CRIMINAL JUSTICE
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-.
273
THREE POLICIES TO REDUCE CRIME
BY ONE-THIRD IN TWELVE MONTHS*
BY AMITAIETZIONI~
General Conclusion
So called “liberal” crime-reduction policies, which have not been implemented so far, would reduce crime significantly and quickly. Our projections show that if really given a chance we would see a decline of crime
between 36 and 39 per cent within twelve months.
The three policies we have investigated are: the decriminalization of
victimless crimes, which would result in a reduction of annual arrests of 31
per cent; a program of full employment -meaningful and decent payingof young people that would result in a 9 per cent reduction of violent crime;
and domestic disarmament that would result in a decrease in murder from
40 per cent to 45 per cent and an estimated decrease in armed robbery of 23
to 26 per cent.
We further calculated the secondary reduction in crime that would
come with the freeing of police resources as a result of the above reductions;
this amounted to another 3.3 per cent to 3.4per cent annually.
In sum, we project a total reduction in all crime, as measured by
, arrests, of from 35.9 per cent to 38.8 per cent annually. The three policies
that would effect this reduction could be implemented within the next
twelve months and they are vastly more effective than any reduction even
advocates of the death penalty could hope for.
%
c
Methods of Computation
I
Our projections are based on 1970 data, the most complete currently
availabIe data on crime. When relevant, both a pessimistic and an optimistic
projection, as regarding the effects of the suggested policies, were made.
Note that while the pessimistic projections are very cautious, the optimistic
ones are not excessively so. The reasons we used such conservative projections is that we wished to bend over backward, to be extra careful in our
conclusions. Nevertheless, even the more pessimistic projection suggests
that more than a third of the crime in the U.S.A. (35.9%) could be eliminated
within the next twelve months, ifthe Congress, the Executive and the courts
saw fit to implement, in conjuction, the following three policies often discussed but never implemented in this country.
*This statement was submitted to the House Hearing for placement in the
records on May 8, 1973.
tAmjtai Etzioni is professor of sociology and Chairman of t h e Sociology Department a t Columbia. The professor has been a consultant for government agencies
a t the Federal, State and local levels and has written widely. Professor Etzioni was
assisted i n his research by Joshua Freeman.
274
The Forensic Q u a r t e r l y
The lzlrusure of Decriminalization of Victimless Crimes
Again and again the national debate about crime conjures up the image
of the mugger, robber, rapist and assassin. Often overlooked is that a
sizeabie pa:.’. irfthe crime wave is made up of crimes which have no harmful
effect on anyone other than the perpetrator and even the harmful effects on
him are not fully estahli5hed. A staggering 2,066,035 arrests, of the total of
6,570,473 reported in 1970‘, a full third, were for victimless crimes. (These
victimless crimes include prostitution, gambling, drunkeness, runaways,
and marijuana violations.)
Some of these victimless crimes, such as prostitution and gambling,
involve moral issues. In effect then, our police are punishing people who
misbehave by the code of established members of the community, or by a
code of behavior that is no longer responsive to the community, rather than
protecting body or property from violence. However, the most common
arrest in the area ofvictimless crimes is for a “crime” which only a minority
consider more than a breach of good manners, namely drunkenness.
1,512,672 arrests, or 23%, of the total arrests reported were for this charge.
This does not include those arrested for drunken driving (432,522 arrests),
liquor violations (222,464) or alcohol related crimes. (In line with our cautious approach, we included none of the 9% of all arrests which involved a
simple “breach of the peace” at least some of which surely involve victimless
crimes, e.g. boisterous drunk.) Computing only those arrests concerned with
drunkenness alone locates this a s the leading victimless crime; over twice as
many arrests are reported on this charge as for the next largest cause for
arrests, larcency.
Sex offenses, other than forcible rape, account for 1.5%of all arrests.
There were about 49,000 arrests for prostitution and commercialized vice,
and an equal number for other sex offenses,2for a total of 98,722 arrests.
Practically all of these “criminals” are consenting adults, who in other
countries, for instance Britain, would not have been arrested. Police
sources, who indicate that the policemen often are quite happy to get out of
the social work and “moral” business, and focus on chasing criminals,
occasionally suggest that prostitution should be controlled because it
“leads” to other crimes, especially theft (or “rolling”). But the arrests reported here include only those in which charges no more serious than
prostitution are also involved.
Gambling accounted for another 1.3%of all arrests, with 84,804 arrests
made on this charge in 1970. The extent to which communities still view
gatnbling as a sin varies, but this seems to be on the decline. Virtually
nobody now seriously views it as a “crime,” other than in the tautological’
sense, i.e., “because the law says so.”
These crimes also raise a constitutional issue. Only a very small fraction of all gamblers, homosexuals, or prostitutes are arrested: when only a
minute proportion of those committing a crime are punished, the punishment might legally be considered “arbitrary”, and as such be unconstitutional. On these grounds the Supreme Court might be able to relieve the
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
275
society from the obsolescent grip of laws prohibiting victimless crimes by
striking them off the books.
As for drunkenness, expert after expert has testified, that drunks
should be turned over to medical, rather than police authorities; the latter
merely lock them up for the night, release them the next day, without the
benefit of any long-term treatment, and then, simply rearrest them shortly
thereafter.
If runaways as well as drunkards, were to be handled by authorities
other than the police, in this case, social work agencies, the number of
arrests would fall by another 179,073 a year.
