Animals in Greek
and Roman Religion
and Myth
Animals in Greek
and Roman Religion
and Myth
Proceedings of the Symposium
Grumentinum Grumento Nova
(Potenza) 5-7 June 2013
Edited by
Patricia A. Johnston,
Attilio Mastrocinque
and Sophia Papaioannou
Animals in Greek and Roman Religion and Myth
Edited by Patricia A. Johnston, Attilio Mastrocinque
and Sophia Papaioannou
This book first published 2016
Cambridge Scholars Publishing
Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Copyright © 2016 by Patricia A. Johnston, Attilio Mastrocinque,
Sophia Papaioannou and contributors
All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without
the prior permission of the copyright owner.
ISBN (10): 1-4438-9487-7
ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-9487-6
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS .............................................................................. ix
EDITORS’ PREFACE ................................................................................... xiii
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS ......................................................................... xv
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 1
Sophia Papaioannou
PART I: ANIMALS AND COMMUNICATION WITH THE DIVINE
CHAPTER ONE ............................................................................................ 19
Sacrificial Animals in Roman Religion: Rules and Exceptions
Dimitrios Mantzilas
CHAPTER TWO ........................................................................................... 39
Men and Animals in Lucretius’ De rerum natura
Giampiero Scafoglio
CHAPTER THREE ........................................................................................ 51
Vox naturae: The Myth of Animal Nature in the Late Roman Republic
Fabio Tutrone
CHAPTER FOUR .......................................................................................... 85
Numero avium regnum trahebant: Birds, Divination, and Power
amongst Romans and Etruscans
Daniele F. Maras
CHAPTER FIVE.......................................................................................... 115
Constructing Humans, Symbolising the Gods: The Cultural Value
of the Goat in Greek Religion
Giuseppina Paola Viscardi
vi
Table of Contents
CHAPTER SIX............................................................................................ 141
How to Understand the Voices of Animals
Thomas Galoppin
PART II: THE RELIGIOUS SIGNIFICANCE OF INDIVIDUAL ANIMALS
IN GREECE AND ROME
CHAPTER SEVEN ...................................................................................... 171
Ὁ περσικὸς ὄρνις: The Symbology of the Rooster in the Cult
of the Kabiroi
Emiliano Cruccas
CHAPTER EIGHT ....................................................................................... 189
Persephone’s Cockerel
Augusto Cosentino
CHAPTER NINE ......................................................................................... 213
Birds and Love in Greek and Roman Religion
Attilio Mastrocinque
CHAPTER TEN .......................................................................................... 227
Flying Geese, Wandering Cows: How Animal Movement
Orients Human Space in Greek Myth
Claudia Zatta
CHAPTER ELEVEN .................................................................................... 237
The Dolphin in Classical Mythology and Religion
Marie-Claire Beaulieu
CHAPTER TWELVE.................................................................................... 255
Unusual Sacrificial Victims: Fish and Their Value in the Context
of Sacrifices
Romina Carboni
CHAPTER THIRTEEN ................................................................................. 281
The Importance of Cattle in the Myths of Hercules and Mithras
Patricia A. Johnston
CHAPTER FOURTEEN ................................................................................ 299
Lament on the Sacrificed Bull in Ovid, Metamorphoses 15.120-42
Gérard Freyburger
Animals in Greek and Roman Religion and Myth
vii
CHAPTER FIFTEEN .................................................................................... 309
Horse Riders and Chariot Drivers
Henry John Walker
CHAPTER SIXTEEN ................................................................................... 335
The Horse, the Theology of Victory, and the Roman Emperors
of the 4th century CE
Tiphaine Moreau
CHAPTER SEVENTEEN .............................................................................. 361
Fierce Felines in the Cult and Imagery of Dionysus:
Bacchic Mania and What Else?
Maja Miziur
CHAPTER EIGHTEEN ................................................................................. 393
Through Impurity: A Few Remarks on the Role of the Dog
in Purification Rituals of the Greek World
Alessio Sassù
CHAPTER NINETEEN ................................................................................. 419
Acting the She-Bear: Animal Symbolism and Ritual in Ancient Athens
Diana Guarisco
CHAPTER TWENTY ................................................................................... 431
The Symbolism of the Hornet in the Greek and Roman World
Marianna Scapini
PART III: ANIMALS IN GREEK AND ROMAN MYTH
CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE ........................................................................... 449
Inventing the Phoenix: A Myth in the Making through Words
and Images
Françoise Lecocq
CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO .......................................................................... 479
The Language of Animal Metamorphosis in Greek Mythology
Kenneth S. Rothwell, Jr.
CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE ....................................................................... 495
Animals and Mythology in Vandalic Africa’s Latin Poetry
Étienne Wolff
viii
Table of Contents
GENERAL INDEX....................................................................................... 507
INDEX LOCORUM...................................................................................... 509
CHAPTER THREE
VOX NATURAE:
THE MYTH OF ANIMAL NATURE
IN THE LATE ROMAN REPUBLIC
FABIO TUTRONE
1. Signifying mirrors. Animals, sources, and conceptual
transformations
In a famous passage of his First Epistle to the Corinthians, Paul
describes the imperfect and obscure character of human knowledge, while
envisaging the admirable clarity of divine eschatological realities. As Paul
puts it, ‘now we see only a reflection as in a mirror; then we shall see face
to face. Now I know in part; then I shall know fully’. 1 Of course, the
Christian author’s mystic discourse is intended to oppose present and
future, material world and metaphysical truths, in a peculiarly spiritual
sense which has nothing in common with the discussions of Classical
scholars. Nevertheless, such a resolute incitement to a bipartite consideration
of things, interpreting the evidence at our disposal as a puzzling, secondrate reflection of the real world, should not sound unfamiliar to
philologists. As a typically post-Romantic (and post-positivist) discipline,
Classical Philology has tended to construct its own mystic view of
history. 2 In this view, Latin authors and the whole heritage of Roman
philosophical texts have frequently figured as a sort of deforming mirrors,
that is to say, as inaccurate and partial reproductions of Greek thought.
While Greece has traditionally been considered the lost heaven of ancient
1
1 Corinthians 13.12.
For a critical discussion of the idealist-positivist tradition of Classical Studies and
its ideological mysticism see Romano (1997), and Cozzo (2011). Cozzo (2006)
interestingly highlights the enduring influence of positivist methodological
approaches on present-day scholarship.
2
52
Chapter Three
philosophy, the original dimension one should always try to rescue, the
works of Roman thinkers have basically been used as sources–Quellen, in
the meaningful vocabulary of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
Altertumswissenschaft.3
As Carlos Lévy pointed out, even in our day “the suspicion remains
that the Roman philosopher was a philosophizing Roman, namely someone
who saw philosophy as an object and did not define it as a subject. The
Roman philosopher may well maintain that there is nothing more
important in his life than philosophy, but the fact that he was a consul, the
advisor of a prince, or an emperor himself, seems to belie such a
statement”.4 Like other contemporary scholars of ancient philosophy, Lévy
has subjected Hermann Diels’ “phylogenetic” view of the doxographic
tradition (and its on-going influence on academic research) to harsh
criticism. 5 He rightly remarked that the transmission of philosophical
tenets, like that of rhetorical doctrines, undergoes a complex and, so to
speak, multifocal elaboration. 6 Thus, instead of going in search of one
(irremediably lost) original source, one should strive to see the progressive
manipulation of beliefs as “a continuous and plural process of creation”
(“un processus de création continu et pluriel”).7
Remarkably, an analogous methodological perspective has been
3
Moatti (1997) 20, has compared the proclivity of modern scholars to assume
“systematic filiations” (as unrelated to the dynamics of acculturation) with the socalled “illusion of origins” perceptively described by Marc Bloch. Cf. Bloch
(1952) 5-9: “le problème subsistera toujours de savoir pourquoi la transmission
s’opéra à la date indiquée: ni plus tôt, ni plus tard. Une contagion suppose deux
choses: des générations de microbes et, à l’instant où le mal prend, un “terrain”.
Jamais, en un mot, un phénomène historique ne s’explique pleinement en dehors
de l’étude de son moment”.
4
Lévy (1996a) 15.
5
I refer, of course, to the famous collection of Diels (1879). A fundamental
revision of Diels’ approach—or, as they put it, “a partial farewell” to his method
(106-9)—has been carried out by Mansfeld and Runia (1997), who call for a more
careful consideration of contexts, genres, and individual authors in the analysis of
doxographic accounts.
