Risk and Insurance Vani Borooah University of Ulster Gambles An action with more than one possible outcome, such that with each outcome there is an associated probability of that outcome occurring. If the outcomes are good (G) and bad (B), denote the associated probabilities by pG and pB Payoffs and Utilities With each outcome is associated a “payoff” which can be expressed in terms of money: $cG and $cB With each payoff is associated a “utility”, u(c): u(cG) is the utility in the good situation u(cB) is the utility in the bad situation. We assume that utility increases with payoff Note: a payoff is different from the utility from the payoff Expected Return and Utility • Expected Return: The expected return from the gamble is: ER=pGcG+pBcB • Expected Utility: The expected utility from the gamble is: EU=pGu(cG)+pBu(cB) Note: The return expected from a gamble is different from the utility expected from the gamble Facing a Gamble You are faced with a gamble: If you accept the gamble you will, in exchange for $W (the amount “staked”), receive CG with probability pG and CB with probability pB If you reject the gamble you will keep your $W You have to decide whether or not to accept the gamble? Expected Utility Rule • If you accept the gamble, your expected utility is EU=pGu(cG)+pBu(cB) • If you reject the gamble, your (certain) utility is u(W) • The expected utility rule requires you to compare EU and u(W) and: accept if EU>u(W) reject if EU<u(W) indifferent if EU=u(W) Certainty Equivalent • How much should the stake be to make you indifferent between accepting and rejecting the gamble? • Or what value of W will equate: U(W) = EU=pGu(cG)+pBu(cB) • Suppose W* solves the above equation • Then W* is known as the certainty equivalent of the gamble • it expresses the worth of the gamble: $W* Choice Using Certainty Equivalent If the certainty equivalent is W* and W is the stake, you will: 1. Accept the gamble if W < W* 2. Reject the gamble if W > W* 3. Indifferent to the gamble if W = W* Risk Premium • The risk premium associated with a gamble is the maximum amount a person is prepared to pay to avoid the gamble RP = ER - CE An Example Suppose you have to pay $2 to enter a competition. The prize is $19 and the probability of winning is 1/3. You have a utility function u(x)=log x and your current wealth is $10. What is the certainty equivalent of this competition? What is the risk premium? Should you enter the competition? Answer:I 1 2 EU log(10 2 19) log(10 2) 3 3 1 2 log(27) log(8) 3 3 1/ 3 2/3 log(27 ) log(8 ) log(3) log(4) log(12) CE 12 The gamble is worth $12 to him. But, if he rejects the gamble, he has only $10. So, he will accept the gamble. Answer:II The expected wealth from the lottery is: 1 2 ER (10 2 19) (10 2) 3 3 1 2 1 27 8 14 3 3 3 1 1 So, RP 14 12 2 3 3 Attitudes to Risk • Intuitively, whether someone accepts a gamble or not depends on his attitude to risk • Again intuitively, we would accept “adventurous” persons to accept gambles that more “cautious” persons would reject • To make these concepts more precise we define three broad attitudes to risk Three Attitudes to Risk • • • • The Risk Averse Person The Risk Neutral Person The Risk Loving Person To define these attitudes, we use the concept of a fair gamble • In essence, a fair gamble allows you receive the same amount of money through two distinct ways: • Gambling or not gambling A Fair Gamble • A fair gamble is one in which the sum that is bet (W) is equal to the expected return: W = ER = pGcG+pBcB • You are offered a gamble in which you bet W=$500 and receive: • $250 with pB = 0.5 or $750 with pG= 0.5 • ER=$500=W: fair gamble An Unfair Gamble • An unfair gamble is one in which the sum that is bet (W) is different (usually less) from the expected return: W < ER = pGcG+pBcB • You are offered a gamble in which you bet W=$500 and receive: • $250 with pB = 0.6 or $750 with pG= 0.4 • ER=$450<W: unfair gamble Attitudes to Risk and Fair Gambles • A risk averse person will never accept a fair gamble • A risk loving person will always accept a fair gamble • A risk neutral person will be indifferent towards a fair gamble What Does This Mean? • Given the choice between earning the same amount of money through a gamble or through certainty The risk averse person will opt for certainty The risk loving person will opt for the