While the treatment of marijuana is much more controversial, the
evidence shows that this is not more but less harmful than alcohol.
Moreover, it pacifies and does not cause aggressive behavior. A Presidential
commission has recommended that it be decriminalized. This would reduce
the annual number ofarrests by another 190,764 (by 1970 figures) or 2.9%.3
All said and done, if the categories of victimless crimes listed above
were decriminalized, 31.4% of all arrests, or 2,066,035, would be
eliminated.4
It may a t first seeni that this crime reduction is strictly semantic Le.,
some acts, which are not harmful to body or property of others or the
community, were once called crimes, we cease to call them crimes, and -we
report less crime. But there is a corollary, very real, crime reduction effect: a
giant pool of police resources would be freed to focus on the crimes which do
have victims5And, hundreds of thousands of people, many quite young, who
are legally labelled “criminals” and taught to see themselves as such, and
are thus forced into contacts with criminal sub-cultures and organizations,
would themselves no longer be so pushed by the society and its obsolescent
laws.
Employment of the Young, and Crime Prevention
Crime is very much a youthful occupation. Many young offenders “retire” by the time they reach 25, even if they were not caught or arrested.
More than half ofall arrests, 52.4%, are of persons under 25. (25.3%-under
18.) 77% of all robbers arrested are less than 25 years old.6
Second, unemployment which is itself disproportionately associated
with crime, is disproportionately high among the young. Using 1970 as a
base year, we find that while the unemployment rate for all males was
4.4%, the rate for males aged 16 and 17 was 16.9%, for males aged 18and 19,
13.4% and for those 20-24 years old, 8.4%. Likewise, while the overall rate
for women was 5.9%, for those 18 and 19, 14.4%, and for those 20-24 years
old, 7.9%. For non-white persons the rates are even higher than the overall
rates, reaching a peak of 36.9% unemployment for non-white females, age
16 and 17.’
Finally, i t should be noted that unemployment rates are still higher
when we look specifically a t urban poverty neighborhoods. Thus, while the
overall unemployment rate for the entire population was 4.9% in 1970, it
was one and one half times a s much (7.6%)in urban poverty neighborhoods.R
-.-
I
The Forensic Quarterly
276
TABLE 1. - AGE AND CRIMINALITY
Per cent of offenders arrested
Per cent Per cent Per cent Per cent
under 15 under 18 under 21 under 25
Crime
All crimes..
.............................. . ....
9.2
25.3
39.1
52.4
.
Aggravated aslault ... . .... . . .. .... . . ...... .
... ... .
1.5
4.1
11.1
5.4
10.5
20.8
33.4
16.5
25.2
42.4
56.6
29.8
43.4
64.5
77.0
58.6
.. . . . .. .. . ..... . . ... ...
7.1
22.6
40.1
58.5
Burglary, breaking and entering . ... . ... . . . . .
Larceny-theft . . . . . . _..
. . . ..... ........... .
Auto theft. .. . . . . . . . . ........_......
... ......
22.9
25.1
15.1
52.0
50.7
56.1
70.4
66.5
74.9
80.7
77.4
86.3
Total p p e r t y crime . . . . . . .. . ... . . . . . . .... .
23.3
51.7
68.6
80.1
Other selscted crimes:
Other assaults (not aggravated). . . .. ...... .. .
Arson . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... . . . .
Vandalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . ... ...... .. .. . . .
7.3
39.0
45.3
18.2
59.5
72.0
30.7
69.5
81.0
47.0
77.4
87.3
Violent crime major:
Murder and nonnegligent manslaughter
Forcible rape .. . ... . ......... ...... . . . . .. .. .
Robbery .....................................
,
Total violent crime..
Property crime major:
.
...
.
.
Source: Fromm “Uniform Crime Reports,” FBI, 1970, pp. 12827 (52 per cent agencies, 1970
population: 151,604,000).
TABLE 2.- AGE AND CRIMINALITY
Per cent of offenders of age
0 to 17 18 to 25Total
fOto25)
!
Criminal homicide . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . , . . . . 9.1
Aggravated assault ... . . .. . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . .17.7
Forcible rape . ... . .. . . .. , . ... . .. . . .. .. . .. .20.9
Armed robbery .. . .. .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. .23.4
Unarmed robbery , ... . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .87.1
.
33.5
24.6
45.0
52.0
31.3
42.6
42.3
68.9
75.4.
.
88.4
Source: From a survey of 17 cities, 1967, weighted cases conducted by National
Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, i n their report, vol. 11,pp. 267,
271,275,219,283.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
277
TABLE3.- UNEMPLOVMENT BY SEX, RACE, AND AGE,1970
Per cent
4.9
............................................................
Male ............................................................
Total
.4.4
Age :
16 ! : I 17 ...................................................... 6.9
.'vhite ...................................................... 5.7
Nonwhite ......................................................
.27.8
18 to 1 9 . . .................................................. .13.4
White .................................................... .12.0
Nonwhite ......................................................
.23.1
20 to 24 .....................................................
.8.4
White .....................................................
.7.8
Nonwhite .................................................
.12.6
Female ..........................................................
5.9
Age:
16 t o 1 7 ......................................................
7.4
White ...................................................... 5.3
Nonwhite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.9
1 8 t o 19 ....................................................... 4.4
White .....................................................l
1.9
Nonwhite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2.9
...3
20 to 24 ......................................................
7.9
White ..................................................... .6.9
.15.0
Nonwhite ................................................