6
Lévy (1996b) 117 sharply observes that while scholars are not keen to imagine a
continuous and linear tradition between Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Cicero’s De
inventione, they are in the habit of applying a much more rigid paradigm to the
field of philosophical knowledge. However, expressions of discontent concerning
the canonical method of source-criticism are more and more common among
Classical scholars. Not without a certain amount of regret, Mansfeld (1999) 14,
notices that “Quellenforschung (or Quellenanalyse, Quellenkritik) enjoys a bad
reputation today, especially among students of ancient philosophy”.
7
Lévy (1996b) 121-2.
Vox naturae: The Myth of Animal Nature in the Late Roman Republic
53
adopted in the cultural-anthropological study of animal figures on the basis
of Dan Sperber’s path-breaking contributions. In particular, Sperber’s
book La contagion des idées 8 has inspired a series of stimulating
investigations on the ancient representation of animals and its symbolic
background.9 The focal point of such investigations, of course, is not the
identification of a supposedly linear tradition. On the contrary, a kind of
conceptual epidemiology enables detection of permanent and varying
features of each animal type, for it is precisely the adjustment of certain
elements that denotes the peculiarity of writers, ages, and social milieus.10
I believe that it is worth applying this original perspective to the
comprehensive framework of Roman philosophy, accepting the fact that
Cicero’s or Lucretius’ presentations are not mere simplifications (or
distortions) of Greek sources, but highly relevant stages of a centurieslong transformation. Indeed, it seems that, once again, animals (and their
critics) can offer a thought-provoking pattern for intellectual analysis.11
Curiously, in the ancient tradition animals experience a similar
condition to that of Latin philosophical texts, since they are frequently
depicted as mirrors or voices of an underlying reality which is difficult to
capture elsewhere. Such a reality, of course, can be either positive or
negative, desirable or execrable, and hence animals appear at the same
time as idealised and disgusting mirrors. By and large, the interpretation of
such living reflections is controversial, for different writers and lines of
thought tend to evoke the model of animal behaviour for different
8
Sperber (1996).
See e.g. Bettini (1998), Franco (2003a), and Li Causi (2003), (2008).
10
Sperber (1985) 74-5 sees “causal explanations of cultural facts as necessarily
embedded in a kind of epidemiology of representations”. When discussing
differences and similarities between epidemiology sensu proprio and its analogical
application to the field of human culture, Sperber purposely points to the
prevalence of transformation processes in the dynamics of knowledge
transmission: “epidemiology of diseases occasionally has to explain why some
diseases are transformed in the process of transmission. Epidemiology of
representations, on the contrary, has to explain why some representations remain
relatively stable, i.e. why some representations become properly cultural”. Cf. also
the wide-ranging treatment of Sperber (1996) 79-135.
11
As is well-known, in his influential study of primitive totemism, Lévi-Strauss
(1962) claimed that animals are “good to think with” (“bons à penser”), opening
the way to further researches on the symbolic construction of animals and its
general theoretical significance (see, for instance, the reappraisal of Sperber
[1975]). With regard to Classical scholarship, the heuristic potential of similar
researches has been highlighted by Bettini (1998) 219-48, and Franco (2003b).
9
54
Chapter Three
purposes.12 As a rule, however, when animals are raised to the rank of
positive mirrors, they are presented as embodiments of Nature. The
identification between animal life and natural values, zoological data and
allegedly cosmic principles, has been rightly recognised by cultural
anthropologists as a characteristic feature of the Western mentality. In
particular, the traditional binary opposition between nature and culture
(which, far from being “universal”, is embedded in the culture of the West)
runs parallel with the argumentative contrast between man and animal,
presuming a biological—if not ontological—gap between human and nonhuman beings.13 The history of Western thought has been shaped by the
combination of primitivist and progressive views, alternately praising or
denigrating animals as the quintessence of a “state of nature”.14
From the long-term perspective of conceptual history, the period I shall
be focusing on in the present paper—the so-called Late Republic—seems
to be of special interest, since it is in these years that some of the most
influential writings dealing with the problem of humanity and beastliness,
anthropocentrism and animal nature, come out.15 The frequent recurrence
of themes relating to the animal condition in different authors of this
time—themes such as bestialisation, human identity, and sociability—can
easily be connected to a shared cultural milieu. It is certainly no accident
12
See Dierauer (1977) 194: “die Tiere als vox naturae—mit dieser Metapher liesse
sich nicht bloss die Position der Epikureer, sondern ebensosehr die gewisser
Sophisten sowie der Stoiker und vor allem der Kyniker wiedergeben.
Unterschiedlich war nur die Art, wie man diese Stimme der Natur interpretierte,
welchen Ausruf man daraus heraushörte”.
13
See Rivera (1999) and Descola (2005), though in this case, too, the work of
Claude Lévi-Strauss has proven inspiring and groundbreaking (cf. e.g. LéviStrauss [1967] XVI). As Descola (2005) points out, even if the heritage of the
Graeco-Roman world made a fundamental contribution to the development of the
nature/culture dichotomy—it may suffice to mention the Roman opposition
between ager and silva, cultivated land and wild space—the establishment of our
current dichotomy is strongly indebted to modern age naturalism.
14
See the classical treatment of Lovejoy and Boas (1935).
15
Indeed, one should not forget that in the Middle Ages and the modern era Latin
texts were among the main sources of philosophical knowledge. When Thomas
Aquinas and Francis Bacon reshaped the Stoic concept of natural law, for instance,
they basically drew on authors such as Cicero and Seneca. Here and elsewhere, I
employ the term conceptual history with explicit reference to the interpretive
approach primarily known as Begriffsgeschichte. For the purposes of Classical
scholarship, special attention should be paid to Reinhart Koselleck’s view of
historical temporality as a meta-physiological dimension inherently involving the
presence and transformation of concepts: see now Koselleck (2002).
Vox naturae: The Myth of Animal Nature in the Late Roman Republic
55
that in the age of civil wars, when traditional moral values and social
models began to crumble, Roman writers felt the need to investigate the
origins of human community, its salient features, and, by contrast, the
notion of animality. Therefore, instead of dissecting the Latin texts at our
disposal in search of their sources, we should rather adopt a systemic
perspective allowing us to detect the intellectual exchanges occurring
across the Greek and Roman worlds. Cicero and Philodemus are not selfconscious doxographers requiring ‘comparatist’ surveys after the style of
Diels’ tables.16 They are part of a wide-ranging process of reception and
conceptual rearrangement which gives new meaning to previous
ideological traditions. Interestingly, one of the focal points of this process
concerns the moral and cognitive status of animals as well as their role as
mirrors of cosmic truths. To all appearances, the cultural and epistemological
myth of animal nature—i.e. the typically Western idea that animals
embody a perennial state of nature, as opposed to human society—
receives important inputs from the first century BCE discussion on ethics
and natural philosophy.
An exhaustive review of all the extant texts of the late Republic
focusing on such matters is beyond the scope of this paper. It will suffice
to take into account a series of representative passages from the words of
Sallust, Cicero, and Lucretius to get a sense of the ideological relevance of
zooanthropological issues17 to the cultural debate of this period.
2. Sallust on cattle. A dualistic ethics for the crisis
of the mos maiorum
Since most of the remarks made so far evidently concern the field of
philosophy and theoretical constructs, it may be useful to start our quick
survey with an author who is not renowned for his philosophical interests:
the purportedly “pragmatic” historian Gaius Sallustius Crispus.
16
See Diels (1879) 529-50. However, the fact that in our day Diels’ cladistic
approach frequently draws methodological criticism should not obscure its evident
merits as an epoch-making reappraisal of largely neglected (or misunderstood)
traditions. Diels’ contribution to the development of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries Altertumswissenchaft is properly highlighted in Calder and Mansfeld
(1999).
17
In its proper scholarly meaning, zooanthropology is the study of man-animal
relationships and their many-sided cultural significance. See the presentation
provided by Marchesini and Tonutti (2007) 11-13, who include the stereotypic
representation of animals as pre-cultural beings among the main concerns of
zooanthropological inquiry.
56
Chapter Three
At the beginning of his De coniuratione Catilinae, Sallust justifies the
choice of literary otium—which he famously presents as an alternative
form of civic engagement—on the basis of a morally compelling
cosmological picture:
Omnes homines, qui sese student praestare ceteris animalibus, summa ope
niti decet, ne vitam silentio transeant veluti pecora, quae natura prona
atque ventri oboedientia finxit. Sed nostra omnis vis in animo et corpore
sita est: animi imperio, corporis servitio magis utimur; alterum nobis cum
dis, alterum cum beluis commune est. Quo mihi rectius videtur ingeni
quam virium opibus gloriam quaerere et, quoniam vita ipsa qua fruimur
brevis est, memoriam nostri quam maxume longam efficere. (Cat. 1.1-3).
