building an oil pipeline
from Oklahoma to the Gulf of Mexico, including a refinery intended to sell refined product to
help pay for the process. Effectively, this resembles Churchill’s call for direct state involvement
in the oil markets. This move by the Americans was ultimately unnecessary, due to the ruling of
the Supreme Court making pipelines common carriers. The U.S. Congress, President Wilson,
and Secretary Daniels were convinced by the beginning of the war to dramatically increase
military spending, including the largest naval appropriations bill in U.S. history, and by 1917
there was over sixty-seven million dollars in spending on aircraft. The emergence of airpower
prompted discussion of a separate air branch of the military, although the Aircraft Board did not
recommend such a move. The creation of the American Air Force did not occur until 1947, after
the next world war. Like the British, the Americans also created multiple organizations designed
to oversee oil matters, including the Council of National Defense, the War Industries Board, the
U.S. Fuel Administration and its Oil Division, the National Petroleum War Service committee,
and the Petroleum Advisory Committee. The reasons for such a confusing mess of committees
and bureaucracies are several, including changes in available authority stemming from
Congressional legislation, and also pre and post wartime bodies that had different level of
authority.
Prior to the transition to oil by their respective navies, Britain and the United States imposed
very little regulation on the oil industry. As the fuel gained in popularity, and its role in national
security became more clear, each state demonstrated a willingness to intervene in the industry to
256
induce preferred conditions, despite the widely held laissez faire economic ideologies of the time
period. The British were so deeply tied to their naval dominance that it was seen as imperative
that they remain on the cutting edge of naval technologies. The United States was emerging as a
world power, continuing to grow in power, population, and geographic size. To maintain such
trends, and to project power across the two oceans that separated it from Europe and Asia, a
modern navy capable of competing with the European powers was necessary. The British
seemed slightly out in front in terms of adopting new technology, with the exception of the
airplane, although the British caught up relatively quickly. Both states utilized investigative
bureaucratic bodies to participate in scientific examinations of the benefits, and detriments, of
new oil technology, and both navies sought independent control over this new fuel outside of
market structures. Policies toward the oil markets differed substantially. The Americans
initially took steps to reduce the control of the oil industry by Standard Oil, successfully using a
judicial strategy to weaken the monopoly, although the approach toward the state’s relationship
with large oil companies became decidedly more cooperative once war was inevitable. In
Britain there was a substantially higher level of anxiety about the ability of oil monopolies to
take advantage of the British need for oil. The British sought not to break up oil monopolies, but
instead to create one of its own, resulting in the purchase of A.P.O.C., and also, albeit after the
war, of Royal Dutch Shell. While much of the American policy efforts were inward looking due
to high levels of domestic production, the British were forced to look outward, to her empire, and
took measures not only to increase imperial production levels but also to ensure that the Navy
would be the preferred customer for any oil production that did develop. Additionally, the
British felt compelled to resort to the outright conquest of oil producing territories, as
demonstrated by British policy in Mesopotamia. Interestingly, in the case of Iraq, Britain
257
understood that this would be widely unpopular, and took measures to establish non-oil related
arguments as to why the Iraqi mandate should be under the control of Britain.
This energy transition was likely to happen regardless of naval policy in the United States and
Britain. However, as these navies became involved in determining what use this fuel could be to
them, they shaped the nature of the emerging oil industry, developed new technologies, and
directly steered the activity of oil production, transport, and refinery operations worldwide. In
that sense, naval and state policy related to oil can be seen as both reactive and proactive, as it
relates to the energy transition. There was innovation stemming from the private sector that was
then coopted by the navies, and there was also independent innovation within the various navies.
The British navy developed oil atomization technology independently, and then kept it a secret.
The American navy was the first to demonstrate that a plane could take off from, and then land
back on, a ship. The Americans also did not invent manned flight, but without military demand
for better and better engines and aircraft design, aeronautical technology would certainly not
have developed as quickly as it did. Oil technology did not result in the creation of the
submarine, but naval research and development of improved submarine designs allowed for the
emergence of the most dangerous new weapon of the war. Thus this energy transition was
pushed forward by the interaction between private entrepreneurs and state national security
needs. The interplay of these different elements represents the primary transmission path for the
diffusion of oil related technology. The historical process by which such energy transitions
impact and change our society, our economy, and our militaries is extremely detailed and
complex, and more research must be done, even in the narrow context of the American and
British navies between 1900 and 1918. What is presented here is not a complete picture, but
258
instead an attempt to create building blocks upon which further research can be laid down. In the
next section, I will describe what lessons may be learned from this research, as well as the
implications that can be drawn about likely future transitions.
Conclusions
The primary driver of the diffusion of oil-based technology in this within-case comparison is
competition and imitation. As naval technology improved, and as states such as Germany and
the United States chipped away at traditional British naval advantages, the British responded
with continued construction and development to maintain their superiority. The Germans were
explicitly seeking to challenge British naval dominance, which provided a clear element of
political threat to what may have otherwise simply been regarded as technological development.
A similar situation existed in terms of the American-British relationship, as the United States had
finally constructed the tools necessary to enforce the Monroe Doctrine, although the relationship
between the United States and Britain was considerably more friendly than the relationship
between the British and the Germans. The naval arms race that developed has been described as
the most celebrated arms race in modern history, and is usually tabulated by a simple counting of
major naval vessels.784 In addition to this simple tally of ships, the type of vessel, namely the
dreadnaught, is said to have revolutionized warfare at the time. This approach to the
development of naval power misses the underlying energy transition that was occurring. The
dreadnaught did not bring about a new age of naval warfare; rather, it represented the end of the
older era. It was not the dreadnaught but the submarine, and later the aircraft carrier, that truly
revolutionized naval war. The new oil-centric technology had opened up two new dimensions of
784
Lambert, Nicholas A. "British Naval Policy, 1913-1914: Financial Limitation and Strategic
Revolution." The Journal of Modern History 67 (September 1995), pg. 596
259
warfare. The submarine instilled a substantial amount of fear in men who had spent their lives at
sea. Although aircraft, and manned flight, had been dreamt about for hundreds of years, it was
made possible with small petroleum powered engines. The early twentieth century arms race
was effectively an oil technology race. This was not widely understood until the war was well
underway, and those states that had been at the forefront of the process prior to the war did
possess an advantage in understanding just how important oil would become.
This shift in energy resource technology had dramatic implications for national security policy.
State policy responses to the transition changed as the transition itself progressed through the
three stages described above. The investigative era saw exploratory testing of oil propulsion
technology comparatively against coal. Navies in particular involved themselves in the scientific
research and development process. This was done, instead of simply relying on the private
sector, because navies had particular goals and needs. In seeking to accomplish these goals,
navies pushed oil technology in certain directions. Also, this period saw proof of concept of the
oil burning process, and thus the policy decision to use oil in tandem with coal burning. This
was the establishment of bridge technology. This allowed navies to reap the benefits of oil,
without completely discarding the stability and security of coal burning technology. This
process also demonstrates the incomplete nature of the transition at this time. Most were
unwilling to discard the proven and reliable coal burning machinery until oil as a fuel was better
established, and until the requisite supply and infrastructure set in place.
The pre-war transition was an era in which states were testing the scientific bounds of oilpowered engineering. While there was still some experimental scientific research and testing, it
260
was firmly established that oil was a better fuel than coal. Much of the transition policy in this
period focused on obtaining the requisite supply, or steering market conditions towards state
preferences. Additionally, further developments in oil fuel technology brought about completely
new modes of transport in the form of manned flight. At this point building machines based
upon the previous energy sources ceased, and navies had fully committed to making oil their
primary fuel for ships of war. States began to seek ways to stockpile the new energy source, and
to exercise financial and/or legal control over the resource. It is in this period where the new
energy technology begins to impact established military doctrine. Submarines and airplanes
were worked into military strategy and tactics, including in live military exercises. States and
their navies began to visualize, quite specifically, how this new energy technology was likely to
change the nature of the battlefield, without these things being demonstrated in war.
The wartime transition accelerated funding and appropriations for construction of oil powered
tools of war. Where financial limitations had played a role in earlier discussions related to where
states should put their resources, the war altered the nature of state financial considerations. The
war demonstrated which new energy technologies were most effective and thus altered resource
allocation. Namely, this meant allied response to the German U-boat offensive. Additionally,
the conflict had proven the usefulness of this energy resource, removing any lingering doubt that
may have existed in the minds of skeptics. This raised the stakes for access to and control over
oil deposits, resulting in direct state purchase of oil companies, as well as military conquest to
ensure physical control over areas now known to be the most oil rich territories on the planet.