Source:"Manpower Report to the President"U.S. Department of Labor, March
1972 (U.S. Government Printing Office) p. 177-179.
F
.'
While there do not seem to be any recent national statistics on the
socio-economic status of criminal offenders or their occupational status,*
there are several studies which allow us to estimate the proportion and
number of crimes committed by unemployed young persons, and the effect of
full and meaningful employment of the young on crime. The most comprehensive study of the occupational status of offenders was the study of
major crime in 17 cities in 1967 conducted by the National Commission on
the Causes and Prevention of Violence.'o
Using the data in that study, we can calculate the rate at which unemployed and employed persons commit crimes.ll We calculated these rates in
two ways, once using the unemployment rates for these cities presented by
the U S . Department of Labor, and once using rates one and a half times as
great, in order to compensate for official unemployment rates undercounting the chronically unemployed, particularly among the young. (They include only those who actively seek employment.)**
278
The Forensic Quarterly
Assuming that those currently unemployed would, if employed, commit
crimes not a t the rate they currently do so, but rather at the rate of those
currrntly employed (ifonly because the hours spent at work, or resting from
it, are not spent stalking the street in search of a “mark”), we can calculate
the percentage decrease in crime that would result from conditions of full
employment of all persons.’s
*
TABLE4. - CRIME RATES: EMPLOYED VERSUS UNEMPLOYED; 17
CITIES, 1967’
m
I t
P e r cent
Number
committed by. committed by
employment
employment
statu3
status
Criminal homicide,
total offenss=3274’
Unemployed . , , . , . . . . . . . . .
12.7
415.8
Employed , . . . . . . . .. . .. . . .
Aggravated assault,
total offenses=75.198:
Unemployed . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
59.9
1,961.1
15.0
11,279.7
Employed . . . . . . . . . . . .... .
Forcible rape,
total off+njes=7,908
Unemployed . . . . . . . . . . ... .
43.7
32,861.5
15.7
1.241.6
Employed . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .
Armed robbery.
total offeenses=63.718:’
Unemployed .. .. . , .. . . . . . .
59.4
4,697.4
29.8
18.988.0
Employed . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .
Unarmed robbery,
total offenses=42,479:’
Unemployed . . . . . . . .. . . . . .
42.1
26.825.3
5.6
2,378.8
Employed . . . . . . ... . . . .. ..
17.0
7,221.4
1 number
of persons
(thousands)
in employment status
category’
Rate of
crimelthouRatio unsand persons employed vote/
by employemployed
ment status’
votes‘
870.7
’(1.306.1)
24,6 165
0.478
(.318)
,080
5.975
(3.985)
870.7
(1,306.1)
24,616.5
11.620
(.8636)
1.335
8.714
(6.469)
870.7
(1,306.1)
24,616.5
1.426
(.951)
,191
7.466
(4.979)
870.7
(1.306.1)
24,616.5
21.808
(14.538)
1.040
20.007
(13.31
870.7
(1,386.1)
24,616.5
2.732
(1.821)
,293
9.324
(6.215)
’ From 17 city survey, “Crimes of Violence,” op. cit., pp. 270, 274, 278, 282, 286.
From “Manpower Report to the President,” April 1971.
* Column 2 divided by col. 3.
’Unemployed rate from col. 4 divided by employed rate from col. 4.
Total offenses for the 17 cities, fmm “Crimes of Violence,” p. 262, multiplied by col. 1.
Parenthetical figures are second calculation, using higher unemployment rate estimate, as
discussed in footnote 11.
‘Estimate, based on total robberies: 106,197, and national figure of 60 percent robberies armed.
.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
279
TABLE 5. - PROJECTED REDUCTIONIN
CRIME
AFTERFULLEMPLOYMENT
1970'
Number
Per cent
of offenses
committed committed
by unem- by unemployed2
ployment3
Number
of offenses
if committed at
employed
rate4
Projected
number
of crimes
less'
Per cent
decrease"
(1)
(2)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Number
of offenses
Offense
Criminal homicide . . . . . . .15,856
Excluding manslaughter by negligence . . . . . ..12,836
13)
12.7
2,014
12.7
1,630
Forcible rape . . . . . . . . . . . .15,411
15.7
2,420
Aggravated assault . . . . .125,971
15.0
18,896
Armed robbery4... . . . . . . .52,612
29.8
15,678
Unarmed robberyn .. . . . . .35,075
5.6
1.964
337
273
'(505)
(409)
324
(486)
2,168
(2,921)
784
(1,175)
211
(316)
1,677
10.6
1,357
(1,509)
1,221
2,096
(1,934)
16,728
(15,975)
14,894
(14,503)
1,753
(1,648)
.....
(9.5)
.....
13.6
(12.5)
13.3
(12.7)
28.3
(27.6)
5.0
(4.7)
'Number of arrested offenders, 1970. From UCR, 1970,p. 126.
'From table 4,col. 1.
Yo1. 1 times col. 2.
'col. 3 divided by table 4,col. 5 (the ratio of unemployed crime rate to employed crime rate).
Scol. 3 minus col. 4.
T h e percentage decrease in total crime, ifunemployed committed crimes at employed rate.
Col. 5 divided by col. 1.
The parenthetical figures are for a 2d calculation, using increased unemployment estimate,
as discussed in footnote 11.
'The UCKdoesnot directlygivearmed-unarmedstatisticsforrobbery. However, it states that
60 per cent of robberies were armed and in total there were 87,687robbery arrests.
I
.
