Distributive Justice
331
Journal of Sport Management, 2002, 16, 331-356
© 2002 Human Kinetics Publishers, Inc.
Distributive Justice in Intercollegiate
Athletics: Perceptions of Athletic
Directors and Athletic Board Chairs
Daniel F. Mahony and Mary A. Hums
University of Louisville
Harold A. Riemer
University of Regina
Hums and Chelladurai (1994b) found NCAA coaches and administrators believed distributing resources based on equality and need was more just than
distributing them based on equity (i.e., contribution). However, Mahony and
Pastore (1998) found actual distributions, particularly at the NCAA Division I
level, appear to be based on equity over equality and need. The main purpose
of the current study was to determine why the findings in these studies differed. The authors of the current study reexamined the principles from Hums
and Chelladurai’s (1994b) study, while making significant changes in the
sample examined, asking new questions, and adding more distribution options. The results indicated that need based principles were considered to be
the most fair, but there was less support for equality than in prior research. In
addition, the current study found differences between Division I and Division
III administrators with regards to some equality and equity based principles.
The distribution of resources within American intercollegiate athletics has
been one of the most controversial issues since its early days. Over the years,
coaches have argued that their sports should get more of the resources for a variety
of reasons, including their team was more successful, they have to work more
hours, and their current share of the resources are insufficient to meet some of the
needs of the program (e.g., facilities, equipment). As far back as the early 1900s,
the leaders of minor sports at Yale University expressed their displeasure with a
distribution system that gave most of the resources to Walter Camp’s football team
(Thelin, 1994). Camp, who was also the athletic director, felt the system that distributed most of the resources to football was fair and refused to make major changes
in these distributions (Thelin). This controversy over the distribution of resources
D.F. Mahony and M.A. Hums are with the Department of Health Promotion, Physical Education and Sport Studies, University of Louisville, Louisville, KY; H.A. Riemer is
with the Faculty of Kinesiology and Health Studies, University of Regina, Regina, SK.
331
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Mahony, Hums, and Riemer
has become even greater in recent years since the passage of Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972. While most athletic administrators traditionally used
a distribution system similar to Camp’s in which most of the money went to revenue producing sports, generally football and men’s basketball (Mahony & Pastore,
1998), Title IX mandated that resources be distributed more equally between men’s
and women’s sports. Still, very few larger schools provide equal opportunities or
budgets for the women’s sport programs (Brady, 1995; “Fact and Figures,” 1999;
Mahony & Pastore, 1998).
The fact that many athletic departments fail to meet the Office of Civil Rights’
standards relative to Title IX (Zimbalist, 1999), especially given the high frequency
of court victories for Title IX plaintiffs (Jurewitz, 2000), would suggest that factors other than the law influence the distribution of resources. For example, it is
possible that important stakeholders, such as athletic department donors, are not
very supportive of Title IX and believe distributions should continue to favor the
men’s revenue sports. In fact, a recent study by Mahony and Gladden (2001) found
athletic department donors at Division I-A institutions tended to be much more
supportive of efforts to improve the quality of revenue sport teams than other athletic department teams. Moreover, it is possible that decision makers in intercollegiate athletics may make distributions in a manner they believe will lead to the
best financial results for their organization. In other words, they distribute more
resources to men’s revenue sports because they believe these sports have the greatest
potential to generate needed revenue. They believe following the mandates of Title
IX exactly would lead to major financial problems for the athletic department (e.g.,
Brewington, 1995; Neinas, 1995).
Finally, a major reason for the reluctance to follow Title IX guidelines appears to be differing views among decision makers regarding the fairness of various resource distribution methods (e.g., Brewington, 1995; Lopiano, 1995; Neinas,
1995; Wolff, 1993). While the importance of stakeholder opinions (e.g., donors,
alumni, students) and economic necessity can not be ignored, the perceptions of
fairness of various methods held by the primary decision maker(s) often have a
significant impact on actual distributions. In fact, it is logical that despite pressure
from inside and outside the organization, decision makers would attempt to make
at least some adjustments to the distributions based on their own beliefs about
what is fair.
The existence of different views within and across organizations with respect to fairness or justice is not unique to intercollegiate athletics. Organizational
justice researchers have spent considerable time examining the role of fairness in
the workplace, often focusing on distributive justice (Greenberg, 1990). Distributive justice focuses on the perceptions of individuals regarding the fairness of the
end results (i.e., the actual distribution of resources). For example, employees within
an organization will often compare their salary increases with the salary increases
of other employees to determine if the distribution of resources is fair. Their individual determination of whether the distribution is fair will be based on their general view of what is a just method of determining resources. As will be discussed,
Distributive Justice
333
they may believe that all employees should get the same increase or some employees should get more because they work harder, are more productive, have more
ability, or have greater needs.
Prior research also examined distributive justice and its applications both to
distributions (i.e., the increasing/provision of resources) and to retributions (i.e.,
the decreasing/withdrawal of resources) (Tornblom & Jonsson, 1985). Deutsch
(1975) identified three primary principles used to distribute or allocate resources
fairly: (a) equity (allocations are based on the contributions each individual or
group makes to the organization), (b) equality (all groups or individuals receive
the same allocation), and (c) need (allocations are based on the level of need of
groups or individuals).
Distributive Justice Principles
When the principle of equity (i.e., contribution) is used, allocations may be determined by (a) productivity, (b) effort, or (c) ability (Tornblom & Jonsson, 1985).
This means the individual or group producing the most, putting forth the most
effort, and/or having the most ability receives the larger share of the resources
being distributed or has fewer resources taken away. Because of the unique nature
of the sport industry, Hums and Chelladurai (1994b) also suggested spectator appeal as an additional equity based principle for determining distributions in sport
or athletic organizations. In general, equity is used most often in situations where
economic productivity is the primary goal (Deutsch, 1975). Many scholars have
argued “big time” college sports (Division I) have become more like “big business” (Sperber, 1990) and follow a corporate model (e.g., Hart-Nibbrig &
Cottingham, 1986; Schneider, 2000). In addition, the Division I Philosophy Statement suggests that institutions at this level strive to produce revenue sufficient to
cover their costs (NCAA Manual, 1996). Therefore, one would expect equity to be
used to determine distributions more often at NCAA Division I schools than at
Division III institutions.
