Nice But Tough: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Muslim World
Nice But Tough:
A Framework for
U.S. Foreign Policy in the
Muslim World
M.A. MUQTEDAR KHAN
Assistant Professor of Political Science
Adrian College
T
he attacks on the United States on 11 September have had a significant
impact on U.S. foreign policy thinking. The government has now reoriented
its foreign policy approach, from one that was essentially geoeconomical
to one that is quintessentially geopolitical. Under President Clinton, the United
States focused primarily on advancing the so-called Washington consensus (World
Bank, IMF and the White House) on globalization and tried its best to make the
global economy a reality. Now there is a new consensus in Washington to fight
terrorism globally. Security has replaced the economy as the primary concern.
Realists are once again in the driver’s seat and liberals increasingly find themselves
forced to cheer an agenda that is reminiscent of the Cold War.
Before 11 September, the United States had a segmented policy towards
the Muslim world. The fact that Indonesia and Malaysia are predominantly
Muslim nations was irrelevant to U.S. policy in the region. Indonesia was a major
military ally and an important cog in the potential coalition against China, as
well as the guardian of trading lanes in the Far East. On the other hand, Malaysia
was important to the United States as a trading partner. But now both the Muslim
Malay nations are seen as potential havens for anti-U.S. terrorists and are
important stops on the anti-terrorism trail.
During the Cold War, Pakistan was first seen as a major ally against the
expanding Soviet Union, and has since been seen as a potential nuclear
proliferator; conflict in the region could have global ramifications. Until 11 Sep-
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tember, Pakistan’s importance to the United States was declining rapidly, but
since then, it has become the most important ally in the U.S. war against alQaeda in Afghanistan.
In the past, Washington has often perceived the Middle East, especially
Iran, as the focal point of the Muslim world. Everyone was aware that not all
Arabs are Muslims and that not all Muslims live in the Middle East, but this
awareness did not permeate policy making. Since Washington has noted the
presence of al-Qaeda in the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and other parts of
the Muslim world, policy makers realized the security implication of the global
nature of Muslim distribution.
Things have indeed changed fundamentally. For the first time, U.S. foreign
policy has a unified goal vis-à-vis the entire Muslim world. By defining the war
on terror as a war against radical and militant expressions of Islam, Washington
has taken a wide-angle view of the Muslim world from Indonesia and the
Philippines in the east, to Canada and Dearborn, Michigan in the west. U.S.
objectives are narrow and limited, concerned primarily with reducing if not
eliminating the capacity of anti-Western Islamists to hurt the United States and
Israel. This simplistic goal is driving a foreign policy makeover that has much
wider strategic and political implications for U.S. relations with Muslim nations.
The new consensus in Washington is also redefining U.S.-Israeli relations.
When Osama Bin Laden explained that one of his reasons for hating the United
States was its support for Israel, he brought all anti-Israel forces such as Hamas
and Hezbollah within the ambit of U.S. response, uniting the United States and
Israel in the war against Islamic militancy. The United States was formerly a
passive guarantor of Israeli security, limiting its support to diplomatic and
material aid. Now its commitment to Israeli security has become more active.
The United States will itself seek to destroy the enemies of Israel such as Hamas
and Hezbollah. The inclusion of Iran in the much-criticized idea of the “axis of
evil” is primarily in the interest of Israeli security. The U.S.-Israel “special
relationship” was historically regional in scope and limited to the Middle East,
but has developed into one with a global scope.
The tragedy of 11 September presents both opportunities and dangers
to the United States. A finely calibrated and thoughtful foreign policy towards
the Muslim world can have a globally transformative impact. It can not only
make the United States more secure but also prompt the Muslim world to become
more democratic, peaceful and an important member of the international
community. A rash and insensitive foreign policy will only enhance insecurity
and lead to a prolonged and bloody conflict that will undermine the global
economy and subvert global stability.
