ROUGE Estelle A. The Effectiveness of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan This paper evaluates the performance of the German, U.K. and U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) models regarding the three NATO-­ISAF objectives of facilitating development, strengthening governance and enhancing security. It suggests that the lead nations’ PRT structures, mission focuses and cooperation with other development actors in their provinces of operation are crucial factors influencing their overall effectiveness. In final, it assesses the U.K. model as the most successful with important characteristics that both U.S. and German PRTs could draw from. I. Introduction Following the United States-­‐led coalition’s removal of the Taliban regime from power in December 2001, the international community was left with the daunting task of reconstructing Afghanistan albeit precarious security conditions. In addition to al-­‐Qaeda and Taliban remnants still engaged in active insurgency, the degrading security situation also resulted from the resurgence of warlords and other local power-­‐holders, as well as from the booming drug trade (Eronen 2008, pp.7-­‐8; Gauster 2008, p.15). In light of these security challenges, the United Nations Security Council enacted resolution 1386 providing for the deployment of International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) to Kabul (McNerney 2005-­‐06, p.32). Yet, unwillingness from the U.S. which feared that the presence of such military assistance would clash with the imperatives of its ongoing counter-­‐insurgency and broader claims of incapacity to provide a sufficient number of troops for deployment across a territory as wide as Afghanistan, ISAF remained confined to the capital and its immediate surroundings (OECD 2009, p.20; Stapleton 2007, p.10). As a result, the United States began to devise alternatives and successively proposed to establish ‘Provincial Reconstruction Teams’ (Dziedzic and Seidl 2005, p.3; 3 October 2011 1 ROUGE Estelle A. Jackson and Gordon 2007, pp.648-­‐649). The underlying assumption behind implementing such concept was that it would reinforce the country’s reconstruction process by facilitating development activities and strengthening the Afghan government’s authority beyond Kabul. Indeed, PRTs were considered as a key means to achieve tangible results in development and governance, which would in turn translate into greater security (Stapleton 2007, p.11). In this essay, the idea is to take a closer look at the effectiveness of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in meeting these threefold goals since their establishment in early 2003. Analysing the success of PRTs in facilitating development, strengthening governance, and enhancing security at the local level in Afghan provinces will be done by comparing three very different models—the United States, Germany and the United Kingdom. The first part of this research will provide a brief overview of the PRT concept and of its plural dimension. The second section will examine the varying structures and mission focuses of the three PRT models in an effort to evaluate PRT performance in development and governance as well as PRT contributions to peace and security. Lastly, the conclusion will reiterate some of the major findings of this research and propose a few recommendations. II. A Multiplicity of Provincial Reconstruction Team Models To understand what PRTs are, the role they play in Afghanistan, and the challenges they suffer from, it is important to place them in the broader context of the international community’s perspective shift on peacekeeping missions. While the United States’ decision to establish PRTs in Afghanistan reinvigorated notions behind a support 3 October 2011 2 ROUGE Estelle A. concept it used in Vietnam, it also coincided with a broader reconsideration of traditional peacekeeping and state-­‐building in post-­‐conflict countries and disaster situations towards more integrated or comprehensive missions encompassing multiple agencies and a plurality of different actors under a single command (Degennaro 2011, p.85; Jackson and Gordon 2007, pp.647-­‐648). Comprising of both civilian personnel from a wide range of governmental agencies, development experts, and Afghan government representatives, as well as military officers from one or multiple nations, PRTs consist of an attempt to operate such integration. From their onset as part of the coalition’s ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’, these civil-­‐
military joint teams were poorly conceptualised (Lane and Sky 2006, p.47). At best there seems to have been a common initial standard of rather small units, ranging from about 50-­‐100 personnel and containing a disproportionate civil-­‐military ratio with army staff heavily outnumbering civilians (Stapleton 2007, p.11; Montgomery and Rondinelli 2004, p.195). From mid-­‐2003, they became gradually integrated within NATO-­‐controlled ISAF, which had by October 2006 successfully taken over responsibility for all PRTs. This shift in command failed to further provide PRTs with a formal organisational structure and clear mandate comprising of common operating principles and more narrowly defined objectives, which led to the adoption of different PRT models depending on contributing NATO countries’ respective priorities and resources. As Stapleton (2007, p.38) notes, this NATO takeover further contributed to ‘increasingly disparate PRT approaches due to the plethora of national leads, differing agendas and respective list of national caveats.’ 