When the principle of equality is used, all individuals or groups receive the
same allocation regardless of their contributions and/or inputs. Equality may be
based on equality of treatment (distributions are equal in a given situation), equality of results (distributions are equal over the long term), and equality of opportunity (each individual or group has an equal chance of receiving the distribution)
(Tornblom & Jonsson, 1985). Equality is more commonly used in organizations
characterized by cooperative relations where fostering and maintaining positive
social relations is the primary goal (Deutsch, 1975) and there is increased cohesion and a sense of “common fate” (Sheppard, Lewicki, & Minton, 1992). Therefore, this principle would be expected to be used more often at Division III schools
where the departments are smaller and the NCAA Division III Philosophy Statement clearly indicates economic productivity is less important (Mahony & Pastore,
1998; NCAA Manual, 1996). In fact, Mahony and Pastore found that equality
based distributions appeared to be much more common at the Division III level
than at the Division I or even the Division II level.
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Mahony, Hums, and Riemer
When the principle of need is used, the only consideration is that one group
has less of a given resource and, therefore, is seen as entitled to more. Similar to
equality, this form of justice is also most common in organizations characterized
by cooperative relations (Deutsch, 1975). The difference is that need based distributions are more common where fostering personal growth is the primary goal
and survival of each group member is generally the most important concern
(Deutsch). In other words, while equality based distributions are used when an
organization is focused on treating all individuals and groups the same, need is
used in organizations which recognize that some individuals may need more of the
resources because their growth needs are different (e.g., they may be less prepared
for their current position, their area has traditionally received less so they do not
have the resources necessary to support growth, or they will simply not survive
without additional resources).
While outside observers (e.g., Schneider, 2000; Sperber, 1990) and the NCAA
Division I Philosophy Statement (NCAA Manual, 1996) both suggest that economic productivity are important at the Division I level, “fostering personal growth”
appears to be the most appropriate goal within an educational setting and is the
first purpose listed in the NCAA Manual (2000). Therefore, need would appear to
be one of the most appropriate principles to use when allocating resources among
programs in college sports. In fact, Hums and Chelladurai (1994b) found that need
was among the three distribution methods consistently considered just by male
and female coaches and administrators at all levels in the NCAA. The other two
were equality of treatment and equality of results. This finding would suggest
college athletic departments are cooperative work environments in which everyone works together and generally agrees on how to distribute resources.
However, the findings in a recent study of intercollegiate sport expenditures
at NCAA schools by Mahony and Pastore (1998) indicated need and equality are
not used when making actual distributions, especially at the Division I level. First,
Mahony and Pastore found many schools, in an effort to comply with Title IX,
chose to eliminate some men’s non-revenue sports rather than decrease budgets of
men’s revenue sports teams. This strategy would certainly not be occurring if survival of group members (need) was one of the major principles used in determining distributions and retributions. Second, Mahony and Pastore found expenses
for revenue sport teams at the Division I level were increasing at a faster rate than
the rise in the consumer price index and most schools were not close to distributing resources equally. The results suggested equity based on revenue production
and/or spectator appeal was a major principle used when distributing resources,
especially at the Division I level.
The findings of Hums & Chelladurai (1994b) are also inconsistent with the
arguments of male coaches and administrators who have suggested that distributions to popular revenue producing sports, particularly football, should not be decreased in order to provide more equal distributions for female sports because
football produces more revenue (e.g., Brewington, 1995; Neinas, 1995). Again,
this would suggest they believe distributions should be based on equity, not equality or need. Moreover, prior research indicates men generally prefer to distribute
Distributive Justice
335
rewards based on equity (e.g., Kahn, O’Learn, Krulewitz, & Lamm, 1980; Kipnis,
1974), so the preference for equality and need based distributions by men reported
by Hums and Chelladurai (1994b) is certainly unique and difficult to explain.
Purpose of the Study
Given the inconsistency between Hums and Chelladurai’s (1994b) findings related to the perceptions of the fairness of various distribution methods and evidence from the media and research studies (Mahony & Pastore, 1998) regarding
actual distributions, another study is necessary to better understand perceptions of
fairness and the relationship between these perceptions and distributions. Therefore, the purpose of the current study was to better understand the perceptions of
fairness and the distributions of resources in intercollegiate athletics. Similar to
Hums and Chelladurai (1994b), respondents in this study were asked about both
distributions and retributions and were asked to evaluate each of the principles
(e.g., equality, equity) and sub-principles (e.g., equality of treatment, effort, ability) discussed in the distributive justice literature. However, a number of substantive differences exist between the current study and the Hums and Chelladurai
(1994b) study, including using a different group of participants, asking participants what would be done in each scenario in addition to what they believed was
fair, and adding additional subprinciples under equity, equality, and need.
Research Questions
In summary, the current study sought to answer a number of research questions
including:
1. What distribution principles do athletic directors and athletic board chairs
consider most fair?
2. How do athletic directors and athletic board chairs believe their institution
would actually distribute or take away resources?
3. Are there differences between athletic board chairs and athletic directors
within the same division regarding their perceptions of fairness and the actual distribution or retribution decisions they believe would be made at their
institution?
4. Are there differences between administrators at Division I and Division III
institutions regarding their perceptions of fairness and the actual distribution or retribution decisions they believe would be made at their institution?