It becomes all men, who desire to excel other animals, to strive, to the
utmost of their power, not to pass through life in obscurity, like the beasts
of the field, which nature has formed groveling and subservient to appetite.
All our power is situated in the mind and in the body. Of the mind we
rather employ the government; of the body, the service. The one is
common to us with the gods; the other with the brutes. It appears to me,
therefore, more reasonable to pursue glory by means of the intellect than of
bodily strength, and, since the life which we enjoy is short, to make the
remembrance of us as lasting as possible. (trnsl. Watson [1896]).
In order to revise (or, more precisely, to widen) the traditional Roman
view of a free man’s political duties, the writer appeals to a long-lived
anthropocentric conception of the cosmos. An active spiritual life, based
on a virtuous use of reason and memory, is said to constitute the original
vocation of man, whereas animals are depicted as irrational and greedy
beings par excellence. Sallust’s intellectual purpose is to extend the
Roman model of a worthy human life by moving the focus of such a
model from the collective ideal of direct engagement to the more radical
(and universal) notion of animus or rationality. In anthropological terms,
one might say that our text proposes a shift to a different paradigm of
anthropopoiesis18: what makes men human and worthy of their status is
not only the assumption of political responsibilities, but, more basically, a
18
The problem of anthropopoiesis is at the core of the present-day anthropological
debate. By this term, scholars refer to the symbolic devices employed by human
cultures in order to construct a standard pattern of humanness. See e.g. Affergan at
al. (2003): “‘Renaissance’ de l’homme comme être social et fabrication de modèles
et de fictions d’humanité, l’anthropopoiésis se saisit des figures de l’humain qui,
constitutives du fait de civilisation, traversent les cultures et informent les
démarches de l’anthropologie”. Cf. also Allovio and Favole (1996), and Calame
and Kilani (1999).
Vox naturae: The Myth of Animal Nature in the Late Roman Republic
57
correct use of those rational faculties which mankind shares with the gods.
Commentators usually recall the vaguely Platonic character of Sallust’s
proemial statements. 19 And there is no doubt that Plato’s ethically
significant portrayal of prone animals in the Republic exerted a profound
influence on this and other classical descriptions.20 However, one should
not undervalue the impact of Stoic models, since, as the case of Cicero
will show, Stoic anthropocentrism played a very important role in the late
Republican discussion on animal and human paradigms (as well as in the
development of Roman philosophical anthropology as a whole). In
particular, the idea that, unlike beasts, men and gods share the gift of
reason—so that the animus/
ς functions as a hierachic cosmological
criterion—seems to reflect a crucial Stoic tenet. 21 In the conceptual
repertory of first-century Roman writers, however, long-lived Platonic
stereotypes and widespread Stoic principles tended to merge. Above all, as
mentioned earlier, our main efforts should not be directed at the
identification of single sources, but at a careful recognition of the author’s
ideological aims, seen in their broader cultural context. Indeed, Sallust’s
reception of previous theoretical patterns is also shaped by traditional
common-sense beliefs. The writer was perfectly aware that in his readers’
imagery—even in the imagery of those who had not read Plato, but simply
19
See, most recently, Ramsey (2007) 55-6.
Cf. Plato, Rep. 586a-b. On the enduring influence of Plato’s ethicalcosmological representation see Lanata (1994) 20-2, and Pinotti (1994).
21
On the Stoics’ reason-based cosmology and its anthropocentric structure see
now Wildberger (2006), esp. I.205-75. As is well-known, the pre-eminence of
animus and intellectual activities over the corporeal dimension is stressed in the
proem of the Bellum Iugurthinum (1-2) as well. In the past, several scholars indeed
suggested that Sallust’s historiographic ideology was influenced by Stoicism, or
even by Posidonius (cf. e.g. Pantzerhielm and Thomas [1936] and Altheim
[1956]), thus engaging in controversy with the supporters of a Platonising
interpretation (see the overview provided by Colish [1985] 292-8). Similar
conflictual reconstructions clearly reflect the above-mentioned approach of
Quellenforschung, and La Penna (1968) 36, is certainly right in claiming that
“quando si tratta di concetti così generici e diffusi, la ricerca di fonti precise
diventa impossibile ed inutile”—though La Penna himself does not refrain from
making his own suggestions concerning Sallust’s sources. Besides the considerable
impact of the Roman milieu (to which I shall now refer), one should also bear in
mind the ascendancy of protreptic treatises and their largely shared arguments,
since, independently of specific philosophical orientations, such treatises often
resorted to a rhetorical contrast between man’s rational vocation and animal
bodiliness: see La Penna (1968) 21-3, while Wagner (1910) and Bignone (1950)
221-3, go too far in seeing, respectively, Posidonius and Aristotle (qua authors of a
Protrepticus) as the main sources of Sallust’s proems.
20
58
Chapter Three
lived in an agro-pastoral society like Rome—animals appeared as morally
and cognitively inferior beings. He deliberately exploited such a commonsense association in order to support his dualistic and moralistic
conception of life: a conception of primary importance to Sallust’s
discourse on the late Republican crisis and its fundamental causes.22
In more general terms, the symbolic opposition between animal and
human status (that is to say, between animal and human nature, for man’s
physiological vocation is said to be culture, culminating in the practice of
ethical virtues) underpins all of Sallust’s works. The moral and political
crisis of Rome is depicted by the Latin historian as a form of collective
bestialisation, a general repudiation of the use of reason for the sake of
eagerness and violence. In the famous picture of chapter 5, Catilina’s
animus is openly said to be ferox (‘savage’ or ‘untamed’).23 Likewise, the
corrupted citizens betraying the values of the mos maiorum are typically
described as committed to ‘beastly’ vices such as lubido, avaritia, and
socordia.24 In Sallust’s eyes, a similar process of moral degeneration may
have appeared as a paradoxical and improper return to primitive savagery,
since in the so-called archaeology of the Bellum Catilinae the native
inhabitants of Latium, the Aborigines who mingle with the Trojans, are
labelled as a genus hominum agreste, a ‘wild kind of men’, unaware of
laws, government, and non-migratory life.25 An analogous description is
22
Cf. Momigliano (1992) 504-11, and Paul (1984) 9-11.
Cf. Cat. 5.7-8. Throughout the work, Catiline’s impetuous behaviour is variously
assimilated to the vehemence of wild animals. In 52.35, for instance, Catiline and
his army are said to threaten Rome ‘with their jaws’ (faucibus). And at the very
beginning of his First Catilinarian Oration (1.1), Cicero himself had presented the
conspiracy as a relentless chained beast. On such disparaging depictions and their
folk background see Tutrone (2010a) 220-4.
24
In light of its easily discernible etymological origin, the recurrent term socordia/
secordia (which is frequently taken in the more common meaning of ‘laziness’ by
Sallust’s interpreters) implies a polemic reference to the degradation of inner
faculties: see e.g. Cat. 4.1; 52.29; Iug. 1.4; 2.4; 31.2; 85.22.
25
Cf. Cat. 6.1-3. On Sallust’s reconstruction of the origins of Rome and its
intellectual peculiarities see Briquel (2006), who regards Ateius Philologus as the
historian’s fundamental source. Much more interesting, however, is Briquel’s
comparison between the Sallustian account and such well-known treatments of
Roman primitive history as Cato’s Origines, Vergil’s Aeneid, and the late antique
Origo Gentis Romanae. On the basis of this comparison, Briquel connects Sallust’s
emphasis on inter-ethnic fusion and rejection of other common versions with the
purpose of calling for civic harmony–an extremely urgent purpose in the age of
civil wars. Moreover, Briquel (pp. 96-7) points to the possible Catonian origin of
the description of the Aborigines as a savage people (cf. also Richard [1983] 411,
23
Vox naturae: The Myth of Animal Nature in the Late Roman Republic
59
applied to the first inhabitants of Africa, the Gaetulians and Libyans, in the
ethnographic digression of the Bellum Iugurthinum:
Africam initio habuere Gaetuli et Libyes, asperi incultique, quis cibus erat
caro ferina atque humi pabulum uti pecoribus. Ii neque moribus neque
lege aut imperio quoiusquam regebantur: vagi palantes quas nox coegerat
sedes habebant. (Iug. 18.1-2).
In the beginning Africa was inhabited by the Gaetulians and Libyans, rude
and uncivilized folk, who fed like beasts on the flesh of wild animals and
the fruits of the earth. They were governed neither by institutions nor law,
nor were they subject to anyone’s rule. A restless, roving people, they had
their abodes wherever night compelled a halt. (trnsl. Rolfe [1931]).
