A Gateway to the Americas:
Ecuador's 'Policy of Open Doors' as
a Natural Experiment
Luisa Feline Freier, PhD candidate
London School of Economics and Political Science
Prepared for delivery at the International Political
Science Association XXII Congress, Madrid
July 8 to 12, 2012
1
The contemporary nation state-system is characterized by a fundamental paradox:
most people have the right to leave their countries of origin, but very few can freely
move to their preferred countries of destination. An asymmetric distribution of travel
freedom divides citizens of wealthy and free states concentrated in the Northern
hemisphere and citizens of poor and repressive states concentrated in the Southern
hemisphere, who face increasing restrictions to reach their preferred destinations in
North America and Europe. The uneven distribution of global opportunities and
travel freedom raises the question of the impact of immigration policies, not only of
preferred destination countries but also of third countries, on global migration
patterns. This paper examines changes in Ecuador’s visa policy as a quasiexperiment to test the impact of the liberalization of immigration policies of a Latin
American country on South-South migration from Africa*. The findings show that
Ecuador’ liberal visa policy resulted in an increase of African immigration flows.
Complementary qualitative findings suggest that Ecuador’s liberal visa policy result
in two phenomena: 1. ‘transmigration’ to North America, and 2. settlement because
of relatively improved opportunities.
*The current version of the paper focuses on immigration from Africa. The increase of Central
America, Caribbean and Asian inflows is more significant and will be included subsequently.
Introduction
A fundamental paradox characterizes the post World War II nation state-system: most
people have the right to leave their home countries, but very few enjoy the right to
freely choose where they want to move and settle. Article 13 of the non-binding
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 grants every world citizen the right
to leave her home country, that is, to emigrate. This right is respected by most
governments and in theory implies the freedom to escape state repression, prosecution
and economic hardship, or, more generally speaking, to seek better opportunities
abroad. However, nowhere in international law is there a provision for the reciprocal
right to immigrate to, or even just to enter a preferred international destination
(Sassen 1996).
An asymmetric distribution of travel freedom divides citizens of relatively free and
wealthy states concentrated in the Northern hemisphere, who face few visa
restrictions, and citizens of relatively repressive and poor states concentrated in the
Southern hemisphere, who face many (Neumayer 2006; Whyte 2008). OECD
passport holders enjoy high degrees of travel freedom although their countries impose
many restrictions on passport holders from other countries. 1 Countries with a history
of violent political conflict, countries with strictly autocratic regimes and very poor
countries make up the group with the least travel freedom worldwide. The principle of
reciprocity is not generally applied to visa policy-making, and the notion that “people
are freer to move than ever before” because the world has become “more open, more
democratic, and more liberal” (Hollifield 2012 IPSA: 10) does not hold true for all.
1
Whyte (2008) analyses the Henley & Partners Visa Restriction Index, and shows that in 2010, citizens
of the United Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden had visa-free access to more than 160 countries. At the
same time, the European Union only granted visa-free access to citizens of 42 states. On the lower end
of this hierarchy, Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia had visa-free access to 26, 27 and 31 countries (Whyte
2008).
2
Many citizens who are able to leave poor, repressive or conflict-ridden states cannot,
or only illegally, enter their preferred – that is wealthy, free and save countries of
destination. The combination of continuous ‘push-factors’ that motivate migrants to
leave their home-countries (Hatton & Williamson 2002; De Haas 2010) and
increasing migration control enforcement in Europe and North America (Bigo &
Guild 2005; Rosenblum 2011) likely divert migrant flows to third countries. In fact,
the share of international migrants living in developing countries increased from 37 to
43 per cent between 2000 and 2010 (IOM 2010), and Ratha & Shaw (2007) estimate
that nearly half of all migrants from developing countries reside in other developing
countries. The immigration policies of third countries are likely to significantly
impact where these flows are diverted to, i.e. which new South-South flows emerge.
Despite the recent increase of South-South migration, the migration literature in
general, and the political migration literature in particular, remain geographical
biased. Most studies focus on the ability of North American and European
governments to reduce South-North flows (Cornelius et al. 1994; Freeman 1995;
Guiraudon & Joppke 2001; Durand & Massey 2004; Messina & Lahav 2006; Portes
& DeWind 2007), without considering the impact of immigration policies on global
migration patterns. In order to probe the impact of visa policies of developing
countries on South-South migration, this paper examines Ecuador’s visa policy of
open doors as a natural experiment (Cook & Campell 1979; Meyers 1995; Dunning
2008; Robinson 2009).
The paper proceeds as follows. The first section briefly resumes the state of the
literature on the impact of visa policies on international migration flows. The second
section presents the research design of Ecuador’s visa policy making as a natural or
quasi-experiment. In the third and main section provides the data and empirical
analysis. The fourth section complements the quantitative findings on the impact of
Ecuador’s visa-policy making with qualitative results on migrants’ motivations.
Finally, I conclude. The paper shows that Ecuador’ visa policy of open doors resulted
in an increase of immigration flows from Africa. The qualitative findings suggest that
this increase leads to two phenomena: 1. ‘transmigration’ to North America and 2.
settlement because of relative improved opportunities.