Method
Participants
The population for this study consisted of the athletic directors and athletic board
chairs at all NCAA Division I-A institutions and NCAA Division III schools participating in men’s football as identified by the NCAA (N = 660). The entire population was surveyed because of its relatively small size and the difficulty in getting
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Mahony, Hums, and Riemer
responses from this group. Address labels for the sample were obtained directly
from the NCAA, so they were as updated and accurate as possible. Of the questionnaires returned, 261 (40%) were useable. More specifically, response rates for
various groups were as follows: Division I and Division III athletic directors at
47% (53/112) and 40% (87/218), respectively; and, Division I and Division III
athletic board chairs at 38% (42/112) and 35% (76/218), respectively. Of the 261
respondents, 233 were male (89%), while only 28 were female (11%).
While the response rate was good given the population and the questions
being asked, there were concerns about how representative the respondents were
of the population.1 Therefore, we compared the schools of the athletic directors
and athletic board chairs who responded with the schools of those that did not (for
Division III schools, a random sample of the non-responders was used). In the
case of Division I institutions, we contrasted the following variables: undergraduate enrollment, number of athletes on financial assistance, general and athletic
graduation rates, and reported revenues and expenditures. For Division III institutions, we compared male and female undergraduate enrollment and four year graduation rates. No differences were found suggesting the sample was an adequate
representation of the population of interest.
Instrument
Although the scale developed by Hums and Chelladurai (1994a) was used as a
model, a number of substantive changes were made for the present study (see
Appendix A). First, revenue production was added as a sub-principle under equity.
This suggestion was made by Hums and Chelladurai (1994b) and appears logical
based on the method being used (Mahony & Pastore, 1998) and the arguments
often presented by male coaches and administrators (e.g., Brewington, 1995; Neinas,
1995). Second, the principle of equal percentages was added. This refers to a commonly used, but often ignored, distribution method where all budgets are increased
or decreased by an equal percentage, often referred to as incremental budgeting
(Hums & Chelladurai, 1994b). While this method could clearly result in an unequal distribution of resources, especially if past budgets were unequal, the reason
this is classified as an equality-based distribution is all of the individuals or groups
are treated the same regardless of their contribution or current needs.
Third, need was examined using multiple items rather than just one. Although the respondents in Hums and Chelladurai (1994b) rated need highly, it was
unclear how they interpreted need when responding to the item. Traditionally, organizational research had defined need as ensuring the survival of group members. However, we believe that prior distributive justice research, inside sport management and beyond, has not adequately defined the complexities of need and the
current study is, in part, an attempt to extend prior research and begin an effort to
better understand the use of need as a distribution principle. Athletic directors’ and
board chairs’ answers to these new items used in this study should provide a better
understanding of how they actually define need. The three need related items were
developed through discussions with experts in the area (i.e., three researchers who
have done extensive work in the area of college athletics) and arguments presented
Distributive Justice
337
through the media. Two of these items, (a) need to survive (women’s team) and (b)
need to survive (men’s non-revenue team), incorporated the traditional survival
notion of need. However, the recent cuts experienced by many men’s non-revenue
sports (Gavora, 1996; Mahony & Pastore, 1998; Shelton, 2000; Wolff & Stone,
1995) and the legal difficulties faced by those trying to cut women’s sports
(Filippone, 1999) would suggest there may be differences in how need is interpreted based on the gender of the athletes. A third item, (c) need to be successful,
was included because it has been suggested that in order to succeed some sports
simply need more of the resources (Mahony, 1999). In other words, football and
men’s basketball teams may “need” more resources in order to keep up with competing programs that spend excessively on these sports. Therefore, decision
makers may believe it is fair to distribute more resources to these sports because of the “need” to be more competitive, which will lead to more fans and more
revenue.
Fourth, the current study focused solely on the distribution and retribution
of financial resources, while Hums and Chelladurai (1994b) also examined facility use and support services. This decision was made because there is more information on actual distribution of financial resources to compare with the perceptions of the respondents, and it is more difficult to hide inequality when allocating
financial resources. Moreover, the allocations of financial resources are often very
visible and controversial.
Fifth, the current study examined athletic directors and athletic board chairs
rather than administrators and coaches. One possible reason for the discrepancy
between actual distributions and perceptions of the fairness of distribution methods may have been that many of those surveyed by Hums and Chelladurai (1994b)
did not have any power over the distributions. The current study examined only
those who had some involvement, and perhaps some power, with regards to financial distributions. A review of organizational structures in college athletics by the
lead author found that college athletic departments generally have an athletic board
made up of various stakeholders (e.g., faculty, students, alumni, administrators),
which is at the top of the athletic department organizational chart and often approves budgets. We believed it would be inefficient to survey all board members,
but that it would be useful to examine the views of the individuals with the most
formal power on the board (i.e., the athletic board chair). However, many have
argued these boards are largely ceremonial and have little actual power (e.g.,
Sperber, 1990). The study, therefore, also examined athletic directors because many
believe they have more power over distributions than the chair of the athletic board.
Sixth, we asked athletic directors and board chairs to indicate the distribution methods that would be chosen by their schools. The rationale for this question
was that there may be a difference between what administrators believe is fair and
how they behave. For example, an administrator may believe equality is most fair,
but may distribute resources based on revenue production because individuals with
power put pressure on him/her to distribute resources in this manner. Therefore,
the participants’ answers to these questions may provide responses that are more
consistent with the actual distributions.
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Mahony, Hums, and Riemer
Drawing on the research by Tornblom and Jonsson (1985) and extending the
work of Hums and Chelladurai (1994a, 1994b), the instrument developed for this
study consisted of two basic sections. In the first section, participants were provided with a distribution scenario (i.e., a lump sum of money was awarded and
must be spent) followed by 12 statements each describing a different principle of
how the money might be distributed. For each of the 12 principle statements, participants were invited to rate, using five-point Likert-type scales, (a) the fairness
of each principle (“Very Unfair” to “Very Fair”), and (b) the likelihood their particular institution would use the principle when actually making distribution related decisions (“Very Unlikely” to “Very Likely”). The second section was similar except the scenario involved retribution (i.e., a large amount of money had to
be cut from the budget). Again, participants were asked to evaluate the fairness,
and likelihood of use, of the 12 principles in a situation where money needed to be
taken away.
