The Monroe Doctrine---A Stopgap Measure
Author(s): Gale W. McGee
Reviewed work(s):
Source: The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Sep., 1951), pp. 233-250
Published by: Organization of American Historians
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Stopgap
Doctrine---A
TheMonroe
Measure
By GALE W. MCGEE
The Monroe Doctrine has generallybeen looked upon as a unilateral policy, deliberatelyaccepted by the United States in preferenceto an "entangling"Britishsuggestionof a joint manifesto.
been assoThe doctrineof the two spheres,moreover,has commnonly
ciated with the principlesof isolationism.But both the determination of the Americansto "go it alone" and the attributesof isolationbecomeapparentonly when certainutterancesof the principal
statesmeninvolved are lifted fromthe contextof the diplomatic
conditionswhichproduced them.
If those statementsare left in theircontextit is possible to see
that while the early spokesmenoftenvoiced a desireto remainunfettered,theyseldom permittedtheirideals to blind themto realities. With a sagacity rarely equaled since then, they stood ever
ready to compromiseideals with the exigenciesof realityin order
to obtain what was to them more fundamentalthan any theories
- the securityof thenation.In the discussions
of nonentanglement
whichevoked the Monroe Doctrine this is clearly illustrated.
Long before George Canning became alarmed over the designs
of the Holy Alliance in the New World, the Americanswere concerningthemselveswith the threat. After turningdown the repeated invitationsof theCzar to accede to his European concert,the
United States servednoticethat it would have nothingto do with
any schemefor restoringSpanish control in South America.' As
early as December, 1815, Secretaryof State James Monroe instructedJohn Quincy Adams, then ministerto Britain, to sound
the London governmenton the question of recognizingthe indeI See JohnQ. Adamsto AlbertGallatin,May 19,1818,Worthington
C. Ford (ed.),
VI, 318. Note also
Writingsof John QuincyAdams,7 vols. (New York, 1913-1917),
Adamsto RichardRush,May 20,1818,ibid.,325-26.
233
234
THE MISSISSIPPI
VALLEY HISTORICAL REVIEW
nations.2Althoughnothingcame
pendenceof theLatin-American
madeit thebusinessof a cabiof thegesture,
Monroeas president
family
netsessionthreeyearslater,in May, 1818. Fromhisofficial
oughtto be takento ascermeasures
he soughtadviceas to whether
tain Britain'sattitudetowarda concertof policiesin whichany
the Latin Americansshouldreceiveno support
projectaffecting
The upshotof the
unlesstheend resultwouldbe independence.3
to RichardRush,ministerto
cabinetsessionwas an instruction
of StateAdamsdrafted:
London,whichSecretary
object of your attentionto watch the moment
It may be an interesting
whenthisidea [cooperationwithBritainin recognizingthe independence
of Latin America]will becomeprevalentin the Britishcouncils,and to
to a more
be manifested
whichmayconsequently
encourageany disposition
perfectconcertof measuresbetweenthe United States and Great Britain
of theSpanishSouthAmerican
towardsthatend- thetotalindependence
provinces.4
to lapse.Two months
proposalpermitted
Nor was thisinformal
laterMonroe"veryabruptly"askedAdamsto proposeto theBritof the
CharlesBagot,jointactionto aid theambitions
ishminister,
thought
AlthoughtheSecretary
Spanishcoloniesforindependence.
theEnglishwerenotyetreadyto assumesuchan advancedposition
inAmerican
theproposalwas notabandoned.6It was transaffairs,
and transmitted
to the Courtof
lated into a formalproposition
Londonin August,1818. As it read,theproposalwas "fora conoftheindependence
of Buenos
recognition
certedand contemporary
theBritishsaid onlythatit did not
theoffer,
Ayres."In refusing
thensuittheirpolicy.'
In
The Americans,
however,werenot to be easilydiscouraged.
2James Monroe to Adams, December 10, 1815, Instructionsto Ministers, VII, Departmentof State Archives (Washington).
8 Charles H. Sherrill,Modernizing the Monroe Doctrine (Boston, 1916), 81-82.
4Adams to Rush, May 20, 1818, Ford (ed.), Writings of John Quincy Adams, VI,
326.
6 This conferencetook place on July 23, 1818; its substance was recorded by Adams
on July 25. Charles F. Adams (ed.), Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, 12 vols. (Philadelphia, 1874-1877),IV, 118.
6 These exchanges were recounted for Richard C. Anderson, newly appointed envoy
to Latin America, by Adams on May 27, 1823, Ford (ed.), Writings of John Quincy
Adams, VII, 446-47. From Madrid George W. Erving reportedthat the French government expected "a dangerous concert of measures" between the Anglo-Americans in
the event of a rupture with Spain. Erving to Adams (private), October 22, 1818,
Despatches (the contemporaryspelling has been retained), Spain, XVI, Department
of State Archives.
