23 June 2013
UNITED States’ diplomatic manoeuvrings of the past five days exemplify the fall and rise of the
Afghan Taliban over the past decade-plus, with an emphasis on their current irrepressible rise.
On Tuesday, US and Taliban officials announced a meeting in Doha on Thursday over plans for the
future of Afghanistan.
That occasion would coincide with the opening of a new Taliban office in the Qatari capital. US
officials seemed set to grace both occasions, which could spell the beginning of a Taliban government
in exile.
For a moment, the compelling question was: what happened to the war in Afghanistan, in which the
United States and its allies fought long, hard and expensively for more than a decade to remove the
Taliban and keep them out?
More to the point, what happened to the Afghan government of President Hamid Karzai that US and
Nato forces were supposed to keep in place post-Taliban?
The Afghan people did not vote Karzai’s government out. Neither do they prefer the return of the
Taliban, after suffering the ravages of their militant extremism and gross human rights abuses.
The simple fact is that yet another alliance of the strongest military powers on the planet could not
resist the return of a rag-tag band of guerilla fighters battling on home ground. US and British forces,
joined by those of Canada, Australia, France and others could not hold the fort that was Kabul.
As it happened, this was not just a victory of the determined over the rich, strong and powerful. It was
also, as the Taliban and their supporters see it, proof of the deserved triumph of the divinely inspired.
Score another point for those who would use religion in their politics and war. Dumb down several
points those who would boast a military prowess that is politically and strategically empty.
Some whispers accompanied Tuesday’s announcement, to the effect that Afghan government
officials would also attend the Doha meeting. This might have surprised the Taliban themselves, since
they had refused to recognise the Karzai government.
The whispers might also have surprised Karzai and his colleagues in Kabul. Less than 24 hours after
the announcement of the Doha meeting, Kabul said Afghan officials would not go near it.
Meanwhile in Doha, reports emerged that the Taliban office – complete with the Taliban flag – was
being signposted officially as “the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan”, the name the Taliban government
gave Afghanistan when they ruled it in 1996-2001.
It was a long-distance slap in the face for Karzai, adding insult to injury. For Afghan officials to travel
to Doha for the meeting would be akin to paying homage to the Taliban there, being worse than
allowing Taliban officials to attend a meeting in Kabul.
The Doha office itself, with US endorsement, already stands as a threat to the Karzai government’s
continued relevance, credibility and dignity. The government and its High Peace Council established
for developing a peace process were being challenged by the Taliban and abandoned by their US
ally.
Smarting from some pangs of embarrassment, the Qatar government later said the Taliban office was
renamed “Political Bureau for Afghan Taliban in Doha”. But although the flag had been lowered it was
still attached to the pole, while another plaque for the “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” remained on
the side of the building.
For its part, the United States wants the Taliban to dissociate themselves from al-Qaeda, stop political
violence and embrace the Afghan Constitution that respects women and minorities.
But the Taliban have so far refused to be drawn on any of those issues. They know that they remain
strong and are getting stronger, while their adversaries are in no position to bargain for anything.
Why would the Taliban commit to anything now or when they return to power? Neither the United
States nor Karzai’s government wields any leverage over them, and are even less likely to do so later.
Equally, why would the United States or Afghan government need to meet the Taliban now to discuss
Afghanistan’s future? That in practice only indicates their weakness relative to the Taliban, without
having any conceivable redeeming features.
The only likely reason for talks now is that without any agreement with the Taliban from such a
meeting, a future Taliban government would prove even worse. That makes US and Afghan
weaknesses even more pronounced.
Naturally, the US position is not universally shared on Capitol Hill. Republican Senator Saxby
Chambliss has argued that the United States should not be negotiating with the Taliban before they
prove themselves in both words and action.
But such arguments will continue to fall on deaf ears. Washington’s “lesser of two (or three) evils”
approach has gained traction to the point of being a default position.
At the same time at the UN Security Council, Afghan and Pakistani diplomats slugged it out over
which (other) country hosted more terrorists. If Pakistan has a point even now, it could win hands
down once the Taliban retake Kabul.
Taliban forces and their tribal allies have long controlled most of Afghanistan, leaving Karzai with
nominal power in limited urban corridors like Kabul. That is why US Sgt Bowe Bergdahl remains a
prisoner of the Taliban-linked Haqqani Network, which is supposed to be represented in the planned
talks.
Groups like the Haqqani Network operate freely on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border. The
point is not which country has more terrorists, but the ease with which all kinds of militant groups
operate in both countries at will.
The US war in Afghanistan is already the longest on record, and the US public has grown weary of it.
Yet nobody can honestly say there is more peace with security today than before.
When Washington opted for war in Afghanistan in October 2001, cooler heads around the world were
stunned by the rashness of the move. Russian veterans of the Afghan war and others elsewhere
counselled against getting trapped in “the graveyard of empires”.
But there was no dissuading a US rampant, hell-bent on reshaping yet another foreign land in its own
image. Even Senator Barack Obama went after President George W. Bush for not getting stuck into
Afghanistan more decisively.
If any Taliban leader towards the end of 2001 had feared the end of his government in Afghanistan
following US attacks, he only needed to wait another 13 years.
By the end of next year, the bulk of US and Nato forces would have withdrawn from the country,
ceasing all combat operations there, but not before much bloodletting, enormous human and
economic costs, and extensive pain and frustration.
However, it would not be true to say that nothing had changed since the forced removal of the Taliban
in 2001. Once returned to power, the Taliban rulers of Afghanistan can be sure this time that no
superpower will seek to bother them.
Of course, some US troops will remain behind as “trainers” or “advisers” to assist the new
government. That support and protection by the world’s strongest military power would mean a net
gain for a Taliban government.
The decade-plus sacrifices of the Taliban could then prove to be a worthwhile investment. But the
same cannot be said of the sacrifices of US and Nato forces and the Afghan people.
Bunn Nagara is a Senior Fellow at the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia.