A Tale of Two Cities: Collective Memory of
the Chinese Diaspora in Taipei and Shanghai
Shu Keng, Associate Professor,
School of Public Economics and Public Administration,
Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
Paper to be presented at the International Conference on “China: Space Production
and Territoriality,” Organized by the Institute of East Asian Studies, University of
California, Berkeley, Berkeley, California, May, 14-15, 2011.
First draft. Please do not cite without prior consultation with the author.
A Tale of Two Cities: Collective Memory of the Chinese Diaspora
in Taipei and Shanghai
Shu Keng
Associate Professor, School of Public Economics and Administration,
Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
Abstract
What brings Taiwanese back to Shanghai? And, why did several waves of
Shanghai fevers so strongly grip Taipei? This paper seeks to uncover such
hidden affinity between Taipei and Shanghai by tracing the half-century-long
social memories of the people travelling between the two cities. It argues
that, the memories of Shanghai among mainlanders, though largely
constructed in Taipei, still make significant difference on their and even their
children’s incorporation into the place where they have no longer or never
been truly accustomed to. Because the Shanghai memory is mostly
constructed, the study of how it is constructed and reconstructed can reveal
not just the mentalities but also the social milieu of the Chinese diaspora
settling in post-war Taipei.
Keywords: collective memory, mainlanders (waishengren), return migrants,
Shanghai, Taipei
2
I. Introduction
When I was seven or eight, just about time for me to really remember anything, I
met Shanghai.
Every time when Grandma laid fingers on that old gramophone, we
knew that she’d like to put on the songs of Zhou Xuan, and once again, she missed
China [then referred to as laojia/the home] that day.
As the music softly played,
Ye Shanghai,
Shanghai night,
Ye Shanghai,
O Shanghai night,
Ni Shige Buye Cheng,
Night’s s always young in Shanghai.
Huadeng Qi,
With all those neon lights,
Chesheng Xiang,
Streams of cars,
Gewu Shengping….
Singing, Dancing Everywhere…
--Shanghai night,
--Ye Shanghai
With the songs went on, sometime she was in terrible but something in good mood.
If so, she would normally tell me about stories and things in Shanghai, such as how
my Dad got chocked when first tasted soda and how weird were those modeng
(modern) ladies who even wore sleeveless clothes, and so on and so forth.
To a
small boy like me, obviously, Shanghai was the place full of maternities, which we
did not have in Taiwan and could only yearn for…. This must be the time when I
started imagining about and even feel missing about that unfamiliar place. Thus,
when I first set foot on the city in 2001, six years after I have been to China, it was the
first time I felt so strongly disturbed, “this was the place Grandpa and Grandma left
from and always talked about,” salty tears slowly tricking down my cheeks.
※ ※ ※ ※ ※
This paper addresses the cultural ties across the Strait and beyond the
territoriality constructed politically. It seeks to bring to light the cultural affinity
between Taipei and Shanghai and reveal how the Shanghai memory among the
mainlanders in Taiwan (waisheng ren) have been carried on, handed down, and finally
wasted away.
Such effort will be necessary to make sense several waves of
“Shanghai fever” (Shanghai Re) in Taipei in the past decades, and thus helpful to
3
demonstrate the cultural dimension of Taishang (Taiwanese business people in China)
study and the study of cross-Strait relations.
The study originated from some observations during our field research on
Taishang sometime between 2005 and 2006.
For us, it is something like serendipity
to come up with these observations. At first, we were just interested in the social
incorporation of these Taishang.
But we then came across several perplexing
problems surrounding the affinity between mainlander Taishang and Shanghai city,
and they cannot be fully made sense in light of any reasons we knew at that time.
Such questions then led us to explore the cultural dimension of the mobility across the
Taiwan Strait.
As I will argue in this paper, the memory of Shanghai shared among
mainlanders settled in Taipei in the 1950s and 1960s somehow affected the pattern of
their incorporation into the Shanghai city when they found chances to go back after
some half-century later in the late 1990s and the 2000s.
For these mainlanders,
today’s Shanghai might be unfamiliar and people there strangers, but haunted by some
memory of Shanghai, many of them mentioned that they had felt some inner callings
or some unexplained affinity to the city.
Such age-old and somewhat vague memory
of the old Shanghai led them to manage to move to the city and made it relatively
easier to decide to settle down and stay on.
The affinity between mainlanders and Shanghai, however, can usually be found
on those who once lived in Taipei in the 1950s and 1960s. For those who have been
exposed to the socio-cultural atmosphere of post-war Taipei, the memory of Shanghai
would function like “the symbol of the past,” repeatedly reminding them the “good
old days” in the mainland. And, when the mainlanders finally gave up their hope to
get back to the place they dreamed of and decided to settle down and live on in
Taiwan, their memory of Shanghai and China would be gradually faded away usually
at the turn of 1960s to 1970s.
Therefore, tracing the cultural affinity between
Shanghai and Taipei not just reveals the cultural ties across the Taiwan Strait but also
helps expose the mentalities and social milieu of the mainlanders in post-war Taipei.
To trace the influences and dynamics of the Shanghai memory, showing how
such memory makes the difference and how it has been collectively carried on, the
4
paper will be divided into four sections.
The next Section Two begins with the
perplexing problems we ran into during our field research over Taishang’s
incorporation, and how these problems led us to explore the deep rooted cultural
linkages between Shanghai and Taipei. In the following Section Three, I will
address the dynamics of such collective memory among mainlanders in Taipei.
Through a bunch of life stories, I will try to dig in the processes how such collective
memory has been carried on, handed down, but finally wasted away.
In the end,
based on the findings of the paper, I want to call more attention to the cultural
dimension in the study of cross-Strait relations, which has been seriously
overshadowed by its politico-economic aspects.
II. Collective Memory Makes the Differences: Tracing the Cultural
Affinity of Shanghai and Taipei
Why do mainlanders in Taiwan reveal some hidden but natural affinity with
Shanghai?
And what difference that affinity would make when mainlanders have
the chance to come back to this seemingly familiar but actually unfamiliar place?
In
this section, I will address how our observations of Taishang bring to light the cultural
dimension of cross-Strait relations, which has been long ignored, and thus call our
attention to the strong ties between the two cities across the political border.
A. Why Some Settle and Others Don’t? Explaining the Social
Incorporation of Taiwanese in China
The study started with a research project on Taishang’s social incorporation,
since 2002. Before starting our field research, we take into account of several
factors derived from existing theoretical literature. These factors include: (1)
practical or economic factors, normally highlighting whether economic opportunities
were abundant (Todaro, 1976), (2) immigration policies and their implementation,
typically emphasizing whether policies were exclusionary (Meyers, 2004), and (3)
responses from local society, usually stressing whether local people are xenophobic or
5
cosmopolitan (Fetzer, 2000), (4) living conditions, often underlining the general
cultural atmosphere and living conditions (Florida, 2005), and, finally, (5) the cultural
affinity between sending and receiving countries (Heisler, 2000). Our investigations
over Taishang’s incorporations thus began with testing these hypotheses against our
field findings (Portes & Böröcz, 1989; Massey et al. 1993, Portes, 1997; Castles &
Miller, 2009).
One of the most distinguished features in our study of Taishang is the remarkable
difference between Taishang in Guangdong and greater Shanghai, the two densely
populated Taiwanese in China (Keng, 2002; Lin & Keng, 2009).
The two places
have different ethnic composition: there are more ethnic Taiwanese (Minnan/Helou
and Hakka) in Guangdong and more Mainlanders in Shanghai. There are also
differences in their Taishang community in terms of employment: most Guangdong
Taishang are engaged in labor-intensive manufacturing while Shanghai Taishang
high-tech or service sector. More importantly, the Taishang in Shanghai and
Guangdong show completely different patterns in their social incorporation: Shanghai
Taishang are generally more willing to carry their family with them, purchase real
estate as home, make friends with local people, and settle down and merge into the
city. In contrast, Guangdong Taishang are in general more reluctant to carry their
family with them, purchase real estate as home, make friends with local people, and
settle down and merge into the locality (Keng, 2002; Lin & Keng, 2009).
Being a study on the social incorporation of Taishang, our investigation thus
seeks to make sense what cause the differences in the pattern of social incorporation
between Shanghai and Guangdong Taishang.