Also, the new technologies prompted discussion of completely new branches of state militaries,
at least in the case of airpower. The significance of the new energy technology also prompted
261
allied creation of international cooperative organizations for the purpose of appropriate resource
allocation. For those involved in the pre-war consideration of oil technology, the war had proven
what they already knew. Yet that proof was particularly significant per se.
Below are two forms of matrices that categorize selected examples of state policy. The first
matrix type is a three by three matrix identifying which branch of government was responsible
for the policy (legislative, executive, judicial) and also categorizes the policy by area of focus
(financial/economic, military/political, and technological/research and development). Items
from the selected timelines were first classified by the three by three matrix, and then inserted
where appropriate into the two by two matrix, indicating the location of the policy (domestic,
international) and the strategic quality of the policy (offensive, defensive). One of each type of
matrix was created per state per transition period and there are thus six matrices per state
examined, and twelve matrices total (see appendix for both the selected timelines and the twelve
matrices). These matrices are color coded by transition period to ease quick viewing by the
reader. Subsequently, various types of these policies are displayed in the two by two matrix
format to provide a generalizable typology of energy transition policies. This typology will
serve as a lens through which to view future research of other great power naval energy
transition response policies.
262
Typology of
energy transition
policies
Defensive
Domestic
International
Energy research and development expenditure
Bureaucracy creation
Requests for technology from private sector
Intra-organizational competition
Major military appropriations
State secrecy and secret patents
Offensive
Laws creating state control of resources
Court ordered monopoly break-up
Creation of new independent military branches
State regulation of energy production
Major weapons
purchases/construction/design
Major weapons expenditure (proven)
New military doctrine for new energy
technology
Construction of new energy
infrastructure abroad
Cross military cooperation
State corporate cooperation
Shows of force
Wartime change in tactics due to new
technology
State purchase of multinational
corporations
Military conquest
Future energy transitions
Academic literature and popular discourse related to energy over the last decade has been
focused primarily on a shift away from fossil fuels, namely oil, and toward more renewable
energy sources. Much of this discourse has been directly related to the issue of climate change, a
subject matter not dealt with here. A different subset of this literature relates to the concept of
peak oil, or put simply, the issue of fossil fuels as finite resources that cannot last forever. Thus
it is widely believed that in the relatively near future, states, and even militaries, will choose to
transition away from the use of oil-based technology. In many economic sectors, the technology
to accomplish such a transition exists already. The use of solar, geothermal, hydroelectric, wind,
tidal, and nuclear sources to generate electricity is becoming increasingly common and
increasingly competitive in price when compared to fossil fuels. However, the one area in which
such technology has not made significant progress is in propulsion for military purposes. The
only other energy source for propulsion of military vehicles is nuclear energy, used in
submarines and aircraft carriers. While nuclear power has proven relatively safe, albeit with a
263
few exceptions such as Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and the more recent disaster at
Fukushima,785 there are other problems associated with its use and spread. These risks include
the proliferation of uranium enrichment capabilities, and the related likely increase of knowledge
needed to create nuclear weapons. Moreover, the use of nuclear technology as a means to
combat climate change is quite unlikely, and is described by some as a process that would
require 2,500 one-GW nuclear plants to be constructed by the year 2050, or a new nuclear power
plant every six days between 2010 and 2050.786 While nuclear energy has increased by around
five percent since 1980, it has also been surpassed by renewable energy as a source for domestic
consumption in the United States.787 Nuclear energy is likely to be limited in military use to
powering large aircraft carriers and large submarines, as well as in the form of nuclear weapons
for deterrence. It is safe to say that nuclear energy, while useful and an important element in our
energy future, is no silver bullet.
The lessons to be learned from this research are most relevant to what the Department of Defense
(DOD) calls operational energy.788 The DOD distinguishes between the energy needs of military
bases and facilities, primarily electricity generation, and liquid fuel required for “training,
moving, and sustaining military forces and weapons platforms for military operations.” 789 Also,
this construct of operational energy excludes “nuclear energy used for the propulsion of the U.S.
Navy’s aircraft carriers and submarines” as these systems “by their nature, avoid many of the
785
For details about the Fukushima disaster, see http://www.world-nuclear.org/informationlibrary/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/fukushima-accident.aspx
786
Brice Smith, Arjun Makhijani. "Nuclear Is Not the Way." The Wilson Quarterly 30, no. 4
(2006): 64-68.
787
"Annual Energy Review 2011." edited by Department of Energy, 370. Washington D.C.:
Office of Energy Statistics, 2012, pg. 28
788
Department, Defense. "Department of Defense Annual Energy Management Report."
Washington D.C., 2015, pg. 8
789
Ibid
264
challenges associated with resupplying other military air, sea, and land capabilities with liquid
fuel.”790 Total DOD liquid fuel consumption is staggering. In fiscal year 2014 the DOD
consumed 87.4 million barrels of fuel.791 One half of this fuel was consumed by the United
States Air Force, and one third consumed by the United States Navy.792 If the United States
military is to experience an energy transition that is comparable to the events and processes
described in this research, it is this form of operational energy that must transition to some new
form or source. In short, the next major operational energy transition will require a new type of
fuel or energy resource than can provide the necessary propulsion to bombers, jets, helicopters,
and non-carrier and non-submarine naval craft. A transition of this variety is shaped by several
factors. First, the DOD seeks to reduce the use of liquid fuels to provide electricity for bases and
other military installations to reduce strain on the need for such fuels for operational purposes.793
Secondly, for a transition to not require new hardware, the DOD will need a fuel that can be used
in current platforms. For that purpose the primary alternative is biofuel, or a mix of biofuel and
traditional liquid petroleum fuels.794 Finally, there is a substantial emphasis on efficiency. This
is similar to the emphasis on efficiency seen during the U.S. and British Naval energy transitions
described above. The cost of modern military liquid fuel needs is astronomical, and is greatly
impacted by even small increases in market rates. In 2011, the revolution in Libya pushed oil
prices up by $30/barrel, resulting in an increase in the fuel bill for the U.S. Navy of $1 Billion,
according the U.S. Naval Secretary Ray Mabus.795
790
Defense, Department of. "Department of Defense 2016 Operational Energy Strategy."
Washington D.C., 2016, pg. 3
791
Ibid, pg. 4
792
Ibid, pg. 5
793
Ibid, pg. 13
794
Ibid, pg. 13-14
795
Matthews, William, “Bio Fleet: The Navy’s pursuit of an ambitious alternative energy
program,” Government Executive and republished at
265
As modern militaries have begun to understand the level of vulnerability attached to military
platforms based upon liquid petroleum, they have recognized that a transition away from oil is
necessary. However, there is currently no substitute for the capabilities offered by petroleum in
terms of operational energy. To compare where modern militaries are now to a similar position
in the past, one could make the case that 2016 much resembles the late 1890s. It has only
recently been recognized that a major transition from our current energy paradigm toward
something different is likely. This time around, the need to transition has come before a
demonstrated capability. Much like dual burning ships of the early twentieth century, the first
steps of this transition will center around bridge technologies, such as the usage of bio-fuel as an
adjunct to oil, along with efforts to increase efficiency and reduced oil consumption where
possible. While these efforts are implemented, modern militaries will likely begin to explore the
most feasible alternatives to oil for operational energy needs. Further research in this area is
needed to better understand how states respond to energy transitions. The British and American
cases described above provide an important building block for moving forward. First, this line
of inquiry must by continued by applying the same approach used here to the other great powers
of the time, namely, Germany, Japan, France, Italy, and Russia. Secondly, this same approach
should be applied to other types of energy transitions, such as the development of atomic energy.
Finally, this framework for understanding energy transitions and state responses can be applied
to future energy transitions. Lessons learned from the past should be capable of providing some
guidance for how states and their military organizations formulate their policy responses to the
likely shift away from fossil fuels.
http://www.nextgov.com/defense/2011/12/bio-fleet-the-navys-pursuit-of-an-ambitiousalternative-energy-program/50380/. 266
Lastly, I will discuss my position on the central research question presented in this dissertation,
how this research fits within the various literature discussed in chapters two and three, and also
what lies ahead for this line of scholarly inquiry. The central research question posed in Chapter
One was why did the American and British navies decide to transition their naval fleets from
being fueled by coal to being fueled by oil? The case studies demonstrate that both the
Americans and British were focused on building navies that were comparable to the navies of
rival states. There were different policies regarding what the U.S. and British navies should look
like when measured against others, yet in both states policymakers articulated concerns over the
naval power of others as a driving force for a continued naval buildup throughout the period.
The British emphasis on the two-power standard, and the American belief that its navy should be
comparable to Britain’s, were the central motivators for overall naval construction policies.
As navies continued to build bigger and faster ships, oil-burning technology was introduced from
the private sector, and as its capabilities became more clear to those investigating the matter,
important individuals within these navies began to visualize and articulate the demonstrated and
likely operational and tactical advantages of new energy technology. These advantages and the
concurrent elimination of a litany of annoyances associated with the use of coal convinced many
important naval officials in both states to push for a wholesale shift away from coal to oil.
Where the military organizational literature would suggest resistance to such a dramatic and
unpredictable change, this dissertation depicts military organizations that were open to change,
willing to expend resources to answer questions, and capable of envisioning the longer term
impact of such an energy transition. While both states studied here did demonstrate a degree of
caution, manifest in bridge technologies and concern about supply and infrastructure, they
267
nonetheless moved rather quickly to implement the transition, once convinced that such a
transition would possess important military advantages. Additionally, these states also embraced
the new vessels of war that stemmed from the energy transitions, albeit with slightly different
degrees of enthusiasm. While the military organization literature would suggest that states
would need to see and/or experience these new technologies perform on the battlefield prior to
their adoption, the case studies find that such dramatic, major innovations were investigated,
improved upon, adopted and implemented prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Moreover, where
the military organizational literature would indicate that war could cause major innovations, the
case studies suggest that in terms of this particular energy transition, the outbreak of the war
accelerated changes already taking place, as opposed to stimulating the change itself.
Importantly, these case studies also demonstrate that military organizations can and will imitate
the actions of others, while it also shows that this does not happen in all instances. The
Americans cited German use of experimental laboratories for military technological research in
deciding to build such facilities of their own. The British began building dreadnaughts, and
many of the other major powers followed suit. These instances show that states will imitate
other states in the use of new technology, and policy makers often cite fear of disadvantage, or
concerns about competition, to justify such policies. There are also important instances of nonimitation. The Germans experienced spectacular success with their controversial use of
submarines to bring down commercial ships without warning. The Allies did not adopt these
tactics during the war. Such non-imitation demonstrates the impact of the “software” element of
technological diffusion. While all major navies adopted the submarine as an integral part of their
fleets, they did not imitate what can be easily described as the most effective demonstrated use
268
for the new type of vessel. This demonstrates that the diffusion of military technology is not
automatic, and that states will incorporate such technology into their operations in ways unique
and particular to their own perceptions and ideas about how a military should act. These
findings show that states will react to outside pressures, but not necessarily in the same way as
other states, which raises important issues regarding levels of analysis. As previously
mentioned, both systemic level variables and domestic level variables must be assessed to obtain
a truly clear picture of how energy transitions impact military organizations and states. State
level variables and market forces dramatically impact the trajectory of this energy transition, and
must be considered as co-determinants in driving state policy along with traditional realist
variables. States are not black boxes; they are both impacted by the world around them and also
shape and impact that world.
Further research must be done in order to understand the interplay between these variables and
systemic level variables. Consequently, I will discuss the trajectory of my future research in this
area, and briefly describe some of the important research questions that I intend to address
moving forward from this dissertation. First, several other cases will be added to broaden and
deepen the cross state comparisons and augment the conclusions drawn from them. Those cases
include Germany, France, Italy, Russia, and Japan. Later in my post-dissertation career, I may
examine other examples of the diffusion of energy technology and energy transitions, including
the development and diffusion of nuclear technology, as well as the development and diffusion
of renewable energy technology.
269
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281
Appendix
THE AMERICAN AND BRITISH POLICY MATRICES
THE UNITED STATES INVESTAGIVE ERA 1898-1905
POLICY CLASSIFICATION
FINANCIAL/MONETARY/ECONOMIC
MILITARY/POLITICAL
LEGISLATIVE
EXECUTIVE
TECHNOLOGICAL/
RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT
1898: $15,000 APPROPRIATION BY CONGRESS
FOR OIL BURNING EXPERIMENTS
1902: $20,000 APPROPRIATION BY CONGRESS
FOR OIL BURNING EXPERIMENTS
1904: FIRST MAJOR SUBMARINE PURCHASE
1889: WORLD CRUISE OF THE DOLPHIN
1902: CREATION OF THE LIQUID FUEL BOARD
1902: MOODY DESCRIBES OIL AS THE BEST
