The Master of the Senate: Lyndon Baines Johnson, seen here in a 1954 photo, ran a presidential campaign in 1960 that was far more successful than previously thought. Using foreign policy as an issue and pushing an image that emphasized his experience, he delivered
several blows that bloodied the effort of Senator John F. Kennedy in a race for the
Democratic nomination. Later, as the vice presidential nominee of his party, Johnson used
world affairs again to turn back Republican efforts in the South.Phologruph ccrurtesy of
Edward Burks, LBJ Library CoUeclion, Austin, Texas.
IAyndonJohnson, Foreign Policy, and the
Election of I g 60
S POl.I'rI(;;\L.
ISSlIES, A\IERI(:AN FOREI(;N RELA'TIONS
ARE: OFTEN T H E SIJR-
ject of intense national debate. Since it is a matter of national interest, foreign policy is discussed across the country often at both the state
and local levels. This discussion normally takes place as part of an election for the U.S. House o f Representatives o r the Senate. Anyone running f o r o n e of these offices rnust have some positions about, a n d
understanding of', Arner~ca'splace in the world. Lyndon Baines J o h n s o n
was n o dilfer-cnt. He had years of experience in foreign relations as a
mernber of the legislative branch, and his understanding of the subject
came fi-oln this background. When he ran for president of the United
States, hc had his own tiistinct vision of what. course the United States
should pursue in world affhirs. These ideas reflected a fairly sophisticated understanding of international relations. He also unclerstood how to
use foreign policy to his political advantage, and he cleverly did so first
opposite Sell. .John F. Kennedy of Massachusett~in an effort to win the
Democl-atic rlomination, a n d t h e n , t o ~ r l u c hgreater effect, against
Richard Nixon as a membel- of the national ticket in the general election. In short, he undel-stood fixeign affairs as both a policy and a political issue.
Previous accounts of this election have f'ailed to give Johnson d u e
credit. Most writers have concentrated o n the Nixon-Kennedy confrontation in the general election. This focus started with Theodore
White's 7%(~~ t f < ~ k iofn g~ / L PPrrsident, 1960. This work makes little mention
'N~chol,r\ t.vdn
S~I-drrtakrh15 a n ahslstarrt PI-ofrssor in tllr d r p r t m r n t of hlsroiy at I r x a s
.AXr&l I:r~~\rih~t\-(:orrimrrcr.
H r I \ curl-rrrtlv WI-~tirrg
a book about Rict1a1-tiN ~ x o arld
r ~ spo~-ts.
Tllr
aurhol- \voultl l ~ h to
r tllaril Rogcl- U~ngnran.Pa111 Nrwrrldn. Maciinco M a ~ o r rarrd
,
t h r anoriyrnorls
rrvlrwrrr of rhr .YHQ to1 thrll- corrlrlrrrrtc. T h r Jollrlsor~Rrsr;irctr Fourrdat~or~
provided a gl-ant
w h ~ c hallo\vr(l Inr to ( . ~ ~ r ~ tsir~~~pcptl r l ~ ~ r I-rhrnrch.
~ ~ t d n M r n ~ b r l - sot t h r J o h n s o n . Eisrrihowrr.
p r d1 1 1 ~111 \ o r ~ l a r ~Wy ~ V Srhat 1 1 woulti b r d~fticultto 1151 t h r ~ nall.
drld lirnlicd\ ~ . I ~ I - . IlI~I r~l S
Nrvr~-thvlra\,I a m tlrrf)lv g ~ , i t r t u lto1 .111 I I I ~ I I nsslsuncr.
-
Vor.. CIII, so.
2
SOUTEI\\~ESTERN
HIS~ORIC:AI.
QVAK~ERLY
OC~ O H E K ,i 999
144
Southurertm~H~stoncalQuart~rly
October
of international re1ations.l Arthur M. Schlesinger and Theodore C.
Sorensen, the semi-official historians of Camelot, argue that foreign policv and Kennedy's wise decision to select Lyndon Johnson for the second spot on the ticket were two major reasons he beat Vice President
Richard M. Nixon In the general election.' Other than saying Johnson
was a vigorous campaigner, these writers never explain how Johnson
contributed to the victory. In their subsequent scholarly studies, Kent M.
Beck and Robert A. Divine have challenged the idea that the Massachusetts senator handled the matter well. According to Divine,
"Foreign policy, rather than contributing to Kennedy's victory, cost him
votes and transformed a nearly certain triumph into a cliffl~anger."'He
contends Johnson was a nonfactor in the debate on foreign policy that
fall, a view others have accepted.+At the national level Divine's argument is essentially correct, but the electoral college makes reponal outcomes of equal, if not greater importance.
New information requires a reassessment. Regional newspapers and
documents uncovered in the mass of material at the Johnson Presidential Library, including the papers of John Connally, his campaign manager, show that foreign policy played an important role in the Johnson
campaigns of 1960. Other documents in the Nixon pre-presidential collection in the National Archives, and the Eisenhower and Kennedy Presidential Libraries make it clear that Johnson had a key role in the debate
on foreign policy. Put together, this material helps explain the outcome
of an extremely tight presidential campaign.
Since he was a domestic politician, first and foremost, it is easy to
assume that 1,yndon Johnson had little interest or experience in international affairs. Such was not the case. A quick examination of his background will show that he actually had a good deal of experience in this
area. The idea that he knew little of foreign relations is hardly new, and
the suggestion always angered him. "I suppose sitting in on all those
' Theodorr I ~ i .White, 7 % iLlnkin,g
~
/I/ lhr Prr\zdrnl. ~ ( l h o
(Nrw York: Athrnrurr~ Puhlishrrs.
1q61).
'Arthur h.1. Sctilr\lngrl- / I - . . '4 '/%ot~tn?zrl
/lag\ (Boston: l-lo~ightor~
Mifflin. 1 ~ ~ 1 5 5Throdorr
);
(:.
Sorrnsrl~,Knlnuriy (Nrw York: Harper & Row. 1gli.5).
' Kent M. 8rck. "Nrcrssary Llrs, Hlddrn Truths: (:uba in the I yfio (:arnpaign,'" Dz~~lornntzr
Hz\lov, H (M'l~lter.I 9 8 4 ) . :(7-5%); Rohrl-t A. Divinr. F i r z p Pobcs a11d U.5. Prr~ihnli(l1Ll~c[zon.\.voI.
2. 1 9 7 2 - 1 9 6 0 (Nrw Yo1 k : New Virwpolne, I 974). 286.
'[)oris Krarns, I . y ~ l ~ l oH.?,/ohn\orr
~
and Ihr Ammcr~nDrrom (New York: Harper & Row, 197fi);
Mel-lr Millrr. I.jt~rlr~?t:
An 01-al Riogr/~j~hy
(New YOI-k:Putnarn, 1980); Paul K. (:onkin, Bzg 1)arlds
/ram lhr IWrmrrlr\: I.y~rtlon1in111uc/ohlz.w)n (Boston: Twayne Publishers. 1qX6);Robert Dallrk, I.unr
.Sku I<ztzng: l1.?7t(lo7t/ohn.\otr ~rrrltfilir 7'imrr (Nrw York: Oxford University Press, 1yg1 ); Kathlrcn
Hall ,]arnlrbor~,thl-ko~nrt,q
lhc Prr\~rlun/-).:A tfi\lm7. and (,'nlicbm o/ P~u.si(lrnlzn1Cnmf~ozgnAduwliring
( N e w YOI-k:O x t o ~ c lIlnivrr?lltv PI-rss, 1 q 8 q ) ; Strphrn E. Arrlbrose, ~Vzxon:Thr I;/Lucnlzon o/ o
Polilirznn. 191 3 - 1 9 6 2 ( N r w York: Sirnon a n d Schuster, 1 q 8 7 ) ; Herhrrt S . P a r ~ n e t ./ark: Thu
Slrugqh (11/ohn I.: Krt~nr/ls(Nrw York: Dial Prrss. 19Xo); I lrrhrrr S. Parmrt. Kichc~1-d~Vixonnnrl
Hz.\ A ~ n m c n(Boston: 1.1ttlr.BI-own. ~ q > ) o )
1999
I,vt1(1ot1Johnson, Foreign Policy, und the Elertzorl o f 1 9 6 0
149
meetings with Eisenhower and passing on foreign aid and every major
foreign policy bill in the last twenty years isn't good experience," h e
said, annoyed. As he noted several times in I 960, he had served o n committees concel-necl with national defense throughout his entire congressional career. These bodies ranged from the House Naval Aff'airs
Committee, to the jolrlt congressional investigation of Gen. Douglas
MacArthul-'s 1.emova1fi-om command. Johnson also did Inore than sit in
o n some hearings. O n sevel-a1 occasions h e used his influence in
Washington to get resu1t-s. In 1939 and iyqo, he helped a large number
of German and Polish Jews get out of Eul-ope and into the United States.