The twelve principles evaluated in terms of “fairness” and “likelihood of
use” by respondents were (a) revenue production, (b) effort, (c) spectator appeal,
(d) winning percentage, (e) ability, (f) need to succeed, (g) need to survive by a
women’s team, (g) need to survive by a men’s non-revenue team, (h) equality of
treatment, (i) equality of results, (j) those with the largest budget receive the most
(cut the least), and (k) equality of opportunity (random selection). The distribution
and retribution scenarios, the accompanying 12 principles, and the related rating
scales are presented in Appendix A. The instrument was formatted differently than
is shown in Appendix A, but the original format was much more lengthy and the
authors presented it differently here to save space. After an initial version of the
instrument was developed, it was sent to a panel of six experts who were asked to
analyze it for readability and content. All of the experts were chosen because they
have done an extensive amount of research on intercollegiate athletics. Recommendations from the experts were incorporated into the revised questionnaire presented in Appendix A.
Procedures
A first mailing was sent to all 660 members of the population. Participation in the
study was voluntary, and a letter indicating the participants’ rights was included.
The letter and questionnaire were approved by the University Human Subjects
Review Committee. Surveys were numbered to help track respondents. Two months
after the first mailing, a second mailing was sent to those individuals who had not
yet responded. While the overall response rate of 40% is somewhat low, we considered this to be a good response rate. We were surveying a group of administrators who are very busy and asking them questions that could be considered controversial. We used different means for increasing the response rate, including sending the second mailing at a later date because it was a time of the year when they
would likely be less busy. We also compared respondents with non-respondents to make sure there were no significant differences. Based on all of this,
we believe that the 40% response rate was sufficient for the analysis in the
current study.
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339
Data Analysis
To address the various research questions, several analyses were undertaken. First,
the authors calculated all the means and standard deviations of all the variables.
For the second series of analyses, we were interested in the effects that a person’s
position (i.e., Division I or III board chair or athletic director) might have on the
responses provided relative to the 12 principles. Given the small number of women
(n = 28) in the sample, gender was not included in these analyses.
As noted in the introduction, each of the 12 principles may be classified as a
distribution/retribution form of either (a) equity, (b) equality, or (c) need. Specifically, five of the principles may be considered forms of equity (i.e., revenue production; effort; spectator appeal; winning percentage; ability). Four principles may
be treated as a type of equality (i.e., equality of treatment; equality of results; those
with most receive the most or are cut the least; equality of opportunity). The remaining three principles may all be thought of as some form of need (i.e., financial
need to succeed; financial need to survive by a women’s team; financial need to
survive by a men’s non-revenue team).
In addition, respondents also evaluated each of the 12 principles from two
different, and potentially unique perspectives. These were the respondent’s own
evaluation of the fairness of each principle, and his/her estimation of the likelihood that the principle would be used in the retribution/distribution decision making at their institution.
Therefore, the authors conducted a series of six MANOVAs followed up
using procedures outlined by Stevens (1996). Specifically, the dependent variables for the first MANOVA consisted of responses to the fairness of the five
principles (retribution and distribution) that could be classified as a form of equity.
The dependent variables for the second MANOVA similarly consisted of responses
to the fairness of the four principles (retribution and distribution) that could be
classified as a type of equality. The dependent variables for the third MANOVA
consisted of the respondents’ views of the fairness of the three principles (retribution and distribution) that could be considered need based. In the same way that
the first three MANOVAs addressed questions related to the fairness of the various
principles, the second set of three MANOVAs were identical in form except that
they concerned the respondent’s evaluation of the likelihood that a given principle
would be used at his/her institution.
Following a significant multivariate result (i.e., < .008, based on
Bonferroni’s adjustment of .05/6), Hotelling 2 was employed to determine,
multivariately, which of the groups differed. Again, since there are six possible
pairwise comparisons (as there are four groups to compare), an adjusted alpha of
.008 was used. At this point, direct entry discriminant analysis was employed to
help determine whether there was a major dimension(s) (i.e., discriminant function) within a given set of dependent variables on which the groups differed. Finally, to identify which of the dependent variables were contributing to the group
differences, the Tukey simultaneous confidence interval approach was used
(Stevens, 1996).2
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Mahony, Hums, and Riemer
Results
Descriptive Statistics
The means and standard deviations of all the variables are provided in Tables 1
and 2. Several observations regarding the overall means are noteworthy. First, the
only principles rated above a 3.5 were associated with need (i.e., needed for success, needed for survival). Second, overall means indicate that equality of treatment and equality of results (retribution scenario) were also above a 3.0 (i.e., the
midpoint) for fairness, but not for likelihood of use. Third, the means for all other
principles were below a 3.0 and in some cases were below a 2.0, indicating relatively strong rejection of many of the other principles.
The following results associated with group level means are worth highlighting. First, the fairness of equality of treatment and equality of results in the
distribution scenario was generally above 3.0 only for Division III administrators.
Second, the Division III administrators also rated the likelihood of use above 3.0
for equality of treatment. Third, other than the need based principles, equality of
treatment, and equality of results, only two other group means were above 3.0.
Division I athletic directors indicated they believed revenue production and spectator appeal were at least somewhat fair in the retribution scenario.
Multivariate Analyses
Overall multivariate results. In the case of principles related to equity and
equality, results indicated a difference between the groups on the sets of dependent
variables. This was true for both the respondent’s evaluation of fairness and his/
her estimation of the likelihood the principle would be used at their university. The
equations for the principles of need were not significant, suggesting there were no
differences between the four groups on these sets of variables. Therefore, the need
related principles were not included in any of the remaining analyses. A summary
of the overall multivariate results of the six MANOVAs is provided in Table 3.
