Forming a regional policy in Sweden:
W here will the contradictory policies lead?
by
Lars Niklasson
Political science/IEI
Linköping University
581 83 Linköping
Sweden
[email protected]
and
Pontus Tallberg
Regional development
Region Skåne
291 89 Kristianstad
Sweden
[email protected]
A bstract
The future role of the regions is a contested issue in Sweden, in spite of more than a decade of
experiments and innovative solutions. Images of a regionalized future are formed and visions
are competing behind the scenes. A national commission suggested a regional model for all of
Sweden and further devolution of policy to the new regions. However, the government made
few changes to the present situation and has postponed many issues until after the upcoming
election in September. But the issue of designing regions in Sweden is not just a political
question for the parties. It is also an area where actors form strategies and external events
have an impact. Various problems and solutions are floating around in something resembling
a garbage can. We can see several interrelated issues being discussed, such as how bigger
regions can be formed, how national agencies can relate to new regions and to what extent
local governments should work out new roles within larger regions. Demography and other
challenges put pressures on all levels to rethink roles and responsibilities.
Hence, the future development of the regions in Sweden is at a stage where the issue is being
framed and coalitions are formed, partly through debate and partly through the rivalry of the
various perspectives. It is a situation which can be described through theoretical lenses such
as the tKUHH³LQVWLWXWLRQDOLVPV´6RFLRORJLFDO institutionalism focuses on the creation of meaning, how joint understandings are formed. Historical institutionalism highlights the importance of paths, how previous choices restrict the current situation. Rational choice institutionalism can add an understanding of the setting where issues are made. These perspectives
help us understand what will be important when regional and national actor finally make up
their minds.
Previously presented at the 32nd Conference of the European Group for Public Administration
(E GPA), September 8-10, 2010, Toulouse, F rance
2
Innehåll
0. Sammanfattning: vart leder regionfrågan?
1. Regional policy in Sweden
2. Three ways to understand what is going on
3. The contested role of the regions
4. The first interpretation: games on two levels
5. The second interpretation: competing logics
6. The third interpretation: paths determine outcomes
7. Where will the contradictory policies lead?
References
2
3
5
6
10
14
17
19
20
0. Sammanfattning: vart leder regionfrågan?
Ansvarskommittén föreslog regional självstyrelse i alla län och en fortsatt överföring av uppJLIWHUIUnQVWDWHQWLOOODQGVWLQJHQ´UHJLRQNRPPXQHUQD´5HJHULQJHQlUNOXYHQRFK*|UDQ
Persson har i efterhand antytt att hans önskan, när han skapade Ansvarskommittén och utsåg
en moderat landshövding till dess ordförande, var att lägga ner landstingen.
8QGHUGHVHQDVWHnUHQKDUGHWSnJnWWHWWJDQVNDPlUNOLJW´SDUWQHUV|N´SnOlQVQLYnI|UDWWVNDSD
större län. Nya län i Norrland har avslagits samtidigt som regeringen har beslutat att bevara
Halland och Gotland i orubbat skick. Bland övriga län är osäkerheten större. Sjukvårdslogiken
pekar mot nya län utifrån samarbeten om de stora sjukhusen. Samtidigt pekar den ekonomiska
utvecklingens logik mot samarbeten i riktning mot storstadsområden. Vid sidan av dessa arbetar statliga myndigheter och EU med sina egna regioner. Går det att skapa en gemensam indelning?
Frågan är ännu mer komplex. Regionförsöken i mitten av 90-talet kom till efter hårda strider
inom det socialdemokratiska partiet, som hade behov att göra upp med centern. Förenklat kan
man säga att det finns fyra falanger som kämpar mot varandra i politiken och i förvaltningen.
Regionvännerna har slagits för en överflyttning av ledarrollen, från länsstyrelsen till landstinget. Båda är organisationer på den regionala nivån, men det är en principiell skillnad mellan att representera staten (länsstyrelsen) och att representera väljarna i länet (landstinget).
Även länder som Frankrike och Storbritannien sliter med principfrågan om hur demokratin
ska organiseras, uppifrån eller nerifrån. Länsstyrelserna befinner sig på defensiven, men det
finns fördelar även med en organisation som företräder centralmakten ute i landet.
En tredje falang påpekar att vi redan har extremt självständiga kommuner och att en modell
för regionalt ledarskap måste bygga på deras medverkan. Den finska modellen med kommunförbund sågs länge som ett alternativ till landstingen.
Det som gör situationen extra rörig är att det finns en fjärde falang som står i motsats till alla
de tidigare, vilket gör att det är svårt att finna en övertygande majoritet åt något håll. Det
handlar om sektorsmyndigheterna, särskilt Arbetsförmedlingen. Tidigare hade AF och Försäkringskassan regionala styrelser, som kunde se gemensamma intressen med andra aktörer i
regionerna. Nu har myndigheterna centraliserats för att bättre uppnå sina egna mål.
På 90-talet var lösningen den motsatta, att bilda regionala partnerskap med uppmaning från
UHJHULQJHQDWWVDPRUGQDVLQDLQVDWVHU%DNJUXQGHQYDUHQKnUGNULWLNPRW´GHQUHJLRQDODUöUDQ´GYV|YHUODSSDQGHRFKRNRRUGLQHUDGHLQVDWVHUDYP\QGLJKHWHUQD8WDQI|UVNDSHWlUHWW
sådant problemkomplex som berör många organisationer. Tillsammans har kommunerna, Ar-
3
betsförmedlingen och Försäkringskassan resurser att ordna utbildningar mm, men frestelsen är
stor att dra sig undan och låta övriga (eller ESF-rådet) betala.