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Nice But Tough: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Muslim World
Globalization of Anti-Americanism
American officials have found the al-Qaeda network’s presence in over sixty
countries worldwide. It is indeed a multinational operation adapting and operating
in culturally, politically, and economically diverse environments. Al-Qaeda’s
success lies in its ability to find local sympathizers. This ability to find supporters
in such diverse environments is indicative of how a radical Muslim understanding
of the United States as an enemy of Islam is globalizing. Radical Islamic
grievances against the United States include:
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The United States’ uncritical support of Israeli occupation and
colonization of Palestine;
The human tragedy caused by the sanctions against Iraq;
U.S. military, moral, and even financial support to undemocratic Arab
regimes;
U.S. opposition to Islamization in Muslim societies;
Cultural Americanization of the Muslim world through globalization.
These issues are finding global resonance among Muslims regardless of
their ethnic origins or social class. It is this resonance among ordinary Muslims
everywhere that has prompted some radical elements to align with the antiAmericanism engendered and fostered by al-Qaeda and its associates.
Americans have realized that there is a unifying streak of antiAmericanism pervading Muslim societies all over the world,1 and that fighting it
will entail a global enterprise. This is a fundamentally important conceptual
outcome of the investigation of the global network of radical Islamic militancy
that was responsible for the unprecedented attacks of 11 September 2001.
This intellectual breakthrough presents Washington with a profound
opportunity to completely rethink its foreign policy, not towards East Asia,
South Asia, or the Middle East, but towards the entire Muslim world. What the
United States does and does not do in the Middle East will affect how Muslims
in Indonesia, Bangladesh, Europe, Australia, Africa, and America think of the
United States.
Muslims now enjoy a global presence. There are 1.5 billion Muslims in
the world. Nearly every fourth person in the world is a Muslim. Islam is the
fastest growing religion in North America, Europe, Australia, Asia, and Africa,
and in all these places it is either the largest or the second largest faith. This
globalization of Islam along with the emergence of global media is constructing
a global Muslim consciousness that is uniting Muslims. All over the world they
see the images of Palestinians and Iraqis suffering on television, and everyday
their anger towards the United States grows.
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Governments in much of the Muslim world are ineffective and
authoritarian. They have failed to safeguard economic as well as political rights
of their citizens. Over 60 percent of the Muslims in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan,
and parts of Africa and Indonesia live in abject poverty. The corrupt and
authoritarian regimes in these Muslim societies successfully channel Muslim
discontent towards the West, and at the United States and Israel in particular.
This is one of their major survival strategies, and many of these regimes have
become masters at diverting frustration outwards.
Islamists understand this situation. Some of them have tried to channel
Muslim resentment inwards to precipitate fundamental socio-political changes
in the Muslim nations. Syed Qutb, a firebrand ideologue of the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood, redefined the Islamic
theological concept of jahiliyyah (ignorance
A finely calibrated and of God and faith) as non-Islamic
thoughtful foreign policy governance and declared a holy war against
towards the Muslim the corrupt and inept regime in Egypt. His
book, Milestones, became very popular and
world can have a globally is still the manifesto of many Islamic
transformative impact. movements in the Arab world and
elsewhere, but it has failed to galvanize the
masses in sufficient numbers to overthrow the Egyptian state. Some Islamists
believe that if Egypt did not receive nearly two billion dollars in foreign aid
from the United States every year, the authoritarian state mechanism would
collapse, allowing a popular revolution. For them the United States is the barrier
to freedom. Regardless, Islamists have failed to achieve the change they desire
and discontent in the Muslim world festers.2
Many Muslims are not convinced that the United States is waging a war
on terror and not against Islam. Sloppy discursive errors, such as the use of the
word crusade by President Bush, and the U.S. insistence on expanding the military
war to include Iraq and Iran regardless of their involvement in the 11 September
attacks, cement these perceptions and undermine the United States’ diplomatic
and communicative initiatives.
The New Paradigm in Washington
During the Clinton administration, a conscious decision was made not to have
a policy towards Islam or political Islam. The state department recognized the
diversity within Muslim nations and also within Islamic movements and
concluded that any attempts to have a common policy towards the entire Islamic
world would be counterproductive.3 While Islamic states like Iran and Sudan
were opposed to U.S. interests, countries like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan shared
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Nice But Tough: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Muslim World
a wide range of objectives with the United States. Some Islamic movements
such as the Hizbul Tahreer from Jordan and Palestine, were opposed to
democracy, while others such as An-Nahda of Tunisia strongly favor it. The
administration did not find a common thread that linked all the Islamic
movements and Muslim nations and wisely decided to abstain from an umbrella
policy towards them.
