Creating Social Capital and Civic Virtue: Historical Legacy and
Individualistic Values. What Civil Society in Spain?
Rafael Vázquez García
Department of Political Science and Administration
University of Granada (Spain)
[email protected]
European Consortium for Political Research
Joint Sessions of Workshops
Uppsala, Sweden, April 13-18, 2004
(Workshop 8: Changing Structure of Civil Society)
First draft
-Work in progress-
0
Creating Social Capital and Civic Virtue: Historical Legacy and Individualistic
*
Values. What Civil Society in Spain?
Rafael Vázquez García
Department of Political Science and Administration
University of Granada
“Liberal democracy is thus a “thin” theory of democracy, one whose democratic values are
prudential and thus provisional, optional and conditional –means to exclusively
individualistic and private ends. From this precarious foundation, no firm theory of
citizenship, participation, public goods, or civic virtue can be expected to arise”.
(Barber, B., Strong Democracy, 1984: 4)
INTRODUCTION
Since the restoration of democracy, Spain seems to have become a modern capitalist
economy, a liberal democratic state, and a tolerant, pluralist society, based in principle on
respect for values common to other western societies, including individual freedom and
human rights. This has been the result of a deep institutional and cultural transformation of
which the most exceptional aspect has been the democratic transition (Pérez Díaz, 1993).
However, it´ s not so clear that the set of values, attitudes and feelings, that political
culture is, has been transformed in the same positive direction. We maintain in this work
that current Spanish political culture still contains many elements of subject political
culture.
Successful transitions to democracy implies the creation or restoration of a set of
democratic institutions, rules and practices, but to what extent does this new institutional
framework increase political engagement, social trust and, consequently, social capital and
civic virtue (Torcal and Montero, 1999: 167). Despite certain rise since the restoration of
* I gratefully acknowledge professor Miguel Jerez’s comments to the early version and Jaime Andreu and
Fundación CentrA de Estudios Andaluces, and Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung
(MZES, University of Mannheim) for letting me use the data bank, mainly: European Social Survey and
World Values Survey.
1
democracy, social capital in Spain remains in a low intensity equilibrium. In the last
decade, Some works, referable to transitions to democracy in Central and Eastern Europe,
outline these circumstances1. “It seems to be evident, especially when we look from an
Eastern European perspective, that a properly functioning democracy must be
complemented by civil society. There is no citizenship without civil society. The
reconstruction of democratic institutions and political society does not entirely provide the
conditions for a truly liberal society” (Pietrzyk, 2003: 44).
We underline the idea that if it´ s true that a flourishing market economy makes
liberal democracy stable (Lipset: 1959), however, what makes a truly civil society, and not
only liberal and formally democratic, is a wider range of aspects than the market economy
(Diamond, 1997). Nowadays, we can observe the outcomes of a successfully transition to
democracy in Spain in many aspects: political and governmental stability, a reasonable
party systems towards moderate two-party system without extremist parties2, low poverty
levels and so on (Pérez-Díaz, 1996). But what about civil society? What is the situation of
political and social engagement in Spain? How strong is civic democracy in Spain? How
much civic culture can we find in Spain?
Hypothesis
We argue that the return of democracy has not produce, at large, a particularly more
engaged and civic civil society in Spain. We have to take into account historical
consequences and obstacles and current structural difficulties, related to individualistic
values that shape the features of civil society, both social capital and civic virtue, in Spain.
This is a debate between historical forces and contemporary factors and its effects on civil
society. We take both into consideration and believe that both factors are necessary and
1
As example, Vojoveda, I. (ed.) (1999) Democratization in Central and Eastern Europe. Pinter. London and
Bryant, C.G.A and Mokrzycki (eds.) (1994) The New Great Transformation? Change and Continuity in EastCentral Europe. Routledge. London.
2
See Maravall, J. M and Santamaría, J. (1989) “Political Change in Spain and Perspectives of Democracy”, in
G. O’Donnell, P. Schmitter and L. Whitehead (eds.) Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Southern Europe.
The Johns Hopkins University Press. Baltimore.
2
complementary in order to obtain a more real and clear description of civil society at
present time. Some scholars maintain that capability of a society to make possible
cooperation among its members is determined by its historical experience3. From this point,
it would be more likely, as we support here, that particularly oppressive regimes, like
general Franco system, can damage and destroy social capital and civic society in a very
strong way, with consequences till nowadays. Anyway, as Putnam himself has signed, it’s
necessary to make a distinction between short-term and long-term influences, between
historical consequences and present-day social and political factors, like current values and
institutions. Because of that we adopt a wide and inclusive approach.
To analyse both set of factors, we need to test some hypothesis:
Firstly. Despite the increase since the restoration of democracy, social capital in Spain
remains in a low intensity equilibrium. Some elements of political culture (interest in
politics, satisfaction with democratic performance, institutional and social distrust…)
remain in the same direction, with similar attitudes and values over time4. That seems to be
due to a certain cultural legacy, norms and values transmitted from generation to generation
by political socialization, since the last decades. This historical situation obviously shape
the Spanish pattern of civic society and opportunities to create civic culture.
Secondly. Although, membership and participation in voluntary associations, and
intermediary organizations are relatively similar as compared to most other Western
nations, however, the extent of involvement is always lower. Spaniards are less likely to
belong, participate, donate money or work in voluntary organizations than citizens in any of
the other countries. It exists an obvious lower level in social involvement and implications.
Moreover, predominant types of voluntary organizations is not in all cases the more
3
Classic works are: Banfield, E. (1958) The Moral Basis of a Backward Society. The Free Press. New York.
Putnam, R. D. (1993) Making Democracy Work. Princeton University Press. Princeton.
4
Attract attention the great stability in some patterns of political culture in some countries like Italy and
Spain. See Inglehart, R. (1988) “Cultura política y democracia estable”. Revista Española de Investigaciones
Sociológicas, 42: 45-65.
3
suitable for fostering the quality of democracy, since not all associations produce the same
effects on democracy.
Thirdly. At micro-level those who are explicitly involved in associations present more civic
virtues as more interest, higher capability to understand political issues, participate in
politics or be more informed (Morales, 2004: 498). On the other hand, at least at aggregate
level, private and individualistic values, play a role for creating civic virtue that implies a
larger social and political engagement, while an earlier politicization encourage to relate
each others.
We divide our presentation in two main areas. We start with a theoretical
framework, where Spanish situation concerning political culture since the 70’s is exposed.
We show the main features that define the historical evolution through some variables and
indicators, pointing up the presence and continuity of a set of elements that, beyond time
(dictatorship and political transition, determine the success in developing a stable
democracy (Inglehart, 1988; Diamond, 1998) and a more participative civic society
(Diamond, 1997). At the same time, we seek to mark theoretically existing connections
among civil society, social capital, voluntary organizations and civic virtues, those which
make possible to improve the quality of democracy. With this idea, and following political
theorist Mark Warren (2000), a typology of associations and effects on democracy is
exposed.