First of all, such difference obviously
cannot be explained through factors such as immigrant policies, local responses and
living conditions.
To begin with, the policies involving Taishang — whether related
to business inviting or other aspects — are set by the central government.
And, with
respect to implementing these policies, the development trajectory since 1978 usually
grants Guangdong — esp. places like Shenzhen and Dongguan — more flexibility in
implementing policies especially when involving foreign investments.
As a result,
Guangdong Taishang, with the status of foreign investors, usually enjoyed a more
privileged status. On the other hand, for the Shanghai city, Taishang’s investments
6
are relatively insignificant and thus earn them little or no privileged status.
Therefore, it is difficult to argue that Shanghai Taishang are more willing to merge
into the city because of Shanghai’s immigration policies.
Secondly, the common attitude toward Taishang is also difficult in explaining the
difference in the incorporation of Shanghai and Guangdong Taishang.
Indeed,
residents in Shanghai in general seem more cosmopolitan or at least have certain
sense of multiculturalism.
But, in reality, Shanghainese usually look down on
“anyone who does not come from the West or Japan.”
For them, Taiwanese usually
referred to as “deibazi” (yokels from Taiwan). During our interviews, much more
Shanghai Taishang but much less Guangdong Taishang have complained about the
attitude or manner of local people (Keng, 2002; Lin & Keng, 2009).
Thus, we
cannot claim that Shanghai Taishang are more willing to merge into the city because
of the attitude of the local residence of Shanghai.
Furthermore, it is true that the
living condition in Shanghai is much more rich and diverse than that of Guangdong.
But still, an explanation based on living condition has to face the fact that the lives in
Guangdong cities — such as Shenzhen, Guangzhou and even Dongguan — have been
catching up. These cities also have their own attractions and lives in “gated
communities” in these cities can also be nice and cozy.
It is also problematic to say
that it is the living condition only that causes the different mode of social
incorporation.
After eliminating three above-mentioned explanations: # 2 on immigrant policies,
# 3 about local responses, and # 4 stressing living conditions, we can then move
toward the most popular explanation: the one based on economic opportunities. It is
definitely true that practical concerns play a role. After all, it is the reason that
Taishang have to leave for China. Also, it makes sense to expect that the difference
between Shanghai Taishang and Guangdong Taishang might be caused by the
profitable opportunities each city has: Shanghai has more opportunities and thus is
more capable of attract Taishang to settle down.
Even so, we do not believe
practical concerns would determine the possibility of incorporation. First of all, the
decision of to settle down is different from that of making investment.
The later
demands rational calculation and thus must be separated from the interferences of
7
other sensational factors.
But the decision of settling down has to do with “feelings”
and thus must take into account of questions: “do you like this place?” or “can you get
along with people there?”
In other words, when referring to making investments,
“sense” and “sensitivity” are separable while when referring to settling down, “sense”
and “sensitivity” cannot be separated. In other words, economic opportunities
cannot guarantee incorporation.
Such situation can be summarized as follows:
I do not like China for many reasons. …
Although I need to stay here to make
money, I still cannot like this place. After all, making money and loving the
place are two different things.
So, after I retired, I would definitely go back to
Taiwan. That is really my home. (Interview in Dongguan, 2005/02/021)
Secondly, people have instincts or sensation other than rational calculation.
For
example, one of our interviewees thus recalled.
When I landed on the land [China], I was in such a complicated mood.
I felt
like to getting close to the “old home” [laojia], the place my parents build their
career and finally left from.
I felt so familiar with this piece of land.
heard so much about the city. I couldn’t wait to embrace the city.
I have
But on the
other hand, I also felt a bit nervous. After all, all such familiarity came from
my imagination.
I knew almost nothing about the place…. (Interview in
Shanghai, 2002/01/005)
In other words, for the Taishang who later made large sum of investments and
moved his family to Shanghai, he feel the closeness to the land long before his
“rational calculation.” As we know, symbolic factors like identity usually functions
like a cognitive framework — which may “tarnish” the seemingly “neutral” way to
collect information and thus have an effect on the final decision over settling down.
According to our interviews, for mainlander Taishang, “settling down” in Shanghai
means to get accustomed to a new environment.
Just like moving from one city to
another or returning home after traveling away many years. But for Taiwanese
Taishang, “settling down” in Shanghai means to get accustomed to a foreign setting.
They have to deal with the people and culture they are unfamiliar with and not willing
8
to get accustomed to. In this sense, the calculation based on economic opportunities
cannot provide us a acceptable explanation of Taishang’s incorporation.
Our field data could be more systematically presented from our survey of
Taishang conducted in the summer of 2009. 1
The purpose of the study is to contrast
the difference between the Taishang in Guangdong and greater Shanghai. To begin
with, we know that because of some historical legacies, the mainlander Taishang and
the indigenous Taiwanese Taishang are rather different, no matter in terms of (1) the
self-claimed identity, (2) the time staying in China, and (3) their employment sectors
(see following Table One, Table Two and Table Three). But a closer look at the data
presented here also suggest that there is not much difference between the mainlander
Taishang and Taiwanese Taishang in the two regions over that three traditionally
considered to be the most significant factors affecting the social incorporation of new
migrants (see the literatures cited before & Keng, 2002).
[Table One, Table Two and Table Three about Here]
But when we move on to observe the two key aspects of social incorporation, the
social relations and life and family plans of the Taishang in the two regions, we can
find some remarkable difference between the mainlanders in greater Shanghai and
Guangdong.
First of all, no matters in terms of (1) the feeling towards local Chinese,
(2) the boundary perception between Taiwanese and local Chinese, or (3) the social
relationships between Taiwanese and local Chinese (see following Table Four, Table
Five and Table Six), mainlander Taishang and Taiwanese Taishang are rather similar
in Guangdong but very different in greater Shanghai.
[Table Four, Table Five and Table Six about Here]
And moreover, when we move further to touch upon the core of social incorporation,
1
The survey collaborated by University of Hong Kong (Weixing Hu) and National Chengchi
University,(Shu Keng) offers us the chance to present our field findings in a quantitative approach.
In this survey, we interviewed Taiwanese settled in greater Shanghai and cities neighboring
Dongguan for more than one year, with semi-structured questionnaire and in-depth interviewing.
With 12 researchers for about six-week field research, we collected 214 completed samples and
made that the largest ever systematic survey of the Taiwanese staying in China.
9
which is closely associated with personal identity, in the (1) family arrangements, (2)
career plan after retiring, and (3) the feeling of home of the Taishang in China (see
following Table Seven, Table Nine and Table Ten), we can again easily find the clear
contrasts between the Shanghai Taishang and Guangdong Taishang: in Guangdong,
mainlanders and Taiwanese Taishang are rather similar but in Shanghai they are
completely.
Then, what causes the differences?
Why there is a strong though
hidden affiliation between mainlanders and Shanghai, and that cannot be found in
Guangdong or probably anywhere else?
And, also, please keep in mind that such
differences cannot be explained by the factors stresses in mainstream literature, i.e.,
the economic conditions, the time stay, and the preexisting identity.
B. Cultural Affinity and Social Incorporation of the Shanghai Taishang
As show in the earlier section, all the four above-mentioned explanations seem
not so satisfactory.
But more than that, after further observations, we also found
several distinctive patterns over the mode of Taishang incorporation in Shanghai.
The more significant one is the difference between mainlander Taishang and
Taiwanese Taishang, the former are prone to being incorporation while the latter less
likely.
As our fieldnotes thus recorded:
Mainlander Taishang has the natural sense of closeness and familiarity to the
Shanghai culture.
Many of them mentioned the glories of Shanghai in the
1930s: who could forget names like “Ten-mile Market” (shili yangchang),
“Horse Racing Fields” (Paoma Chang), and Xiafei Road.
Most of them could
still remember the songs of Zhou Xuan, modern movies by Ruan Linyu and Hu
Die, and movie theaters like Da Guangming, all there must tracked back to the
lives in Shanghai.