På regional nivå finns stora offentliga och privata resurser för utveckling av företag och individer. Många resurser hör till staten och en del hör till landstingen och kommunerna. Hur kan
man samordna dessa insatser över sektorsgränserna och över nivåerna? Regionalisering är en
lösning, men den tilltalar inte alla fyra falangerna ovan.
Den politiska situationen kan belysas utifrån tre vetenskapliga perspektiv som lyfter fram
spelreglernas (institutionernas) betydelse. Ett ekonomiskt (rationalistiskt) synsätt hjälper oss
att se maktspel mellan partier, departement och regioner. Mycket handlar om att berörda politikområden har utvecklats med olika logik. Den offentliga verksamheten är specialiserad men
överlappar. Bakom varje myndighet står en järntriangel av intressen som försvarar det historiskt framvuxna. Göran Persson tillsatte Ansvarsutredningen. Alliansen har tillsatt en ny utredning att nysta i frågan utifrån statens perspektiv samt hjälpa till med länssammanslagningarna. Framför allt har alliansen priorterat andra frågor.
Ett sociologiskt synsätt hjälper oss att se verksamhetslogiker som får aktörerna att prioritera
olika lösningar. På många håll är det oklart vilken väg man bör gå. Sannolikt tittar man på
andra län för att få vägledning. Inom ett och samma län kan aktörerna ha olika framtidsbilder.
Landstingen kan hamna i konflikt med regionförbunden, där de själva ingår. I värsta fall blir
det ett hela havet stormar, där några län hamnar utanför. Regionalisering utmanar den svenska
V\QHQSnGHPRNUDWLGlUUHJHULQJHQ´IRONVXYHUlQLWHWHQ´E|UKDVWRUWXWU\PPHDWWVW\UDI|UGHW
gemensamma bästa.
Ett historiskt perspektiv hjälper oss att se dörrar som har stängts och är svåra att öppna igen.
Alliansen bytte spår genom att reformera försäkringssystemen istället för att samordna insatserna regionalt. Centralstyrning ökar likabehandlingen och därmed reformernas legitimitet.
Åtgärderna bygger på makroekonomiskt tänkande, medan den tidigare regionaliseringen snaUDUHE\JJGHSnNXOWXUJHRJUDIL´QHZUHJLRQDOLVP´gGHVIUnJDQlUYDUWGHWWDOHGHU.DQGHQ
makroekonomiska diskursen kombineras med Ansvarskommitténs regionaliseringsförslag? På
90-talet var det EU som öppnade ett nytt spår; kan det hända igen?
1. Regional policy in Sweden
Like Denmark and Norway, Sweden combines a strong central state with very independent
local governments. The regional level has traditionally not been as important and has also
been a level where other actors have strong interests (Petersson 2005). For the past 20 years,
the regions have been the focus of much activity with several reforms and a number of organizational experiments. These touch upon deep conflicts in the design of the Swedish welfare
state and successive governments have found it hard to solve tKH³*RUGLDQNQRW´RIUegional
policy in Sweden.
There is a growing literature on regionalization in Europe. To mention just two examples,
Patrick Le Galés has described the politics in France while Ian Bache has described the unfolding of events in the UK (Le Galés 2005, Bache 2008). France and the UK move generally
in the same direction as Sweden, towards a greater role for regional actors, while starting with
much less independent local and regional governments. Italy and Spain have moved further
towards federalism. Restructuring has taken place in Denmark and Norway too, with amalgamations of local governments being the big issue in Denmark. There are still big similarities
with Sweden, but the three countries seem to be moving in different directions. In Finland,
4
which has a more fragmented structure (Sandberg 2005), there have been several waves of
contradictory regionalizing policies.
Much interest has been focused on Europeanization, how the EU influences its member states
to build up a regional level of administration. In Sweden, the EU opened a window of opportunity in the 90s which led to the adoption oI³QHZUHJLRQDOLVP´HPSKasizing the need to
develop all regions on their own merits rather than by transfer payments between regions
(Regionalpolitiska utredningen 2000; Lagendijk 1997, Keating 1998) Working in partnership
was inspired by the EU structural funds. However, in the present context, the question is more
about the next step, after the first integration into the EU, to create greater coherence across
the public sector and, possibly, greater capacity at the regional level. The EU has little direct
impact on the organization of health care or sub-national democracy in the member states. Its
role in economic development is very restricted, with the structural funds operating through
the Swedish national government. Stronger regions may demand a more powerful role in the
future administration of the funds.1
At this point, we find it more useful to dig deeper into the Swedish case than trying to compare it in broader terms to other countries. The processes which go on within Sweden are potentially more dramatic than any previous reorganization at the regional or local levels. The
handling of the issues is XSWRUHJLRQDOEDUJDLQLQJWRDQH[WHQWWKDWKDVQ¶WEHHQVHHQEefore.
There have been just a few slightly similar processes of regional bargaining to form regional
partnerships and for collaboration on metropolitan development ³VWRUVWDGVSROLWLNHQ´, across
local government boundaries. Amalgamations of regions took place in the 90s, but they were
mainly about creating more coherent regions around two major cities.
Our ambition in this paper is to discuss where the present situation is leading, using methods
from the social sciences. The purpose is to interpret the situation in the light of modern
theory. It is an exploratory paper, without the ambition to fully track the processes going on.
We proceed deductively, starting with the models and then look for examples of the factors
they focus on. This gives us a broad and relevant but not complete picture of what goes on. At
WKLVVWDJHZHGRQ¶WJRLQWRWhe debates on the contents of the theoretical models.