The pre-cultural condition of such primitive peoples is characterised
not only by nomadism and absence of laws, but also by pasturing and the
consumption of raw flesh.26 Given that the author later explains how these
savage tribes, mingling with more civilised peoples of foreign origin,
created a powerful and extended kingdom, the analogy with the Roman
archaeology of the Catiline is even more striking.27 As Robert Morsteinand Martinez-Pinna [2002] 55-6). What is certain is that Vergil, Aen. 9.603-13,
took up the same anthropological pattern when characterising the Latins as a
durum a stirpe genus, alien to the refinements of civilisation. And annotating
Vergil’s text, Servius, ad Verg. Aen. 9.600, refers indeed to Cato’s and Varro’s
similar presentations, thus confirming the long-standing relevance of such
culturally embedded representations.
26
On Sallust’s interest in ethnography and his relationship to a long tradition of
ethnocentric patterns see Oniga (1995), who devotes special attention to this
African excursus (Iug. 17-19). Oniga (esp. 23-50) offers a perceptive
reconstruction of the ancient discussion on cultural norms, climatic determinism,
and social evolution—a discussion ranging from Homer and Herodotus to
Aristotle, Posidonius, and beyond. In the Aristotelian tradition, in particular,
peripheral peoples tend to be assimilated to a state of anti-cultural animality, both
in a positive and a negative sense; cf. also Sassi (1988), and Bettini (1992). Oniga
(78-9) rightly parallels Sallust’s account of African prehistory with the
reconstructions of primitive Italy in Cato, Vergil, and Sallust’s own Catiline.
While Thomas (1982) 96 had suggested that Vergil’s description in Aen. 8.314-36
represents “a conscious reminiscence of Sallust’s Libyan ethnography”, the
extensive material gathered by Oniga supports the view that all these texts rely on
widespread cultural beliefs.
27
Cf. 18.3-12. Remarkably, in the history of the Numidians, too, a prominent role
is played by the move of a mythological hero (Hercules, who strongly evokes
Aeneas) and his wandering companions. See Moatti (1997) 264, and MorsteinMarx (2001) 192-3.
60
Chapter Three
Marx pointed out, a careful comparison between the two passages “reveals
that the Numidians are represented as archetypal ‘anti-Romans’, like the
Romans an imperial people but occupying the opposite cultural pole”.28
But it is clear that in Sallust’s view a degrading regression to the
animalistic stage of human life is always possible as a consequence of
moral degeneration. From the writer’s critical standpoint, the first-century
Roman Republic is very close to a similar involution—an involution
which, in light of Sallust’s proems, looms over mankind as a whole. The
opposition between nature and culture, brutishness and civilisation—or, in
Lévi-Strauss’ terms, raw and cooked29—operates on both a synchronic and
a diachronic level in Sallust’s historiography. It is no accident that the
“materialistic” men of the proem of the Bellum Catilinae are explicitly
likened to cattle (veluti pecora) in the same way as the early inhabitants of
Africa (uti pecoribus).
The writer’s representation of cultural and pre-cultural life, as well as
his emphasis on omophagy, nomadism, and the lack of a political
dimension, reflect a structured system of socio-anthropological patterns,
magisterially investigated in the studies of the so-called École de Paris.30
What is worth noting here is that in late Republican literature the
representation of man’s “animal” origins—the rearrangement of the topos
of ρι
ς
ς, which dates back at least to the sophistic age31—plays
an impressive and intellectually significant role. Sallust is not the only
writer of his age interested in exploring the first stages of human society,
the distinctive features of human beings, and their relationship to a
destabilising animality. Behind both the Bellum Catilinae and the Bellum
Iugurthinum there is an intense intellectual debate, variously reworking the
lines of previous literary and philosophical traditions.32
28
Morstein-Marx (2001) 195. The radical cultural otherness of Numidians is
stressed by the fact that even when they grow into a more orderly and complex
society, they maintain a series of peculiar ethical features which are antithetical to
the Roman model of civilisation—first of all, their unjustified bellicosity and
nomadic instability. Broadly speaking, the war against Jugurtha appears as “a war
between Roman civilization and the mobile, treacherous, seminomadic ‘Other’”
(180).
29
Cf. Lévi-Strauss (1964).
30
See esp. Vernant (1972), (1978), Vidal Naquet (1975), Detienne and Vernant
(1979). Such works, which focus on the Greek world, are admittedly influenced by
Lévi-Strauss’ view of nature, culture, and binary oppositions.
31
See Dierauer (1977) 25-39.
32
A stimulating survey into the breadth of this debate, with special regard to the
Roman attitude towards human progress, has been carried out by Novara (1982).
Vox naturae: The Myth of Animal Nature in the Late Roman Republic
61
3. Cicero on what man is not. Anthropocentrism
and Roman humanitas
One of the most famous and influential discussions of man’s primitive
life is recorded in the first chapters of Cicero’s De inventione, a work
probably dating to 91-88 BCE. 33 Starting from the observation that in
human (and Roman) history the power of speech (eloquentia) has been
perniciously separated from the ideal of wisdom (sapientia), Cicero
endeavours to show that in its original form the eloquentia characterising
mankind was a fruitful and even salvific faculty, for the earliest “animal”
phases of human history were overstepped precisely through the use of
reason and language.34 In Cicero’s view, it was the later unnatural divorce
of wisdom and eloquence—i.e., in more philosophical terms, of language
and virtuous rationality—which disrupted man’s progressive development.35
But in the beginning human beings ceased to live bestiarum modo thanks
to the fact that linguistic communication spread moral knowledge across
the community.36
As regards the philosophical background to the opening of the De
inventione, attention has recently been drawn to the impact of Philo of
Larissa and Academic thought. The fact that Cicero’s early work is
influenced by teachings in the Platonic tradition, should not, however, lead
us to overlook the concomitant influence of Stoic doctrines, especially in
light of the author’s long philosophical training under the Stoic
Diodotus.37 Indeed, not only does Cicero argue that eloquence and wisdom
33
See Kennedy (1972) 106-10.
Cf. Cicero, Inv. 1.1-3. Although scholars are often keen to dismiss Cicero’s
historical reconstruction in his early treatise as a philosophically insignificant piece
(echoing Cicero’s own modest self-assessment of the De inventione: De or. 1.5),
such a detailed theoretical introduction brings together relevant notions of the
ancient anthropological debate—notions which had clearly been central to the
author’s Bildung. What is more, the passage’s great influence on European thought
makes it worthy of careful consideration. As Beckman (1993) 6, remarked, “this
particular version of the origins of civilization appealed so much to the concerns of
the humanists that it became a commonplace in Renaissance thought”.
35
See Cicero, Inv. 1.4-5.
36
Cicero, Inv. 1.2-3. In Cicero’s account, a kind of original civilising hero (quidam
magnus vir et sapiens) is said to have understood the great potential of the human
mind and brought the people together through his sensible speeches.
37
On Cicero’s house philosopher Diodotus see Brut. 309; Luc. 115; Fam. 9.4; Att.
2.20.6. The lack of references to specific philosophical orientations has led some to
see the praise of language in the De inventione as a merely rhetorical topos; see
Solmsen (1932) 153, and Barwick (1963) 21-4, whose Quellenforschungen point
34
62
Chapter Three
freed mankind from primitive beastliness, but he also expressly remarks
that it is language that distinguishes man from other animals.38 Generally
speaking, the twofold character of the Stoic concept of
ς, which
covers both the field of “external” language (
ς πρ
ρικ ς) and that
of inner rationality (
ς ν ι ε ς), 39 seems to underlie the first
chapters of the treatise—for wisdom or sapientia embodies the perfection
of reason, ideally directing linguistic expression. In accordance with his
own rhetorical interests, Cicero emphasises the importance of speech to
the process described, since, as he says, ‘no wisdom which was silent and
destitute of skill in speaking could have had such power as to turn men on
a sudden from their previous customs, and to lead them to the adoption of
a different system of life’.40 Even if, as in Sallust’s depiction, the animal
to the Isocratean tradition. By contrast, Lévy (1992) 98-101, and (1995) 155-64,
has thoroughly explored the theoretical implications of the passage, placing special
emphasis on Cicero’s debt to his teacher Philo. But, the profound influence of
Academic tenets seems in this case to have become inextricably intermingled with
widespread Stoic beliefs. After all, a representative text cited by Lévy himself
(Nat. Deor. 2.148) attests to Cicero’s awareness that Stoic and Neoacademic
thinkers agreed on the cosmological centrality of
ς. And, as indicated during
our analysis of Sallust’s proems, in the late Republican debate the wide acceptance
of certain core principles made school barriers less rigid—not to mention the fact
that, as Lévy (1992) 104-9, notes, the traditional connection between Platonism
and Stoicism became even closer in this period, so that Cicero, Fam. 15.4.16,
could confidently claim to spread the same ‘true and old philosophy’ (philosophia
vera illa et antiqua) as Cato the Younger. Also see Bonazzi (2007) 121-4.