Not just these, for Taipei mainlanders, almost all the modern
wonders — such as department stores (e.g., Sincere/Shianshi Department Store
and Daxin Department Store), ballroom dance (e.g., Paramount Hall), western
suit (especially those made by Ningbo tailors), perfume (Mingxin Hualushui),
and even the funeral service (e.g., the Jile funeral service) — all bear the marks
of Shanghai. Shanghai has been part of the common memories of the Taipei
residents in the 1950s and 1960s (Fieldnotes, 2004)
10
But such pattern is subject to two additional conditions: generation and
hometown.
To be specific, for mainlander Taishang, only those who are at their
fifties show a different pattern of incorporation from Taiwanese Taishang.
For
younger generation mainlanders, they show little difference from Taiwanese Taishang.
Moreover, for mainlander Taishang, only those who live in Taipei demonstrate a
different pattern of incorporation from Taiwanese Taishang. For mainlanders living
in central and southern Taiwan, again, they show little difference from Taiwanese
Taishang.
In addition, we find that the difference in terms of feeling close to Shanghai has
not so much to do with personal ethnic origins. For mainlander Taishang, they do
not need to be a Shanghainese to feel very close with the Shanghai and admire for the
Shanghai life style: they could experience all these in Taipei, no matter hearing from
family gatherings or reading from published stories or newspapers.
But on the other
hand, as observed earlier, the memory is closely tied to the social class of the
mainlanders in Taipei. As showed in a collection of stories named Taipei People
(Taibeiren) by Bai Xianyong, the memory of lives and culture in Shanghai is common
practices among the upper circles of mainlanders in the 1950s’ and 1960s’ Taipei (Bai,
2000).
This leads to our research hypothesis: it might be the memory shared by the
mainlander in the 1950s’ and 1960s’ Taipei and especially among upper class
mainlanders and that memory then lead to the tendency for mainlander Taishang in
their 50s and grew in Taipei to be incorporated into Shanghai city much more easily.
To be more specific, it is the admire and yearn for the Shanghai life style — which are
constructed or affected and not necessarily experiences — among the mainlanders that
later turned out to the “feeling of closeness” to Shanghai and thus facilitate these
Taishang’s decision to settle down in the city and get along with local people.
It is
the collective memory and constructed cultural affinity between the two cities that
make the difference (Xu, 2005).
Without taking into account of this cultural
dimension, factors such as economic opportunities, immigration policies, local
responses, or living conditions are not enough for us to make sense the different
11
modes of social incorporation of Taishang in China.
III. Rise and Fall of Collective Memory over Shanghai in Taipei
If it the collective memory among mainlanders in Taipei that build up the cultural
affinity between Shanghai and Taipei, how such collective memory have been carried
on, handed down, but finally wasted away?
Once we arrive at the above-mentioned
hypothesis, we then try to test it against the field findings over the incorporation issue.
In this way, we can better understand the functioning and effects of collective
memory.
A. How Collective Memory Took Shape in Taipei: Why Remembered and
Why Shanghai?
When moving to the hypothesis of collective memory and focusing on the
cultural environment of 1950s’ and 1960’s Taipei, we then face two questions: Why
these mainlanders didn’t forget? and why they remember Shanghai rather than other
cities?
With respect to the first question, through our interviews, we find that it is
primarily the upper class mainlanders who always have been refreshing their memory
over Shanghai. As one of our interviewees suggested,
I learned to be a Shanghainese from my family teachings.
I remember when I
was young, almost all the visitors are also Shanghainese.
When they chat with
my parents, they would normally refer to the “good old days” in Shanghai.
In
their memory, Shanghai was so beautiful. I also remember, when we ate at
restaurants — mostly Jiangsu or Zhejiang food — Grand Mom often complained
about the food.
According to her, the food was too crude [cu], in contrast the
food [which is so fine cooked [jing] she had in Shanghai in her own memory. It
seemed to me that the only place you can enjoy lives with “class” is, of course,
Shanghai. (Interview in Taipei, 2003)
12
We [Shanghainese] do not live to other mainlanders.
Unlike other mainlanders,
our parents sought to reach out and deal with Taiwanese.
My parents once told
me that, “You are Shanghainese. It is your obligation to learn to do business.
You need to do business with anyone you could, no matter Taiwanese or
mainlanders.”
Since then, I perfectly understood that I was not just mainlanders
but a special kind named Shanghainese. (Interview in Taipei, 2003)
But the memory over the life style of Shanghai is not just limited to the
emigrants from Shanghai.
Some of them just have the Shanghai experiences and
some just heard about Shanghai.
But it is the same for all these people that Shanghai
is the symbol of modernity and, embodying the high culture of China.
For those
who do not come from Shanghai, they would usually remember two places: Shanghai
and their hometown.
China.
The later seems the real China while the former an idealized
Thus, in most occasions, they would even prefer to remember Shanghai
instead.
The migrants fled from mainland can be divided into two groups: one group
consist of high-ranking KMT officials, business tycoons closely associated with the
Nationalist regime, and some anti-communist intellectuals, and the other group of
mainlanders of some middle- or low-ranking officials and soldiers, many of them
were peasants forcefully conscripted during the Civil War (Curfuff, 2004).
Most of
the first group of mainlanders live in Taipei while large number of the second group
mainlanders settle in “segregated communities” (juancun, or its formal translation,
“military-dependents’ village”) in central and southern Taiwan.
According to our
field research, the collective memory mentioned earlier is mainly shared among the
first group mainlanders.
Many of them are closely associated with the core of the
KMT ruling class — many of them used to be part of the “Jiangsu- Zhejiang Business
Groups” (jiang-zhe caituan) and thus had more or less the Shanghai experiences.
On
the other hand, those who grew up in those segregated communities are relatively
indifferent in the symbol of Shanghai. For the residents of these communities, the
only thing they would remember is their own hometown [jiaxiang].
13
Why do these upper class mainlanders get so involved in the collective
remembering of Shanghai?
According to our field research, the Shanghai
experiences mentioned earlier is just part of the reason.
As one of our interviewee
recalled:
The memory of the past becomes the panacea of my parents.
Whenever they
ran across frustrations — which is common for children from an extremely
wealthy family — they would remembered the “good old days” in Shanghai.
Just like what described in Taipei People [Bai’s famous novel] I believe that they
still lived in the past. And not just my parents, there were a group of similar
people doing the same thing.
The social gatherings between these people — as
far as I could recall, always in restaurants serving JiangZhe food — really sound
like a ceremony: every participant tried to “remember the good things of
Shanghai.” (Interview in Taipei, 2003).
In other words, the memory of the past become anesthetic helping them to forget
the frustrations they have to fact in uneasy daily lives.
And not just so, the same
interviewee also suggest that:
Every when we [the brothers and sisters of the interviewee] mentioned some
western things in Taipei, they [his parents] would usually responded like, “Well,
we had seen these long time ago.”
experiences in Shanghai.
Then, they would start talking about their
It seemed that, for them, Shanghai was full of modern
wonders and those things seemed very attractive for the young and well-educated
people admiring for western culture like my parents in their teen age. (Interview
in Taipei, 2003)
Putting these together, we may imagine that these upper class mainlanders tend
to remember Shanghai, sometimes intentionally and sometimes collectively, in order
to defend themselves against the reality, the down and out in Taiwan.
In their
refreshed (or constructed with selective experiences) memory, Shanghai becomes the
symbol of the modernity (Leo, 1999), demonstrating how backward Taiwan (the
reality) was. This seems to satisfy their psychological needs of glorifying the past
14
and denounce the present.
This is a very common practice for the Taipei
mainlanders in the 1950s and 1960s.
This is why Shanghai has revisited and
reappeared in the talks, memory and imagination of mainlander community in Taipei.
B. How Collective Memory Passed and Fade Away: Why Taipei and Why
1950s & 1960s?
After addressing the issues regarding who always tried to remember, why they
could not forget and why they remembered Shanghai, we then move to the next set of
issues: How do these mainlanders handed down their memory to the next generation,
for most of the Taishang are “leaning” about Shanghai rather “experiencing” Shanghai
personally. Such process gives us a case to understand the course how collective
memory can be passed on and faded away.
To begin with, as addressed earlier, many Taishang coming from the upper class
mainlander family learned about the symbol of Shanghai from their parents and
family gatherings.
But, in our interviews, many Taishang learned about the
Shanghai style and formed their imaginations from other occasions — such as
contacts with neighbors or superiors, sharing stories with classmates, and, so on.