The issue of designing regions in Sweden is not just a political question for the parties. It is
also an area where actors form strategies and external events have an impact. Various problems and solutions are floating around in something resembling a garbage can. Images of a
regionalized future are formed and visions are competing behind the scenes. We can see several interrelated issues being discussed, such as how bigger regions can be formed, how national agencies can relate to new regions and to what extent local governments should work
out new roles within larger regions. Demography and other challenges put pressures on all
levels to rethink roles and responsibilities.
Hence, the future development of the regions in Sweden is at a stage where the issue is being
framed and coalitions are formed, partly through debate and partly through the rivalry of the
various perspectives. It is a situation which can be described through theoretical lenses such
aVWKHWKUHH³LQVWLWXWLRQDOLVPV´
x Social institutionalism focuses on the creation of meaning, how joint understandings
are formed.
1
This was proposed by the parliamentary commission discussed below (Ansvarskommittén 2007).
5
x
x
Historical institutionalism highlights the importance of paths, how previous choices
restrict the current situation.
Rational choice institutionalism can add an understanding of the setting where issues
are made.
These perspectives help us understand what will be important when regional and national actor finally make up their minds. Our ambition is to use the frameworks to describe the situation and point to the factors which will have an effect on how the issues will be solved (or
handled) in the future. We have a good knowledge of the issues and debates and believe that a
theoretical frame or model can help us make predictions on what will happen and what could
affect outcomes.2
2. T hree ways to understand what is going on
We believe that the so called three institutional perspectives can shed some light on what goes
on behind the scenes. The institutional perspectives have become standard tools for analysis
over the past two decades and lots have been said about their merits. Peter Hall and Rosemary
Taylor framed the issue of three institutionalisms in a classic article which is still much
quoted (Hall & Taylor 1996). Other lists have been introduced by Guy Peters (Peters 1999),
John Campbell (2004) and others. Recently these perspectives have been applied to studies of
the European Union (Pollack 2009, Risse 2009), which is also about the development of relationships between levels of government, although on a larger scale.
The models or perspectives represent three important ways of thinking about politics, by emphasizing how norms and/or regulation guide the behavior of individuals and sometimes
create unexpected outcomes. Individuals may do the best they can, but the frameworks within
which they act can be of great importance as more or less conscious guidelines. The point of
focusing on institutions is that they have a great explanatory value, especially when countries
are compared. They are the key to understanding why policies are different; because they determine the room for action by political actors, in three different ways.
³5DWLRQDOFKRLFHLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP´LVYHU\VLPLODUWRQHRFODVVLFDOHFRQRPLFVDSSOLHGWRSRlitical phenomena. To some extent politics can be understood in terms of self-interested politicians fighting for power within the rules (institutions) of parliaments and constitutions. The
institutions determine what is rational to do and, hence, can explain why actors behave the
way they do. Much focus in this perspective is on the interaction between actors and how outcomes are structured by the situation (Hall & Taylor 1996:940, 945). Originally this framework was used to understand behavior in the US Congress, but a similar line of analysis has
been applied to politics in European countries, even though European parliamentary systems
are much more dominated by the executive government and not as open for political bargaining as the American system (Page 2006).
This institutional model works best when individual preferences are set and self-interested
rationality will guide behavior in predictable ways. Political games at the national level can be
understood in these terms, as conflicts between parties, but the play within and between regions is generally more open. The self-interest of politicians and bureaucrats can also be more
long-term and more influenced by ideology, suggesting that the government may think in
terms of principles rather than short-term utility maximization.
2
One of us has followed the events mainly from a regional perspective and the other mainly from a national
perspective, before returning to academia.
6
The ambiguity of the first type of institutionalismLQGHWHUPLQLQJZKDWLVLQRQH¶VVHOIinterest, is the starting point RI³VRFLRORJLFDOLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP´ZKLFKIRFXVHV(among other
things) on how preferences are formed. It foFXVHVRQWKHVWHSEHIRUH³UDWLRQDO´SROLWLFDOFRnflicts take place, when issues are open for interpretation. Politicians need to figure out what
the situation demands E\DVNLQJTXHVWLRQVOLNH³ZKDWLVWKHULJKWWKLQJWRGR"´DQG³ZKLFK
concerns should take SULRULW\"´ Sometimes decisions may be based on other things than selfinterest, such as following norms or building up legitimacy in the face of other actors (Hall &
Taylor 1996:949).
In this second institutional perspective, actors want to do what is appropriate or good enough,
rather than calculating what is in their best interest. In a strong version, the claim is that this
should replace the rationalistic conception as a more relevant way of explaining human behavior. In a softer version, this view is compatible with the previous perspective and is especially relevant when individual preferences are not yet settled (Risse 2009). This is, in other
words, a way of understanding how individuals form their positions. Some norms can be very
strong, like a dominant paradigm in the light of which all issues are interpreted, while in other
cases there can be competing norms, leaving it up to individuals to interpret the situation.
/DVWO\LQ³KLVWRULFDOLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP´WKHFODLPLVWKDWthe past partly determines the future.
Some choices have consequences at later stages, thereby creating a path which is difficult to
reverse, for example by giving certain interests a privileged position (Hall & Taylor 1996:938,
941). In an international perspective, the particular constitutional traditions limit the range of
possible options in each country. To shift models completely would demand very strong leadership to go against tradition and vested interests. Usually this takes place only if there is a
crisis or a change of perception, as when countries join the EU. This could mean that there are
several paths which could either come into conflict or work as closed doors for various alternatives, restricting the range of options open to the actors. The way the issues are handled
may turn out to be very important in restricting the range of solutions available.