This decrease, using the official unemployment rates, (which averaged
3.4% for the 17 cities) varies from 5% for unarmed robbery to 28.3%for
armed robbery. Using the higher unemployment rate, the range is from a
4.7% to a 27.6%decrease. Since however, our figures are based only on the
easier-to-achieve full and meaningful employment among those 25 and
younger, we have to apply these decreases only to the percentage of each
crime committed by persons in that age category. Projecting data for the
percentage of crimes committed in the 17 cities by young offenders (which
are very similar to national data from a separate source),14we find that full
employment for those 25 and younger would result in a decrease of from
4.3%- 4 . W of all murder (depending on the unemployment rate estimate
used), from 5.4'70 - 5.6%in aggravated assault, from 8.6%- 9.4% in forcible
rape, and from 20.8% - 21.3%in armed robbery.15The decrease in unarmed
robbery would be from 4.2%- 4.4%.
i
5 . .
.
280
The Forensic Quarterly
Because the National Commission survey included only violent crimes,
we cannot calculate a precise projection of the reduction in property crime,
such as burglary, larceny, and auto-thefI.l6However, given that the percentage of young property crime offenders is higher even than for robbery,'' we
can assume that the reduction here would also be higher. However, to
maintain o u r conservativeapproach, we estimate only that it will be in the
r a n g of reduction of those crimes we were able to make precise projections
for, that is between 4.4% and 21.3% or 4.2% - 20.8% using the higher
unemployment estimate. (The large range is due to the lack of more precise
data.)
In toto, while the relationships between unemployment and criminal
behavior are rather complex and not well studied, we estimate that full
decent-paying employment of young persons, would reduce violent crimes
by 9% a year.lST h e size of the effect on crimes against property is difficult to
pin point but certainly will be considerable.
Domestic Disarmament
What effects on criminality would be achieved if most firearms would
not merely have to be registered, but were removed from private hands, as in
Canada, Britain, France, West Germany, Israel and practically all other
democratic, economicallydeveloped societies. Drawing on the experience of
other countries, we assume and this is our pessimistic estimate -that 85%
of all arms could be removed; optimistically, this figure could reach 95%.
W h a t would be the effect of such domestic disarmament, we ask, knowing
full well that not all those deprived of arms will also drop their criminal
intent?
Murders: The Most Serious Offense
In 1970,66% of the 13,649 murder victims were killed by the use of a
firearm.IgFirearm elimination would decrease this high rate of murder in
two ways: in some cases faced with the lack of firearms, the potential
murderer will abandon his intent altogether, and no crime will take place,
for reasons soon to be explained. Secondly, in a greater number of cases,
some less deadly weapon will be substituted for a firearm, and what otherwise would have been a lethal attack will be in many cases, a nonfatal one.
Certain murders by their very nature require a firearm.*OIt is impossible to climb a tower and murder persons a mile away without using a rifle.
Similarly, i t is very difficult to attack a guarded bank without using some
sort of firearm. Weak persons, children, cowardly assailants would all find
attacks on others, particularly physically strong victims, difficult if not
impossible without firearm availability. As Robert Coles puts it: "Every
psychiatrist has treated patients who were thankful that guns were not
around a t one time or another in their lives. Temper tantrums, fights,
seizures, hysterical episodes all make the presence of guns an additional,
and possible mortal danger"?'
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
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,
281
An informal examination of actual cases indicates that in about 25%of
all murders committed with firearms, the absence of the firearms would
have resulted in no crime a t all being committed.
What does this mean in terms of the overall murder rate? 66% of all
murderers use firearms, and after domestic disarmament firearms would
not be available in these cases. Our estimated reduction by 25%of murders
in such cases would therefore mean a total decrease of 15.9%in all murders
(ifdomestic disarmament is 95%effective), the reduction would be by 14.0%,
if it is 85%enforced.“
However, the benefits of firearms elimination does not stop here. In the
attacks that still do occur, the substitution of less deadly weapons for
firearms will result in a large saving of lives, even if the number ofincidents
a s such remains the same.z3It is well documented that murders fall into two
categories: those characterized by a “single minded intent to kill,”“ and
those which are “Slaying in the heat of passion, or killing as a Result of the
intent to do harm, but without specific intent to kill.”25We will assume
pessimistically that all the remaining murders of the first type will be
successfully carried out, even in the absence of firearms. However, in the
latter cases this will not be true. These attacks, far more numerous, almost
always grow out of quarrels or arguments, usually among family or
friends.e6 The typical case involves someone grabbing the most potent
weapon around -and using it. Ifit is a gun the effect is usually fatal. As the
head of Chicago Homicide put it, describing one such case: “There was a
domestic fight. A gun was there. And then somebody was dead. If you have
described one you have described them all.’’z’But what happens if a gun is
not there? On the basis of the aforementioned survey we assume that in
three out of four ofthe cases, a n attack still will take place and the next most
lethal weapon, a knife will be used. It has been shown that fewer fatalities in
the case ofknife attack will result by a ratio of 4 out of 5,i.e.only one fatality
where firearms would have left five dead.28In other words, in such attacks,
when knives instead ofguns are used, the death rate goes down by 80%.(Of
course when other weapons are used, as they would be, whether fists, coke
bottles, or baseball bats, the reduction will be still greater, but we will stick
to our conservative estimations).
To calculate the effect of this “substitution” effect, we first calculate the
number of attacks that would still occur when firearms are eliminated.
