THE BREAKTHROUGH AT BUSAN
UN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT CONFERENCE
ISTANBUL, TURKEY - 22/23 MARCH, 2012
by
DAC Chair, J. Brian Atwood
The Human Development Report has contributed much to development thought over the years.
The development community awaits this annual UNDP report with great anticipation. It has
illuminated our understanding of such issues as civil society, gender equality, democratic
development and the need for reform in the Arab World. It has never feared to venture into
unexplored territory, and often has created pathways to new thinking and innovation.
A compendium of the UNDP flagship reports would reveal much about the history of the
development cooperation enterprise. Together with the World Bank’s World Development
Report and the OECD/DAC’s Development Cooperation Report, it clearly mirrors past trends in
development.
And because these reports often have attempted to look out beyond the horizon, it is fascinating
to examine through them, in retrospect, the many paradigm shifts that have influenced
development cooperation policies.
The modern history of development traces back to the Marshall Plan and the Point Four
Program. The term Point Four is a reference to President Truman’s 1948 inaugural address,
where he propounded the view that rich countries had an obligation to provide opportunities to
the poor of developing nations. In 1960, several donor nations followed suit by joining together
to form the Development Assistance Group, or DAG, which later became the Committee I chair
today.
Since that time, the evolution of development has been a subject of scholarly analysis and, quite
frankly, a process of trial and error. In the sixties we saw a focus on the “hierarchy of needs”
approach and the view that poor nations must exploit their comparative advantages, usually in
the form of natural resources. Some, including Paul Collier, have returned to this view, arguing
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that, if managed well, the exploitation of oil and other minerals can boost development.
Norway’s “Oil for Development“ program, for instance, has helped many new oil-producing
states turn their newfound wealth into development impact.
President Kennedy separated security-motivated assistance from development assistance,
creating the US Agency for International Development, an Agency I was later proud to lead as
Administrator. In this same period, many other nations created their development cooperation
agencies. Just last week I attended the 50th anniversary celebration of DANIDA, Denmark’s
development cooperation agency.
Yet after having learned that security and development do not often mix, we are now learning
that in some situations there is no development without security, and no security without
development.
In the 1970s the focus was on “basic human needs”, with much attention paid to the threat of
the world’s food production falling behind the need. With the subcontinent of South Asia very
much at risk, it became the focus of the “Green Revolution,” a transformation in agricultural
technology that saved millions of lives. In today’s global economy, we understand that
agricultural exports still can save a country from poverty. And we have learned that Western
subsidies, unregulated markets and production challenges can create market distortions, price
volatility and development setbacks.
The 1980s was a decade of structural adjustment. Near the end of the decade, economists were
promoting fiscal discipline, privatization and trade as part of what was called a Washington
Consensus. Yet just as we realized that one-size-fits-all structural adjustment was not a universal
recipe for success, we also learned that trade is not a panacea, and that small businesses and
new industries may need a degree of temporary protection.
During these decades, the development community focused on the volume of its assistance. At a
1967 meeting of the UN Committee on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the Group of 77
nations promoted an initiative to encourage the so-called rich countries to provide 1 percent of
their Gross National Product as development assistance to the poorer nations. As the description
of Official Development Assistance (ODA) evolved, the target for this more clearly defined flow
of resources became 0.7 percent. The DAC was given the responsibility to keep track of these
flows.
The fixation on volume continued well into the 1990s, with the 0.7 percent target becoming the
UN-endorsed volume target until this day. In 1996, the DAC released a report acknowledging the
importance of the 0.7 percent target, but also recommending specific goals for development In
“Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Cooperation,” a report that formed
the basis for the MDGs.
The “Shaping” report, and the subsequent setting of the Millennium Development Goals by the
United Nations, changed the behavior of donor nations and their partners. No longer would it
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suffice to measure volume alone. The new challenge of measuring results against goals caused
us all to focus on effectiveness, and led to a series of DAC-sponsored high-level forums on aid
effectiveness starting in 2003 in Rome. Later, in 2005, a set of effectiveness principles were
promulgated at a Forum in Paris; over time, these principles have been embraced by developing
countries and donors alike and have had a lasting impact.
The Paris Declaration—as the 2005 document is called—and the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action
constituted an important roadmap leading to the 2011 HLF-4 in Busan, Korea. Unlike previous
Forums, this summit was enthusiastically attended by developing nations, civil society and the
private sector, who were present in large numbers. What’s more, of the 160 nations represented
there, many had engaged their entire governments, not just their Planning or Finance Ministers,
or, in the case of donors, not just their Development Ministers.
