Peacekeeping Operations and the Quest for Peace
Author(s): Paul F. Diehl
Source: Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 103, No. 3 (Autumn, 1988), pp. 485-507
Published by: The Academy of Political Science
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PeacekeepingOperationsand
the Quest for Peace
PAUL F. DIEHL
Theproblemof warhas plaguedinternationalsocietyfor centuries.
As increasinginterdependence
fosteredinternationalorganizations,the worldcommunityhas attemptedto respondto violencein a collectivemannerwith a variety
of differentapproaches.Today,internationalorganizationshavecome to regard
preventivediplomacy,or as it is more popularlyknown, peacekeeping,as their
primaryalternativein settlinginternationaldisputes.Nevertheless,international
organizationshavenot alwaysreliedon peacekeepingto redressconflict nor was
it the intentionof their foundersto employ such a strategy.
Althoughthereareexamplesof multilateralinterventionin conflictpriorto the
twentiethcentury,the first comprehensiveeffort to addresssecurityconcernsby
an internationalorganizationonly dates back to the Leagueof Nations in 1920.
The Leagueprovidedfor a collectivesecuritysystem,wherebyan act of warwould
bringpolitical,economic,and possiblymilitarysanctionsagainstthe aggressor.I
The failureof the system,culminatingin WorldWarII, was foreshadowedby the
League'sineffectivenessin Manchuriaand Ethiopia.
Although faith in a collectivesecurityarrangementwas shaken,this strategy
for peacewas not abandonedby the framersof the UnitedNations Charter.Article43 of the Charterprovidesfor members'contributionsto supplyarmedforces
in the conductof collectivesecurityactions.Followingother attemptsat halting
conflict, suchas economicsanctions,collectivesecuritywas to be the centerpiece
1 See especiallyArticle 16 of
the Covenantof the Leagueof Nations.
PAULF. DIEHLis assistantprofessorof politicalscienceat the Universityof Georgia,co-editorof
Throughthe Straitsof Armageddon:Arms ControlIssuesand Prospects,and editorof ThePolitics
of InternationalOrganizations.
Political Science Quarterly Volume 103 Number 3 1988
485
486
| POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
of the UN efforts to deal with the problemof war.The agreementsnecessaryto
implementthe provisionsof Article43, however,wereneversuccessfullynegotiated.
Thus, the lack of availablemilitaryforcesmakesUN threatsagainstaggression
appearsomewhathollow.Furthermore,the absenceof consensusamongthe permanentmembersof the SecurityCouncilvirtuallyprecludesany formof military
enforcementaction.
Onlythe Koreanpolice actionin the early 1950sapproximatesthe kind of collectivesecurityoperationenvisionedby the founders.The Koreanaction avoided
a SecurityCouncilveto by virtueof the Sovietboycottof that body. In addition,
the GeneralAssembly,throughthe Unitingfor PeaceResolution,took on the major
responsibilitiesfor authorizingthe operation.The recurrenceof either of these
conditionsso as to permita similaroperationis now so unlikelythat the Security
Councilstalematehas effectivelysignaledan end to collectivesecurityas a viable
U Thantsoundedthe deathtoll for coloption. In early 1963,Secretary-General
lective security:
The idea that conventionalmilitarymethods-or to put it bluntly,war-can be used
by or on the behalf of the UnitedNationsto counteraggressionand securethe peace,
seems now to be ratherimpractical.2
The gradualabandonmentof a collectivesecuritystrategyled the UN to seek
othermeansto insureinternationalpeaceand security.The SuezCrisispresented
the UnitedNationswith a difficultproblem.Observationforceswereinsufficient
to ensuredisengagement,andcollectiveenforcementactionwouldriska confrontation betweenfour worldpowers.The solutionwasto createthe UnitedNations
EmergencyForce(UNEF)to facilitatewithdrawalof troops,preventa recurrence
of hostilities,and act as a barrierseparatingthe protagonists.A new strategyof
peacekeepinghad been created.
Althoughthe creationof a peacekeepingforceis not mentionedin the Charter,3
the UN hasreliedheavilyon this approachsince 1956.Onereasonis thatthe membershiphas foundit easierto achieveconsensuson a peacekeepingoperationthan
on collectivesecurity.Peacekeepingbrandsno state as the aggressorand is not
designedto influencethe militarybalancein the area.Indeed,consentof the host
state is necessarybefore the peacekeepingunit is deployed.Thus, one side in a
disputedoes not necessarilybenefitfromthe UN action,andin this respectpeacekeepingis less controversialthan collectivesecurityor any otherpunitiveaction.
2 These remarksare taken from an addressby U Thantto the HarvardAlumniAssociationon
13 June 1963.Quotedin WilliamBishop,InternationalLaw:Casesand Materials,3rded. (Boston:
Little,Brown,1971),260.
3The legal basis for authorizingpeacekeepingoperationshas long been a hotly debatedissue in
the legalcommunity.An excellentsummaryand analysisof the variouslegalpositionson the matter
can be foundin Dan Ciobanu,"ThePowerof the SecurityCouncilto OrganizePeacekeepingOperations"in Antonio Cassesse,ed., UnitedNations Peacekeeping:LegalEssays(Netherlands:Sijthoff
and Noordhoff, 1978), 15-53.
PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS
|
487
In addition, the positive commitment required of UN members is fairly small.
Troops are usually drawn from only a few countries (on a voluntary basis) and
the mission is relativelysafe for those involved.4Although it would be a gross overstatement to say that no controversy exists over peacekeeping operations, there
is a broader basis of support in international organizations for this technique than
other methods for securing international peace.
The International Peace Academy defines peacekeeping as:
theprevention,containment,moderation,andterminationof hostilitiesbetweenor within
states,throughthe mediumof a peacefulthirdpartyintervention,organizedanddirected
internationally,
usingmultinationalforcesof soldiers,police,and civiliansto restoreand
maintainpeace.5
The primary goal of a peacekeeping operation is to halt armed conflict or prevent its recurrence. It achieves this goal by acting as a physical barrier between
hostile parties and monitoring their military movements. A secondary purpose
of peacekeeping is to create a stable environment for negotiations, which could
lead to resolution of the underlying conflict. The operation can defuse tensions
between the parties by giving each side time to cool-off without fear of imminent
attack. In theory, this should make them more willing to negotiate and offer concessions.
If peacekeeping operations are effective, they can help resolve conflict without
bloodshed - a valuable accomplishmentindeed. Nevertheless,no approachto peace
is ideally suited to every situation. One approach may be a complete success under
one set of conditions, but a total failureunder another. Variationsin the implementation of a program can also influence success rates. The purpose of this article
is to identify and analyze the conditions that contribute to the effectiveness of
peacekeeping operations. Our initial focus is on the characteristics of the operations themselves; the elements of organization, impartiality, and logistics, among
others, are considered. Second, the level of cooperative behavior exhibited by interested parties is assessed, as is its impact on the operations' effectiveness. From
an analysis of this multiplicity of factors in a comparative case study, we hope
to gain a more complete picture of when and how peacekeeping operations should
be used.
Identifying the conditions enabling a peacekeeping operation to be successful
has theoretical as well as practical utility. Most studies of international intervention in crises fail to differentiate the various forms that intervention has taken.6
I Chapter14 of Inis Claude,SwordsInto Plowshares,4th ed. (New York:RandomHouse, 1971)
providesan authoritativecomparisonof preventivediplomacyand otherapproachesto peaceavailable to internationalorganizations.
5 Thisdefinitionis quotedin IndarJit Rikhye,MichaelHarbottle,and BjornEgge,TheThinBlue
Line: International Peacekeeping and its Future (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 11.
6 For example,see JonathanWilkenfeld
and MichaelBrecher,"International
Crises,1945-1975:
The U.N. Dimension,"InternationalStudiesQuarterly28 (March1984):45-68; and RobertButterworth,ModerationFromManagement(Pittsburgh:
UniversityCenterfor International
Studies,1978).
