JFK's Positive Impact on American Policies in Vietnam
MN BOT Standard: F. A teacher of social studies understands the historical development of
structures of power, authority, and governance and their evolving functions in contemporary
United States society and other parts of the world. The teacher must understand:
(3) ideas and mechanisms to meet needs and wants of citizens, regulate territory, manage
conflict, establish order and security, and balance competing conceptions of a just society.
JFK's Positive Impact on American Policies in Vietnam
When John F. Kennedy took over as President, he inherited an office that was already deeply
committed to Vietnam, as well as the rest of Southeast Asia. There was already a worry of the
"domino theory," which was the belief that if South Vietnam fell, the rest of Southeast Asia
would fall behind it.[1] President Kennedy bought into this idea, but was still hesitant when it
came to U.S. military involvement in Vietnam. He did an extremely good job during his
presidency at making sure to take a long look at all the facts before making any decisions
regarding Vietnam. By doing this, the Kennedy administrations policies had a positive
effect. Had he remained President, it is possible that the war could have been avoided.
Prior to Kennedy taking over as President in 1961, The U.S. had already been quite involved in
Vietnam, as well as the rest of Indochina. America had adopted a policy of stemming the growth
of communism, not only in Southeast Asia, but across all areas of the world. The Eisenhower
administration came to the conclusion that the best way to do this was with a "militant response
to any new Communist advances virtually anywhere on the globe." The State and Defense
Departments had devised policies for the Cold War in 1954-1956 that "called for a military
response to Communist aggression almost anywhere that it might occur, and specifically in
Southeast Asia," which were secretly approved by President Eisenhower.[2] Eisenhower saw the
Indonesian territory and the rest of Southeast Asia as extremely important in our security, power
and ability to continue to obtain valuable objects from the region. He saw the stability of
Indochina as the ability to have a major blocking point in the spread of communism. India and
Pakistan were the last major Asian populations remaining free of communism. In 1953
Eisenhower tried to convince the American people that voting to give $400 million in aid to the
French for their war in Indochina was "the cheapest way that we can to prevent the occurrence of
something that would be of the most terrible significance for the United States of America,"
which was the fall of Indochina, which would in turn trigger the domino theory and cause the
loss of all of Asia to communism.[3] At the Geneva Convention, which designed the Geneva
Accords in an effort to preserve peace in Vietnam, the U.S. had said that it "would view any
renewal of the aggression in violation of the agreements with grave concern and as seriously
threatening international peace and security."[4] This statement committed the U.S. to Vietnam
well before Kennedy ever took office.
There were some significant differences between the Eisenhower administration and that of
JFK's. One major one was the importance placed on Laos. As Kennedy was taking over he met
with Eisenhower and his counselors to talk about the situation. Eisenhower believed that if the
U.S. gave up Laos it would topple the rest of Southeast Asia, and thus his administration
attempted to model a pro-Western government in Laos. Although Kennedy agreed about the
importance of Laos, he disagreed with attempting to turn Laos into a pro-Western government,
mostly because of the weak military presence there. He simply wanted a peaceful resolution,
free of war. He said in a Presidential news conference in March of 1961 that he wanted to "make
it clear to the American people and to all of the world that all we want in Laos is peace and not
war, a truly neutral government and not a cold war pawn, a settlement concluded at the
conference table and not on the battle field."[5] Rather than listen to the Eisenhower
administration or his own Joint Chiefs of Staff, who wanted to use U.S. military intervention and
nuclear weapons, Kennedy negotiated a solution to the conflict in Laos, agreeing to a neutral
Laotian government and obtaining Nikita Khrushchev and Ho Chi Mihn's cooperation in letting
Laos go.[6] Even with all the differences there were some obvious similarities between the
administrations. The administrations preceding Kennedy supported sending aid to Vietnam,
whether financial or non-combat military forces. Kennedy continued this trend, while gradually
escalating the amount of support, yet continuing the idea of refusing to send combat troops. He
reiterated his stance against sending combat troops to Vietnam in a News Conference in
February of 1962. He stated, "we have not sent combat troops there, although the training
missions that we have there have been instructed that if they are fired upon they are, of course, to
fire back, to protect themselves, but we have not sent combat troops, in the generally understood
sense of the word."[7]
Although Kennedy made many decisions regarding policies in Vietnam, he often took quite a
long time to make these decisions. He supported Vietnam and gradually escalated the U.S.
involvement there throughout his presidency, but he was not sure that we should have been there
in the first place. Even though he was an ardent anti-communist, he did not think that the U.S.