MEANS FOR NAVAL PROPULSION
1904: NAVAL FUEL BOARD RECOMMENDS 1/3
OF TORPEDO BOATS BURN OIL
1904: SCOUT CRUISERS TO BURN OIL,
RETROFIT OF SMALL SHIPS
1904: HOLLENSTEIN WATER TUBE BOILER
TESTS
1904: NAVAL FUEL BOARD OIL ENGINE TESTS
ON INTREPID AND ALARM
1905: FIRST DREADNAUGHT DESIGN
JUDICIAL
282
THE UNITED STATES PRE-WAR TRANSITION 1906-1913
POLICY CLASSIFICATION
FINANCIAL/MONETARY/ECONOMIC
MILITARY/POLITICAL
LEGISLATIVE
1911: CONGRESS PASSESS APPROPRIATIONS
FOR LAST COAL BURNING SHIPS
1909: CONGRESS CREATES FIRST NAVAL OIL
RESERVES
EXECUTIVE
1909: NAVY SEEKS NEW GASOLINE MOTOR
DESIGNS FROM PRIVATE SECTOR
1913: NAVY SEEKS SUPPLY ASSURANCES
FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR
1906: BUREAU OF CORPORATIONS ALLEGES
STANDARD ILLEGAL ACTIVITY
1906: NAVY PLANS FOR DUAL FIRING SHIPS
1908: SUB DOCTRINE OF COASTAL DEFENSE
1908: DUAL BURNING BATTLESHIPS (UTAH
AND FLORIDA)
1908: DIESEL GENERATORS TO CHARGE SUB
BATTERIES
1909: MEYER DECLARES ALL BATTLESHIPS
WILL BURN OIL (PREMATURE)
1909: BUREAU OF NAVIGATION GIVEN
AUTHORITY OVER OIL CONTRACTS, ETC
1909: OIL BURNING DESTROYERS
1910: NAVY BEGINS EXPANDING FUEL DEPOT
CONSTRUCTION AT OUTLYING STRATEGIC
BASES
1910: NAVY SETS FUEL OIL STANDARDS (NOT
WIDELY AVAILABLE)
1911: COMPETITIVE SHIP EFFICIENCY TESTS
1912: NAVAL AIR DOCTRINE OF MAINLY
RECONNAISANCE)
1913: DANIELS CALLS FOR NAVAL CONTROL
OF ITS OWN OIL RESOURCES
JUDICIAL
1911: US SUPREME COURT BREAKS UP
STANDARD OIL
1906: AG SUES STANDARD OIL
TECHNOLOGICAL/
RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT
1906 EARLY TALKS OF USE OF DOUBLE
BOTTOMS
1906: FIRST BATTLESHIP CONVERTED TO
BURN OIL
1907: SUBMARINE PERFORANCE TESTS AT
NARRAGANSET BAY
1907: COAL V. OIL EFFICIENCY TESTS
1907: TESTS ON 2-CYLINDER GAS ENGINES
1908: ARMY/NAVY FLIGHT TESTS
1910: RECIPROCATING V. TURBINE TESTS
1910: DUAL FIRING TESTS (DELEWARE &
NORTH DAKOTA)
1910: FIRST PLANE TAKEOFF FROM SHIP
1911: DESIGNS COMPLETE FOR FIRST ALL OIL
BURNING BATTLESHIPS (NEVADA AND
OKLAHOMA)
1912: EARLIEST DISCUSSION OF SHIPS AS
AIRBASES, AIRCRAFT CARRIER CONCEPT
1912: EARLY HIGH ALTITUDE TEST FLIGHTS
1913: BEGIN NAVAL COOPERATION WITH
LANGLEY LABS
1913: NAVAL OFFICER SENT TO EUROPE TO
EXAMINE AIRCRAFT ADVANCES
1913: NAVAL EXERCISES DISCOVER PLANES
CAN SPOT SUBS
283
THE UNITED STATES WARTIME TRANSITION 1914-1918
POLICY CLASSIFICATION
FINANCIAL/MONETARY/ECONOMIC
MILITARY/POLITICAL
LEGISLATIVE
1915: CONGRESS PASSES LARGES NAVAL
APPROPRIATIONS BILL IN HISTORY
1916: APPROPRIATIONS FOR NAVAL
CONSULTING BOARD SCIENTISTS
1916: 1.5 MILLION APPROPRIATION FOR NCB
(AVIATION)
1917: $67 MILLION APPROPRIATED FOR
AVIATION
1915: CREATION OF LONG TERM 5 YEAR
NAVAL FUNDING BILLS CONCEPT
EXECUTIVE
1914: NAVY BEGINS EXAMINING OKLAHOMA
PIPELINE OWNERSHIP/OPERATION
1914: NAVY CALLS FOR $5,000,000 IN AIR
POWER INVESTMENT
1918: NAVAL REQUISITION OF SIX OIL
TANKERS
1918: CONSTRUCTION OF SCOTTISH PIPELINE
WITH BRITAIN
1914: NAVY CALLS FOR CONSTRUCTION OF
FLEET SUBMARINES
1914: NAVY LAUNCHES FIRST ALL OIL
BATTLESHIP USS NEVADA
1915: NAVY CALLS FOR 1000 TON FLEET
SUBMARINE
1916: NAVAL COMPLAINTS ABOUT
CONGRESSIONAL EROSION OF NAVAL
RESERVE RIGHTS
1916: CREATION OF COUNCIL OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE
1916: FIRST ALL OIL BATTLESHIP JOINS
FLEET USS NEVADA
1916: CREATION OF COMMITTEE FOR
INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS
1917: AIRCRAFT BOARD FAILS TO CREATE
THRID BRANCH OF US MILITARY, BOARD TO
PLAY COORDINATION ROLE BETWEEN
ARMY AND NAVY
1917: IMPLEMENTATION OF CONVOY
1917: CREATION OF NATIONAL PETROLEUM
WAR SERVICE COMMITTEE, USFA, AND ITS
OIL DIVISION
1918: CREATION OF INTER-ALLIED
PETROLEUM CONFERENCE
JUDICIAL
1914: SUPREME COURT RULES PIPELINES ARE
COMMON CARRIERS
TECHNOLOGICAL/
RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT
1914: CREATION OF US AERONAUTICS BASE
IN PENSACOLA
1914: FIRST NAVY DESIGNED AIRPLANE
1915: RECRUITMENT OF THOMAS EDISON
AND CREATION OF NAVAL CONSULTING
BOARD
1916: CREATION OF COMMITTEE FOR
INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS
1916: CATAPULT AIRCRAFT LAUNCHING
EXPERIEMNTS
1917: DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING OF
LIBERTY ENGINE
284
The United States Investigative period: 1898-1905
TYPOLOGY OF ENERGY
TRANSITION POLICIES
DOMESTIC
INTERNATIONAL
DEFENSIVE
1898: $15,000 APPROPRIATION BY CONGRESS FOR OIL
BURNING EXPERIMENTS (L, T)
1902: CREATION OF THE LIQUID FUEL BOARD (E, M)
1902: $20,000 APPROPRIATION BY CONGRESS FOR OIL
BURNING EXPERIMENTS (L, T)
1904: NAVAL FUEL BOARD RECOMMENDS 1/3 OF
TORPEDO BOATS BURN OIL (E, M)
1904: SCOUT CRUISERS TO BURN OIL, RETROFIT OF
SMALL SHIPS (E, M)
1904: HOLLENSTEIN WATER TUBE BOILER TESTS (E, T)
1904: NAVAL FUEL BOARD OIL ENGINE TESTS ON
INTREPID AND ALARM (E, T)
1904: FIRST MAJOR SUBMARINE PURCHASE (L, F)
1905: FIRST DREADNAUGHT DESIGN (E, T)
OFFENSIVE
1889: WORLD CRUISE OF THE DOLPHIN (COAL VESSEL) (E, M)
285
The United States Pre-War Transition period: 1906-1914
TYPOLOGY OF ENERGY
TRANSITION POLICIES
DOMESTIC
INTERNATIONAL
DEFENSIVE
1906: BUREAU OF CORPORATIONS ALLEGES STANDARD ILLEGAL
ACTIVITY (E,M)
1906: NAVY PLANS FOR DUAL FIRING SHIPS (E,M)
1906 EARLY TALKS OF USE OF DOUBLE BOTTOMS (E,M)
1906: FIRST BATTLESHIP CONVERTED TO BURN OIL (E,M)
1907: SUBMARINE PERFORANCE TESTS AT NARRAGANSET BAY (E,T)
1907: COAL V. OIL EFFICIENCY TESTS (E,T)
1907: TESTS ON 2-CYLINDER GAS ENGINES (E,T)
1908: DUAL BURNING BATTLESHIPS UTAH AND FLORIDA (E,M)
1908: DIESEL GENERATORS TO CHARGE SUB BATTERIES (E,M)
1908: ARMY/NAVY FLIGHT TESTS (E,T)
1909: MEYER DECLARES ALL BATTLESHIPS WILL BURN OIL (E,M)
1909: BUREAU OF NAVIGATION GIVEN AUTHORITY OVER OIL
CONTRACTS, ETC (E,M)
1909: OIL BURNING DESTROYERS (E,M)