38
Inv. 1.5.23-8. Cicero also notes that, in respect to many other qualities, humans
are ‘lower and weaker’ (humiliores et infirmiores) than the beasts—a point which
clearly connects his reconstruction to the tradition of sophistic anthropology
exemplified by Plato’s Protagoras (320c-322d). In the Platonic myth, however, it
is not
ς that releases mankind from its original weakness, but ‘technical
knowledge’ ( ν ε ν ς σ
) and the use of fire, which in turn lead to the
development of language (322a). On the importance of Plato’s Protagoras to both
Academic and Stoic philosophy see Alesse (2007).
39
On this foundational Stoic division (presumably drawing on Plato, Theaet. 189e190a), and the controversy with the Academy it aroused, see Labarrière (2005) 6581.
40
Inv. 1.3: (trnsl. Yonge [1888]). Though Cicero’s emphasis on the power of
rhetoric–namely, on the linguistic side of
ς–is indisputable, Kastely (2002)
241, goes too far in claiming that “Cicero’s myth separates reason and eloquence”.
According to Kastely, “it was not reason but eloquence that made the crucial
difference in the rise of the human species as a cultural animal, as an animal
governed, in part, by nomos”. As mentioned earlier, Cicero’s main concern is
precisely to call for a sound conjunction of sapientia (viz. virtus) and eloquentia, a
Vox naturae: The Myth of Animal Nature in the Late Roman Republic
63
world incarnates the primacy of corporeal force and the savage essence of
human life, Cicero identifies the real source of man’s aberrance as a
perverse employment of reason for the mere sake of self-satisfaction, thus
embracing the Stoic idea of a ‘subversion of reason’ ( ι σ ρ
) peculiar to mankind. 41 In Cicero’s portrayal, language and
rationality are intimately connected, and when the human mind deviates
from the right path, such deviation results in a corrupted eloquence.
In the symbolic structure of Ciceronian thought, however, those men
who reject their rational and linguistic vocation are usually downgraded to
the same level as beasts—a polemic strategy deep-rooted in folk
imagery.42 A censorious passage from the late treatise De officiis shows
the relevance of Stoic anthropocentric rationalism to the construction of
Cicero’s humanism (and, more specifically, to his view of social ethics
and personal identity). While categorically separating man from the
instinctual realm of animals, Cicero equates sensualist humans with beasts,
for some people would be ‘men only in name, not in fact’ (non re sed
nomine):
Sed pertinet ad omnem officii quaestionem semper in promptu habere,
quantum natura hominis pecudibus reliquisque beluis antecedat; illae nihil
sentiunt nisi voluptatem ad eamque feruntur omni impetu, hominis autem
mens discendo alitur et cogitando, semper aliquid aut anquirit aut agit
videndique et audiendi delectatione ducitur. Quin etiam, si quis est paulo
ad voluptates propensior, modo ne sit ex pecudum genere, sunt enim
conjunction which becomes even more necessary in ages of moral corruption (cf.
1.5, with the compelling exempla of Cato, Laelius, Scipio, and the Gracchi).
Likewise, at the beginning of human history, the power of speech induced men to
accept the principles discovered by reason (ea quae ratione invenissent, 1.3), and
the original civiliser (he himself being a sapiens) gained the attention of other
humans thanks to his ability in reasoning and speaking (propter rationem atque
orationem, 1.2).
41
Cf. Inv. 1.3, where the author describes the emergence of ‘a certain sort of
complaisance’ (commoditas quaedam), ‘a false copyist of virtue’ (prava virtutis
imitatrix), ‘without any consideration for real duty’ (sine ratione officii)’. Cicero’s
reference to the malicious distortion of a good natural disposition, producing a
kind of “symmetrical” imitation of virtue, hints at the typically Stoic view that vice
is a rational deviation parallel and opposite to virtue: cf. SVF 3.228-36, and Grilli
(1963). The topic is variously debated in Cicero’s works (see esp. Leg. 1.31-2; 47),
and in the Roman philosophical debate more generally, as it directly concerns the
problem of the origin of evil and that of the end of pleasure (see e.g. Bellincioni
[1978] 33-6, and Berno [2003] 25-29, both focusing on Seneca).
42
It may be sufficient to recall that in Classical Latin words like bestia and belua
are commonly used as terms of reproach.
64
Chapter Three
quidam homines non re sed nomine, sed si quis est paulo erectior, quamvis
voluptate capiatur, occultat et dissimulat appetitum voluptatis propter
verecundiam. (Off. 1.105).
But it is essential to every inquiry about duty that we keep before our eyes
how far superior man is by nature to cattle and other beasts: they have no
thought except for sensual pleasure and this they are impelled by every
instinct to seek; but man’s mind is nurtured by study and meditation; he is
always either investigating or doing, and he is captivated by the pleasure of
seeing and hearing. Nay, even if a man is more than ordinarily inclined to
sensual pleasures, provided, of course, that he be not quite on a level with
the beasts of the field—for some people are men only in name, not in
fact—if, I say, he is a little too susceptible to the attractions of pleasure, he
hides the fact, however much he may be caught in its toils, and for very
shame conceals his appetite. (trnsl. Miller [1913]).
Under the lens of a properly anthropological analysis, Cicero’s
celebrated ideal of humanitas appears as a powerful anthropopoietic
pattern. The echo of Plato’s ethics-based cosmology (which we have
already noticed in Sallust)43 becomes even stronger in this section of the
De officiis as a result of the author’s pervasive anti-Epicurean polemic.
Many years after the composition of his work on rhetorical invention,
Cicero regarded the animal side of human nature as an extremely
dangerous (and already overwhelming) ingredient of social life. In his
opinion, the escalation of struggles, murders, and political personalism
affecting Rome’s declining Republic can be traced back mostly to the loss
of a virtuous feeling of community. 44 Above all, Cicero blames the
primacy of sensory and individual experiences (tendentiously connected
with Epicurean philosophy) as a morally destabilising factor and compares
it to a self-degrading bestialisation.45
43
See above n. 20.
See Atkins (2005) 505-14, and Picone (2012), who both highlight the
constructive (and not merely nostalgic) character of the De officiis. As Atkins
observes, “in de Officiis, in short, we can see Cicero using the resources of his
philosophical education to articulate a conservative moral response to the
revolution through which he was living. The mos maiorum is given its most
intelligent restatement; and in the process, the language of honestas, dignitas,
officium, beneficia, and gloria is reshaped to meet present needs. The four virtues
of De officiis are borrowed from Greek philosophy; but they are analysed in
sharply contemporary terms” (513).
45
On Cicero’s (and Panaetius’) polemic against Epicurus’ “bestializing”
materialism see Narducci (1987) 20-1. However, it is now generally admitted that
Cicero’s relationship to Epicureanism was not restricted to criticism and
44
Vox naturae: The Myth of Animal Nature in the Late Roman Republic
65
In order to invert the course of this general involution, Cicero’s late
philosophical works endeavour to define a standard paradigm of humanity
(which is meant to be universal in spite of its clear cultural embeddedness),
by readapting the most salient features of Stoic natural philosophy to the
needs of Roman culture. To such an ambitious project (as to almost all the
processes of anthropopoiesis), the characterisation of the symbolic role of
animals is of paramount importance. 46 In a strikingly large number of
passages, Cicero points to the constitutive primacy of human beings as
well as to the providential view that animals have been created for the sake
of men. Additionally, it is made clear that men do not owe justice to other
animals, since, according to Stoic doctrine, justice originates from the
rational creation of bonds, and reason is the exclusive prerogative of men
and gods.47
The second book of the De natura deorum provides remarkable
evidence of Cicero’s re-use of Stoic anthropocentric cosmology, including
as it does Balbus’ enthusiastic presentation of Stoic theology (and
teleology). At the very end of the work, it is Balbus’ idea of a
providentially ordered cosmos, corresponding to the needs of men, which
is said to have convinced Cicero. 48 In Balbus’ view, the body itself of
human beings, with its different organs and limbs, attests to nature’s
teleological plan. In accordance with a well-known commonplace of
Classical and Hellenistic philosophy, for instance, man’s upright posture is
interpreted as a natural privilege leading to the practice of contemplation.49
denigration (see Lévy [2001] and Maso [2008]). Moreover, the author’s depiction
of a radically individualistic—if not asocial—Epicurean ethics (a depiction largely
accepted and reinforced by the later Western tradition) has been validly questioned
by scholars, especially since the survey of Long (1985).