In the second part, empirical findings try to check our three hypothesis. First, an
analysis of the main features of political culture in the last decades. Continuously, we
describe socio-political participation in Spain, comparing with rest of Europe y, what is
most important, types and involvement extension are analyzed. Finally, we’ll try to find
substantive ties between several socio-political indicators and voluntary social engagement.
This paper is based on survey data, most of which coming from World Values Survey
(WVS), European Social Survey (ESS)(2002-2003) and CIS (Centro de Investigaciones
Sociológicas).
4
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Historical legacy and political culture in Spain
Our point of view is that, as we’ll see later, historical tradition is really important to
understand political culture at the present (Almond and Verba, 1963; Putnam, 1993).
Francoist legacy, political transition and the fist years in democracy are pieces undoubtedly
necessary to make a retreat of present Spanish society. Despite course of the time, historical
legacy is still presented in our values and attitudes. As it has been said “there is a kind of
historical singularity made out of a vast array of beliefs, customs and attitudes that are the
legacy of a set of other historical traditions and that could be considered a reflection of
historical backwardness and inconsistent with the rules and values of an open society”
(Pérez-Díaz, 1990: 26-27).
Following López-Pintor, Spanish political culture would be determined by five really
important phenomena (López-Pintor: 1982: 74):
1. Civil war (1936-1939) people who lived it, has transmitted it as victory o defeat
experiences. In this sense, some cleavages (left/ right, secularisation / religion)
might have marked the following years (Perez-Díaz, 2003).
2. Authoritarian regime: Franco regime promoted antidemocratic and anti-partisan
values and customs and demobilized an open and free civic society (Gracia, 2001,
López and Aranguren, 1976, López-Pintor and Buceta, 1975).
Dictatorship left a legacy of scarce interest in politics, apathy, political scepticism, a
great lack of confidence in political elites and an estrangement of the making decision
process. Here are the roots of present social demobilization. Political and social
circumstances in Spain over the last 150 years have hardly promote the development of
5
voluntary associations. Political life has been characterized by a n extraordinary
discontinuity. In the twentieth century a liberal monarchy has been followed by a short
military dictatorship, a democratic republic that ended in a civil war, and the establishment
of a dictatorship during almost forty years.
Political instability have made impossible the development of autonomous social
organizations, traditions of cooperation between social and political elites and citizenship,
and relations based on dialogue and reciprocal trust among citizens. “These problems were
aggravated by systematic electoral fraud, the extensive functioning of caciquismo, and the
increasingly widespread feeling of alienation from the political system” (Torcal y Montero,
1999: 178).
After the Civil War the first fifteen years of the authoritarian regime saw the virtual
elimination of most of the existing organizational traditions and the repression of
opposition groups. During this period only those organizations linked to the Catholic
Church or the Single Party were able to operate with any degree of autonomy.
3. Industrialization process in 70’s produced deep changes in economic activity,
incomes policy, urbanization, social stratification, education and lifestyles.
4. Since the early 60’s the political breakdown of the regime emphasized its limited
legitimacy and popular support.
5. The gradual and peaceable instauration of democracy expanded freedom right and
confirmed the new political rules. (García, 1997). Anyway, at the end of
dictatorship there is often virtually no social capital. Citizens have been exposed to
long experiences of authoritarian rule during which associative involvement was,
most of times repressed and forbidden. In seventies we found a clear irrelevance of
politics, and even certain acquiescence towards francoist regime (Perez Diaz, 1993:
47).
6
Once in democracy political culture is characterized by:
1) Legitimacy of political system as play rules but dissatisfaction with its
performance: “cinismo democrático5. That is the result of the divergence
between generally positive values towards the political system, an the negative
perceptions of the way it works.
2) Political disaffection. It can be considered to be the result of a distrusting and
suspicious vision of all human relations acquired at an early stage of the
socialization process (Montero, Gunther and Torcal, 1997: 18). Feelings of
distrust affects almost of types of political institutions as well as interpersonal
relations as we observe in table 6 and 8.
3) Disinterest and lack of knowledge about politics.
4) Low political involvement.
5) Ideological moderation.
To sum up, we can say that the lack of interest, only higher in specific situations
does not affect legitimacy of democracy and democratic institutions, giving reason to
Almond and Verba’s theory about compatibility of democratic systems with high
legitimacy and stability but a citizenship scarcely involved in political and social action
(Almond and Verba, 1963).
Civic Society, social capital and civic virtue
Mark Warren places civil society halfway between political society, public sphere
and intimate spaces where family and friendship are dominant elements (Warren, 2000:
5
See Maravall, J. M. (1981) La política de la transición. Taurus. Madrid and (1995) Los resultados de la
democracia. Alianza. Madrid, and Sanz, R. (2002) El cinismo político de la ciudadanía española: una
propuesta analítica para su estudio. CIS. Cuadernos Opiniones y Actitudes, n°43 (Diciembre, 2002). Madrid.
7
57). Civil society is the domain of social Organization within voluntary associative
relations are dominant, and political mediating associations are excluded.
Table 1. Locating civil society
Means of Social Coordination
Closeness of
social relations Legal coercion
Distant
States
Social
(norms and communication)
Mediating associations:
"political society"
Mediating spaces: Publics
Intermediate
Civil Society.
Pure associative
relations
Intimate
Families, friendship
Money
Mediating
associations
Markets
Source: Warren (2000: 57)
What makes civil society “civil” is the fact that it is a sphere within which citizens
may freely organize themselves into groups and, mainly, associations at various levels. we
also use the concept here because its great explanatory potential for the theory of the
political as well as for the theory of transition and consolidation of democracies.
Most theorists from Tocqueville have focused in the importance of civic society,
and specially, voluntary associations as vital to the performance and life of democracy
(Selle and Stromsnes, 2001: 135). For current political theorists “typical face-to-face
deliberative activities ad horizontal collaboration within voluntary associations far removed
from the political sphere, such as sports clubs, agricultural cooperatives, or philanthropic
groups, promote interpersonal trust, fostering the capacity to work together in future,
creating the bonds of social life that are the basis for civil society and democracy” (Norris,
2002)
In addition, civic society based in associations makes citizens themselves stronger,
in a democratic way, by providing civic and political skills as improving their sense of
efficacy . As Morales has written “associations work as schools of democracy, and their
development should, therefore, be promoted for their positive consequences for democracy
8
as a whole” (Morales, 2002: 498). The effects are a too large to enumerate them one by
one, but what is most important to highlight is that literature about associational
participation has notably increased since 90’s with Putnam’s works.