Although he disliked reading, his staff kept him up to date on current
scholarly views about national defense policy, which he often cited in
Senate debates. While Amel-icans might have focused on his domestic
record, foreigners saw othelwise. In an account of the presidential campaign in Texas, the 7i'nre.y of'L,ondon noted that he had a strong interest
in worlcl events.:,
An examination of his pliblic statements will also show that he had a
far lnorc sopl~isticatedunderstanding of the American role in world
events than is generally believed. He was a strong anti-Communist, and
had no I-eservations about American post-war foreign policy. Like many
other cold war warriors he was an ardent advocate of keeping the armed
services well f ~ ~ n d and
e d developed. Indeed, he considered it a necessity.
"Con~rn~tnisln
has not been able to overpower the world because of our
I-esolve in the zu-eas of military strength," he told a Houston crowd in
"159."
He recognizeti, however, that the military was an instrument that serviced a larger political purpose, and that the cold war was a manifestation of ideological and political diffel-ences between the United States
and the So~.ietUnion. As such, any American victory in this conflict
would l ~ epolitical in nature. "C:ommlinism must not be able to evescome the world with handshakes and smiles and campaign promises
because o f o u r lack of resolve iri the areas of political affairs." T h e
United States ncetlcd a strorlg military "behind which we can and
indeed must, take positive steps toward a peaceful future." he told a veterans' organization in 1960. "Weapons will bring us a truce-a truce
which is PI-ef'ci-ableto the destruction of oul- way of life, but we will meet
our respor~sit~ilitics
only if' we use that tl-uce to b11ild toward a world in
150
.So11ti17or.c tt,w
t~lJ.tot~i(~(11
Qu~rt~rly
October
which men can live together in understantling and the weapons become
merely dusty imllsellnl pieces.";
The problem he had with current policy was that i t offcrecl neither
resolution to, o r victoiy in the cold war. "There is a depressing lack of
vital new idcas in o u r foreign policy," he stated. "M'hat we are doing is
commendable. The, people who are carrying o u t oui- pi-ograms are
devoted and pall-iotic. Rut I cannot find the bold steps that would reach
h oworld."h
~~t
the heara antl souls of' men ~ h r o ~ ~ gthe
His own responsc was to propose multilateral hlimanitarian aide projects, which wo111tl inclllde the Sovict Union. These programs would
channel and direct thc conf'rontation between the two count.ries into
areas of political colnpetition. He proposed to challenge thc Soviets to
join the U . S . in the scientific exploration of space, and in providing
~ral
to ~~ndcr.de\.eloped
countries. "I
medical antl a g r i c ~ ~ l t ~assistance
think i t is incumbent 11po1111s. as the Icaclcl- of the free world. and one
of' the stronger nations, to propose great programs, t111.ough the United
Xations, that would stamp o ~ killing
~ t and crippling disease," he said
from the floor of the Scnatc in 1960. l i m Mathis. ;I reporter fi-om the
Houston Post assignc.tl to cover the scrl;~ror,noted "co-operative international effoi-t is gi-atll~allybeing developed by Johnson as his uriiq~lcloreign relatioils policv."',
lohnson hat1 a clistinctivc vision oi' the fill-eign policy he wanted to
p11rs11cas prcsidenl, but political L~ctorsmade i t difficult for him to
interject them into the campaign as ;I candidate. He had a serious poIitical limitation t h a ~hat1 a nlajor imp;\ct o n campaign stl-ate<gy.Unlike
Kc:niicdv he \vas nlorr t11arlj11st onc of a hundred senators. H e was the
majority lcad(.r. ancl with that joh camc a number of responsibilities that
were liabilities in a campaign. H e had to be phvsicallv present in
Washington, tnakilq i t d i f t i c ~ ~for
l t him to travel and campaign. Regular
abscnccs from the (:ap~toiwo~ll(lc.omp11cate the legislative process. if'
not bring i t to a halt. He hiid an additional concern. if he wcrc an
annollnced c.antlidatc t~ortnallegislative votes wo111dtake on more political and p;~i.risatisignific:ance than would otheiwise I,c the case."'
Anothei- coi~sitlcratioilthat shaped Johnson's campnirn planning was
his geograpllicnllv liiriited support. <;eoi-ge C;allllpls public- opinion polls
also indicatctl that hc 11ad a weak national political base. Johnson con-
"'Iiiri. 20. 101io 1)oIl. l..cl> zli, I O ( ~ Opoll, b t d ~ 27,
.
I : ) I ~ I ) poll, ,4171-211, I O ( ~ I Ipoll, Ma\ 27, 101io
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1 2
Sor~thro~.cteni
Historicnl @ ~ n f l ~ r l j
October
in the Wisconsin primary and would probably win in West Virginia, but
these states had fcwer combined delegates than Texas. Given Johnson's
strength in the South and popularity in western states, Duckworth predicted that the senator woultl win a second-ballot victory after delegates
had honored their prelirninaq commitments to vote for favorite son
candidates. "So, in spite of the opinion polls and the preferential prirnary headlines, Johnson of Texas is still among top runners and may well
be the next 1)enlocratic nonlinee for president of the United States," he
concluded. h non nth latel-, the Houston Post reported thatJohnson actually had the lead in tlelegates. T h e article included an acknowledgment
from a n a n o n y n o u s Kennedy campaign source that Johnson held a
was quick to add that the Massachusetts
slight lead, hut the indivitl~~al
senator had much greater potential and would quickly overconle the
Texan. I:'
Clever politician that he was, Johnson turned the limiting factor of his
job responsibilities into an asset. When I ~ d yBird Johnson visited the
University of Texas in May I 960, a female reporter from the Dnib Texnrt,
the school paper, asked her- when her husband would announce as a
candidate. "My dear, 1'111 sure I (Ion't know," she I-esponded. "Someone
has to keep the stol-c. T h e sixty-three Democrats in the Senate have
given him a sizable ,job. He wants to d o the best he can." Two weeks
later, Johnson gave a similal- answer while appearing o n the "Face the
Nation" tcle1-ision program. He said his duties as majority leader of the
U.S. Senate de~nancledthat he stay in Washington: "Somebody must stay
there and tent1 the store. And tltc I-esponsibilityfalls llpon the Leader to
d o this." hlathis o f the Houston Post noted that there was no real need
for Johnso11 to nlake a f'or~naldeclal-ation; his repeated weekend jaunts
were a clear c-xprcssion of his intentions.14
F o r e i g n policy was o n e of t h e most i m p o r t a n t c o m p o n e n t s in
Johnson's stealth s t r a t e z , and for all practical purposes he started his
I 960 presidential campaign shortly after the I 958 midterm elections.
Fi~llyaware tl~al.the puhlic consitler-ed expertise in world affairs a major
requil-emerlt o i any presidential canditlate, hc began working to build a
strongel- I-eput;itio~lin this ficld. He wanted to speak to the United
Nations o n space exploration. He sent a n aide to talk with United
Nations a~nbassadol-I-len~y(:allot Lodgc ahout this idea. He also had his
frieriti, Sen. \li!ir hlanstield, thc Montana 1)emocrat. contact the State
Department a1,out 1.1icspeech. While others in thc administration supported the iclc-a,Scc. of' State Jotln Foster l)ulles had resc~vations."He is
"Dallas / \ I I I ~ ~ I ~ I I , ~ . \ , Z Frb.
I I ) , .5,I c l ( ; i ~ ( q ~ i ~ ~ t a t i ~o~r O~I)I;S I I t'o.sl,
I I ~ b1;11.. 2 8 , I 01io.
rnoving in hard and rapidly in this field," Dulles said. "This in itself' is
very extraordinary." After Eisenhower approved the request, Dulles
warned the administration about the irnpact of this decision. "Let's
don't fool ourselves here. They are beginning to build up for 1960." He
admitted, however, that Johnson was the lesser of two evils. "If you are
going to I~uildanybody u p it is bettel- to build Jlohnson] u p and his
group than [Sen. Hubert] Humphrey and people like that.");
Johnson also improved his knowledgc of foreign affairs. Mansfield
started briefing him. Sometimes these briefings were nothing more than
copies of' Mansfielil's Senate speeches, at other times they were detailed
memos. It is tinclear from the d o c ~ ~ m e r iwhen
ts
this pl-ocess began.