gamble The risk neutral person will be indifferent Diminishing Marginal Utility • Why does the risk averse person reject the fair gamble? • Answer: because her marginal utility of money diminishes Example • Your wealth is $10. I toss a coin and offer you $1 if it is heads and take $1 from you if it is tails • This is a fair gamble: 0.511+0.59=10, but you reject it • Because, your gain in utility from another $1 is less than your loss in utility from losing $1 • Your MU diminishes, you are risk averse • Conversely, if you are risk averse, your MU diminishes A risk averse person / with diminishing MU / with a concave utility function will reject a fair gamble u(c) u(750) u(500) EU u(250) 250 400 500 750 c The certainty equivalent of the gamble is $400; the risk premium is $100 A risk neutral person / with constant MU / with a linear utility function will be indifferent between accepting/rejecting a fair gamble u(c) u(750) u(500) =EU u(250) 250 400 500 750 c The certainty equivalent of the gamble is $500; the risk premium is $0 A risk loving person / with increasing MU / with a convex utility function will accept a fair gamble u(c) u(250) u(750) EU u(500) 250 500 600 750 c The certainty equivalent of the gamble is $600; the risk premium is -$100 Contingent Commodities • With contingent commodities, the nature of the commodity depends upon the contingency: A house before a storm is a different good after a storm A car before an accident is a different good after an accident A holiday in sunshine is a different good from a holiday during which it rains Trade in Contingent Markets • The risk of a gamble is the difference between the payoff in the good state (CG) and that in the bad state (CB): Risk = CGCB • When we buy insurance we try to reduce risk by trading between two contingent states: “good” and “bad” • We do this by buying wealth in the bad state and paying for it from wealth in the good state • The rate at which we can make this exchange depends on the premium $ (per $ of insurance bought) charged by the insurance company • $(1-) of additional CB can be bought by giving up $ of CG • So $1 of additional CB can be bought by giving up (/1-) of CG The Insurance Budget Line Z is amount of insurance CG = CG- Z < CG CB =CB- Z + Z =CB + (1-)Z > CB The slope of the budget line is -/(1-): as insurance gets cheaper, the BL becomes flatter CG No Insurance point: Z=0 CG 450 line: CG = CB or full insurance CB CB The Contingent Consumption Indifference Curves On each curve, different combinations of CG and CB give the same level of Expected Utility: pGU(CG) + pBU(CB) CG Higher EU on black curve than on red CB Equilibrium in the Insurance Market Given the terms offered by the insurance company, consumer maximises EU at point A CG X: no insurance point A: equilibrium point CG CG* Z = CB*-CB is amount of insurance bought CB CB * CB Different Types of Equilibrium in the Insurance Market Given, the terms offered by the insurance company, consumer maximises EU at point X or at Y or at some point in between X and Y CG X: no insurance equilibrium, Z=0, insurance “too expensive” CG Y: full insurance equilibrium, insurance “cheap” CG* CB CG * CB Condition for Equilibrium • Indifference Curve should be tangential to budget line • This means that the slope of indifference curve equals slope of budget line • Slope of indifference curve is marginal rate of substitution: how much of wealth in the good state you are prepared to give up to get another $ of wealth in the bad state and still be on the same IC • Slope of budget line is rate of exchange: how much of wealth in the good state you have to give up to get another $ of wealth in the bad state Interpreting Equilibrium • MRSBG = /(1-) pB u(CB ) 1 pB u(CG ) 1 Note: pG = 1 - pB An Actuarially Fair Premium • An actuarially fair premium is one which is equal to the probability of the adverse contingency: = pB • When the premium is actuarially fair: u(CB)=u(CG) • So, under diminishing marginal utility: CB= C G • Implying full insurance Under what market conditions will an actuarially fair premium be charged? • The expected profit of an insurance company is: Z - pBZ 0 • When the insurance industry is competitive, free entry of new firms will compete away excess profits: Z - pBZ = 0 • Which implies: = pB
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