Chapter VI
ATTITUDES OP INDIA AND BRITAIN TO MILITARY
ALLIANCES : NATO, SEATO, AND CENTO
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
In 1948, Western Europe encountered economic and political
crises. While the attempt to solve the economic crisis led to the
formation of the Organization for European Economic Co-operation
A
(OEEC),
*
similar attempt to face the political crisis culminated
in the establishment of the NATO. The political crisis emanated
from the fear that Communism would spread over the whole of Europe
by methods of force and not by persuasion. Based on the experience
of the Western countries about the correlation of forces after the
termination of the Second World War, the theory of rebuilding 'an
o
area of security in the vacuum left by the War' was developed.
Considering Soviet menace real enough to call for immediate res­
ponse, the original purpose of the Atlantic Alliance was 'to
fend off the dangers of a Soviet thrust westward to the English
channel*.^ Thus, the NATO was created as the primary instrument
of Western security.
Support of the NATO has been a characteristic feature of
Government and Opposition policies in Britain. While moving the
Motion for the approval of the North Atlantic Treaty by the Bri­
tish Parliament, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin stated at length
the reasons that impelled Britain to join the Alliance.
2l
Britain
experienced frustrations and disappointments due to the frequent
exercise of the veto by the Soviet Union at the UN Security Coun­
cil. Bevin explained that the UN machinery proved powerless to
prevent the eastern European countries from ’being made absolute­
ly subservient to Soviet Russia*. Thus, to counter the Soviet
'policy of promoting unsettlement all around*, Britain and other
- 93 like-minded nations were driven to get together in the NATO, *not
for the purpose of attack, but in sheer self-defence*. They deri­
ved the 'greatest encouragement' from the Marshall Aid offer and
American support for the provisions of the Brussels Treaty. This
spirit of co-operation found expression in a wider combination,
i.e«, the Atlantic Fact. Answering the criticism that the Atlan­
tic Fact was an aggressive thing, Bevin held that 'the absence of
the Atlantic Fact did not stop war in 19i4 or 1939* and I suggest
that if a pact like this had existed and the potential aggressor
had known what he would have to face, those wars might have been
avoided* . Further, he said that the Atlantic Fact had been
designed to make 'the whole of the Western world stronger and wi­
lling to contribute effectively to a basis for total world peace
and stability*. Finally, Bevin protested that the Fact was fully
in conformity with the W ,
and that it did not abandon the idea
of one world security system. Be even suggested that the Atlantic
Fact was not in any way incompatible with the war-time AngloSoviet Alliance and added that if both the Alliances could be
operated correctly, there was hope about a state of universal
peace.^ The Opposition gave their*cordial welcome' to the Fact
g
and the Motion was carried with near unanimity.
Indeed, Britain's
relations with the NATO were not the result of any party decisions:
iSbese were cultivated with the general assent of the British nation
as a whole.
The North Atlantic Treaty presented 'the first occasion of a
formal, end, in its commitments, highly specific multilateral ins­
trument
tm
of mutual defebce and military aid concluded in peace­
time between, among the signatories, two Member* of the British
Commonwealth of Nations*,? i.e., Britain and Canada. The Common­
wealth as such has not been a party to the NATO in its collective
capacity* Tet, in the first flush of enthusiasm for the Atlantic
Alliance which, however, did not abate in the subsequent period,
Anthony Eden, claimed that the Atlantic Fact 1brings together, for
the first time, in conditions of peace and in close practical
association, the United States, the British Commonwealth and Western Europe'*
While one could readily agree that British foreign
policy is based on the unity of Britain with the Commonwealth,
with the United States and with Western Europe - the Three Cir­
cles after Winston Churchill, or the Three Unities^ after Anthony
Eden - it is highly misleading to drag the Commonwealth as such
to any concept of 'close practical association' with the NATO. In
any case, th&s has not been the position of the non-aligned Mem­
bers of the Commonwealth*
In his capacity as Britain's Foreign Secretary, Eden,however,
reaffirmed the official position in more exact terms* Thus, he
declared in the British Parliament * 'Her Majesty's Government
regard the Atlantic Alliance as fundamental to their policy.They
can conceive of no circumstances in which they would wish to
modify this policy or to denounce this Treaty. They regard NATO
as of indefinite duration and are confident that it will develop
as an enduring association for common action between member
States' *10 The same emphasis on the NATO as a highly integrated
collective defence system was laid by Britain throughout the
period of our survey*
■ li
NATO members regard it as 'an inter-allied, not an inter' '
A O
national, institution'.