Just like one interviewee mentioned,
When I studied at Junior High School, I had a classmate whose parents came
from northern Jiansu but has once worked in Shanghai banks. Her parents once
invited me to a luxurious Shanghai restaurant. On the dinning table, they tolm
me many stories about Shanghai and the rules [guiju] of how big families in
Shanghai lived their lives with so much class. … Since then, I started have many
imaginations about Shanghai and stared read as much as I could about Shanghai.
I finally fell in love with the novels of Zhang Ailing [a novelist who wrote about
many things in 1930s’ Shanghai]. (Interview in Taipei, 2009)
Cases like this lead us back to the old question: the cultural affinity between
Shanghai and Taipei. But why Taipei?
According to our earlier analyses, those
who remembered Shanghai are upper class mainlanders.
15
This must have something
to do with the sharing of the collective memory.
In the meantime, we also found a
Taishang who happened to be Shanghainese but share little about the Shanghai
memory.
And, this Taishang, as we would expect, though grew up in Taipei but in a
“segregated community” full of middle- and low-ranking soldiers.
His background
did not offer him a chance to get in touch with the community of the upper class
mainlanders in Taipei. And, even being a Shanghainese, his farther married to a
Taiwanese wife and lived with mainlanders mostly coming from difference provinces
of China.
The environment did not give too much chance for his father to
collectively remember the days in Shanghai and thus give him the chance to form his
Shanghai imaginary. The memory must be a collective action.
Once left out of the
circles, even a Shanghainese may lose the chance to share such imaginary.
In other words, the Shanghai imaginary is not necessarily carried in genuine
memory (like the past experiences) and family origins, it is something subjected to
construction and sharing.
As showed in this case, such collective memory is
essentially an imaginary or a myth can be disseminated and acquired, depending on
whether there might be proper circumstances and personal contacts.
Then, we have one more question to be tackled: only Taishang at their fifties
would share with us their imaginary of Shanghai. Young Taishang, no matter
Taiwanese or mainlander and no matter growing up in Taipei or not, have all lost their
admire for the Shanghai culture and the sense of “closeness” with this city.
According to our interviews, it seems that the efforts of upper class mainlanders to
“remember Shanghai” collectively were only popular in the 1950s and 1960s.
After
that, although we have witnesses some comeback of the “Shanghai fever” — once in
the 1980s (limited to literature) and once in the early 2000(more to do with making
investments), none of them could form the imaginary as in the 1950s and 1960s.
And the remembering and imaginary of Shanghai have gradually faded away after the
1960s.
The reasons might be as follows: (1) It was quite clear that then had little
hope to fight back and take over China.
It is about time for them to settle down and
live on. (2) It has also been more than two decades to leave the mainland.
A dream
cannot be realized would later arouse harsh feelings. (3) It was also about time for
Taiwan’s economic take-off.
Taiwanese people — whether mainlanders or native
16
Taiwanese seem had new directions for them to devote efforts.
The memory of
Shanghai has left only for a small group of mainlanders living in tragedies.
In this
sense, mainlanders flied to Taiwan have finally broke away from the past, from
Shanghai, from the mainland, and started “learning to be Taiwanese” in the 1970s.
IV. Economic and Politics Behind Cross-Strait Integration
Since the 1996 missile crisis, the relationship between China and Taiwan has
become an international concern.
Some believe that such confrontation would lead
to an all-out military conflict between China and the U.S.
Other, of course, might
disagree. But, what shall be the future prospects of cross-Strait relations? Will
China and Taiwan eventually go to war? Is there any mechanism, such as
socioeconomic interdependence, that may mitigates disputes over sovereignty and
facilitate stable integration across the Taiwan Strait? Moreover, is it also likely that
such growing economic exchanges and social contacts would ultimately make
political rapprochement and political unification unavoidable?
Given the current situation, “political separation with economic integration,” the
key to carve out cross-Strait future probably lies in the “spillover effects” from
economics to politics. Therefore, governments from both sides have reasons to
either take advantage of or stay vigilant for the impacts from economics to politics.
For example, China has introduced policies like “using business to steer politics”
(yishang weizheng) and “using economics to promote unification” (yijing cutong) to
gain leverage over Taiwan. Taiwan, on the other hand, has also taken policy
initiatives such as “going south” and “going slow” (or “patience over haste,” jieji
yongren) to defeat China’s efforts exert influences. In other words, the struggles
between China and Taiwan can be largely understood as the tug of war between
economics and politics. And the integration across the Taiwan Strait thus can show
us the contention between the two forces. This leads to Hu Jintao’s new waves of
endeavors to “win over the hearts of the Taiwanese people” through economic
benefits.
17
Bidding for Taiwanese Hearts: China’s New Policy toward Taiwan
The Sixteenth Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), held in
October 2002, marked the official beginning of the “Hu Jintao era,” but it was not
until after the Fourth Plenum of the CCP’s Sixteenth Central Committee in September
2004 when Hu began to assert full control over China’s policy toward Taiwan. Such
policy agenda took a few years to take shape. And nowadays, it is quite clear what
are the essentials of China’s new policy, or Hu Jintao’s “new thinking” on cross-Strait
relations.
According to many observers in Taiwan, Hu’s Taiwan policy is a “two-handed
strategy”(liangshou celue), generally described as “keeping the firm hand sufficiently
firm and the soft hand sufficiently soft.” However, as will be demonstrated in the
following discussions, the “firm hand” measures (such as the Anti-Secession Law) are
largely defensive actions in nature, being taken to stabilize the current situation.
What Taiwan needs to pay more attention to and must be more careful about are
offensive measures, i.e., the “soft hand,” namely, “look ward to the Taiwanese people”
(ji xiwang yu Taiwan renmin).
Compared with China’s policies in Jiang’s years,
Hu’s new campaign of reunification is more sophisticated and discriminating, and
consequently, difficult for Taiwan to respond to successfully.
Hu’s New Thinking: “Extending Benefits, Transforming Identity”
Hu’s new strategy toward Taiwan emerged from the limitations of Jiang’s Taiwan
policy.
Beginning around mid-1990, as Deng Xiaoping gradually left the stage,
Jiang Zemin assumed control over the PRC’s Taiwan policy. His policy can be
divided into two stages set apart by the “special state-to-state relations” dispute
(liangguolun shijian) of 1999.
In the earlier period, Jiang’s policy was characterized
by harsh “verbal attacks and military threats” (wengong wuhe) as in the two missile
crises of 1995 and 1996, while in the later period Jiang’s placed greater emphasis on
“great power governance” (daguo guanxi, in effect, applying pressures by way of the
United States), as the approach to settle the 1999 dispute. In addition to these two
major approaches, Jiang also took steps to strengthen trade exchanges in an attempt to
18
“use people to pressure the officials, and use business to constrain the government.”
Nevertheless, in considering the overall practical consequences of these policies, it is
quite obvious that, although China could effectively deter independence, it could do
nothing to achieve its ultimate goal of unification.
Instead, the application of
military-backed pressures has alienated the Taiwanese people and widened the divide
across the Taiwan Strait.
In view of the inadequacies of the Jiang-era Taiwan policy, Hu changed his
strategies toward Taiwan, promoting greater economic cooperation, avoiding direct
struggles over sovereignty, and appealing directly to the Taiwanese citizen.
This set
of new policies targets directly “the hearts of the Taiwanese people.” In more
concrete terms, the new strategy includes charter flights across the Taiwan Strait for
travelers, duty-free exports of agricultural products to the mainland, provision of
favorable terms for Taiwanese investments, relaxation of restrictions on working and
staying in China, offering Taiwanese the same status to apply for license and same
tuition to study in China and so on and so forth.
The logic behind Hu’s new policy,
according to the author, is to sacrifice China’s economic benefits in exchange for
Taiwan’s political identity.
Hu’s interest-based appeal is no doubt a sophisticated strategy.
After Taiwan
largely completed its democratic transition and state building in the 1990s, in order to
make unification likely, China has to overcome a resisting Taiwan identity without
using coercive means—which might further establish the Taiwan identity
afterwards. Research on the cross-Strait issue reveals that Taiwanese attitudes
toward the mainland are influenced by two intertwining factors: identity vs. interests.