1. The state of the literature on visa policies and international migration
A key concern of international migration theory are the determinants of international
migration; the larger structural causes and specific social, economic and political
factors that underlie individual or household decisions to move across national
borders (Donato et al. 2010). Weiner (1985) distinguishes four different types of
migration determinants: differential variables, such as wage differentials and
differences in employment rates, mostly studied by economists; spatial variables,
such as distance and transportation costs, mostly studied by geographers; affinity
variables, such as religion, culture, language and kinship networks, mostly studied by
sociologists and anthropologists; and access variables, such as the rules of exit and
entry into a country, studied by political scientists (Weiner 1985: 446). Similarly,
Thielemann (2006) distills five pull-factors from the migration literature: economic,
historic, political, geographic and policy related factors.
3
There are two major gaps in the political migration literature. First, despite Weiner’s
alluding to the importance of access variables, studies of the impact of visa policies
on international migration patterns remain scarce (O’Byrne 2001; Salter 2003;
Neumayer 2006). Some scholars include visas as one component of access policies
when looking at the impact of immigration policies on international flows on an
aggregated level (Hatton 2004; Ortega & Peri 2009; Bertoli et al. 2011). One obvious
reason for the lack of specific studies of visa policies is the lack of reliable data. Both
the lists of countries exempt of visas, and the requirements themselves change
frequently and historic data is often very hard to come by (see Whyte 2008).
However, there also exists a theoretical disregard for the importance of access
policies, such as tourist visas.2 One possible reason for this theoretical neglect is that
tourist visas do not constitute immigration policy-making in a strict.
Others might argue that visa policies don’t matter because states are incapable of
effectively controlling their borders (Bhagwati 2003). It is true that national borders –
even the high-tech securitized borders of developed countries – are never hermetically
sealed off. Nevertheless the access variable of legal entry very likely has a significant
impact on the extent to which potential migrants perceive the movement to a specific
country as a realistic option. Various studies find that the majority of irregular
migrants enter their destination countries legally (Bigo 1998; de Haas & Collyer
2010; FLACSO 2011) and then overstay their temporary visas. As Brubaker puts it
“...through their ability to set the price [of entry, including specifically the price of
illegal entry], states do have a substantial capacity to control migration”. “[S]een from
the outside – from the perspective of those turned down for tourist visas (…) –
immigration control appears all too effective” (1994: 230, 231).
The second gap in the political migration literature is the lack of studies of SouthSouth migration. Existing studies of the impact of immigration policies have focused
on the attempts of North American and European governments to decrease SouthNorth flows (e.g. Cornelius et al. 1994; Freeman 1995; Guiraudon & Joppke 2001;
Durand & Massey 2004; Messina & Lahav 2006; Portes & DeWind 2007). Very little
attention has been paid to the effects of immigration policy in southern regions, such
as Latin America, on global migration patterns. The restrictive policies of preferred
destinations in North American and Europe likely divert some migrants from the
Southern hemisphere to third countries that might be less attractive but more
accessible; thus triggering new South-South flows. The visa policies of third countries
probably have an impact on migrants’ choice of alternative destinations, thus
determining which South-South flows emerge.
2
This becomes apparent in the recent study by Bertoli et al. who identify visa policy as a main
determinant of shifting migration of Ecuadorians from the United States to Spain. Nevertheless they
call travel freedom to Spain a ‘small’ difference in comparison to U.S. immigration policy (2011: 70).
4
2. The case of Ecuador’s visa policy making as a natural or quasi-experiment
On 20 June 2008, Ecuadorian president Rafael Correa issued a verbal decree that
lifted all visa requirements for all world citizens to enter Ecuador for a 90-day tourist
stay. 3 Only six months later, visa requirements were reintroduced for Chinese
citizens. Two years after the initial abolishment, visa requirements were reintroduced
for citizens of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nepal, Nigeria,
Pakistan and Somalia in September 2010. Previous to the introduction of universal
travel freedom to Ecuador, visa exemptions had already been in place for all OECD
countries except Mexico, most European countries, and almost all South American
countries. Most citizens from Central America, the Caribbean, Asia and Africa, on the
other hand, needed a visa to enter Ecuador. The extreme case of the annulment of all
visa requirements thus presents a natural experiment to analyse the impact of access
policies of a South American country on South-South migration.
The rational of natural or quasi-experimental designs is to assess the causal effect of a
variable that is changed through an exogenous shock or intervention on an outcome of
interest (Meyers 1995; Cook & Campbell 1979). Ideally, this change occurs in a
treatment group – “as if” randomly with respect to other potential causes of different
outcomes (Dunning 2008) – while the same variable is held constant in one or more
comparable control groups (Meyers 1995). Government policies, of course, do not fall
out of the sky, but are the product of social and political interests and negotiations
(Dunning 2008). They are thus afflicted by three main problems: selection bias of the
treatment group, endogeneity through confounding variables, and comparability of
control groups (Besley & Case 2000; Dunning 2008; Robinson 2009).