Moreover, they considered it as a
community of nations with essentially the same background,aims,
outlook
ethical standards* However, *any%wfeh cJLaim was
weaker after the addition for military reasons of an outlying
wing in Greece and Turkey'
Nehru* s comments in this regard
95
are very apposite* Speaking in the Lok Sabha, he observed * 1In
the first plane it developed geographically. Supposed to be the
North Atlantic Community, it spread to the Mediterranean,to the
coasts of Africa, to Eastern Africa end to distant countries
which had nothing to do with the Atlantic community1
Thus,
India had reasond to be interested in the NASO and its doings,
even apart from her natural interest in an institution which was
regarded b y the Commonwealth senior as fundamental to its policy.
The Indian reaction to the NATO was a mixture of recognition
of the legitimate right of countries to have measures of selfdefence and expression of concern for the fate of colonial peo­
ples, should the concerned colonial Powers try to use the NATO
•shield* to protect their colonial establishments* India was too
far removed from the Atlantic Treaty area to be directly affected
by it* Neither did the Commonwealth connection connect her in any
way with the NATO, as Nehru stated in the Indian Parliament.^ In
a foreign policy speech in June 1952, Nehru stated : 'What other
countries do for their defence is not ay concern.As a Government,
we do not come into the picture; nor can we object to anything
that they do* •
Further, he stated in 1954- that when the NATO
was first formed, *it was a defence organization of certain coun­
tries associated in Joint defence. I must say that at that time
it seemed to me nothing but a Justifiable reaction for certain
countries who are afraid of certain developments to Join together
in defence*
All this shows that up to a certain point, India
was singularly understanding of the raison d* etre of NATO*
But India felt disturbed by the colonial aspects of NATO
when it tended to proceed beyond the bounds of the Atlantic
community. Prime Minister Nehru gave categorical expression to
India’s views on the issue on a number of occasions* If Britain
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96
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regarded the NATO as fundamental to her policy, fundamental were
the objections of India to the colonial aspects of the NATO.Nehru
said that starting as a pact for defence against aggression, the
RATO 'has apparently widened its scope and taken upon itself the
defence of the colonial possessions of the nations ooncemed.That,
so far as we are concerned, is a very serious matter' .
If NATO
acted as the 'defender and protector of colonialism1, all those
interested in ending colonialism would naturally 'react stringly
against it'
$ defence against aggression was a legitimate thing,
but that certainly did not entitle the colonial Bowers to keep
down and suppress the freedom of colonial territories. Further,
he declared that the SATO Powers would have utterly misunder­
stood the temper of the people of Asia and Africa, if, 'going
against the obvious lessons of history*, they attempted to act
as a repressing f o r c e I n another statement, Nehru said that
he did not understand how the maintenance and continuation of the
authority of the concerned colonial Powers over their dependent
territories could be a matter of defence of the North Atlantic
community.^0
India's sharp reaction to the colonial aspects of the NATO
produced evidently some effect on the Western Powers, for it was
made 'fairly clear by responsible people that the RATO alliance
has little relevance to this question*
Tet, the fact remained
that subjects like Goa and other colonial questions could be
brought up for discussion at the NATO level. Troc To that extent,
opposition to the least manifestation of the NATO revealing
its colonial teeth was firm and resolute.
Thus, India's stand has been that the NATO must not be used
for the protection of colonialism* ate felt concern about another
aspect of the matter. There was a suggestion in I960 that nuclear
- 97 t
weapons should be distributed to all the NATO countries. India
opposed any such move, as this would increase international tenslons.
22
In the context of a NATO council meeting in 1957,Nehru
said that India opposed military alliances because these led to
the formation of counter-alliances , thereby causing an aggrava­
tion of world tensions. ^
SouftfrHSftff* Agj* ftreafry Organ!.patfoifl
The idea of forming a bloc of nations in the Asian region
had been nursed by the NBA. long before 1954. The path was cleared
by the conclusion of a series of bilateral military arrangements
by the United States with certain Asian countries, and with Aus­
tralia and New Zealand. Thus, in August 1951, the IJB-Philippnea
Defence Treaty was signed and a similar treaty was signed with
Japan in the same year. Then came the AHZUB pact, a Security
Treaty signed by Australia, New Zealand, and the United States.