Multivariate pairwise group analysis. A summary of these results are provided in Table 4. First, there were no significant differences, in a multivariate
sense (i.e., on the dependent variables as a set), between respondents within a
given division for any set of dependent variables. That is, Division I athletic directors did not differ multivariately from Division I athletic board chairs, and Division III athletic directors did not differ multivariately from Division III athletic
board chairs. Second, differences, in a multivariate sense, existed between Division I athletic directors and their Division III counterparts for the sets of variables
associated with equity (“evaluation of fairness” and “likelihood of use”), and equality in the case of “likelihood of use.” Multivariate differences between Division I
athletic directors and Division III athletic board chairs were also significant for the
principles associated with equity (“evaluation of fairness” and “likelihood of use”).
Division I athletic board chairs differed significantly from Division III athletic
directors and athletic board chairs for all sets of dependent variables associated
with equality and equity, with only one exception (i.e., principles of equity: “evaluation of fairness”).
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Mahony, Hums, and Riemer
Distributive Justice
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344
Mahony, Hums, and Riemer
Distributive Justice
345
Discriminant analyses. A total of four direct entry discriminant analyses
were conducted. Alpha for these analyses was set at .0125 (i.e., based on
Bonferroni’s adjustment of .05/4). Overall results indicated that only the first function was significant in each instance (refer to Table 5). Following Stevens (1996),
the discriminant function-variable correlations were used to interpret the functions. These are reported in Table 6. Examination of the first functions (fairness
and likelihood of use) associated with the principles of equity suggests that both
might be named “measurable equity”; that is, the highest correlations all concerned
forms of equity that are more objective in nature and readily measurable. The two
principles with relatively low correlations compared with the rest in the group
were distributive and retributional effort, a form of equity rather subjective and
not easily measured.
The first functions (fairness and likelihood of use) associated with the principles of equality might be referred to as “true equality.” Equal treatment (distribution and retribution) was the only principle with large correlations with the functions.
The other forms of equality had considerably lower and/or negative correlations.
A second telling feature of the discriminant analysis is the group means on
the first discriminant function (refer to Table 7). These clearly separate Division I
administrators from Division III administrators. While Division I respondents had
higher means on the discriminant functions referred to as measurable equity (fairness and likelihood of use), Division III respondents had higher means on the
functions labelled “true equality” (fairness and likelihood of use). A third observation related to the significant discriminant functions is that they were not associated with a distinction between distribution and retribution.
Post hoc procedures. The Tukey simultaneous confidence interval approach
was used to identify which dependent variables were contributing to the multivari-
Table 3
Overall Multivariate Results of the MANOVAs
Dependent variables
Equity Principles
Evaluation of fairness
Likelihood of use
Need Principles
Evaluation of fairness
Likelihood of use
Equality Principles
Evaluation of fairness
Likelihood of use
*p < .008.
n
Wilks λ
df
F
258
259
.731
.726
30,719
30,722
2.95*
2.77*
258
258
.958
.917
18,704
18,704
.592
1.21
260
259
.811
.804
24,722
24,719
2.26*
2.33*
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Mahony, Hums, and Riemer
Table 4
Results of the Multivariate Pairwise Group Comparisons
F value of Hotelling T2
n
df
1 vs.
2
1 vs.
3
1 vs.
4
2 vs.
3
2 vs.
4
3 vs.
4
Equity
Evaluation of fairness
Likelihood of use
258
259
10,245
10,246
1.5
.88
4.6*
3.9*
3.6*
4.3*
2.3
2.9*
2.6*
3.4*
1.7
1.6
Equality
Evaluation of fairness
Likelihood of use
260
259
8,249
8,248
1.7
1.5
2.1
3.5*
2.4
2.4
3.3*
2.8*
3.5*
3.0*
1.0
1.1
Equation
1 = Division I athletic directors; 2 = Division I athletic board chairs; 3 = Division III
athletic directors; 4 = Division III athletic board chairs
* p<.008
Table 5
Overall Result of the Discriminant Analyses
Equation
% of
Function Eigenvalue Variance
Equity principles
Evaluation of
fairness
(n = 258)
Likelihood of use
(n = 259)
Equality principles
Evaluation of
fairness
(n = 260)
Likelihood of use
(n = 259)
*p < .0125
Canonical
correlation Wilks λ
2
(df)
1
2
3
.216
.084
.036
64.2
25
10.8
.42
.28
.19
.73
.89
.97
78.2(30)*
29.2(18)
8.9(8)
1
2
3
.253
.062
.034
72.4
17.7
9.8
.45
.24
.18
.73
.91
.96
80.2(30)*
23.6(18)
8.5(8)
1
2
3
.140
.049
.031
63.7
22.1
14.2
.35
.22
.17
.81
.93
.97
53.1(24)*
19.8(14)
7.8(6)
1
2
3
.146
.063
.020
63.8
27.6
8.6
.36
.24
.14
.81
.92
.98
54.8(24)*
20.4(14)
4.9(6)
Distributive Justice
347
Table 6 Correlations Between the First Discriminant Function
and the Associated Variables
Discriminant function–
variable correlation
Evaluation of
fairness
Equation
Variables
Equity
Spectator appeal (r)
Spectator appeal (d)
Revenue production (r)
Revenue production (d)
Ability (r)
Ability (d)
Winning % (r)
Winning % (d)
Effort (r)
Effort (d)
Equality
Equal (r)
Equal (d)
Least in past (r)
Least in past (d)
Largest % in past (r)
Largest % in past (d)
Equality of opportunity (r)
Equality of opportunity (d)
Likelihood
of use
.76
.61
.71
.55
.64
.67
.65
.60
.21
.24
.51
.45
.63
.56
.34
.41
.34
.63
.003
.047
.69
.52
–.14
.02
–.32
.11
–.031
–.19
.74
.60
.02
.16
–.16
.18
–.23
.15
(r) = retribution; (d)=distribution.