Civic virtue, that transcend the concept of social capital and combines some more
elements, related to democratic theory6 and commonly republican tradition (Barber, 1984.
As Warren notes “the list of potential civic virtues is a long one: attentiveness to the
common good and concerns for justice; tolerance of the views of others, trustworthiness,
willingness to participate, deliberate and listen; respect for the rule of law, and respect for
the right of others” (Warren, 2000: 73).
Anyway social involvement has appeared most of times in the last decade joint to
the concept of social capital. At the core of the conventional definition of social capital is
membership in voluntary associations, which may be dedicated to a variety of purposes
ranging from the recreational or social to the religious or political but which should share
two key features to conform to existing theory. First, they should involve their members in
at least some face-to-face interaction with others, a factor of importance since it is from
such interaction that the capacity for reciprocity is said to follow. Secondly, they should
engaged their members in common endeavour, increasing capacities for collective action
beyond the simply self-help. (Hall, 1999: 420).
Warren identifies three general ways in which associations might produce positive
effects and potentially “democratic” (Warren, 2000: 61). First, effects what he refers as
developmental effects on individuals “Ideally, associations would underwrite the capacities
of individuals to participate in collective judgement and decision making This idea appears
in other recent publications (Clarke, 2002) and it´ s the point of view of many governmental
agendas. Second, associations may contribute to the formation of public (public sphere
effects). Finally, They also “contribute to institutional conditions and venues that support,
express, and actualise individual and political autonomy as well as transform autonomous
judgements into collective decisions”.
6
See Burtt, S. (1993) “The Politics of Virtue Today: a Critique and a Proposal”. American Political Science
Review, 87 (2): 360-368.
9
Starting from this point, we wonder if all voluntary associations have the same
benevolent effects on democratic life. Since the dark side of social capital has been
introduced into the literature7, we must make clear which are the associations and what are
its effects for a much civic and democratic life. We clearly argue that voluntary
associations are not at all always causing the same effects8. The main theoretical
elaboration comes from Warren in his work Democracy and Association and this
assumption follows from the fact that in a complex and pluralist society associations tend to
specialize. “Associations today serve discrete and segment goods, and they usually define
their purposes […] often in terms of a dominant good” (Warren, 2000: 124). Warren
classifies constitutive goods which are relevant for associations into the following types:
-Individual material goods: They are individual, scarce and excludable. As Warren
maintain “there is no inherent requirement for collective action to gain them” (2000: 126).
In This kind of association pursuing these goods could be perceived to have only small
impact on their members’ civic virtues. Examples: Business lobbies, unions…
-Public material goods: goods which are individual, material, scarce and non excludable.
Warren gives some examples as public radio, television, environmental integrity or
territorial security. Associations that pursue these goods “must attend to common interests,
and must persuade individuals they in fact have common interests” (128). They are most
likely to contribute to a wide range of democratic effects. As examples it can be mentioned
civic and environmental groups as well as parties.
-Inclusive social goods: They refer to goods that are social, symbolic, non scarce, and non
excludable and include common elements as language, knowledge, culture, as well as
shared ideas and goals. Associations that seek such goods include those like educational
societies, cultural groups, charitable foundations…
-Interpersonal identity groups are individual, symbolic, non scarce but excludable. That
comprises goods like “identities that emerge out of close interpersonal relations such as
7
See Putnam, R.D. (2001) Bowling Alone. The Collapse and Revival of American Community. Simon &
Schuster. New York. (pages 350-363).
8
An excellent work on this issue can be viewed in Zmerli, S. (2002).
10
love, family, friendship and primary groups” (Warren, 2000: 129). They are private goods,
in the sense that their inherent intimacy has an irreducibly private dimension.
Neighbourhoods, social and sport clubs can be assigned to this category.
-Status goods: In this case Warren refers to social, symbolic, scarce and excludable goods
such as degrees, titles, exclusive membership. In this case, it’s clear that the possession of
exclusive privileges cannot be defended in the name of common interest and associations
pursuing these goods, as elite social clubs or private schools are very unlikely to contribute
to civic virtues.
-Finally, exclusive group identity goods depend on group distinctions (religion, language,
ethnicity, race, age or gender) or distinctive interests, hobbies, lifestyle. ”Associations that
pursue these goods can contribute to pluralism and diversity while providing individuals
with a sense of agency, solidarity, and efficacy” (2000: 130-131). As examples, Warren
refers fraternal orders, groups dedicated to cultural tradition, ethnic identity groups.
So, that typology is what is put to the test in Spain at the present. The goal is get to
identify every voluntary organization with a type in Warren’s classification, in order to
check the potentiality of everyone, their effects, on civic virtue and democracy.
Some works (Paxton and Nash, 2002) have outlined the possibility of a
associational engagement containing certain doses of individualism o selfishness, but
always joint to an important grade of civic virtues as solidarity, in order to develop
democratic praxis. The problem appears when individualistic values, associated with
private interests, are predominant. We maintain that one of the main obstacles for
expanding associations, helping in this way to improve the quality of democracy is the
predominance of this kind values. That is what we´ ll check with second and the third
hypothesis.
We have just presented the theoretical framework of the conceptualisation. We’ll
apply it in the following section in order to test empirically its relevance.
11
Empirical evidence
1.Hypothesis
Historical Legacy and political culture
As it has been exposed above, Spanish political culture tradition can be explained as
function of several elements, which can be summed up as follows: democratic cynicism,
political dissatisfaction, political disaffection, disinterest and low levels of involvement.
Let´ s have a brief overlook to the situation of these factors in recent Spanish history. Juan
Linz refers legitimacy as the belief that existing political institutions, in spite of their faults
and defects, would be too much better that whichever (Linz, 1988: 65) 9.
Table 2. Legitimacy/ Performance of Democracy
Legitimacy of Democracy
Democracy is always the best form of government
DN / DA
Satisfaction with democratic performance
Very
Quite
Not very
Not at all
DN / DA
1980
1984
1988
1992
1996
2000
2002
49
33
69
9
72
8
73
5
79
4
88
3
82
4
3
46
35
11
5
7
61
23
4
4
5
51
33
7
4
4
39
36
9
12
Source: CIS Data Bank. Percentages.
Table above shows the percentages of respondents who agreed with the statement
“democracy is the best system for a country like ours” is always the higher. Despite in the
early 80’s democracy as an ideal was not absolutely fixed in Spanish public opinion, since
the end of the decade and, even more, since the middle of 90’s, democratic legitimacy, as
play rules, is completely consolidated. Between two thirds and more than three quarters
agreed with the statement, affirming the superiority of democracy over any other political
9
See also Morlino, L. and Montero, J.R. (1995) “Legitimacy and Democracy in Southern Europe” (pp. 231260), en Gunther, R, Nikiforos Diamandouros, P. and Puhle, H.J. The Politics of Democratic Consolidation.
Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective. The John Hopkins University Press. Baltimore. And
McDonough, P., Barnes, S. H. and López Pina, A. (1986) “The Growth of Democratic Legitimacy in Spain”.
American Political Science Review, 80:736-760.
12
system. Levels of support for democracy in Spain is in fact similar to that found in other
western societies.
However, political discontent is defined as the expression of a certain frustration
derived from comparing what one has with what one ought to have (Montero y Torcal,
1998) and it´ s usually measured by the indicator “satisfaction with democratic
performance” (see table above). So, it arises from citizens’ evaluations of the performance
of the regime, authorities, as well as of their political outcomes10. The indicator
“satisfaction with democratic performance” measures a felt discrepancy between
democratic norms and the actual democratic process. In table 2 can be noted that
satisfaction with democratic praxis is always lower that legitimacy. In 2002 only 56 per
cent of citizens declared that they were very or quite satisfied with democratic performance.
Almost twenty years before the percentage was nor too much different, 43 per cent.
This combination of legitimacy and dissatisfaction is a phenomenon that Maravall
has denominated “democratic cynicism” (see footnote 3) and that it seems to be common to
other Mediterranean countries (Montero and Morlino, 1993).
People who put a high rating on the attractiveness of democracy as a form of
government but a the same time place a low rating on the performance of their particular
democratic regime. Dissatisfaction with democracy does not necessarily mean that people
do not support democratic principles. As some scholars has clarified “it might just as well
mean the opposite; it is not unlikely that people may be dissatisfied with democracy
because the actual political process does not meet their high democratic standards”
(Thomassen, 1998: 383).
10
Klingemann (1999: 54): “Dissatisfied democrats. This is the label applied to people who put a high rating
on the attractiveness of democracy as a form of government but a the same time place a low rating on the
performance of their particular democratic regime”. See, for European countries, López-Pintor, R. (1995)
“El descontento político en las sociedades informadas de Europa”. Informational Bulletin. Juan March
Foundation. Madrid.
13
Table 3. Interest in Politics (Spain, 1960-2002)
Year
1960
1968
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1988
1989
1996
1998
2000
2002
Source
IOP
IOP
ICSA/GALLUP
ICSA/GALLUP
ICSA/GALLUP
ICSA/GALLUP
ICSA/GALLUP
ICSA/GALLUP
CIS
CIS
CIS
CIS
CIS
CIS
CIS
CIS
CIS
CIS
CIS
CIS
CIS
CIS
CIS
ESS
Very
6
4
5
5
6
4
5
6
16
11
8
6
8
7
4
4
4
3
2
3
4
6
4
5
Quite
15
15
15
14
15
12
11
17
23
27
21
21
18
22
19
19
21
20
20
19
29
26
20
25
Not very
27
30
17
17
18
22
16
17
18
20
26
30
26
24
34
32
37
35
35
36
29
29
37
36
Not at all
49
48
58
57
57
60
65
59
41
40
41
41
45
45
43
43
37
39
42
42
37
39
39
33
DK / DA
3
6
7
4
3
3
1
1
2
4
3
3
3
1
1
2
1
1
Source: see table. Percentages.
Interest in politics is commonly the best used indicator to measure the level of
subjective political implication. According to the data Spaniards, generally speaking are
less likely to be interested in politics than most of the European countries. As it can be seen
in table 3, levels of political interest has been extremely low in Spain, despite the enormous
political, economic and institutional changes witnessed over the last twenty five years. The
only relative increase took place during the first two years of the transition (Sastre, 1997:
79). Since the early 1980s around 50 and 60 per cent of Spaniards declared that the had no
(or nor very) interest in politics. Only between 15 and 20 percent of citizenship has very or
quite interest in politics. Also in this case the continuity of figures over time is evident.
While in 1960, during dictatorship, people most interested in politics represented 21 per
cent, in 1971 is 20 per cent, 27% in 1980, 22% in 1989 and 24 per cent in 1990.
This low level of interest in politics is accompanied with a not too high electoral
turnout. Generally speaking, Spain presents a relative low electoral turnout. In some
elections abstention levels has gone beyond 30 per cent in general elections and 40 per cent
14
in some European elections. Anyway, electoral participation rates have not systematically
declined in the last two decades. The high abstention level of 2000 is not very different to
that we had in 1979.It exists a clear continuity.
Table 4. Electoral Participation rates (Spain, 1977-2004)
1977
1979
1982
1983
1986
1987
1989
1991
1993
1994
1995
1996
1999
2000
2004
General Elections
79,1
68,3
79,8
Regional Elections
Local elections
European Parliament
68,63
68
67,68
69
69,32
63
62,84
70
69,89
67
64
70,6
69,7
54,8
79,4
59,1
78,1
64,3
70
77,3
Source: Ministerio del Interior. Percentages.
However, abstention levels, comparing with other western nations, cannot be
considered as alarming and they are placed into the normality, between 20 and 30 per
cent11. Spain is not too different from the rest of European countries in this case of political
conventional action. As matters in other places, local and regional elections tend to be
considered less important than national ones. Citizenship perceive that central government
as the hard core in making decision processes. That reality add some difficulty to the
development process of a genuine civic society, which is associated by many authors to
closer spheres and circles like local initiatives. In addition, we should take in mind that, as
Joan Font has show, “the introduction of formulas of citizen participation beyond elections
should not only preserve but also foster the capacity of representation of these diverse
interests in public decisions” (Font, 2003: 128). Voting is only a sporadic and particular
action, that doesn’t involve a continuous mobilization and a permanent solidarity among
citizens. On the other hand, we can find more differences with Europe in the extent of
11
See Montero, J. R. (1998) Stabilising the Democratic Order: Electoral Behaviour in Spain. WP, 123.
CEACS (Juan March Institute). Madrid.
15
implication in some kinds of social engagement as it can be observed in table number
seven.
Table 5. Confidence in institutions (Spain, 1981-1997)
Church
Armed Forces
Legal System
Press
Television
Labor Unions
Police
National Government
Political Parties
Parliament
Civil Service
Major Companies
Ecology Movement
Women´s Movement
European Union
United Nations
1981
49
60
47
46
1990
47
38
45
48
31
62
38
35
8
47
38
37
37
35
45
49
1997
49
42
45
42
39
30
60
30
18
35
40
44
58
39
48
44
Source: World Values Survey. Percentages.
Areas related to public sphere, political society in Warren’s words, are which raise
less confidence. We are talking about political parties, trade unions, the national
government or the parliament. On the other hand, some traditional institutions as church
and the police get a better evaluation since 1981.