The former provide the foundation for Taiwan’s independence from China while the
later serves as the basis of cross-Strait interdependence. Hu’s new policy thus
expand the scope and appeals of economic interests and thereby dilute the effects of
identity on views of the unification-independence issue, and subsequently strengthen
the mainland’s influences over Taiwan.
Is Hu’s New Policy an Effective Means to Modify Taiwanese Identity?
19
As argued earlier, China’s new Taiwan policy was designed under the
circumstance that official contacts and reciprocal dialogues are unavailable.
As a
result, China continued to focus its efforts on appeals to the Taiwanese people with
tangible benefits, thereby influencing future Taiwan’s policy toward China. Facing
Hu’s new policy, Taiwan has failed to develop an effective response for the following
three reasons.
First, most of the efforts to “expand benefits” requires only unilateral
measures of China, and as such does not need cooperation from the Taiwanese
government to be implemented.
As a practical consequence, Taiwan will have a
difficult time supervising cross-Strait interactions or putting effective
countermeasures into practice—it has no way to participate meaningfully in China’s
chosen course of action to ease the impacts of the strategy.
Secondly, China’s strategy of expanding the benefits create groups of
beneficiaries—this in turn will make it difficult for the Taiwan government to rebuff
mainland’s initiatives or otherwise foster popular resistance to these overtures.
The
Taiwanese government still describes all manner of offerings from China as its “plot”
to ensure unification, regardless of the actual substance of the policy, but it has no
way to prevent ordinary Taiwanese from wanting to obtain the benefits of China’s
cross-Strait initiatives. And finally, regardless of the strategy that the mainland
adopts, and regardless of whether the results are significant, there is another
advantage from the mainland’s point of view—as soon as the new policy was
announced, China’s image among Taiwanese quietly began to change. If one
compares the past impression of most Taiwanese of China as a militaristic, bellicose
power threatening the island’s existence, to the present impression of a hand
extending a check and aiding farmers, the positive effects of the policy are readily
apparent.
Even so, after Hu’s new Taiwan policy has been implemented for a couple of
years, we still cannot properly assess its effectiveness and come to a conclusion
whether the policy is working or not. In fact, researchers studying cross-Strait
relations have been debating over the effectiveness of Hu’s new Taiwan policy.
Some scholars highlights China’s rising economic strength and expanding cross-Strait
exchanges exert gravitational forces on Taiwan.
20
These lead to Wei’s famous
functionist analysis and an expectation that cross-Strait relations will gradually move
toward economic to political integration.
Contrary to this optimism, other scholars
are more cautions. For example, Cal Clack challenges Wei’s logic and argue that the
cross-Strait relations is different the European model, for “the periodic crises between
Beijing and Taipei demonstrate that the spillover of low politics into high politics has
been much more circumscribed in the Chinese case than in the European one.”
Based on recent poll data, Shu Keng also finds that Hu’s policy has it limits: “though
Hu’s policy does make considerable impacts on the image of China among the
Taiwanese but have little or no effects on the identity of the Taiwanese, and thus is
probably unable to reshape the future of cross-Strait relations in the direction China
wishes.”
Empirical studies go further to explain why Hu’s policy to modify the Taiwanese
identity has not been very successful.
For example, some scholars stress Taiwan’s
concerns and resistance over China’s economic statecraft.
For other scholars, it is
the “identify factor” that block Taiwanese from accepting the goodwill of the Chinese
government. For example, according to Keng, Chen and Huang, for many Taiwanese,
the economic exchanges with China is similar to “trading with the enemy.”
And
under such circumstance, judging whether China is an enemy is much more critical
than calculating how much Taiwan can get from China.
Still others argue that social
contacts and economic exchange have achieved little in overcoming the differences
over culture, social and political lives among the citizen in China and Taiwan.
These
deep-rooted differences matter significantly when the cross-Strait relationships
transforming from economic cooperation to political unification.
As argued earlier, economic interdependence across the Taiwan Strait has widely
believed to be the factor that might reshape the future of cross-Strait relations and
Hu’s new Taiwan policy is obviously designed to expand such interdependence and
create beneficiaries and ultimately reshape the identity of the Taiwanese involved.
But still, without an appropriate analytical framework, we can not testify the
above-mentioned arguments and make sense the effectiveness of China’s economic
statecraft. Therefore, in following section, I will address the reasons why we have
not developed an effective analytical framework?
21
In my view, the problem lies in
the limitations of the integration theory often been looking forward for insights to
understand the paces of cross-Strait integration.
V. Domestic Politics, Cultural Roots and the Politics of Integration
As mentioned earlier, the most popular model to observe the future of cross-Strait
relations is still the experiences of European integration. Scholars such as Wei Yong
and Cal Clack have been debating over the applicability of the European model.
But
I will argue in this section that the European model is not applicable not because the
situation in Europe and cross-Strait are too different, but because of the limitation of
the integration theory itself.
Due to this limitation, according to my analysis, the
integrationist framework fails to establish the linkage between societal interests
nurtured in cross-Strait transactions and contacts and the policy outcomes proposed
by a democratic government.
As a result, when talking about the future of
cross-Strait relations with “political separation with economic integration,” the
integrationist framework often results in more confusion than clarification.
The most remarkable feature to borrow insights from the integrationist framework
is the discrepancies among the authors applying the framework: different authors
often arrive at conclusions that are diametrically opposed to each other. For example,
Chan & Clark underscore the effects of trade, investment, tourism, and other forms of
people-to-people contacts, expecting that such contacts may sooner or later lead to
official negotiations and most likely to integration between the two sides of the Strait.
Following the same line, Yung Wei goes farther to claim that cross-Strait linkages
grounded in non-official contacts would finally result in the unification of the two
divided nations.
On the other hand, according to Hsin-hsing Wu, “[t]here is no
evidence of a spill-over effect in the Chinese case: economic integration shows no
signs of leading to political reconciliation.” Likewise, Jean-Pierre Cabestan also
asserts that those cross-Strait people-to-people contacts will never exceed the
limitations set by the governments of the two sides of the Strait.
Why do these authors draw conflicting conclusions regarding the future prospects
22
for the cross-Strait relationship?
Once we look into their arguments, we shall find
that these scholars are actually borrowing from different variants of integration
theories for their analyses of the cross-Strait relationships. Those who underline the
bright side of the story usually ground their forecasts in “Communication Theory,”
while those who stress the dark side often refer to the “Neo-functionalism” as the
source of insight.
Even though both theoretical frameworks draw from the
integrationist view, there is significant inconsistency in their expectations over the
future of cross-Strait relations.
In other words, the disagreements among scholars do
not arise from their efforts to apply the integration theory but from an inconsistent
integration theory itself. It is the uniqueness of the cross-Strait case—economic
convergence with political divergence—that brings such a discrepancy to light.
If we go back for a closer look at the integrationist perspective itself, we shall
easily distinguish the two theoretical variants in this theoretical tradition: one is
“society-centered” and the other “state-centered.”
The former approach normally
draws attention to the common interests created in the process of making trans-border
contacts and transactions. In other words, this perspective believes in the influences
of the objective “interest structure” in the shaping of policy outputs and final political
integration. The representative of this society-centered view in the integrationist
approach is undoubtedly Karl Deutsch’s “Communication Theory.”
By contrast, the
state-centered variant in the integration tradition usually emphasizes the role of
politics and leadership, arguing that the flows of transactions are just the very first
step toward integration. The true integrative process is the result of specific
decisions and arrangements made by government actions and/or political elites.
In
other words, the policy outputs not only reflect societal interests but also play an
essential role in creating the framework within which pro-integration interests can be
generated. Therefore, the very premise of integration is the commitments of political
elites.
The precursor of the logic is without doubt Ernst Hass’s Neo-functionalism.
By contrasting the two competing theoretical formulations in the integrationist
approach, we can easily locate the core of the disagreements between them: whether
the existing pro-integration social interests would be transformed into pro-integration
policy outputs under a democratic government.
23
These unsolved disputes between the two theoretical variants suggest that
integration theory lacks a well-specified model for the dynamics of domestic politics.