In the light of the lack of control and perfect randomization of the intervention in a
natural experiment, the analyst carries the burden of having to verify that the
indicated treatment in fact was the cause of a change in the outcome across two time
periods. Both a priori reasoning and empirical evidence should be used to validate
that there has not been a selection bias of the treatment group, that the source of
variation of the treatment was exogenous (Shadish et. al 2002), and that, if applicable,
the control group(s) are in fact comparable to the treatment group in their core
characteristics. Supplementary evidence should furthermore be used to eliminate all
plausible rival explanations (Cook & Campbell 1979; Robinson et al. 2009).
I argue that the annulment of tourist visa requirements to Ecuador can be treated as a
natural experiment for two reasons: 1. The source of variation of the visa policy was
exogenous to changing immigration flows. It was based on the political utilization of
the mass emigration of Ecuadorians in the context of both the domestic vote and the
country’s foreign policy. 2. The issuing of the presidential decree can be seen as an
external shock to Ecuadorian politics because it was a single-handed, spontaneous
decision by Correa and not based on any domestic political debate.
3
Visa requirements for Chinese citizens were lifted four days before on 16 June 2008.
5
Study Design
The quasi-experimental study design of this paper is a comparative interrupted timeseries analysis (Meyer 1995), with a partial reversal of the initial treatment.4 Official
entry and net migration rates to Ecuador are compared through descriptive statistics
prior and subsequent to the annulment of all visa requirements, as well as subsequent
to the reintroduction of visa requirements for a selected group of nationals. The study
applies a mid-term series of flow and stock data, six months prior to the policy
intervention and five months subsequent to the reintroduction of visa requirements,
i.e. the 2008-2010 period. Peru will be treated as a comparable control group that did
not experience the treatment of an extreme change in immigration policy making.
Supplementary qualitative findings on migrants’ motivations and migration
trajectories will complement the experimental study.
The selection of time frame deserves some additional consideration. Generally, a
short time series is most appropriate for the analysis of policy changes as natural
experiments because they avoid the influence of slowly moving factors that might
have endogenously determined policy changes (Dunning 2008). In the case of
migration policy, however, choosing too short a time frame might result in mistaking
regularly occurring seasonal migration patterns as changes induced by the policy
treatment. Furthermore, it is likely that there is a delay in changes in migration
patterns, because the information about an abruptly changed policy first has to reach
potential migrants and travel arrangements have to be made accordingly. In a
comparative case design, mid to long term series are advantageous because they show
parallel movements before the intervention, which would be expected in absence of
interactions between the treatment and other omitted variables (Meyers 1995).
Since Campbell and Ross’ emblematic quasi-experimental study of the effects of
speeding policies (Campbell 1970), it has become increasingly common to see natural
or quasi-experimental designs that take advantage of jurisdictional or political borders
(e.g. Stasavage 2003; Miguel 2004). Jurisdictional or political boundaries divide
states and countries into treatment and control groups if a policy shift only occurs in
one state or country but not its neighbour(s). The pitfall of the self-selection of
treatment groups is of less concern when studying the impact of policies on entire
states and countries, as is the case of this study. However, both endogeneity through
confounding variables, and the comparability of the control groups will be of
heightened concern.
4
The reversal of the initial treatment strengthens evidence of causal relationship between the treatment
and the dependent variable, if the effect on the latter is thereby also reversed (ibid.).
6
3. Data and Empirical Analysis
The introduction of visa-free access to Ecuador had little impact on the overall
patterns of entries (and exits) to Ecuador. The high tourist seasons from mid
December to January and from June to August are clearly represented in Graph 1. It is
important to keep in mind that most wealthy countries and thus the most important
tourist groups – including all OECD countries except Mexico – were exempt of visa
requirements before the treatment.
Graph 1: Official entries to Ecuador January 2008-December 2010:
120000"
Universal visa freedom issued
20.06.2008
Reintroduction of visa
requirements 3.09.2010
100000"
80000"
60000"
40000"
Dec+10"
Oct+10"
Nov+10"
Sep+10"
Jul+10"
Aug+10"
Jun+10"
Apr+10"
May+10"
Mar+10"
Jan+10"
Feb+10"
Dec+09"
Oct+09"
Nov+09"
Sep+09"
Jul+09"
Aug+09"
Jun+09"
Apr+09"
May+09"
Mar+09"
Jan+09"
Feb+09"
Dec+08"
Oct+08"
Nov+08"
Sep+08"
Jul+08"
Aug+08"
Jun+08"
Apr+08"
May+08"
Mar+08"
Jan+08"
0"
Feb+08"
20000"
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Dirección de Migración de Ecuador, 2011
In the case of African entries to Ecuador (excluding South Africa due to prior visa
exemption), however, the extreme change in visa policy had an impact as the Graph 2
shows. After the treatment of visa-free access to Ecuador, African entries increased
from 35 in June 2008 to 95 in July 2008. From December of 2008 to July of 2009
African entries steadily grew and peaked in August of 2010, just before the partial
reintroduction of visa requirements, with 300 entries. With the reversal of the
treatment, African entries fell to 109 in September of 2010.