While he may have started as early as February of 1959, Mansfield was
deal-ly keeping Johnson al~reastof foreign relations in 1960, and well
into the latter's tenlire as \:ice president. Johnson also sought the advice
of Sen. J . William Fulbright of Arkansas, chairman o f t h e Senate Foreign
Relations (:o~n~nittee.
Johnson once described their relationship: "Bill's
~ n Sy e c r e l a ~o t~State.""'
These efforts wel-c wise. George Gallup's public opinion polls found
that natior~aldeltnse, foreign policy, and peace were the most important issues to the electoi-ate.17Other sanlplirigs taken in the late spring
a n d carlv s u m m e r of' I g(jo showcd that a s t r o n g plurality of' the
America11 people considered Repul~licansin general. and Nixon in particular, lxtter at handling world affairs than ar13Dcmocrat.lY
Just as the Gallup took these samplings, a fortuitous national crisis
suddcnly bolstered J o h n s o n ' s candidacv just two months l ~ e f o r et h e
Democratic national con\:ention. The air defenses of the Soviet Union
downed ;1n .-kne~.icanL-2 spy planc on a reconnaissance mission for the
Central Intelligence Agency. After exposing the American cover- story
about a missing weat11c1-plane as a lie, Soviet Prernier Nikita Khl-ushchev
used this violation of Soviet air space as a pretext to scuttle a planned
sunl~nitn ~ c c t i ~ with
l g Eisenhower in Paris. ~ o h n s o nused the I-csulting
national hu~niliationto present hiinself as a statesman on international
affairs, and damage thc Kennedv campaign
"'Alat~\l~?l(l
\ ~ ~ I I I O I ~ I I I I ~ ISrpt.
II~I, I I , I
I . 4 1 i k r h l a ~ ~ h f ~ rFl (~l ~ ~ rPolicy
i x r ~t31icts F o l r l r ~ ~Box
.
( : ~ ~ I ~ I FIIc,,
~ \ l.B[
~ I . AI I (~! I ~I\ ? >I ~
!l.B[L);
I ~ H;IVII?\ ~ o t 1 1 i \ o t 1a11ci Br11ia1d bl. C.wrt.t/r~iat~,
fit/h~.~,g/tl:
7 7 1 ~ 1 ) 1 \ . \ 1 ~ 1 1 1( 1( ~; ~
. I I ~ ~ I (:it\,
I
N.Y:l ) o ~ ~ h l r ( Il ~~ (\ i, f i )1Ii.1
,
(~IIOI~IIOII)
' 7 h l < l l .2 , I !)OO ~ ~ I hl;t1.
I I ~<I. 1qIio ~ ) I J I I ,I l l c;'lllllp, .I'/lP (;/l/ltl/lt'llll, 10,r,~i,
I(i.57,
49,
154
\501lthitrf~st~m
Ht\tor~ro/Qunrt~rly
October
,kne~-icansinitially rallied behind their president during the U-2 incident, and the senator from Texas was no different. O n the Senate floor
he said, "When o u r I'rcsident 1s at the summit confel-ence, 1 want him to
feel the buoyancy 01' a united coilntrv. The President is a member of a
political party with whose concepls I d o not agree. But he is still o u r
P1-esiclent, ant1 lie will continue to be o11r President until next January.
He is the one who must speak for o u r nation; and practically all of us are
Americans before wc arc partisans.""'
As the sumlrlit broke up,Johnson tired to use his support of the president against Kenllcdy. He conviriccd Fulbright, former Deniocratic presidential noininee Xdlai Stevenson, a n d Speaker of the House Sam
Raybl~rnto join hiln in sending a telegr-arn to Khrllsh(:hev via Eisenhower
~ $ asked the
and the State I>cpartment. As Americans and I > e ~ n o c r athey
Russian to wait until i~fterthe November election before canceling the
d inexpesiconference. Ke~lrlcdy'sal,serlce as a signatory ~ ~ n d e r s c o r chis
ence in ~'oI-cign1-clations. In case anyone lrlissed the point, J o h n s o n
n n l twicc.'"
entered the telegranl into the ( ; o r t ~ ~ ~ s s i oR8cortl
The next day, Sec. o i State Christian A. Hertcr called Johnson. According to his notes, he found the senator "in a vcty irasci1)le frame of
mind." Hertrr's lrlissioll was to convince Johnson of "how fruitless [he
delivery of tlit* telcgrarri . . . woulti be." He said [he request made n o
sense, arid was clcarl!. ill1 attempt 10 make political capital out of the crisis. Johnson rcspo~ldcddelensivcly. The State Department had told him
the message wo~lltlarrive 11cibl-e the e n d of the c o n k rencc. He also said
the telegrarn was,jusl an attempt to show Khrusl~cl~ev
that the nation was
~ m i t c din the fzlcc: oi an! Sovie1 threat, despite partisan political differences. Hertcl. poli1.ely called him a liar. "Well. Senator," he I-csponded.
"I d o n ' t likc to arglle wit11 you in rcgard to the wording of the thing
itself, b11t t l i a ~isn't ex;tctly the way i t I-eads. 1 wlsh it d i ~ l . " ~ ~
J o h n s o n ant1 his associates came clost: to disaster. Herter hung up and
confel-red ~vitllElseilllowcl. Xtlvised that Johnson st111 inslsted o n the
dcli\~el, trl hlr ~ i o t c ,[lie ~ ) r e \ ~ d e Incl11c
t rantlv agl eed to send the message along with 'I (over 1ettc.1 explaining that i t a~-livedin Paris after the
termi~latiollo l the. c:onference. Because of this ({clay. Khrl~slichevhad
an opportitnlty 10 p l a y the .hnerican political parties off one anotliel. to
the d i s a t i \ , ~ ~ ~ l aolg c[he Democlats If he tlccided to reconsider , ~ n d
1999
Lyndon Johnson, Foreign Policy, and tlw Election of 1960
155
A Willing Suitor: In the wake of the U-2 incident, the breakup of the summit in Paris and
the antitreaty riots in Tokyo, the issue of experience in government became an important
topic and began to hurt the Democratic front nlnner. Lyndon Johnson stressed this issue
in his public appearances, making himself a more competitive candidate against Kennedy.
Ballimure Sun,./un.e 2 I, r 960.
await a new administration, it would make the four Democrats quite vulnerable to charges of undercutting Eisenhower for partisan gain. Such
an accusation would do grave damage to the electoral and political
chances of the Democrats. Khrushchev, however, saved the four, using
156
S o u t h r r ~ r t f ~Hr r/~~ f o n c nQ/I L U T ~ P T ~ ~
October
his response as a forum to repeatedly denounce Eisenhower, and the
United States."
Aware that his nonpartisar~stance was winnlng votes, Johnson continued even as other 1)einocrats began criticizing the president's handling
of the incident. When reporters asked about his stance, he explained,
"\17ell,I w;isn't supporting any i~ldividualas such. I was supporting my
country as 1 saw it. 1'111 not going to spend any of my time looking u p
ugly words to sav a b o u t fellow Americans because that's what Mr.
Khrushchcv wants clone, and 1'111 not going to d o Mr. Khrushchev's job
for him." J o h n s o n did offer some mild criticisins of Eisenhower's foreign
policy to avoid bcing scen as the president's token Democrat. He said
s u m ~ n i tc o n ~ c r e n c c sw ~ r cnothing inore than propaganda shows, and
Eisenhower had set the stage fbi- this crisis by relying o n them instead of
the Foreign Service and quiet diplomacy.''
s e thc Republican National C;ommittee made lifc
The White H o ~ ~ and
difficult forJohnson when thcy launched a public relations campaign to
t
He wanted to refrain from criticizcounter the 1)elnoci-atic i j ~ r l finding.
i n g Eisenhower. I,ut had ro avoid giving the Republicans bipartisan
cover. If h e gave the adininisti-ation that shielding, he risked his own
standing in rlie 1)rmoci-atic Part!;. O n May 2 1, he and Fulbright talked
about his pi-ol)lrin oil the telephone. H e would be o n the "Face the
Nation" television pi-ogl-:~lrlthc next day and expected to be questioned
o n the U-2. A ti-anscri1)t of' t11c telephone call shows that Johnson controlled thc c:onvel.s;~tion.Hc askcd Fulbright Sol- advice, but in the end
n s . Texan dcclarcd hc would simply "put
answered his o w n q ~ ~ e s ~ i oThc
~
draw his own c o n ~ l u s i o n . " ~ ~
the cards o n the tat~lei~ntll e everyone
O n the show he gave a contl.olled perforrnancc. He answered evely
question thc way he \\,anted. often ignoring the main thrust of the panelist5' inquiries. 111 o ~ l ccxc:hange. he simply refused to give an answcr.
