CRIM 3460 Introduction to Critical Infrastructure Protection
Fall 2016
Chapter 5 – Communications
School of Criminology and Justice Studies
University of Massachusetts Lowell
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The 3 major, interconnected telecommunication
network infrastructure components are:
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Landlines
Wireless
Extra-terrestrial networks (communication satellites).
The 1996 Telecommunications Act:
 Re-regulated the vertically integrated system
 Created the “carrier hotel” which are the major hubs
containing switching equipment, servers, storage and
services critical to the operation of the CIKR system
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Carrier hotels:
 The regulatory reshaping produced network hubs (carrier
hotels and large metropolitan exchanges),with high degree
and betweeness centrality. Carrier hotels and their
interconnection are the most critical assets in this sector.
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Criticality:
 The critical nodes of the communications sector are:
o Carrier hotels
o IEC POPS and gateways
o Land-earth-stations (LES)
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Unusual sector threats:
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Beside cyber exploits, High Power Microwave (HPM)* and
jamming threats pose sector-specific threat-asset pairs.
Risk-informed strategy:
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The optimal risk-informed strategy invests heavily in hubs
(carrier hotels and exchanges) and betweeners (highly
critical transmission cables).
*Can be constructed from ordinary
electronic parts purchased from
a Radio Shack store, etc.
Figure 5-3. Architecture of today’s communications sector
Figure 5-4. Top carrier hotels in the U.S.
 Human threat-asset pairs are:
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Cyber exploits against users and servers
Physical attacks against carrier hotels
Physical attacks against land-earth stations
HPM attacks against electronic equipment
Physical attacks against POPS
Physical attacks against communication satellites
 Natural threats include:
 Weather damage to buildings & equipment
 Power outages at carrier hotels
 Equipment component failures
Figure 5-5. Fault tree of major threats
Figure 5-6. Exceedence probability of telecommunication
system outages in the 1990s.
Figure 5-7. The top 30 communication routes in the USA, circa 2001.
Ref. Simulation of cascades by author in the
top 30 communication routes in the USA.
 The author analyzed the top 30 routes from previous slide.
 Vulnerability was set to 5% and then 20%. In both cases, the
exceedence probability is long-tailed, but the risk profile shows
this is a high-risk system.
 It was determined that below 12.3% risk is low and above is high.
 At higher vulnerabilities, the network transitions to a complex
catastrophe risk profile.
 Chicago is shown to be the hub and the maximum betweener.
The critical point lowers to 4.1% if Chicago is targeted for
disruption.
 Another simulation shows that the link between Atlanta and
Washington DC and Baltimore was found to be most critical.
 17 routes and 4 nodes are critical. Removal of any separates the
network into non-communicating islands.
 The author analyzed the top 30 routes from previous slide.
 Vulnerability was set to 5% and then 20%. In both cases, the
exceedence probability is long-tailed, but the risk profile shows
this is a high-risk system.
 It was determined that below 12.3% risk is low and above is high.
 At higher vulnerabilities, the network transitions to a complex
catastrophe risk profile.
 Chicago is shown to be the hub and the maximum betweener.
The critical point lowers to 4.1% if Chicago is targeted for
disruption.
 Another simulation shows that the link between Atlanta and
Washington DC and Baltimore was found to be most critical.
 17 routes and 4 nodes are critical. Removal of any separates the
network into non-communicating islands.
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Self-organization in the form of preferential
attachment has resulted in the accumulation of
communication sector assets in a handful of carrier
hotels, metropolitan area exchanges, and highbetweeness cables.
The optimal risk-informed strategy invests heavily in
these hubs and betweeners.
The threat includes highly asymmetrical HPM
weapons, as well as cyber and physical attacks.
