451
RIGHT International, 16 February 1980
Salt 2: from delay to decay?
IN the wake of the Afghanistan crisis
it has become clear just how short
of effective sanctions against the
Soviet Union the US (and indeed the
West as a whole) really is. In addition to cutting off wheat, high technology and athletes to the Soviet
Union (none of which is likely to
affect their capacity for foreign adventure), President Carter has been
forced to threaten the centrepiece of
the detente process—the Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks (Salt).
After seven years of negotiations it
now looks as though Salt 2 may never
become a reality. The US Senate has
been asked to delay (indefinitely) its
consideration of the Salt 2 treaty and
Backfire bomber (set at 30 a year by
a Soviet unilateral statement) or by
testing an ICBM with more than the
maximum number of warheads (ten)
permitted under Salt 2.
Many analysts have argued that if
the US were to go ahead with the
deployment of 200 MX mobile ICBMs
the Soviet Union would be induced to
break out of the Salt 2 multiple
independently t a r g e t e d
re-entry
vehicle (Mirv) restrictions around
1986—the time when Salt 2 would
have expired and MX become operational. With Salt 2 shelved the Soviet
Union may now attempt to make MX
deployment look futile to the US by
signalling its intent to MIBV its heavy
missiles to their maximum throw-
weight limit. Even staunch proponents
of MX are now beginning to argue
that its survivability in the face' of
massive Soviet attack could not be
assured without additional protective
measures—by this they mean antiballistic missile systems (ABMs).
In 1972 the US and Soviet Union
agreed to limit deployments of ABM
systems to two each—one around the
national capital and one around an
ICBM complex. (The US has since
deactivated its one ABM system.) The
ABM agreement did not, however,
prevent research and development
into new ABM systems and both the
US and USSR are known to have
made considerable progress in this
field since 1972.
The fate of Salt 2 looks bleak. The
chances of it ever coming to fruition
appear slimmer than ever. Nonetheless, this non-agreement has already
had profound effects on US strategic
policy and its influence may be far
from dead.
Having invested considerable political capital in Salt, President Carter
could not afford to see it falter on the
floor of t h e Senate. He appeased those
Senators who were not satisfied with
the small print of the agreement by
promising that its adoption would be
accompanied by substantial increases
in US defence expenditure. His
decision to proceed with MX must be
seen against this background. Having
bought into Salt 2, Carter may now be
faced with having to buy out of the
treaty.
If t h e Soviet Union does respond
to the shelving of Salt 2 by breaching
some of its provisions, and the
chances are that she will judge it
opportune to do this sooner rather
than later, then the clamour in the
US will be for countermeasures in
the form of ABM and the regeneration of the manned bomber. Should
this eventually occur the whole Salt
process would be in ruins. President
Carter in his State of the Union message spoke of the need for America
to maintain its position as the world's
most powerful nation at any price.
The price will indeed be high if a new
chapter in the strategic arms race is
about to unfold.
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According to White House aides,
the US is watching carefully for any
signs of a Soviet reaction to President
Carter's shelving of Salt 2. Under the
terms of the 1972 Interim Agreement
the Soviet Union is allowed to install
additional ICBMs and SLBMs only as
replacements for older missiles which
must be dismantled or destroyed
under agreed procedures. The Soviet
Union could now begin to deploy
additional IGRMs and SLBMs without
withdrawing earlier types. More
serious, the Soviet Union could opt
to signal to the US that it, too, thought
Salt 2 dead, by deliberately breaching
some of its provisions—either by increasing the production rate of the
Boeing's AGM-86B air-launched cruise missile has completed the required ten flights in the US Air
Force fly-off against the General Dynamics Tomahawk. The winning missile will be deployed on
B-52s—the airborne leg of the US strategic Triad
there are strong indications that a
combination of US domestic and international political factors as well as
technical considerations could turn delay into decay.
Though recent indications had been
more hopeful for President Carter, it
was never certain that the Senate
would ratify Salt 2 anyway. Rejection
of the agreement would have been a
grave and embarrassing blow for
Carter in an election year. There will
therefore be little if any incentive
for the White House to seek to revive
the faltering treaty, at least until the
November election is over (by which
time large elements of the treaty
package will be close to expiration).
One of the major arguments deployed by the pro-Salt lobby was that
the Treaty would help to redress the
Soviet superiority in overall numbers
of offensive missiles which was
formalised under the terms of the
Salt 1 Interim Agreement of 1972.
This agreement expired in October
1977 but both the US and the USSB
agreed to continue to abide by its
terms until the completion of Salt 2
agreement. Pentagon officials have
saidl that the US will continue to abide
by t h e provisions of the 1972 Interim
Agreement. But considerable pressure
is expected from within Congress for
the US to take unilateral action to
redress the ICBM imbalance.
A Chinese test pilot, receiving honours
from the Military Commission of the
CCP Central Committee, was cited as
having taken a "Chinese-made highspeed fighter for a test flight at more
than three times the speed of sound."
Saudi Arabia has purchased $350 million of support equipment and spares
for the 60 F-15s it has on order. This
order includes AIM-9 Sidewinder support items, fuel tanks and adapters
plus depot maintenance equipment.
An additional $70 million has been
spent on 14 spare engines and 71
spare engine modules for the F-15.
These are in addition to the previously approved 26 spare F-100 engines and 81 modules. The increase
in spares is to improve the readiness
of F-15s in Saudi service.
The sale of 84 refurbished A-4 Skyhawks to Malaysia has been approved,
but not officially announced, by the
US Government. The aircraft will
probably be ex-US Navy A4E and
TA4F models.