488 |
POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
As a result,thereis little basis for ascertainingthe relativeutilityof differentapproachesto peacein differentsituations.In addition,the numerousvolumeson
peacekeepinghavealmostexclusivelyofferedidiographichistoricalaccounts.There
havebeenfeweffortsto studyspecificstrategiesto insurepeaceanddevelopgeneralized conclusions.This study is an initial attemptto fill those theoreticalgaps.
Determiningthe situationsappropriateto peacekeepingcouldhelpavoidcostly
mistakesor missedopportunitiesin the future.Plans formulatedunderSecurity
Council Resolution435,7 but currentlyin abeyance,providefor a peacekeeping
forcein Namibia;the troopswouldpolice a cease-fireand supervisethe elections
that wouldleadto Namibia'sindependence.In addition,regionalor international
peacekeepinghas been suggestedas partof plansto solveinstabilityin Chadand
NorthernIreland,andvariousproposalsfora Mideastpeaceincludea peacekeeping
component.This study can hopefullyoffer insightsinto the appropriatenessof
these and other proposedpeacekeepingoperations.
The recentpeacekeepingexperiencein Beirutdemonstratesthat this approach
to peaceis no longerexclusivelyexercisedby internationalor regionalorganizations. Theterribleloss of life in that missionrevealsthat nationaldecisionmakers
maynot fullyunderstandsuchoperations.Ouranalysiscanoffersomeroughguidelinesto policymakersin internationalorganizationsandnationalcapitalson peacekeeping and its effectiveness.We begin by specifying the cases of preventive
diplomacyto be studiedand estimatingtheir overalleffectiveness.
CASES
The analysisof preventivediplomacyis inherentlylimitedby the comparatively
smallnumberof historicalexamples.In contrast,scholarsstudyinginterstateconflict havethe benefitof investigatinga largenumberof incidentsin their search
forgeneralized
patterns.We,therefore,mustbe contentwithcomparinga fewpeacekeepingoperationsin the hope of discoveringcommonproblemsand successes.
Nevertheless,the cases chosen must be sufficiently similar so as to permit
meaningfulcomparison,yetdemonstrateenoughvariationin orderto allowsome
conclusionsabout the importantfactorsaffecting peacekeeping.
Wehavedecidedto concentrateon six peacekeepingoperations,includingthe
earliestand most recentexamples:The United Nations EmergencyForce,with
operationsconductedafterthe SuezCrisis(UNEFI) andfollowingthe YomKippur
War(UNEFII);the UnitedNationsOperationsin the Congo(ONUC);the United
Nations PeacekeepingForcein Cyprus(UNFICYP);the UnitedNations Interim
Forcein Lebanon(UNIFIL);and the MultinationalForceof American,British,
French,and Italiantroops stationedin Beirut(MNF).
The selectionof these cases was guided by a numberof principles.First, we
wishedto focus on those operationsthat weredeployedto maintaincease-fires
7
Security Council Resolution 435, 29 September 1978.
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS |
489
withmilitaryinterpositionforces.Consequently,we ignoreobserverand othercivilian forces. In those instances,the performanceof the missionsplayedonly a
minor role in the maintenanceof peace. Second, we looked only at operations
that weresent to conflicts prior to final resolutionof the disputesbetweenthe
parties.Becausesome significantconflictremains,we arebetterableto assessthe
impactof the operationson conflict reductionand peace maintenance.Finally,
we purposelyignoredoperationsthatresembledoccupyingforcesmorethanpeacekeepingtroops and whose purposewas to preservethe hegemonyof a regional
PeaceForce(IAPF)
power.Examplesof suchoperationswerethe Inter-American
in the DominicanRepublicand the Syrianinterventionin Lebanonfollowingthe
1975civilwar.Wearethenleft withthe six operationsnotedabovethatareconsistentwithourpurposes.Besideconfiningouranalysisto thoseoperationsthatneatly
correspondto the goals of preventivediplomacy,we havechosen our sampleso
that it has a numberof attractivefeatures.
First,the sampleenablesthe analystto considerinternationalinterventionin
two differentsettings:civil and interstateconflict.The samplecasesincludeoperations sent into an areawreckedby internalinstability,as well as those that concernedthemselvesprimarilywiththe separationof warringstates.Whetherpreventive diplomacyis more appropriateto one kind of conflict than anothercan be
a subjectfor inquiry.Anotherfeatureof the sampleis that differentoperations
withinthe same geographicarea (the MiddleEast) involvingmany of the same
protagonistscan be compared.In effect, the environmentalcontextis held constantto someextent,andthe effect of differencesin the conductof the operations
can be assessed.Indeed, two differentsegmentsof the same operation(UNEF
I and UNEF II) make for almost a perfectanalysisof this kind.
Finally,comparisonsarepossiblebetweenoperationsconductedby an internagroupingof nationswithout
tionalorganizationandone conductedbya multilateral
internationalsanction.Whetherpeacekeepingshould become a primaryoption
in nationalforeignpolicyor whethersuchoperationsshouldbe exclusiveto internationalbodies can be judged. Beforeconsideringthe factorsaffecting success
in peacekeepingoperations,we offer a brief descriptionand evaluationof each
samplecase.
Estimatinga peacekeepingoperation'ssuccessis a difficult problem.It seems
to us, however,that a successfuloperationshouldachievetwo thingsin particular.
First,the operationshouldpreventa renewalof armedhostilitiesbetweenthe disputingparties.Maintainingthe cease-fireis its primaryfunctionand a prerequisite to attemptsat reconcilingthe protagonists.Second,the peacekeepingoperation should facilitatea final, peacefulresolutionto the dispute.This often can
be a monumentaltask, and the blamefor failurecannotalwaysrestsolely on the
operationitself.Nevertheless,unlesstheunderlyingsourcesof conflictareresolved,
the threatof renewedwar is alwayspresent.Thus, in evaluatingeach operation,
we focus primarilyon the firstcriterionof success,but recognizethe importance
of the secondand devotea sectionat the conclusionof this studyto the problems
inherentin attainingfinal conflict resolution.
490
| POLITICAL SCIENCE
QUARTERLY
UNEF I
UNEF I wasthe firstrealpeacekeepingoperation,extendingits functionsbeyond
those of mereobservation.It grewout of the Suez crisisin 1956,when a means
was neededto stop the warbetweenBritain,France,Israel,and Egypt. Because
of the directinvolvementof permanentmembersof the SecurityCouncil,the UN
GeneralAssemblytook the initiative,usingthe sametechniqueas it had six years
before with respectto Korea,a Uniting for Peace Resolution.8A peacekeeping
forcewassetup to separatethe combatantsandsupervisethe withdrawalof British
and Frenchtroopsin the area.Finally,the peacekeepingforcesactedas a barrier
to Arab-Israeliengagement,patrollingpartsof the SinaiPeninsulaand the Gaza
Strip.
That the Six Day Waroccurredin 1967may be evidenceof UNEF's failure.
Nevertheless,thisignoresthatthe operationachievedalmostelevenyearsof peace
with few violent incidentsin a highly volatile area of the world. Despite many
terroristattacksand threatsagainstIsraelfrom other parts of the MiddleEast,
the areapatrolledby UNEF I was comparativelycalm. Tothat extent,the operation was quite successful.
That the presidentof Egypt,GamalAbdel Nasser,askedUNEF I to withdraw
and war soon followeddemonstratesthat the peacekeepingoperationdid little
to resolvethe underlyingsourcesof conflict. UNEF I apparentlyremovedsome
of the urgencyfor conflict resolutionand perhapscontributedto prolongingthe
dispute,albeit without armedinteraction.9
ONUC
As wasthe casewithmanyAfricanstates,the Congo(nowZaire)wasill-prepared
for its 1960independencefrom colonial domination.Domesticinstabilitysoon
of its formercolonialmaster,Belgium;the Congolesegovernledto the intervention
ment requestedassistancefrom the United Nations to redressthis infringement
of its sovereignty.Freshfromits initialsuccessin the MiddleEast,the UN created
the ONUC forcein 1960,givingSecretary-General
Dag Hammarskjoldwidelatitude in its use.