3 October 2011 3 ROUGE Estelle A. In the absence of a clear mandate, lead countries have developed PRT approaches tailored to their own domestic agendas (Perito, 2007). Except for general calls to spread ‘the ISAF effect’ without expanding ISAF itself and delimitating broad areas of operation, NATO contributing nations were left without a ‘detailed strategic plan (…) via which the PRTs were to reach their broadly stated objectives’ (Stapleton 2007, pp.1-­‐2). Moreover, lead nations retain the ability to decide on the organisational structure of their PRTs. Each country has the possibility to independently adjust the size and composition of their civil-­‐military unit as they wish. This has generated PRT models that vary extensively in terms of number of personnel, average of civilians and military components, as well as leadership command (Dziedzic and Seidl 2005, p.4; Sedra 2005, p.2; Eronen 2008, p.9). While such national flexibility is essential to meet local socio-­‐
economic, political and security conditions in a country as diverse as Afghanistan, it also leads to the formation of very different PRT models that do not possess the same capacity to perform their threefold mission. Depending on some of the national strategic decisions adopted, some models will enjoy greater overall effectiveness than others. Efforts were undertaken to bridge the gap and provide clearer guidance and oversight with the establishing of the PRT Executive Steering Committee in December 2004, PRT Terms of References in 2005 and with the enactment of a PRT handbook in 2006 (Runge 2008, p.12). Mechanisms such as conferences regrouping PRT leaders were also used to develop and communicate best practices and policy notes (Stapleton 2007, p.39). Yet, these attempts have not succeeded in forging a unified PRT policy. Today, the 16 nations responsible for the 27 PRTs spread throughout Afghanistan’s provinces continue to enjoy a high level of flexibility in delineating their units’ structures and functions. 3 October 2011 4 ROUGE Estelle A. III. Evaluating PRT Performances in Development, Governance and Security All Provincial Reconstruction Team models vary in their degree of involvement and success in facilitating development efforts, strengthening governance and enhancing peace and security. Indeed, there are sharp contrasts in the German, American and British models’ apprehension of their role to play and resulting effectiveness in bringing about positive change in these three fields. Primarily, the PRT models’ performance in regard to NATO-­‐ISAF broadly stated goals varies according to their intra-­‐unit efficiency—mainly in terms of civil-­‐military coherence—their pursued approach and goals, as well as their level of cooperation with other external actors working alongside them in their provinces of operation. III.i. Differing Structures and Civil-­‐Military Compositions Since the establishment of the first U.S.-­‐led PRT in Gardez in January 2003, American units have been characterised by an overwhelming military presence (Degennaro 2011, p.86). All American PRTs have generally followed a certain structural standard of a military commander leading some 80 military officers and 3-­‐5 civilian representatives from USAID, the Department of State and the Department of Agriculture. In comparison, the U.K. and German models first established in Mazar-­‐e Sharif in July 2003 and in Konduz in January 2004 comprised of about 100-­‐150 and 400 staff respectively, with a proportion of civilians ranging from 20-­‐30 for the former to 10-­‐20 for the latter (Eronen 2008, p.45; Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, p.5). While these don’t seem to reflect a better proportion of civilian components, British and German PRTs still provided for greater civilian presence within the units due to the civilian and joint civilian-­‐military command 3 October 2011 5 ROUGE Estelle A. they possessed. However, contrasting viewpoints remain in the literature in regards to the benefits of Germany’s inter-­‐ministerial approach under which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs selects a civilian head and the Ministry of Defense appoints a military commander to lead the unit together. While some see this double civil-­‐military command as further integrating both components in the unit, thereby allowing for greater coordination, others point out the strict division of responsibility that exists between the militaries and civilians within the PRT, with civilians living separately and acting independently in matters of development and governance. Discrepancies seem to exist between German ministries themselves, with some promoting a strict separation between the two components and others supporting a ‘whole of government’ approach (Runge 2008, p.13). Whatever the case in theory, it seems that in practice the German PRT is confronted to unbalanced numbers of military-­‐civilian staff with ‘civilian personnel complain(ing) perpetually of being sidelined by the military’ (Runge 2008, p.13). In the case of the United States with the military component dominating the whole PRT structure, civilian capacity to implement development and governance projects that failed to reflect military tones has been very weak. Indeed, financial and human resources have largely benefited the military components of U.S. PRTs rather than civilians and thus contributed to further altering the civil-­‐military balance ratio in favour of the military. Firstly, U.S.