THE MONROE DOCTRINE -A
STOPGAP MEASURE
235
BuenosAires
the followingDecemberjoint actionin recognizing
overture
neither
bothtoLondonand Paris.7Although
wassuggested
theywerefollowedcloselybythemost
evokedfavorablesentiment,
In January,1819,Presito originatein Washington.
offer
definite
by theBritishrefusalat theCongressof
dentMonroe,encouraged
in the Spanishcolonies,broughtthe
to intervene
Aix-la-Chapelle
issuebeforehis cabinetonce again. On January2, whenAdams
the inshowedMonroea dispatchpreparedforRush announcing
Brazil,
of
theindependence
to recognize
tentionof thegovernment
to a unilateralact,preferring
thePresidentdeclaredhisopposition
of Europeanpolitics.In
to followratherthanopposethecurrent
to England,"
"deference
to
any
thecabinet,whereAdamsobjected
ofWar JohnC. Calhounvoicedtheprevailingsentiment
Secretary
to avoid actingunlessin con"themostearnestness
in expressing
of State's
the Secretary
8
a
consequence,
As
England."
with
cert
originaldispatchwas alteredto say that in Washingtonit was
betweenthe viewsof the two Englishhopedthatthe difference
speakingnationswas one of formratherthansubstance.The new
said in part,"If it shouldsuittheviewsof GreatBritinstructions
ain to adoptsimilarmeasuresat thesametimeand in concertwith
to the President."' The offer,
us, it will be highlysatisfactory
by Lord Castlereagh."0
was accordeda cold reception
however,
in the UnitedStatesto
of a disposition
Furthermanifestations
CancombinepolicieswiththeBritishappearedin 1821. Stratford
Casthis
to
in
reported
ning,His Majesty'sminister Washington,
withAdams.On
tlereaghas the substanceof an Aprilconference
"should
of Statesaid thathe personally
thatoccasiontheSecretary
the
to
draw
closer
even
which
tended
viewwithpleasureanything
amicablerelationsof the two countries."The meretoneof these
sinceit was somecaughttheBritishby surprise,
openingremarks
Adams."1
of
on
the
of
form
reversal
part
whatof a
... the
Canning,"whether
"I inquiredof Mr. Adams,"reported
termswhichhe had just used weredirectedto any particularob7 See entries for December 7, 12, 1818, Adams (ed.), Memoirs of John Quincy
Adams,IV, 186ff.
Ibid., 203-205.
Ford (ed.), Writings of John Quincy Adams, VI, 525.
10 Richard Rush, Memoranda of a Residence at the Court of London . . . 1819-1825
(Philadelphia, 1845), 13-20.
11 Stratford Canning to Lord Castlereagh, April 27, 1821, Public Record Office,
Foreign Office,5:158 (Library of Congress transcripts).
8
9
236
THE MISSISSIPPI
VALLEY HISTORICAL REVIEW
There
ject." He was told thatnothingspecificwas contemplated.
in Europe,Adamsexwas a newseriesof eventsjust commencing
groundfora closerconnecaffording
plained,and "circumstances,
tion mightpossiblyarise in the courseof theirdevelopment."
Coupledwiththe shifton the Europeanpoliticalfrontwas the
in Latin America.As a resultof these
addedfactof newuprisings
CanningconcludedthatAdamswas intiStratford
conversations,
to receiveanyproposalfromGreatBritain."12
mating"a readiness
the same time,and coincidentwithAdams'
At approximately
RichardRush reported
startlinggestureto the Britishminister,
fromLondonthatEnglishpolicytowardthe Holy Alliancewas
it would appear,was
Mutual interest,
morefrigid."3
preceptibly
onto common
governments
drivingthe two English-speaking
ground.
By early 1823 the eventsof Europeanpoliticswerenudging
even closertogether.The suddennesswith
the Anglo-Americans
deposedtheliberalgovernment
whichFrancein thatyearforcibly
and London.Even
Washington
bothin
in Spain alarmedofficials
As Stratford
thesuspiciousAdamssensedthegrowingfriendship.
GeorgeCanoffice,
it to hiscousinin theforeign
Canningreported
opposethe
to
Britain
of
Great
ning,the apparentdetermination
SouthAmericanambitionsof the Holy Alliancehad made "the
English almostpopularin theUnitedStates,"withAdamshimof thesoftinfection."4
selfhaving"caughta something
seemedto have exeof State in effect
The AmericanSecretary
cuteda neat about-facein his attitutetowardthe British.Comofprinciple"existingbetweenthetwo
on the"coincidence
menting
he wentso far as to suggestto StratfordCanning
governments,
thatthe two mightcomparetheir"ideas and purposestogether,
ofgreatinterests
uponwhichthey
witha viewtotheaccommodation
in the tone
indicated
was
further
15 This
differed."
had hitherto
preparedforRichardRush in July,1823. As
of the instructions
of thenewordersto His Majesty's
Adamsexplainedthesubstance
been drawn"witha view . . .
had
in Washington,
they
minister
12I1id.
13 Rush to Adams, April 2, 1821, Despatches, Great Britain, XXVI, Department of
State Archives.
14 StratfordCanning to George Canning, Public Record Office,Foreign Office,8:352,
StratfordCanning Papers, cited by Dexter Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine, 1823-1826
(Cambridge, 1927), 60.
15 Adams (ed.), Memoirs of John Q2uincyAidams,VI, 152.
THE MONROE DOCTRINE -A
STOPGAP MEASURE
237
on severalpointsaffecta commonunderstanding,
of establishing
that
16 Rush was informed
of thetwoCountries."
ingtheinterests
"the finalresultanxiously
in regardto the proposednegotiation,
and harmonious
lookedto fromit . . . [was] a morepermanent
of purposebetweenour
concertof publicpolicyand community
thanhas everyetexistedsincetheperiodof ourintwocountries,
17
dependence."