Initially,ONUC was designedto ensurethe withdrawalof Belgiantroopsand
help the centralgovernmentmaintainlaw and order.The situation,however,became morecomplicatedwhenthe provinceof Katangasoughtto secede,and the
8 See GeneralAssemblyResolutions998 (ES-I),4 November1956;1000(ES-I),5 November1956;
and 1001,7 November1956.Mostof therelevantdocumentsforthisoperationcanbe foundin Roselyn
Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping 1946-1967Documents and Commentary, vol. 1 (London: Oxford UniversityPress, 1969).
9 Formoreinformationon UNEF I, see WilliamFrye,A UnitedNationsPeaceForce(NewYork:
Force(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversity
Oceana,1957);GabriellaRosner,TheUnitedNationsEmergency
Press,1963);andMaxwellCohen,"TheDemiseof UNEF"International
Journal23 (Winter1967-68):
18-51.
PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS
|
491
centralgovernmentsplitamongfactions.Thepeacekeepingforceswerethenadditionally chargedwith maintainingthe territorialintegrityof the Congo (that is,
stoppingthe secessionistmovementin Katanga)and preventingthe outbreakof
a full-scalecivil war."0In 1963,ONUC becamepartof a militaryeffort, actively
engagingin limitedmilitarycombat,to defeatsecessionistforcesin Katanga.ONUC
forces finally withdrewin 1964with the outwardsigns of conflict resolved.
In a certainsense, ONUC was a successfuloperation.It did preventKatanga
fromsecedingand managedto averta full-scalecivil war.In addition,the operation helpedgain a meetingof Congo'sNationalAssembly,and some senseof political normalitywas restored.On the other hand, this was far from a textbook
operation.Therewas a greatdeal of bloodshedduringthe four yearsof ONUC's
mission,some of it causedby the use of militaryforceby the peacekeepingforces.
Thus,whileONUC mightbe calleda success,it is difficultto attributeall of that
successto the principlesof peacekeeping."
UNFICYP
The next incidenceof UN peacekeepingagaininvolvedthe difficulttransitionto
independencefor a newstate- Cyprus.At first,British,Turkish,andGreektroops
weredeployedto keep peace on the island.Theiraction was far from successful
as ethnicrivalriesborderedon civil war,and Turkeythreatenedmilitaryintervention. UN sponsoredtroops weredeployedin 1964to preventthe recurrenceof
fightingand to supervisethe cease-firein a bufferzone separatingthe Greekand
Turkishcommunitieson the island.The forceswerealso chargedwithvariouslawand-orderand humanitarianfunctions.12
UNFICYPremainsin placetoday,evidenceof its successin preventingwaras
well as its failurein promotinga permanentsettlement.The presenceof peacekeepingtroopshas helpedavertcivil warwhentensionswerehigh, and therehas
been a gradualdecreasein the numberof shootingincidentsoverthe life of the
operation.UNFICYPwasevenableto diffusea 1974crisiswhenTurkeyoccupied
the northernportionof the island.Yet,the hostilitybetweenthe GreekandTurkish
communitieslingers,andthe necessityfor an interpositionforcehas not lessened.
Thus, it must be said the UNFICYPhas been and is only a qualifiedsuccess.13
10
See Security Council Resolutions 143, 14 July 1960; and 145, 22 July 1960. Also see General
Assembly Resolutions 1474 (ES-IV), 20 September 1960; 145, 9 August 1960; 161, 21 February 1961;
1600 (XV), 15 April 1961; and 169, 24 November 1961; and Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping,
vol. 3.
11For more information on ONUC, see ErnestLefever,UncertainMandate (Baltimore:Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1967); George Abi-Saab, The United Nations Operation in the Congo (London: Oxford University Press, 1978);and Arthur House, The UN. in the Congo (Washington, D.C.: University
Press of America, 1978).
12 See Security Council Resolution 186, 4 March 1964; and Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping,
vol. 4. The original mandate has been generally renewed at six month intervals.
13 For more information on UNFICYP, see James Boyd, "Cyprus: Episode in Peacekeeping," In-
492 |
POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
UNEF H
Aftersix yearsin abeyance,UNEFwasreconstitutedin 1973as a partof the ceasefire agreementfor the YomKippurWar.UNEF II was designedto monitorthe
cease-fireandthe disengagement
of ArabandIsraelitroopsmuchas its predecessor,
UNEF I, had in earlieryears.14The force was again withdrawn,as it had been
in 1967,but this time it was becauseof peaceand not war.The CampDavidAccords,signalingan end to warbetweenEgyptand Israel,resolvedmost of the disagreementsoverthe Sinai.Theneedfora peacekeepingforcediminished,although
an observergroupwasstill stationedin the areaanda comprehensiveMiddleEast
peace was as elusive as ever.
In general,UNEF II wasas successfulas its predecessorin preservingthe ceasefire. Therewerefew violent incidentsin the patrol area;the primaryexception
occurredwhen a UNEF aircraftcrashedin Syriaafter being hit by anti-aircraft
fire. Unlike other peacekeepingmissions, however,there was an agreementbetweenthe partiesfor resolvingthe conflict. Althoughit may be incorrectto give
the UNEFanydirectcreditforthepeacetreaty,certainlytheirpresencemadenegotiations betweenthe sides easier.15
UNIFIL
Although initial attemptsat peacekeepingwere,on the whole, quite successful,
the most recentoperationshaveyieldeddifferentresults.The need for UNIFIL
beganwiththe persistantterroristattackslaunchedagainstIsraelfromPalestinian
bases in southernLebanon.Israelsent troops six miles deep into Lebanon(and
laterextendedeven further)in responseto the hijackingof a bus, with the aim
of destroyingthoseterroriststrongholds.Thefearof majorwarin theareaprompted
the UN to establisha peacekeepingforcetherein 1978.16UNIFIL was supposed
to supervisethe withdrawalof the IsraelDefenseForces(IDF) and assistthe Lebanesegovernmentin reestablishingsovereigntyoverthe area.The forcepatrolled
a wide area with the purposeof stoppingterroristactivity.
The UNIFILmissionhas beena failure.Duringthe firstfouryearsof the operation,terroristactivityin the areacontinued,seeminglyunabated;retaliatory
strikes
by Israelwerealso commonplace.IsraelinvadedLebanonin 1982and overran
ternational Organization 20 (Winter 1966): 1-17; and James Stegenga, The United Nations Force in
Cyprus (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1968).
14
See Security Council Resolutions 340, 25 October 1973 and 341, 27 October 1973.
'5 For more information on UNEF II, see Nathan Pelcovits, "U.N. Peacekeeping and the 1973ArabIsraeli Conflict," Orbis 19 (Spring 1975): 146-165; K.P. Saksena, "Not by Design: Evolution of U.N.
Peacekeeping Operations and Its Implications for the Future," International Studies 16 (OctoberDecember 1977):459-481; and SurendraBhutani, The UN. and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (New Delhi:
Academic Press, 1977).
16
See Security Council Resolutions 425, 19 March 1978 and 426, 19 March 1978.
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS |
493
UNIFILpositionsas the Israeliforcesadvancedall the wayto Beirut.Israelcited
UNIFIL'sunwillingnessor inabilityto performits missionas partialjustification
for the invasion.The latest indignitysufferedby UNIFIL is the kidnappingof
someof its personnelby a localmilitia.UNIFILcontinuesits presencein southern
Lebanon,butthereis no signthatthe problemsin the areaareanycloserto resolution than before.17
MNF
The Israeliinvasionof Lebanon,besideall but destroyingUNIFIL,createda new
opportunityfor peacekeepingin Beirut.Israeldemandedthat all PalestineLiberation Organization(PLO)fightersleavethe city,but was opposedto UN supervision of the exodus.A multinationalforceof American,French,and Italiantroops
weresentin to supervisethe withdrawal.Theshort-termoperationwashighlysuccessful,andthe MNFquicklywithdrew.A seriesof eventsoccurred,however,that
of MNFtroops.LebanesePresidentBashirGemayel
the redeployment
precipitated
was assassinated,the IDF movedinto WestBeirut,and a massacreoccurredin
two Palestinianrefugeecamps.The MNF was sent back into Beirutto act as an
interpositionforcebetweencompetingmilitiasand to aid the centralgovernment
in establishingcontrol over the country.Britishforces soon joined the effort.
