APPENDIX 3
THE BANNING OF THE COMMUNIST PART Y
The Communist Party was a minority group which itself claimed onl y
5,000 members in 1940, but, for a time, working on the idealism ,
confusion, sectional selfishness and lethargy of far greater numbers, it ha d
a marked effect both on the shaping of the attitude of Australians to th e
war and in impeding effective Australian participation in the war . The
Australian Communist Party had been formed originally in October 192 0
from among those little rebel groups of Australian socialists who, since th e
eighteen-nineties, had always been found on the edges of the Labour Party ,
taking their socialist doctrine more seriously than their politics ; and i t
developed through schisms and much internal bickering into a militant
body preaching the class struggle, ridiculing the "reformism " of official
Labour and looking towards the abolition of "capitalism" by force .
In the characteristic jargon of the party, its foundation has bee n
described a s
the outcome of the experience of the working class gleaned in the struggles an d
growth of the Labour movement from 1890 to 1920 . In this period the working clas s
experienced the limitations of `Liberal' labour governments and reformist trad e
unionism . It experienced the futility and bankruptcy of socialist sectarianism (Socialist
Labour Party, Australian Socialist Party etc .) and anarcho-syndicalism (Industrial
Workers of the World) . The formation of the Communist Party represented th e
victory of Marxism-Leninism over various petty-bourgeois-pacifist and socialis t
theories (Victorian Socialist Party, `Peaceful Revolution', Fabianism, etc .) . 1
The Communists worked both above ground and underground mainl y
by attempting to gain control of industrial unions and by taking advantage
of whatever grievances or enthusiasms in other sections of the communit y
might be directed towards their purpose . The successes of the party were ,
by reason both of its smallness and its doctrines, achieved by spoiling,
destroying or distorting what other parties attempted rather than by obtaining wider acceptance for its own ideas . It was not strong enough to gain
any representation in Parliament so it could not make the laws it wante d
or bring about by constitutional means the sort of society it wanted, bu t
it was determined and active enough to be able to influence others t o
break the laws and impede or discredit the society which it did not want .
In particular, it sought power by gaining control or influence in the trad e
unions and used whatever position it gained in the trade unions both t o
promote industrial strife and to exert pressure on the policy-making organ s
of the Australian Labour Party . In general, it would appear that, during
the war, industrial stoppages were regarded by the Communists as bein g
of prime importance as a political weapon rather than as an immediate
objective in themselves . Communists tried to use trade unions to squeez e
Labour governments as well as to embarrass non-Labour governments .
1 L.
L. Sharkey, An Outline History of the Australian Communist Party (Sydney,
December 1944) .
584
THE BANNING OF THE COMMUNIST PART Y
In matters relating to foreign affairs the Communist Party sat tight o n
a single wheel—loyalty to the Soviet Union—and rode wherever it too k
them . In the twelve months or so immediately before the outbreak of war
their pamphlets and newspapers had expressed the view that the worl d
was divided into two camps, one wanting peace and one wanting war . The
chief war-seekers were Germany, Italy and Japan . The "enduring centre
for world peace " was the Soviet Union and its principal supporters wer e
the "international proletariat" —the workers in all lands—and they were
exhorted to take action independently of their governments and, if nee d
be, in defiance of them to advance the "peace policy" of the Soviet Union .
They were advised that they might also find allies among the middle-clas s
and "liberal bourgeois" and the populations of colonial, semi-colonial an d
weak countries who dreaded the coming of war ; the aid of such allies wa s
to be gained through the organisation of peace congresses, popular protest s
against war and Fascism and demonstrations of friendship for the Sovie t
Union .