The first clucstiorls Ibcused on the U-2 incident. He dismissed Nixon's
assertion that discussing thc aff'air was irresponsible, but avoided taking
an anti-aclministratioi1 stance. He also distanced hinlself tiom a recent
Stevenson speech blastiny tlle adlninistration, saving they had "a differ2>.I'h~s
ACCOIIIII
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October
.\011//17o~ctn
r~ H Icto, I ( a1 Qi~nrt~rl\
158
Ttie speech I~lcwup in Kennedy's !ace. Instead of answering c1ues~iorls
atlout his knowletlge antl ability, the speecll raised doubts ahout his-judg
ment. His direct attacks on thc popular Eisenhower in a moment of crisis
made him look opportunistic and unseemly. This speech made many
Alricricans unt,asy a t ~ o uhaving
~
a President Kennedy in the White
Housc.~"'
J u s t as the U-a incitlt'nt waned, another crisis tieveloped that Johnson
once again i~sctlto his advanugc. The LTnited States antlJapa11 had spent
a year and ;I lialf ~icgotiatinga new rnu~tialsecurity trealy. 111J u n c , a
series ol'\iolcnt I-iorstook pI;-lce iri Tokvo as the Diet,.lapan's parliament,
prepared to r a ~ i l )thc treaty Huge mobs assembled outside thc Diet
Building in a n attclnpt to prevent this action. The Japanese governnlcnl
carlcelcd Eisenlio~~or's
planiird visit for safety purposes. Although there
were complex 1.c- sons li)r [he liots antl protests, Atnericans blarned ?verything on ~Japaricsc(:orni~~unis~s.'~"
Comirig a inonth afier the U-2 incitlcnt
and the failctl P;u-is sturninit, thc mobs made Americans worry ahout their
place ill the ~ v o i - l t l ..Cj7tls7o(vk said the iiots "had thrown the eritire question of Lr.S. foi-eig~ipolicy tip lor debate." Specifically, the magazine said,
"Keput~licans1i;~veI ~ c e nclainagcd. Though Mi-. Eisenhower seems
immune, the c:pisotlc has given the Democrats strong campaign issues."'"
Johnson hl;inic.tl Ainci-ic;tn setbacks on p~tblicdiplomacy, being caref ~ t lt o avoid ; I I I ~tlil-rc:t cri~icisrno l the president. Eisenhower should
have lin~itctlhis visits t o gootlwill trips, leaving the scrious preparatoiy
work to ~ l i c"scasoiictl tliploniats of the State Dcpai-tinent." These comments angerctl tlic prcsitl(:nt no cnd. "1,yndon Johnson is getting to be
one of tliosc S I ~ ; I I L;ilccks." lie snapped."
Whatever Eisc.ni~o~ve~thought of' the majority leader, he still needed
his help. The, sccul.itv trcatv faccd prohlems in the Senate. Richard
iIron1 C;rorgia and chairmarl of the Arincd
Kussell, r l l C s c ~ ~ i ost,~iatolSenices ( ;omini t tee, I+,:II~tcd to delay I-atification.He had several reasons
Tor waiting. In tlic new trenly the U.S. w o ~ ~ relinquish
ld
its right to intervenc in Japan tlurinp mornents ol donlestic unrcst, a concession that
looked i~nwisci r l light o f reccrit events. He also wonderctl about Japan's
reliability as a11 ;illy. O n June 16, ,Johnson warned Herter that Kussell
might be a pi-ot)lcm. I-Ie also said Hubert Hu~riphreyand some libci-als
might ot?jccl to pl-olrlpt ratificat~on.""
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H ~ \ l o t i , n /Q u a r t ~ v / ?
(io
October
J o h n s o n . T h e Scnate h a d to rat@ the treaty, Herter- wrote, the future of
Japan was a1 stakc:
If we ; ~ r crlor iri a posiriorl to exchange ratificatioris fairly shortly, the press~lres
building L I I ) i l l , ] ; I ~ ) ; I I I SOT a dissolrition of tlie Diet to regularize the prrselit
abnorn1;ll ~~olitic;tl
situatio~~
nlay fol-c-c.Prin~eMinster I s h i to resign and dissolve
the Diet 1)eSorc rl~r:c,xch;~rlgc.takes lace. I n this event, the position of those i r l
Japan who fi~vorclose ties \vitll the Url~trdStates. whorn we belirvr to be at the
present tinle a sul~stanri;rlrnzijority of t t l ? Japanese people, wo~ll(1be consider;~l)lyweakened d ~ ~ r i rrhr
l g election campaigrr a n d thereaftrr. If the Japanese consewativcs are able to cnter the clection campaign \vithout the treaty an accornplislied fact. this h o ~ i l t c.rt:atc
l
consernativc unity t~ehinda policy of close cooperatiorl \ v i t l ~ thc: Ur1itt:tl States ;111tl h c l f ) nlair~tainthe dominance i r ) Japan o f
cor)scrvativr, pr-o-M'cstcrn elenic.rlts whose positio~~
has beer1 shaker) by recrnt
everits.
C)n the othcr I~arld.if the Crlitctl States does not act proniptly this could be
interpretecl i l l ,]apari as a 1;ic.L of corlfidencr in tlle f ~ ~ t uof
r r the U.S.-Japanese
partnership. It cou1~1also lead to pressttrcs in Japan for reviewing the treaty with
the goal of alttv-illg t l ~ rpr-o\isions of the trcaty i r i a nianrler which ~ v i l lsatisfy certain (:onlrn~~riisr-i~is!,irt.tl
tlrrriar~ds.'"
011Srlne 2 1 , the Scnate debated ant1 voted o n the treaty. Fulbright acted
as floor managcr-. ;inswc.r-ing nuinerous clr~estions.Nearly eve17 senator
expressed sorllc urlcasiness a b o u t recent events in Japan. Most said they
would s u p p o ~tht,
~ 11-ea~y,hut inany did so with misgivings a n d reserva\\.as
t closer than the final tally indicates, the treaty
tions. In :I vole ~ h : ~
passed 90 to 2 . "
Treaty I-atilic;ttiorl Ilelped .Johnsoil politically. H e recognized t h a t
although t h c clcctorate cai-ed a b o u t foreign affairs. thev cared m o r e
a b o u t leatlership ~ h a nany specific policy. While o t h e r Democrats distanced thcrnselvcs trorn Kisenhower. Johnson inoved closer to the presirlent. This s c ~ e i n i r i g lnonpartisan
~
move increased his stature, making
him a marc viable cantlitlate. i;olumnists X r t h r ~ rKrock of the New York
I inzf's a n d Ki.ncst K. 1 , i n d l e ~o f L\re70srl~erk s a i d J o h n s o n ' s p o l i t i c a l
prospect5 wc,~-c,iinpr-o~ririg.Krock believer1 Kennedy h a d suffered a sei-ious blow, whilc l.irlciley reported that J o h n s o n was the only o n e of the
Democrals t h a t Itad gained fi-oin r e c e n t international events. R o b e r t
Harlman, ~ h \I'ashingtorl
c
I)ltl-eau chief of the 1.0s Angeles Tir~rtswrote a
long ai-tick for tlle papt.1.'~editoria1 section titIed ':lohnson's Star Rising
l
which c a m r to similar concl~isions.T h e editorial
in Stand A ~ a i i i a Firld,"
.
\Vorth Slnr.Tr(ulnonr praised this nonpartisan position:
board of ~ h c For-t
"Senatoi- L ~ n t l o n1%.,Johilson o f Tcxas is increasing his stature as a statesr
7
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Srr!?l:ru prre rrerr~
October
Southri~~ctern
I l ~ s l o n c c ~Qur~rterIj
l
Itj'~
chairman of the state Democratic Party said the eleven-man delegation
that once favored Kennedy belonged to.Johnson now. " t l lot of people
have changed since the summit," he remarketl. About half of the South
Dakota delegation threw their lot in with .Johnson after h e spoke to
:hem. T h e governor of Washington was also leaning towards.]ohnsor~in
part as a reaction against heavy-handed Kennedy campaign efforts to get
him to join their bandwagon."'