 Sherman Antitrust Act (1890) - First Federal
statute to limit cartels and monopolies
 Clayton Antitrust Act (1914)
 Further restricted price discrimination, if it creates a
monopoly (or exclusive dealing agreements)
 Tying a non-monopoly product to a monopoly product)
 Mergers/acquisitions that reduce market competition
 The First AT&T
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Alexander Graham Bell forms company (1877)
Loses control to J. P. Morgan (1907)
Merged with (handsets) Western Electric with
(carrier) Bell Telephone (1909)
Consolidated independents into a vertically
integrated monopoly (1911)
DOJ sues under Sherman Antitrust Act (1913)
Kingsbury Commitment splits company into Western
Electric and AT&T (1913)
 The Second AT&T (1934 Telecom Act)
 By 1924, AT&T purchased 223 of the 234
independent telephone companies
 Management claimed the advantages of a “natural
monopoly”, which were: interoperability, efficiency,
universal access and high reliability/resilience
 AT&T was operated as a vertically integrated natural
monopoly from 1934 to 1996
 The Third AT&T - Baby Bells and Divestiture
 Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (CLECs or LECs)
 InterExchange Carriers (IECs) was broken up into Baby
Bells (CLECs and an IEC) (1974-1984)
 Regional Baby Bells unprotected as natural monopolies
 Baby Bells consolidated into Qwest, Verizon and AT&T
 1996 Telecom Act
 Divestiture: CLECs and LECs share everything (peering)
 Creates a “communications commons”
 Peering leads to “telecom hotels”
 The Next AT&T - AT&T Wireless and T-Mobile
 ATT applied to buy T-Mobile, thus removing a
competitor
 Grounds for merger: Interoperability, efficiency and
universal access
 Net Neutrality Debate
 Net neutrality means ‘freedom of speech’ on the
Internet
 Otherwise, AT&T could once again monopolize
communications
 What is Net Neutrality?
 A principle that advocates no restrictions, by ISPs, or
governances on access to the internet. It would
prevent restrictions on content, sites, platforms and
equipment used.
 What are challenges to Net Neutrality?
 Comcast attempts to block or limit use of its bandwidth
(2008)
 Google blocks bandwidth to rural users (2009)
 Metro PCS accused of blocking Skype users (2011)
 What is an infrastructure monopoly?
 When a single company owns all/nearly all of the
market for a product or service (typically > 70%)
 Occurs when the barrier to entry is high
 Well-known infrastructure monopolies
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Rockefeller's Standard Oil
Carnegie's steel empire
Vanderbilt railroad empire
OPEC
Cable TV
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Does it matter? If so, why?
What sectors would tend to be a monopoly?
Are monopolies more or less secure?
More or less resilient?
Would a monopoly look at security differently?
Redundancy has little value to consumers when
they only need one water supply, telephone line,
gas pipeline, electric line, etc.
Betweness emergence produces a long tail
 Telecom hotels
 Multitenant sites (security risk?)
 Highly critical telecom locations
 Major locations
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57-60 Hudson Street, NYC (Europe, Mideast and Africa)
1 Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles (Asia and Japan)
Seattle (Canada and Alaska)
Miami (South America)
 Housed in carrier hotels
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CLECs
Application services providers
Local telephone providers
Wireless providers
Long distance providers
Data Storage
DSL providers
Resellers
ISPs
 Competitive Exclusion ≈ Self-organized Criticality (SOC)
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Monopoly shapes a system’s architecture (network topology)
Network topology is the arrangement of the links, nodes, etc. of a
computer network depicted physically or logically.
 Bak’s (sandpile) punctuated reality
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Interoperability equates to optimization of technology and
resources (monocultures)
o Monoculture is an agricultural practice of growing a single
crop. The term is often borrowed and in computer science it
describes computers running identical software.
o In agriculture it can lead to the quicker spread of pests and
diseases. Similarities in communications?
Efficiency equates to reduced redundancy and surge capacity
(Could this be resiliency? How?)
Telecom hotels is an application in the real world
 Competitive exclusion appears to increase SOC
 Another explanation of SOC is that complex behavior
can develop suddenly in certain multi-body systems
whose dynamics vary abruptly
 Possible ways of reducing SOC (fragility and lack
of resilience?):
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Regulation, standards and codes
Redundancy (i.e. spares and storage)
Surge capacity (i.e. unused capacity and storage)
Backup capability (i.e. power generators and water)
 The above have cost implications and ROI should
be considered