When this advocacy of peace is followed through to the action counselled in particular issues, however, it would seem to have been calculate d
to make Britain and France go to war against Germany and Japan an d
to do so when in a state of unpreparedness . Intervention in Abyssinia ,
Spain and China was advocated while at the same time Great Britain
was denounced for rearming . The Lyons Government was denounced fo r
linking Australian with British defence measures at the Imperial Conferenc e
in 1937, while at the same time the Australian Labour Party was bein g
attacked as isolationist and for advocating a home defence policy . Australian rearmament or any Australian participation in overseas wars wa s
opposed while at the same time there was agitation for a total embarg o
on trade with Japan . These difficulties in finding consistency in the Communist advocacy of peace are lessened when the more positive elements o f
their policy are considered . The party also advocated collective securit y
through the League of Nations and, in discussing Australian relations wit h
Japan, urged that active steps be taken to bring about cooperation wit h
the Soviet Union and "defensive agreements with our great democrati c
neighbours" in the Pacific—the U .S .A . and the U .S .S .R .—and also China,
Dutch East Indies and South American States . In the Far East, the purpose
apparently was, while excluding Britain and France, and regarding th e
Dutch East Indies as a non-European entity apart from the Netherlands ,
to build up regional alliances against Japan . The United States was to be
brought into Pacific affairs to help contain Japan, and the old condemnations of American imperialism in the East seemed temporarily to diminish
although attacks on British exploitation continued . The policy was clear,
logical and understandable so far as it served the national interests of th e
Soviet Union. The extent to which it commended itself to other countrie s
would depend, of course, on their estimation of the place of the Sovie t
Union in the world . On this the Australian Communist had his greates t
certainty . Alone among the great powers the Soviet Union appeared t o
him as a peace-loving nation for it had abolished capitalism "and, con-
THE
BANNING OF THE
COMMUNIST
PARTY
58 5
sequently, the incentive to conquest and war, from one-sixth of the world" .
The Soviet Union could never go to war unless attacked and, if it wer e
attacked, it would become the duty of "every Communist and the dut y
of all workers and supporters of peace to use every means in their powe r
to guarantee the victory of the Red Army over the imperialists" . 2
This policy was essentially one of loyalty to the Soviet Union and, eve n
before the war, had meant opposition to any Australian governmental
support for British policies in Europe . The outbreak of war heightened this
opposition . Apart from some initial confusions, the Australian Communis t
Party was faithful to Moscow .
When the Soviet Union signed the non-aggression pact with German y
on 23rd August 1939, the party accepted the view that the "ruling circles
of Britain and France" had been trying to "bring Germany and the Sovie t
Union into a collision", and the Soviet Union, by concluding the non aggression pact with Germany, had " frustrated the insidious plans of th e
provokers of war " and ensured peace between the two largest States o f
Europe . Henceforward, Britain and France were regarded as war-makers
and the German-Soviet treaty as a "barrier against the extension of th e
imperialist war " . When war broke out between Germany and the Western
Powers it was seen as "a struggle between two groups of imperialists fo r
the repartition of the world" . But at this point a little confusion crept int o
the argument . On the one hand it was said to be the duty of the worker s
to obstruct the waging of war by Britain . Labour Party leaders who sup ported the national war effort were draped with adjectives like "filthy "
and "criminal" . Yet, on the other hand the war was seen as not wholl y
deplorable . The capitalist world was "blowing itself to bits " while the
Soviet Union, as the result of the pact—"one of the most brilliant acts o f
policy in working-class history"—was consolidating its economic, politica l
and military might . The antagonisms of the imperialist states had bee n
used to safeguard the Soviet Union, the base of world socialism, fro m
capitalist attack .
Then came the partition of Poland between Germany and the Sovie t
Union, the Soviet invasion of Finland, and the Soviet treaties with Latvia ,
Estonia and Lithuania . The first was seen as the liberation of the oppresse d
minorities from a wicked Poland . The second was necessary to remov e
dangerous anti-Soviet bases of international capitalism and imperialism .
The third was a measure to protect the independence of small States .
As indicated in Chapter 4 of the present volume, there had bee n
momentary deviations from this line . Some Australian Communists, pressing ahead too logically from the peacetime teaching of the menace o f
Fascism, had seen Germany as the enemy and had thought it was prope r
to try to defeat her . They had been told that Britain should have gone t o
war over Czechoslovakia and thought it was therefore right for her to g o
'Typical Australian pamphlets and the source of quoted phrases are : Tom Wright, We Defend
Peace (Sydney, circa 1937), and The Way Forward ; Decisions of the 12th National Congress ,
Communist Party of Australia, November 1938 . A Communist account of the rise of the part y
will be found in E. W . Campbell, History of the Australian Labour Movement, A Marxist
Interpretation (Sydney 1945) .