It was an important preparatory step for the formation of the
SEATO bloc. All these treaties entered into force in 1952. Fina­
lly, the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement was signed between
the USA and Pakistan on 19 May 1954.2*
After the fall of Dien M e n Fhu, American poliojr was direc­
ted toward saving as much of the Indo-China wreckage as possible
in order to prevent the whole region from falling under Commu­
nist control
John Foster Dulles was very much interested in
erecting a south-east A sian defence organisation well ahead of
the conclusion of the Geneva Conference on Indo—China. British
moderation postponed the issue for some time. But after the
Geneva Settlement on Indo-China, hurried negotiations were held
on American initiative for the formation of a treaty organisation.
The result was the Manila Conference of September 1954 which es­
tablished the South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty Organ!-
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98
-
.
satlon, i.e., the SEATO.26
Although it was British policy to delay the formation of a
treaty organisation till a settlement was reached at Geneva on
the Indo-China imbroglio, certain steps were, however, taken by
the British Government to proceed with the matter. Thus, on 25
June 1954, Anthony Eden announced that, 'in view of the need
for preparatory work to start at once, the existing Five-Power
staff agency of Britain, Australia, France, Hew Zealand and the
United States had, on the proposal of the British Government:,
already begum a military study of the various situations which
might arise in South-East A s i a * A f t e r the Geneva Settlement,
the British Government felt free to announce an 14- August that
they 'have agreed with other like-minded Governments, that the
situation in South-East Asia calls for the establishment of a
collective security arrangement in accordance with the purposes
and principles of the Charter of the Bolted nations to streng­
then the fabric of peace in the general area of South-East Asia
and the South-West Pacific* »2® Agreement with 'like-minded*
Governments in effect meant agreement with the American response
to the Geneva Settlement, a response of relying more on military
alliances rather than on negotiated agreements of all the parties
concerned.
About the effects of the SEATO Treaty2^
Walter Llppmann
wrote as follows * 'Our latest treaty which was signed in Manila
last week is not Just one more in the series of collective pacts.
.... It is the first formal instrument in m o d e m times which is
designed to license international intervention in internal
affairs' .5°
The British position in regard to SEATO was explained at
length by Foreign. Secretary Eden. On 8 Hovember 1954- he intro-
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99
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duced into the House of Commons a motion ( to which the Commons
agreed without a division) approving *the policy of Her Majesty* s
Government in South-East Asia as expressed in the Agreements
reached at Geneva and in the Manila treaty*
?}
As Eden explained,
the British Government had envisaged a dual arrangement to gua­
rantee the Geneva settlements - a reciprocal international gua­
rantee that would cover the settlement itself, and then a SouthEast Asia collective defence treaty to balance the existing SinoSoviet Treaty and the close friendship existing between the Viet
Minh, China and the Soviet ttnion* ^he reciprocal guarantee of the
British conception ruled out any 'collective* guarantee as insis­
ted by the Slno-Soviet-Viet Minh delegations at Geneva, because
Britain believed that the latter type of guarantee would intro­
duce the principle of veto* Therefore, SEATO came as a 'collect­
ive safeguard against any act of aggression in South-East Asia
or in the South-West Pacific*. Thus, in a somewhat fantastic rig­
marole, Eden sought to justify 'collective safeguard* of the
SEATO variety as against the 'collective guarantee* advocated by
the other side at Geneva* Be that at it might be, he insisted
that the Manila Treaty was purely defensives it was 'essentially
a regional instrument
to give effect to our existing obliga­
tions as members of the United nations' • Eden would have liked
to see 'more Asian S t a t e s ^ join us at the outset in this essen­
tial and pacific task'. He expressed the hope that as they stu­
died the Treaty terms and witnessed them in practice, some Asian
States might change their minds* The British Government was re­
solved to make it a real and not a paper treaty, or just a state­
ment of aAmisable principles* Eden was happy to express the hope
that when the Treaty entered into force, ^ it would mark the
beginning of a period of real co-operation between the parties to
-
100
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it.
While surveying the provisions of the Treaty, Eden acknow­
ledged that much was borrowed 'from the actual NATO language for
this agreement *. The British Government was absolutely convinced
that for the Manila Treaty to be successful, 'it has to do two
things * it has to give the assurance of military security, and
the positive encouragement of economic help*.