should have shouldered the bulk of the responsibility to fight it in other parts of the world. He
believed that the countries being threatened by communism should have to stand up for
themselves and accept the majority of the responsibility for defending themselves against
communism. He believed in supporting these countries, but he wanted to do this by some way
other than direct American military involvement.[8] This was in contrast to what his advisors
and the people around him wanted. His advisors consistently reassured Kennedy that the
military situation was progressing, even during the demise of Ngo Dinh Diem and all the
political problems that had brought about in South Vietnam.[9]
Although Kennedy himself later questioned the action he took in regard to Diem, his policies in
this area made the best of a bad situation. In a dictated reflection of the coup that brought down
Diem, Kennedy showed his remorse by saying, "I feel that we must bear a good deal of
responsibility for it, beginning with our cable of early August in which we suggested the coup. In
my judgment that wire was badly drafted, it should never have been sent on a Saturday, I should
not have given my consent to it without a roundtable conference at which McNamara and Taylor
could have presented their views."[10] However, he had done what he needed to do. Diem and
his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, were incredibly stubborn and unwilling to compromise in a number
of important areas. The U.S. repeatedly informed Diem that he needed to change his policies in
order to regain the trust and respect of his people, but he refused. One of the most notable events
demonstrating Diem's inability to relate to, or compromise with, his countries general population
was the Buddhist Crisis. On August 21, 1963 Diem "had army units raid Buddhist pagodas in
Saigon and Hue, arresting over fourteen hundred dissidents under cover of martial
law."[11] This was just one example of Diem's policies that had caused him to begin losing
control.
Although Kennedy was still opposed to an all out war in Vietnam when he died, he had briefly
talked about a talked about a plan to reduce U.S. involvement. Himself and Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara had created a plan to begin phasing out U.S. forces by 1965 as long as there
was continued progress in the war effort.[12] However, He knew that we could not simply pull
out immediately. He said in response to a question at a news conference in March of 1963, "I
think that unless you want to withdraw from the field and decide that it is in the national interest
to permit that area to collapse, I would think that it would be impossible to substantially change
it."[13] These two facts together show that Kennedy knew he could not simply withdraw
immediately and give away Vietnam to communism, yet he did want to limit, and eventually
stop, U.S. aid to a country that he felt needed to fend for itself against the communist movement.
Throughout his brief presidency, President Kennedy made numerous important decisions
regarding the situation in Vietnam. As is the case with any president, there were surely decisions
that may not have resulted in the best possible outcome. However, Kennedy made the best of
what he was given to work with, and his policies and procedures in Vietnam were, overall,
positive decisions for our country.
[1] Public Papers of the Presidents; John F. Kennedy, 1963, 651-652 (September 2, 1963).
[2] David Kaiser, "Kennedy's Prudent and Cautious Policy," in Major Problems in the History of
the Vietnam War, ed. Robert J. McMahon (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2003), 151.
[3] President Eisenhower's Remarks at Governors' Conference, August 4, 1953, Public Papers of
the Presidents, 1953, p. 540, "President Eisenhower's Remarks on the Importance of Indochina at
the Governors' Conference," Mt. Holyoke College,
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon/ps7.htm (Accessed October 7, 2009).
[4] The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 2, pp. 805-806, "President Kennedy Letter to
President Diem, December 14, 1961," Mt. Holyoke College,
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon2/ps14.htm (Accessed October 7, 2009).
[5] The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 2, pp. 799-800, "Statement by President
Kennedy on the Importance of Laos at a News Conference, 23 March 1961," Mt. Holyoke
College, http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon2/ps5.htm (Accessed October 7, 2009).
[6] Michael H. Hunt, "The Perils of Interventionism," in Major Problems in the History of the
Vietnam War, ed. Robert J. McMahon (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2003), 140-141.
[7] The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 2, pp. 807-809, "Response to a Question on
American Involvement in South Vietnam, President Kennedy's News Conference, February 14,
1962," Mt. Holyoke College, http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon2/ps18.htm
(Accessed October 7, 2009).
[8] Kaiser, "Kennedy's Prudent and Cautious Policy," 152.
[9] Kaiser, "Kennedy's Prudent and Cautious Policy," 155.
[10] Kaiser, "Kennedy's Prudent and Cautious Policy," 154.
[11] Hunt, "The Perils of Interventionism," 146.
[12] Hung, "The Perils of Interventionism," 149.
[13] The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 2, pp. 816-817, "Excerpts from President
Kennedy's News Conference, March 6, 1963," Mt. Holyoke College,
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon2/ps29.htm (Accessed October 7, 2009).