of 1823 GreatBritainand the
It is apparentthatbymidsummer
of policies.Boththetimeand
UnitedStateswerecloseto a concert
the EuropeansettingwerepropitiousforGeorgeCanning'soverproposalsdidnotcomeout
turestoRichardRush;his"spectacular"
of the
in theearlyefforts
basis
sound
of a clearsky.They had a
UnitedStatesto teamup withBritainon LatinAmerica.Theyhad
an immediatesourcein the unusualAmericancordialitytoward
itselfin the springand summermonthsof
Englandmanifesting
of the coinci1823. And finally,theywerea logical consequence
dentalsecessionof GreatBritainfromtheconcertof Europeand
Americansuspicionof theHoly Alliance.
themounting
withRichardRush
The substanceof Canning'sconversations
of 1823 are too well knownto need
duringAugustand September
Let it be bornein mind,however,thatby late Septemrepeating.
ber the distanceseparatingthe two men fromsomesortof joint
small. It could be measuredby the
was surprisingly
commitment
thatRush accepta British
distancebetweenCanning'ssuggestion
of SouthAmericanindependence
pledgeforthefuturerecognition
recogniupona Britishpolicyof immnediate
and Rush'sinsistence
tion.
diplomaticunderThe crestof the tide of an Anglo-American
of September
26,
standingwas actuallyreachedin theconference
destinedtobe thelastexchangeon thesubjectin Londonfornearly
would
in themeantime,
minister,
twomonths.The Britishforeign
throughCountPolignac,conelicitfromthe Frenchgovernment,
vincingassurancesthatFrancewouldnot participatein an overAs a
seas expeditionin behalfof the Spanishcolonialinterests.
16 StratfordCanning to George Canning, June 6, 1823, Public Record Office,Foreign
Office,5 :176, Nos. 54, 56.
17 Adams to Rush, July 29, 1823, No. 72, cited from the Richard Rush Papers,
folder 1823, Arthur P. Whitaker, The UnitedStatesand the Independenceof Latin
America,1800-1830(Baltimore, 1941), 432-33.
238
THE MISSISSIPPI
VALLEY HISTORICAL REVIEW
resultCanningbeat a hastyretreatfromthe positionhe had assumedin his talkswiththeAmericanenvoy.
however,the tempoof officialopinionon the
In Washington,
was on theincrease,
accommodation
questionof an Anglo-American
so duringOctoberand November.The government
and continued
therewas notto learnuntilFebruaryof thefollowingyearthatin
Londontheprojecthad beenabandoned.18
was receivedby JamesMonroe,it
WhentheBritishproposition
amongthePresidentand
touchedoffa seriesof spiriteddiscussions
it was themost"mohis advisers.In theeyesof ThomasJefferson
since1776,'"and to JohnQuincyAdamsit
mentous"development
suchparamountconsequence,
seemedto be "Of suchmagnitude,
as involvingthewholefuturepolicyof theUnitedStates."20
theAmericangovof theofficial
deliberations
As a consequence
a disposition
towarda policyof actionwhich
ernment
manifested
fromthetenetsusuallyassociatedwiththe
deviatedsubstantially
chapter
a significant
constitutes
MonroeDoctrine.That disposition
policy. In orderto keepin
in theoriginsof UnitedStatesforeign
settingfromwhichthe Monroemessage
mindthe contemporary
on theproevolved,it is well to recallthebetterknowncomments
withGreatBritain.PresidentMonposedpolicyof collaboration
elderstatesof all soughttheadviceof twoofthecountry's
roefirst
and
Jefferson
in office,
and predecessors
men,hisfellowVirginians
Madison.
stressedthatwhileour trueobjectiveshould
ThomasJefferson
the"domicile. . . of freedom,"
hemisphere
be to makethewestern
separatefromEurope,yet,in attainingthatobjective,"One nato lead, aid,
tion,mostof all, coulddisturbus . . ; shenowoffers
us in it." By accedingto theproposal,moreover,
and accompany
Even should
Britainwouldbe detachedfromtheEuropeansystem.
he added,sucha war would
a warresultfromtherapprochement,
18 Canning did not explain his change of mind to Rush until an interview of
November 24, 1823, and followed it with another conference on December 12. Rush
to Adams, November 26, December 27, 1823, William R. Manning (ed.), Diplomatic
Correspondenceof the United States Concerningthe Independence of the Latin-Amencan Nations, 3 vols. (New York, 1925), III, 1503-1506,1510-12. This particular dispatch from Rush was not received in Washington until February 2, 1824.
19Thomas Jeffersonto Monroe, October 24, 1823, Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert
E. Bergh (eds.), The W'ritings of Thomas Jefferson,20 vols. (Washington, 19031905), XV, 477.
20 Adams revealed this to Henry U. Addington. Addington to George Canning,
December 1, 1823, Public Record Office,Foreign Office,5:177, No. 25.
THE MONROE DOCTRINE -A
STOPGAP MEASURE
239
notbe "herwar,butours."21 To JamesMadison,joiningwiththe
Britishwouldbe a wisestep"shortof war." But forhimthiswas
peoplesissue
notenough.He wouldhavethetwoEnglish-speaking
a similardeclarationin behalfof theGreeks.22
Nor was JamesMonroehesitantabout what shouldbe done.
was a soundpolicy,he said, the
While no foreignentanglements
fromit. "My ownimpression
presentseemedtojustifya departure
is," he observed,"thatwe oughtto meettheproposalof theBritishgovt.& to makeit known,thatwe wouldviewan interference
on thepartof theEuropeanpowers. . . as an attackon ourselves,
that,if theysucceededwiththem,theywould extend
presuming
it to us."