But things are different now. Anti-Americanism fostered and nurtured
by the strange alliance between the inequities of U.S. foreign policy and the
rhetoric of radical Islam are uniting the Muslim world. The objective to fight
anti-American sentiments and prevent them from translating into political violence
now provides the justification for a unified U.S. foreign policy towards the Muslim
world. Yet this policy gives rise to a strong feeling among many Muslims that
the United States is against them.
The present goals identified by the Bush administration are narrowly
focused and may prove to be more detrimental than beneficial to U.S interests
and security. In the aftermath of 11 September, the Bush administration has
adopted, or is at least advocating, a policy of preemptive counterterrorism.
President Bush has identified the following objectives as the main foci of his
foreign policy:
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Eliminating the terror network and all its affiliates wherever they are.
This involves extensive intelligence gathering and covert and overt
military, as well as police operations for eliminating and apprehending
terrorist assets.
Undermining the capacity of the “axis of evil”—Iran, Iraq, and North
Korea—to use weapons of mass destruction against the United States.
The most important goal under this objective is a change of regime in
Iraq.
Preventing the growth and influence of radical Islamists, particularly
from the oil rich nations in the Gulf and Muslim diasporas in the West.
While the administration has made these goals its priority and stated
unequivocally that they will be pursued with or without international support, it
has not made clear whether its interests in the Middle East remain unchanged.
This is an important issue since much of the resentment against the United
States in the Muslim world stems from U.S. policies in the Middle East. In this
region, the traditional U.S. interests have included stability, support of Israel
and the Middle East peace process, support of moderate (pro-Western) regimes,
unfettered access to oil at a reasonable price, and containment of Iran, Iraq,
Syria, Libya, and Sudan.
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While the new policy focuses on Iran and Iraq, it is also clear that Syria,
Sudan, and Libya are not policy priorities. However, the administration is silent
on two other crucial issues: U.S. support for Israel and U.S. support for the socalled moderate regimes. The United States has also remained conspicuously
silent on its future relations with Saudi Arabia, which is increasingly implicated
in the 11 September attacks.
In the early stages of the war against Afghanistan, President Bush
announced his desire to see a Palestinian state, but he has since said and done
nothing to realize this goal. In the Muslim world, his continued silence and
refusal to restrain Israel is seen as tacit support for Ariel Sharon’s efforts to
break the Palestinian resolve and destroy Chairman Arafat’s capacity to govern
the occupied territories.
In the early days of the war against Afghanistan, the Bush administration
also took great pains to win the Muslim world’s support for its war on terror.
The declaration supporting the Palestinian state, and constant statements
explaining that the war was not aimed at ordinary Muslims, helped build a
coalition that included many Muslim nations, including partial support and
cooperation from Iran. But the victory in Afghanistan has changed the mood in
Washington. The arrogance and swagger is back, and irresponsible and rash
statements such as the declaration of intent against the “axis of evil” are
becoming more and more common.
This new belligerence from Washington has already alienated moderate
pro-Western states like Turkey and Saudi Arabia who are opposed to attacks
against Iraq. Even Russia and Europe are opposed to these new policies of the
Bush administration.
Conclusion
11 September was a watershed event in U.S. relations with the Muslim world.
Washington must realize that it cannot continue to do business as usual. Some
analysts are suggesting that the United States has only two options, either to
exit the Middle East or get tougher.4 No one expects the United States to withdraw
from the Middle East; it has too many interests in the region and any withdrawal
would undermine its global prestige and invite others to use terrorism as a means
to advance their interests. This leaves only one option—get tougher.
This path would be a serious mistake. Rather than addressing the
conditions that engender anti-Americanism and terrorism, simplistic military
solutions will only aggravate the situation. Washington must adopt a
multidimensional strategy that will foster a peaceful and cooperative relationship
that recognizes and promotes mutual respect and cultural understanding. I would
like to recommend the following principles as a framework for a new relationship.