1909: NAVY SEEKS NEW GASOLINE MOTOR DESIGNS FROM PRIVATE
SECTOR (E, F)
1910: NAVY SETS FUEL OIL STANDARDS (E,M)
1911: COMPETITIVE SHIP EFFICIENCY TESTS (E,M)
1911: DESIGNS COMPLETE FOR FIRST ALL OIL BURNING BATTLESHIPS
(E,M)
1911: CONGRESS PASSESS APPROPRIATIONS FOR LAST COAL BURNING
SHIPS (E,F)
1912: EARLY HIGH ALTITUDE TEST FLIGHTS (E,T)
1913: CALLS FOR NAVAL CONTROL OF NEEDED RESOURCES (E,M)
1908: SUB DOCTRINE OF COASTAL DEFENSE (E,M)
1910: FIRST PLANE TAKEOFF FROM SHIP (E,T)
1910: NAVY BEGINS EXPANDING FUEL DEPOT CONSTRUCTION AT
OUTLYING STRATEGIC BASES (E, M)
1912: NAVAL AIR DOCTRINE OF MAINLY RECONNAISANCE) (E,M)
1912: EARLIEST DISCUSSION OF SHIPS AS AIRBASES, AIRCRAFT CARRIER
CONCEPT (E,T)
1913: NAVAL EXERCISES DISCOVER PLANES CAN SPOT SUBS (E,T)
1913: NAVAL OFFICER SENT TO EUROPE TO EXAMINE AIRCRAFT
ADVANCES (E,T)
OFFENSIVE
1909: CONGRESS CREATES FIRST NAVAL OIL RESERVES (L,M)
1911: SUPREME COURT RULES TO BREAK UP STANDARD OIL UNITED
STATES VS. STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF NEW JERSEY (J, F)
286
The United States Wartime Transition: 1914-1918
TYPOLOGY OF ENERGY
TRANSITION POLICIES
DOMESTIC
INTERNATIONAL
DEFENSIVE
1914: NAVY BEGINS EXAMINING OKLAHOMA PIPELINE
OWNERSHIP/OPERATION (E,F)
1914: NAVY CALLS FOR $5,000,000 IN AIR POWER INVESTMENT (E,F)
1914: NAVY CALLS FOR CONSTRUCTION OF FLEET SUBMARINES (E,M)
1914: CREATION OF US AERONAUTICS BASE IN PENSACOLA (E,T)
1914: SUPREME COURT RULES PIPELINES ARE COMMON CARRIERS (J,E)
1915: CONGRESS PASSES LARGES NAVAL APPROPRIATIONS BILL IN
HISTORY (L,F)
1915: CREATION OF LONG TERM 5 YEAR NAVAL FUNDING BILLS
CONCEPT (L,M)
1915: RECRUITMENT OF THOMAS EDISON AND CREATION OF NAVAL
CONSULTING BOARD (E,T)
1916: APPROPRIATIONS FOR NCB SCIENTISTS (E,M)
1916: NAVAL COMPLAINTS ABOUT CONGRESSIONAL EROSION OF
NAVAL RESERVE RIGHTS (E,M)
1916: CREATION OF COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (E,M)
1916: CREATED COMMITTEE FOR INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS (E,M)
1916: CATAPULT AIRCRAFT LAUNCHING EXPERIEMNTS (E,T)
1917: $67 MILLION APPROPRIATED FOR AVIATION (L,F)
1917: CREATION OF NATIONAL PETROLEUM WAR SERVICE
COMMITTEE, USFA, AND ITS OIL DIVISION (E,P)
1917: DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING OF LIBERTY ENGINE (E,T)
1914: NAVY LAUNCHES FIRST ALL OIL BATTLESHIP USS NEVADA (E,M)
1914: FIRST NAVY DESIGNED AIRPLANE (E,T)
1915: NAVY CALLS FOR 1000 TON FLEET SUBMARINE (E,M)
1916: FIRST ALL OIL BATTLESHIP JOINS FLEET USS NEVADA (E,M)
1918: CONSTRUCTION OF SCOTTISH PIPELINE WITH BRITAIN (E,F)
1918: CREATION OF INTER-ALLIED PETROLEUM CONFERENCE (E, M)
OFFENSIVE
1917: AIRCRAFT BOARD FAILS TO CREATE THRID BRANCH OF US
MILITARY (E,M)
1917: IMPLEMENTATION OF CONVOY
287
Great Britain Investigative Period: 1898-1905
POLICY
CLASSIFICATION
FINANCIAL/MONETARY/ECONOMIC
MILITARY/POLITICAL
LEGISLATIVE
1904: OIL MINES ACT OF BARBADOS,
STIPULATES THAT OIL CONCESSIONS IN THE
COLONY WOULD ACT WITH BRITISH NAVAL
INTERESTS IN MIND
1902: BRITAIN BUILDS ITS FURIST SUBMARINE,
THE H-1, HOLLAND TYPE VESSEL
1903: BRITAIN OBTAINS 8 MORE HOLLAND TYPE
SUBMARINES
EXECUTIVE
1903: FISHER MEETS WILLIAM D'ARCY, AND IS
SHOWN THE MAPS OF THE D'ARCY PERSIAN OIL
CONCESSION
1904: PRETYMAN COMMITTEE AND COLONIAL
OFFICE DEVELOP POLICIES THAT ENCOURAGE
HEAVY OIL FUEL PRODUCTION IN THE EMPIRE
1905: PRETYMAN COMMITTEE, ADMIRALTY, AND
INDIAN GOVERNMENT, AGREE TO EXCLUDE
STANDARD OIL SUBSIDIARY (ASIATIC OIL) OUT
OF INDIA
1905: ADMIRALTY SIGNS FIRST LONG TERM OIL
CONTRACT WITH BURMAH OIL, INCLUDES
CLAUSE THAT ADMIRALTY MUST APPROVE ANY
CHANGE IN OWNERSHIP
1904: BRITAIN ADOPTS OIL AS AN AUXILLIARY
FUEL ON ALL NAVAL VESSELS, ALL SHIPS TO BE
DUAL-BURNING
1905: PRETYMAN, SELBORNE, AND REDWOOD,
WORK TO KEEP PERSIAN CONCESSION IN
BRITISH HANDS THROUGH DEAL WITH BURMAH
OIL
TECHNOLOGICAL/
RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT
1898: FISHER SUPPORTS EARLY TESTS ON OIL
AS CONTROLLER OF NAVY 1898-1901
1901: PRELIMINARY LIQUID FUEL
EXPERIMENTAL PLANT BUILT AT
DAVENPORT
1902: ADMIRALTY FUEL EXPERIMENT
STATION ESTABLISHED AT HASLAR
1904: BRITISH ACHIEVE OIL ATOMIZATION
WITHOUT COMPRESSED AIR, CONSIDERED
STATE SECRET, GRANTED SECRET PATENT
JUDICIAL
288
Great Britain Pre-War Transition Period: 1906-1914
POLICY CLASSIFICATION
FINANCIAL/MONETARY/ECONOMIC
MILITARY/POLITICAL
TECHNOLOGICAL/
RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT
1907: ADMIRATLY REJECTS AN OFFER FROM
THE WRIGHT BROTHERS FOR THEIR
PATENTS ON AIRPLANES
1910-1911: ADMIRALTY PURCHASES ITS
FIRST EXPERIMENTAL AIRPLANES FROM
MCCLEAN AND ALSO FROM SHORT
BROTHERS
1912-1913: BRITISH NAVY MORE THAN
DOUBLES ITS EXPENDITURE ON
AERONAUTICS
1913: A.P.O.C.'S ABADAN REFINERY BEGINS
FUEL OIL PRODUCTION
1913: CHURCHILL EXPLAINS HIS POSITION
ON OIL TO PARLIAMENT, CALLS FOR DIRECT
STATE PARTICIPATION IN THE OIL
PRODUCTION, AND REFINERY BUSINESS,
STATE TO CREATE PETROCHEMICAL
INDUSTRY
1908: CREATION OF THE IMPERIAL DEFENSE
SUB-COMMITTEE ON AERIAL NAVIGATION
1910: DESTROYERS BURNING ONLY OIL
FIRMLY ESTABLISHED, ALL BATTLESHIPS
DUAL-FIRING USING OIL AS ADJUNCT
1911: BRITAIN BY 1911 OWNS MORE
SUBMARINES THAN ANY OTHER NAVY
1911: ADMIRALTY CREATES PAKENHAM
COMMITTEE TO EXAMINE TRANSITIONING
ALL BRITISH SHIPS TO BURNING ONLY OIL
1912: PAKENHAM COMMITTEE FAILS TO
RECOMMEND TRANSITIONING ALL SHIPS TO
OIL BURNING
1913: CHURCHILL TASKS THE NAVAL WAR
STAFF TO PRODUCE A REPORT ON THE
FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF ADOPTING OIL
1911: BRITISH NAVY BEGINS USING INTERNAL
COMBUSTION ENGINES AND TURBINE ENGNES
IN DESTROYERS
1911: CREATION OF THE NAVAL FLYING
SCHOOL
1912: CHURCHILL CREATES THE ROYAL
COMMISSION ON FUEL AND ENGINES