Since 66% of murders are by firearms and in 95%of these cases firearms
would have been eliminated, and knowing that 75% of these previously
firearm attacks will still occur, we find that 47% of all murders are attacks
in which another weapon will be substituted for a
With 85%
elimination, our pessimistic projection, such cases are 42% of the total. A
study ofChicago murders showed that 78% were ofthe type characterized as
“deadly attacks,” not “single minded” murders.3o(It is among these attacks
that the 80% reduction in fatalities will take place.) All told then, as a result
of the substitution of other weapons for firearms, we will expect a reduction
in the overall murder rate of from 26.3% to 29.3% (depending on the effectiveness of the elimination policy).31
-
__
.
.
. i
The Forensic Quarterly
282
Combining the two effects, i.e. the elimination of some firearm attacks
altogether, and the use of less deadly weapons in others, we find that the
overall reduction in murder would optimistically be 45.09 (at 95% elirnination) and pessimintically 40.3% (at 85% elimination). In 1970 this would
bare amounted to a saving of from 5501 to 6142 lives.
Firearm Accidents
In 1968 there were 2,394 deaths from firearms accident^.^" The rate of
firearms accidents varies regionally in line with the rate of firearm ownership. In other words, the more firearms- the more firearms accident^.^^ We
would therefore expect that the reduction in firearms would result in a
parallel reduction in accidental deaths, or an annual saving of 2232 (or
2035) lives.34
It should be noted that the average life expectancy in the W.S. is about
72 years, the average age of death from all accidents is 41 years, and the
average age of victims of firearms accidents only 24 years. 4 0 8 of the victims
are children and teenagers (under 20).35Disarmament would then save the
most tragic victims, the young and the innocent.
Firearms elimination will also lead t o the avoidance of some
19,000-95,000 a t 95% elimination (or at 85% effectivenss, 17,000-85,000)
nonfatal injuries annually, that result from firearm accident^.^^
Combining the reductions in murder and accidents, we find that 95%
firearms elimination would result in a n annual savings of 8,374 lives, or if
85% effective, a saving of 7,536 lives.
Robbery
I
In 1970 there were approximately 500,000 robberie~,~'
60% of which
were armed, and 37%, or 185,000 of which involved firearms.38 (Several
studies show that these robberies involving firearms caused a disproportionate amount of harm both in property loss and fatalities, but we will not
focus o u r attention on these.Y9
Evidence shows that the firearm is an essential element in many armed
robberies. In its absence, many robberies would not be committed at all, both
because of the increased difficulty 6.e. it is difficult to rob a bank protected
by alarms and armed guards without a firearm),4othe increased risk to the
robber (e.g., that the victim might fight back), and the psychological obstacles. On this last point Dr. Donald Newman, in a study of convicted robbers,
commissioned by the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of
Violence, noted:
Robbery appears t o be a crime made infinitely more possible by
having a gun. To rob without one requires a degree of strength, size and
confidence which was lacking i n many ofthe men with whom I spoke. . . ,
For the most part the men involved in robbery were not very aggressive.
%me of these men could not possibly carry out a robbery without a gun.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
283
In short, there was a clear reality element in the need for a gun once a
m a n made the decision to rob. . . . Although the men needed a gun to rob,
the converse was also true: they needed to rob in order to use a g u n . . . it
was t h e gun which provided t h e power and t h e opportunity for
mastery.“
.
A very cautious way to estimate the proportion of firearm robberies
“saved’in a disarmed America, lacking direct data on this, is to use the same
proportion of murders avoided, namely under optimistic assumptions, 45%,
pessimistically, 40%. There are some reasons that argue that it mig!it be
lower (for instance, robbery is more often pre-meditated than murder and
hence the “appropriate” tools can be related), and there are some reasons to
think it might be higher (e.g. many robbers now armed would not dare climb
into a house, let alone face a guard in a bank, without a weapon). Hence, we
will take 5%off from o u r low estimate ofmurder depressent rate, making it a
38% reduction, and add 5% to our high one, making it 47%, to give us a
reasonable range.
Thus, the reduction in firearm robbery would lead us to expect a decline
of from 70,300 to 77,000 robberies annually, or 23.4% to 25.9% of all armed
robberies4’
Cumulative and Secondary Effects, and Resource Allocation
To be able to judge thecombined effects of all threepolicies, we deal with
arrest figures. We have already calculated the reduction in annual arrests
that would result from the decriminalization of victimless crimes. For other
crimes, by simply assuming that the number of arrests are proportional to
the number of crimes, we can express their reductions in terms of the
projected reductions in the number of arrests. We can then calculate the
cumulative reduction from these three policies combined, modifying the
individual reductions to take into account previous reductions from the
other policies (e.g. if there are fewer younger offenders because they are a t
work, this reduces the benefits one can expect to gain from gun elimination
and vice versa). The cumulative results are shown in Table A [aRer
Footnotes]. They are expressed in terms of a range, the lower figure based on
the most pessimistic assumptions, the higher on more optimistic ones.
The table shows that we can project a reduction in the number of
arrests, here used as an indicator of the number ofcrimes committed, using
the most pessimistic assumptions, of from 4.28 for unarmed robbery, to
29.39 for armed robbery, and 24.9% for murder. The total reduction in
arrests would be 32.6c7, a reduction of over 2 million arrests annually. Using
more optimistic assumptions, the reductions would range from 4.4% for
unarmed robbery, to 47.5% for murder, and 40.5% for armed robbery. The
total reduction in annual arrests would be 35.4% or 2,322,758 arrests.