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In the short term, Washington should reserve the right to use force against
specific terrorist groups in any Muslim country that attacks or intends to attack
the United States, its citizens, or its interests. Muslim nations must take actions
against such groups to eliminate their capabilities, or they must allow the United
States to take actions against such groups inside their territory. In exchange for
this cooperation, the United States will agree to share intelligence and provide
sufficient evidence of imminent threats to Muslim countries. Needless to say,
this principle will not accommodate silly rhetoric such as the “axis of evil” or
attempts to implicate groups or states the United States does not like. The key
to this principle is credible intelligence.
In the long term, promotion of democracy, political self-determination,
and human rights should be the overarching goal for U.S. cooperation with the
Muslim world. Washington should not support authoritarian regimes that
undermine democracy and systematically violate the human rights of their own
citizens.
In addition, Washington should promote a program for cross-cultural
understanding. Western allies should not only be asked to participate in this
global program, but also to share the financial burden of the project. American
and European Muslims can become a very important bridge between the two
worlds and their involvement should be actively sought. The goal here is to
arrest the growing anti-Americanism in the Muslim world and reduce the prejudice
and hostility towards Islam in the United States.
Along with oil rich Arab states, Japan, and the European Union, the
United States should put together a social aid package that will promote
education, respect for women’s rights, understanding of the principles of
democracy, and help build institutions that will integrate local and global
knowledge. This comprehensive package will enable underdeveloped Muslim
societies to embark upon sustainable development programs.
The United States should work to resolve regional disputes such as
Kashmir, Palestine and Chechnya that encourage militancy, war, and terrorism.
While the United States cannot impose peace, it must foster conditions that
make peace possible.
Even as I make these proposals, I recognize that they may sound like a
naïve wish list of a die-hard Muslim liberal. So be it. Unless we work towards
building a relationship that is premised on mutual respect, and understanding
and accommodating interests, we will be condemned to wage war. Above all,
the events of 11 September have shown that the United States can be hurt in an
era when it is the sole, dominant, and undisputed superpower. We live in an
increasingly interdependent world, and in this world our insecurities are also
interdependent. Unless others feel safe, we will not be safe. If we wish to
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safeguard our security, we must work with others to make them safer. In their
security is our security. This is the only solution to the security dilemma.
The basic idea here is to advocate a policy that can be summarized as
“nice but tough.” In an interesting computer game theoretical experiment, Robert
Axelrod (in Evolution of Cooperation), demonstrated that in the long run,
international actors whose first move was nice and subsequent ones tough
(employing a tit-for-tat strategy), were the most likely to escape the security
dilemma.5 The policy of “nice but tough” that I am recommending, not only
makes rational sense, but will also stand up to systematic scientific inquiry.
I also recognize that changes in Washington alone will not be enough to
transform the fundamental character of the relationship between the United
States and the Muslim world. But the framework I recommend will certainly
reduce anti-Americanism and will also enhance U.S. security and its image in
the eyes of Muslims everywhere. WA
Notes
1. Fareed Zakaria, “Politics of Rage: Why do they Hate Us?,” Newsweek, 15 October 2001; M. A.
Muqtedar Khan, “Understanding the Roots of Muslim Resentment,” Canadian Dimensions, 35,
6, November/December 2001: 25-26; Peter Ford, “Why do they hate us?”, Christian Science Monitor,
27 September 2001.
2. See Khalid Bin Sayeed, Western Dominance and Political Islam (Albany, NY: State University
of New York Press, 1995). Also see M. A. Muqtedar Khan, “The Political Philosophy of Islamic
Resurgence,” Cultural Dynamics, 13, 2, July 2001: 211-230.
3. See M. A. Muqtedar Khan, “U.S. Foreign Policy and Political Islam: Interests, Ideas and
Ideology,” Security Dialogue, 29, 4, December 1998: 449-462. Also see John Esposito, “Political
Islam and American Foreign Policy,” Brown Journal of World Affairs, 1, 1 (Winter 1993-94): 6382.
4. Bernard Lewis, “Did You Say ‘American Imperialism?’” National Review, 53, 24, (17 December
2001): 26-30.
5. Robert Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984).
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