Armed with a study showing that the Paris principles produced results when applied, and by a
survey showing that donors had not lived up to the commitments they had made under the Paris
Declaration, at Busan developing country partners were intent on strengthening their hand. The
new providers of assistance—the Chinese, Indians, Brazilians, Indonesians and South Africans—
took note.
In Busan, civil society and the private sector shared their experiences in developing countries
and lent their support to the outcome document, which contains a strong reaffirmation of the
role of democratic institutions, civil society, local government and parliaments. It also contains
the first ever Joint Statement and set of commonly agreed principles for enhancing and
expanding cooperation in development between the public and the private sector.
With the pressure on from many fronts and developing country partners taking charge, Busan
signaled the real end of dependency. Although ownership had been enshrined as a principle at
the Paris Forum, few developing country partners had attended that conclave. At Busan,
ownership was a cause taken up by all, including the powerful emerging economies.
Busan symbolizes what could be the most important paradigm shift in development over the
past 50 years. It does not yet signal an end of ODA, but it bridges the donor-recipient divide by
creating a partnership on level ground that will extend as far as the political will of partner
countries is prepared to take it. This agreement would have been unimaginable 50 years ago. It
represents the collective empowerment of the developing world. The DAC member states and
emerging economies are expected to contribute, but in the end, the success of Busan will be
determined by developing nations who wish to own their destiny.
Busan remains a promise. It must be fully implemented if it is to fulfill our highest aspirations.
We are now in the process of creating the Global Partnership for Effective Development
Cooperation, the “Partnership” described in the outcome document. Once fully implemented,
this is what we hope the Global Partnership will accomplish:
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1. It will put in place an equal and synergistic relationship with defined and differential
commitments among traditional donors, partner countries in the developing world,
providers of South-South cooperation, civil society and the private sector.
2. It will move the developing nations and their partners from a transactional aid
relationship to a transformational development relationship that will engage
governments at all levels and all departments within governments, as well as civil society
and the private sector. This should encourage donors to align their domestic policies with
their development policies to avoid incoherencies.
3. It will improve coordination at all levels and between all partners—including public and
private—reducing transaction costs and bringing more focus and less fragmentation of
effort at the country level.
4. It will empower developing countries to build the capacity to create strategic plans,
measure results, enforce coordination, request more transparency and monitor against
indicators that relate directly to their own strategies. Countries will be assisted in this
capacity-building endeavor by UNDP and other on-the-ground donors, and by regional
organizations.
5. It will create global indicators for those whose “differential commitments” require
monitoring, as well as a high-level, ministerial council that will oversee the system,
offering a forum for dialogue, maintaining the pressure to provide effective and coherent
development cooperation, and keeping alive the political momentum that Busan
produced.
6. It will facilitate complementarity among the efforts of South-South and North-South
cooperation partners and will encourage all providers to fulfill their respective
commitments to partner countries. In doing so, it will inspire an open and constructive
dialogue that will lead to better understanding of the goals of South-South and NorthSouth cooperation at the country level, and a stronger overall effort to achieve the
Millennium Development Goals. This dialogue should be seen as a pathway to 2015, as
well as a way to reaching agreement on new UN-endorsed goals for the development
community; in short, a pathway to a better future for those suffering in poverty.
This is the promise of Busan. We cannot afford now to rest on our laurels or to undervalue that
promise. Yes, Busan was a great breakthrough in the history of the development community. It
represents a collective voluntary commitment to change behavior and to reinvigorate our level
of effort. We have made a promise to the world’s poor and to our own global interests. We
cannot keep that promise if we revert to a polarized ideological debate over matters that are
relatively inconsequential.
Much of the early period to which I have alluded was colored by a Cold War that saw opposing
sides treat the developing nations as pawns in a security-driven political competition. That
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ideological war may have done more damage to the aspirations of the poor than did colonialism.
The combination of the two—colonialism and the Cold War—produced paternalism,
dependency and deep cynicism about the motives of those who offer assistance. Now we know
that development cooperation, above all, requires trust—a fundamental element that was
missing during the Cold War. But today we have another chance. Today we can appreciate that
we are all in this together. This is the spirit we felt in Busan, Korea.
There, we saw what development can accomplish. Once one of the poorest nations in the world,
Korea today is a member of the DAC. The symbolism of this development success infected all the
participants at Busan. The Korean Government was a wonderful host, just as the Turkish
Government is here in Istanbul.
The promise of Busan cannot be undervalued, for it is the promise to undertake a major effort to
reduce and finally eliminate the scourge of poverty. It is the ultimate promise of human
development—that every individual born into this world shall have the opportunity to fulfill her
or his potential as a human being.
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