Table 7 Group Means on the First Discriminant Function for Each Set
of Equations
Group
Function
Measurable equity
Evaluation of fairness
Likelihood of use
True equality
Evaluation of fairness
Likelihood of use
Division 1
AD’s
Division 1
ABC’s
Division III
AD’s
Division III
ABC’s
.747
.693
.368
.588
–.402
–.322
–.276
–.446
–.305
–.494
–.660
–.500
.238
.329
.309
.241
348
Mahony, Hums, and Riemer
Table 8 Results of Tukey Post Hoc Analysis to Determine Which Dependent
Variables Contributed to the Multivariate Pairwise Results
Dependent variables
with significant differences in means
Div.I AD’s
vs Div. III
AD’s
Div.I AD’s
vs. Div. III
ABC’s
Div. I ABC’s
vs. Div. III
AD’s
Div. I ABC’s
vs. Div. III
ABC’s
Equity
Evaluation of fairness
Likelihood of use
1-8
1-8
1-8
1-8
n/a
1, 3, 4, 7
3
3
Equality
Evaluation of fairness
Likelihood of use
n/a
10, 11
n/a
n/a
10
9 - 11
9, 10
9, 10
Equation
Dependent variables:
1 – Spectator Appeal (distribution); 2 – Spectator Appeal (retribution); 3 – Winning
Percentage (distribution); 4 – Winning Percentage (retribution); 5 – Revenue Production
(distribution); 6 – Revenue Production (retribution); 7 – Ability (distribution); 8 – Ability
(retribution); 9 – Equal Treatment (distribution); 10 – Equal Treatment (retribution); 11 –
Largest Percentage in Past (retribution).
ate group differences (i.e., pairwise) noted above. Results are provided in Table 8.
Generally speaking, Division I respondents responded more favorably to those
equity principles which contributed to group differences than did Division III respondents, while Division III respondents scored higher on the equality principles
which were contributing to group differences.
Discussion
Fairness of the Principles
The results of the current study provide answers to each of the research questions
outlined in the beginning of this article. The first finding of this study was that
need related distributions were consistently rated as the most fair among all four
groups for both the distribution and retribution scenarios. Moreover, there appeared
to be little difference in these ratings across the need principle (i.e., need for survival of women’s team, need for survival of men’s non-revenue team, need to
succeed). This result is somewhat consistent with Hums and Chelladurai (1994b).
Respondents in this study also rated need among the most fair principles. However,
the support in Hums and Chelladurai (1994b) for need was not as consistently
strong as in the current study and it was not always rated as the most fair.
Distributive Justice
349
Second, while equality of treatment often had the next highest means, it was
generally not rated as highly as in Hums and Chelladurai (1994b). In fact, the
Division I athletic board chairs actually rated it as unfair (below a 3 on a scale of
1–5) for both retributions and distributions. Moreover, equality of results was generally rated as unfair in the distribution scenario and around neutral in the retribution scenario. The fact that more of this study’s respondents were likely decision
makers (compared with Hums & Chelladurai, 1994b) may help explain why
Mahony and Pastore (1998) found little evidence that equality was the principle
being used to make distributions at the Division I level. While the coaches and
lower level administrators in the Hums and Chelladurai (1994b) study believed
the equality of treatment was clearly a fair method for determining distributions
and in some cases was identified as the best, those who make the distribution
decisions are more likely to reject this as a fair principle.
The preference for need over equality among the decision makers has some
possible implications for the distribution process in intercollegiate athletics. While
equality appears to be a fairly objective principle, need, particularly need to succeed, appears to be fairly subjective. Defining what is needed by each team in
order to succeed gives decision makers quite a bit of flexibility. While the swim
coach may argue she “needs” her own office so she has a place to do her work, the
football coach may argue he “needs” a new plush office in order to impress recruits. In this case, the decision maker may define these needs as equal or may
define one need as greater than the other. The decision would be fairly subjective
and gives great power to the decision maker to determine the criteria for what is
truly a “need.” While respondents did not show preference for all criteria that
appear to be subjective (e.g., effort, ability), the possible preference for some subjective criteria over objective criteria for making distributions is an interesting
possibility and one worth pursuing in future research.
Finally, all of the other principles were rated as unfair by the respondents as
a group. The only exception was among Division I athletic directors. When money
was being cut from budgets (i.e., in the retribution scenario), Division I athletic
directors rated both revenue production (M = 3.02, SD = 1.03) and spectator appeal (M = 3.02, SD = 1.01) as neutral. This result is important because the respondents in Hums and Chelladurai (1994b) “almost totally rejected” all of the contribution principles (p. 212). Because decision makers were surveyed in this study,
while Hums and Chelladurai (1994b) examined employees at all levels, this result
would suggest Division I decision makers are not as quick to reject some equity
based principles as are lower level administrators and coaches.
Likelihood of Use at Respondent’s Institution
When examining the likelihood that each of the principles would actually be used
at the respondent’s institution, the three need related principles were again rated
the highest. Therefore, not only do decision makers believe these more subjective
principles are fair, they also indicate that subjective principles are more likely to
be used when making actual distribution decisions. While need by a men’s nonrevenue sports team did appear to be the lowest rated of the three, particularly
350
Mahony, Hums, and Riemer
among Division I athletic directors, there appeared to be no significant differences
in the rating of the three need principles.
While Division I athletic directors tended to rate need by a men’s non-revenue team just as fair as the other need principles, the mean for the likelihood of
this principle actually being used at their university was somewhat lower. This
would suggest administrators who frequently cut men’s non-revenue sports
(Mahony & Pastore, 1998; Shelton, 2000) may not actually see their decisions as
“fair.” As suggested in Mahony and Pastore, they may feel pressure to move resources toward women’s sports due to legislation and court cases. Because Division I administrators rarely take resources away from the revenue generating sports
(Mahony & Pastore, 1998), their only remaining option is to reduce the budget for,
or entirely eliminate, some men’s non-revenue sport teams. Therefore, what they
believe is fair and what they actually do are different.