7KHVHSHUVSHFWLYHVGRQ¶WH[KDXVWWKHUDQJHRISRVVLEOHH[SODQDWLRQVRISROLFymaking since
they only deal with the role of institutions (rules, regulations, norms) for making decisions.
Other factors, such as levels of the economy and other variables used in statistical analyses,
are only dealt with indirectly. Furthermore, in their pure forms the three make very different
assumptions and DUHQ¶WQHFHVVDULO\FRPSDtible. Here, we follow John Campbell and others
who have pointed out that the perspectives can be compatible and can be applied simultaneously, in spite of their differences. $V+DOODQG7D\ORUVD\³HDFKVHHPVWREHSURYLGLQJD
partial account of the forces at work in a given situation or capturing different dimensions of
WKHKXPDQDFWLRQDQGLQVWLWXWLRQDOLPSDFWSUHVHQWWKHUH´S By applying all three versions of institutionalism we believe we can understand much of what is going on in relation to
regional policy in Sweden.
3. T he contested role of the regions
To understand the present situation in Sweden, one has to look at the context of how things
have developed until now. The role of the regions has been a contested issue in Sweden at
least since the 1960s.3
3
This is a brief summary only. For a longer overview, see Stegmann McCallion & Tallberg (2008).
7
The term region refers both to an area, a county, and to the elected body of the county
³ODQGVWLQJ´WKHEHDUHURIWKe old tradition of free men gatherLQJDWWKH³WLQJ´7KHHOHFWHG
body is primarily responsible for health care, but also transport, culture and some other issues.
,WLVD³ORFDOJRYHUQPHQWRQDODUJHUVFDOH´ZLWKJUHDWLQGHSHQGHQFHDQGFROOHFWVLWVRZQWDxes.4 Together with the similarly independent local governments, it forms the Swedish model
of welfare state, where parliament and the national government sets standards, while local and
regional governments provide most of the services. An indication of the importance of local
and regional governments is that Swedes pay around 30 per cent of their income in taxes to
these levels of government.
One exception to the general model is the growing role of private providers. Another exception is that some services are provided by national agencies, like unemployment benefits and
social security. A large number of national agencies - ranging from social security to customs
services - run their own regional and local operations, often divided into other areas than the
formal regions (counties). Finally, the counties are administrative units of the national government, each with an appointed prefect ³ODQGVK|YGLQJ´to be the representative of the
king/government. The prefect and his or her county administrative board had (has) some control over the local governments, some administrative roles of their own and also the role of
coordinating the regional operations of national agencies. Some agencies, like the environmental board, have no field organization of their own and therefore operate through the county administrative board.
Hence, the national and local governments are strong in Sweden, while the regions are arenas
ZKHUHVHYHUDONLQGVRIRUJDQL]DWLRQVLQWHUVHFWDQGSURGXFHZKDWLVRIWHQUHIHUUHGWRDVD³UeJLRQDOPHVV´7KHUHJLRQDOJRYHUQPHQWVFRXQW\FRXQFLOVKDYHJUDGXDOO\PRYHGIURPEHLQJ
providers of health care to general spokespersons of the regions. Local governments can be
powerful by themselves at the regional arena (especially big cities) and through federations
for various purposes. A large number of national agencies have regional operations or operate
through the prefecture (county administrative boards). In addition, various strategies have
been applied to bring coherence, either a clearer separation of roles or integration through
various kinds of issue-related partnerships. Devolution is one solution while a contract between region and state would be another solution.
In the 1960s the role of the prefects was questioned as elected politicians had become in
charge of most of the welfare state, either in local governments or in regional governments.
The latter were increasingly seen as the more appropriate spokespeople of the regions, which
lead to a pragmatic solution in the 1970s, where the appointed prefect had to work with a
board of elected politicians appointed by the county council.
In the 80s another debate was taking place, on decentralization to local governments. Schools
were handed over from the national to the local governments and an opinion demanded that
labor market programs should be turned over to local governments too. Some of them were
turned over and some other programs were turned over to the county administrative boards.
However, most of the huge resources remained with the labor market board, which at the time
operated with very independent regional branches, as separate agencies with their own boards
and chaired by the prefect, also a pragmatic solution.
4
Regional and local governments are parallel governments, under the national government.
8
In the beginning of the 90s, Sweden was an extreme example of multilevel governance, with
lots of organizations, belonging to different levels and sectors of government and sometimes
with overlapping leadership, holding resources for regional development (especially support
for businesses and skills development). The situation was described as ³the regional mess´,
where the level of conflict or cooperation varied across the regions and depended very much
on personal relationships. Regional planning processes were important instruments to bring
about some coherence.
To summarize, there have been at least three regional debates in Sweden, one on democracy
(elected versus appointed regional leadership), one on the design of the national agencies (regional integration or functional separation) and one on the more general issue of centralization
versus decentralization. These perspectives are still competing over the development of regional policy. Several minority fractions are fighting each other within the public sector and
in the major parties, making it difficult to form a coherent majority opinion. The agencies
often find it easy to work with the elected bodies and want to avoid being merged with the
prefecture. Partnerships and the prefecture are competing mechanisms for integration, which
is something that some ministries are not interested in. Some say economic development has a
regional logic while others think that Sweden is too small to diversify more. Some believe in
bottom-up processes while others think that only a strong center can provide coherent policies
and equal treatment across the country. Some think that local governments, rather than regional governments, are the appropriate bearers of bottom-up processes. And so on.