46
On the crucial role of animals in man’s self-definition see Shepard (1996) and
Rivera (1999). Rivera (67-9) further develops Marshall Sahlins’ critique of
sociobiology (Sahlins [1976]), showing how the “bestialization” of animals (i.e.
their conceptual degradation as deficient beings) is closely connected with the
“bestialization” of men, especially of rival social agents—a type of discourse
widely attested in Cicero and other Classical authors.
47
A comprehensive account of the Stoic anthropocentric view of animals and mananimal relationships is offered by Dierauer (1977) 199-252, and Sorabji (1993)
122-57. Sorabji (136) interestingly remarks on the connection between hierarchic
cosmology, dualistic psychology, and political imperialism emerging from works
such as Cicero’s De re publica.
48
Nat. Deor. 3.95.
49
Ibid. 2.140. The long history of this cultural topos, from Diogenes of Apollonia
to Aristotle and the Stoics, is briefly recalled by Lanata (1994) 19-21, whose
discussion relies on Geoffrey Lloyd’s path-breaking studies of common-sense
66
Chapter Three
At the same time, a wide-ranging section of Balbus’ speech is devoted to
praise the physical and intellectual qualities of animals. Even if these are
not endowed with reason and language, their instinctual behaviour is said
to reveal ‘a certain cunning and shrewdness’ (machinatio quaedam atque
sollertia).50 The description of such faculties—effected via an assortment
of mirabilia dating back to the Peripatetic tradition 51 —is nonetheless
intended to confirm the existence of immanent divine providence.
Another well-known Ciceronian work bearing witness to the Roman
reception of biological arguments is the De finibus bonorum et malorum.
In Book 3, Cato illustrates the principles of Stoic ethics, devoting special
attention to their physical and psychological basis: the so-called oikeiosis
theory. According to this theory, every living being has a natural instinct
of “social appropriation” (‘appropriation’ is indeed the basic meaning of
the Greek κε σις, derived from the adjective κε ς). The Stoics
argued that the creation of social bonds—following a first phase of selfappropriation—is the primary teleological inclination of every animal and
proceeds in progressive stages. 52 Like the Epicureans (whose ethical
polarities (low/high, left/right etc.) and their scientific relevance (see Lloyd
[1966]).
50
Nat. Deor. 2.123. The Latin hendiadys seems to correspond to the Greek concept
of ρ ν σις, the “practical intelligence” perceived in writers from the time of
Aristotle onwards as typically characterising animals (see Labarrière [2005] 12147). Whether Cicero borrowed similar notions from Peripatetic sources or
embraced them through Stoic mediations (first of all through Posidonius and
Panaetius, as scholars usually suggest following Hirzel [1877] 191-244) is very
hard—if not impossible—to know. Cf. Dierauer (1977) 224-45.
51
Ibid. 2.121-31. As Rocca (2003) 49-57, pointed out, in spite of its adherence to
Stoic cosmology, Cicero’s extensive treatment of animal ethology is largely
indebted to Peripatetic thought. Several of the author’s exemplifications can be
traced back to the ninth book of the Historia Animalium, a text which underwent a
complex process of transmission before reaching its present form (Düring [1950],
Balme [1991] 1-13) and had a great impact on the ancient biological debate
(Dierauer [1977] 162-70, Vegetti [1996] 58-71). It is widely agreed that the
Historia was a kind of “open text” in the history of the Peripatetic school, and it
has been often surmised that its ninth and tenth books are distinctively postAristotelian (cf. Sharples [1995] 32-5). To be sure, an enduring tradition of
zoological speculations arose from the works of Aristotle and his early followers
(Theophrastus in primis), heavily influencing the Hellenistic and Roman worlds.
The breadth of such a multi-faceted heritage appears to justify dismissal of the
simplistic approach of Reinhardt (1926) 139-41, who overstated the influence of
Posidonius’ fusion of Stoic and Peripatetic materials.
52
On the Stoic doctrine of oikeiosis and its various theoretical connections see
Engberg-Pedersen (1990), Pemproke (1996), Long (1996b), Radice (2000), and
Vox naturae: The Myth of Animal Nature in the Late Roman Republic
67
theory is expounded by Torquatus in the first book of the De finibus), the
Stoics saw in animal behaviour an irrefutable proof of their views.
However, their overall analyses and conclusions differed widely from
those of Epicurus, for they pointed to the unbridgeable distance between
human and animal sociability and advocated man’s exclusive possession
of reason. Cato explicitly reasserts the exclusion of animals from a reasonbased cosmopolitan society as well as from the field of justice and
morality:
Et quo modo hominum inter homines iuris esse vincula putant, sic homini
nihil iuris esse cum bestiis. Praeclare enim Chrysippus, cetera nata esse
hominum causa et deorum, eos autem communitatis et societatis suae, ut
bestiis homines uti ad utilitatem suam possint sine iniuria. (Fin. 3.67)
But just as they (scil. the Stoics) hold that man is united with man by the
bonds of right, so they consider that no right exists as between man and
beast. For Chrysippus well said, that all other things were created for the
sake of men and gods, but that these exist for their own mutual fellowship
and society, so that men can make use of beasts for their own purposes
without injustice. (trsnl. Rackham [1951]).
Animals nevertheless play a prominent role in Cato’s discourse and in
Stoic arguments generally. Despite their radical marginalisation as
irrational agents, they are continuously cited as evidence for pivotal ethical
principles. A few paragraphs before making the anthropocentric claim just
quoted, for instance, Cato mentions the caring attitude of non-human
beings towards their offspring as a proof of the naturalness of parental
love. Interestingly, he reports the Stoic belief that ‘when we observe the
labor that animals spend on bearing and rearing their young, we seem to be
listening to the actual voice of nature’ (naturae ipsius vocem, Fin. 3.62).
Although in the De finibus Cicero contradicts both the Stoic and the
Epicurean ideals of moral good, abstaining from making any explicit
statement on his own preference,53 his above-mentioned appreciation of
Bees (2004). On the role of animals in this theory see Sorabji (1993) 122-33. In
recent times, Algra (2003) has convincingly called for a comprehensive
contextualisation of the “mechanism of social appropriation” as a central issue of
ancient ethics, far beyond the specific problem of the Stoics’ debt to the
Aristotelian tradition—a problem famously raised in Book 5 of the De finibus: see
Magnaldi (1991), and Lévy (1992) 381-7.
53
Even Antiochus’ system, carefully illustrated by Piso in Book 5, is criticised by
Cicero in the second part of the same book. A perceptive discussion of Cicero’s
philosophical position at the time he wrote the De finibus is offered by Lévy
68
Chapter Three
Stoic cosmology predisposes us to take similar assumptions into proper
account.
On the one hand, Cicero seems to accept the tenets of Stoic rationalist
universalism, as this allows him to support a cosmopolitan idea of law,
justice, and political community, which is totally consistent with the
Roman experience.54 The severe denigration of animals discussed so far is
a necessary corollary to this fundamental proposition. On the other hand,
however, the inherent ambiguity of the Stoic appeal to natural law
reverberates through Cicero’s own philosophical arguments. 55 It is
noteworthy that when Cato illustrates the natural foundations of human
altruism—a point important for Cicero’s model of humanitas and
imperialist tutelage—the image of the bulls taking care of their offspring is
coupled with that of philanthropic heroes such as Hercules and Liber:
Ita non solum ad discendum propensi sumus, verum etiam ad docendum.
Atque ut tauris natura datum est ut pro vitulis contra leones summa vi
impetuque contendant, sic ii, qui valent opibus atque id facere possunt, ut
de Hercule et de Libero accepimus, ad servandum genus hominum natura
incitantur. (Fin. 3.66).
So strong is our propensity not only to learn but also to teach. And just as
bulls have a natural instinct to fight with all their strength and force in
defending their calves against lions, so men of exceptional gifts and
capacity for service, like Hercules and Liber in the legends, feel a natural
impulse to be the protectors of the human race. (trsnl. Rackham [1951]).
Once again, animals are said to mirror a physical truth of social and
political relevance. Their paradigmatic behaviour serves as an inspiring
myth, in an epistemological sense, along with the deeds of mythological
(1992) 377-444. According to Lévy, “c’est dans le refus de donner une adhésion
définitive à l’Ancienne Académie ou au Portique et dans la volonté de dépasser le
dilemme que se trouve le Cicéron de la Nouvelle Académie” (443).
54
Cicero’s efforts to rework the Stoic idea of natural law in view of Rome’s
international role have been sensibly highlighted by Watson (1996) 225-34. For a
penetrating survey of the evidence provided by the De legibus and De re publica
see Ferrary (1995) 68-70.