Graph 2: African entries to Ecuador 2008-2010:
350"
Universal visa freedom issued
20.06.2008
Reintroduction of visa
requirements 3.09.2010
300"
250"
200"
African"entries"(without"RSA)"
150"
100"
50"
Ja
n*
08
Fe "
b*
0
M 8"
ar
*0
8
Ap "
r*0
M 8"
ay
*0
8
Ju "
n*
08
Ju "
l*0
Au 8"
g*
08
Se "
p*
08
Oc "
t*0
No 8"
v*
0
De 8"
c*
08
Ja "
n*
09
Fe "
b*
0
M 9"
ar
*0
9
Ap "
r*0
M 9"
ay
*0
9
Ju "
n*
09
Ju "
l*0
Au 9"
g*
09
Se "
p*
09
Oc "
t*0
No 9"
v*
0
De 9"
c*
09
Ja "
n*
10
Fe "
b*
1
M 0"
ar
*1
0
Ap "
r*1
M 0"
ay
*1
0
Ju "
n*
10
Ju "
l*1
Au 0"
g*
10
Se "
p*
10
Oc "
t*1
No 0"
v*
1
De 0"
c*
10
"
0"
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Dirección de Migración de Ecuador
7
The impact of the treatment of visa free access was especially significant in the cases
of African nationalities for which visa requirements were reintroduced in 2010. Not
only did the number of entries of nationals of Nigeria, Kenya, Eritrea, Ethiopia and
Somalia increase after June 2008 and abruptly fall with the reintroduction of visa
requirements in September 2010, but these newcomers did not officially leave
Ecuador as reflected in the net migration rate of Graph 4. With the reversal of the
treatment of visa-free travel, both the entries and net migration of citizens of Nigeria,
Kenya, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia fell significantly, from 218 entries and a net
migration of 188 in August of 2010 to 28 entries and a net migration of 8 in
September of 2010.
Graph 3: African entries to Ecuador 2008-2010, with partial reversal of treatment:
250"
Universal visa freedom issued
20.06.2008
Reintroduction of visa
requirements 3.09.2010
200"
150"
Visa)free"since"06.2008""
Visa)free"06.2008")"09.2010"
100"
50"
Ja
n)
08
Fe "
b)
08
"
M
ar
)0
8
Ap "
r)0
8
"
M
ay
)0
8
Ju "
n)
08
"
Ju
l)0
8
Au "
g)
08
Se "
p)
08
Oc "
t)0
8
No "
v)
08
De "
c)
08
Ja "
n)
09
Fe "
b)
09
"
M
ar
)0
9
Ap "
r)0
9
"
M
ay
)0
9
Ju "
n)
09
"
Ju
l)0
9
Au "
g)
09
Se "
p)
09
Oc "
t)0
9
No "
v)
09
De "
c)
09
Ja "
n)
10
Fe "
b)
10
"
M
ar
)1
0
Ap "
r)1
0
"
M
ay
)1
0
Ju "
n)
10
"
Ju
l)1
0
Au "
g)
10
Se "
p)
10
Oc "
t)1
0
No "
v)
10
De "
c)
10
"
0"
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Dirección de Migración de Ecuador
Judging from Graph 3 and 4 the treatment of visa free access to Ecuador between
June 2008 and August 2010 had a significant impact on the outcome of African
immigration, which started to increase shortly after the policy change. The partial
reversal of the treatment had an even clearer impact on the concerned groups, whose
entries and net migration rates fell back to pre treatment levels in September of 2010.
Graph 4: African net migration to Ecuador 2008-2010:
200$
Universal visa freedom issued
20.06.2008
Reintroduction of visa
requirements 3.09.2010
150$
100$
African$net$migraBon$visa!restricted$
African$net$migraBon$visa!free$$
Oct!10$
Dec!10$
Nov!10$
Jul!10$
Sep!10$
Jun!10$
Aug!10$
Apr!10$
May!10$
Jan!10$
Feb!10$
Mar!10$
Oct!09$
Dec!09$
Nov!09$
Jul!09$
Sep!09$
Jun!09$
Aug!09$
Apr!09$
May!09$
Jan!09$
Feb!09$
Mar!09$
Oct!08$
Dec!08$
Nov!08$
Jul!08$
Sep!08$
Jun!08$
Aug!08$
Apr!08$
May!08$
Jan!08$
Feb!08$
0$
Mar!08$
50$
!50$
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Dirección de Migración de Ecuador
8
Graph 5 and 6 show how the changes in the outcome variable in Ecuador – that is the
changes in African inflows and net migration – compare to the outcome in the control
case Peru, where no visa freedom was implemented. After the treatment of visa free
access African entries to Ecuador increased from 35 in June 2008 to 95 in July 2008.
From December of 2008 to July of 2009 African entries steadily grew and peaked in
August of 2010, just before the partial reintroduction of visa requirements, at 300
entries. With the reversal of the treatment, African entries fell to 109. Peru shows a
small peak, and increase from 86 entries in February to 147 entries in March of 2009,
but otherwise rather constant monthly entries around the 100 mark.