1912: AIR COMMITTEE (SUB COMMITTEE OF
COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENSE) CREATED
1912: AIR COMMITTEE RECOMMENDS
CREATION OF THE ROYAL FLYING CORPS
LEGISLATIVE
EXECUTIVE
JUDICIAL
289
Great Britain Wartime Transition: 1914-1918
POLICY CLASSIFICATION
FINANCIAL/MONETARY/ECONOMIC
LEGISLATIVE
1918: PASSAGE OF THE 1918 PETROLEUM
PRODUCTION ACT
EXECUTIVE
1914: BRITAIN OBTAINS CONTROLLING
SHARES IN ITS FIRST NATIONAL OIL
COMPANY
1917: BY 1917 BRITAIN 22,000 AIRPLANES
BETWEEN THE ARMY AND NAVY
MILITARY/POLITICAL
TECHNOLOGICAL/
RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT
1914: R-CLASS BATTLESHIPS CONVERTED TO
BURN ONLY OIL
1916: SYKES PICOT AGREEMENT BETWEEN
BRITAIN AND FRANCE (DIVIDING UP
FORMER OTTOMAN TERRITORIES)
1916: BALFOUR DESCRIBES CONTROL OF
MESOPOTAMIAN OIL RESERVES AS FIRST
CLASS WAR AIM
1917: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVOY
SYSTEM
1917: CREATION OF MINERAL AND OIL
PRODUCTION DEPARTMENT, THE POOL
BOARD, THE PETROL CONTROL
DEPARTMENT
1918: SLADE MEMO REACHES CABINET WITH
ADMIRALTY APPROVAL
1918: CREATION OF THE INTER-ALLIED
PETROLEUM CONFERENCE
1917: CABINET CALLS FOR INCREASED USE
OF DOUBLE BOTTOM SHIPS FOR CARRYING
OIL
JUDICIAL
290
Great Britain Investigative Period: 1898-1905
TYPOLOGY OF ENERGY
TRANSITION POLICIES
DOMESTIC
INTERNATIONAL
DEFENSIVE
1898: FISHER SUPPORTS EARLY TESTS ON OIL AS CONTROLLER OF
NAVY 1898-1901 (E,T)
1901: PRELIMINARY LIQUID FUEL EXPERIMENTAL PLANT BUILT AT
DAVENPORT (E,T)
1902: ADMIRALTY FUEL EXPERIMENT STATION ESTABLISHED AT
HASLAR (E,T)
1904: BRITISH ACHIEVE OIL ATOMIZATION WITHOUT COMPRESSED
AIR, CONSIDERED STATE SECRET, GRANTED SECRET PATENT (E,T)
1904: BRITAIN ADOPTS OIL AS AN AUXILLIARY FUEL ON ALL NAVAL
VESSELS, ALL SHIPS TO BE DUAL-BURNING (E, M)
1902: BRITAIN BUILDS ITS FURIST SUBMARINE, THE H-1, HOLLAND
TYPE VESSEL (L, M)
1903: BRITAIN OBTAINS 8 MORE HOLLAND TYPE SUBMARINES (L,M)
1904: PRETYMAN COMMITTEE AND COLONIAL OFFICE DEVELOP
POLICIES THAT ENCOURAGE HEAVY OIL FUEL PRODUCTION IN THE
EMPIRE
1905: PRETYMAN COMMITTEE, ADMIRALTY, AND INDIAN
GOVERNMENT, AGREE TO EXCLUDE STANDARD OIL SUBSIDIARY
(ASIATIC OIL) OUT OF INDIA (E, F)
1905: PRETYMAN, SELBORNE, AND REDWOOD, WORK TO KEEP PERSIAN
CONCESSION IN BRITISH HANDS WITH HELP OF BURMAH OIL (E,M)
OFFENSIVE
1903: FISHER MEETS WILLIAM D'ARCY, AND IS SHOWN THE MAPS OF
THE D'ARCY PERSIAN OIL CONCESSION (E,F)
1904: OIL MINES ACT OF BARBADOS, STIPULATES THAT OIL
CONCESSIONS IN THE COLONY WOULD ACT WITH BRITISH NAVAL
INTERESTS IN MIND (L,F)
1905: ADMIRALTY SIGNS FIRST LONG TERM OIL CONTRACT WITH
BURMAH OIL, INCLUDES CLAUSE THAT ADMIRALTY MUST APPROVE
ANY CHANGE IN OWNERSHIP (E,F)
291
Great Britain Pre-War Transition Period: 1906-1913
TYPOLOGY OF ENERGY
TRANSITION POLICIES
DEFENSIVE
DOMESTIC
INTERNATIONAL
1907: ADMIRATLY REJECTS AN OFFER FROM THE WRIGHT
BROTHERS FOR THEIR PATENTS ON AIRPLANES (E,F)
1908: CREATION OF THE IMPERIAL DEFENSE SUB-COMMITTEE
ON AERIAL NAVIGATION (E,M)
1910: DESTROYERS BURNING ONLY OIL FIRMLY ESTABLISHED,
ALL BATTLESHIPS (E,M)
1910-1911: ADMIRALTY PURCHASES ITS FIRST EXPERIMENTAL
AIRPLANES FROM MCCLEAN AND ALSO FROM SHORT
BROTHERS (E,F)
1911: CREATION OF THE NAVAL FLYING SCHOOL (E,T)
1912: PAKENHAM COMMITTEE FAILS TO RECOMMEND
TRANSITIONING ALL SHIPS TO OIL BURNING (E,M)
1912: CHURCHILL CREATES THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON FUEL
AND ENGINES (E,T)
1912: AIR COMMITTEE (SUB COMMITTEE OF COMMITTEE OF
IMPERIAL DEFENSE) CREATED (E,T)
1911: BRITAIN BY 1911 OWNS MORE SUBMARINES THAN ANY OTHER
NAVY (E, M)
1912-1913: BRITISH NAVY MORE THAN DOUBLES ITS EXPENDITURE ON
AERONAUTICS (E,F)
OFFENSIVE
1912: AIR COMMITTEE RECOMMENDS CREATION OF THE ROYAL
FLYING CORPS (E,T)
1913: CHURCHILL EXPLAINS HIS POSITION ON OIL TO
PARLIAMENT, CALLS FOR DIRECT STATE PARTICIPATION IN
THE OIL PRODUCTION, AND REFINERY BUSINESS, STATE TO
CREATE PETROCHEMICAL INDUSTRY
1913: A.P.O.C.'S ABADAN REFINERY BEGINS FUEL OIL PRODUCTION
(E,F)
292
Great Britain Wartime Transition Period 1914:1918
TYPOLOGY OF ENERGY
TRANSITION POLICIES
DOMESTIC
INTERNATIONAL
DEFENSIVE
1914: R-CLASS BATTLESHIPS CONVERTED TO BURN ONLY OIL (E,M)
1917: BY 1917 BRITAIN 22,000 AIRPLANES BETWEEN THE ARMY AND
NAVY (E,F)
1917: CABINET CALLS FOR INCREASED USE OF DOUBLE BOTTOM SHIPS
FOR CARRYING OIL (E,T)
1916: SYKES PICOT AGREEMENT BETWEEN BRITAIN AND
FRANCE (DIVIDING UP FORMER OTTOMAN TERRITORIES) (E,M)
1917: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVOY SYSTEM (E,M)
1918: CREATION OF THE INTER-ALLIED PETROLEUM
CONFERENCE (E,M)
OFFENSIVE
1918: PASSAGE OF THE 1918 PETROLEUM PRODUCTION ACT (L,F)
1918: SLADE MEMO REACHES CABINET WITH ADMIRALTY APPROVAL
(E,M)
1914: BRITAIN OBTAINS CONTROLLING SHARES IN ITS FIRST
NATIONAL OIL COMPANY (E, F)
1916: BALFOUR DESCRIBES CONTROL OF MESOPOTAMIAN OIL
RESERVES AS FIRST CLASS WAR AIM (E,T)
American Energy Transition Timeline
YEAR
1889
1889
1898
1899
1902
1902
1902
1904
THE UNITED STATES
CONSTRUCTION OF THE ABCD SHIPS (COAL BURNING),
DOLPHIN'S WORLD WIDE CRUISE WITHOUT INCIDENT
$15,000 CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATION TO NAVY FOR EXPLORATORY RESEARCH ON OIL POWERED VESSELS
12 MILLION BARREL/YEAR CONSUMPTION
WILLIAM H. MOODY, NAVAL SECRETARY, OIL AS BEST MEANS FOR NAVAL PROPULSION
CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATION OF $20,000 FOR OIL EXPERIMENTS
CREATION OF THE LIQUID FUEL BOARD (EXAMINE COAL V. OIL)
HOLLENSTEIN WATER TUBE BOILER TESTS BY LIQUID FUEL BOARD
293
1904
1904
1904
1904
1905
1906
1906
1906
1906
1906
1907
1907
1907
1908
1908
1908
1908
1909
1909
1909
1909
1910
1910
1910
1910
1910
1911
1911
1911
1911
1911
1911
1912
1912
1912
1912
1912
1913
1913
1913
1913
1913
1914
1914
1914
1914