586
THE
BANNING
OF THE
COMMUNIST
PART Y
to war over Poland and that Poland should be defended as a victim o f
Fascist aggression . Such an "incorrect appraisal" of the character of th e
war was soon suppressed by Communist headquarters in Australia and th e
party "quickly orientated itself to a correct Leninist estimation an d
policy" . The erring ones were counselled that Britain and France were no t
fighting against Fascism and were not fighting for anything at which a
worker could rejoice . They were warmongers and imperialists and share d
an equal responsibility with Germany for starting the conflict . Their wa r
with Germany had "the aim in reality of crushing the people's movemen t
throughout Europe and preparing the ground for an Anti-Soviet war " .
It was heretical to think that the U .S .S .R . could take sides in an imperialis t
war—"a reactionary war waged for imperialist aims on both sides" . 3
During October 1939 Communists supported proposals for calling a
peace conference . When nothing came of this move they helped to popularise the idea of the "phoney" war ; they worked to discredit and under mine the leaders of the Labour Party who had declared their support o f
the Australian war effort ; they worked to prevent any closer cooperatio n
between Government and Opposition in the conduct of the war ; they
hindered recruitment of the A .I .F . and opposed the sending of troops
overseas . They had their share in the fostering of strikes . Early in 194 0
they were particularly active in spreading the story that the A .I .F . in th e
Middle East was being used in an imperialist war, for the protection o f
the oil interests of British capitalists, and possibly would be sent agains t
Soviet Russia . "The tragedy of the Anzacs of 1915 was that they believe d
they were fighting for a fine and righteous cause," one of their pamphlet s
reads, "but they were killed in a war for trade, for profits, for capitalis t
domination of the world . And that is the tragedy of the Anzacs of 1940 ."°
When the German invasion of France made it irrelevant to talk eithe r
of a negotiated peace or of a " phoney" war, the party shifted its groun d
to demanding a "People's Government" which would sue for a People' s
Peace and, failing that, would organise a "real People's war agains t
Fascism" . The result was, as before, opposition to the constituted government of Australia and obstruction of any war effort conducted by suc h
a government .
The party' s choice of guidance was deliberate . R . Dixon, a member of
the Central Executive of the Communist Party, replying to public criticis m
by the Attorney-General (Mr Hughes), denied in March 1940 that th e
party took orders from Moscow in the sense of receiving secret instructions ,
but added : "If by `directions from Moscow' Mr Hughes means that our
foreign policy is influenced by the policy of the Soviet Union or that w e
study and apply to Australia the experiences of the working-class movement in other countries and the Communist International, then we plea d
guilty to the charge " . He compared this attitude to the Australian Govern a Typical Australian pamphlets published by the Central Committee, Communist Party of Australia .
are : Soviet-Germany Non-Aggression Pact Explained . Introduction by E. W . Campbell ; The War
and the Working Class, by George Dimitrov, General Secretary of the Communist International :
The Truth About Finland and The Communist Party Speaks, by L . L . Sharkey .
' L. P. Fox, The Truth about Anzac, first published 1936 ; republished March 1940 .
THE BANNING OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
58 7
ment's relations with Great Britain . "We Communists prefer that ou r
policy should be influenced by workers ' Russia rather than by the imperialists of Downing Street. Much better that we should be `agents o f
Stalin', as Mr Hughes referred to me in his broadcast, than agents of Mr
Chamberlain" . 5
At the outset of the war the attitude of the Australian Government t o
Communist activities was tender, considering all the circumstances . Th e
information before the Government during the early months of the wa r
pointed to the possibility of war with Russia, either as the result of th e
German-Soviet pact or of an independent attack by Russia on the Middl e
East, South-Eastern Europe, or Afghanistan . Russian invasion of Finland ,
coupled with speculation about Germany ' s interest in Scandinavia, raise d
a further risk that the Allies and the Soviet Union might become involve d
in hostilities against each other . Until Hitler struck in the East in 1941 ,
there was never any certainty as to which side would gain Soviet aid . Th e
Communist propagandists themselves had in mind the possibility that
Great Britain and the Dominions might fight the Soviet Union .