55
On the ambiguities of the Stoic ideal of a “reason that accords consistently with
Nature’” see Long (1996a) 150-1. As Holowchak (2008) 38, observed, the Stoics
“speak of ‘nature’ both normatively and descriptively. […] The ambiguity is
captured in two senses of Stoic naturalism in today’s literature—cosmological and
anthropological naturalism”.
Vox naturae: The Myth of Animal Nature in the Late Roman Republic
69
figures traditionally associated with the process of culturalisation.56
In the intellectual debate of the late Republic, the Stoic identification
of animals with the “voice of Nature”, in combination with a rationalist
and providential view of social life, must have sounded particularly
attractive. While arguing for the cosmological supremacy of mankind (as
well as for the humanist vocation of the most powerful human beings),
Cicero, engaged intellectual as he was, enlisted the aid of the legitimising
myth of Nature and its “zoological” basis. His strenuous efforts as a
political thinker were consistently supported by the folk view of animality
as a pre-cultural and archetypal condition. However, Cicero himself tells
us that the evidence provided by animals concerning natural truths was
highly controversial. In the second book of the De finibus, where the
Epicurean view of catastematic pleasure as the supreme good is confuted,
Epicurus is said to have regarded animals and children as ‘mirrors of
nature’ (specula naturae). 57 And we know that the use of zoological
arguments in support of ethical and scientific doctrines was a common
practice of Cicero’s pugnacious contemporaries, Lucretius and Philodemus.
They both seem to have put into effect Epicurus’ exhortation for careful
consideration of elementary beings.58
4. The importance of being animals. Lucretius
the Epicurean against the mystique of logos
For the purposes of the present survey, it may suffice to discuss an
especially eloquent passage from Lucretius’ De rerum natura. Indeed,
while expounding the contents of Epicurean philosophy for the benefit of
Roman readers, Lucretius makes numerous references to the paradigmatic
value of animals, since he regards these as both analogical images of
physical truths and morally significant agents. As I have dealt elsewhere
56
On Hercules’ characterisation as a civiliser hero and its aftermath in the Roman
tradition see Galinsky (1972) 126-52. Sallust’s use of the Hercules myth in his
African excursus has already been mentioned (cf. above n. 27). And such a
politically significant myth becomes even more prominent from the Augustan age
onwards.
57
Fin. 2.32
58
On the Epicurean attitude towards animals and its original combination of
primitivist and rationalist ideas see Dierauer (1977) 194-8. Generally speaking,
though Epicurus’ philosophy calls attention to every living being’s tendencies and
emotional faculties, its understanding and practice require a proper use of reason.
See also Annas (1993) 61-2.
70
Chapter Three
with the ideological implications of the poet’s attitude to animals,59 I shall
not insist further on this point. Nonetheless, it is worth mentioning here
that Lucretius’ use of animal figures was aimed at achieving a very
different goal from the demonstration of man’s superior position. Unlike
Cicero and Sallust, the Epicurean poet does not aim to remind human
beings of any cosmological privilege—for he simply believes that no
cosmological privilege exists.
As is well-known, Lucretius’ atomistic world relies on purely material
processes of transformation, excluding any providential or metaphysical
principle. Neither is man’s upright posture a sign of divine will, nor is
reason a gift reflecting a teleological plan. Of course, Lucretius glorifies
the role of ratio as a cognitive instrument allowing mankind to understand
Epicurus’ precepts (and thus to live ‘a life worthy of the gods’).60 But our
author considers rationality an inherited biological trait like the lions’
bravery or the deer’s timidity.61 In more general terms, Lucretius seems to
suggest a basic ontological continuity between human and non-human
beings, arguing that both emerged out of a process of spontaneous
generation.62 Differences of degree—not a physiological gap—are said to
separate men and animals.
Lucretius’ famous account of the origin of language can persuasively
illustrate the far-reaching repercussions of a similar view as well as its
notable originality in the context of late Republican thought. As mentioned
earlier, Cicero gives special prominence to the linguistic side of Greek
ς, thus reflecting the ideals of a society largely based on the political
use of language. By contrast, Lucretius takes up the Epicurean view that
linguistic expression originated accidentally from spontaneous attempts to
communicate and developed by trial and error.63 According to the poet,
human language differs from animal expressivity because of its more
59
See Tutrone (2012) 27-154. Important remarks on the subject can also be found
in Saylor (1972), Segal (1986), Gale (1991), Shelton (1996), and Scafoglio (this
volume)
60
Cf. DRN 3.314-22. Lucretius’ enthusiastic assertion that Epicurean philosophy
can lead to a god-like life (digna dis vita) has inspired the title of Konstan’s
insightful research on Epicurus’ materialistic psychology: Konstan (2008).
61
Ibid. 3.741-53. On this passage and its ethological background see Schrijvers
(1999) 40-54.
62
See the scientific cosmogony at 5.783-825, and the perspicuous comments of
Waszink (1964), Schrijvers (1999) 1-15, and Campbell (2003) 41-90. On the
ancient doctrine of spontaneous generation see Sissa (1997).
63
On the Epicurean theory of the origin of language, with special regard to
Lucretius’ exposition, see Schrijvers (1999) 55-80, Verlinsky (2005), and
Reihnardt (2008).
Vox naturae: The Myth of Animal Nature in the Late Roman Republic
71
sophisticated character, but both phenomena share the same natural root. It
is on the basis of such cogent analogy that Lucretius draws a strikingly
lively picture of animal behaviour:64
Postremo quid in hac mirabile tantoperest re,/ si genus humanum, cui vox
et lingua vigeret,/ pro vario sensu varia res voce notaret?/ Cum pecudes
mutae, cum denique saecla ferarum/ dissimilis soleant voces variasque
ciere,/ cum metus aut dolor est et cum iam gaudia gliscunt./ Quippe et
enim licet id rebus cognoscere apertis./ Inritata canum cum primum
magna Molossum/ mollia ricta fremunt duros nudantia dentes,/ longe alio
sonitu rabies restricta minatur,/ et cum iam latrant et vocibus omnia
complent;/ at catulos blande cum lingua lambere temptant/ aut ubi eos
lactant, pedibus morsuque potentes/ suspensis teneros imitantur dentibus
haustus,/ longe alio pacto gannitu vocis adulant,/ et cum deserti baubantur
in aedibus, aut cum/ plorantis fugiunt summisso corpore plagas./ Denique
non hinnitus item differre videtur,/ inter equas ubi equus florenti aetate
iuvencus/ pinnigeri saevit calcaribus ictus Amoris/ et fremitum patulis sub
naribus edit ad arma,/ et cum sic alias concussis artibus hinnit?/ Postremo
genus alituum variaeque volucres,/ accipitres atque ossifragae mergique
marinis/ fluctibus in salso victum vitamque petentes,/ longe alias alio
iaciunt in tempore voces,/ et quom de victu certant praedaque repugnant./
Et partim mutant cum tempestatibus una/ raucisonos cantus, cornicum ut
saecla vetusta/ corvorumque gregis ubi aquam dicuntur et imbris/ poscere
et inter dum ventos aurasque vocare./ Ergo si varii sensus animalia
cogunt,/ muta tamen cum sint, varias emittere voces,/ quanto mortalis
magis aequumst tum potuisse/ dissimilis alia atque alia res voce notare!
(DRN 5.1056-90).
Lastly, what is so wonderful/ if the human race, with vigorous voice and
tongue/ endowed, should mark things out with voices/ differing according
to their different feelings? Dumb cattle and wild beasts of every kind/
make noises quite distinct and different/ when they are gripped by fear or
pain, or joy/ wells up within them. And the evidence/ for this lies in plain
facts well known to all./ Angry Molossian hounds, when first they draw
back/ their flabby jowls and bare their teeth and growl/ with rage
suppressed, make sounds quite different/ from when they bark and fill the
place with din./ And when they lick their pups with loving tongue/ and toss
them with paws and nibbling them/ pretend to make sweet tender
mouthfuls of them,/ far different then the playful yelps they make/ from
when they howl abandoned in the house/ or whimper cringing from the
master’s whip./ In neighing too, there is a difference/ when a young
64
To all appearances, Aymard (1951) 104, did not go too far in defining these lines
as “la description la plus vivante et la plus nuancée de l’animal que nous ait laissée
la littérature latine”.
72
Chapter Three
stallion in the prime of life/ pricked by the spurs of winged love runs wild/
among the mares, and from his flaring nostrils/ snorts out his challenge to
arms, and when he’s weak/ at other times and neighs with quaking limbs./
Lastly, among the different types of birds,/ ospreys, sea hawks, and gulls
amid waves/ seeking their life and living from the sea,/ at other times make
very different cries/ from when they are fishing and struggling with their
prey./ And some birds change their voices with the weather, as ancient
ravens do and flocks of rooks,/ or so they say, when they cry out for rain/
to bring them water, or summon wind and storm./ Therefore if animals are
caused by different feelings, dumb though they be, to utter different sounds,
so much the more and with compelling reason/ must we suppose that men
could in those days/ mark different things by different sounds of speech.