111 addition to iniproving his o w n stantling, Johnson damaged Kennedy's. Leading Nixon i l l early Ma! wit11 54 percent, the Massachusetts
senator fell behind in rnid7Juliewith only 49 percent. Anti-Kennedy dclegates in New York, I'ennsylvania, a n d New .Jersey 1.allied u n d e l %Johnson'sbanner, finding hini a viable alternative cantlidatc. Support
101 Kennedy evaporated in Indiana. T h c Intlianapolis Sto) reported that
state-witlc polls showed that ~ l o h n s o n ' ssupport welit fl.o~nstatistically
nonexistent to I 5 pel-cent in a month's time. The state t l c l c g ; ~ t i ohat1
~~
;ilrcady co~nmitteditself to vote for Kennedy arid a unit rule I-equil-ed
that the group vote as a whole o n the first ballot, but the delegates were
free to vote individually o n later ballots. Tht. editorial board of' the .Stor
argued that Kennedy woultl have n o support in Indiana after the first
ballot. Out o n the campaign trail, Johnson would I-ernark that his ri\.al
was n "nice young man." This c o ~ n ~ n e iniplictl
nt
that Kennedy lacked the
11ecess;il-y expe1ie1rc.e. " T h e effect o n ttic cl-owtl is telling," Miithis
obse~ved."
Johnson fbl.mally announced for presidelit o n J u l y rj to a CI-owdof
li,ur h u n d r e d in a Scnatc. auditorium ant1 ;I niirional I-adio-tc.lc.visio~~
audience. His anlloulicc.inent d o ~ n i n a t e dnews ;111d c d i t o r i ~ lco\,t,l.ngc
li)r the next day. H e took an intlirect swipe ;it Kennedy, noting that his
clutics had linlitetl tllc ; m o u n t of c a ~ n p a i g n i ~ he
i g hati been ablr to do.
"Now, as of this moment. I am a candidate lo^. the 1)enlocraric riomina
tion Ihr the office of PI-c,sitlcnt 01' ttic I!~~itc.tlSta(c.s." A tout1 I-o,u. of'
ap~xov;ilfronl the ;issc~nblctlc.1-owcl grrctetl this stlitenlent. He saitl h e
"'
42.
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LJtl(loti JOII n \o7t, Forei,pt Poll(?., and the Elerttor~of I 9 60
163
expected to be cornpctitive at thc convention with a good number of
delegates. "My fi-iends tell nie I will have in excess of 500 and 111y leading
opponent ~ v i l lhave less than (ioo."Johnson and his supporters predicted
a thi~.tl-1)allotvictory. Oscar L. C h a p m a n , co-chair of Citizens f o r
J o h n s o n , told a I-cporter for the Dallas Tinrrs Herald, " T h e break in
Kennedy's su-c.ngth will begin to take place on the third l)allot."42
Despitc i t all, J o h n s o n knew the odds were against him. There were
limits to this success. Although he was getting I-esults and slowing down
the fo~wal-d111-ogress o f the Kennedy campaign, he could not stop his
rival t1.om inching fo~wal-d,and garnering the last few votes he needed.
H e understood the limits of his success, a n d accitientally admitted as
much at the PI-css confercncc. .4 reporter asked if he failed in that bid
woul(l he accept a spot or] the ticket as vice president. H e avoided answering, saying that he was only a candidate for president. Pressed, he said, "I
would never I-ejectsomething that hasn't been of'fered to me. I have becn
prepal-etl thl-oughout In): adult life to serve my countlv in any capacity
where my c:ountl-y thought my services were essential."" His actions were
even mo1.e ~clling.In J l l n e he s e ~ his
~ t trusted aide Bobby Baker to see
Theodore. Sorcnscn. Kennedy's right-hand man and alter ego. Baker's
message:.Johnson would accept the second spot o n the ticket."
Knowing he had l o s ~and
,
understanding why were two different matters. "It \vas {II(: gotltlamndest thing," he told Doris Kearns Goodwin
yeal-s af'tri-rvartls, "here was a young w1iippe1-snapper, malaria-ridden and
yellah, sickly. sickly. Hc nevrl- said a word of importance in the Senate
and he nc.vel- rlitl ;I thing. But somehow with his books and his Pulitzer
to create the image o f . hi~riselfas a shining intellectuPI-izes he ~n:~nagc.tl
al, a y c i ~ ~ t h flciltle~.
l~l
w h o would change the face of' the countly. Now, I
will admit that he had a good sense of humor and that he looked awfully
good or1 thc go(ltlam~l~elevisionscreen and thl-ough it all he was a pretty
deccnt li-llo~v.but his growing llolcl on the American people was simply a
mystelv to me.""
When .(ohnson acctrptcd Kenncdy's offer, he had a simple job-win
Texas, ant1 ;is ~ n u c hol the South as possible. Traditionally a stronghold
i)f Democl-atic strength. the state and the region were suspect in 1960.
Many soutlic-i.ricrs 1-c.sentc*cithe agitation of northern e l e ~ n e n t sin the
- - ~ ---
I
(iq
,Yo nlh7oc<t~~rrr
Ills/or icrrl
Quurtcrly
October
party o n tllc. issue 0 1 civil rights. An editorial that appeared in the
Texarkana (kzzc?l/r wllen .Johnson made his formal announcement is a
g-ood expression of the strong resentment towards these outside forces.
The editorial l~oartlof the paper hoped that Johnson would fail to get
the nomination. If he did it he would have to make concessions to labor,
a n d civil rights groups. "11' they were for him, we would have to be
against him, lxcause wc, would know that there was something wrong
i
h e h a d a tlifficult task i n f r o n t of h i m .
with him." J o h ~ l s o ~knew
Sometime aftc.1- hc accepted Kennedy's offer, he called Jack Valenti, a
Texas suppol-tcr a n d advertising executive, a n d told him h e was in
charge of'Kerliictly-Johnson media and publicity efforts in Texas. Then,
in a hard and stc.1-11voice, he said, "I airn to carry Texas for- this ticket.
We are rlot going to lose Texas. A lot will depend on how well you d o
yourjob. Is that cleai.?" V'alenti said it was.4"
The Dernoc~.atshad good I-eason to worry. Texas was heavy in electoral college votes, delivc.1-ing them to Republicans instead o f Democrats
~ national elections. A private Nixon campaign poll in
in the 1 ; ~ stwo
August had tllc vice president winning the state with 5 2 percent of the
vote. Nixorl's appi-oval rating in the state was higher than those of either
Kennedy 01-,Johnson.Even Nixon's I-unning mate Henry Cabot Lodge
had a r;iring 111g11e1L I I ; I ~ Kcnnetlv:
"Nixon-Lotlge hatve a good chance to can-\.Texas, despite .[oh nson's
native son car~tlidacv,and this state should he put high on the list foleffort," a s t ~ ~ dac:corrlp,inying
v
the poll concluded.'"rn
this close race,
electoral I-icli .I'cxas p~.orrlisedto be an important battlefield.
Iiad lligli hopcs for thc rest of' the South as well.
T h e Kepiil)lic-;~~is
Campaigrl atlvisol- and Halyard government professor William Y. Elliot
i ~ ~ gof' the electoral possibilities in the South.
wrote Nixori ~ . ( . l i i i ~ i ( l11in1
t l ant1 very much ~nclinedto be brought
"It is r~owol)c.ii g ~ . o ~ ~l orl -~vou
into the Reput)lic-a11c-olunln for the Presiderlcy, as I have been telling
~
very well
you fbr a lolig tinic'." Tllcrc was darigcr, 11oweve1-.N i x o ~could
in an Eisenhowerlose the Soutli. Elliot cau~ioned,if Ire tried to c a r n p a i , ~
.. .
I
KEEP YOUR EYE ON LYNDON.
'
011thc.
!
-Knor
In h'ashvllle Banner.