While the general public might hear little from the Communists except
their criticism of Australia's part in the war, officials charged specificall y
with maintaining the security of Australia saw also a danger in the existenc e
of an active, organised and determined group whose whole sympathy wa s
with a country which was already in alliance with the Allies' enemy and
with which the Allies might some day find themselves at war . Attention wa s
drawn to this situation by the Intelligence Branch towards the end o f
October 1939, and again in December ; and on 5th January 1940 a
memorandum by the Military Board was submitted to the War Cabinet .
This memorandum stated that the well-known method of the Communist s
was to plant " cells " in units—one to spread propaganda and to lead agitation, and another to collect information and to learn as much as possible
of military technique, especially the handling of arms . It was also known
that the party had a special section whose principal task was to carry ou t
this secret work in the armed forces and that recently branches had bee n
instructed that the party's "unknown members " must join the militia ,
although the party ' s public fight against conscription was to continue . On e
definite instance at Ingleburn was quoted of a proposal that party organisers should work on the discontent of the troops over alleged profiteering
in canteens and organise them for mass demonstrations against the Federa l
Government . A Communist directive of 9th November 1939 was quote d
to show plans for sabotage in order to stop the " imperialist war". This
directive read, in part, as follows :
It should be realised that the sabotage contingency is to be introduced in ou r
programme only when war is declared by Britain and France against Russia, a near
possibility . What is to be done? We have surveyed in the past certain vital points i n
each State that would hamper definitely the war progress or the attack on the civi l
population . Since then many more defence undertakings have been set up and mor e
are under way . We must give our intelligence forces the task of ascertaining th e
6 Tribune, 8 Mar 1940.
588
THE BANNING OF THE COMMUNIST PART Y
whereabouts of these projects, the size and extent of the aerodromes, the location s
of munitions dumps, ordnance depots, clothing stores, coastal defence stations, etc . ,
so that immediate action can be taken to hinder the war intentions of Menzies.
The report of the Military Board was supported by the Naval and Ai r
Boards, both of which were mainly concerned with the possibility o f
sabotage . The Naval Board reported "clear indications that Communis t
agitation and activities are growing amongst naval personnel " . The thre e
services concurred in a recommendation that, if it were not in accordanc e
with the Government policy to have subversive organisations declare d
illegal, authority should be given under National Security (General) Regulation 79 to enter and search the premises occupied by any members o f
the Communist Party so suspected, and, where proof of subversive activitie s
could be obtained, to take action against individuals under Nationa l
Security (General) Regulations 25 or 26, restricting their movements o r
ordering their detention .
The War Cabinet decided that it was inadvisable to declare the party a n
illegal organisation and instructed that a conference should be held o f
representatives of the services, the Commonwealth Investigation Branch ,
the Police Commissioners from the various States and the Departmen t
of Information to report on counter-measures . This conference produce d
a series of recommendations to the general effect that the Cabinet shoul d
instruct the various authorities to take action both to detect subversiv e
activities, to institute proceedings against detected persons and to engag e
in counter-propaganda .
The Prime Minister, Menzies, in submitting these recommendations t o
the War Cabinet, however, was unwilling to give a general approval to th e
recommendations "in view of the danger of infringement of the right s
and privileges of innocent persons should approval be given to principle s
without regard to the details and methods of implementing them and th e
provision of safeguards to prevent their abuse" . At his instance, the War
Cabinet set up a ministerial sub-committee on 6th February to conside r
the course of action to be followed . No action was taken immediately .
During the first quarter of 1940 Communist pamphlets, leaflets, news papers, and the use of time purchased on commercial radio stations wer e
reported to be increasing . Publicity censorship, which was working unde r
a standing instruction "to approach the matter of Communist activitie s
without political bias " , was occasionally issuing warnings to editors bu t
found that doubtful matter was usually claimed to be "political criticism "
and thus to be immune from censorship . Two papers which had evaded th e
rules were eventually ordered to submit all copy to the censor . The Department of Information attempted to smother their anti-war propaganda with
its counter-propaganda .