(trnsl. Melville [1997]).
As Elisabeth de Fontenay remarked, in this passage “the constraints of
theory have given way to the pleasure of letting animals enter the poem”.65
In effect, our poet is frequently inclined to put forth similar “ethological”
arguments, for in the De rerum natura, too, animals appear as mirrors and
voices of natural truths, contributing substantially to the reader’s epistemic
advancement. When attacking and deconstructing, by means of a powerful
animal imagery, the widespread view of language as a providential
prerogative, Lucretius openly challenges the mystique of
ς established
by other contemporary thinkers under the influence of Stoic and Platonic
tenets. 66 It would be unforgivably reductive to see the author’s vivid
demonstration of Epicurus’ doctrine as a piece of perfunctory (if not
doxographic) divulgation 67 —especially because Lucretius’ emphasis on
65
De Fontenay (1998) 129.
In the all-embracing interpretation of Moatti (1997), esp. 301-16, a
methodological appeal to reason and rationalistic systematisations underpins the
Roman intellectuals’ varied responses to the late Republican crisis. The increasing
interest in physical research, usually founded on an anthropocentric perspective,
would be one of the main signs of this cultural phenomenon. However, in contrast
with the mainstream, Lucretius—whose stand is recurrently labelled as “radical”
and “dogmatic” by Moatti (cf. 46; 169-74)—seems to intensify the anti-finalistic
polemics of Epicurean philosophy, promoting an alternative concept of nature and
rationality. See Tutrone (2012) 113-54.
67
While it is clear that Lucretius’ creative exposition of Epicurean views is far
removed from doxography sensu proprio, scholars have variously remarked on the
role of doxographic writings in the construction of the poet’s arguments; see e.g.
Rösler (1973), Mansfeld (1990) 3143-54, and Runia (1997). No doubt, compendia
and résumés of various kinds were commonly used by Latin writers in Lucretius’
day, and it would be quite odd to suppose that our poet made no use of them.
Nevertheless, as Lévy (1996b) warned, their influence as a source of philosophical
66
Vox naturae: The Myth of Animal Nature in the Late Roman Republic
73
animal communication and his neglect of mankind’s linguistic development
are a unicum in the Epicurean tradition.68
In De rerum natura Book 5, Lucretius deals with several problems of
socio-anthropological interest, and his careful treatment is inextricably
linked to the dynamics of the Roman debate. Like Sallust, Cicero, and
Varro,69 the Epicurean poet engages in a complex reconstruction of the
earliest phases of human history, paying special attention to the process of
culturalisation by which mankind overcame its original beastliness.70 The
discussion on the origin of language is a key section of this fascinating
reconstruction. Though it is clear that Lucretius rearranges the materialist
and casualist anthropology developed in classical thought since the fifth
century BCE, a wide-ranging scholarly discussion has arisen over the
sources and ideology of Lucretius’ account.71 If we enlarge the scope of
knowledge should not be overrated, nor is it safe to see all such works as belonging
to a linear and unitary heritage. Runia’s assumptions (99-102) concerning the role
of the Placita in Philo of Alexandria, Cicero, Lucretius, and even Catullus
eloquently exemplify the conceptual “reductionism” of a similar approach. It is
also significant that on the basis of his phylogenetic connections, Runia (98)
adheres to the thesis argued in Furley (1978) on the outdatedness of Lucretius’
arguments—a thesis further developed by Sedley (1998).
68
The comparison with Epicurus, Ep. Herod. 75-76, Diogenes of Oinoanda, fr.
12.col 2.11-col 5.14 Smith, and Diodorus Siculus, Bibl. 1.8.3-4, is particularly
striking. Though a large part of the Epicurean literature dealing with linguistic
issues is now lost, Lucretius’ focus on the “animal” stage of language—in spite of
Epicurus’ notes on human peculiarities—can hardly be explained without referring
to the poet’s polemic with late Republican humanism. See Novara (1982) I 351-2,
and Lehmann (2004) 48-9.
69
The evidence provided by Varro concerning the late Republican attitude to
cultural history deserves much more careful attention than one can devote here.
The De re rustica shows that this erudite “archaeologist of memory and language”
(cf. Moatti [1997] 143) offered a stage-by-stage account of the origins of human
society, presumably indebted to the Peripatetic Dicaearchus of Messana (cf. Rust.
1.2.15-6; 2.1.3-10). Varro’s interest in historical and anthropological matters (also
emerging from the etymological explanations of De lingua latina) relies on his
epoch-making investigations of early Roman history. It is indeed regrettable that
only scattered fragments of Varro’s monumental Antiquitates survived. In all
likelihood, the author elaborated a sophisticated interpretation of the myth of
Saturn’s age and discussed the development of civilisation with special regard to
the evolution of technical knowledge. See Reischl (1976) 82-142, Novara (1982) I
445-70, and Van Nuffelen (2010) 167-8.
70
5.925-1457.
71
It may suffice to mention the thorough surveys by Furley (1978), Sasso (1979),
and Manuwald (1980).
74
Chapter Three
our inquiry, however, we can easily see that defining the intrinsic “degree
of animality” of human beings—as well as the reasons for a re-emergence
of man’s savage nature—was a common purpose of Roman intellectuals in
the age of civil wars. The infraction and implosion of standard cultural
rules, due to violent political changes, inevitably led to a rethinking of the
borders between humanity and naturality.
In the lines immediately preceding our passage, 5.925-1027, Lucretius
notably describes the life of early men (who, like other animals, are said to
have been born from the earth) and remarks that ‘they wandered in the
way of beasts’ (volgivago vitam tractabant more ferarum, 5.932).
Compared to the men of the poet’s day, however, such beast-like humans
seem far less aggressive, for Lucretius sarcastically notes (cf. 5.999-1010)
that they had no experience of war, sailing, excessive wealth, and
malicious poisonings. Even if one might surmise that polemical comments
of this kind recurred in some of the author’s sources (as ethical-didactic
aims have been inherent in the reconstructions of primitive history since
the beginning of Greek literature),72 they must have sounded particularly
meaningful in first-century Rome.
Later on, at 5.1011-27, Lucretius maintains that the creation of parental
and social bonds softened the brutal nature of primitive mankind. 73
Nevertheless, it is clear that neither the creation of human society nor the
development of linguistic communication caused relevant discontinuities
in man’s intrinsically animal status. According to the poet, the human race
can wholly fulfil its vocation to reason (which is seen as a special, but not
providential condition) only by accepting and practising Epicurus’ word.
On the other hand, when irrational and destructive inclinations prevail,
men seem to degenerate into something worse than animals. Lucretius’
moralising reconstruction of primitive history includes a wild-eyed
72
By and large, moral and ideological principles (perceived as relevant to the
writer’s present) underpinned ancient histories of civilisation. This is true of both
the main forms of genealogical account discussed by Classical authors (forms, of
course, overlapping each other): the so-called golden age myth, which emphasised
mankind’s gradual decadence from its original happiness, and the theory of human
primitive animality, which pointed to the role of progress, knowledge, and material
circumstances (see Boys-Stones [2001] 3-27). While the former view was deeprooted in ancient religious thought and appeared as early as Hesiod (see Gatz
[1967], and now Currie [2012]), the latter was characteristic of the anti-teleological
tradition (to which Lucretius belongs) and originated from sophistic-presocratic
rationalism—perhaps from Democritus’ anthropology: cf. Cole (1967) and
Cartledge (1998) 20-5.
73
On this section and its relationship to Epicurean contractualism see Campbell
(2003) 252-83.
Vox naturae: The Myth of Animal Nature in the Late Roman Republic
75
depiction of the use of animals in early warfare which powerfully
corroborates this last assumption. In such an impressive passage, even
savage beasts like lions and boars become instruments and victims of
man’s senseless violence.74
Lucretius might well have agreed with Cicero on the dangers of moral
regression resulting from the repudiation of reason.75 But the Epicurean
poet rejected the idea that embracing an anthropocentric cosmology could
contribute to avoidance of such degeneration. Rather than this, he
preferred to put his trust in Epicurus’ irenic hedonism, arguing for an antiteleological and materialistic view of the cosmos. The inconstant and
vacillating image of animals he projected can be interpreted as supporting
both Cicero’s humanism and Lucretius’ physicalism, for in each of these
cases—as in most Western traditions—animals were cited as evidence of
underlying imperatives: the irresistible voice of a mythical Nature.
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