I
1
Koarl to 1.0s .4rlgrles: This editorial cartoon fr-on1 the Nashville H a n 7 i ~ was
indicarl1.e ot n ~ u c ho t thc t l ~ i r r k i ~in~ glate 1u11r.Drspite tlie strong Kennedy lead in delegate
\otes, t l ~ cI-acc fi~r-t l ~ Dcn~ocratic
r
~ ~ o n i i n a t i owas
n far- from ovrr a n d Lyr~donJ o h n s o n was
a rnajol- obst;~cIc.st;~l~tlinq
in the way of t h r Massachusetts srrlator-. l+{)nnlrrl in t / ~ rKnrtsr~s
(,'1/y'~ir11cs,/ 1 1 1 1 ~ 2 3, r 9 6 0
166
So~ithrortfnrrHrstoncnl Q~~arterly
October
like fashion. The foundations of their popularity were different; he had
to be his own man.-"'
Nixon ignored this counsel. In h e r study of presidential campaign
advertising, Kathleen Hall Jamicson found that in both major and minor
matters, his campaign was a copy of Eisenhower's successful efforts in
1'152 a n d 19y,fi. Like Eisenhower, he promised to campaign in every
state. He grt:eted crowds in a similar fashion-flashing the victory sign
with arms u p in the air. Even the ads looked alike. That year Nixon preferred to go with triecl ancl true method^.;^'
While Nixon attempted to duplicate the effort a n d success of the
,
turned to t h e example of the last
Republican i n c u ~ n h e n t.Johnson
Democratic presidenr. On the advice of Hariy S. Truman, he decided to
travel through the South o n a whistle-stop train tour. This suggestion
made sense. Johnson's ,job-the reason he was o n the ticket-was to
roundup votes in the states of the old Confederacy. Although he made
appearances outside the South, and Kennedy visited the region, he was
the o n e in the carripaign responsible for winning voters hack to the
Democratic l'art).. His train, the LB] Victory Special-journalists began
calling it thc "Col-npone Specialn-covered eight states that O ~ t o h e r . ~ ~
Almost evcry biographical study ofJohnson mentions this trip, but most
focus just on the inaugural stop in Culpepper, Virginia. This emphasis is
a reflection of (:ulpepper's proximity to Washington, D.C. None of
these studies rrlakes mention of the o t h e r numerous stops Johnson
made, o r what hc said out in the southern hinterlands."
This trip was important and caused an instant shift in the political
landscape. T h e nunl1)er oi'~journa1istscovering J o h n s o n campaign
appearances incrcascd tenfold. Until he took the train, a small handful
usually ranging between two and Sour reported on his efforts, but at any
o n e time on the rail trip, the number fluctuated between thirty a n d
forty. As the train r-olletl through the South. local politicians and civic
leaders werc invitetl o n board t o meet the candidate a n d his wife.
Whenevel- possible. Iohrlson tried to have a local dignitary introduce
him to the crowd."
Johnson stuck to national issues, particularlv Soreign policy, in stump
speecht:~.Hc continr~ctlwith this approach in his televised remarks and
--
-
~
"'Elliot 11, N I X O I ISrpt.
.
24. I ~ ( ~ Fllc
I I . 2 . Box I . ~ q t i oElrctlori. Prr-Prrsidrritlal Papers of
Riclial-11 bl. K I X I (! N~ ;~I I I I I I ,-\I(
I A ~111vr\-l.[n\ Aiigelr\ 131.ar1cI1)
""
J i i r ~ ~ i r s ~'(LI/MI,LFIII,~,
or~~
I 2 2, I . J - I
5I
"' fbicl., 15ti;L>'~Ilrk,1011i~.\/~17,
,r,Xli,
,'Dallek, / ~ I I I C ,\//IT,5x6: F . L ~ IXI \I
/o/t?~\on.I OCFI 1 1 I
I ~Novdk,
/i~/ir~>on,
; { I I ~hlillrr,
;
I , ~ T L ( ~ O:{2,5-:327;
TI,
Krairib,
~ " M 1 ; + s I i i ~ i ~/',I\/,
t o r ~O( I . I 9. 1 . 4 , I q00, at ,i \tor> 1 1 1 t l i i c l r ~ ~ o rSi .c ) ~ t Odrolil~a,
l~
11irie lo(al politiclans ~ p o k ri ) ( . f o c.~ ~ I ) ~ I I I ~ ( I cI :Io 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ) 1 . 1 .\l/ii,,. OCI I 2. I 00o.
ads aired in the South, avoiding appeals to regional pride and racial
hatred. Hc tlitl this Sor two reasons. First, throughout his political career,
Johnson liad worked to end the South's political isolation. More importantly, if he was going to help Kennedy win the South, Johnson had to
find an issue that LI-ansccndedregional differences. According to a
Kennedy campaign poll o f t h e South, seventy-one percent of the public
thouglit f61cign policv was the most important issue in the election. This
fact gave t11r 1)erriocratic ticket some possibilities in the region. A study
analyzing the poll st;ited: "The high rating given to fbreign policy in the
South (coupled with the apparent low salience of states rights as a
national campaign issue) offers Kennedy a channel for appeal to the
South. Kennetlv may have little to offit- the South directly, but the South
also carcs about broad issues of foreign policy, peace and war. When foreign policy . . . is to be a topic of Kennedy speeches, the South might be
the place to tlr:livci- them." This was particularly important in the Idone
Star State, wllerc the issue favored Nixon. "To carry Texas, Senator
Kennetl!. rrltlst bc able to blunt this advantage. at least to a degree."'4
Johnson ~~ec:detl
little convincing on this rnatter of strategy. He started
attacking Nixon or1 the issue of' world affairs long befhre the train trip.
Shortly aster the Dcnlocratic convention he gave a speech in Nashville,
Tennessee, and dcparted several times from his prepared text with what
a reporter callctl "1,itter attacks" on tbreign policy. At a press corifcrence
in Texas in SeptelnI)er, he said the basic election issue was what type of
leadership would I-estoreAnlericari prestige and "give the country confidence and fi-eectont. ""
Tl~roughourthe trip .Johrison assailed Nixorl o n foreign policy. H e
turned to YIansticl(1 Sol- help in this endeavor. As a loyal Democrat, the
Montaru senator was n o r e than willing. but he also had a personal stake
in [lie rlection. IS ,Johnson became vice president, Mansfield as the
rnajoritv whip would become the new majority leader. In the two months
beti)re the election, he wrote fourteen foreign policy addresses for
Johnson to use in thc South. Mansfield tailored the speeches to conform
to staritls~JollnsonIiatl taken earlier on foreign affairs. There were three
major therncs i l l tllcsc statements. First, in a blatantly partisan appeal to
soutI1c1-11c1.s'
p~-itn;tt-vitlcntification as I)emocrats, Johnson blamed all
disasters or1 t l ~ c"lic~publicanticket" and the "Republican administration." Not c.ve~ythlnghad gent. wrong w ~ t hArncrican fbreign policy over
the past eight ~ . c ; u s LVhrn
.
the ad~niriistrationhad heeded the warnings
168
Sort/lr7r1rc-/urr1IlTrstoncal
Q~~nrterly
October
of Democrats in (;ongress events had gone fairly well. "The party best
able to give the lie to Khrushchcv's claim that Communism is the future
of mankind, is the party best able to marshal the strength of this nation
for all the people of America. Now,
and to channel it into a bcttcr f11t111-e
is that party tllc Dcrnocratic o r the Republican party?" The reply was so
obvious, Johnson ncvc.1- provide an a n s ~ e r . ~ "
Competencc. was a second theme. In Jacksonville, Florida, he sarcastically mocked Nixon's clairrl of expertise comparing him to a character
in an old rlursc~y1-hv~nc:"l'ussycat, pussycat where have vou been? I've
been to 1,ondon to see the clueen." Johnson said with sarcasm that was
blatant. "He went to 1,ondon to see the queen, so what?" Not only did
n quality of the vice president's experience, h e also
Johnson q ~ ~ e s t i othe
ridiculed the I-esultsof' thc entire atlministration. "The truth of the matter is that the Kepul)licans have neither stood firm nor made peace during the past f0ur vr;tl-s. I)o yo11 see any reason for believing that they are
g o i n g to bc any hcttcr at i t d u r i n g the next four?" After mocking
Nixon's kitchen tlchate against Khr~~shchev.
he said. "If we are to succeed in o u r fol-eign policy we must put o u r hoase in o r d e r here at
home." Not only wcrr Nixon and 1,odge incompetent, but they had dangerous ideas about tampel-ing with the Constitution. A Republican s u g
gestion to givr thc vice president more influence in foreign policy was
an attempt to c-over fol- Nixon's failure to perform the Constitutional
duties already assigrletl to the vice president, he said. The Constitution
worked fine; there was n o reason to tamper with what had worked for
.175 years. ''
The miserahlc r c s ~ ~ lof
t s Kepublican incompetence was the last topic
Johnson strcssetl. Kcpuhlican foreign policy was uncoordinated a n d
American
s
resources. "What has happened to the proud
wasted p r c c i o ~ ~
claim of just eight !;pars ago that ;t Rep~tblicanvictory would speed u p
the liberation of the nations of' Eastern Europe." he pointedly asked a
point h e
Tallahassee garhering. <:itha a n d Berlin were disasters-a
repeatedly ~ n a d ein rllaharna, Georgia, a n d Florida. He reminded an
Atlanta crowti that one. 01' thc results o f Republican-managed foreign
policv was ''x dictator ninety miles from o11r shoreline standing there
thumbing his riosc: at us." Cuba was just one example of how h e r i c a ' s
prestige abroad had Gltcred over the last eight years. Only ten years ago
lh"What'.~R~ght, ~ t ) o r i t F o ~ v ~ qPolicv."
n
< k t . 25, ~ c l f i o ,Mikr Marlslirld FOI-rig11Policy BrirKs
Fo1tlr.1-,Box .ti), ( : O I I ~ I ~ S \ I ( H I .1:ilz.