28
With the exceptionof JohnQuincyAdams,the cabinetmemless
muchagreeduponthethreatand onlyslightly
berswerepretty
so upona courseof action.The PresidentfavoredgivingRushdisof policywiththeBritish.2'
a merging
cretionary
powersto effect
ofWar Calhounbelievedsufficient
powersshouldbe sent
Secretary
to permitan accessionto all of Canning'sproposals,and if necesambitionsin Cuba and
sary,even to the pointof relinquishing
General,William Wirt,whilefearfulof
Texas.25The Attorney
theHoly Alliance,raisedthepracticalquestionof theconsequences
he pointedout,
of sucha jointdeclaration.
To be reallyeffective,
a war; and he doubtedthattheAmerit wouldhaveto presuppose
ican peoplewouldsupporta war in behalfof Latin America.26
27 has tradition
spuna
But aroundnoneof thecabinetmembers
moreromantic
narrativethanabouttheSecretary
of State.Never
oneto huntwiththepack,it was naturalthatJohnQuincyAdams
would hold divergentviews. The conventionalaccountsof his
to steertheadministration
alonga courseof true
efforts
courageous
21Jeffersonto Monroe, October 24, 1823, Lipscomb and Bergh (eds.), Writings of
Thomas Jefferson,XV, 477-78.
22 James Madison to Monroe, October 30, 1823, Gaillard Hunt (ed.), The Writings
of James Madison, 9 vols. (New York, 1900-1910),IX, 158-59.
23 Monroe to Jefferson,
October 17, 1823, Stanislaus M. Hamilton (ed.), The Writings of James Monroe, 7 vols. (New York, 1893-1903),VI, 323-25.
24 Adams (ed.), Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, VI, 192.
25 Ibid., 186.
Ibid., 202, 205.
Secretaryof the Treasury William H. Crawford did not participatein the sessions
due to illness. Apparently there is no record of the views of Secretary of the Navy
Samuel L. Southard and Postmaster General John McLean, whose position was not of
cabinet rank.
26
27
240
THE MISSISSIPPI
VALLEY HISTORICAL REVIEW
actionare well known.From his
and independent
Americanism
ownaccountswe learnthathe aloneopposedjoiningwithBritain."
Stronglysuspiciousof Canning'smoHis reasonsare significant.
tives,he felt that someulteriorobjectswerebeing entertained.
of blockingthe further
These he thoughtto includean intention
of the UnitedStatesto the southward.2"
efforts
expansionist
as
He regardedthe threatfromthe Holy Alliance,moreover,
morefanciedthanreal.Thoughwillingto concedethattheAllies
[in LatinAmerica]forthree,
impression
"mightmakea temporary
it no moreprobablethattheSpanfour,or fiveyears,"he thought
to themothercountry"thanthat
couldbe restored
ish dominions
the ocean."3O Believingthat
beneath
sink
will
the Chimborazo
ratherthan adherenceto idealisticprincipleswould
self-interest
finallyregulatetheconductof thecourtsof Europe,he coulddiscernno practicalbasis uponwhichtheycould resta policyof inin behalfof Spain.3"
tervention
While inclinedto minimizethe threatfromabroad,Adams,
was readyto act on the questionproposedby Cannevertheless,
himmostwas thatEnglandwas alreadydisning.What concerned
posed to act, in whichcase it would appearto the outsideworld
thatshehad takenthelead; to her,thus,wouldfall thecreditfor
To England,as
hemisphere.
of thewestern
theinterests
preserving
favors,probablyat theexpense
a result,wouldaccruecommercial
of the United States.For thisreasonthe Secretaryof State observedthat"It wouldbe morecandid,as well as moredignified,
to avow our principlesexplicitlyto Russia and France,than to
"2
comein as a cock-boatin the wakeof a Britishman-of-war."
at thispointdoes Adamsreveal
Nowhereamonghis utterances
on accountof traa determination
to rejecttheCanningoverture
Fromhisownphrases,in fact,
consequences.
ditionoritsentangling
conclusion
thatcollaboration
onecan arriveat thenotunwarranted
was acceptableto himprovidedit neitherbarredAmerica'sfuture
in Cuba norrelegatedtheUnitedStatesto theposition
ambitions
of an appendageto Britishpolicy.
28 A diary note of November
7, 1823,Adams (ed.), Memoirs of John QvuincyAdams,
VI, 178-79.
29 Ibid., 188.
30 Ibid., 186.
31 Ibid., 207.
32
Ibid., 179.
THE MONROE DOCTRINE-A
STOPGAP MEASURE
241
OtherindicationsthatAdamswas not as staunchlyset against
wouldhave it are rewiththeBritishas convention
collaborating
vealedin thedispatchesof His Majesty'schargein Washington,
While Canninghad beensoundingRush in
HenryU. Addington.
London,Addingtonwas pushingessentiallythe same proposition
had begunperhaps
in conversations
withAdams.33These efforts
whenCanningperceivedthathe was gettingnoin late September
of NovemberAddington
wherewithRush.At anyrate,bythefirst
at whichthe subjectwas a "joint
and Adamsheld a conference
at a dinon SpanishAmerica."And shortlythereafter,
manifesto
ner party,the Britishenvoyreceivedan accountof the RushCanningexchangesfromthe AmericanSecretaryof State. With
the proposition,reportedAddington,"Mr. Adams seemedexhis countryas aland evidentlycontemplated
tremelygratified,
elevation
thaton whiclh
than
on
a
much
higher
readyplacedby it
34
she had hitherto
stood."
between
no satisfactory
agreement
The following
weeksbrought
however,fail to discloseany
the two.The diplomaticexchanges,
on thepartof Adams.Theyreveal,on theconhostility
mounting
a disposition
on hispartto accedeto theproposalfromLontrary,
don. This is apparentin the detailedaccountof the severalconto his chiefin BritaindurwhichAddington
forwarded
versations
ing December.On an occasionsubsequentto thedinnerpartyal"Mr.
readyalludedto,Adamsagainadvertedto theCanningoffer.
manner
in
which
Adamswas also evidently
muchpleasedwiththe
had beenmade,as wellas theopeningthusafforded
theproposition
a part in the affairsof the
forhis Countryto play so prominent
recorded.