The MNF missionis by most accountsa completefailure.The civil war escalated duringMNF's presence,so much so that the peacekeepingtroops had to
be withdrawnbecausetheirsafetycould not longerbe guaranteedand the political costs werejudged to be too great. Many lives werelost in the exchangeof
firebetweenthe troopsand rivalmilitias;suicideterroristattacksalso took their
toll on the peacekeepingforces.The problemsin Lebanoncontinuetoday,and
the MNF was apparentlylittle help in alleviatingthe conflict. Indeed,the MNF
was itself a point of contentionbetweenvariousLebanesefactions,and its mere
presencewas anotherstumblingblock to agreement.18
INTERNAL FACTORS
In this sectionwe look at the internaloperationsof the peacekeepingmissionand
determinetheireffect on its successor failure.It is not our intentionto focus on
all aspectsof a peacekeepingoperation,but ratherto concentrateon the important elementsthat could affect whetherthe mission'spurposeis achievedor not.
17
For more information on UNIFIL, see Alan James, "Painful Peacekeeping: The United Nations
in Lebanon, 1978-1982," International Journal 38 (Autumn 1983): 613-634; Nathan Pelcovits, Peacekeeping on Arab/Israeli Fronts: Lessons from the Sinai and Lebanon (Boulder, Colo.: Westview
Press, 1984); and Naomi Weinberger,"Peacekeeping Options in Lebanon," The Middle East Journal
37 (Summer 1983): 341-369.
18 For more information on MNF, see Richard Nelson, "Multinational Peacekeeping in the Middle
East and the United Nations Model," International Affairs 61 (Winter 1984-85): 67-89.
494
| POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
The five factorsbelow are those most frequentlycited in reports,debates,and
scholarlyworkson preventivediplomacy.In addition,our analysisof the six cases
indicatesthatthesefactorsdeserveconsideration,if onlyto dispelor confirmsome
of the conventionalwisdom surroundingpeacekeeping.
Financing
Peacekeepingoperationscan be quite expensive;money is needed for supplies,
costs.In the UnitedNationssystem,
equipment,salaries,andvariousadministrative
peacekeepingoperationsare not funded from the regularbudget. They require
a specialauthorizationfromthe organizationor relyon voluntarycontributions.
Whengroupsof nationsforma peacekeepingmission,appropriationsaredependentupon eachnationalcontribution,subjectto the constraintof domesticpolitical forces.Financingis a problemfor anycollectiveaction,particularlywhenthe
coercivemechanismto enforcecontributionsis weak.19A peacekeepingoperation
could be terminatedprematurelyif its sourceof fundingwerecut off. Its area
of operationor its efficiencycouldalso be severelylimitedif fundswereinsufficient.
Almost all of the UN operationsstudiedherehad difficultieswith financing.
Operatingexpensesexceededexpectations,andtherewasa persistentproblemwith
nationsrefusingto contributetheir assessedshare.At the end of 1983,the debt
from peacekeepingwas approximately$205 million, or 68 percentof total UN
indebtedness.Attemptsto rectifythe problemhavefailed.In 1964theUnitedStates
attemptedto suspendnoncontributingmembersunderArticle 19of the Charter.
Whenthe United Stateswithdrewits effort, the only legal means of pressuring
recalcitrantmemberswaseffectivelyabandonedfor politicalconsiderations.The
MNF enduredthreatsof a cutoff of funds by the Congressof the UnitedStates,
but was apparentlyunaffectedby the financialactions of other countriesin the
consortium.
Althoughthe operationsexperiencedfinancialdifficulties,these did not seem
to adverselyaffectthe conductof missions.Largedeficitsdid not preventthe UN
from continuingthe operations,and the consequencesof the financialproblems
wereminor.Forexample,UNEF II wasunableto purchasecertainmine-sweeping
equipmentbecauseof financialconstraints.The UN operationsbenefittedfrom
largevoluntarycontributionsfromsome nations.Thesetendedto hold downthe
deficitsand allowedthe operationsto continue.A notableexceptionamongthe
operationswas ONUC. It was a veryexpensiveoperation,and the high cost producedconstantpressureto completethe mission.It maybe that this pressureencouragedthe UN to use militaryforce againstKatangaand therebycompleteits
mission.Financialconsiderationswerecertainlyimportantin the decisionto with19The classicanalysisof this problemis givenin MancurOlson, TheLogic of
(Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress, 1965).
CollectiveAction
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS |
495
drawfromthe Congo, eventhoughsome analyststhoughtit wise to continuethe
mission for a little while longer.
Overall,financeswerean irritatingproblemfor peacekeepingmissions,but in
no casewereanyof the operationsseriouslyhamperedby the difficulty.Financial
supportof a peacekeepingoperationis to somedegreea barometerof the political
supportfor the operation.Financialproblemsthemselvesapparentlywillnot jeopardizethe effectivenessof preventivediplomacy,buttheycouldbe the officialcause
of death wereenough political supportwithdrawn.
Geography
Anotherconsiderationin the successor failureof preventivediplomacyis the locus
of deployment.Wherethe operationis locatedcan influencethe effectivenessof
its patrols.If the size of the areais great,the monitoringof conflictingparties'
action could be problematic;the marginfor errorin detectionand verification
would increase.The vulnerabilityof the peacekeepingforcesto hostile fire also
coulddamagetheireffectivenessandpossiblydrawtheminto the militarystruggle.
wereimportantin thesuccessor failure
In oursixcases,geographicconsiderations
of eachoperation.The most successfuloperationshad certaingeographicadvantages. The two UNEF missionswerelocated in mostly desertterrainin sparsely
populatedareas.This allowedfor easy observationof militarymovementsand
infiltrationattempts.This advantageclearlyoutweighedthe minorproblemsencounteredwith deserttransportation.UNFICYPwas fortunateto be located on
an islandseparatedfromGreeceandTurkey,who mighthavemoreeasilyinstigated
troublehad theybeen contiguousby land to Cyprus.In these threeinstances,geographyassistedin the preventionof conflict.
A numberof generalrulescan be derivedby lookingat those missionsthatwere
lessthansuccessful.First,whenthe peacekeepingtroopsdid not separatethe combatantsby a significantdistance,the resultswereadverse.The Frenchtroops in
theMNFwerestationedat the so-calledGreenLineseparatingEastandWestBeirut.
Theirpresencewasnot enoughto haltsniperfireor artilleryattackovertheirheads.
The buffer zone was much too narrowto effectivelyseparatethe rival militias.
UNIFILencountereda similarproblemovera largergeographicareaas political
considerationspreventedit from taking its desiredpositions. They wereunable
to preventrocketattacksor retaliatoryraidsby eitherthe Israelisor the Palestinians, as each side was still close enough to do damageto the other.
Anothergeographicproblemconcernedlogistics.If the areaof deploymentdid
not permiteasy observationof the combatants,problemscould arise.UNIFIL
had to patrola veryruralportionof Lebanon,and it was rathereasy for guerrilla
fightersto infiltratethe area.ONUCoperatedin sucha largegeographicareathat
it was difficult to monitorall the activitiesaroundthem, muchless supplytheir
own troops in an orderlyfashion.A final rule is that the vulnerabilityof peacekeepingpositionsto attackcan underminetheir neutralityand complicatetheir
496
| POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
mission.TheMNF forcesof the Americansand Frenchwerelocatedin areasopen
to attack. The Americanposition was at the Beirutairporton low groundand
subjectto attackfromthe surroundinghills.Theattackson FrenchandAmerican
positions led them to take an active role in combat, contraryto the basic principles of preventivediplomacy.