1914
1914
1914
1915
1915
1915
LIQUID FUEL BOARD RECOMMENDS 1/3 TORPEDO BOATS AND DESTROYERS SHOULD BE FITTED WITH OIL BURNING ENGINES
NAVAL FUEL BOARD PLANS FOR EXPERIMENTAL ENGINES ON INTREPID, ALARM
PLANS FOR OIL BURNING SCOUT CRUISERS, RETROFITTING SMALLER SHIPS TO BURN OIL
COMPLETION OF 12 EARLY SUBMARINE CRAFT FOR US NAVY, 10 BY HOLLAND, AND 2 BY ELECTRIC BOAT COMPANY
FIRST 'DREADNOUGHT' CLASS SHIPS DESIGNED BY US, SOUTH CAROLINA CLASS
USS WYOMING ADAPTED TO BURN OIL FUEL, TO LEARN HOW OIL WOULD IMPACT SHIP DESIGN
EARLY NAVAL DISCUSSION ABOUT DOUBLE-BOTTOM SHIPS
BUREAU OF CORPORATIONS ALLEGES MONOPOLIZATION, CORRUPTION, PRICE CUTTING, AND BRIEBERY BY STANDARD OIL
ATTORNEY GENERAL BRINGS SUIT AGAINST STANDARD OIL
NAVAL PLANS FOR DUAL-FIRING SHIPS
NARRAGANSETT BAY SUBMARINE PERFORMANCE TESTS
EFFICIENCY TESTS OF RAW COAL V. BRIQUETTED COAL
EARLY TESTING AND ACQUISITION OF 2-CYLINDER GASOLINE MOTORS FOR SMALL CRAFT
JOINT ARMY/NAVY FLIGHT TESTS…FIRST MANNED FLIGHT TEST OF A WRIGHT MODEL PLANE BY US MILITARY
BATTLESHIPS UTAH AND FLORIDA, TO BURN BOTH COAL AND OIL
US NAVY DESCIBES SUBMARINES AS PURELY DEFENSIVE WEAPONS, COASTAL AND HARBOR DEFENSE
USE OF TURBO DIESEL GENERATORS ON DESTROYERS AS SUBMARINE TENDERS TO CHARGE SUBMARINE BATTERIES
GEORGE VON LENGERKE MEYER STATES ALL BATTLESHIPS FROM HERE ON OUT WILL BE OIL BURNING…
BUREAU OF NAVIGATION PLACED IN CHARGE OF OIL CONTRACTS AND PURCHASES, DEPOT CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE
WYOMING, AND ARKANSAS BUILT AS DUAL FIRING, BUT PLANS LAID DOWN FOR 5 OIL BURNING DESTROYERS
NAVY SEEKS NEW GASOLINE MOTOR DESIGNS FROM PRIVATE SECTOR COMPANIES
NAVY ADOPTS SPECIFIC FUEL OIL STANDARDS (NOT READILY AVAILABLE ON MARKET)
NAVAL COMPARATIVE TESTS OF RECIPROCATING V. TURBINE ENGINES
NAVY BEGINS EXPANDING FUEL DEPOT CONSTRUCTION AT OUTLYING STRATEGIC BASES
NAVAL TESTING ON DUAL FIRED BATTLESHIPS DELEWARE AND NORTH DAKOTA
EUGENE ELY SUCCEEDS IN TAKING OFF IN A PLANE FROM THE USS BIRMINGHAM (AIRCRAFT CARRIER PROOF OF CONCEPT)
NAVY IMPLEMENTS COMPETITIVE TESTING FOR FUEL EFFICIENCY AMONG SHIPS/CREWS (INTERNAL FUEL EFFICIENCEY TESTS)
USS DELEWARE SAILS FROM US TO ENGLAND AND BACK WITHOUT TAKING ON ANY EXTRA FUEL (OIL AS ADJUNCT TO COAL)
APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE NEW YORK AND TEXAS PASS CONGRESS, (THE LAST COAL BURNING BATTLESHIPS)
NAVY COMPLETES DESIGN OF FIRST ALL OIL BURNING BATTLESHIPS, NEVADA AND OKLAHOMA
INCREASED USE OF INTERNAL COMBUSTION GASOLINE ENGINES IN SMALL CRAFT (REPLACING HEAVY FUEL OIL)
SUPREME COURT RULES TO BREAK UP STANDARD OIL UNITED STATES VS. STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF NEW JERSEY
NAVAL SECRETARY MEYER CALLS FOR MORE OIL TRANSPORT VESSELS
NAVAL FUEL OIL CONSUMPTION AT 16 MILLION GALLONS (380,952 BARRELS)
EARLIEST NAVAL AIRPOWER DOCTRINE ARTICULATED (RECONNAISANCE AND SOME LIMITED ATTACK EFFORTS)
NAVAL CONSIDERATION OF SHIPS AS MOBILE AIR BASES (AIRCRAFT CARRIER), CATAPULTS FOR LAUNCHING AIRCRAFT,
EARLY HIGH ALTITUDE FLIGHT TESTS, 3,000 FEET
JOSEPHUS DANIELS CALLS FOR AUTARKY/CONTROL BY NAVY OF NEEDED RESOURCES, INCLUDING OIL
START OF COOPERATION BETWEEN NAVY AND LANGLEY AERODYNAMIC LAB, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AERONAUTICS
FLEET EXERCISES USING PLANES TO SPOT SUBMARINES
NAVAL OFFICER SENT TO EUROPE TO EXAMINE AIRCRAFT ADVANCES
NAVY REQUESTS ASSURANCES FROM DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR TO CONFIRM ADEQUATE OIL SUPPLY
DANIELS EXPLICITLY DESCIBES THE PASSING OF COAL AND THE BENEFITS OF OIL
NAVY BEGINS TO EXAMINE FEASIBILITY OF CONSTRUCTING A STATE OWNED PIPELINE FROM OLAHOMA TO GULF OF MEXICO
SUPREME COURT RULES THAT PIPELINES ARE COMMON CARRIERS, US VS. OHIO OIL CO.
NAVY CALLS FOR CONSTRUCTION OF 4 FLEET SUBMARINES
NAVY RECOMMENDS $5,000,000 APPROPRIATION FOR 'PROPER AIR SERVICE'
LAUNCH OF FIRST ALL OIL POWERED DREADNAUGHT CLASS SHIP… USS NEVADA
CREATION OF THE US AERONAUTICS BASE IN PENSACOLA FLORIDA
NAVY DESIGNS AND BUILDS ITS FIRST AIRPLANE, (INDEPENDENT OF PRIVATE INTERESTS)
NAVY CALLS FOR FIRST 1000 TON DISPLACEMENT FLEET SUBMARINE
CONGRESS PASSES LARGEST NAVAL APPROPRIATIONS BILL IN HISTORY
294
1915
1915
1916
1916
1916
1916
1916
1916
1916
1917
1917
1917
1917
1917
1917
1917
1917
1918
1918
1918
1918
1918
1918
DEVELOPMENT OF THE LONG TERM FUNDING PLANS FOR NAVY (5 YEAR BUILDING PLANS)
NAVY RECRUITS THOMAS EDISON TO HELP LEAD THE NEWLY CREATED 'NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD' (HARNESS INNOVATIVE TALENT)
NAVY COMPLAINS THAT CONGRESS IS ACTING AGAINST ITS INTERESTS AND ITS LEGAL RIGHTS OVER NAVAL OIL RESERVE LAND
CONGRESS APPROPRIATES $25,000 TO PAY CIVILIAN SCIENTISTS INVOLVED WITH NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD
$1.5 MILLION APPROPRIATED FOR EXPERIMANTAL LABORATORY FOR USE BY NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD
CREATION OF THE COMMITTEES FOR INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS (240 NATION-WIDE MEMBERS OF NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD)
CREATION OF THE COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (LATER TO BECOME THE WAR INDUSTRIES BOARD)
CONTINUED CATAPULT AIRCRAFT LAUNCHING EXPERIMENTS ON NORTH CAROLINA, WEST VIRGINIA, AND WASHINGTON
USS NEVADA JOINS FLEET SERVICE AS FIRST ALL OIL BATTLESHIP IN US NAVY
LAST PRE-WAR AMERICAN APPROPRIATIONS BILL FOR NAVAL CONSTRUCTION, 3 BATTLESHIPS, 3 CRUISERS, 15 DESTROYERS, 18 SUBS
$63,000,000 APPROPRIATED FOR AVIATION IN THIS YEAR
DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING OF THE 'LIBERTY ENGINE'
AIRCRAFT BOARD FAILS TO RECOMMEND A THIRD BRANCH OF MILITARY FOR 'AIR SERVICE'
AIRCRAFT BOARD CREATED TO COORDINATE BETWEEN ARMY AND NAVY AIR ACTIVITIES