Even though political parties are perceived, for the most part, as necessary in order
to make work democracy (table 15) and, even more, as main channels for representation
and participation, their performance is strongly criticized by public opinion. They are often
seen as disturbing elements in political like because of the corruption, their rude and vulgar
criticisms and their exclusive search for votes and partisan interest12.
12
See Aguila, R. del (1985) Crises of Parties as Legitimacy Crises: a View from Political Theory. WP, 75
(Juan March Institute). Madrid and Porras, A. K. (ed.) (1996) El debate sobre la crisis de la representación
política. Tecnos. Madrid.
16
So, It’s clear that politics, generally speaking and politicians specifically generate
negative effects for most of the citizens. Distrust in politics and politicians is the best way
to define relations between political elites and ordinary people (Uriarte, 2001)13.
Table 6. Social Trust (Interpersonal Trust)
1971
21
1980
1981
1987
1990
1994
1996
22
33
25
32
29
34
1997
29
Not trust
72
74
61
73
62
67
61
68
DK/DA
7
4
6
2
6
4
5
4
1200
1200
2303
2499
4147
2491
2481
1211
Trust
(N)
Source: 1971, Gallup. 1980-1987 CIS Data Bank. 2003 (ESS, 2002-2003). Percentages.
Finally, we find that levels of interpersonal trust have not changed to a great extent
across generations, That is due to a certain cultural legacy transmitted from generation to
generation. It’s resistant to the great economic, social and political changes that have taken
since the last thirty years and this is a shared aspect with other Southern European
democracies like Italy, Greece and Portugal (Magone, 2003). A mutual and reciprocal
suspicion become one of the most historical and important feature in these countries, as an
distinctive attribute (Inglehart, 1988: 51). We find again how pre-democratic values
continues during democratic period. In 1971, 72 per cent who declare not trusting each
other is almost the same more than twenty-five years later (68 per cent). Traditional and
Mediterranean distrust impedes the expansion of reciprocity links beyond narrow
boundaries of family and friends.
2.Hypothesis
Civic engagement and individualistic values
At the same time we’ll try to discover the existence of a set of values, that can be
defined as private or individualistic values, far from public spheres and obstacles in some
way, joint to historical legacy, for creating social capital and civic virtue. With this purpose
13
See Listhaug, O. (1995) “The Impact of Modernization and Value Change on Confidence Institutions”, in
Moor, R. de (ed.) (1995) Values in Western Societies. Tilburg University Press. Tilburg. And Listhaug, O. and
Wiberg, M. (1998) “Confidence in Political and Private Institutions”, in Klingemann, H. D. y Fuchs, D. (ed.)
Citizens and the State. Oxford University Press. Oxford.
17
we’ll carry out an analysis of most important aspects in everyday life of people. In addition,
starting from Warren´ s typology of associations, we’ll specifically analyze Spanish
situation in order to make a sketch of more prevalent organizations and see what are the
effects on developing civil society.
Table 7. Most important aspects to be a good citizen
Germany
Norway
Finland
Netherlands
Switzerland
Ireland
Luxembourg
Austria
United Kingdom
Israel
Spain
Belgium
Italy
Czech Republic
Hungary
Poland
Greece
EUROPE
Support people who are
worse off than
Vote in
themselves
elections
7,31
7,55
7,94
8,19
8,02
7,59
7,41
7,48
7,4
7,37
7,67
7,7
7,55
8
7,56
8,07
6,82
7,16
8,46
7,98
7,76
6,43
6,95
6,56
7,84
7,51
6,15
6,16
6,71
8,26
7,48
7,65
8,37
8,12
7,58
7,61
Always obey
laws and
regulations
7,54
8,18
8,56
7,28
7,28
8,35
8,43
7,69
8,31
8,91
7,12
7,43
8,48
8,16
9,1
8,99
8,75
8,13
Form their own
opinion,
independently of
others
8,81
8,62
8,51
8,19
8,68
8,16
9,14
8,78
8,25
8,47
7,52
7,81
7,98
7,98
7,93
8,16
8,54
8,41
Be active in
voluntary
associations
4,84
5,95
5,5
5,82
5,68
5,78
6,72
5,28
5,17
6,8
5,85
5,35
6,43
4,45
4,51
5,54
6,01
5,62
Be active in politics
4,25
4,75
4,43
4,24
4,4
3,82
3,77
4,89
3,48
4,41
3,52
3,41
3,99
2,93
3,66
5,11
5,42
4,24
Source: ESS, 2002-2003. Percentages.
Table 7 presents a detailed overview of the eighteen countries taken into
consideration. They are analyzed in relation with the most important aspects that people
consider to be necessary to be a good citizen.
Participation in voluntary associations, that is more linked to the possibilities for
generating social capital, seems to be more important for people than exclusive political
involvement. This situation doesn’t mean, necessarily, that it exists a massive decision to
take part in associations, but at least, associations are considered more important for
democratic life. It’s something paradoxical to observe how in Spain, which presents a
relative low level in participatory politics, being active in politics show an important
consideration. Again, “democratic cynicism”.
18
Table above proves that existing civic virtue is only related to legalism but not with
active participation. That is a common feature for all the countries. In addition, the
importance of forming independent opinion stand up. That makes true the predominance of
a liberal vision, close to a individualist conception of political life, where having personal
and exclusive ideas is more important that getting opinions by socialization in groups and
deliberation in associations.
As table 10 offers, individualist values like exclusive confidence in familiar spheres
are a constant factor in Spanish political culture. A wider vision of this phenomenon of
mistrust and lack of solidarity vision is presented in table (Table 8 and figure 1). In Spain,
possibilities of collaboration run into difficulties and obstacles related to interpersonal trust
(A8), the search of personal advantages (A9), and the lack of solidarity and individualism
(A10). As we have already signed, they are sharing values in Mediterranean nations and in
some eastern Europe like Czech Republic, Hungary , Slovenia and Poland.
Table 8. Interpersonal relations. Spain in comparative perspective
Germany
Norway
Finland
Netherlands
Switzerland
Ireland
Luxembourg
Sweden
Austria
United Kingdom
Israel
Spain
Belgium
Italy
Czech Republic
Portugal
Hungary
Slovenia
Poland
Greece
EUROPE
A8
6,99
6,64
6,46
5,71
5,64
5,47
5,18
5,13
5,13
5,05
4,89
4,89
4,81
4,52
4,29
4,16
4,08
3,98
3,69
3,63
5,05
A9
7,33
7,01
6,88
6,19
6,2
6
5,5
5,62
5,62
5,56
5,36
5,23
5,61
4,59
5,11
5,27
4,64
4,68
4,53
3,69
5,61
A10
6,12
6,09
5,68
5,26
5,32
5,95
4,54
5,19
5,19
5,41
4,51
4,4
4,44
4,07
3,95
3,91
4,16
4,24
3,16
3,01
4,79
Source: ESS, 2002-2003. Mean scores.