0HPEHUVKLSRIWKH(8LQDQGWKHGLVFRXUVHRQ³QHZUHJLRQDOLVP´JDYHDERRVWWRWKH
proponents of a stronger role for elected regional politicians. The balance shifted within the
dominating party to embark on a set of experiments which included some devolution of powers to elected regional bodies as well as the encouragement of regional partnerships of public
and private organizations (Statskontoret 2004a, 2004b, Niklasson 2004, 2005). The idea of the
latter was to coordinate policies geographically rather than by (or, in addition to) policy sector
³VLORV´LQRWKHUZRUGVD³VRIW´NLQGRIGHYROXWLRQ$VPDOOEXWYHU\FRQWURYHUVLDOH[SHUiment in one region integrated the labor market board and forestry board in the prefecture, as a
kind of regionally integrated (national) state (Statskontoret 2005).5 This was when the structural funds of the European Union started operations with projects more or less related to other regional initiatives, providing funds to regional actors if they could agree on the use of
these funds. Hence, Sweden entered a phase of increased regionalization but also ambivalence
with several models operating in parallel and no unifying vision of where to move or why.
The delicate balance of the opposing groups soon shifted. No more regional governments than
the original two were given devolved powers.6 Instead, another of the experimental models ±
an indirectly elected assembly of local and regional governments ± was opened up for more
regions. Since 2002 almost all regions have opted for this model, except for a few where the
DFWRUVKDYHQ¶WEHHQDEOHWRZRUNRXWDQDJUHHPHQWPRVWQRWDEO\in the Stockholm region. In
the latter, the prefect still holds the leadership role in regional development issues.7 The proponents of strong national agencies triumphed with the abolishment of the regional boards of
the labor market board, the social security administration and some other agencies. Later, the
labor market board was given control of its programs in all regions, ending the odd experi5
At the same time, the leadership role in the region (Gotland) was transferred (devolved) from the prefect to the
elected body, creating a French situation of one state body dealing with one regional body.
6
Region Skåne and Västra Götalandsregionen. However, the island of Gotland should be included too, since it is
de facto both a local and a regional government, making a unique hybrid.
7
In Stockholm, there are parallel planning processes by the prefect and the regional government (OECD 2006).
9
ment in one of the regions. In other words, the national government shifted its focus to centralization and conformity of welfare provision across the country, swinging the pendulum away
from decentralization of the public sector, while the devolution experiment continued.
The confusing situation was and is a problem for the public sector and for the main political
parties, with internal fights over who should do what. A parliamentary commission was appointed in 2003 to come up with an overall view of how to reorganize the public sector, i.e.
how to allocate responsibility for various tasks across the levels of government. To some surprise, the commission favored continued devolution and published long reports on how to
organize at the national, regional and local levels. One part of this was to create larger regions
with greater capacity to adapt and develop policies for economic development. Some policies
were suggested to be devolved from the national to the regional governments, while other
policies should be transferred from local to regional governments.
Equally surprising, not very much happened after the report was published in 2007 (Ansvarskommittén 2007). The report was not what the government in 2003 had hoped for. The prime
minister at the time has later admitted in public that he was hoping for a chance to abolish the
elected regional governments and find new solutions for health care, similar to what has happened in Norway (Sydsvenska Dagbladet 2008). That would have been a serious blow to the
whole idea of devolution and regional integration of policies.
The present government (elected in 2006) is divided and has kept a low profile. First it asked
the regions to propose how they could merge into larger regions, which started heated regional debates on whom to partner with. A coordinator was appointed to help filing applications
before the end of 2008, to be processed before the elections in September 2010. Then the
government decided that two small regions would be preserved as they are, taking them out of
the discussions. Meanwhile, the various ministries pursued their own agendas, including the
surprising suggestion to partly amalgamate the county administrative boards nationally, to
have specialized functions placed in different regions.8
The proponents of a more integrated public sector (dominated by the regional development
section of the Ministry of Enterprise) found a new way to pursue its agenda, through an experiment in 2007-09. More than twenty agencies were grouped thematically at the national level,
to coordinate their implementation of policies related to innovation, skills development and
transport, in order to provide better support for regional development. From an analytical
perspective, this was an interesting attempt to meet the regional demand for a more coherent
national government. In the end it was not strong enough to integrate the ministerial silos
³LURQWULDQJOHV´HYHQWKRXJKLW was part of the national strategy for implementation of the
structural funds. Ironically, the government decided, before the experiment was over, to
merge the four large agencies for transport (roads, railroads, air and sea transport), choosing
formal integration over informal.9 How this will affect the operations at the regional level and
integration with other organizations remains to be seen.
8
Specialization may bring savings, but it is rather odd to divide up a body designed for regional integration into
little silos placed in different regions.
9
The other failed area was skills development (including programs run by the labor market board and the social
security administration). Here the experiment was too much of wishful thinking, since many of these programs
are social rights for individuals, designed by parliament and not up to the agencies to adjust or integrate (Niklasson, Eduards & Eriksson 2009). However, the downturn of the economy in 2009 forced the Ministries of Enterprise, Labor and Education to discuss joint regional strategies and instruments for the unemployed, which the
experiment had failed to encourage. In other words, the range of politically/bureaucratically feasible action expanded with the crisis.