In general,geographicconsiderationswereimportantto the successof peacekeepingmissions.It appearsthatthe peacekeepingforcesideallyshouldbe placed
in an area that is relativelyinvulnerable,yet is easy to patrol and separatesthe
combatantsat a distancecapableof preventingarmedexchanges.Nevertheless,
a favorablelocation is no guaranteethat the missionwill turn out well. At best,
one might hope that a particulardeploymentwill preventviolent incidentsthat
could escalateand renewthe warfare.
Clarityof the Mandate
A frequentlycitedproblem,especiallyin light of the truck-bombtragedyin Lebanon, is the absenceof a clearmandatefor a peacekeepingmission.20A clearly
definedmandaterestrictsthe latitudeof actiongiventhe mission,therebylimiting
both the controversyoverpossibleactionsand the potentialmanipulationof the
forceby interestedparties.A clearmandatealso maygenerategreaterpublicsupportin thatthe populacecanidentifyandunderstandthe purposeof the operation.
In practice,the most successful missions have begun with clear mandates.
Nevertheless,the causallinks betweenmandateclarityand operationsuccessare
not clear. Some missions had problemsemanatingfrom their mandates,but it
is not evidentwhetherthese weresufficientto do seriousdamage.The MNF had
veryfewguidelinesto followin its seconddeployment.21
Americanforceshad no
clearideaof whatto do beyondholdingdownpositionsaroundthe airport.22
This
not only underminedpublicand congressionalsupport,but perhapsled the force
to undertakemilitaryactions that wereinconsistentwith the concept of peacekeeping.ONUC also experiencedsome problemsbecause of its mandate.The
20 Forexample,
bothWeinberger,
"Peacekeeping
Options"andNelson,"Multinational
Peacekeeping"
give primaryimportanceto this factor.
21 Unlikea UN operation,thereis no authorizing
resolutionstatingthe mandateof MNF'soperation. The closestone comesto a statementof the mandatecamefrom DeputyPressSecretaryLarry
Speakes:"TheMNF is to providean interpositionforceat agreedlocationsand therebyprovidethe
MNF presencerequestedby the Governmentof Lebanonto assistit and Lebanon'sarmedforcesin
the Beirut area"(quote taken from Public Papers of the President of the United States:Ronald Reagan,
book II, Washington,D.C.:U.S.GovernmentPrintingOffice,1983,1202).Thisis stillvagueandquite
in contrastto the firstdeploymentof MNF,whenthe guidelinesfor supervisingPLOwithdrawal
were
fairlyspecific.
22 Problemswith the mandatewerecomplicated
by the lack of trainingin peacekeepingmeasures
for the militarypersonnel.MNF troopswereprimarilycombatpersonnel,unaccustomedto holding
downa defensivepositionwithoutfiringat an enemyforce.Fora descriptionof peacekeeping
training,
seeRichardSwift,"UnitedNationsMilitaryTiainingfor Peace,"International
28 (Spring
Organization
1974):267-280.
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS |
497
was grantedenormouspowerin the conductof that operation,
secretary-general
and his actionsled to an erosionof supportfor the missionamongUN members.
Furthermore,the ONUC mandatewas modifiedseveraltimes, leadingto confusion and additionalerosion of support.
It is evidentfromthesesix casesthata clearmandateis usefulfor a peacekeeping
operation.Yet,that clarityis often only a reflectionof the underlyingpolitical
consensuson the mission. A clear mandateoften can generatelittle supportin
the deliberativebodiesthat authorizesuchoperations.In controversialsituations
someoperationswouldneverhavetakenplacewithouta vaguemandate.Theoperationsthat had a vaguemandatecan attributetheirmajorproblemsto something
otherthanthe mandateitself. In short,the importanceof a clearmandateis probably overestimated,for it is merelya surrogatefor the politicalconsensusunderlying it.
Commandand Control
programneedsto havea smoothmethodof operation.A peaceAnyorganizational
keepingmissioncanbe jeopardizedif it makesmistakes,cannotcarryout its duties
effectively,or lacks coordination.The most common command and control
problemin oversix caseswaslanguage.By organizingforcesfrommanydifferent
nations,it was often difficult for commandersto communicateon a one-to-one
basis (much less in any largeraggregation)with their subordinates.
A centralcommandcan solve coordinationproblems,and four of our sample
operationswereset up on this fashion. ONUC was somewhatdisorganizedbecause it lackeda centralcommand.23It did, however,havea coordinatingbody
to ensurethatthe forceswerenot workingat crosspurposes.ONUC'sonlyproblem
occurredwhen it was unclearwho gave ordersfor a particularmaneuverduring
the operation.The MNF was linked only throughliaison officers. The sharing
of intelligenceand the mappingof joint strategycorrespondinglysuffered.
Most peacekeepingoperationshaverun smoothly,with commandand control
problemsaffectingthe efficiency,but not the overallsuccess,of the missions.Languageproblemscan be cumbersome,but thereis an inherenttradeoffin making
a peacekeepingforcerepresentative
versusmakingit efficient. Most of the command and control problemsshould dissipatein the future.24From the benefits
of experience,the UN can now send trainedpersonnelinto the field and choose
fromamongmanyexperiencedindividualsto directthe peacekeepingunits.Should
23
An elaboration on ONUC's problem in this regard is given by Lincoln Bloomfield, "Political
Control of International Forces in Dealing with Problems of Local Instability" in Arthur Waskow,
Quis Custodiet? Controlling the Police in a Disarmed World(Washington, D.C.: Peace Research Institute, 1963), appendix E.
24 An excellent operations manual detailing the mechanics of setting up and conducting a peacekeeping operation is International Peace Academy, Peacekeeper's Handbook (New York: Pergamon
Press, 1984).
498
| POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
anycollectiveeffortbe launchedby a groupof nations,theytoo shouldlearnfrom
caseof completeincompethe mistakesof the MNF.Otherthanan unprecedented
operation.
tence,commandandcontrolproblemsareunlikelyto ruina peacekeeping
Neutrality
An essentialcomponentof the preventivediplomacystrategyis that the forces
shouldnot workto the benefitof eitherside.Historically,militarypersonnelfrom
nonalignedcountrieswereused to guaranteethis neutrality.Twoinformalrules
have arisenin choosing troops for the peacekeepingforce. The first is to never
allow forcesfrom a state involvedin the conflict to participatein the operation.
A second rule is to bar troop contributionsfrom major powernations or their
allies.Inthesewaysit washopedthatthe conflictingpartieswouldregardthe peacekeepingforcesas unbiasedand disinterested.Becausethe host state'sconsentis
necessaryto deploypeacekeepingforces,the failureof the host state to approve
a particularforce compositionpreventsthat operationfrom taking place.
In our samplethose operationsthat werestaffed almost entirelyfrom disinterested,nonalignednationshad the least difficulty.Nevertheless,we found the
Cyprusoperationwasequallyeffective,despitebeingcomposedprimarilyof troops
from NATOcountries,includingthose of ex-colonialpowerBritain.This seems
for success.
to indicatethattroopsfromnonalignedcountriesarenot a prerequisite
Nevertheless,theyareno guaranteeof it either;IsraelclaimedUNIFILwasguilty
of aidingthe Palestiniancauseand took violent action. The MNF operationhad
terribledifficultiesarisingfrom the perceivedunfairnessof the troops. Manyof
the factionsin LebanonregardedU.S. troopsas supportersof theirtwo principal
enemiesin the dispute,the Gemayelgovernmentand Israel.Thisimmediatelysubjected the forcesto distrustand laterto hostile fire. These suspicionsseemedto
be confirmedwhenthe UnitedStateshelpedto trainLebanesegovernmenttroops
andshelledsurroundingvillages.TheFrenchencountereda similarresponsefrom
the militias.The Italiancontingentwas regardedas neutralby all sides, owingto
its behaviorduringthe operation(whichincludednumeroushumanitarianacts)
and the political stance of its government.As a result,they generallywerenot
the subject of protestor attack.
Overall,drawingpeacekeepingpersonnelfrom nonalignedcountriesis desirable, but is not a necessarycondition for successfulcompletionof the mission.