Graph 5: African official entries to Ecuador and Peru 2008-2010:
350"
Universal visa freedom issued
20.06.2008
Reintroduction of visa
requirements 3.09.2010
300"
250"
200"
African"entries"Ecuador"
African"entries"Peru""
150"
100"
Dec*10"
Oct*10"
Sep*10"
Nov*10"
Jul*10"
Jun*10"
Aug*10"
Apr*10"
Mar*10"
May*10"
Jan*10"
Feb*10"
Dec*09"
Oct*09"
Sep*09"
Nov*09"
Jul*09"
Aug*09"
Jun*09"
Apr*09"
May*09"
Jan*09"
Feb*09"
Mar*09"
Oct*08"
Dec*08"
Nov*08"
Jul*08"
Sep*08"
Aug*08"
Jun*08"
Apr*08"
May*08"
Jan*08"
Feb*08"
0"
Mar*08"
50"
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Dirección de Migración de Ecuador and the Dirección General de Migración y
Naturalización del Peru
Regarding the net migration from Africa to Ecuador and Peru, the difference is even
starker. Roughly half of all African citizens that entered Ecuador between July of
2008 and August of 2010 had not officially left the country by the end of that time
period. For that time span, Ecuador shows a net migration of 2028 African citizens,
compared to 4952 entries. In the case of Peru, 2283 African citizens entered, but the
net migration only amounted to 43 people, in the same period.
Graph 6: African net migration to Ecuador 2008-2010:
200$
Universal visa freedom issued
20.06.2008
Reintroduction of visa
requirements 3.09.2010
150$
100$
African$net$migraBon$Ecuador$$
African$net$migraBon$Peru$$
Dec!10$
Nov!10$
Oct!10$
Sep!10$
Aug!10$
Jul!10$
Jun!10$
May!10$
Apr!10$
Jan!10$
Feb!10$
Mar!10$
Oct!09$
Dec!09$
Nov!09$
Sep!09$
Jul!09$
Aug!09$
Jun!09$
Apr!09$
Mar!09$
May!09$
Jan!09$
Feb!09$
Dec!08$
Oct!08$
Sep!08$
Nov!08$
Aug!08$
Jul!08$
Jun!08$
May!08$
Apr!08$
Feb!08$
Mar!08$
0$
Jan!08$
50$
!50$
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Dirección de Migración de Ecuador and the Dirección General de Migración y
Naturalización del Peru
9
In the following two potential threats to the internal validity of the above analysis will
be discussed: endogeneity and comparability of the control group.
Endogeneity
The problem of endogeneity when treating policy change as a natural or quasiexperiment is that policymakers might change a specific policy in response to withinstate changes in either the outcome variable itself, or in response to an unobserved
factor that independently influences the outcome variable (Besley & Case 2000).
Besley & Case (2000) and Meyer (1995) thus point to the importance of
understanding the source of the policy change of interest. Only if the variation in the
explanatory variable (the policy change) is exogenous to the outcome of interest can
the causal effect of the former on the latter be established. In the case of the extreme
change in Ecuador’s visa policy it would thus be problematic if a. the policy had been
motivated by prior changes in migrant inflows, or if b. the policy change had been a
response to a change of a third factor, e.g. the state of the economy, that had also
caused increasing immigration flows.
Regarding preceding migration movements, it has to be pointed out that Ecuador
experienced net immigration of over 500.000 people in the past decade, mainly from
neighbouring countries Colombia – due to the civil conflict – and Peru – due to the
incentive of the dollarization of the Ecuadorian economy and slightly higher
minimum wages. However, citizens of Colombia and Peru not only long enjoyed visa
free travel to Ecuador but since 2002 can travel to Ecuador with their national IDs
only.5 In the two years preceding the annulment of visa requirements net migration
from Peru and Colombia showed a downward trend. Net migration of Peruvians
decreased from 25.912 in 2006 to 17.720 in 2007, and Colombian net migration from
26.055 in 2006 to 23.906 in 2007. The net migration from all other countries doubled
from 6.275 in 2006 to 13.482 in 2007.
Graph 7: Net migration to Ecuador 2006-2008
70000"
60000"
50000"
All"other""
40000"
Colombia""
30000"
Peru"
20000"
10000"
0"
2006"
2007"
2008"
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Dirección de Migración de Ecuador
According to the official press release of the Ecuadorian Foreign Ministry, visa-free
travel to Ecuador was implemented to apply the principle of free movement and to
promote tourism to Ecuador.6 Both of these motivations seem questionable. Visa
5
6
Decision 503 of the Andean community.
BOLETÍN DE PRENSA No. 398, Quito, 11 de Junio del 2008, ELIMINACIÓN DE VISAS DE
10
freedom was not expected to have an impact on the free movement of people, because
the two main immigrant and refugee sending countries – namely neighbouring
Colombia and Peru – have long had free access to Ecuador. The claim that travel
freedom was introduced for the promotion of tourism seems equally implausible. In
2008, Ecuador already had a very low rate of visa requirements. Visa exemptions had
already been in place for all OECD countries except Mexico, most European
countries, and all South American countries except Guyana and Suriname.
Regarding the reintroduction of visa requirements for citizens of China, Afghanistan,
Bangladesh, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan and Somalia, a civil
servant responsible at Ministry of Justice explained: “The official argument about this
was that [visas were reintroduced] due to the fact that these are new nationalities,
nationalities that have never come to these latitudes.” This explanation confirms that
there was in fact a significant ‘discursive gap’ between Correa’s populist
proclamation of free movement and the impact he expected. That is, that he did not
expect increasing South-South immigration after the lifting of all visa requirements.