Questions in questionnaire:
A8: Interpersonal trust (Question: “would you say that most people can be trusted (maximum 10), or that you can’t be too
careful in dealing with people (maximum 0)? (scale 0-10)
A9: (Question: “¿do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance (maximum 0),
or would they try to be fair (maximum 10)”?
19
A10: (Question: “Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful (maximum 10) or that they are mostly
looking out for themselves (maximum 0)”?
Figure 1. Help for others
36,9
31,4 31,2 29,6
29,1
26,5
22,8 21,3
20,5 20,2
18,3 18,1
21,9
11,3 10,6
9,8
EUROPE
Czech
Republic
Portugal
12
Greece
Spain
Norway
Italy
Ireland
Luxembourg
Hungary
United
Kingdom
Belgium
Israel
Swizertland
Netherlands
Germany
Austria
12,1
Poland
14,5
Finland
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Source: ESS, 2002-2003
Percentages declaring providing help for others every day or several times a week.
In this situation of distrusting each other and privacy, the most important aspect in
people’s life is always the family. It’s the closest space where they often find protection and
security. Economic security is also very important, so this is the second most important
aspect for people. Inside the same private area we have to take into account friendship and
leisure time, normally spent with friends. Politics, finally, is the least important aspect in
Spanish everyday life. Most people do not spend a lot of time engaging themselves in
organizational activities nor in political involvement compared with the time they spend in
school, work or the family, with friends or in leisure time. These are likely to be more
important spaces for the generation of trust, of security than voluntary associations and
political sphere of course (see table 10).
20
Table 10. Most important aspects in personal life
Germany
Netherlands
Switzerland
Ireland
Austria
United Kingdom
Spain
Belgium
Italy
Czech Republic
Hungary
Greece
Portugal
EUROPE
Family
9,16
8,63
9,3
9,66
9,32
9,56
9,47
9,05
9,22
9,42
9,7
9,74
9,62
9,44
Friends
8,4
8,34
8,53
9,02
8,7
8,53
8,34
8,26
7,65
8,18
7,5
8,62
8,35
8,47
Leisure Time
7,62
8,16
7,79
7,89
8,09
7,69
8,03
7,8
7,57
7,5
7,41
7,8
7,37
7,91
Politics
5,1
5,02
4,61
3,85
4,91
3,77
3,68
4,03
4,34
3,51
3,75
4,92
3,52
4,3
Work
7,34
6,76
7,66
6,79
7,62
5,78
7,77
7,53
8,18
7,37
7,46
8,75
7,69
7,53
Religion
3,95
4,37
4,52
6,19
5,01
3,88
4,71
4,14
6,47
2,62
4,29
8,34
5,87
4,93
Voluntary Organizations
4,06
5,03
4,88
4,54
4,34
3,61
5,6
5,02
6,38
3,09
2,1
4,97
5,36
4,53
Source: ESS, 2002-2003. Percentages.
Table 11. Socio political involvement during the last 12 months
Denmark
Sweden
Norway
Netherlands
Finland
Belgium
Germany
United Kingdom
Ireland
Israel
Slovenia
Czech Republic
Spain
Italy
Portugal
Hungary
Greece
Poland
EUROPE
Worked in a political
party or action group
4,1
5
9,2
3,4
3,5
5,4
3,9
3,4
4,7
5,7
3,5
4,7
6,1
3
4,2
2,9
4,8
2,9
5
Worked in another
organization or
association
17,3
24,6
28,2
23,1
30,7
23,2
17,8
9,2
13,8
7,4
2,3
15,1
16,7
7,6
4,2
2,9
5,7
5,9
15,1
Signed a
petition
28,2
40,8
36
22,4
24
33,9
30,5
40
27,6
18,4
11,8
16,1
24,2
17,4
7,3
4,2
4,8
6,9
23,8
Taken part in a
lawful public
demonstration
8,3
6,4
8,5
2,9
2
8,4
10,6
4,4
7,1
9,9
2,7
4,6
17,5
11
4,3
3,7
4,5
1,3
7,3
Participated in illegal
protest activities
1,1
0,8
0,7
0,4
0,3
2,4
1,1
0,8
0,8
1,4
0,8
1,4
1,7
1,8
0,3
0,8
1,5
0,2
1,2
Source: ESS, 2002-2003. Percentages.
We have serious doubts about if we can say that this kind of interactions as sign a
petition, take part in a lawful public demonstrations can be considered as social capital.
They are sporadic and they don’t often need social trust to exist. They don’t have a long life
and there is no continuity. In most of cases, they enjoy only a short life Once they have
been produced, they disappear. They don’t produce solid networks and nor strong ties (see
the table below) and what is most important the don’t create reciprocity: they are, in most
21
of times, individualistic and hedonistic values which consequences are limited to a very
small group but there is no an idea of common good.
As can be observed in table 11, the greater is the implication in activities and costs
are higher, the lower is the importance of them. While signing a petition doesn’t carry too
many costs, participating in political or nonpolitical associations or a strike and a illegal
protest activities do it, with personal costs in terms of leisure time, money and physical
integrity.
Spain is situated over European mean in relative terms, but too far for other
countries on the top. That means that if we have a look to the extent of their activity
within the association, percentages are decreasing as the implication goes up. In general
terms, survey data show that levels of membership and other types of participation
(participating in fact, not only member, donating money and offering voluntary work) in
voluntary associations, intermediary organizations in Spain are relatively low as compared
to most other Western democracies (table 12).
Table 12. Associational involvement (Spain in Europe)
None
Sports Club
Cultural/Hobby
activities
Trade Union
Business/Professional
organization
Consumer
Humanitarian Aid/
Human Rights
Environmental
Protection
Religious
Political Party
Science/Education/
Teachers/ Parents
Young/ Elderly/
Women
Any other voluntary
organisation
Member
Participated
Donated money
Voluntary Work
Spain
Europe
Spain
Europe
Spain
Europe
Spain
Europe
Spain
Europe
6,6
81,2
68,7
12,4
23
10,2
14,6
3,1
5,4
1,3
83,4
91,8
78,2
76
11
5,5
14,6
22
7,5
1,8
10,7
3,7
2,9
2
3,6
2,2
2,3
0,5
93,6
94,7
88,9
80,7
4,7
3,7
9,1
18,1
1,9
1,4
3,3
1,2
0,8
1
1,2
1,1
0,1
0,1
88,7
83
4
5,8
4
2,6
5,9
11,6
1,4
93,9
87,3
1,8
6
2,1
2,2
1,9
6,7
0,3
88,9
80,7
6
13,6
4,4
6,2
3,2
7,3
1,3
95
92,6
2,8
5,3
1,8
2,2
0,6
1,4
0,8
88,6
89,9
7,5
6,7
3,9
4,1
2,2
1,9
1,3
2
88,6
83,5
7
11,5
5,4
6,9
1,6
2,6
1,4
3,2
92,7
89,4
3,4
6,6
1,4
2,9
1,7
2,5
0,8
2,4
4,5
1,1
1,1
0,2
1,9
0,9
3,1
1,2
Source: ESS, 2002-2003. Percentages.