-­‐led units have had a hard time combining financial resources with large amounts of funds flowing to the military within the PRT to the detriment of the civilian counterpart. Both the Defence Department’s Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid and the Commander’s Emergency Response Program, which provide U.S. PRTs with the available funds to pursue development and 3 October 2011 6 ROUGE Estelle A. governance projects, have contributed to empowering the military thereby impeding on the civilians’ overall ability to carry out activities on their own (Hernandorena 2007, pp.144; Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, p.9). Secondly, the U.S. Department of State has encountered difficulty in recruiting civilians to work in PRTs. On one hand, it has become hard to find civilians willing to work in Afghanistan due to the location of U.S. PRTs in high-­‐risk areas of the country. Many civilians refuse to commit to long-­‐term missions leading to their recruitment for shorter tours of duty that aren’t necessarily the most appropriate to achieve best results as they hinder the continuity of projects (Azarbaijani-­‐Moghaddam et al. 2008, p.44; Adams 2009, p.17). This has been equally noticed in German PRTs with civilians only agreeing to three months short term rounds, which prevent them from leading and completing any significant development projects, as well as ‘understand(ing) local politics and distinguish(ing) relatively good from relatively bad actors’ to strengthen effective and legitimate government institutions in the eyes of the local Afghan population (McNerney 2005-­‐06, p.40). Even when civilians have been assigned to U.S. PRTs they have remained highly dependent on the militaries to operate, which has significantly impeded on their overall ability to conduct projects in development and governance (Eronen, p.36). In effect, USAID and other civilian representatives within U.S. PRTs rely on direct military assistance for both their security and access to areas of operation (Azarbaijani-­‐Moghaddam et al. 2008, p.52). As they tend to not leave PRT headquarters often, it has happened that the local Afghan population is not even aware of either their presence or role (Degennaro 2011, p.86). On another hand there have been increasing criticism directed towards the inability of the U.S. State Department, USAID and other civilian agencies to provide skilled civilian personnel. Often, civilians who join PRTs are junior officers with a lack of practical skills, limited knowledge of their role to play and dynamics present in the field, which 3 October 2011 7 ROUGE Estelle A. exacerbate civil-­‐military tensions and incoherence within the unit (Hernandorena 2007, pp.143-­‐144; Perito, 2007). While efforts have been undertaken in the last few years to ‘civilianise’ US PRTs by strengthening the civilian component and their decision-­‐making influence within the units, a strong military dominance still prevails over embedded civilian representatives (Azarbaijani-­‐Moghaddam et al. 2008, p.77). These challenges encountered by the U.S. and to a lesser extent, German PRTs, have been successfully dealt with by Britain. Indeed, British PRTs fall under a multi-­‐agency approach combining the Ministry of Defense, Department for International Development, and Foreign and Commonwealth Office operating with a high degree of coherence, which in turn translates into great coordination at the field level between PRT militaries and civilians (Eronen 2008, p.21; Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, p.16). Britain handled the issue of disparate sources of PRT funding better than the U.S. through the establishment of a ‘Stabilization Fund’ supervised by all three key ministries (Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, p.8). More than comprising of a good PRT civil-­‐military structural composition and common civil-­‐military sources of funding, Britain invests heavily in mission preparedness before deployment to the provinces of Afghanistan in comparison to Germany and the United States. Prior to an operation, Britain’s Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit conducts assessments of the needs of the given Afghan province with both civilian and military personnel. For example, before establishing the current British PRT in Lashkar Gah, Helmand province, in May 2006, a joint civil-­‐military team visited the future area of operation ‘to identify objectives and delineate tasks’ (Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, p.7). British military troops and civilian representatives also follow joint training and deploy together. Undertaking such pre-­‐deployment planning and exercises resulted in the PRT personnel’s understanding of their role to play, higher 3 October 2011 8 ROUGE Estelle A. civilian and military preparation for working together and greater awareness of their mission’s joint objectives. The U.S. and other lead nations have now began to take measures to ‘heighten situational awareness’ by hiring anthropologists and other experts but this mechanism remains somehow limited as it fails to provide any clearer guidelines and team deployment policies similar to Britain’s meticulous joint civil-­‐
military planning (Stapleton 2007, p.40; Azarbaijani-­‐Moghaddam et al. 2008, p.69). III.ii. Contrasting Approaches and Objectives From the beginning, American PRTs have been committed to implementing development and governance projects that follow and reinforce their counter-­‐