After further complaints that the method of voluntary censorship ha d
been evaded, the Full Cabinet decided on 8th April on a general actio n
against Communist publications and, pursuant to this decision, it wa s
announced on 19th April that the manuscript of all Communist news papers, pamphlets and leaflets must be submitted to censorship before
THE
BANNING
OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY
58 9
publication and that Communist publications were totally prohibited from
writing on "the war, including recruiting and training ; Russia and its
Government ; any strike within the Empire or any Allied country ; or industrial unrest—real or imaginary" . At the same time the Cabinet asked th e
Attorney-General to review the legal position and ascertain what power s
there were to deal with subversive activities, the intention being tha t
persons making seditious statements or performing subversive acts wer e
to be prosecuted .
The Government, however, still hesitated to impose restrictive measures .
The Governor-General's speech on 17th April 1940 had contained a warning that the limits of freedom of political thought and action were reache d
" when men profess an allegiance to a nation other than their own, whe n
they plan to overthrow constitutional government, when they direct thei r
activities to the defeat of their own country in a war to which that country
is committed" ; and stated that, when the vast majority of Australians were
trying to win the war, "no gentle consideration can be extended to thos e
whose real desire is that we should lose it" . s
A month later, on 24th May, after a further investigation, a total ban
was placed on the publication of nine Communist papers, 7 and on 15th
June the Communist Party was declared an illegal organisation . Both those
events came after a major change had taken place in the war situation .
They were directly linked to an increase in the national danger . The ban
on the party was imposed by National Security (Subversive Associations )
Regulations . 8 The regulations provided that the Governor-General migh t
declare the existence of any body, corporate or incorporate, to be "pre judicial to the defence of the Commonwealth or the efficient conduct of th e
war" ; a body so declared became unlawful and was dissolved . The printing
and publication of matter containing "unlawful doctrines " or the holding
of meetings or raising funds to advocate or promote "unlawful doctrines "
was also prohibited . "Unlawful doctrines" were defined as including an y
doctrines or principles which were advocated by a body which had bee n
declared to be unlawful and any doctrines or principles whatsoever pre judicial to the defence of the Commonwealth or the efficient prosecutio n
of the war .
While under the ban, the Communists continued to attempt to influenc e
opinion against the war, with meetings, clandestine publications and, b y
taking advantage of the 1940 General Elections, the electioneering of a
number of "independent" candidates . In this period Curtin, the Labou r
leader, as well as Menzies, came in for abuse as a "Fascist monster" and
supporter of "monopolists, bankers and profiteering warmongers " . In their
propaganda the characteristic persuasions were that the war was bein g
fought between "imperialist gangsters " and the people should suppor t
neither British nor German imperialism . It was being fought for the benefi t
of war profiteers and the working class should not allow themselves to b e
Commonwealth Debates, Vol 163, p . 8.
7 Commonwealth Debates, Vol 163, pp . 1273-4.
6 Statutory Rules 1940, No .
109, 15 Jun 1940.
6
590
THE BANNING OF THE COMMUNIST PART Y
the dupes of these "enemies" of their class . The only thing clear wa s
that while the " rival imperialisms" were fighting each other, the Sovie t
Union, "that great fraternity of socialist nations" was more secure . Because
of the influence of the Soviet Union in bringing in the new socialist order ,
it was the duty of those who hoped for that new order to support th e
Soviet Union . The Soviet-Japanese pact of neutrality was commended
inasmuch as it contributed to "the security of the land of socialism" .
Then came the German invasion of Russia . On the eve of that attack
the Communists in Australia were still dismissing the rumours of a n
impending attack by Germany on the Soviet Union as calculated attempt s
by the British to turn the war against the Soviet Union and they wer e
giving dark hints, based in part on the episode of Rudolf Hess's fligh t
from Germany to England, of some conspiracy between Britain and th e
Axis . When the attack was in progress they insisted that, whatever ai d
might be given by Britain to Russia did not alter the "class character o f
the ruling monopolists in our own country or any other" . Their purpose
was clear. "The first duty of Communists, today as since 1917, is th e
preservation of the spearhead of the Socialist transformation of the worl d
—the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics . Our contribution in Australia will be to continue the struggle against the ruling class, to fight
mercilessly, relentlessly against any attempt by them to switch their wa r
for plunder against the Soviet Union . Such action is the best preparation
for successful aid to the revolution in Germany and the rest of Europe . "
They expressed, too, their distrust of the allies of the Soviet : "The Anglo American imperialists can switch the war even while keeping up a facad e
of real war on German towns, even while allowing supplies to reac h
Soviet Russia" .