Though the Labour Opposition of the day did not divide the
House at the end of the SEATO debate, some Members did criticize
the pact from various standpoints. Thus, Harold Davies held that
the tragedy of the pact was that lit undermined the good work at
Geneva and the ’good work for unity which is going on in India*.
Characterising the pact as *dangerous *
*humbug*, he eeld
:
'It only includes a few nations which are satellites of the Wes­
tern Powers. I am using the word *satellite* purposely, because
this is the kind of propaganda going on at the present time -if
a Power is the friend of Russia, it is a satellite, but if it is
a friend of America it is an ally. Is not it a farce
Ken­
neth Younger said that there could be nothing more short-sighted
than a policy in South-East Asia of building up military allian­
ces like the Manila pact, un-buttressed by widespread support in
the region, while starving schemes which could build up the eco­
nomic and political defences of the area. Further, he said he
did not believe that *anyone in South-East Asia sleeps very
much easier in his bed as a result of the treaty signed at Manila*.”
However, discarding Eden's mild approach to the question of
non—participation by the concerned Aslan countries in the SEATO,
a Labour Member tended to introduce an element of persona l con­
troversy, obviously piqued Sqc at India's role and the position
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101
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of her Prime Minister Nehru* 33ms, George Brown ridiculed the
idea of peaceful co-existence and decried the *great tendency' of
the day to quote Nehru 'as though he were the absolute answer to
•* *
•
*
every single problem* I must say that I have not all that faith
in Mr Nehru, although he is a very considerable man who, fortu­
nately perhaps, is in the position he occupies at the moment*.^6
It appeared that SEA2E0 produced enough enthusiasm for certain
people to ignore the larger scheme of things.
India's reactions to the SEAIO were not sudden or surprising.
3?hey flowed from the country's policy of avoiding tensions and
promoting areas of agreement* At the nan-official level, impor­
tant sections of the Press wholly disapproved of any defence com­
bination of the type suggested when the Geneva deliberations were
still on* They laid emphasis on peaceful^co-existence of the vari­
ous nations of the world on the basis of non-interference in each
other's internal affairs*-^ After the Geneva settlement was
reached, they expressed themselves categorically against any sepa­
rate arrangement under the garb of a defence organisation* ^ T h a y
expressed the apprehension that the projected defence organisation
might not turn out to be defensive in practice and that it might
be used for offensive purposes
such a development could only
heighten tension in Asia and, in the ultimate analysis, make
Am
i
fight Asians.
40
Prime Minister Nehru made a comprehensive speech in the Lok
4-1
Sabha on 29 September 195^ cm India's attitude to the SEATO. Be
said that India refused to participate in the Manila Conference
because participation would have meant abandonment of India's
basic policy of non-alignment and, secondly, such participation
would obviously have affected her position as Chairman of the
three International Commissions in Indo—China* At a time when
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102
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peace had returned to the region after the Geneva settlement and
when no one threatened the peace of South-East Asia or the Paci­
fic, India dis not understand why the particular time was chosen
to erect the SEATO. In India’s view the Manila Treaty did not
add to the strength of the parties to the Treaty. Thus, he said :
'Positively, therefore, it has little contribution to make, nega­
tively, it has definitely added to the tensions and fears of the
situation'. Referring to the SEATO 'treaty area', Nehru said that
the way the actual treaty area could be extended by mere declara­
tion was 'a dangerous extension of the idea of defence'. India
did not want to challenge the desire of certain c o u ' ries to have
a measure of security, neither did she want to question their
motives. But it was her considered view that they have set about
it in the wrong way. Nehru declared that the approach of the
Treaty was wrong and might antagonize a great part of Asia.SEATO
was inclined dangerously 'in the direction of spheres of influent
ence to be exercised by powerful countries. After all, it is the
big and powerful countries that will decide matters and not the
two or three weak and small Aslan countries that may be allied
to them'.
Making a pointed reference to Article 4(2) of the treaty,
Nehru said that it meant 'that any internal development in that
area might also entitle these countries to intervene *• This
militated against the whole conception of integrity, sovereign­
ty and independence of the countries of the area under refer­
ence. Judged in this context, the SEATO approach was dangerous
from the point of view of any Asian country.