insurgency objectives of achieving stability and security rather than remaining truly dedicated to the long-­‐term reconstruction of Afghanistan’s provinces (Katzman 2011, p.37). In line with this national counter-­‐insurgency mindset, U.S. PRTs have primarily engaged in minor development and governance activities through quick-­‐impact projects aimed at showing immediate visible results to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of the local Afghan population (Eronen 2008, p.17; Gauster 2008, p.36; Sedra 2005, p.1&3). Winning over the local population with rapid and easily identifiable development and governance improvements was and is still considered vital to facilitate the garnering of valuable intelligence information to defeat the insurgency (Stapleton 2007, p.12). In addition to enhancing counter-­‐insurgency objectives, quick-­‐impact projects were also designed to extend the reach and legitimacy of the Afghan central government to the countryside (Gauster 2008, pp.21-­‐22). In practice, such projects have included the construction of government buildings, schools, hospitals, as well as the rebuilding of transportation and communication infrastructure (Adams 2009, p.12). Delivering services to the population 3 October 2011 9 ROUGE Estelle A. in these forms was seen as a mechanism which could reinforce favourable Afghan sentiments in regards to the U.S. presence, the local administration and by extension, to Kabul (Runge 2008, p.10; Sedra 2005, p.1). Yet, such short-­‐term projects haven’t proven very successful in strengthening central Afghan governance with foreign actors being ‘overwhelmingly credited with delivering services, rather than the government‘ (OECD 2009, p.11). In some cases, U.S. PRTs have even worsened local governance conditions and contradicted their own position in the eyes of the Afghan population. In their effort to strengthen Kabul’s capacity by supporting local authorities and incorporating them in the delivery of services, U.S. PRTs have sometimes sided with corrupted leaders rather than effectively worked towards removing them from power. Failure to hold these officials accountable for their action continues to fuel the central government’s dysfunctional mechanisms and undermine the establishment of the rule of law (Rubin 2006, p.20). By acting as such, ‘the PRT becomes an unwitting partner in crime, sustaining culture of graft because there is no other alternative with which to deal’ (Bebber 2008, p.10). More importantly, this pursued stabilising approach has failed to improve security conditions in the provinces in which it was implemented. Focusing extensively on reconstruction activities as a means to enhance security impeded on U.S. PRTs’ direct commitment to security activities. Aside from strong force protection and some successful capacity building of the Afghan National Army (ANA), U.S. PRTs did not invest much attention and resources in direct peace and security concerns. The problem with following such strategy was that it became clear that ‘no amount of development (would) improve security conditions’ (Foust, 2011). The overall security situation in the Afghan provinces supervised by U.S. PRTs remains highly volatile and even deteriorated significantly 3 October 2011 10 ROUGE Estelle A. between 2003 and 2010 despite an increase in reconstruction projects (Sedwill, 2011; Gauster 2008, p.58; Adams 2009, p.13). Although Germany and Britain have both also undertaken a series of quick-­‐impact projects, the tendency to resort to these short-­‐term measures has remained limited in comparison to the United States (Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, p.12; Runge 2008, p.15; Eronen 2008, p.23). Germany has also concentrated on reconstruction yet with a focus towards achieving more long-­‐term sustainable results (Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, p.5; Gauster 2008, p.24). While German PRTs effectively facilitated and implemented long-­‐
term development and governance activities, and successfully contributed to security projects such as supporting the disarmament process and training the Afghan National Police (ANP), their overall role in security has remained largely confined to force protection (Eronen 2008, p.18). Accordingly, many scholars have criticised German PRTs’ limited performance in enhancing overall security by pointing out that they could have been more efficient had they not self-­‐restricted themselves. Due to self-­‐imposed restraints on the use of their military capabilities, German units failed to tackle the issue of drug trafficking properly and kept from intervening in acts of violence occurring in their provinces of supervision (Gauster 2008, p.27; Dorronsoro 2009, p.19). As a result of the limited scope of action of German PRT militaries, the ‘stabilization of the security situation in northern Afghanistan (…) has generally not been successful’ (Runge 2008, p.13). In contrast to both the American and German PRT models, Britain has remained closer to the initial NATO-­‐ISAF PRT mission guidelines, which intended PRTs to act as ‘development facilitator(s)’ providing support for projects undertaken by regular 3 October 2011 11 ROUGE Estelle A. Afghan and international development agencies and only engage directly in small-­‐scale reconstruction as a means to fill the void in areas inaccessible to such actors (Adams 2009, p.10). Although the current British PRT in Helmand also resorts to quick-­‐impact projects, the previous British PRT in Mazar-­‐e