In the new circumstances the Communists also started to talk of th e
war as a "war of independence on the part of democratic peoples agains t
Fascist imperialist aggression " , and, interpreting it as such, to give thei r
support to the war effort . It is plain, on an analysis of their statements ,
however, that what they were supporting was not the Australian war effor t
but the "people's war " which, in their interpretation of events, it had no w
become. Their loyalty was not to the nation but to their own idea .
Communist policy was expressed in demands for the closest relation s
with and fullest support for the Soviet Union, and in the promotion an d
advocacy of several movements to that end in which a great number of
Australians, glad to have a new ally and seized with growing admiratio n
of Russian resistance, eagerly joined . It also was expressed in renewe d
agitation for "freedom" for the party in Australia and in this agitatio n
many Australians who were not Communists joined with enthusiasm .
The phrase "civil liberty " was still one to which Australians in genera l
responded readily .
The Communist Party gained from the increased admiration and friendl y
feeling towards the Soviet Union as an ally against Germany . Moreover,
so far as the conduct of the war against Germany was concerned, they
were henceforth pushing in the same general direction, even if not with
THE BANNING OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
59 1
the same purpose, as the Australian Government . Thus more and more
ears were receptive to the persuasions that the Communists were no w
intensely patriotic.
The distinctiveness in the Communist view became chiefly apparent i n
their enthusiasm for such popular and uncontrollable manifestations o f
patriotism as " a people's army" composed of men furnished with individua l
arms and trained in guerilla war and the use of home-made bombs ; their
resistance to the return of the A .I .F . from the Middle East ; their campaigning in favour of military conscription, and their early and clamorous
agitation for the opening of a "second front " in Europe . They were
assiduous, too, in fostering admiration of the Russians at the expense o f
the reputation of other allies and contributed to the criticism of the Unite d
Kingdom which became vocal from time to time .
With the growth of pro-Russian feeling there was in practice som e
mitigation of the ban on their activities . Their pamphlets appeared mor e
numerously and their known members appeared to enjoy considerabl e
freedom of movement, speech-making and organising . It was one of the
remarkable features of the changed attitude that, at a time when th e
organisation was still illegal its known officials were able to receive trave l
permits, it was able to obtain paper for the printing of its banned publications, additional telephones were connected to its offices, J . B . Miles
(described as its general secretary) broadcast from the platform of th e
Sydney Town Hall at a demonstration to mark the first anniversary of th e
Soviet Union's entry into the war, and it published on at least one occasio n
a message of greeting to the Communist Party from a Minister in the
Labour Government . An even more remarkable feature of the situation
was its public campaigning during 1942 for the imposition on so-called
" Fascists" in Australia of exactly the same restrictions and penalties which ,
when applied in its own case by the previous Government, it had represented to be a violation of "freedom" .
It was not until December 1942, however, that the ban on the Communist Party was formally lifted . One of the major reasons for the delay
had been the division of opinion in the Labour Party itself . The announcement was accompanied by explicit statements that the decision evidence d
no sympathy by the Labour Government with any Communist doctrine .
The announcement also made it clear that the lifting of the ban wa s
not a decision on any principle of civil rights or liberties . The prohibition
of the party was removed after the Government had received "satisfactor y
undertakings guaranteeing assistance in war production and in preventin g
stoppages and absenteeism", and it was stated that if the undertaking s
were not observed the Government would reimpose the ban . "This decision
of the Government means only that a very unusual ban or proscriptio n
which was imposed by a previous Government as a war measure to mee t
a particular war situation will be removed because that situation has completely changed as a result of Soviet Russia's fighting on the side of the
United Nations," said the Attorney-General . The lifting of the ban wa s
also accompanied by the promulgation of new National Security Regulau
592
THE BANNING OF THE COMMUNIST PART Y
tions against subversive conduct by individuals . On the same day th e
order banning the publication of newspapers issued by or on behalf o f
the Communist Party was revoked . 9
9 Digest of
Decisions and Announcements, No. 56, p . 10 .