Regarding the impact of the economy on both changes in Ecuador’s visa policy
making and immigrant flows, the argument would go that a cyclical upturn could
have motivated both a liberalization of immigration policies – because of a greater
demand of labour - and also affected increases in immigration flows – due to
increased employment opportunities. With a GDP growth rate of 4.1% in 2006 but
only 2% in 2007, the Ecuadorian economy made a negative development the two
years preceding the annulment of all visa requirements. The official unemployment
rate slightly decreased from 10.7% in 2006 to 8.8% in 2007.
Graph 8: Ecuador GDP growth rate (%)
8$
6$
4$
2$
0$
1999$ 2000$ 2001$ 2002$ 2003$ 2004$ 2005$ 2006$ 2007$ 2008$ 2009$ 2010$
GDP$growth$in$%$
!2$
!4$
!6$
!8$
!10$
Source: Index Mundi, based on CIA Factbook Data
TURISMO PARA INGRESAR AL ECUADOR, El Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio e
Integración informa que, por expresa disposición del Señor Presidente Constitucional de la República,
a partir del día viernes 20 de junio de 2008, los ciudadanos de cualquier nacionalidad podrán ingresar
al Ecuador, sin necesidad de visa, y permanecer por un período de noventa días, en aplicación del
principio de libre circulación de personas y con el fin de fortalecer las relaciones entre el Ecuador y
todos
los
países
del
mundo,
y
promover
el
turismo.
http://www.mmrree.gob.ec/mre/documentos/novedades/pol_exterior/junio/bol398.htm
[Last accessed 08-02-2012]
11
Graph 9: Ecuador unemployment rate (%)
16"
14"
12"
10"
8"
Unemployment"in"%"
6"
4"
2"
0"
2000" 2001" 2002" 2003" 2004" 2005" 2006" 2007" 2008" 2009" 2010"
Source: Index Mundi, based on CIA Factbook Data
Taken together, Graphs 7, 8 and 9 do not suggest that either prior changes in the
migration patterns to Ecuador nor a cyclical economic upturn motived the
liberalization of access policies, thus presenting the problem of endogeneity. The
political context rather suggests that the reason for this policy change lie in Correa’s
strategy of transnationally targeting Ecuadorian emigrants. Correa won the 2006
presidential elections as a self-declared Christian ‘Bolivarian’ leftist. His on-going
populist strategy includes an up-lifting rhetoric, emphasizing concepts such as dignity
and national pride and preaching against a list of declared enemies, including the
political opposition, the national media and the Unites States (Conaghan 2008;
Conaghan & de la Torre).
Margheritis (2011) convincingly argues that the mass emigration Ecuador
experienced as a result of the economic crisis of 1999 presented Correa with the
opportunity to use the topic of international migration as a populist identification
platform for his coalition. Today, an estimated 2 million Ecuadorians (out of a total
population of approximately 14.5 million) live abroad. International migration thus is
a topic that affects most Ecuadorians personally. By introducing universal travel
freedom, Correa made a symbolic mark against the immigration policies of the United
States and Europe in the context of his populist political project. As a member of the
civil society organization Fundación Esperanza observed:
“ I think [visa freedom was introduced] because of the political momentum. It was Ecuador’s
manifesto against the world in the sphere of migration. After the banking crisis of 99 Ecuador
experienced a wave of emigration that had a huge effect, above all to Spain, the United States,
Italy, those countries. It was like an answer to the closing of doors of the Europeans: Ok, you
close the doors on us, we open them.”
Visa free travel to Ecuador furthermore was an external shock to Ecuadorian politics
because it was a single-handed, spontaneous decision by Correa that was not based on
any domestic political debate. A high ranking major of the Migration Directorate
(Dirección Nacional de Migracion) explained, that the president took this decision
after a trip to Mexico where her had discussed the increasingly restrictive immigration
policy of the United States with Mexican president Felipe Calderón. Correa himself
justified the presidential decree with the following statement:“We are in the middle of
a campaign to dismantle this invention of the 20th century of passports and visas.”7
7
hoy.com.ec: Correa elimina el visado a los extranjeros, 12/06/2008 http://www.hoy.com.ec/noticiasecuador/correa-elimina-el-visado-a-los-extranjeros-297707-297707.html [Last retrieved 01-02-2012]
12
Comparability of the control group
As a control group or case, Peru is considered a country similar to Ecuador in key
parameters that did not experience the same policy intervention. Pretreatment
differences arguably exist between Ecuador and Peru, and Peru can thus only offer an
imperfect control case. When interested in the impact of the extreme change of
immigration policy, comparability is arguably especially important across other
possible migration determinants. Besides access variables that are considered the
treatment in this study, Weiner (1985) distinguishes differential variables, such as
wage differentials and differences in employment rates, affinity variables, such as
religion, culture, language and kinship networks and spatial variables, such as
distance and transportation costs (Weiner 1985: 446). Similarly, Thielemann (2006)
distills economic, historic and geographic pull-factors from the literature. In addition
he distinguishes between political and policy related pull-factors.
Regarding political pull factors, Thielemann (2006) points out that “political concerns
about personal security and migrants’ acceptance into a new host society can be
expected to be important considerations for potential migrants”. To this the incentive
to not only live in peaceful and secure, but also free societies should be added.