That is the reason why integration theorists cannot agree upon whether and under
what circumstances the existing societal interests may affect formal policies toward
each other and whether the current cross-Strait situation will end up with integration/
unification. Since the integrating process derives dynamism from the demands at the
sub-nation level to the mutual assimilation at the state-to-state level, the integrationist
framework involves not just a model of international relations but also a model of
comparative politics. Unfortunately, early constructors of integration theory did not
pay enough attention to the domestic dimension. The result is the different
estimations of the effects of civil contacts and the contradictory predictions regarding
the prospects for the cross-Strait relations.
After bringing to light the limitations of integration theory, George Yu and Paul
Bolt suggested that “[m]uch more research is needed ….. [m]ost useful would be
further studies in both the mainland and Taiwan on how group pressures for good
cross-Strait relations that arise out of cross-Strait contexts affect the policy-making
processes and outcomes in both Beijing and Taipei.”
Therefore, for a better
understanding of the integration across the Taiwan Strait, a framework with a
well-specified linkage between “social interests” and “policy outputs” is absolutely
essential. And the cultural roots clearly plays a critical role in facilitating such
integration.
VI. Conclusion
As claimed at the very beginning, this paper addresses the cultural linkages
between Shanghai and Taipei.
We try to bring to light the significance of the cultural
affinity between the two cities and thus reveal the dynamics of “collective memory”
of the mainlanders in Taiwan.
Through this research, we want to show that it might
be fruitful to explore the cultural dimension of cross-Strait relations.
And, also, we
hope to provide a detailed case study to demonstrate the significance of the collective
memory and how collective memory could be carried on, handed down, and finally
24
wasted away.
In this section, we will briefly address some implications or
contributions of this study.
As we know, current studies of cross-Strait relations have significantly expanded
in the past several decades.
Unlike earlier studies — which usually stick to the state
sector only and thus focus on formal talks or policy declarations, current studies tend
to take a bottom-up approach and thus take in socio-economic forces and public
opinions (e.g., Cheng, Huang & Wu eds., 1995; Zhao ed., 1999; Kastner, 2009) to
help explaining the cross-Strait dynamics. Even so, the cultural dimension has still
been missing in the study of cross-Strait relations, with exceptions of some comments
from Shih (2002) from time to time.
Even for the most updated and timely
collection of essays designed to represent the current status of the field of cross-Strait
relations (Bao & Wu eds., 2009), the cultural dimension is ignored.
As has been
shown in this study, cultural factors can be significant in explaining the deeper
transformation across the Strait.
We thus look forward to more works taking a
cultural approach to shed light on the study of cross-Strait relations.
In addition, we have seen more and more illuminating and insightful publications
dealing with the relations between “collective memory” and sociopolitical actions
(Gillis ed., 1994; Pennebaker, Paez & Rimé eds. 1997; Wertsch, 2002; Bell ed., 2006).
Though following the traditions of earlier theoretical pioneers (Halbwachs, 1992;
Connerton, 1989; Hobsbawm & Ranger eds., 1992), most of these works still adopt a
more static approach, taking the fixed “collective memory” as the starting point of
their analyses.
This study is meaningful not just because it provides a detailed case
study of the effectiveness of collective memory, but also because it shows how such
collective memory has been carried on, handed down, and finally wasted away.
In
this sense, the study carries the implications beyond the field of cross-Strait relations.
Also, in the past two decades, we have witnessed two generations of Taishang
study (Keng, Forthcoming).
Earlier studies focus on investment issues such as how
to locate the cross-Strait investments, the competitiveness of different locations, and
how to build the cross-border governance (e.g., dealing with governments both sides
of the Strait). There are certainly many milestone achievements following that line
25
(Hsing, 1998) but aspects of Taishang’s lives in the locality are not the primary
concerns. Since about 2000 following the “Shanghai fever,” there arise another
wave of Taishang study. The second generation of Taishang study tends to treat
Taishang as migrants and thus shifts its focus on the daily lives of Taishang.
Issues
such a localization, accommodation, incorporation and acculturation become the
current research topics (Keng, Forthcoming).
With respect to this second generation
of Taishang study, this paper seems to suggest that to better understand the deeper
localization or incorporation, we need to bring in the cultural perspective, unlike the
earlier studies which stress investments issues and ignore cultural aspects.
Since about mid-1990s, cross-Strait relations have been characterized as
“political separation with economic integration.”
Though successfully deterring the
endeavors fro Taiwan independence, China achieved little in breaking the current
political stalemate.
On the one hand, public opinion surveys conducted in Taiwan
indicate that some 80 percent of Taiwanese lean toward status-quo—i.e., ongoing
political separation with mainland China.
On the other hand, the policy position of
the United States has been made clear: US would oppose any unilaterally attempt to
change the current status-quo. Consequently, as most Taiwanese believe, cross-Strait
relations will remain stable for the foreseeable future, no matter the “pan-Blue” or the
“pan-Green” would be ruling.
Even though the political status quo looks stable, cross-Strait economic
transactions and social contacts have been both dynamic and close.
According to
official statistics, today’s China brings in more than 40 percent of Taiwan’s exports,
up to 70 percent of Taiwan’s FDI, and almost one million Taiwanese businesspeople.
Therefore, China has the incentives and capability to exert its political leverage over
Taiwan.
The economic interdependence across the Taiwan Strait thus is widely
believed to be the factor that might reshape the future of cross-Strait relations.
Observing from a broader theoretical context, increasing socio-economic
contacts with growing political alienation make today’s cross-Strait relations a very
unique case analyze the nexus between economic and political integration.
But
without an appropriate analytical framework, we can not successfully make sense the
26
effectiveness of China’s economic statecraft in particular and the influences of
economics on politics in general.
Just like today’s situation, scholars inspired by the
Integration Theory are often sharply divided among themselves—not just over
substantial issues but how to settle those issues.
To provide common grounds for
academic analyses or debates, this paper thus suggests a “linkage community”
framework — which focuses on the relative bargaining power between different
interest/advocacy groups generated with the expansion of cross-Strait exchanges and
contacts. Hopefully, this framework can help organize factual information and thus
lead to a clear-cut assessment over the progresses and limits of cross-Strait
integration.
To do so, this paper will be divided into following sections. In next section, I
will briefly characterize current cross-Strait relations with a focus on China’s new
economic statecraft against Taiwan. In the following Section Three, I will quickly
review the existing research over cross-Strait integration and explain why we haven’t
yet found an effective analytical framework for making sense cross-Strait integration.
The framework of “linkage communities” is proposed in Section Four, which
highlights changes in (1) the size, resources, and organization of the linkage
communities and (2) their relations vis-à-vis the state and other rival groups, and (3)
their constraints from the international power structure.
The concluding section will
address a bit about the strengths and weakness of this analytical framework offered in
the paper.
As pointed out at the beginning of the paper, students of cross-Strait relations
have been debating over the political consequences of growing economic exchanges
and social contacts across the Taiwan Strait: Whether these linkages may pave the
way for final in the end?
Those who stick to the earlier integrationist framework
would often disagree with each other over the “spillovers” from socio-economics to
politics.
The paper thus borrows insights from the policy networks perspective and
focus on the “linkage communities” to help observe how interest-driven
socio-economic transactions may transform into identity-based political allegiance
and in the end bring about political leverage. With this new framework, we should
be able to clearly observe both the effectiveness of China’s new policy and the
27
consequences of cross-strait exchanges.
But still, we need further research to specify the parameters included in the
framework.
For example, to observe the development of the “linkage communities,”
we need a social psychological model to observe the identity shift of the people
involved in cross-Strait interactions.
That model can tell us the relations between the
pre-existing identity of the person involved and the influences from his or her contact
experiences and material interests. We also need information about the material and
non-material resources maneuvered by the members of the “linkage communities”
and the organization of the “linkage communities”—which is another type of
“resources” owned by the members.
In addition, we also need a model of the
socioeconomic structure and state-society relations of the political entity being
analyzed. Factors related to the socioeconomic structure include the physical
endowments and international competitiveness of major economic sectors while
related to state-society relations include the political institutional setting, the
ideological composition and the autonomy and strength of the state vis-à-vis society.
Finally, factors related to external constraints would include the interests and
policies of US, China and Taiwan—the so-called “strategic triangular relationship.”
In addition, the global economic trends such as China’s rise as an economic giant, and
regional economic arrangements, such as “ASEAN plus One,” also need to be
included to make sense the facilitating or blocking forces from the international
system.