22
As can be seen in tables 12, 13 and 14, Spanish citizens are less likely to belong,
participated, donated money or work in voluntary organizations that citizens in any of the
other countries in the tables . This is not only true of political parties and trade unions but
of all the many organizations of civil society that depend on the voluntary participation of
citizens.
Table 13. Type of involvement in associations (Spain in Europe)
Denmark
Sweden
Norway
Netherlands
Finland
Belgium
Germany
United Kingdom
Ireland
Israel
Slovenia
Czech Republic
Spain
Italy
Portugal
Hungary
Greece
Poland
Europe
Member
92
90
84
84
76
71
71
70
68
55
52
43
36
35
29
27
25
21
54
Participated
48
47
47
41
36
49
44
49
38
27
26
19
25
22
18
20
13
11
34
Donated Money
34
44
44
43
19
26
34
39
32
13
31
13
15
12
16
6
9
12
25
Voluntary Work
28
35
38
29
12
23
26
23
16
7
19
8
7
5
6
9
6
5
17
Source: ESS, 2002-2003. Percentages.
Following our theoretical framework, diverse associations produce different results
for generating civic virtue among their members and deepening the quality of democracy.
Some of them generate more collaborative efforts but other ones promote a high
individualism and hedonist lifestyle.
Spain is under the European mean for all types of involvement (Table 13). In
relative terms as well as global terms, figures in table are very low and little propitious to
create a advantageous atmosphere for creating social commitment. Let’s analyzed Warren’s
classification applied to Spanish case:
23
Individual material goods: trade unions and business organization. They are not obviously
the best type for producing social capital. Anyway, people don’t usually use them (not for
membership, nor participating, nor donating money neither making voluntary work.
Public material goods. In our table, they are represented by parties, environmental
protection groups, and human rights associations. Due to their nature, they could play a
very distinguished role, but they haven´ t got too many volunteers. Anyway, parties are not
always totally representative of civil society and they are situated closer to political spheres
(see Warren’s scheme above). Although there is a significant role for political parties to be
played in representing social interests and mediating between the civil and the political,
they are not sufficient in the long term. Political parties tend to represent particular
interests and the main goal they seek is the access to institutional power.
Inclusive social goods: as shared identity symbols, are essential for societies and
democracy. They don’t count with too much participation in global terms, but perform a
positive function for Spanish civil society.
Interpersonal identity groups. Sport associations are the most likely to be used by
Spaniards. However, their importance is more connected with hedonist and individualistic
reasons than societal solidarity. They are often closed groups which activities are not to the
advantage of society.
Group identity groups. They only generate effects for specific social sectors. In European
Social Survey we distinguish some examples: religious, gender, age associations. They are
not at the top and their outcomes cannot usually be expanded for the rest of society.
In Warren´ s typology, no association become really important in Spain, not even at
level of membership. Active engagement, donation of money and voluntary work is even
lower in all cases. Positive effects, via associations, has not much chance to be successful in
a country, where individualist and traditional values are predominated over communitarian
and republican virtues.
24
In any case, methodological difficulties come from the fact that there is no microtheory of social capital ,of voluntary organizations that explicitly states which aspects of
civic engagement, of social interactions matter for the creation of social capital and civic
virtue. “The efficacy of voluntary associations in creating trust and reciprocity has so far
only been assumed in the literature and has not been empirically tested or explored” (Stolle,
2003: 23-24). National and cross-national surveys include questions on generalized
attitudes and values, but not give specific information about respondent’s involvement in
different types of associations. Our third hypothesis try to supplied it with some analyses.
Table 14. European citizenship by number of civic actions
Sweden
Norway
Finland
Switzerland
Denmark
United Kingdom
Luxemburg
Germany
Belgium
Ireland
Czech Republic
Netherlands
Israel
Spain
Italy
Slovenia
Poland
Greece
Hungary
Portugal
Europe
No civic actions
23
28
28
30
32
35
36
37
39
46
47
47
53
60
68
69
73
74
75
77
51
One or two
44
40
43
37
44
40
41
37
38
34
37
37
30
24
22
25
21
19
21
16
31
Three or more
33
32
29
33
24
25
23
26
23
20
16
16
17
16
10
6
6
7
4
7
18
Source: ESS 2002-2003. Percentages.
3. Hypothesis
Creating social capital and civic virtue
Most empirical as well theoretical studies on the effect of voluntary associations,
since The Civic Culture, has signed that members of organizations exhibit more democratic
and civic attitudes as well as more active forms of political participation than
nonmembers14.
14
See Billiet , J. and Cambré, B. (1996) “Social Capital, Active Membership in Voluntary Organizations and
Some Aspects of Political Participation”. Paper presented at Conference on Social Capital and Democracy.
25
Table 15. Volunteers and civic virtue
Worked in an association in the last year
YES
NOT
Interest in Politics
39 (.258**)
18
Facility to understand Politics¹
40 (.160**)
21
Capability to forming an opinion²
49
23
Active role in the future³
28
7
Voted in the last election
81
71
Member of political party
7 (.107**)
2
Provide help for people
26 (.097**)
20
Discussing Politics
47 (.263**)
24
Source: ESS, 2002-2003. Percentages.
¹ Question: How often does politics seem so complicated that you can’t really understand what is going on?
² Question: How difficult or easy do you find it to make your mind up about political issues?
³ Question: Do you think that you could take an active role in a group involved in political issues?
In brackets, Pearson’s correlation coefficient ** Significant at p<0,01. *Significant at p<0,05.
Spanish case seems not to be different. At micro-level we have found that people
who worked in an association during the last year is more politically active, with more
interest and more discussions about politics, more active in voting and parties membership
in voluntary organizations, more sanguine about their ability to affect political life (facility
and capability to understand politics) and more inclined to help for other people. Anyway,
global rates of membership and work in associations, as we have just showed, are clearly
low. So, that means that these effects become true only for very few people.
Let´ s see now, what are the most influential variables, factors, elements in
producing voluntary participation. If we run a correlation analysis to check the influence of
some indicators of political culture, private values, and socio-demographic factors, as
explicative variables, the result can be observed in table 16. Table contains the result of a
correlation analysis (Spearman’s Rho).
In relation to political culture, civic engagement in associations increases with
interest in politics. That is, the greater the presence of interest in politics, the greater the
probability of using any voluntary organizations.
Milan, October, 3-6. To observe the effects on voting, see Olsen, M. (1972) “Social Participation and Voting
Turnout”. American Sociological Review, 37: 317-333.