BOTH ARMY AND NAVY WILL OPERATE SEPARATE AIR WINGS OF THEIR SERVICES
IMPLEMENTATION OF CONVOY SYSTEM TO COMBAT U-BOAT WARFARE
CREATION OF THE NATIONAL PETROELUM WAR SERVICE COMMITTEE, UNITED STATES FUEL ADMINISTRATION, OIL DIVISION WITHIN
USFA
NAVY FUEL OIL CONSUMPTION AT 189,000,000 (4.5 MILLION BARRELS), GASOLINE CONSUMPTION 11.5 MILLION GALLONS
NAVY DECLARES THAT NO NATION CAN MAINTAIN FORCES IN THE FIELD WITHOUT CONTROL OF ADEQUATE OIL SUPPLIES
NAVY REQUISITIONS 6 COMMERCIAL OIL TANKERS
US AND BRITAIN BUILD OIL PIPELINE ACROSS SCOTLAND
CREATION OF THE INTER-ALLIED PETROLEUM CONFERENCE
AT WAR'S END US NAVY HAS OVER 2100 PLANES, 695 SEAPLANES, 1,170 FLYING BOATS,(5,965 total navy planes) 241 LAND-BASED AIRCRAFT
British Energy Transition Timeline
YEAR
1865
1898
1899
1901
1901
1902
1902
1902
1903
1903
1904
1904
1904
1904
1904
1904
1905
1905
1905
1907
1907
1908
1908
GREAT BRITAIN
SELWYN AND RICHARDSON CONVINCE ADMIRALTY TO CONDUCT EARLY TESTS ON OIL BURNING TECHNOLOGY
FISHER SUPPORTS EARLY TESTS ON OIL AS CONTROLLER OF NAVY 1898-1901
JACK FISHER MEETS MARCUS SAMUEL FOR THE FIRST TIME
WILLIAM D'ARCY OBTAINS REMARKABLE PERSIAN OIL CONCESSION
PRELIMINARY LIQUID FUEL EXPERIMENTAL PLANT BUILT AT DAVENPORT
ADMIRALTY FUEL EXPERIMENT STATION ESTABLISHED AT HASLAR
JAMES MELROSE CHIEF INSPECTOR OF MACHINERY FOR ROYAL NAVY CONVINCED BY TESTS OF THE CAPABILITY OF OIL FUEL
BRITAIN BUILDS ITS FURIST SUBMARINE, THE H-1, HOLLAND TYPE VESSEL
FISHER MEETS WILLIAM D'ARCY, AND IS SHOWN THE MAPS OF THE D'ARCY PERSIAN OIL CONCESSION
BRITAIN OBTAINS 8 MORE HOLLAND TYPE SUBMARINES
FISHER MADE FIRST SEA LORD
BRITISH ACHIEVE OIL ATOMIZATION WITHOUT COMPRESSED AIR, CONSIDERED STATE SECRET, GRANTED SECRET PATENT
BRITAIN ADOPTS OIL AS AN AUXILLIARY FUEL ON ALL NAVAL VESSELS, ALL SHIPS TO BE DUAL-BURNING
PRETYMAN COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED, PURPOSE TO EXAMINE THE SUPPLY PROBLEM
PRETYMAN COMMITTEE AND COLONIAL OFFICE DEVELOP POLICIES THAT ENCOURAGE HEAVY OIL FUEL PRODUCTION IN THE EMPIRE
OIL MINES ACT OF BARBADOS, STIPULATES THAT OIL CONCESSIONS IN THE COLONY WOULD ACT WITH BRITISH NAVAL INTERESTS IN MIND
PRETYMAN COMMITTEE, ADMIRALTY, AND INDIAN GOVERNMENT, AGREE TO EXCLUDE STANDARD OIL SUBSIDIARY (ASIATIC OIL) OUT OF INDIA
ADMIRALTY SIGNS FIRST LONG TERM OIL CONTRACT WITH BURMAH OIL, INCLUDES CLAUSE THAT ADMIRALTY MUST APPROVE ANY CHANGE IN
OWNERSHIP
PRETYMAN, SELBORNE, AND REDWOOD, WORK TO KEEP PERSIAN CONCESSION IN BRITISH HANDS THROUGH DEAL WITH BURMAH OIL
FISHER MEETS WINSTON CHURCHILL
ADMIRATLY REJECTS AN OFFER FROM THE WRIGHT BROTHERS FOR THEIR PATENTS ON AIRPLANES
FIRST OIL GUSHERS RUPTURE IN D'ARCY PERSIAN CONCESSION AT MAIDAN-I-NAFTUN
CREATION OF THE IMPERIAL DEFENSE SUB-COMMITTEE ON AERIAL NAVIGATION
295
1909
1910
1910
1910-1911
1911
1911
1911
1911
1911
1911
1912
1912
1912
1912
1912-1913
1913
1913
1913
1913
1913
1914
1914
1916
1916
1917
1917
1917
1917
1917
1917
1917
1917
1918
1918
1918
ANGLO PERSIAN OIL COMPANY INCPORPORATED
DESTROYERS BURNING ONLY OIL FIRMLY ESTABLISHED, ALL BATTLESHIPS DUAL-FIRING USING OIL AS ADJUNCT
BRITISH SUPPORT FOR EXPERIMENTAL AIRPLANE RESEARCH LAGS BEHIND THE US, AND FRANCE.
ADMIRALTY PURCHASES ITS FIRST EXPERIMENTAL AIRPLANES FROM MCCLEAN AND ALSO FROM SHORT BROTHERS
BRITAIN BY 1911 OWNS MORE SUBMARINES THAN ANY OTHER NAVY
BRITISH NAVY BEGINS USING INTERNAL COMBUSTION ENGINES AND TURBINE ENGNES IN DESTROYERS
WINSTON CHURCHILL MADE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY
56 DESTROYERS, 74 SUBMARINES BURNING ONLY OIL IN BRITISH NAVY
ADMIRALTY CREATES PAKENHAM COMMITTEE TO EXAMINE TRANSITIONING ALL BRITISH SHIPS TO BURNING ONLY OIL
CREATION OF THE NAVAL FLYING SCHOOL
PAKENHAM COMMITTEE FAILS TO RECOMMEND TRANSITIONING ALL SHIPS TO OIL BURNING
CHURCHILL CREATES THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON FUEL AND ENGINES
AIR COMMITTEE (SUB COMMITTEE OF COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENSE) CREATED
AIR COMMITTEE RECOMMENDS CREATION OF THE ROYAL FLYING CORPS
BRITISH NAVY MORE THAN DOUBLES ITS EXPENDITURE ON AERONAUTICS
A.P.O.C.'S ABADAN REFINERY BEGINS FUEL OIL PRODUCTION
CHURCHILL CALLS FOR DIRECT STATE PARTICIPATION IN THE OIL PRODUCTION, AND REFINERY BUSINESS, STATE TO CREATE PETROCHEMICAL INDUSTRY
JACK FISHER DESCRIBES THE CONNECTION BETWEEN SUBMARINES AND OIL ENGINES
BRITAIN HAS BUILT A 2-1 MARGIN OVER GERMAN IN SUBMARINES FOR ITS NAVY
CHURCHILL TASKS THE NAVAL WAR STAFF TO PRODUCE A REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF ADOPTING OIL
BRITAIN OBTAINS CONTROLLING SHARES IN ITS FIRST NATIONAL OIL COMPANY
R-CLASS BATTLESHIPS CONVERTED TO BURN ONLY OIL
SYKES PICOT AGREEMENT BETWEEN BRITAIN AND FRANCE (DIVIDING UP FORMER OTTOMAN TERRITORIES)
BALFOUR DESCRIBES CONTROL OF MESOPOTAMIAN OIL RESERVES AS FIRST CLASS WAR AIM
BRITISH OIL RESERVES ONLY AT 60% OF PREFERRED LEVELS
CABINET CALLS FOR INCREASED USE OF DOUBLE BOTTOM SHIPS FOR CARRYING OIL
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVOY SYSTEM
CREATION OF MINERAL AND OIL PRODUCTION DEPARTMENT, THE POOL BOARD, THE PETROL CONTROL DEPARTMENT
CREATION OF THE PETROLEUM EXECUTIVE
BRITISH (NAMELY JELLICOE) ADMIT THAT THE GERMANS CONTROL THE SKIES, AND BELOW WATER IN NORTH SEA AND EVEN EASTERN ATLANTIC)
BY 1917 BRITAIN 22,000 AIRPLANES BETWEEN THE ARMY AND NAVY
70% OF ALL BRITISH OIL IMPORTS FOR NAVAL USE, BRITISH OIL IMPORTS DOUBLED SINCE 1914
SLADE MEMO REACHES CABINET WITH ADMIRALTY APPROVAL
CREATION OF THE INTER-ALLIED PETROLEUM CONFERENCE
PASSAGE OF THE 1918 PETROLEUM PRODUCTION ACT
Matrix and Timeline Legend
Investigative Era
Pre-War Transition
Wartime Transition
Color Code
YELLOW
GREEN
TURQUOISE
296
297