I~
L151 A ~ - ( . h ~ v(1.BIL.):
r\
"'Shr. Third Marl Ttirrnr." Oct. ti. 1l)fio
(qlcotat~otis),
tI)1(1
""'Thr I!.S. 'ilrtl 1 1 1 ~ .I'N," Srpt a ( ; . 1 1 ) f i o . lbid.: "Rolr ot thr Vice-PI-es~drrit."
Srpt. n g , lgtio.
ibid.; FInrzil(i 'I'I?~~I,\-['III(;II,
OCI I :{, I qfio ( 2 n d q ~ l o r d t i o r ~\acksor~~iIlr
);
/ 0 ~ 7 1 1 / 1 ~ ,Oct. I 2 , l<)fio ( Ist
~ ~ l l o ~ d t l oA!I:lll~~l
l l ~ : ( . ' ~ I I I ~ ~ I ~ I ~ ~ OI I cI Il I. , 1 2 . 1 c ) I j o ; M I ~ I I thr/~Id,
II
( k t . I:+, 1c)tio: Tdn1p;l ~ ' L ~ P . (Yk , t .
I 'J,, l<)fio: kl:l( 0 1 1 / ~ l ( ~ ~ ~ fOCI.
~ i ~ lI ,;,/ l , 1 qoo
Ic i c ) ~
I,)ntlot/ Jolrrtto,~,Fore~g71
l'oliq, a71d the Elrctiort of 1960
1 69
!he L1.S. "cr!jovcd it position of unchallenged world leadership," he told
gathering at Mcl-cer University in Macon, Georgia. "It matched and
rhwai-ted the twin threats of Communist economic and militaiy aggression wherever they appeal-ed. It had inspired a faltering world to new
heights of strength, confidence and hope. In taking stock of' where we
nre as axainst where we were-we today find ourselves face-to-face with
the stark reality that ever). o n r of those advantages has been lost o r compromised. Today, thc foreign policy is onc of total negative reaction."
The president's canceled trip to Japan and Nixon's infamous trip to
Latin America in 1!)58 wcrc good examples. "1)oes that tell you the
nation's busincss is t ~ e i n gwell taken care of by this Republican Administration? 1)oes it tcll you that o u r prestige was never higher," he asked
rhetorically. Thc only solution to all these problems, he suggested, was
to elect 1)emocrats in November.'"
It is also important to note what-Johnson did not say. Absent from
these attacks on Republican mismanagement of foreign policy was any
mention of' Eisenhower. The president's pcrsonal popularity tl-anscended partisan iclentification. Attacks o n him were likely to be counterproductivc, and.Johnsoi1 avoided them.
There were, to bc sure, other reasons for southerners to flock to the
Kennedyjohnson banner. In Mississippi, Senators Janles Eastland and
John Stennis called on the voters to support the ticket because Johnson
Nixonwas o n it, which was certainly better than the alternative-a
Lodge ad~llinistrat~on.
Sen. Thomas Wofford of South Carolina made a
similar point at onc appearance: "If you can't get the foreman of the
july, for God's sake get one member o f t h e jury so you won't be hurt too
much." ,John Patterson, governor of Alabama, was honest when he told
reporters that hc wits "tlisappointed" about the civil rights plank in the
party piatfox-~n.but 11(, said the overall document was quite good, including the sections on farm policy. 'Traditional loyalty to the Democratic
Party was i~rlothel-factol. in Johnson's tour. His attacks o n "Republican
fol-eipn policv" was an indirect appeal to this tradition. He also made
more direct appr,ils. At a wcll-attended park rally in Jacksonville, h e
- Congrcss fi-om the state was a Demnoted that since evrly m e m b e ~of
ld
little scnse for Florida voters to put a Republican in
ocrat, i t w o ~ ~ makc
the IYhitc IJousc. "That's like asking the Army quarterback to serve on
.i
'""Tllr S I I ~ ) [ I I ~ SRcpolt."
\"~
Ocr. 1 0 , ~ $ i ( i ob, l d ~ ~ s t i v lFd O I ~ I Policy
~ ~ I I BI-ids: "l.aos: (:as(Histol-y I I I F o l r l ~ nAltl." 'k.111. 2 8 , lcllio, 1111~1:"!\ Mattel- ot PI-rstigr," O c t . n g , 1 9 6 0 ( , ~ t h
quornron). ~ b :~"(:hirl<t
d
.tritl (:ul~;t."Srpr. I ! ) , l q f i o . lbiti.; "[llleglble] a n d Summits." Scpt , l$io.
ibid.. "Brl-ll11 Blow 1'p." hrpl. I 11. I oI)o. lbid.: I'%)nrln 7'irnr~-Un1o11,
Oct. I :(, ~ g f i oJacksonvillr
:
j o u n ~ ( [ /(;(.I
,
I 2 , 1q00: . \ i l ~ t i ~ (I~~
~ ItL . \ / I I I I L ? ~ I z .O r [ . I 2 ( 2 1 1 ~ 11tt1-0~1gti
4111 q ~ l o t a t i o r ~ sI;{,
) , 1~)fio;
X4iar111f 1 1 1 ~ 1 1 1 10, ~ 1 I. : \ , I ( I ( ~ O
TC
; t ~ ~ ~l pi ii /t ~ r ~O~cit ~. ,I:(, 1 q 0 o (1st q ~ l o t a t ~ o rMacon
~):
T~lq-rnt~h,
O c t . I;), 10lio; I ~ I I I I I I I I ~.\'t,71,\,
~ I , ~Oct.
I I I 1 4 , 1c)Oo Johr1\011was r11ak111gs i ~ ~ ~ icommcrlLs
lar
I~efol-c
the rl.1111 I I ~ St"
I ~ .11". ( O \ C I , I ot
~ V'I Trxah p ~ . r \ sC O I I ~ ~ I . C I I (ICI I HOLISIOII
I'osl, S ~ p t!),. 1060.
Navy's football teain." He ;ilso called for party loyalty wherr the V/ctojy
Special pulled o u ~of stations, yelling, "Vote Democratic!" Party officials
and office holdel-s responded: in part because they realized tllerc wns a
danger if they ignored the Krnriedyjohnson ticket. If thc lkinocratic
national ticket won, those who failed to support the campaign .~voultl
lose appointments to those that d i d . If the Republicans won, the
Democrats who supported Nixon would still face a Congsess controlleti
in the Senate by Johlison and In the House of Rep1,esrntatives by his
close friend Sam Kayb~lrn.'"
As w ~ t hany polit~calcainpnign there were pickete~sand small crowds
at some appeaiarlccs, but thr' biggest problem was that the whirlwind
effort overtaxed Jollrison 4 icportcr for the Macon T~legraphobserved
"Johnson was at his best when \pealung off the cuff Keadlng from a prepared text, h c tentled to cl~oneon " iinothcr repoltrl from the paper
agreed. "In all honest). it cannot bc I eportcd thatjohnson was a dynamo
on the platfoim He read the sprrch. and ~tqounded like he was readlng
it." He made ninc nppenicnccs in one dnv 111 South Carolina and was
sunburned and tiled at the crid The next day In mi am^, he collapsed
after glvlng clevcii speec hcs 1r1 hve different Florida cities in onlv four
hours. He arrived h,ilf arl hour late to $;we n speech at a dinner foi the
joumal~smfrate~nity.
local chnpier of S~gmnI)clt,t Chi, the p~ofess~onal
He delivered n fi\.e-ln~nutcs p c ~ ~
o nh Cuba dnd the failure of Repubr n a "dull, hoarse," and "monolican foreign polir) 111 I>,itin S ~ n e i ~ in
tone" volt e Hi3 sliolildei s 3cigqcxcl ~ i hhe talked, and he left without taking
e The president of the organization
any question\ f I oin thc ai~tiic>nc
called tlie speech "111y111~ tl~rappointing" A columnist for the Miami
Herald wn, n i o ~
e d 1 1 c r 1, c,ill~rigjol~nson'spellormance "di~mal."'"'