But whenpressedforan immediate
World,"Addington
the
decisionso thatthecompactmightoperateas a "preventive,"
Secretaryasked formoretime,pleadingthe "paramountconsequence"of the rapprochement.3"
Callingagain in a fewdays,Addingtonwas oncemoreput off.
Adamsadvisedhim,however,thatthe termslaid downby Rush
wouldinsistupon.
in Londonwerethosewhichtheadministration
33An Englishman, William F. Reddaway, in an excellent, though brief, study of
the Monroe Doctrine, was one of the earliest, if not the first,to disclose Addington's
activities. The Monroe Doctrine (Cambridge, 1898), first published in the United
States in New York, 1905.
34 Ibid., 53.
35Addington to Canning, December 1, 1823, Public Record Office,Foreign Office,
5:177, No. 25.
242
THE MISSISSIPPI
VALLEY HISTORICAL REVIEW
The criticalissue,of course,was thematterof recognition.
Without thatacknowledgment
"no durableconcertand harmony
of op.
erationscouldbe lookedfor,"Adamsdeclared,but "let one com
monbasisbe laid down,and therewouldbe no longeranydifficulty
in concerting
commonmeasures."The Secretary
of State extended
of thepact.
a concession,
moreover,
as if to facilitatetheconclusion
If GreatBritainwouldonlyrecognize
he toldAddingonecountry,
he wouldaccedeto Canning's
ton,so as to lay downtheprinciple,
proposition.36
Once again, on November19, the Britishdiplomatinquired
whetherthe necessaryinstructions
wouldbe sentto Rush in the
November24 packet.Adams,whohad receivedhim"withunusual
affability,"
repliedthat,"forhimself,
he was quiteready,but the
on a matterof
Presidentmightpossiblydesiremoretimeto reflect
suchdeepimportance."
He hastenedto add,then,that"theUnited
Stateswerewarmlyand cordiallydisposedto makecommoncause
came first.37
withGreatBritain,"providedonly that recognition
thison December1,
Finally,Addingtonmade one last effort,
onlyto discoverthatthedecisionwas still pending.The subject,
Adamsexplained,"was a morecomplicated
one" thanat firstbelieved.But evenwithoutBritishrecognition,
he assuredthevisiting
diplomatthat "The UnitedStateswouldshowby acts how corin theline of policyproposedto be pursued
diallytheyconcurred
by GreatBritain."On takinghisleave theBritisher
notedthatthe
AmericanSecretary
"concludedby expressing
in termsof warmth
and apparentsincerity,
his earnesthope that the relationswhich
existedbetweenour two governments
would becomedaily of a
closer and more confidentialnature."38
It would appear thatmoststudentsof the Monroe Doctrinehave
overlookedor ignoredthisAddingtondispatch.That documentsuggeststhat the conventionalaccountswhichhave ascribedto Adams
the airs of a knight-errant
bent upon preservingindependenceof
action for America perhaps should be modified.The Secretaryof
State possiblywas not as much opposed to the Britishovertureas
is usually thought.How muchof what he told Addingtonwas personal convictionand how much was sheerdiplomaticpalaver can86 Ibid.
87
88
Ibid.
Ibid.
THE MONROE DOCTRINE -A
STOPGAP MEASURE
243
of course.But Adamswas notone to
determined,
notbe precisely
had on occasionplaguedhim.
hisbluntness
equivocate;if anything,
advisersthere
thatamonggovernment
It can be seen,therefore,
with
was a stronginclinationin favorof a joint pronouncement
conon
the
specific
principally
existed
Disagreement
GreatBritain.
ditionsgoverning
sucha declaration.In the lightof thisdisposidifficult
to accountforMonroe'smestionit becomesexceedingly
an Americandetermination
sage of December2 as one reflecting
to "go it alone." Someotherexplanationis called for.
had learnedfromRichard
AlthoughtheAmericangovernment
at no
Rush thatCanninghad cooled towardhis own proposal,"9
did it regardthenetimebeforetheMonroemessageto Congress,
evidence,
as havingbeenbrokenoff.Thereis interesting
gotiations
whichindicatesthatthe President'sfamousproon thecontrary,
a stopgap,dewas issuedas a provisionalmeasure
nouncement
signednotonlyto securefortheUnitedStatesa propershareof
interests,
and creditforlookingafterhemispheric
theresponsibility
diplomacyof world
requirements
but also to filltheimmediate
namely,holdingtheline againsttheHoly AllianceuntiltheCancouldbe translatedintoa bindingagreeconversations
ning-Rush
ment.
It was not untilNovember29 thatthenew set of instructions
whichRushhad requestedforguidancein dealingwithCanning's
in Lonovertures
werereadyto be sentto theAmericanminister
don. Endorsingthe envoy'sown repliesto the Britishdiplomat,
thedirectivestipulatedthatBritainmustfirstrecognizethe indeof South America.With the
pendenceof the new governments
thenoccupyinglike ground,the United States
Anglo-Americans
wouldbe willing"to movein concertwithGreatBritainforthe
40
purposesspecified."