India was unalterably opposed to the SEATO for another vi­
tal reason. It conflicted with her policy of extending the area
of peace. As Nehru put it : *We have thought that one of the
105 major areas of peace might be Sotrfch^East Asia. The Manila Treaty
rather comes in the way of that area of peace* It takes up that
very area which might be an area of peace and converts it almost
into an area of potential war1 •
Finally, Nehru forcefully disapproved of the tendency on the
part of interested Powers to make vital decisions about Asia dis­
regarding the views of the vital part of that very area. He said
that one of the biggest factors for ensuring secirity in SouthEast Asia and the Par East was the recognition of People's China
and her entry into the UN. That would provide 'far greater assu­
rance of security ... than through this South-East Asia Treaty
Organization and the rest'•
The Manila Conference also approved a Pacific Charter
4-2
proclaiming the desire of the parties to the SEATO Treaty to
encourage the development of self-government in colonial terri­
tories. India's view was that all the fine phrases about the UN
Charter in the Manila documents carried little sense in view of
the wholly dangerous approach of the Treaty. The Indian attitude
to the SEATO was in full conformity with its policy in regard to
the Geneva settlement on Indo—China. The evident Indo—British
harmony existing at the time of the Geneva settlement came to be
marred considerably as a result of British membership of the
SEATO.
Anthony Eden expressed the hope that in course of time
more Asian countries might join the SEATO. In fact, none did so.
Supposed to be an Asian pact«, it was essentially a western
arrangement of whose eight members only three were Asians all of
whom were aligned to the Western Powers. Eden's prescription of
the two tasks for the success of SEATO - assurance of military
security and encouragement of economic development - never
reached the stage of maturity in vfcew of the unrepresentative
character of the organisation,**^ As against the more useful cha­
nnel of the Colombo Plan, SEATO was a poor channel for the dis­
tribution of any economic aid. Considered in this light,Britain
might have utilised the expenses***1" she incurred on the SEATO in
a more useful direction.
Prom the standpoint of India, SEATO succeeded in bringing
thi cold war to Asia in a virulent form* At the time of the Ma­
nila Conference, Pakistan was reportedly of the view that the
pact 'covered aggression by India
against Pakistan'.**^
As if to confirm India's worst apprehensions, the Karachi
meeting
of the SEATO Council discussed the Kashmir question
and the communique expressed the need for an early settlement
of the issue through the DOS on the basis of UN resolutions or by
direct negotiations. Apparently the reference was unexception­
able, But it was clear that SEATO was being used to support the
national claims of particular member States, Prime Minister
Nehru sharply reacted to this SEATO communique,^ Be said that
the reference to gAshmir could only mean that a military alliance
was backing Pakistan in its disputes with India and that it was
an *impropriety*. India regretted that three other Commonwealth
countries (l»e,, the IS!, Australia and New Zealand) had associa­
ted themselves with the 'offending declaration'. Further, Nehru
said that India communicated its protest to all countries con­
cerned at the 'unusual procedure* adopted by the SEATO Council.
When the matter was raised in the House of Commons, the official
reply **8 was that the British Government 'have neither the power
nor the desire to prevent any delegation from raising any matter
which may seem to them relevant* • However, it was stated that
Foreign Secretary Selwyn ULoyd*1^ maintained that the SEATO was
105
*an unsuitable forum for discussing the merits of the Kashmir dis­
putes and there was in fact no discussion of them during the meet­
ing* . Further, the House was told that in affirming with other
SEATO countries the need for an m i y early settlement of the
matter, Britain was only restating the attitude which she had con­
sistently taken at the OH, Whatever might be said about the some­
what evasive reply concerning the British stand on a matter which
roused strong feelings in India, it is only faifc to add that the
affair did not improve Indo—British understanding.