Once all major factors are taken into account, we should be able to be in a
much better position to make sense the future prospects of cross-Strait relations.
28
References
Bai Xianyong, 2000. Taipei People [Taibe Ren], trans. Bai Xianyong & Ye Peixia, Taipei:
Changyou.
Bao,
Zonghe
&
Yushan
Wu
eds.,
2009.
Revisiting
Theories
on
Cross-Strait
Relations[Chongxin Jianshi Zhengbian zhong de Liang’an Guanxi Lilun], Taipei: Wunan.
Bell, Duncan ed., 2006, Memory, Trauma and World Politics: Reflections on the Relationship
between Past and Present, Basingstoke, Hampshire UK & New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Bush, Richard C. (2006) Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait, Washington,
DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Carpenter, Ted Galen (2006) America’s Coming War with China: A Collision Course over
Taiwan, Basingstoke, UK & New York: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2006.
Castles, Stephen & Mark J. Miller, 2009, Age of Migration: International Population
Movements in the Modern World, Basingstoke, Hampshire UK & New York: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Chan, Steve (2006) “The Politics of Economic Exchange: Carrots and Sticks in
Taiwan-China-U.S. Relations,” Issues & Studies 42: 1-22.
Chan, Steve (2006) “The Politics of Economic Exchange: Carrots and Sticks in
Taiwan-China-U.S. Relations,” Issues & Studies 42: 1-22.
Chang, Parris H. & Martin L. Lasater (eds.)(1993) If China Crosses the Taiwan Strait: The
International Response, Lanham: University Press of America, University Park, PA: Center
for East Asian Studies, Pennsylvania State University.
Chao, Chien-min (2003) “Will Economic Integration between Mainland China and Taiwan
Lead to a Congenial Political Culture?” Asian Survey 43: 280-304.
Chen, Ling (2010), Zhejiang Diasporas in Taiwan [Zhejiang Ren zai Taiwan], Beijing:
Haiyang.
Cheng, Tun-Jen (1995) “The Mainland China-Taiwan Dyad as a Research Program,” in
Tun-Jen Cheng, Chi Huang & Samuel S. G. Wu (eds.) Inherited Rivalry: Conflict across the
Taiwan Straits, Boulder, CO: Rienner: 1-22.
Cheng, Tun-jen (2005) “China-Taiwan Economic Linkage: Between Insulation and
Superconductivity,” in Nancy B. Tucker (ed.) Dangerous Strait: The U.S.-Taiwan-China
Crisis, New York: Columbia University Press: 93-130.
Cheng, Tun-Jen, Chi Huang & Samuel S. G. Wu (eds.)(1995) Inherited Rivalry: Conflict
across the Taiwan Strait, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Cheng, Tun-jen, Chi Huang & Samuel S. G. Wu eds., 1995. Inherited Rivalry: Conflict across
the Taiwan Straits, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Chen, Ling (2010), Zhejiang Diasporas in Taiwan [Zhejiang Ren zai Taiwan], Beijing:
Haiyang.
29
Clough, Ralph N. (1999) Cooperation or Conflict in the Taiwan Strait?, Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield.
Clough, Ralph N.(1993) Reaching across the Taiwan Strait: People-to-People Diplomacy,
Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Connerton, Paul. 1989, How Societies Remember, Cambridge & New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Corcuff, Stephane, 2004. Like the Breese: The Transformation of the National Identity of the
Mainlanders in Taiwan[Fenghe Rinuan: Taiwan Waishengren yu Guojia Rentong de
Zhuanbian], Taipei: Yuanchen.
Dent, Christopher M.(2001) “Being Pulled into China’s Orbit? Navigating Taiwan’s Foreign
Economic Policy,” Issues & Studies 37: 1-34,
Fei, Li (ed.)(2003), Haixia Liang’an Jingji Yiti Lun (On the Economic Integration across the
Taiwan Strait, Taipei: Boyang.
Fetzer, Joel. 2000, Public Attitudes toward Immigration in the United States, France, and
Germany. Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press.
Florida, Richard L., 2005, Cities and the Creative Class, New York: Routledge.
Freeman, Jr., Chas. W. (1998) “Preventing War in the Taiwan Strait: Restraining Taiwan-and
Beijing,” Foreign Affairs, 77: 6-11.
Ge Fengzhang (2003), Stories of the Taiwanese Businesspeople in Greater Shanghai [Da
Shanghai Taishang Chuanqi], Beijing: Jiuzhou.
Gillis, John R. ed., 1994, Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity, Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Goldstein, Steven & Randall Schriver (2001) “An Uncertain Relationship: The United States,
Taiwan, and the Taiwan Relations Act,” The China Quarterly, 165: 147-72.
Halbwachs, Maurice, 1992, On Collective Memory, edited, translated, and with an
introduction by Lewis A. Coser, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Halpern, Nina & Samuel P. S. Ho (1999/2000) “Understanding Cross-Strait Relations,”
Pacific Affairs, 72: 491-494.
Heisler, Barbara Schmitter. 2000. “The Sociology of Immigration: From Assimilation to
Segmented; Assimilation from the American Experience to the Global Arena” in Migration
Theory: Talking across Disciplines, eds., Caroline B. Brettell & James F. Hollifield, New
York: Routledge, pp. 77-96.
Hickey, Dennis V. (2009) “Beijing’s Evolving Policy Toward Taipei: Engagement or
Entrapment,” Issues & Studies, 45: 31-70.
Hobsbawm Eric & Terence Ranger eds., 1992. The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge & New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Hsing, You-tien. 1998. Making Capitalism in China: the Taiwan Connection, Oxford & New
York: Oxford University Press.
30
Hu Sunyun. 2008. “The Incorporation of Taiwanese into Shanghai: Economic and Social
Dimensions”[Taiwanren Rongru Shanghai Jingji yu Shehui] in Shanghai Citizens in
Transition[Zhuanbian zhong de Shanghai Shimin] ed. Hanlong Lu, Shanghai: Shanghai
Academic of Social Sciences, pp. 243-272.
Kastner, Scott L. (2009) Political Conflict and Economic Interdependence across the Taiwan
Strait and Beyond, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Kastner, Scott L.(2009) Political Conflict and Economic Interdependence across the Taiwan
Strait and Beyond, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Kastner, Scott L., 2009. Political Conflict and Economic Interdependence across the Taiwan
Strait and Beyond, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Keng, Keng, Jia-Wei Liu & Lu-huei, Chen (2009) “Dapo Weichi Xianzhuang de Misi: Taiwan
Minzhong Tongdu Jueze zhong Linian yu Wushi de Liannan”(Between Principle and
Pragmatism: The Unification-Independence Choice of the Taiwanese People and Its
Reasons) Taiwan Zhengzhi Xuekan (Taiwanese Political Science Review), 13:
Forthcoming.
Keng, Shu & Gunter Schubert (2009), “Agents of Unification? The Political Role of
Taiwanese Businessmen in the Process of Cross-Strait Integration,” Asian Survey:
Forthcoming.
Keng, Shu (2005) “Jingmao Jiaoliu de Zhengzhi Yingxiang: Zhongguong de Duitai Xinzheng
yu Taiwan de Liang’an Yanjiu”(The Political Consequences of Economic Exchanges:
China’s New Policy and Taiwan’s Cross-Strait Research), Zhongguo Dalu Yanjiu Jiaoxue
Tongxun, 71: 1-6.
Keng, Shu (2009) “Jingji Niuzhuan Zhengzhi? Zhonggong “Huitai Zhengce de Zhngzhi
YIngxiang”(Limitations of China’s Economic Statecraft: China’s Favor-Granting Policies
and Their Political Implications), Wenti yu Yanjiu (Issues & Studies) 48: 1-32.
Keng, Shu (2002) “IT Class or Taiwan People: The National Identity of the High-Tech
Employees of the Greater Shanghai.”[Zixun Ren yihuo Taiwan Ren?: Dashanghai Diqu
Gaokeji Taishang de Guojia Rentong]. Paper Presented at the Conference on Information
Technology & Political Research, Yilan: Fouguang University, May, 28, available at
http://old.npf.org.tw/PUBLICATION/IA/091/IA-R-091-061.htm.