Sharif remained true to the limited role proscribed in these original recommendations, primarily facilitating development and institution building by enhancing peace and security rather than conducting physical reconstruction projects itself. In this sense, Britain pursued and continues to somehow follow a strategy opposed to the U.S. one, according to which peace and security become essential preconditions for a successful reconstruction to take place. As such, Britain’s security imperatives go beyond the United States and Germany’s mere force protection, technical and material support for and training of the Afghan security forces. More than consolidating government institutional structures, the British PRT remains committed to increasing security sector reform through the disarming, demobilisation and reintegration of illegal armed groups, assisting in the building and training of the ANA and ANP, strengthening the legal system and supporting counter-­‐narcotics programs (Gauster 2008, p.28; Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, p.44). Although the prime goal of PRTs aren’t to engage in combat operations, all three models have established small, armed teams to patrol throughout their respective provinces of operation. While the U.S. and German ones have yet to show results, the Mobile Observation Teams of the British PRT in Mazar-­‐e Sharif successfully mediated and defused skirmishes and major fighting between local Afghan groups. As such, it has been said that the British PRT’s ‘presence alone (…) deterred militant attacks and the outbreak of large-­‐scale factional clashes’, thereby increasing peace and security (Sedra 2005, p.3). Even if challenges such as converting poppy fields into alternative crops without increasing instability remain, 3 October 2011 12 ROUGE Estelle A. government structures have been strengthened and overall security in provinces falling under British control more or less stabilised or increased (Gauster 2008, p.48&52). III.iii. Varying Levels of Cooperation With Foreign and Afghan Development Actors The decision of the United States to allow its PRTs to extend their role in reconstruction further than the NATO-­‐ISAF originally intended, has had profound consequences for the model’s overall effectiveness. Indeed, the bulk of U.S. quick-­‐impact projects were established without consulting and cooperating with neither the Afghan government and other local development actors, nor with foreign non-­‐governmental and international organisations working alongside PRTs in the field. This lack of consultation and cooperation has seriously impeded on their capacity to bring about the positive effects expected. As previously noted, U.S. PRTs’ quick-­‐impact projects reflected the United States’ own counter-­‐insurgency agenda rather than national Afghan priorities or the local community’s needs. In many instances, U.S. PRT militaries provided aid conditionally, forcing local Afghans to provide information on the insurgency (Sedra 2005, p.3). An example includes ‘the handing out of leaflets in Zabul province tying the provision of humanitarian aid to receiving information on armed oppositional forces’ (Runge 2008, p.19). Getting involved in development projects for such political purposes created significant tensions both within U.S. units themselves with civilians disagreeing over the military component’s priorities, and between the PRTs and the broader assistance community, who worried about the increasing blurring of civil-­‐military responsibilities (Olson 2007, p.19). NGOs and other international organisations became preoccupied 3 October 2011 13 ROUGE Estelle A. with their development efforts being associated with those of the PRT militaries as such assimilation could impede on their safety (Jackson and Gordon 2007, p.649). This PRT militarisation of aid jeopardised the core humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality, which ensured their very own security (Perito, 2007; Stapleton 2007, p.24; Katzman 2011, p.37). Following the killing of five of its employees and in light of PRT proliferation encroaching on the humanitarian space of civilian workers, Médecins sans Frontières withdrew its staff from Afghanistan in June 2004 (Eronen 2008, p.32; Stoddard and Harmer 2005, p.14). More than instrumentalising aid for political purposes, U.S. PRTs’ quick-­‐impact projects were considered to be of poor quality, practically undertaken by contractors who produced substandard work (Perito, 2007; OECD 2009, p.13). Such projects also failed to be integrated with the Afghan government and provincial leaders’ development plans, thereby generating long-­‐term sustainability issues (Adams 2009, p.12). In many cases, Kabul remained incapable of financially maintaining the newly built infrastructure and of providing the necessary skilled staff required for schools and hospitals to function upon completion (Eronen 2008, p.27; Perito, 2007). As a result of being poorly aligned with Afghanistan’s central government and local representatives, many U.S.