Rushwas advisedthatthetwonaFor thetimebeing,however,
a common
close
policythrough
effecting
tionsshouldactseparately,
89 Rush to Adams, October 10, 1823, No. 336, Despatches, Great Britain, XXIX,
Department of State Archives. In a private letter to Monroe, October 22, 1823, he
noted: "The Spanish American topick has been dropped by Mr. Canning in a most
extraordinarymanner. Not another word has he said to me on it since the 26thof last
month . . . and he has now gone out of town to spend the remainderof this, and part
of the next month." Hamilton (ed.), Writings of James Monroe, VI, 390-91.
40 Adams to Rush, November 29, 1823, Instructions to Ministers, X, 120-22, Departmentof State Archives.
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THE MISSISSIPPI
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consultations.
But, "shouldan emergency
occur,in whicha joint
of
manifestation opinion. . . may tendto influence
the Councils
imof theEuropeanAllies,"he was to notifyhis owngovernment
mediately.In that event,the instructions
concluded,"We shall
accordingto theprinciplesof our Government,
and in the forms
prescribed
byourConstitution,
cheerfully
join in anyact by which
and the
to supportthecauseof humanfreedom,
we maycontribute
Independence
of theSouthAmericanNations."41
The instructions
bear upon Americanpolicy in two respects.
First,theyshowthattheMonroegovernment
was waryof a sweeping commitment
fromwhichthe Britishmightretreator fail to
carrythrough.If Britaincould be forcedto recognizethe Latin
thelikelihoodof theirdeserting
Americans
the Yankeeswouldbe
lessenedsinceit wouldcostBritainherusualally in Europe,Spain,
and leave her to dependupon the Americans.That is why the
statesmen
in Washington
In the
demandedimmediate
recognition.
faceof thesuddencoolnesson thepartof Canningas disclosedby
Rush'sdispatchof October10, thisactiondoes not seemto have
beenunreasonable.
But perhapsan evenmoresignificant
revelationin the instructionsis theapparentbeliefthatthenegotiations
on thequestionof
joint actionwould continue.That the United States eitherexof thetalksis clearlymanipected,or hopedfor,the resumption
festedin theendorsement
of Rush'sdemandforpriorrecognition.
This is illustrated
further
by thesuggestion
advancedin theorders
whichlookedto thetransfer
of subsequent
negotiations
to Washington,wheretheprojectedententewas eventhena topicof conversationbetweenAdamsand Addington.42
The UnitedStates,it
would appear,was carefullykeepingthe door open fora future
arrangement.
It is, of course,impossibleto say withcertaintythat the Monroe
was doingany morethanprobeforpossibleulterior
government
motivesin Britishpolicy.But severalhintsand privateopinions
of individualscloseto theadminiscontainedin thecorrespondence
trationindicatethatthe intentwas something
morethanexploratory.Fromno quarterwas thismoreapparentthanin theWhite
House itself.
41 Ibid.
42
Ibid.
THE MONROE DOCTRINE -A
STOPGAP MEASURE
245
Even afterhis messageto Congresshad been delivered,the President continuedto worryover Canning's sudden coolness. On December4 he wrote to Jefferson
that in the face of the mounting
threatfromthe Holy Alliance, "the most unpleasant circumstance
... is thatMr. Canning'szeal has muchabated of late." Justwhy,
he was not sure,but he ascribedit eitherto the questionof recognitionbeingpressedso stronglyby Rush, or to counteroffers
made by
the Allies to "seduce" the British.43Monroe, it should be noted,
whileregardingCanning'sinterestas having "abated," did not look
upon it as havingdied. He suggestedat least a hope that the negotiationswith London mightbe continued.
This is borne out furtherby the tone of anotherset of instructionssentto Rush on December8. Arousedby the rumorthat Cadiz
had fallen to France, a developmentwhichwould release an Allied
army of 12,500 to assault Spanish America,the President,Rush
was told, was "anxiously desirous that the opening to a cordial
harmonyin the policy of the United States and Great Britain,
offeredon thisoccasion ... [mightbe] extendedto the generalRelations between the two countries." The time required for the
Allies to preparethe anticipatedexpedition,the ordersconcluded,
"may yet be employed, if necessary,by Great Britain and the
United States,in a furtherconcertof operations,to counter-actthat
design,if reallyentertained."
In a still later letterto Jefferson
the Presidentdisclosed his belief that a rapprochement
was still in the offing.Afteralluding to
the continuingthreatof the European concert,he revertedto an
Anglo-Americanententeas the best means to guard against it. But
to effectsucha collaboration,he observed,it had best emanatefrom
the United States in orderto avoid the appearancethat his government was only the instrumentof England.45
Anotherletter to Jefferson,
writtennearly six weeks after the
statementto Congress- January 12, 1824- discloses that Monroe was even at that late date still waitingfor morenews on Canning's proposal. "Since my last," wrote the President,"we have
4
43Monroe to Jefferson,December 4, 1823, Thomas JeffersonPapers (Division of
Manuscripts, Library of Congress).
44 Adams to Rush, December 8, 1823,cited from the Rush Papers, Whitaker, United
States and the Independence of Latin America, 514-15.
45 Monroe to Jefferson,December, 1823, Hamilton (ed.), Writings of James Monroe, VI, 344-45. This undated letter was writtensometimeafter December 2.