10
As far as the proposals by the parliamentary commission are concerned, the government has
applied a tactic of postponing difficult issues until after the upcoming elections. It appointed a
commissioner in 2009 to review the regional branches of the national agencies with the purpose of making the regional operations by the central government more coherent.10 He will
report in December 2012, after the 2010 elections but before the 2014 elections. Originally,
the mission had five main parts:
- to suggest a coherent regional structure for the national government (agencies and
county administrative boards)
- to investigate whether increased coordination across levels would be beneficial (i.e.
with regional and local governments)
- to prepare a new set of regions (names and capitals for new counties) if regional governments (county councils) want to amalgamate
- to prepare a legal framework for the processes of amalgamation
- to suggest revisions in the system of redistributive payments, as a consequence
In the instruction, the government stated a number of principles:
- The regional operations of the national government must be more coherent. The
present diversity, where each agency designs its own regions and very few follow the
counties boundaries, makes it difficult for local and regional governments to collaborate with the agencies
- amalgamated regional governments will have devolved powers similar to the experiments (in Skåne and Västra Götaland)
- further devolution is not on the agenda
Later, the commissioner was also asked to comment on (future) proposed new regions and, if
he agreed, prepare financial settlements between affected regional governments.11 What was
originally a very passive role for the commissioner now changed into an active role in the
negotiations as the commissioner was given a mandate to negotiate with all the regional governments. The need for such a role was seen in the problems with some of the applications for
amalgamation so far. The government, in other words, gave hints on what it expected and
introduced a new player in the game.
In essence, the regional issue is now primarily about how to draw new boundaries, rather than
a discussion of what the regional governments should do or even why. The government will
let regional actors (within certain limits) negotiate their own fate. The role of the commissioner can be interpreted as preparing an independent view of what would be best for the national
government, while the regional actors take the lead role. Creating amalgamated regions is
now very much up to the present providers of (mainly) health care, rather than a principled
analysis from a distance.
Our ambition is to understand where these entangled processes will lead, especially the regional negotiations to form amalgamated regions. The other issues live in the background and
will eventually come back to the surface when the discussion of devolution and/or integration
of policy sectors are reopened.
4. T he first interpretation: games on two levels
10
11
Instruction given by the government in June 2009 (Dir 2009:62)
Instruction given by the government in February 2010 (Dir 2010:12)
11
The first institutional perspective on the struggles over the role of the regions in Sweden highlights the various games that are going on. There are at least two games at the central level
and several games within and around each region (with the possible exception of the two regions the government has accepted already). Here the focus is on who the actors are, what
their preferences are and how the situation is structured.
Traditionally one would expect a fight between political parties but, as indicated above, there
are many fractions involved. Divisions cut through the parties, where the former prime minister apparently hoped for a cross-party alliance against the regional governments. The strategy
failed when the commission chairman began to see devolution as the preferred way to make
the public sector coherent (in spite of being a prefect himself).
One possible key to understanding recent events is the role of the Center party, which is
strongly pro-decentralization and even has talked about turning Sweden into a federal country.
The experiments in the 90s were enacted when the Social democrats depended on the Center
party in parliament. Now the Center party is in the ruling government but bound by compromises in the Alliance of four parties, dominated by a much more hesitant conservative prime
minister.
Another game is played within the top levels of the civil service, where different parts of the
public sector are defending their interests behind the scenes, constituting what is variously
UHIHUUHGWRDV³LURQWULDQJOHV´SROLF\QHWZRUNVRUHSLVWHPLFFRPPXQLWLHV. The Swedish cabinet can only make decisions by consensus - DYHU\LPSRUWDQW³LQVWLWXWLRQ´WRXQGHUVWDQG6Zedish politics - which gives each PLQLVWU\WKHULJKWWRYHWRDQ\VXJJHVWLRQVWKH\GRQ¶WDpprove
of. One example of the fragmentation this can lead to is the position of the labor market
board, which aims for (national) control of its instruments and is generally supported by the
big unions and several economists. Ministers of Labor have tended to keep other interests at a
distance, either to defend the labor market board or to reform it, as with the present government.12 In either case, integration and decentralization are secondary or even contradictory
concerns for this Ministry.13
In the discussion of regional policy it should be noted that it involves several ministries. The
question of dHYROXWLRQLV³RZQHG´E\WKH0LQLVWU\RI)LQDQFHZKLFKKDVDVHFWLRQRQWKH
structure of the public sector, including local and regional governments as well as the prefectures. The specific policies are owned by their respective ministries like health care (Social
affairs) and transport (Enterprise). The regional development issues are owned by a section of
the Ministry of Enterprise, linking development strongly but not exclusively to business development. They oversee the regional planning processes conducted by the lead organization
for regional development in each region. Finally, one should add the section for economic
policy of the Ministry of Finance, which owns macroeconomic policy and tends to be skeptical towards regional development policy and support for individual business in general.14 Any
new policies will have to be accepted by all ministries or imposed by the prime minister (act-
12
7UDGLWLRQDOO\WKHODERUPDUNHWERDUGZDVVHHQDVDNH\VSHQGLQJLQVWUXPHQWIRUWKH6RFLDOGHPRFUDWV¶KROGRQ
power, but the experiments in the 80s and 90s indicate that there were internal critics too.
13
An amalgamation of the Ministries of Labor aQG(QWHUSULVHDQG7UDQVSRUWGLGQ¶WFKDQJHWKLVVLWXDWLRQDQG
has been reversed. It was most likely an attempt to disarm one or several policy networks.
14
An example of the influence of this section of the ministry was that the Swedish government tried to opt out of
the structural funds, saying that they should only be for the newer member states of the EU.