The large reduction in both crime and arrests will free a large amount of
police resources presently devoted to the investigation of these crimes, the
arrest ofthe offenders, and the post-arrest procedures ofdetention, trial, and
. 284
The Forensic Quurterly
punishment. Sirice the reductions are in all types of crimes, including both
crimes demanding a great deal of resources, such as murder, and crimes
involving few resources, such as drunkenness, we can assume that the
average resources currently devoted to these reduced crimes is proportional
to the resources used for all crimes in general. We can thus say that there
will be a freeing ofbetween 32.6% and 35.4% ofthe police resources devoted
directly to patrol, investigation and arrest a s a result of the three measures
outlined. These resources will now be free to deal with the prevention, and
investigation, of the remaining criminal violations. Even assuming that
crime declines proportionately only 15% as much as police resources will
increase, this will mean a n additional 4.9 - 5.3% reduction in crime rates,
after the initial reductions. This would amount to a reduction in terms ofthe
current crime rate of another 3.3 - 3.4%. The total reduction, including
primary and secondary effects, would thus amount to 35.9 - 38.8% of the
current arrests annually.
While throughout these projections we were a s cautious as possible
in estimating their benefits, we are the first to point out that any such
projections are subject to a margin of error. But it must also be clear that
even if the crime reduction achieved would be lower than expected, the
benefits of the suggested policies would be very substantial.
’
FOOTNOTES
I.
1 Unless noted, all arrest statistics are from the FBI, U S . Department of
Justice UniformCrime Reports-1970 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office,19701,hereafter cited as UCA. 5,270agencies, representing a 1970population
of 151,604,000(or 75% of the country), reported the arrests under their jurisdiction
according to standardized FBI procedures. If a person is arrested and charged with
several offenses, this is counted as only one arrest (which is listed under the most
serious charge involved). Ifan individual is arrested on several separate occasions, or
several persons are arrested for the same offense, each arrest is counted separately.
Traffic offenses are not included in these statistics. For a fuller discussion of the UCR
see Marvin E. Wolfgang, “Uniform Crime Reports: A Critical Appraisal.” University
of Pennsylvania Law Review, p. 721 (1963),and Crimes of VioZence. A staff report
submitted to the National Commission of the Causes & hevention of Violence,
Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1969,Part I chapter 2.
2 Included in “other sex offenses” are statutory rape, offenses against chastity,
morals, common decency and 80 forth.
3 Marijuana: A Signal of Misunderstnnding. First Report of the National
Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse, Washington: U.S. Gov’t Printing Office,
March 1972,p. 106-7.
4 This is simply the summed total of arrests, for the above listed “victimless
crimes.”
5 This effect is discussed in the final section of this report.
6 Uniform Crime Reports, 1970, p. 126-27.Table I presents a summary of the
relevant data.
An independent study of 17 cities, using 1967 data, supplied directly by the local
authorities came up with very similar findings, a s shown in Table 2.See Crimes of
i.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
285
Violence, Vol. 11. A StaffReport Submitted to the National Commission on thecauses
and Prevention of Violence, Washington, D.C.: U S . Government Printing Office,
December 1969, pp. 267, 271, 255,279, 283.
7 Manpower Report to the President, US.Department of Labor, March 1972,
(U S Cmvernment Printing Ofice) p. 177-179. Table 3 gives a complete summary of
the relevant data.
Tht. rates calculated by the Dept. of Labor are based on a monthly survey of
households, in which t h e number of persons actively seeking work is ascertained. It
has been widely stated that this method of calculation significantly underestimates
the true unemployment rate, since those unable to find work, and so discouraged t h a t
they have ceased active search, a r e not counted as being unemployed, but rather a s
not being in the work force. Furthermore, those seeking full-time work, but presently
employed invol1~ntarilyon a part time basis only, are counted as fully employed. In a
study of long-term Civilian Labor Participation Rates, and forced part-time employment, Paul Sweezy has estimated that real unemployment is about 1.5 times the
Dept. of Labor figure. (See Paul Sweezy, “Economic Stagnation and the Stagnation of
Economics,” Monthly Review, 2 2 1 1 (April, 19711.)
As will be seen later, we have therefore made projections based on both of the
oficial rates and rates 1.5 times as high as the official ones.
8 “Thepoverty neighborhood classification used is based on a rarikingofcensus
tracts according to 1960 data on income, education, skills, housing and proportion of
broken families. The poorest one-fifth of these tracts in the Nation’s 100 largest
metropolitan areas are considered poverty neighborhoods. As such some persons
above the poverty level are probably included and some poor persons living i n other
urban neighborhoods excluded.” From: US.Dept. of Labor, Manpower Report to the
President, March 1972, U S . Government Printing Office,p. 251.
9 A local study of the District of Columbia found that 44% of Black and 40% of
White offenders in major violent crimes were unemployed. See Report of the
President’s Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia, Washington, D.C.,
United States Government Printing Office, 1966, pp. 131-132.
10 This study, and the raw data collected for it, comprise Chapter 5 and Appendix 11respectively, ofVolume 11, Crimes of Violence,ofthe Commission’s Report, op.
cit.