Neutralityin peacekeepingis determinedmoreby behaviorand situationthan by
forcecomposition.To the extentthat the troops'behavioris perceivedas biased
and that it underminesthe cooperationbetweenconflictingparties,the peacetroopssuppliedby a givencountry
keepingmissioncouldbe ruined.Furthermore,
maybe regardedas neutralin one situation(forexample,Tanzaniantroopsin Latin
America), but not necessarilyunder a different scenario (the same troops in
Namibia).All thingsbeing equal, however,a nonalignedforceis more desirable
than any other. The nonalignedforce is more likely to be acceptedby all sides
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS |
499
and will be less likely to take actions that may be interpretedas unfair by one
or more of the parties.
RELEVANT ACTORS
Commonsenseandthe previousanalysistell us thatthe mannerin whicha peacekeepingoperationis conductedis not the sole determinantof successor failure.
In this section, we considerthe behaviorof a numberof relevantactorswith an
eye to estimatingtheir impact on peacekeepingoperations.First, we investigate
the actionsof the primarydisputantsor host state(s)in the conflict. Wethenconsider other states, which may be regionalpowersor neighboringcountriesthat
take an active role in the conflict. Becausepeacekeepingoperationsoften deal
with instabilityin the host state(s),we also analyzethe behaviorof subnational
groups.Finally,the policiesof the superpowersareweighed.Theyhavethe global
power,not to mentiona dominantrole in the SecurityCouncil,to dramatically
influence a peacekeepingmission.
PrimaryDisputants
Beforepeacekeepingtroops are deployedon a nation'sterritory,they must have
the consent of that nation'sgovernment.If it is an interstateconflict, the other
disputant(s)mustusuallyagreeto refrainfrommilitaryforce.A successfulpeacekeepingoperation,however,dependson more than this initial level of cooperation. It wouldseemthatthe conflictingstatesalso mustnot tryto exploitthe peacekeepingtroopsfor theirownadvantageandrefrainfromincidentsthat couldlead
to a returnof openwarfare.If one sideis not sincerein its supportof peacekeeping
or changes its policy over the course of the operation, the mission could be
doomed.25
In practice,the maintenanceof cooperationbetweenthe primarydisputantshas
not beena severeproblem.In both UNEF operationsEgyptwasgenerallycooper--ativewiththe peacekeepingforces.Israeldemonstrateda less cooperativeattitude,
but at no time did it initiateviolent opposition. The disagreementswereminor
disputesconcerningthe use of troops fromnationsthat did not recognizethe Israeli state. The other operationshad similarresults,as the host state(s)usually
didlittleto hinderthemission.In one instance,the CyprusNationalGuardblocked
accessto certainareas,but this problemwas short-lived.The majorexceptionto
this patternof cooperativebehaviorwas Israel'sactions towardUNIFIL. Israel
25 Of course,if the host stateformallywithdraws
consent,the peaceoperationis terminated.This
occurredin 1967as EgyptaskedUNEF I forcesto leave.Despitesome suggestionsto the contrary
by membersof the internationalcommunity,U Thantcompliedwith this request.See Jack Garvey,
"United Nations Peacekeeping and Host State Consent," American Journal of International Law 64
(April 1970):241-269.
500
| POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
initiallyrefusedto turn overterritorywherethe UNIFIL forceswouldpatrol.Its
subsequentbehavior,includingthe 1982invasion,showeda completedisregard
of the force and its mission.
Wetendto agreewith DavidWainhousethat "wherecooperationof the parties
is not sustainedand whole-hearted,a positiveresultwill be difficultto obtain."26
Nevertheless,the initiallevel of agreementneededto establishthe forcehas usually persisted;problemsfrom the primarydisputantshave not been empirically
importantin the failureof the missions.Our analysishas discoveredthat while
cooperationfrom the disputantsis a necessarycondition for success,it is not a
sufficientone. This is particularlyrelevantwhen the host state has a very weak
government.Although the Congolese governmentsupportedONUC, the split
amongfactionspreventedit fromfullyaidingthe operation.TheLebanesegovernment supportfor UNIFIL and MNF had little impactbecausethat government
did not have de facto control over the areaswherethe troops weredeployed.
ThirdParty States
Thirdpartyinterventioncan playa prominentrolein internationalconflict.Allies
of the conflictingpartiesmaytake certainactions(for example,supplyingarms,
diplomaticpressure)that may assist or hinderresolutionof the conflict. Peacekeepingoperationsaresubjectto thesesamebenefitsandconstraints.Neighboring
statesor regionalpowersmayhavea stakein the outcomeof the conflictandconsequentlymaytakeactionsin supportof or contraryto thegoalsof thepeacekeeping
mission.
Among our samplecases, five involvedsignificantinterventionby thirdparty
states.UNEF II was the only operationthat was not significantlyaffectedby the
actions of a thirdparty state. It may be coincidental,but this mission not only
keptthe peace,the conflictwasresolvedby treaty.The otheroperationsall experienced negativeeffects from the actions of other states.UNEF I was terminated
after Syriaand JordonpressuredEgyptinto joiningtheirmilitaryaction against
Israel.It is unlikelythatwithoutthatpressureEgyptwouldhaveexpelledthe peacekeepingforce and gone to war with Israelat that time. In the Congo, Belgium
encouragedthe secessionistmovement,andBelgianmercenaries
joinedin thearmed
struggle.A similarsituationoccurredin Cyprusas Turkeypromotedthe founding
of a secessionistTurkish-Cypriot
stateon the island.On variousoccasionsTurkey
also madethreatsagainstthe Greekmajoritythere.The peacekeepingoperations
wereseverelyjeopardizedor complicatedin each case.
Not surprisingly,the failedmissions(MNFand UNIFIL)facedstrongopposition fromneighboringstates.Syriaplayeda criticalrolein eachoperation'sdownfall. Syriasuppliedweaponsand other supportto PLO fightersin southernLeb26 David Wainhouse, International Peace Observation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1966), 557.
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS | 501
anon, helpingthem to infiltrateUNIFIL lines and attackIsraelipositions.Syria
opposedMNFthroughits alliesamongthe factionsin Beirut.It suppliedweapons
and pressuredthe Shi'iteand Druse factions not to accept a solution involving
the MNF.Thereis also some indicationthat Syria,Iran,and possiblyLibyahad
a hand in supportingterroristattacksagainstthe peacekeepingforces.Givenits
influencein Lebanon,Syriacould have been a positiveinfluencefor MNF, but
its actions werea major factor in the mission'sfailure.
It was difficultto detectanypositivepressurein supportof peacekeepingfrom
this kindof analysis.Thirdpartyinterventionwas primarilynegativeand proved
criticalin damagingcertainoperations.Yet,this noncooperationfromthirdparty
states is not automaticallyfatal to a mission. For example,UNFICYP survived
despitethe actions of Turkey.A peacekeepingoperationcan be destroyedif the
third party state encouragesviolence from another state of subnationalgroup
and/or undertakesviolenceitself. A largeportion of the blame for the UNIFIL
and MNF failuresmust be borne not by the primarydisputants,but ratherby
hostile third states.
SubnationalGroups
Justas otherstatesmightinfluencepeacekeepingoperations,so too mightsubnationalgroupsin the host or neighboringstates.Thebehaviorof thesegroupscould
be particularlyimportantwhen peacekeepingforcesare thrustinto areasof internal instability.Preventivediplomacymay be viewed unfavorablyby groups
seekingto topplethe governmentof the host state;preservationof peaceand the
status quo favorthe establishedgovernment.
Subnationalgroups played little role in either UNEF operation, but were
detrimentalin the other operations.The PLO never really acceptedUNIFIL,
claimingthatPalestinianshada rightto operatein the disputedarea.Consequently,
they smuggledweaponsinto UNIFIL'spatrolareaand launchedattacksagainst
Israelitargets.Followingthe 1982invasion,UNIFILhas continuedto havediffi-cultydealingwith uncooperativelocal militias,particularlythe South Lebanese
Army.ONUCfacedproblemsfromthe Katangaindependencemovementandvarious tribal groupsthat supportedfactional leadersin the centralgovernment.