Throughout the period under survey, India and Britain conti­
nued to maintain their respective attitudes to SEATO. As late as
1959* a British Government spokesman claimed that *SEAT0 has been
one of the
props which have maintained the Geneva settlement,
because it gives a general sense of stability to the whole area*f°
At the non-official level, however, there appeared to be a good
deal of appreciation of the Indian position among certain sections
of the British public.-*1
The Baghdad Fact (CEICTO)
After the creation of the SEATO, vigorous efforts were made
by the Western countries to form a complementary organisation in
the Middle East which would maintain links through Pakistan with
SEATO and through Turkey with NATO. Thus, accustomed to thinking
in terms of defence strategy for this or that area, the Western
statesmen sought to being the Middle East *into the compass of
. 52
global strategy*.-'
As far as Britain was concerned, the Suez Canal area had
been the traditional strategic centre of her defence system in
the raddle East. But a hiatus had appeared between British inter­
ests in the area and post-war Egyptian nationalism. Thus,Britain
was obliged to evacuate the Suez Canal zone under the agreement
53
- 106 readied with Egypt on
19 October
1954. Although the agreement
gave Britain certain defence facilities of a purely temporary
character in the event of an armed attack by an outside power on
any country in the region, Egypt as such refused to be drawn into
any defensive organisation of the Western concept. It was in this
background that the Turkisb-Iraqi treaty of alliance5**- was signed
in Baghdad on 24 February 1955« This was the Baghdad Pact.
Britain welcomed the Baghdad Pact as a ’timely Middle Eastern
initiative*.55 After the conclusion of the pact, Foreign Secretary
Anthony Eden visited Baghdad and expressed the view that the pact
would prove an important step in fortifying the security of the
Middle East and in ensuring peace. He Informed the British Par­
liament that in the context of the Baghdad Pact, the Government1s
aim was to forge new association with Iraq which would bring Iraqi-British relations into line with those which already existed
with Starkey and Britain’s other partners in the NATO.56 Accor­
dingly, the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of 1930 was replaced
by a new agreement and Britain acceded to the Baghdad Pact on 5
April 1955.5^ In the next few months, Pakistan and Persia
adhered to the Pact. Thus, the Baghdad Pact became a five-power
pact of Turkey, Iraq, the UK, Pakistan, and Persia (Iran).Though
the United States was not a signatory to the pact, it
ink
had
frequently expressed its sympathy with the aims and ideas of this
*anti—Communist organization*56 and had actively participated in
a number of committees set up under it.*"
Britain regarded the Baghdad Pact as a ’purely defensive
arrangement* • Anthony Eden expressed the view that a system had
been evolved which could serve as the foundation of a general
defence agreement in the Middle East. Further, he claimed that
the pact awe fully in accord with Article M 51 of the UN Charter^®
107 Harold Macmillan also emphasised the defensive nature of the
Baghdad Pact and he did not think that the Soviet offer of arms
to Egypt was a retort to the pact.6** Keeping in view the criti­
cism of the pact in non-aligned countries, he also said that if
such pacts were not organised, ’there would not he much hope for
the neutrals'*
India* 8 condemnation of the Baghdad Pact was sharp and un­
equivocal* In &er view, 'SEATO with teeth or Baghdad with claws'62
was a very deplorable response to the problems of the post-war
world* She was not convinced about arguments for the so-called
northern or middle tier of defence* In a major foreign policy
statement in the Lok Sabha, Hehru declared on 20 March 1936 ;
•The Baghdad Pact is partly responsible far a good deal of the
present trouble which now plagues West Asia* It has rent asunder
Arab unity and has thereby made the solution of a problem already
difficult, still more difficult and complicated'*6^
India's objections to the pact rested on the following
grounds* First, the approach of military pacts, like the SEASDO
and the Baghdad Pact, was a very dangerous and harmful approach.
!Ehe military approach of solving problems, even with the best of
motives, creates a like approach on the other side with the
result that tension dominates the atmosphere* Secondly, for rea­
sons of self-ihterest, India denounced the pact* As Nehru put it,
'SEASO and the Baghdad Pact, apart from being basically in the
wrong direction, affect us intimately. In a sense, they tend to
encircle us'*
Pakistan's membership of the pact was particular­
ly disturbing to India, because she felt that hostility to India
goaded Pakistan to join pacts encircling India. Thirdly, the
approach of the pact came in the way of disarmament and the
lessening of international tension* Fourthly, it Ignored the
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108
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rising force of Arab nationalism. The Baghdad Pact was not a
natural association. As Nehru put it, SEATO and the Baghdad Pact
were likely to ‘push the world in a wrong direction' ,69
The Indian apprehensions about the Baghdad military bloc
arose also from its interlocking character. Many in the West re­
garded the Baghdad Pact and SEATO as the two wings of a single
66
structure.