12
ing on behalf of the leaders of the four-party coalition). This can explain the odd experiment
of 2007-09 as the only feasible option available.15
Another way for ministries to influence issues like devolution is through the flow of other
issues that are on the agenda at the same time (with or without intention). Over the last two
decades, economic development of firms and regions has been high on the agenda, which
favors devolution and regional integration of policies. Opponents of devolution have talked
about welfare and the risk of unequal treatment across the country if regions get more influence. There has also been a heavy debate on health care, saying that either privatization or
nationalization would stand a better chance to restructure and save costs, which hits at the
elected regional governments as providers of health care. The latter linkages tend to work
against the regions while the first work in favor of a stronger role for the regions.
The amalgamation of agencies for transport is a very relevant issue for the regions, but seems
unrelated to regional policy, in spite of being put forward by the same ministry (Enterprise)
and the same party (Center party). There have furthermore been attempts to open up discussions on democracy, by commissions on democracy and on the role of public agencies, but
they have not been very influential. Neither have they worked through their issues to come up
with large-scale solutions like the parliamentary commission on the public sector did (Demokratiutredningen 2000, 2006 års förvaltningskommitté 2007).
What is most interesting at the national level is that this government and the previous one
have turned the issues away over the elections, by means of commissions and turning it over
to regional negotiations. Both are indications of a desire not to risk upsetting vested interests
or the citizens, i.e. to avoid losing face before the elections. 5HJLRQDOSROLF\GRHVQ¶WVHHPWR
be a topic for winning elections.
Setting up the parliamentary commission was itself an important move by the previous government. There was a need to prepare a decision on the experiments in two regions, but the
commission was given a much greater scope. As mentioned, the prime minister in 2003 has
later indicated that he was looking for an end of the experiment and even the abolishment of
the regional governments. Health care was (is) under tremendous pressure and the conservative party has argued for twenty years that the county councils should be abolished and a level
of taxation taken away. It takes little imagination to think that a conservative chairman (a prefect) was chosen by the prime minister (a Social democrat) to do the job for him.
After delivery of the report, the initiative went over to the newly elected government. Its major decision was to abstain from having an opinion, leaving it up to the regional actors to
come up with solutions. One of the main arguments was that the government wanted to avoid
endless battles on how to draw new boundaries, an issue which was thought to produce many
losers and, hence, something to be avoided in order to win the next elections. This set-up was
an important move (a non-decision on substance) by the government. It abdicated on this issue and opened for a regional game of friendsmaking.
Leaders of the conservative party said that there was no demand from the people for devolution or the amalgamation of regions, and that these issues were only in the interest of local
and regional elites. The government instead has focused its energy on fighting unemployment
15
It is even more interesting as it involves a change of government. It was negotiated as related to the national
strategy for the structural funds, by the regional development unit, for a junior minister (Social democrat). After
lots of delay, it was enacted by the new minister who is also deputy prime minister (Center party).
13
and social exclusion in general, with an emphasis on stronger incentives for work in the various public support systems, an agenda much in line with macroeconomic thinking by former
president Clinton and various other European governments. The focus is on reforming individual agencies like the labor market board and the social security administration, rather than
collaboration to deal with overlapping problems.16 The role of the regions is in this perspective secondary, though there are many pro-regional statements in the policies on economic
development (Ministry of Enterprise).
It is important to add that the new government won the elections in 2006 partly through triangulation, using traditional slogans of the left and claiming to be better at providing jobs and
economic growth than the Social democrats. It is very likely that the regional issue was put
aside both because of differences of opinion and in order to focus on other issues where the
alliance has a greater chance to win the next elections. If the latter is the case, then the issue
may be reopened if the government is reelected and circumstances change.
Turning the issue of creating larger and stronger regions over to the regions themselves transforms it into a game of bargaining to find workable alliances. A decision to delegate issues
can be explained, like other decentralization, in terms of blame-avoidance at the center (Pierson 1994). It is in the self-interest of central governments to maintain power over matters but
delegate difficult decisions, especially cut-backs, to lower levels.
Obviously, there is a risk for suboptimal outcomes in these regional negotiations, creating
lock-ins where regional actors settle on something which makes sense to themselves under the
circumstances but where other solutions would be better from a bigger perspective.17 HowevHUWKHUHJLRQDODFWRUVDUHPDNLQJWKHLUGHFLVLRQV³LQWKHVKDGRZRIWKHVWDWH´NQRZLQJWKDWLQ
the end it is the government which makes proposals to the parliament. So far, the government
has given hints, including the rejection of some applications and acceptance of others (after
hearing recommendations by the agency which handles issues of boundary change).
The government plays the role of arbiter but, as the appointment of the recent commissioner
suggests, the national government has its own interests too. The ministries have in effect
agreed, in the instruction to the commissioner, to ask for more coherent regions.18 They may
also have opinions on what that means in practice, even though the commissioner is asked to
figure that out. As the instruction reads, this can have to do with regional boundaries as well
as with the allocation of tasks, which could open a discussion of consequences on costs and
potential savings.
The individual regions have different interests due to such things as their regional economies
and their position in the system of health care. Some regions have large hospitals and depend
on patients from other regions, while other regions can sit back and hope to be free riders
when such regions make big investments. The system of health care is based on voluntary
agreements by the regional governments (county councils), though with some carrots and
sticks by the national JRYHUQPHQW1HJRWLDWLRQVFDQWXUQLQWRDJDPHRI³3ULVRQHUV¶'LOHPPD´
16
Such collaboration regionally and locally has been very common and partly overlapping with the collaboration
on economic development, where better use of public resources for skills development etc has been a main goal.