With the exception of Division III administrators’ evaluation of equality of
treatment, none of the other principles were evaluated as fair by any of the four
groups. This was particularly true in the distribution scenario. However, the evaluations of likelihood of use were generally comparable to the evaluations of fairness, with equality of treatment and equality of results having the next highest
means, followed by the equity based principles of revenue production and spectator appeal. However, the evaluations were somewhat different in the retribution
scenario with the Division I administrators often indicating a stronger likelihood
that revenue production and/or spectator appeal would be used by their university.
The overall consistency between the respondents’ evaluation of the fairness
of each principle and the likelihood that it would be used is an important finding.
While there are certainly some exceptions (e.g., the previous discussed difference
related to the needs of the men’s non-revenue sports), it appears that decision makers believe the principles currently used to make decisions are fair. Moreover, it
appears likely the perceptions of fairness of the decision makers in college athletics have a strong influence on the final decisions. While the authors noted in the
beginning of the paper and earlier in the discussion that other factors and groups
may impact distribution decisions, the results of the current study indicate examining and understanding the perceptions of fairness of the primary decision makers is important because there appears to be a strong congruence with the actual
decisions being made.
Differences by Position (Within Divisions)
Within divisions, perceptions of fairness and assessments of the likelihood of use
did not differ between Division I athletic directors and Division I athletic board
chairs or between Division III athletic directors and Division III athletic board
chairs. At first, this finding was somewhat surprising. A review of college organizational structures done by the lead author found that many athletic board chairs
were either university faculty or administrators. Because many faculty and
administrators have traditionally been quite critical of college athletics (e.g., Sperber,
2000), the authors expected to find more differences in their opinions.
Distributive Justice
351
However, the lack of differences suggests a number of possibilities. First,
individuals who become athletic board chairs tend not to be the faculty or administrators who are critical of college athletics and/or they have been assimilated into
the athletic department culture over time and view issues the same way as the
athletic department administrators. Based on the process used to pick faculty and
administrators who serve on athletic boards (Sperber, 1990), this is a possibility.
Second, both groups may have answered the questions in the socially acceptable
manner. If they interpret what is socially acceptable the same way, this would
result in their answers being similar. Although it is possible these or other explanations are correct, at this point we can only speculate regarding the reasons for the
lack of differences and further research is needed to examine this more thoroughly.
Differences by Division
Finally, there were a number of differences between Division I and Division III
respondents. In general, Division I respondents were more likely to rate equity
(i.e., contribution) based principles as fair or as likely to be used when the principle was measurable and more objective; all groups appeared to reject equity
based principles equally when they were not measurable and more subjective (i.e.,
effort). In contrast, Division III respondents evaluated equality of treatment (i.e.,
true equality) higher for each of the questions. This result is consistent with the
results of Mahony and Pastore (1998), who found more use of equity, particularly
based on revenue production and spectator appeal, as the basis for resource distribution and retribution at the Division I level, and equality at the Division III level.
Moreover, this result supports the widely held belief presented in the introduction
of this paper and by other researchers (e.g., Sperber, 2000; Zimbalist, 1999) that
the culture of Division I college athletics is different from Division III.
While equality of treatment has already been discussed in detail, further analysis of the results related to measurable or objective equity is necessary. In general,
Division I athletic directors were the most supportive of using these equity based
principles (see Table 8). Moreover, this tendency appeared to increase when money
was being taken away. This finding is consistent with prior research suggesting
that preference for equity-based allocations is greatest in retribution situations (e.g.,
Griffith & Sell, 1988). In fact, both revenue production and spectator appeal were
rated slightly above neutral on the fairness question in the retribution scenario,
which were comparable to ratings of equality of treatment.
Moreover, the evaluation of fairness and likelihood of use of these equity
based principles in the current study by Division I administrators is probably a low
estimation. Mahony and Pastore’s (1998) findings suggest revenue production and
spectator appeal are being used in making distribution decisions at the Division I
level with much greater frequency than indicated by the respondents in the current
study. As was suggested in Hums and Chelladurai (1994b), respondents in this
study probably had a tendency to answer in the socially acceptable manner. Prior
research has shown that this tendency to try to appear fair is not unusual (Greenberg,
1995). This is especially likely in the current study because while efforts were
352
Mahony, Hums, and Riemer
made to keep individual responses anonymous, the numbering system prevented
complete anonymity which may have had some impact on the evaluations by the
respondents (Bjarnason & Adalbjarnardottir, 2000). For a number of reasons, suggesting that they believe resources should be cut based on how much money a
sport generates or how many spectators it can attract would be politically incorrect
and would contradict the stated purposes of college sports, as illustrated in the
following examples.
First, college athletic administrators face great pressure to distribute resources
more equally and to be publicly supportive of Title IX. A recent CBS Poll found
that 86% of Americans believe resources should be distributed equally to men’s
and women’s sports (Zimbalist, 1999). This finding suggests there are strong reasons for athletic directors to indicate to the public they are in favor of equal distributions. In fact, prior research has shown managers often conform or try to appear
to be conforming to social norms (Allen, 1982; Greenberg, 1995). Second, a stated
goal of the NCAA is to maintain a clear distinction between amateur athletics at
the college level and professional sports (NCAA Manual, 2000). Third, the NCAA
and its member schools put forth considerable effort to counter the growing public
sentiment that they care only about money. They would like the public to believe
they are more concerned about the personal growth of the athlete than financial
gains. In fact, the NCAA and many of its members focus on this when discussing
primary organizational goals (NCAA Manual, 2000). In contrast, generating revenue or attracting spectators are presented as secondary organizational goals to the
public (NCAA Manual, 1996). Given these circumstances, the authors believe the
level of support for retributions based on revenue production and spectator appeal
in the current study is a somewhat surprising and important finding.