Perhapsthe bestexampleof howsubnationalgroupscandestroya peacekeeping
operationis the tragedyof the MNF.Lebanonconsistedof a largenumberof competing factions, none of which actuallysupportedthe MNF presence.Even the
ChristianPhalangistswereless thanenthusiasticaboutthe operation,as theycontinuedbattleswith Moslemfactions.The Shi'iteand Drusefactionsopposedthe
MNF;theyfelt it wasa shieldfor the Gemayelgovernment.Partof theirdemands
for a resolutionto the conflict was a withdrawalof the peacekeepingforces.Terroristgroupswereat timesjust as damagingas those of thirdpartystates.When
those statesand subnationalgroupsactedin unisonto underminethe operation,
not even the supportof the host state could save the operation.
502 |
POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
Superpowers
An analysisof peacekeepingsuccessshould not ignorethe behaviorof another
groupof thirdparties-the superpowers.The UnitedStatesandthe SovietUnion
(alongwiththe otherthreepermanentmembersof the SecurityCouncil)havethe
powerto veto a resolutionthat initiallyauthorizesa UN peacekeepingoperation.
Becausethe initialauthorizationis usuallyfor a specifiedtime period,the operation and its mandatewill again be subjectto that powerif renewalis necessary.
Beyondtheirpowersin the UnitedNations, the superpowerscan use theirpolitical, economic,and militarypowerto influencethe actorsin the areaof conflict.
havethe potentialto rescueor destroypeacekeeping
In thesewaysthe superpowers
operations.
TheUnitedStateshas provedquitehelpfulto the causeof preventivediplomacy.
Itspoliticalsupportwasoftenthe drivingforcebehindthe creationof peacekeeping
operations.Later,the UnitedStatesprovidedlogisticalsupportand othervoluntary contributionsto keep the operationsrunningsmoothly.Its supportof the
MNF troops,throughthe bombingof suspectedterroristbases, provedcounterproductive,becauseit increasedhostilityagainstthe operation.The SovietUnion
wasreluctantto offer politicaland financialsupportfor ONUCand otheroperations, but demonstratedlittle active oppositionin the way of militaryaction or
vetoingresolutions.It did resupplySyriaduringthe MNF'soperationand vetoed
a resolutionauthorizinga UN forceto replaceMNF.Yet,the MNF wastoo badly
damagedalreadyto say that the Soviets'actions weredecisive.
It is easy to attributea greatdeal of influenceto the superpowersin any area
of worldpolitics.Nevertheless,in the UN peacekeepingoperationsstudiedhere,
theiractualinfluencewaslessthanconventionalwisdommightpredict.Thesuperpowersclearlyplayedan importantrole in settingup some of theseoperations.27
Of particularnote wastheirabilityto haltthe 1973MideastwarandinstallUNEF
II forces.The successof the operationsonce in place,however,was only marginallyaffectedby superpowerbehavior.At best, theyhelpedsupplythe operations
and gavethem some politicalsupport.At worst,they complicatedan operation's
-efficiencyand increasedits controversy.The superpowershavea greatpotential
to do good or harm to peacekeeping.While their behaviormust be considered
in any evaluationof peacekeeping,we have found that thus far, their actualinfluence has been overrated.
CONCLUSIONS
Internationalpeacekeepinghas had a mixedrecordof successoverthe past thirty
years.The main reasonfor the failureof peacekeepingoperationshas been the
27 NathanPelcovitsandKevinKramer,"LocalConflictandU.N. Peacekeeping:
TheUsesof ComputerizedData,"InternationalStudiesQuarterly20 (December1976):533-552,reportsa strongcorrelationbetweensuperpowerinterventionin a conflictand the use of peacekeeping.Thisdemonstrates
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS |
503
opposition of third party states and subnational groups. By refusing to stop violent activity and in some cases attacking the peacekeeping forces, these two sets
of actors can undermine a whole operation. The failure of UNIFIL and MNF
can be attributed to this as can many of the problems encountered by other operations. This leaves us with something of a tautology: peacekeeping is succesful only
when all parties wish to stop fighting. Peacekeeping forces can do certain things
(remain neutral) to ensure that desire for peace continues. Nevertheless, peacekeeping will fail or be severelydamaged if peace is not initially desiredby all parties.
Although the primary disputants and the superpowers each had a great deal
of power to destroy a peacekeeping operation, our study revealedthat neither group
generallytook strong action in opposition to the operation. To set up a peacekeeping
force, the host state(s) must grant its (their) approval, indicating some desire to
stop fighting. If the peacekeeping force was organized by the United Nations, the
Security Council would likely have to approve it; superpower acquiescence is the
minimum requirementfor this. Therefore, once a peacekeeping operation is authorized, there is already confirmation that it is not opposed by the primary disputants or the superpowers. Operations opposed by either of these two groups will
likely never come into being.
The internal characteristics of a peacekeeping operation were generally found
to have a relatively minor impact on the mission's success. A clear mandate was
useful, but hardly critical in determining the outcome. When the mandate was
vague, the underlying political consensus was already shaky, and the mission experienced support problems with the various interested parties. The same conclusion is appropriate with respect to the financing and organization of the peacekeeping force. Problems with funding and command structure served to make the
operation less efficient, but not necessarily less successful. Budget deficits were
ameliorated by voluntary contributions or ignored. Command and control difficulties were never serious enough to jeopardize any of the operations.
IWo aspects of the operations did have an impact on their success: geography
and neutrality.Peacekeeping operations performed best when their areas of deployment adequately separated the combatants, were fairly invulnerable to attack, and
permitted easy observation. The absence of these conditions undermined confidence in the operation and allowed minor incidents to escalate. The neutrality of
the peacekeeping forces was also significant. If the peacekeeping force is perceived
as biased, support from interested parties was likely to be withheld or withdrawn.
As we have seen, this is enough to ruin the operation. Neutral behavior is not always
linked with nonaligned force composition. The likelihood, however, that a force
composed from nonaligned countries will take action favoring one party (or be
perceived as doing so) is much less.
From these findings, we can draw a few guidelines regardingthe use of a preven-
that the superpowers are also an indirect stimulus for peacekeeping operations, beyond their more
direct role in the UN Security Council.
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1 POLITICAL
SCIENCE
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tive diplomacy strategy.28Peacekeeping is most appropriate in a conflict in which
all parties are willing to halt hostilities and accept a peacekeeping force. Consideration must be given to more than just the primary disputants; other interested
states and subnational groups deserve attention. If these latter two actors oppose
the operation, then the peacekeeping option might be reconsidered unless the opposition is minor or would not involve violent activity. This criterion may confine
peacekeeping operations to conflicts that involve relativelyfew actors, for the probability of consensus will decrease as the number of interested parties increases.
Implementation by an international organization is to be preferred to a multilateral grouping of nations. The UN in particular now has extensive experience
with peacekeeping and is more likely to conduct an efficient operation. More importantly, however, an international organization will be better able to acquire
consent from the host state(s) and approval from interested parties.29It is not that
a multinational peacekeeping force cannot suceed, but rather problems with perceived bias (justified or otherwise) will be more likely and its moral authority will
not be as great.
Once it has been established that the relevantactors will support a peacekeeping
operation, the UN command should give special attention to taking a proper geographic position, as well as continuing its policy of neutral force composition.
Although the issues of mandate, financing, and command should not be ignored,
neither should problems with them hold up the operation.
The findings of this study do more than confirm conventional wisdom about
peacekeeping, although in some cases they do that too. The importance of the
mandate and the role of the superpowers is considerably less than has been assumed. Analysts have also probably overestimated the importance of the primary
disputants and the operation's command structure once there is an agreed-upon
cease-fire. Yet, as is prominent in the literatureon conflict and peacekeeping, the
importance of third parties, neutrality, and geography is reaffirmed. Regardless
of whetherthe guidelines laid down here conform to prior expectations about peacekeeping, they bear repetition. We know that policy makers too often ignore or
forget these guidelines, with the MNF being the most recent example of neglect.