Ecuador and Peru can both be considered relatively free and peaceful, lower-middle
income countries. For the years 2008 to 2010, Freedom House rated Ecuador with 3
points as partly free and Peru as free with 2.5 points (1 point representing the most
and 7 points the least free).
Vis-a-vis economic pull-factors, or differential variables, migrant’s decisions are seen
as being guided by processes of income maximisation and risk minimisation due to
increased employment opportunities. Ecuador’s GDP stood at US$ 7.500 and Peru’s
at US$ 8.600 in 2008. Unemployment was 8.1 per cent in Peru in 2007, and 8.7 per
cent in Ecuador. Ecuador’s minimum wage was $218 in 2008, and Peru’s US$180
(S/. 550)8. The economic pull-factors that might have enticed Africans to move to
Peru or Ecuador arguably are comparable between the two countries.
As regards historic pull-factors or affinity, such as ideological or cultural links based
on colonial legacies and social networks, Peru and Ecuador seem similarly foreign to
potential African migrants. In both countries small groups of Africans arrived as
slaves during the colonial era (cite). Afro-Peruvian and afro-Ecuadorian communities
still exist in both countries today (cite). However, the African communities of recent
immigrants in Peru and Ecuador that could offer the benefits of migrant networks are
extremely small (cite). Language and culture can be considered barriers for African
migration to both Ecuador and Peru.
Regarding spatial variables, or geographic ease of access, Ecuador and Peru are
arguably similarly difficult to reach from Africa; certainly further away and more
expensive to reach then neighbouring countries or European destinations. There are
no direct flights from Africa to Ecuador and Peru, and the most economic options via
European countries are often barred because they require transit visas. African
interviewees in Ecuador had paid various thousand US$ for their tickets to Ecuador.
Thielemann (2006) points out that geographic proximity between countries of origin
8
http://elcomercio.pe/edicionimpresa/html/2008-01-02/el-sueldo-minimo-ahora-s550.html
13
and countries of destination can impact international migration patterns because,
despite technological transport advances, smaller distances will still mean easier
access due to lower transportation costs.
In sum, Ecuador’s visa policy of “open doors” makes for a natural experimental
because the effect of unlimited access options on South-South immigration can be
studied by comparing inflow and net migration data before and after the introduction
of visa-free travel. Additionally, these changes in outcome can be compared to
changes in migration to neighbouring Peru, a country comparable across other
possible migration inducing parameters. The significant change of inflows and net
migration from Africa to Ecuador shortly after the introduction of visa free travel, that
did not take place in neighbouring Peru (other pull-factors close to equal), suggests
that the liberalization of access opportunities to Ecuador effected this increase.
4. Qualitative findings
The following section supplements the above results with qualitative findings from 27
interviews with African migrants in Quito, conducted in July and August of 2011.
The main motivation of African migrants to leave their home countries was
economic. Visa free access to Ecuador dominated their choice of (initial) destination.
For most African migrants interviewed in Quito travel freedom to Ecuador presented
an attractive opportunity in the light of the perception of increasingly restrictive
immigration policies in Europe and North America. In fact, many of the interviewees
didn’t know much about Ecuador – except for the fact that they could enter without a
visa. A Nigerian immigrant explained (when he heard that I was German):
A lot of Nigerians like to go to Germany, but to get German visa, it's very hard in my country.
My Nigerian passport, to this country, is visa free. Then, what we just needed to buy your
ticket and then come… The mentality is, when they in Nigeria, a lot of people in Nigerian,
suffering, they want to go out, out of the country, to look for job, to work. And when they
hear, one country is visa free to them, that’s where they go. So, you can check that [on the]
Internet, and then you know, your country passport, to where it’s visa free.
Travel freedom presented the same opportunity window, or pull-factor, to economic
migrants and asylum seekers from Africa. An asylum seeker from Nigeria explained:
I wanted to go to Holland, to go and hide for some years and come back. But they refused the
visa… One person advised me that if I had to leave Nigeria very quickly, I may come to
Ecuador... So why I came to Ecuador, it's not that I like Ecuador… I come because it's visa
free to Nigeria, so and I want to move Nigeria immediately, if I'm going to Holland they
[would] refuse me, if I waited I might be dead. So I move immediately, I come to Ecuador.
According to the African community leader in Quito “90% of Africans” came to
Ecuador with the attention of an onward journey to Canada, the United States and the
English-speaking Caribbean. In line with his assessment, almost all African migrants
I interviewed had aspirations of using Ecuador as a gateway for onward migration to
wealthier countries, predominantly Canada and the United States. When considering
wage differentials between African countries of origin, Ecuador and North America,
the strong economic initiatives for reaching North America become apparent. Moving
e.g. from Nigeria to Ecuador within the minimum wage category would have
14
increased an income by 3.8 in 2009, while moving to the United States and Canada
could have meant a 40 to 50-fold income increase.9 Governmental data on abandoned
asylum application supports the hypothesis that a large proportion of African migrants
who officially entered but did not leave Ecuador, most probably did not stay in the
country. It seems very unlikely that 85% of Eritrean asylum seekers would have
abandoned their application process, if they had indeed remained in the country.