246
THE MISSISSIPPI
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receiv'dno communication
fromMr. Rush,on thesubjectof Mr.
46 Quiteobviously
Canningsproposition."
he did notviewtheBritish projectas havingbeen dropped.
The thesisthattheUnitedStateswas stillwaitingforovertures
fromBritainaftertheMonroeDoctrinewas announced
is substantiatedlikewisein thelettersof JamesMadison.Especiallypertinentis his correspondence
withJamesBarbour,chairmanof the
Senate ForeignRelationsCommittee.On the veryday that the
Doctrinewas proclaimed,
beforeitsdeliveryto
butin themorning
theCongress,
Barbourwroteto Madisonon thesubjectof themessage.As was reasonableto expect,theSenatorhad apparently
been
to examinethedocument
permitted
in advance.Nor is it unlikely
thatthe Presidentat least outlinedforhis fellowVirginianthe
purportof his remarks.
Barbour,at any rate,made reference
to
thatportionof theforthcoming
statepaperwhich"will refer,but
remotely,
however,to the probableinterference
of the Allied
Powersin theinternalconcerns
of theSpanishprovinces."
Remote
thoughthatinterference
maybe, wrotetheSenator,"I have a serious thought
of proposing
a resolution
advisingthePresidentto cooperateby treatywithGreatBritainto preventit.... I shouldbe
verymuchgratified
withyourviewson thisinteresting
subject."47
The significance
of thisnoteapparently
has beenoverlooked
by
studentsof the MonroeDoctrine.48In regardto the shapingof
American
foreign
policy,Barbourwas themostinfluential
member
of theSenate.Morethanthat,he was a Virginiancloseto thePresident.If therehad beena disposition
on thepartof the administrationto viewtheCanningoverture
as abandonedsurelyhe would
have beenprivyto it. Yet, probablywithfull knowledgeof the
ChiefExecutive'smessage,he was proposingSenateendorsement
of an Anglo-American
concert
in treatyformto achieveendsidentical withthosesoughtby Canning.JamesBarbour,who was in a
likelypositionto know,did not view the Monroedeclarationas
withBritain.
endingthenegotiations
JamesMadison,in his reply,placed essentiallythe same in46 Monroe to Jefferson,January 12, 1824, ibid., VII, 1-2.
47 James Barbour to Madison, December 2, 1823, James Madison Papers (Division
of Manuscripts, Librarv of Congress), LXXII.
48 Whitaker, United States and the Independence of Latin America, n. 515, refers
to the letteras indicatingonly that for a policy of joint militaryaction in conjunction
with a joint manifestotheremighthave been "importantsupport" in the United States.
THE MONROE DOCTRINE -A
STOPGAP MEASURE
247
terpretation
upon the December2 statement.
An Anglo-American
joint policy,backedby militaryforce,wouldbe desirable,in his
opinion.As he explainedit to Barbour:
It can hardlybe doubtedthat Great Britainwill readilycooperatewith
thisCountry,or, rather,thatshe wishesour cooperationwithher,against
a foreigninterference
forsubvertingtheindependence
of SpanishAmerica. If the attemptcan be preventedby remonstrance,
she will probably
unitewithus in a properone. If she beginswiththat,she will not hesitate
to proceed,if necessary,to thelast resort,withus fighting
by her side.49
That such a militarycombination
would endure,he had no
doubts,sinceit wouldbe basedon mutualself-interest.
Were Britain to balk at joiningarmedforces,Madisoncontinued,
"it would
be the dilemmaof seeingour neutralcommerceand navigation
flourishing
at the expenseof hers;or of throwing
us into a war
againsther by renewingher maritimeprovocations."But there
shouldbe no further
delay,he cautioned:
On thewhole,I thinkwe oughtto movehand in hand withGreat Britain
in theexperiment
of awingtheconfederated
powersintoforbearance;and,
if thatfail,in followingit by meanswhichcan not fail; and thatwe can
notbe too promptor too decisivein comingto an understanding
and concertwithher on the subject."0
How did the President'sdeclarationof December2 bear upon
all of this' It "distinctly
indicatedtheintents
of theUnitedStates
withrespectto suchan interference,"
Madisonexplained.At best,
he added,it was only a temporary
measure.He thoughtthat "a
fullermanifestation
of thenationalwill" mightbe expedient,as
welltobearouttheExecutive. . , as to makethedesirableimpressionsabroad." The declarationby the Senate,proposedby Barbour,wasnotbroadenough.Would it notbe bettertohavedeclaratoryresolutions
adoptedbybothhousesinsteadof just theSenate?
This wouldhavetheadvantageof providing
sanctionforthePresident'spolicy,of inspiring
GreatBritainwith"the fullestconfidencein thepolicyand determination
of the UnitedStates,"and
of exercising
on theAlliedpowers.5'Obviously,
effects
preventive
MadisonregardedtheCanningofferas still verymuchalive and
of no littleconcernto theUnitedStatesevenafterDecember2.
As late as December26, 1823, Madison was still counselinga
49
Madison to Barbour, December 5, 1823, Madison Papers, LXXII.
51
Ibid.