Keng, Shu., 2011. “The State of Taishang Study: Review and Prospects,” [Taishang Yanjiu:
Huigu yu Qianzhan] in Taishang Study from a Social Science Perspective [Taishang Yanjiu:
Shehui Kexue de Fenxi], eds., Gunter Schubert et al. Taipei: Wunan.
Lee, Leo Ou-fan, 1999, Shanghai Modern: The Flowering of a New Urban Culture in China,
1930-1945, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Lei, Xiang (2007), Shanghai as the Destination [Mudedi Shanghai], Taipei: Xiyouji.
Lin, Chong-Pin (2008) “More Carrot Than Stick: Beijing’s Emerging Taiwan Policy,” China
Security 4: 1-27.
31
Lin, Gang et al.(2004), “Cross-Strait Economic Ties: Agent of Change, or a Trojan Horse?”
Asia Program Special Report #118: 1-18.
Lin, Ping (2009) “Emotions in Migration: Mainlander Taiwanese of Dongguan and Shanghai
in China,” East Asian Studies, 40(2): 99-140.
Lin, Ruihua & Shu Keng (2009) “Social Class, Primordial Ethnicity or Party Affiliation? A
Comparative Study of Social Incorporation of the Taiwanese in China,” Paper Presented at
the Annual Conference of the Taiwanese Sociological Association, Taipei, Nov. 28-29,
2009.
Massey, Douglas S. et al. 1993. “Theories of International Migration: A Review and
Appraisal” Population and Development Review, 19: 3. (Sep.), pp. 431-466.
Meyers, Eytan, 2004, International Immigration Policy: A Theoretical and Comparative
Analysis. New York: Palgrave/Macmillan.
Ouyang Zi (1976), Swallows from the Houses of Wang & Xie: An Interpretation of Taipei
People [Wang Xie Tangqian de Yanzi: Taibeiren Shangxi], Taipei: Erya.
Pennebaker, James W., Dario Paez & Bernard Rimé eds., 1997. Collective Memory of
Political Events: Social Psychological Perspectives, Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Portes, Alejandro & József Böröcz, 1989. “Contemporary Immigration: Theoretical
Perspectives on Its Determinants and Modes of Incorporation” International Migration
Review 23: 3(Aut.), pp. 606-630.
Potter, Robert B. Dennis Conway & Joan Philips eds. (2005), The Experience of Return
Migration: Caribbean Perspectives, Aldershot, Hants, UK & Burlington, VT: Sahgate.
Portes, Alejandro, 1997, “Immigration Theory for a New Century: Some Problems and
Opportunities” International Migration Review, 31: 4(Win.), pp. 799-825.
Qi, Bangyuan & Dewei Wang eds. (2004), The Last of the Whampoa Bred [Zuihou de
Huangpu], Taipei: Maitian.
Sheng, Lijun (2001), China’s Dilemma: The Taiwan Issue, London & New York: I.B. Tauris.
Sheng, Lijun (2002) China and Taiwan: Cross-Strait Relations under Chen Shui-bian,
London & New York: Zed; Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies; Distributed in
the USA by Palgrave.
Shih, Chih-yu. 2002. The Hidden Structure of Cross-Strait Relations: Cultural Development
and Political Cognition[Liang’an Guanxi de Shenceng Jiegou: Wenhua Fazhan yu
Zhengzhi Renzhi], Taipei: Yongran Wenhua.
Tanner, Murry Scot (2007) Chinese Economic Coercion against Taiwan: A Tricky Weapon to
Use, Santa Monica, CA: RAND.
Todaro, Michael P., 1976. Internal Migration in Developing Countries: A Review of Theory,
Evidence, Methodology and Research Priorities, Geneva: International Labour Office.
Tseng, Steve (2006), If China Attacks Taiwan: Military Strategy, Politics and Economics,
London & New York: Routledge.
32
Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf (ed.)(2008) Dangerous Strait: The U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis, New
York: Columbia University Press.
Tung, Chen-yuan (2003) “Cross-Strait Economic Relations: China’s Leverage and Taiwan’s
Vulnerability,” Issues & Studies, 39: 137-75.
Tung, Chen-yuan Tung (2005) “An Assessment of China’s Taiwan Policy under the Third
Generation Leadership,” Asian Survey, 45: 343-361.
Waitaihui/Cheng, Mei-Li eds. (2008) Encounters: Ethnographies of Mainlanders/ Females
[Yuhe: Waisheng/Nuxing Shuxie Zhi], Taipei: INK.
Waitaihui/Liao, Yunzhang eds. (2006) Lives, From China to Taiwan: Ethnographies of
Mainlander Spouses [Rensheng: Cong Na’an dao Zhe’an: Waisheng Mama Shuxie Zhi],
Taipei: INK.
Waitaihui/Jiang, Sizhang eds. (2006) Memories of Those Roaming Years: Family Letters
Never Mailed Out [Liuli Jiyi: Wufa JIda de JIashu], Taipei: INK.
Waitaihui (2008) Home, Here and There: The Photos Books of Mainlanders’ Returning
Experiences [Xiangguan Chuchu: Waishengren Fanxiang Tanqin Zhaopian Gushi Shu],
Taipei: INK.
Wang, Dewei & Jinshu Huang eds. (2004), The Man Who Longed for a Faraway Home
[Yuanxiang Ren: Quzun de Gushi], Taipei: Maitian.
Wang, T. Y. & I-chou Liu (2004) “Contending Identities in Taiwan: Implications for
Cross-Strait Relations,” Asian Survey 44: 568-89.
Wei, Yung (1997) “From ‘Multi-System Nations’ to ‘Linkage Communities’: A New
Conceptual Scheme for the Integration of Divided Nations,” Issues & Studies, 33: 1-19.
Wertsch, James V., 2002, Voices of Collective Remembering, Cambridge & New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Wu, Hsin-hsing (1994) Bridging the Strait: Taiwan, China, and the Prospects for
Reunification, Hong Kong & New York: Oxford University Press.
Wu, Yu-Shan (1994) “Mainland China’s Economic Policy toward Taiwan: Economic Need or
Unification Scheme?” Issues & Studies 30: 29-49.
Wu, Yu-Shan (1997) Kangheng huo Hucong: Liang’an Ganxi Xinquan [Balancing or
Bandwagoning: A New Interpretation of Cross-Strait Relations]. Taipei: Cheng Chung.
Wu, Yu-Shan Wu (2005) “From Romantic Triangle to Marriage? Washington-Beijing- Taipei
Relations in Historical Comparison,” Issues & Studies 41: 113-59.
Xu, Qingzhen (2005) Shanghai Memories and Shanghai Experiences in Post-War
Taipei[Zhanhou Taibei de Shanghai Jiyi yu Shanghai Jingyan], Taipei: Daan.
Xu, Qingzhen (2008) Modern, Shanghai, New Sensation: Works Liu Naou [Moden, Shanghai,
Xin Ganjue: Liu Naou], Taipei: Xiuwei.
Yang Yuting (2008), The Son of a Colonel: Mainlanders, Where Are You Heading?
[Shangxiao de Erzi: Waishengren, Ni Yao Qu Na’er?]: Teipei: Huayan.
33
Zagoria, Ronald S. ed.(2003) Breaking the China-Taiwan Impasse, Westport, CT: Praeger.
Zhang, Jingru (2006), Shanghai Modernities and Taiwan Literati: The Illusions and
Disillusions of a Cultural Dream [Shanghai Xiandaixing. Taiwan Chuantong Wenren:
Wenhua Meng de Zhuixun yu Huanmie], Taipei: Daoxiang.
Zhang, Maoguai ed. (2010), Nation and Identity: Perspective of Some Waishengren [Guojia
yu Rentong: Yixie Waishengren de Guandian], Taipei: Qunxue.
Zhao, Shisheng (1999/2000) “Military Coercion and Peaceful Offence: Beijing’s Strategy of
National Reunification with Taiwan,” Pacific Affairs, 72: 495-512.
Zhao, Suisheng (1999) “Economic Interdependence and Political Divergence: A Background
Analysis of the Taiwan Strait Crisis,” in Suisheng Zhao (ed.) Across the Taiwan Strait:
Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995-1996 Crisis, ed. (New York & London: Routledge:
21-40.
Zhao, Suisheng (1999) Making Sense of Relations across the Taiwan Strait: The Crisis of
1995-1997, New York & London: Routledge.
34