-­‐run projects inscribed themselves in ‘a parallel development strategy’ counterproductive to local and nationally based development (Stapleton 2007, p.23). The same can be said of German reconstruction activities, which undermined the important principle of local ownership. Instead of building local governance capacity, German PRTs’ large reconstruction projects proved insufficiently integrated with the Afghan government’s development strategy and threatened to form an alternate power centre by ‘increasingly replac(ing) the weak government structures in the provinces’ (Gauster 2008, p.42). In addition to 3 October 2011 14 ROUGE Estelle A. lacking expertise to conduct development work and substantial training ‘to assess the long-­‐term capacity of the local population to sustain their projects’ U.S. PRTs failed to consult specialised agencies working alongside them in the provinces, which resulted in redundant assessments and projects that duplicated their efforts (Dziedzic and Seidl 2005, p.9; Adams 2009, p.15). In contrast to U.S. PRTs, both British and German PRTs successfully avoided duplicating the efforts of civilian organisations by establishing strong consultative and cooperative mechanisms with them. To a large extent, German PRTs support local and international development agencies’ projects and try to coordinate with international and national assistance actors when directly involved in the execution of projects. Britain even went a step further by consulting international agencies and NGOs prior to establishing its PRTs in Mazar-­‐e Sharif and Lashkar Gah, and restricting its direct involvement in their sectors of activities to focus on security (Stapleton 2007, p.16; Eronen 2008, p.32). By taking such a restrained approach regarding reconstruction, British PRTs ensured that they avoided replicating the work of civilian agencies and diminished the risks of Afghan confusion over civil-­‐military responsibilities. As a result, they were able to gain high acceptance from civilian organisations and even became considered as ‘the closest approximation of a well-­‐built provincial reconstruction team’ (Eronen 2008, p.25). IV. Conclusion When looking back at the U.S. PRT model’s performance in development and governance throughout these past nine years, it becomes clear that it has clearly failed to extend the reach of the Afghan central government and not contributed to significant 3 October 2011 15 ROUGE Estelle A. improvements in development beyond minor reconstruction projects. By pursuing counter-­‐insurgency imperatives through its reconstruction efforts, the United States has in many instances even done more harm than good. Instead of re-­‐boosting Afghan sentiment for the coalition and legitimacy for Hamid Karzai’s government, many studies report that U.S. PRTs’ reconstruction work in fact provoked negative Afghan reactions vis-­à-­vis both U.S. forces and Afghan governance. Thanks to their actions, U.S. PRTs also came to enjoy poor reputation with national and international development actors working alongside them, who increasingly came to fear for their safety. Yet this poor performance has somehow being tone down by U.K. PRTs and to a lesser extent, German PRTs, which have brought some positive results in both spheres of influence. Their strength has lied in their ability to minimise the reconstruction challenges of work quality, sustainability and duplication by effectively consulting and cooperating with national and international assistance agencies. More importantly, the United Kingdom’s PRT structure favorising strong intra-­‐unit civil-­‐military coordination and initial mission focus prioritising security over reconstruction activities have proven essential elements to generate positive feedback. Choosing to conform to PRT guidelines by restraining from directly engaging in reconstruction activities has avoided an unnecessary blurring of civil-­‐military roles and associated problems, leading development actors to greatly appreciate and support such PRT model. Although PRTs weren’t defined and structured to operate as combat teams supplementing ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ or ISAF troops, there is still much else they could have done to enhance peace and security in their respective provinces. U.S. PRTs could have played a stronger role in peace and security matters had they not rendered such important concerns, a secondary affair. Scholarly criticism hasn’t spared 3 October 2011 16 ROUGE Estelle A. German PRTs either, primarily pointing out their unwillingness to use military capabilities to dissolve local fighting. As a result of this lack of U.S. attention and German self-­‐restrictions, the security situation in their respective provinces has remained extremely volatile, and in some cases, even deteriorated. These poor contributions to peace and security should nevertheless be toned down in light of the three PRT models’ success in building the capacity of the Afghan security forces. At the time transition of responsibility—from ISAF to Afghan authorities—is taking place, and until such process is completed, it might be wise for lead nations to renew their PRTs’ mission objective towards improving security rather than undertaking reconstruction activities. Taking into account the first U.K. PRT model’s greater effectiveness in all three areas of influence, Germany and the United States should make it a priority to duplicate its civilian-­‐oriented structure and well-­‐intended mission focus by reorienting their units towards supporting security sector reform until Afghan forces become able to fill such role on their own. 3 October 2011 17 ROUGE Estelle A. V. Bibliography Abbaszadeh, N., Crow, M., El-­‐Khoury, M., Gandomi, J., Kuwayama, D., MacPherson, C., Nutting, M., Parker, N. & Weiss, T. 2008, ‘Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations’, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, pp. 3-­‐52. 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