50 Ibid.
248
THE MISSISSIPPI
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joint policywiththe British,and thisto PresidentMonroe.The
wouldbe to preventtheLondon
he suggested,
principallimitation,
lead" in any actionin
fromusurping"a meritorious
government
"Nor oughtwe to be less
neighbors.
behalfof ourSouthAmerican
carefulin guardingagainstan appearancein the eyesof Europe,
at whichthe self-loveof GreatBritainmay aim, of our beinga
poliGiventheseprecautionary
interests."
satelliteof herprimary
cies, however,thencooperationshouldnot only be accepted,it
for
letteris notonlyimportant
This particular
shouldbe sought.52
but
whatit revealsof Madison'sviewson theMonroedeclaration,
to thePresidentof the
in thatit was written
evenmoreimportant
that the latterwas thinkingalong the
UnitedStates,suggesting
samelines.
also, thereis
In the recordsof the House of Representatives,
additionalevidence.NearlytwomonthsafterthefamousDeclaraAlexanderSmythof Virginia,in
tion was issued,Congressman
House debateon the Greekquestion,soughtto clarifywhat the
precluded
remarks
Presidenthad intendedon December2. '1Those
materialaid to Greece,becauseit wouldbe "going
our extending
outof ourwayto beardtheAllies: to seeka quarrelwiththemreof which
of Europe,"he explained,the effect
spectingtheaffairs
wouldbe to "makethe declarationof the President. . . a falsehood."5 To remainwithintheboundsof the December2 statements,we shouldlet Englandcarrythe torchin Europe.But we
shouldnot standidlyby if Britainis attackedby theAllies; "if
of
she is involvedin a war withtheAllies,forthe independence
nations,we oughtto giveherassurancethatwe will notbe neutral,
to
butwill giveherfaithfuland honorablesupport."64 According
Smyth,then,whiletheMonroemessagebarredourtakingthelead
in settlingthequarrelsof Europe,it had notclosedthedoorto an
understanding.
Anglo-American
learnedthatthere
By February,1824, however,theAmericans
withtheirEnglishcousins.Rush'sNowouldbe no rapprochement
fordroppingthe
vemberdispatchtellingof Canning'sexplanations
52 Madison to Monroe, December 26, 1823, Letters and Other Writings of James
Madison, 4 vols. (Philadelphia, 1865), III, 354.
5 Thomas H. Benton (ed.), Abridgmentof the Debates of Congress,from 1789 to
1856, 16 vols. (New York, 1857-1861), VII, 660. Alexander Smyth spoke on January
26, 1824.
154Ibid.,662.
THE MONROE DOCTRINE -A
STOPGAP MEASURE
249
2. No longerwas it neceson February
projectreachedWashington
saryto speculateon theformof a policyof jointaction.
theMonThe wholeseriesof diplomaticexchangessurrounding
of
bearingon the formulation
roe Doctrinehave an important
policy.While theyreveala laudabledeterminaAmericanforeign
tionto avertbecominga meretail to the Britishdiplomatickite,
with
towarda collaboration
theyalso disclosea strongdisposition
the English.JamesMonroe'smessageof December2, 1823, it
wouldalso appear,was notintendedas a refusalof Canning'sbid.
Nor can it be said withcompleteaccuracythatthepronouncement
had beenabanthattheoriginaloffer
was madein theknowledge
to
act withthe
continued
had
government
doned.The American
an
on theprojectwouldbe continued,
thatdiscussions
expectation
whichprevaileduntilFebruary2, 1824.
assumption
conclusions
thefollowing
In thelightof theforegoing
materials,
in PresidentJamesMonroe'smessage
in regardto thosestatements
to be calledtheMonto CongressDecember2, 1823,subsequently
roeDoctrine,wouldseemto be in order.(1) The idea fora policy
of joint actionin Latin Americaevolvedas muchfromAmerican
to Richbefore1823 as fromGeorgeCanning'sovertures
initiative
ard Rush in Augustof thatyear. (2) The Canningprojectwas
bythepolicymakersin theUnitedStates,
viewedwithlesshostility
recognized.
JohnQuincyAdams,thanhas beengenerally
including
expedient
(3) The messageitselfappearsto havebeena temporary
a stopgapmeasureintendedto holdtheline againstthedesigns
begunby Canning
of Europe whilethe diplomaticconversations
and Rushin Londoncouldbe continued.(4) In part,it mayhave
beena moveto insureto theUnitedStatesat least an equal share
in behalfof the
of thecreditwhichmightfollowa jointmanifesto
former
Spanishcoloniesin theNew World. (5) It was issuedwith
on the
negotiations
the expectationthat therewould be further
and was not inBritishproposalforsomesortof collaboration,
tendedas a negativereplyto theofferfromEngland.
Viewedin thislight,theobjectivesof theMonroeDoctrineseem
to be verydifferent
fromthoseallegedby studentswhohave tried
to see in its enunciation
the spiritof "isolation."" Quite on the
66 W. A. Bewes, "The Monroe Doctrine and Entangling Alliances," The Grotius
Society Transactions, XIII (1928), 13, explains the actions of the United States as an
250
THE MISSISSIPPI
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contrary,it would appear that the statesmenin Washington felt
that isolation,in fact, was impossible.Instead of pledging themto the mostfunselves to a "tradition,"theydedicatedtheirefforts
damental questionof all - that of Americansecurity.To achieve
that end theywere preparedforclose cooperationwith Great Britain.
adherence to the "tradition" of acting alone. W. P. Cresson, Diplomatic Portraits: Europe and the Monroe Doctrine One Hundred Years Ago (Boston, 1923), 335, accounts
for the decision of Monroe and Adams to decline the bid as due to a realization of
the extent that "the policy of their country had already been fixed by tradition."
J. Fred Rippy, Rivalry of the United States and Great Britain Over Latin America
(Baltimore, 1929), 119, alludes to the message as "the doctrine of American isolation."