11 We calculated the rate at which unemployed and employed persons commit
crime as follows:
The 17 city study gives the total number of offenses in 1967 i n these cities for
criminal homicide, forcible rape, aggravated assault, and armed and unarmed robbery. It also gives the percentage of offenses in each category committed by each
occupational group, which can be subtotaled into offenses committed by unemployed
persons, offenses committed by employed persons, and offenses committed by persons
not in the work force (i.e. students, housewives, etc). Table 4 column 1presents the
percentages for unemployed and employed persons. Unless some occupation was
stated, all persons 17 or under were listed as students, and therefore not i n the work
force. Thus a proportion of crimes committed by persons under 17 who were actually
unemployed, that is neither students nor employed, were listed a s being committed by
students. (Presumably those minors with a job were listed under that occupational
grouping as well). The effect of this bias i s to decrease the amount of crime reported to
have been committed by unemployed persons.
By multiplying the number of offenses in each category by thepercentuge committed by employed and unemployed persons respectively, we calculated the actual
number of crimes committed by each group in these cities in 1967. (For this and other
-
286
The Forensic Quarterly
calculations see table 4).
We used the 1967 employment data for these same 17 cities (from theManpower
Report to thePresident, April 1971)to determine the total number of individuals who
were employed and who were unemployed. By dividing the number of offenses for
each crime committed by unemployed and employed persons respectively, by the
number of persons in each of these categories, we determined the number of offenses
committed per thousand unemployed persons and per thousand employed persons,
that I 5 the rates of crime for unemployed and employed persons. These rates are shown
in T,tL!r 4. column 4.
12 8:nce it is widely asserted that many persons actually unemployed are
categorized by the Department of Labor as being out of the work force (see footnote 6),
we recalculated crime rates increasing by 50% the number of persons reported a s
unemployed in the 17 cities i n 1967. (See Table 4).
13 First we estimated the number of offenses in each crime category committed
nationally by unemployed persons by multiplying the total number of offenses nationally by the percentage of the specific offenses committed by unemployed persons,
as determined in the 17 city study (see Table 5 for full data and calculations). We then
projected the number of crimes that would be committed by those currently unemployed if they committed crime at the employed person rate by dividing the number of
crimes they currently commit by the ratio of the relevant unemployed crime rate to
t h e employed crime rate (again as determined from the 17 city study). By subtracting
the projected number of offenses that would be committed by those currently unemployed if fully employed, from the number of offenses currently committed by the
unemployed, we have the reduction in the number of offenses that we could expect to
result from full employment. Dividing this figure by the total number of offenses for
that crime category, we can express the reduction a s a percentage of current crime
levels.
14 Although the 17 city and the national data are very similar, only the former i s
subdivided for robbery into armed and unarmed robbery. For this reason we chose to
use this data. However, it should be noted that this data is for those25 andyounger,
while t h e national data, previously discussed, i s for those under25. See tables 1 and 2
for comparative data.
16 These figures are simply the decrease in crime expected from full employment
of persons of all ages, multiplied by the percentage of crimes committed by persons 25
and younger (asshown i n Table 2).
1 6 Other, more costly property crime, such as embezzlement, fraud, and false
advertising, is usually committed by older, employed persons and would not likely be
decreased by full youth employment.
17 80.1% of “major” property crime (larceny, burglary, auto-theft) is committed
by persons under 25 compared to 77.0% of robberies. See Table 1.
18 Here we simply totaled up the expected reduction in the number of offenses
for each of the five violent crimes (homicide, rape, assault, armed and unarmed
robbery), and expressed the total reduction as a percentage of all offenses in these
categories. Using the low unemployment estimate, we project a reduction of 9.1%;
using the higher estimate, 8.8%
19 UCR, 1971, op. cit., p. 118.
20 This is particularly true for assassinations, which are almost always committed with firearms.
21 Robert Coles, “America Amok,”TheNew Republic, 155%(August 27,1966) p.
14, as cited in Marvin E.Wolfgang and Frances Ferracuti,TheSubcultureof Violence,
New York: Travistock Publications, 1967, p. 189.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
287
22 15.9c$ is 25Cr (murder reduction) of 95% (effectiveness of disarmament) of
66% (number of murders involving firearms). Similarly, 14.08 is 25% of 85%of 66%.
23 Tor this section, we based our general argument on that presented i n Frank
Zimiing's "Is Gun Control Likely to Reduceviolent Killings," a mimeograph report of
the Center for Studies in Criminal Justice, University ofchicago, (republished in the
University of Chicago Law Review, 35:721 (19681.)
24 Ibid., p. 3.
25 \Volfgang and Ferracuti, op. cit., p. 189.
26 See Zimring, op. cit., p. 23, also UCR,1970, op. cit., p. 9.
27 Commander Francis Flanagin, in a television interview about Chicago's
600th homicide of 1968, quoted in George Newton and Frank Zimring,Firearms and
Violence. A Staff Report submitted to the National Commission on the Causes and
Prevention of Violence, Washington, United States Government Printing Office,
1969.
28 This ratio was determined by Frank Zimring, based on a study of 510
homicdes, reported to the Chicago police i n 1966, and 480 serious assaults involving
knives or guns reported in the 5th period of 1968. In Zimring, op. cit., pp. 4-5.
29 47% is 7 5 4 (murders still occur, without firearms) of 95% (effectiveness) of
66% (52 of murders using firearms).
30 Zimring, op. cit., pp. 2-3. Wolfgang and Ferracuti estimate that"F'robab1y less
than 51%ofall known killingsare premeditated, planned, and intentional."op. cit., p.
189.
31 Le. 7 8 4 of 42% to 78% of 47%.
32 U S . Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United Stutes 1972.
(93rd edition!, Washington, D.C. 1972, p. 61.