Conclusion
The current study builds on the work of Hums and Chelladurai (1994a, 1994b) and
Mahony and Pastore (1998). First, while need was again strongly supported, the
current study suggests need may be defined in a number of different ways. However, further research is required to better understand how administrators define
need and how this fairly subjective criterion is actually used to make distribution
decisions. Second, in contrast to the consistent support for need, both equality of
treatment and equality of results received somewhat less support in the current
study than in Hums and Chelladurai (1994b), particularly among Division I administrators. Third, equity based principles received more support among Division I administrators in the current study than they did in the prior research, particularly when money was taken away. These results together are consistent with
the research of Mahony and Pastore and suggest that while some in athletics may
be more supportive of equality over equity, the decision makers at the Division I
level are not always in agreement with this assessment of fairness.
It should be noted that none of the distribution principles are inherently right
or wrong. However, the distribution method chosen should be supportive of the
organization’s mission, goals, and objectives. For example, an organization wanting
to create a competitive environment among its sales force would base distributions
Distributive Justice
353
on equity instead of equality. If need is indeed the distribution principle used most
often, this has implications for intercollegiate athletic administrators and the mission, goals, and objectives of their respective organizations. While equality based
distributions are fairly clear and easy to determine, need based distributions require serious reflection and discussion regarding what is true “need” and what is
something a program simply “wants.” For example, many revenue sport coaches
may be successful at convincing athletic directors that every “want” is a “need,”
which would explain the large growth in their budgets found in Mahony and Pastore
(1998). However, if a goal of the athletic department is to truly provide athletes
with comparable experiences, administrators must reexamine their traditional definitions of need when making distribution decisions.
The current study also suggests the necessity of further research. First, as
previously discussed, the understanding of need and the various means for determining need is underdeveloped in the literature and warrants further examination.
Second, the scenarios and scale originally developed by Hums and Chelladurai
(1994a) and modified in the current study could possibly be improved in two ways.
First, one of the limitations of this research was our inability to provide stronger
evidence of the instrument’s reliability and validity. The scale’s current form (i.e.,
single item measures for each of the sub-principles) does not lend itself to evaluating its reliability other than through the use of test-retest procedures. While this
(i.e., test-retest) is an alternative, future research should look to develop multiitem measures for the various lower-order constructs (i.e., sub-principles),
which would allow for reliability to be evaluated using Cronbach’s procedures.
Multi-item measures would also better lend themselves to the establishing
construct validity.
Two, the examination of distributive justice in intercollegiate athletics has
traditionally used the scenarios originally developed by Hums and Chellardurai
(1994a) or modifications of these original scenarios (e.g., Mahony & Breeding,
1999). It is possible that the wording of these scenarios is leading to evaluations
that are inconsistent with the findings of Mahony and Pastore (1998). For example, the source of the resources was fairly general (i.e., a large donation). It is
possible if the sources of the revenues being distributed were identified as coming
from a particular sport team (e.g., revenue from a football bowl game), it may
change the respondents’ evaluations of both the fairness of each principle and the
likelihood they would be used. Finally, the principles of distributive justice have
generally been ignored outside of American intercollegiate athletics. Future research could examine perceptions of fairness in a variety of other sport organizations and industry segments. For example, what do stakeholders in professional
sports believe is the fairest way to distribute resources (e.g., salaries, perks). There
are still many areas for researchers to examine.
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Notes
1
We are indebted to the two anonymous reviewers who alerted us to these concerns.
It is important to note that the population of interest is very small relative to the
sample (660 to 261). In such situations the standard formulae for calculating standard errors
are not appropriate and the MANOVA will yield biased results; specifically, there will be
less power and larger standard errors. As a result, any significant results can therefore be
accepted with considerable confidence . We are indebted to the anonymous reviewer who
made us aware of this issue.
2
Appendix A
Distribution (Retribution) Scenarios
Your athletic department has received a large donation with the stipulation that the
money be spent during the upcoming school year (has to cut a large amount of
money from the budget for the upcoming year). The following twelve options are
available to you as the athletic director. Please rate each option based on (1) your
356
Mahony, Hums, and Riemer
perception of the fairness of this option and (2) the possibility that this option
would actually be chosen at your institution given the scenario presented.
1. The money would be distributed (cut) in accordance with the amount of
revenue produced by each team. The team responsible for producing the
most revenue during the past year would be given the largest share of the
money (would be cut the least).
2. The money would be distributed (cut) in accordance with your assessment
of the amount of effort and work put forth by each team and its coach. The
team that put forth the most effort and worked the hardest would receive the
largest share of the money (would be cut the least).
3. The money would be distributed (cut) in accordance with the spectator appeal of each team. The team drawing the most spectators would receive the
largest share of the money (would be cut the least).
4. The money would be distributed (cut) in accordance with the winning percentage of each team during the prior year. The team that had the best winning percentage would receive the largest share of the money (would be cut
the least).
5. The money would be distributed (cut) in accordance with the ability of each
team and its coach. The team with the most ability would receive the largest
share of the money (would be cut the least).
6. The money would be distributed (cut) in accordance with your assessment
of which team needs the money the most in order to succeed. The team with
the greatest financial needs would receive the largest share of the money
(would be cut the least).
7. The money would be distributed (cut) in accordance with your assessment
of which team needs the money for survival. The team (in this case a women’s
team) that needs the money the most would receive the largest share of the
money (would be cut the least).
8. The money would be distributed (cut) in accordance with your assessment
of which team needs the money for survival. The team (in this case a men’s
non-revenue team) that needs the money the most would receive the largest
share of the money (would be cut the least).
9. The money would be equally distributed (cut) among all the sports teams.
Each team would receive (be cut) an equal amount of the money.
10. The money would be distributed (cut) in accordance with the amount of
money each team has received in the past. The team that has received the
least amount of money in the past would receive the largest share of the
money (would be cut the least).
11. The money would be distributed (cut) in accordance with the amount of
money each team has received in the past. The team that has received the
largest percentage of the budget in the past would receive the largest share
of the money (would be cut the least).
12. The money would be distributed (cut) based on random selection. The team(s)
that would receive the most money would be those that were randomly selected to receive the largest share of the money (would be cut the least).