US-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS
REDUCTION TREATY: EXPERIENCE OF THE DIALOGUE
AND LESSONS LEARNED FOR FUTURE WORK AND JOINT
APPROACHES TOWARDS ARTICLE VI OF THE NPT.
Presentation of the Research.
Article VI of NPT: Importance, Focus on USSoviet/Russian Dialogue on Strategic Weapons.
• Art. VI is a result of long and difficult negotiations. At each NPT review
conference its implementation is under fierce debates. In some cases
this issue was the main cause of failures of conferences.
• Despite different juridical interpretations, politically it is clear that its
implementation and, hence, the fate of the Treaty depends on the
two countries with the biggest nuclear arsenals that oversize by far
arsenals of all others taken together.
• 1 July 1968 the US and the USSR, signing NPT, announced about their
agreement to start negotiations on strategic weapons. It was their
recognition of their primary responsibility for the implementation of
Article VI.
Main Stages of the Dialogue.
• 1964-68: confidential preparatory consultations. US: prohibitions of
ABM. USSR: “Defense is moral, offense is immoral”. Compromise:
parallel talks on limitation of ABM and offensive strategic weapons.
• 1969-72: ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement on Offensive Strategic
Weapons (SALT 1).
• 1972-79: SALT 2.
• 1979-85: confrontation, interruption of the dialogue.
• 1985-88: resumption of the dialoguea nd first ahievements. Summits
– Geneva (1985), Reykjavik (1986), Washington – INF Treaty (1987),
Moscow (1988).
Nuclear and Defense/Space Talks.
• 1985-88: the main problem – offense-defense relationship. US: SDI, “broad
interpretation” of ABM Treaty. USSR: non-withdrawal from ABM Treaty “as
it was signed in 1972”.
• 1989, Wyoming Ministerial meeting: political (instead of juridical) link
between START and ABM Treaty. GPALs project (instead of SDI).
• 1989-91: defense and space track, START negotiations (see next slide).
• 1991, July 31: signing of START Treaty.
• 1991-92: preparatory work for its ratification by the Russian parliament,
ratification.
• 1992-94: talks with Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan on their nuclear
status.
• 1994, December 5: enter into force of the START Treaty.
Negotiations on START: Main Problems (apart
from ABM).
• Basic problem: difference of the structures of strategic forces of the US and
the USSR (because of their different geographical and geopolitical
situations). US: advantage on HBs and SLBMs. USSR: advantage on ICBMs,
particularly on mobile and heavy (US had no both).
• Sublimit on warheads of ICBMs and SLBMs (4900). Separate sublimits on
mobile ICBMs (1100) and on heavy ICBMs (1540).
• Heavy missiles.
• Mobile ICBMs.
• Heavy bombers.
• ALCMs: definition and limitation.
• SLCMs: limitation out of the Treaty.
• Verification.
Political Struggle around START in Moscow
and Washington.
• Struggle against START in Moscow as a part of the opposition against
Gorbachev.
• Intrigues in Washington (as I could see them from Geneva).
• Leaks to mass media as an instrument of such fight.
Internal Diplomacy.
• Soviet “Big Five” mechanism on arms control: Central Committee of
CPSU (later – Presidential administration), MFA, Defense Ministry,
Defense Industrial Commission and KGB.
• Final stage of START talks (June-July 1991): definition of a new type of
ICBM and SLBM and other issues. Meeting of the Chiefs of the
General Staffs. Difficulties in arranging this meeting.
New START.
• Signed in 2010, entered into force in 2011.
• Basis – the old START. Simplification of verification.
• New START (Article II.2): “Each Party shall have the right to determine
for itself the composition and structure of its offensive strategic
arms”.
Again Defense-Offense Interrelationship.
• New conditions: no ABM treaty, no SDI, no GPALS. But - Phased Adaptive
Approach.
• The New START recognizes the interrelationship between strategic
offensive arms and strategic defensive arms.
• Russian side unilaterally stated that in case of qualitative and quantitative
buildup of the US ABM Russia would decide on its further participation in
the New START Treaty. The Russian Law of the ratification confirmed this
condition.
• The dialogue on strategic defensive arms started after the conclusion of the
New START on various levels (Presidents – Ministers – Ambassadors) and
was stopped (or suspended?) with the deterioration of international
situation, particularly with the Ukrainian crisis that started in 2013.
Conclusions.
• The backbone and at the same time the major problem of the US-Soviet/Russian
dialogue was always strategic defense-offense interrelationship. This lesson is
important for the approach to the resumption of the dialogue.
• Russian concerns towards current US ABM project might be not justified because
of the unclearness of some important issues of the Phased Adaptive Approach,
namely: (a) range of anti-missiles; (b) their velocity; (c) exclusion of the technical
possibility of THAAD launchers to be used against targets on the surface. The
conclusion of an agreement regulating these issues would help further progress
on strategic weapons.
• It is in the interests of the implementation of Article VI of NPT to further reduce
levels of strategic offensive weapons provided for by the New START. That is why
it is necessary to start the preparation for negotiations on a new treaty on
strategic weapons, keeping in mind lessons of the previous negotiations (more
specific conclusions on such lessons will be formulated in the research).
• The dialogue can be resumed through bilateral summit(s).