26
Associational involvement is significantly related to the importance of politics in
everyday life, and, of course, voluntary organizations and , negatively with the importance
assigned to family. Respondents who declared that family is one of the most important
aspects in life, most of them, tend to be less involved in social networks like voluntary
organizations. Private values play an important role to understand the obstacles to get a
more dynamic civic society.
Regarding to socio-demographic variables included in the analysis, the relation with
education and gender should be noted. These coefficients reveal that less educated citizens
and women are least likely to engage in nonpolitical forms of association. Up to the point,
age and ideology also play certain role, giving more importance to intermediate cohorts and
left ideology.
Table 16. Correlations between nonpolitical associational involvement and: interest in
politics, most important aspects in life, solidarity and socio-demographic factors
.236**
Interest in politics
-.145**
Importance in life of:
Family
-.003
Friends
.022
Leisure Time
.169**
Politics
-.026
Work
.061*
Religion
.091**
Voluntary organizations
.123**
Help others (Solidarity)
Socio-demographic
variables
-.118 **
Gender
-.099**
Age
.247**
Education
-.078**
Ideology
Source: ESS, 2002-2003 . Spearman’s Rho.
Note: ** Significant at p<0,01. *Significant at p<0,05.
27
Summary of findings and remarks. What civil society in Spain?
Trying to summarize the empirical evidence, we might conclude as follows:
1. Hypothesis: Values of Spanish political culture show a society with strong legitimacy,
but using participatory rights and liberties in a very low level. We have more o less liberal
citizens but not civic citizens. Democracy exists but in a formal way without playing as
active citizenship. Historical evolutions help us to understand, using the path dependent
model, the current situation of civil society.
2. Hypothesis: Laura Morales has signed that we cannot argue about a retreat of citizens to
the private sphere (Morales, 2003: 28) That is true, but we must add that levels at the end of
70’s were quite low, comparing with other nations and, in some cases, similar to those
during Franco regime. It was hoped that levels in social engagement will be higher with
democratic consolidation, which has implied a large economical growth and legitimacy of
democracy as play rules, but not a much more engaged civil society, that continues
immersed in the privacy of the family, leisure time, friendship and work.
3. Hypothesis: Possibilities to increase social activities and, therefore, civic virtue, is
associated to some variables as interest in politics, and other ones like private values as the
importance of family.
Starting from our theoretic framework and the results after analysis, it could be
concluded that both social capital and civic virtue in Spain are marked by the following
factors:
-
Francoist legacy of demobilization.
-
Deficient socialization in new democratic values and special features of political
transition.
-
Traditional weakness of Spanish society, comparing with Europe.
28
-
Lack of solidarity15 and the importance of individualistic values, private and limited
boundaries as family, friendship and personal spheres in general.
Summing up, we deal with a civil society where some elements as legitimacy and
support of law are completely established, but at the same time a society where private
relations, generally within the family or the circle of friends, with some doses of
clientelism. Victor Pérez-Díaz has declared, referable to Spain that “the situation should be
defined as that of a field in which we find two competing cultural traditions, that of an open
society and that of the tribal [ closed and neo-clientelistic] societies of the past” (PerezDíaz, 1990: 30)16. A situation that could be defined as liberal privatism17, where citizens
are conceived as legal persons but not as neighbours, bounded together by contract but not
by a common participatory activity, and among others considerations, in a representative
democracy with a distrustful and passive political style versus a strong democracy, with a
cooperative and active way to make political and social transactions18.
When some type of associations emerge they don’t get to joint people and create
reciprocity: In the absence of strong traditions of group loyalty, as in Spain19, it seems
likely that many individuals would use most organizations and patron –client networks in
an instrumental fashion, and that they would give primacy to a narrow definition of
individual (or family)20 self-interest. So, they may be led to play the game of exchange
15
See López-Pintor, R. and Wert, J.I. (1982) “La otra España: Insolidaridad e intolerancia en la tradición
político cultural española”. Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 19: 7-25
16
A deeper vision about clientelism can be founded in Eisenstadt, S. N and Roniger, L. (eds.) (1984) Patron,
Clients and Friends. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge.
17
That is: the social position of being noncommittal to or uninvolved with anything other than one’s own
immediate interests and lifestyle.
18
For having a global comparison between forms of citizenship in representative democracy and “strong
democracy”, see Barber (1984: 219).
19
Similar situations can be founded in others countries in the Mediterranean area. See Magone, J. M. (2003)
“Political Culture and Civil Society in Southern Europe”, in J.M. Magone, The Politics of Southern Europe.
Praeger, Westport.
20
See Pizzorno, A. (1966) “Amoral Familism and Historical Marginality”. International Review of
Community Development, 15.
29
among themselves and with the public authorities, in the spirit of exacerbated hyperindividualism which is typical of those who are proud of smarting everybody else.
The growing emphasis on individual achievement may have sharpened the sense
that opportunism was an important dimension of social advancement and a pervasive
feature of society. This trend obviously could readily lead to some decline in overall levels
of social trust and, what is most important, of civic engagement.
For Spain, generally, it can be affirmed that there is no more ties than those which
refers to individuals and families or small and informal groups. It´ s not only blaming
public life, an active position, but also a disenchantment and passiveness feelings. Citizens
are transformed in consumers, consumers of politics too (Lipovetsky, 1983).
In other words, the return of democracy has not produce, at large, a particularly
more engaged and civic civil society in Spain. We have to take into account historical
consequences and obstacles and current structural difficulties that shape the features of civil
society in Spain.
Institutional change and democratic politics may promote the creation of social
capital in some degree, but it´ s not enough to break a situation of low intensity
equilibrium. The instauration and development of new democratic institutions do not per se
create social capital beyond this level. Changes in civil society need something more than
formal institutions and an established democratic system.
As Habermas has signed a real public sphere requires more than the institutional
guarantees of the constitutional state since it also needs “the supportive spirit of cultural
traditions and patterns of socialization, of the political culture, of a populace accustomed to
freedom” (Habermas, 1992: 453). However, socialization in Spain during the last decades
has perpetuated an apolitical culture that doesn’t let civil society to emerge.
30
Examining contemporary theory of democracy we conclude that nowadays, the
most of current democratic systems, representative democracies, are too far from being
participative democracies. In addition, and what is more important, associations by
themselves don’t make more democratic societies, but most democratic societies has more
and better associations (Rossteutscher, 2002: 525; Marinetto, 2003: 117) It seems that
beyond formal and liberal democracy, there is not just yet genuine democratic mores
(customs), what somebody has called “habits of the heart” or “strong democracy”21.
21
A list of features that strong democracy, versus representative and unitary types, should be contained can
be read in Barber, 1984: 219.
31
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