Despite the\(. sllor tt orrirngs, the trlp was a major success At the end
of the trip, 1 .L 1: l o ( . ~ 1ofiicinl\ and dignitaries had signed the t r a ~ n ' s
guest book ant9 '1 ( ,~mp,i~gri
4tnff member quessed that only half the
numbci th,ir cL+nicoil board had e n o u g h time t o make a n entry
Johnson h,ld 1115 ~ ) h o t otaken with 1,047 He gabc fifty-seven speeches at
forty-nine dil!c.~rnt stops, which 182 reporters covered "People tell us it
15 the most 4 1 1 ~c essllll to111 we hake ever hnd hy tiain," Johnson told the
Macon hi(/?(
5 (;OI ~cspoiiclcntstor the Washirlgton Post and the Dallas
Morvrzr~g 1 F \ : p 7 ~ t ~i cportetl that the two lounge cars o n the train were so
crowded that tlicv had to sho\e their way through the carriages. In the
"'Ma(on T ~ l ~ , p o /0~ l1 :t .
~IOII),
I( j
(:$I (1, ,4111. s
~ t ~li111
t i
~ $ i o( I\I .tnd n r i t l q l ~ o t a t i o n s ) ;M l a n i i H m U . Ort. I:{ ( 5 t h tlilotd~ ~ I ~ I ~ I I I I I I I S I) .~ l i o(:ol~11ii111~i
;
,Sl/~lvO
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I;.
- , sure~b'ord3rssnnrop r11, 111q'rliSuc>ris sod
-dns s ' u o x ! ~'ii3![od U % I ~ J O J uo I O U [)aS113o~.i1'5<,> ~ r ( 1j o 1 5 3 1 <>I[-L suaru
-rrlanoS 1ulapa.j ays jo r p ~ o l Saqs pue n?!~odrrSr.>rojart>&\
uS!vdurv? ayl
u! sanss! OMI aqs p!es hay1 erueqewjo ~ n o sLuosurlol'.rnllu
i
.r.>tled at{-,ur
p a ~ e a d d eley1 [e~~os!pa
ue u! pue u o x ! ~pa.ro,\l?j Y ~ I L . ! rr1.er[Srr!rrr.118
~
ayl
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UMO J!aql 111 olcIo.>d ."[I 01 yeads
01-s! qops!y leyM lea13 seM I! p u v m l e y s ueuru.rLLXr1s.r1?aat11 .lo auIos
peq a H .Xsyloj seM aH .aIqey!I s e aH,,
~ :paLrasqo ~s![rw.n~o!
a u o ,'.a.ro.jaq
salon l n o l o j sn payse Jailau X a y ~.paau aM leqM .i[ixxa s'uosnyol;, 'Xyht
pau~eldxaIe!Dyjo 1 ~ 3 0 1l a y l o u v ,;layn!l ays pu!rlacl n~.red .>[I, rr! sluaru
-aIa Ire pay!p!Ios lnol s1r11,~:paa.r;je Joleuas aleis r:p!.rorL{ y ,;lo1 e ur!y
d ~ a yol Su!oB s! u o s u y o [ ~ o ~ l asj! y ~.U!M 01 Su!oB s! .iparrrrag yu!yl I,,
'payJewa1 .rauo!ss!rrruro3 ii1uno3 ep!lo[d F. ,;dn Su!y3!d s,11 'dl1 2u1~31d
s'll,, : l a l ~ o d ajcod
l
u o l % u ! y s e ~e
eu!lo.~e:) rlsl-toS ,yo rrr?~rr.r!vrlna m s
3!semoruaa ayL ,;palue.rS .roj uaym Bu~aqIOU s! 111x:rp .rannq sla,q r1oea.r
ayl p q .salels Injlqnop p n n a s u! leajap pue ,4ro1.3!,2 rraaMiaq a3rra~a,g!p
ayl rreaur p p o 3 11 .sle.13ouraa aq7 10.j auo as!.+\ r? sr?;\ir ~ i n oaql
~ r1Snolyl
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dl" s ~ u o s u y o ~ ~ o s e u.uo!%aJ
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uo!s3ap ayl M O s~ p u ! ~Jtay1
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y sa3ue~eaddes ' d p a u u a ~.uaS 01 PUI? ~ I ! Z J ~110suqo[ aqi 01 Su!ymu ale
Lays ley1 s x j alaur ayL,, .plepuels 3!lenorua(l at11 01 Sur.ir[v.r 3 1 . 3 ~
sue12
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~
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sgexnouraa ayl ~o i0!r111 pue qlSua~1s[euo!lez!ueY~o a q pasnq!llsr?
~
dosltydaso[ls!uurn103 p a l e x p u d ~.e1ue[sv rr! dols pue qSno.rys 08 01 u!v.r;
ays j o B u p n o ~ as d~ n ~ q eayl seM s~osexpu!asarIs , ~ lsa8%!q
o
arIL c,'rjlrmO"~
~ s e dayl a!x!a u! y~Sua.~ss
arqealnseaur pau!eS sey l ~ y s!lenouxa(I
~ l
ayl
ley1 suS!s asqlns-ayl-lapun,, j o laqurnrr e., pal~oda.1s i t w ~urer~%urur.~~g
ayl 1o.j 1 u a p u o d s a ~ l o 3u o s % u ! y s e ~aqs uo!s!padxa [!el ar1, f o a[pp!rIi
. C ~ I ~ ~ / / ~ O P T111
~ P cto7.icnl
I-II
Quarterly
172
October
Private Kennedy campaign studies support this anecdotal evidence,
recording gains throughout the South. In Florida the Democrats owned
the subject of'fhreign policy. "The issue is not only blunted; it is turned,"
a campaign report declared. In Texas, Nixon's lead began to shrink. "At
this rate of' growtll the Senator can turn this issue," another Kennedy
study pro~lairned.~"
Nixon and his workers received similar messages, but they often conflicted with other sources of information. At a national level, they discovered Kennedy was gaining in I'oreign policy approval. Regionally, the situation was a bit more confusing. In late September, press secretary Herb
Klein contacted the editors of southern newspapers that had endorsed
Nixon. The Texans told Klein that Nixon had no lead. The state could
go either wav. Hut a month later pollster Elmo Roper told the Nixon
campaign thal the vice president was "well ahead" in Texas.'" Only o n
election dav (lid thc Nixon team learn for certain. Nixon won only four
states from thc old Confedel-acy, iosing Texas by the slimmest of' marg n s . Johnson had donc his,job.
Decades later the clection of 1960 continues to fascinate. There are a
variety oS explanations for this interest, but two reasons stand out from
all the rest. First. the clection was extremely close. A few thousand votes
cast in the othcr direction, and Richard M. Nixon would have won the
contest. Second, thrce of' the four national candidates ended u p becoming the president of'the United States. 1,vndon Johnson played a role in
this election, which was far more important than previously thought. His
actions wci-e particu1;ii-ly in the area of foreign affairs. He had a solid
grounding in the sul?jcct, and his own distinctive ideas about the proper
role of the IJrlitetl States in world affairs. He also understood foreign
affairs as a political issuc, and used it to his political advantage against
Kennedy ant1 ~ h c nNixon. His actions took place at both the national
a n d local levels, hccausc foreign policy is a n issue in which society
expresses intercst at all sta~ions.
" ' " l s s t u ot
( : i ~ r l (rt I I I I I
I'lot
ttl,~."
r ~ . d . ( I st
(:orrcern In Texas." r 1 . d .
Rrcords. 1q60Oarr~palgrr,Paprrs ot
q ~ ~ o t a t i o narrd
) . "lsaurs ot
(211d( ~ c i o t d t t o r ~BOX
) , 2 I 2 , I ) ( . I I ~ O C Ih~a~lI~IoI n
Ca l(:ornrnlttrr
Archibald ( : o x (JFK12i
" ' S t t ~ d vof T ~ I I I l)elxt~r,
-d
OCI. 1 0 , 1 q t i 1 1 , 1). :3, i c ) l ~ oF . l r c ~ ~ oF11e
r ~ , I , Box 1 , Pre-Prcs~dr~rt~:iI
Papet-s of K ~ c t l d bf.
~~N
i I X O ~(IN a t l o l l d l AI-CIII\CS--L.~Si\r~jirJrsBranch); KJetn tc) Ntxon. Srpr. 2 2 .
IC$II,
F11r :<,~ h ~ c il .l. ~ c ~ 10
g rN I X I I I IOr[.
.
2 8 , ~ q t i o(qt~otat~or~).
File 7, 1b1d.