Table 1: Abandoned asylum application as of 21 July 2011:
COUNTRY
ASYLUM
APPLICATIONS
ABANDONED
APPLICATIONS
ABANDONED IN PER
CENT
ERITREA
97
82
85%
SOMALIA
23
10
44%
ETHIOPIA
48
20
42%
NIGERIA
311
88
28%
KENYA
1
0
0%
Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Dirección de Refugio de Ecuador
International migration should not be conceptualized as the linear movement between
two countries in a dichotomously divided world between the poor South and the
wealthy North. Various African interviewees had previous migration experiences.
One interviewee, for example, had travelled to and worked in other countries such as
South Africa, Libya, Oman and Spain, before making his way to Ecuador. Colley and
de Haas (2011) point out that migrants’ (mixed) motivations and aspirations often
change during their journey and that countries that were initially conceived as ‘transit’
countries can become countries of destination and vice versa.
In fact, for some African migrants free access to Ecuador also meant the opportunity
of settlement. The African community leader in Quito estimates that about one third
of all Africans that arrived in Ecuador in the past decade have stayed. He explained
that in some instances migrants got stranded because they lacked the opportunities or
financial means to continue their onward journey. They then found life partners
and/or business opportunities and decided to stay. While newly arrived migrants tend
to work as English teachers, some migrants that have stayed in Ecuador for longer
own their own business, such as automobile garages. Similar to the situation de Haas
(2007) describes for the case of African migrants who settle in North Africa after
failing or eventually not trying to enter Europe, some African migrants chose Ecuador
as their second best option, rather than returning home with empty hands.
Essentially economic motivations of international migrants can be considered a given.
Most African interviewees expressed the explicit economic motivation of increasing
their income by reaching the United States or Canada. However, immigration
policies, such as the access policies of visa requirements, shape the opportunity
structures in which international migrants move. As Hollifield (IPSA 2012) points
out, the necessary conditions for migration are economic (and social), but the
sufficient conditions for specific migration patterns to emerge are legal and political.
9
According to the U.S. Department of State’s Human Rights reports for 2009, Ecuador’s minimum
monthly wage stood at $218 in 20099, while the minimum wage of e.g. Nigeria only amounted to 8,630
Naira (approximately $57)9. Minimum wage rates in the United States changed from $6.55 per hour to
$7.259 per hour in 2009, and Cdn$8.00 to Cdn$10.00 ($7.60 to $9.50)9 in Canada.
15
5. Conclusions
Most migration studies focus on South-North movements to the United States and the
European Union. Classic as well as more recent compilations on international
migration ignore South-South migration although these flows make up roughly half of
all international migration today. The existing literature thus nurtures a preconceived
notion that suggests constant global flows of people from less developed countries in
the global South to developed nations in the North. Meseguer and Maldonado (IPSA
2012) point out that that South–South migration flows are already significant, and in
the light of the current economic crisis in the Northern hemisphere, might further
increase in the near future.
This paper shows that a relaxation of access opportunities in a South American
country increases South-South immigration (from Africa). Although most
interviewees expressed explicit motivations of transmigrating to North America,
others perceived Ecuador’s visa freedom as an exit option out of their country of
origin – not their preferred destination, but an accessible place of relatively improved
circumstances. There certainly are threats to the external validity of the study, such as
the interaction of geographic and historic setting and the treatment (Cook and
Campbell 1979).
Nevertheless, the findings have import implications: they suggest breaking up
traditional dichotomous interpretations of migration as fixed South-North movements
between two countries, in favour of a global perspective of opportunity structures and
political access options. Increasingly restrictive European and North American visa
policies, combined with the on-going economic crisis, likely deter growing numbers
of immigrants to accessible destination in the global south. The immigration policies
– especially the access policies of visa requirements – of third countries are likely to
significantly impact where these flows are diverted to, i.e. which new South-South
flows emerge.
16
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18
Annex 1: Countries that did not require tourist visas to Ecuador prior to June 2008
Continent
Countries
Africa
South Africa
Asia
Philippines, Japan, Republic of Korea, Singapore
Central America &
the Caribbean
Dominican Republic
Europe
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Great
Britain, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Finland, Germany, Latvia,
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Malta,
Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Russia, Sweden,
Switzerland, Ukraine, Vatican
Middle East
Israel, Turkey
North America
Canada, United States
Oceania
Australia, New Zealand
South America
Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Paraguay,
Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela
Source: Foreign Ministry of Ecuador
Annex 2: Countries that do not require tourist visas to Peru
Continent
Countries
Africa
South Africa
Asia
Brunei, Hong Kong, Philippines, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Republic of
Korea, Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan
Central America &
the Caribbean
Antigua Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Dominican
Republic, Granada, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad y Tobago
Europe
Andorra, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, France, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxemburg,
Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Macedonia, Malta, Moldavia, Monaco,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Russia, San Marino,
Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, Vatican
Middle East
Israel
North America
Canada, United States
Oceania
Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Salomon
Islands, Nauru, Niue, New Zealand, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga,
Tuvalu, Vanuatu
South America
Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru,
Uruguay, Venezuela
Source: Foreign Ministry of Peru
19
20