Two members of the Baghdad bloc, Britain and Turkey,
belonged to the NATO, while Britain and Pakistan, members of the
Baghdad group, also belonged to the SEATO, As Nehru said, 'The
danger is that any odd member of one of these pacts can set in
motion something which
nodal would
gradually pull in not only the
members of that pact, but some other interrelated pact of which
they are common members',6^ Against such dangerous possibilities,
India stood for zones of peace, zones which would promote the
cause of good neighbourliness and friendly co-operation,
Britain regarded the Baghdad Pact as 'yet another essential
contribution to the deterrent to aggression and to the cause
at
go
of peace'.
In accordance with this policy, she and her American
ally rendered massive aid to help strengthen, as they thought,the
Iraqi and the Baghdad Pact forces.69 In spite of all this, the
Baghdad Pact became a Baghdad-less Pact following the July revo­
lution in Iraq in 1958# No outside forces invaded Iraq from be­
yond the so-called northern tier. As the Governments, Iraqi
Government of Nurl es-Said included, merrily carried on the cold
war, the people in the Arab countries released a flood-tide of
nationalism against foreign interference. As Nehru put it, the
surprise of the Iraqi coup d* etat was not essentially that it
took place, *but the speed with which it took place and the com­
plete success which attended it'
On the very day of the change of Government in Iraq, the new
regime virtually smashed the Baghdad Pact to pieces and declared
its desire to work in accordance with the UN principles and 'to
honour all pledges and treaties in accordance with the interests
of the homeland, and to act in compliance with the Bandung Con­
ference resolutions'P ^
Nehru called foe a proper appraisal of the situation after
the Iraqi revolution* Speaking in the Rajya Sabha, he observed
once again that the militarist approach to a solution of the
world's problems was doomed to failure as it had recently failed
in B a g h d a d * ^
The Labour Opposition in Britain displayed remarkable sym­
pathy with the Indian stand* Aneurin Bevan held the view that
preoccupation with the Baghdad Pact had been one of the fctaxx
things that stbod in the way of a settlement in the Kiddle East;
Philip Ncel-Baker said that the myth that Western military pres­
tige would overawe the Arabs, and that such a policy was the
right way to deal with the Middle East had been the fundamental
rrr
error of the last few years*'7 And the Leader of the Opposition,
Hugh Gaitskell, expressing the hope that the Government would not
try once again to base their Kiddle Eastern policy on supporting
certain Arab States as against other Arab States, observed that,
'that policy, enshrined in the Baghdad Pact, has brought nothing
but harm to our reputation and that in trying to back some Arab
States against others all that we do is to turn all of them
against \m* P*^
For a time it seemed that the British Government would
revise its policy in regard to the ftlddle East* Speaking as
Foreign Secretary, Selwyn M m Lloyd said that Middle Eastern
settlements must be secured within the framework of the UN, and
that *lt is quite unrealistic to think that we could get a
-
110* -
settlement outside the United Nations'
But the Baghdad Pact
minus Baghdad did not really lead to any change In British poli­
cy* Britain still continued to maintain that the pact was ^ser­
ving a good purpose and that it had a role to play
.^6 In
line
with this policy* the surviving members of the Baghdad Pact ,with
the active assistance and co-operation of the United States, re­
named the old Baghdad Pact as the Central Treaty Organization
(CENTO) as from 19 August 1 9 5 9 * ^ CENTO only put the old wine in
a new bottle, perhaps with more alcoholic concentration.
To conclude our discussion on attitudes to military allian­
ces, it might be urged that India and Britain pursued their res­
pective policies in consonance with their basic approaches of
non-alignment and alignment* While opposing the colonialist over­
tones of the NATO, India was prepared to concede that NATO began
as a defensive organisation
4 and
as such, she understood that
a greatly-weakened Britain after the Second World War, but with
many commitments in different parts of the wofeld, sought and
tmm
found safety in holding to the American alliance and the Atlantic
alliance* However, India's opposition to the SEATO and CENTO has
been total and unqualified* This was due to her opposition to
military alliances of every hue end, more importantly, due to
her feeling of being encircled by these pacts* Distant NATO
India could afford to view askance, but she must needs oppose
SEATO and CENTO tooth and nail because, in her view* they affec­
ted India more intimately. Had Britain kept herself out of the
SEATO and CENTO, It is possible to think that such irritation
and migiindft-rerhflTvHng asflmarked the Indo-British relationship
on the score of military alliances would not have arisen in the
way it did*