According to these guidelines, the number of peacekeeping operations would be
limited, but the rate of success should be positively affected.
28 Althoughwe look at peacekeeping
operationsas presentlyconstituted,therehavebeen many
proposalsforimprovement.
Representative
of theseeffortsandideasareIndarJit Rikhye,TheTheory
andPracticeof Peacekeeping
(NewYork:St. Martin'sPress,1984);andAlastairTaylor,"Peacekeeping:
Affairs,Peacekeeping:
International
TheInternational
Context"in CanadianInstituteof International
ChallengeandCanadianResponse(Ontario:CanadianInstituteof InternationalAffairs,1968),1-40.
29 Certain
nations,suchas IsraelandSouthAfrica,mayobjectto peacekeepingoperationsdirected
by the UnitedNations,becauseof the perceivedbias of thatinstitutiontowardtheirinterests.In that
event,a multinationalforcemaybe moreappropriate.In general,however,its advantagesovera UN
forceareminimal.See FrankGregory,TheMultinationalForce:Aid or Obstacleto ConflictResolution, ConflictStudy,no. 170, Institutefor the Study of Conflict (London:EasternPress, 1984).
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS | 505
Is PeacekeepingAppropriatefor Civil Instability?
It is clear that "peacekeeping has been less problematic and generally operated
more smoothly when the danger has arisen from the threat to the peace by external aggression."30For two reasons, peacekeeping is most successful when two
nation-states are the only protagonists. First, it is much easier to gain agreement
between two sets of interests than among many more. Second, peacekeeping forces
are better able to monitor the behavior of only two parties separated by identifiable boundaries. Civil instability may involve many groups operating freely within
their own country. In this way, the peacekeeping strategy is best applied to interstate conflict involving two nations.
Peacekeeping is not impossible in civil conflict, but there are certain hurdles
to its successful use under those conditions. Peacekeeping tends to favor the challenged government. A cease-fire halts pressure on the government and may win
it political capital with a populace longing for stability. Peace means continued
domination bythe status quo elites in the eyes of rebel groups. Unless that perception can be changed, subnational groups will view the peacekeeping operation as
hostile to their interests. Unfortunately, some operations (ONUC and MNF) have
included provisions for strengthing the central government in their mandate. Before a peacekeeping force is sent to an area of civil internal unrest, it must have
at least the tacit acceptance of relevant subnational groups there. To do this, its
mandate should not include functions that give any advantage to the challenged
government. This will be quite difficult without losing the approval of the central
government. Agreement will also be complicated as the number of contending
parties increases. Sometimes, it may be almost impossible to patrol areas where
many different groups operate,much less balance competing interestsamong them.
Peacekeeping encounters certain problems when applied to civil strife. Success
is still possible, but it will be much more difficult. Under these guidelines, the
number of civil conflicts appropriate to preventive diplomacy will be few. The alternative, however, is the certainty of problems and the high probability of failure.
Does PeacekeepingPromote Conflict Resolution?
Some of the peacekeeping operations studied here preventedviolence successfully,
but only one facilitated the peaceful resolution of the underlying conflict; UNEF
II was terminatedafter the implementation of the Camp David Accords. The breakthrough between Egypt and Israel can be explained by reference to the leadership
of Anwar Sadat and the intervention of the United States, rather than the efforts
of UNEF II. UNEF II surely aided the process by helping prevent military conflict, but overall its role was comparatively small.
30
AzinnaNwafor,UnitedNations Useof ArmedForcesin InternalWarConditionsfor theMain-
tenanceof InternationalStability,Ph.D diss., Universityof Michigan,(Ann Arbor: UniversityMicrofilms,
1970), 47.
506 |
POLITICAL SCIENCE
QUARTERLY
Otherevidencesuggeststhat peacekeepingmay havea detrimentalimpacton
negotiationsfor resolutionof the conflict.Peacekeepingremovesmuchof the pressurefroma conflictsituation.Thismayalloweachsideto cool off, but moreoften
it has takenawaythe immediateneed for a resolution.Partiesno longerfeel compelledto solve the conflict in a rapidfashion.As a result,they may hardentheir
positionsand refuseto makethe concessionsthat often come with a need to resolve a crisis.31The statusquo underpeacekeepingalso may becomea desirable
outcomeitself for the parties;it offers a halt to the fightingwithoutloss of face.
Nationscan still hold out the hopethatthe internationalenvironmentwill change
and their goals will be achieved.UNEF I lasted elevenyearsunderjust such a
hope.UNFICYPis nowin its twenty-fourth
year,andthereareno signsthatnegotiations will soon lead to an agreement.
Peacekeepingcan apparentlydo little beyondoffering a halt to the fighting.
Attemptsto tie thepeacekeeping
operationto the negotiationprocessmaybe proven
to be counterproductive.
Focuson the peacekeepingoperationmay overshadow
the mediationefforts.32Controversyoverthe conductof the operationcould also
poison the negotiations.33On the other hand, a failureat mediationmight adverselyaffect the peacekeepingcomponent.
Thereare no easy solutions to this apparentdilemma.As long as preventing
bloodshedis a top priority,peacekeepingwill continueto be a viable meansof
internationalintervention.Scholarsand diplomatsmust devise new means of
resolvingunderlyingconflict once the violence is stopped.
Some Final Notes
Weoffera fewcaveatsandconsiderationson this analysisof preventivediplomacy.
We are limitedin anticipatinghow and wherethe peacekeepingstrategymight
be appliednext.The superpowersdid not playa criticalrolein the five UN operations studiedhere,but this is not to saythat they can not or will not in the future.
In addition,a multinationaloperationsponsoredby nonalignedcountries(such
31 Timepressure
is positivelyassociatedwithcomingto an agreementas canbe seenin DavidBrookmireand FrankSistrunk,"TheEffectsof PerceivedAbilityand Impartialityof Mediatorsand Time
Pressureon Negotiation,"Journalof ConflictResolution24 (June 1980):311-327;see also Samuel
Journalof
Komoritaand MarcBarnes,"Effectsof Pressuresto ReachAgreementin Bargaining,"
Personality
andSocialPsychology13(November1969):245-252;andDeanPruittandDouglasJohnson,
"Mediation as an Aid to Face Saving in Negotiation," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
14 (March1970):239-246.
32 Wainhouse,
InternationalPeaceObservation,arguesthatthe mediationandpeacekeepingfunctionsarebestcombinedwherethe generalprinciplesof a politicalsettlementhavealreadybeenagreed
upon and the chief problemis implementation.
33 The agreement
to stationpeacekeepingtroopscan be an importantbuildingblockto an overall
agreement.Yet,if one nationbelievesthat the otheris not livingup to the peacekeepingagreement
or is in some waymanipulatingthe peacekeepingforce,it may refuseto seriouslynegotiateon the
other issues;see FredIkle, How Nations Negotiate(New York:Praeger,1964).
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS |
507
as Finland or Sweden) may offer a more desirable alternative than those offered
here. Without empirical referents, such a judgment is premature. The future may
breed new variations of peacekeeping that overcome the difficulties cited. It is
our sincere hope that it does.
Finally, we have seemed to imply that no peacekeeping operation is better than
an unsuccessful one. But, is this really correct? If peacekeeping can halt fighting
and stop bloodshed, even for a short time, is this enough to justify a peacekeeping
operation? The answer requires a value judgement. How a failed mission affects
future operations is an empirical question. Both deserve serious consideration.*
*Anearlierversionof this articlewas presentedat the annualmeetingof the AmericanPolitical
ScienceAssociation,NewOrleans,1985.Theauthorwouldliketo thankStevenElliott,RoaldHazelhoff, StephenMcKelvey,TuanCheng,MasakiSato, and WilliamRicheyfor theirassistancein researchandBarclayWardandGaryBertschfor theircommentsandsuggestionson earlierdrafts.This
researchwas supportedin part by a grantfrom the Universityof GeorgiaResearchFoundation.