33 Kew-ton and Zimring, op. cit., pp. 27-28.
31 2232=.95 (effectiveness coefficient) X 2394. 2035=.85 X 2394.
35 Newton and Zimring, op. cit., pp. 27-28.
36 Estimates of non-fatal firearms accidents range from 20,000-100,000annually. (See Ibid., p. 28). T h e "savings" is calculated as 954 (or 8 5 4 ) of t h e range.
37 The UCR indicates that in 1970 there were 348,000 robberies. (UCR, 1970, a s
reported in Stat. Abst., 1972, op. cit., p. 143).This is probably considerably below the
actual figure, since many robberies are not reported to the police, or by the police to
the FBI. A national survey of 10,000 households conducted by the National Opinion
Research Center for the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of
Violence, indicated that the real numbers of robberies was probably about 1%times
the reported figure. (Crimes of Violence, op. cit., p. 19). For 1970 this would indicate
approximately 500,000 robberies.
38 6 out of 10 robberies, reported to the UCR were armed. In turn 63% of the
armed robberies involved firearms. (UCR, 1970, op. cit.,p. 15).Thus3710 (63%of609)
of all robberies involved firearms. This means that in 1970 there were roughly
129,000 reported robberies involving firearms. If unreported robberies followed similar patterns, the actual number ofrobberies involving firearms was closer to 185,000.
39 The percentage of robberies involving firearms is far greater for indoor
robberies (which are more dangerous and lucrative) than for outdoor robberies. See
Newton and Zimring, op. cit., p. 47; also Crimes of Violence, op. cit., p. 302. Furthermore, firearms are involved more often when a commercial establishment is the
location of the robbery. See Crimes of Violence, op. cit., p. 302.
The fatality rate for robberies involving firearms is considerably higher than
t h a t for unarmed robberies, or robberies involving some other weapon. One study
showed that in New York City the fatality rate for firearm robberies is nearly 4 times
e
.
-
The Forensic Quarterly
288
th-it of other armed robberies. See Newton and Zimring, op. cit., p. 47. However, it
should be noted t h a t while the fatality is higher, the injury rate is lower in armed
robhhery than in unarmed robbery. Presumably the presence of a weapon intimidates
the vidim,and heorsheislesslikelytoresist.SeeCrimesofViolence, op. cit.,p. 370.
40 The National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence survey of
17 cittes -.rcluded in its weighted sample 649 armed andunarmed robberies. 3% of all
armed robheries were bank robberies, but not a single case of unarmed bank robbery
w a i reported. See Crimes of Violence, p. 302.
41 Newton and Zimring, op. cit., p. 47. The complete report is Appendix E of the
samr volume.
4 2 70,900 (reduction)=38% of 185,000 (number of firearms robberies).
77,000-47Ci: of 185,000. 23.4%=70,3001300,000 (number ofarmed robberies annually). 25.9% - 77,000 l 300,000.
TABLE
A
Murder and
nonnegligent
manslaughter
1 5 0 arV2st.q
Rrdu,twn from ending
vict,T;,Iew crime
YLF w n t
Re+A.:wn from full
yob:h employment
Pc: ,'e?;
V n . - : , . ~ ~ ddu c t i o n
frnn d , itrnarnent
Per irn:
Adjosrrd reduction
from disarmament
Per cent
Suhrotal
Primary etiects 'per cent)
15.856
552-578
4345
682-714
4.3-4.5
10.943-11.206
20.R-21.3
5, I7 3-5.776
5.173-5.776
34.7-38.7
12.311-13.627
23.4-25.9
40 3-450
4.950-5.516
38 6-43 0
5.502-6.094
42 9-47 5
rape
RPduction from ending
victBmles crime
Per cent
Rdt.rtion from full
youth'emplafment
Per cent
Vnndjusted reduction
from disarmament
Per cent
AdjurLed reduction
from disarmament
Per cent
Subtotal
Primary efTectslper cent,
15.411
52.612
9.751-10.097
18 5-19.2
5.632-6.02n 20.694-21.303
35 5-39.3
39 3-40.5
assault
Unarmed
robbery
125.917
35.075
6.800-7.051
5 4-5 6
1,473-1.543
4 2-4.4
6.800-7.051
5 4-5 5
1,473-1.543
4 2-4.4
4.950-5.516
31.2-34.8
Subtotal Property cnme
violenl Ilarceny. burcrimes
gtary. auto
thefl,
241,905
1.0B.858
1.325-1.449 21.223-21.963 43.212-219.147
86-9.4
88-9 1
4.2-21 3
Other
crimes
Total.
all crime.
5.541.615
6.570.473
2.066.035
37.3
2.066.035
31 4
64.435-241.1 IO
10-37
17.484- 19.403
14-8 2
17.484-19.403
3- 3
14.701-15.6 13
6 1-6.5
14.701- 15.613
2 2
1.325-1.449 35.924-37.576 43,212-219.147
4 2-21 3
8 6-9 4
14 9-15 5
Unadjusted reduction from freed resources 'per Cent1
Adjusted reduction from freed PeSOUrCeS
Per cent
Total reduction
Per cent
Aggravated
12.836
Forcible
.1970 arwsts
All criminal Armed robbery
homicide
2.066.035 2,145.171-2.322.758
37 3
32 6-35 4
4 9-5 3
216.R40-225.129
3 3-3 4
2,362.011-2.547.887
35 9-38 8