A large number of joint projects are now funded by the EU Social fund in Sweden. Here, Norway is a contrast
with its merger of the equivalent agencies, combined with a strong involvement of the local governments in the
so called NAV-reform.
17
In the EU literature, this is refered to as decision-traps (Scharpf 1999).
18
Instructions fall under the requirement of consensus/unanimity.
14
LIERWKSDUWLHVJDLQLQWKHVKRUWUXQE\QRWFRRSHUDWLQJRU³&KLFNHQ´ZKHUHXQLODWHUDOGHIHction is rewarded). Unfortunately, the two regions which the government accepted are without
large hospitals and, hence, possible free riders of the health care system, placing a greater
burden on other regions.
These comments are based on the logic of the health care system but, as noted above, there
are other issues and logics at play too. Economic development issues are much more related
to the composition of the regional business sector, which produces a different set of strong
and weak partners in the dating game. Some are close to metropolitan areas whereas other
regions find it difficult to choose partners for long-term economic development (not to mention the possible conflict between the implications of the different logics). The contents of the
regional negotiations will be discussed further below.
It is obvious that the solutions depend on the set of issues to solve. Health care is taken for
given as part of the solution but, at least in theory, the national government could opt for other
health care providers and build regions around other policies. Many think that such regional
governments would be too narrow to make up a level of the public sector with their own taxes, but the Norwegian experience suggests that regions in the Scandinavian model can survive
such a change. The Danes have gone in the other direction, focusing on health care by taking
away regional development issues from their regional governments.
To summarize, rational choice institutionalism helps us see the games that are going on.
These games are very much ± but not exclusively - about power and money, where selfinterest tends to dominate. Further analysis of these games can help us see solutions and barriers to solutions. The key lesson is perhaps that non-regional perspectives are present in
many parties and ministries, to the extent that they now dominate national politics. They seem
to be based on a macroeconomic thinking where regions are irrelevant. For devolution to
come back on the agenda, a new coalition of interests based on other theories is needed.
5. T he second interpretation: competing logics
Sociological institutionalism can help us understand the negotiations which go on at the regional level and at the national level. In particular it can provide a broader view of how the
actors make up their minds when several issues are at stake, when their ³ORgiFV´come into
conflict. The situation is similar to the famous analogy with a garbage can, where streams of
problems and solution flow around and get connected by politicians in a short-term perspective, avoiding principled long-term perspectives on the issues at hand.
In our case this is highly relevant as there are many issues discussed at once. There are several
issues involved for the regional governments, each with their own sub-bureaucracies for
health care, regional development etc, but for the top level of regional politicians it is very
much an open question of which issues to prioritize. There are several perspectives on what
would be reasonable future regions. Each perspective has its own logic of what is the best
thing to do.
Health care is the backbone of the elected regions, with something of a built-in logic in the
UHODWLRQVKLSVHVWDEOLVKHGZLWKLQKHDOWKFDUHD³KHDOWKFDUHUHJLRQDOORJLF´This has primarily
to do with who have the big hospitals and who provide patients, as mentioned above. Patterns
of collaboration are different in the area of regional economic development, which is operating accordiQJWRDQRWKHU³UHJLRQDOORJLF´$JHQHUDOLQWHUHVWLVWRFUHDWHDOOLDQFHVZKLFKPDNH
sense from an economic perspective, supporting future growth areas around big cities or air-
15
ports etc. The regional governments work with transport and have a need to connect their
mid-range services with national and local services. The need for public transport is endless
and the area is riddled with conflict over priorities, in regions, between regions and between
means of transportation. A holistic view on transport is easier said than done.
We see these conflicting logics at work in many regions. One example is Östergötland, where
Linköping is situated, which is in an alliance for health care with its southern neighbors but
sees its economic development in a northern direction, related to Stockholm. There are indications that representatives of the regional government (county council) say different things in
discussions of health care and within the indirectly elected assembly which has the leadership
role in regional development issues under the post-2002 model of devolution (Hedvall & Vestin, forthcoming). This is in line with the sociological perspective which brings attention to
inconsistencies and de-coupling of issues in an organization, which is rational (!) until an
overall decision is made. What we are witnessing is the process of forming an identity in the
county council.
It is even worse in the Uppsala region, which is economically integrated with the Stockholm
region in terms of its labor market, but has a strong desire to avoid an alliance in health care
ZLWK6WRFNKROPEHOLHYLQJWKDWLQWKHORQJUXQWKHUHFDQ¶WEHWZRPDMRUXQLYHUVLW\KRVSLWDOVVR
close to each other. The desire to protect the hospital and the medical school of Uppsala University is a strong driver for an alliance with the weaker regions to the north and west. Here,
health care won over economic development, or, to put it differently, the regional interest won
over a national interest to integrate the economy of the metropolitan region (OECD 2006)
and, possibly, to have a new structure in health care. A pragmatic solution is now to work
within each industry to integrate the economies, for example in the alliance to develop life
sciences in the Stockholm-Uppsala area.
The national agencies and their ministries have other needs which can be described as a third
NLQGRI³UHJLRQDOORJLF´. As indicated, the agencies have adopted a variety of regional divisions, often dividing the country into fewer and bigger regions than the 21 counties. One of
WKHDUJXPHQWVIRUPDNLQJ³-UHJLRQV´, as the parliamentary commission suggested, is that
such a number seems reasonable to most agencies as well as for health care and regional development purposes. For those who desire regional integration of the public sector, it would
be of great value to have a set of regions which the central government can connect to. However, there may be great differences of opinion in the design of the regions across the ministries and vis-à-vis the regions, as in the example of health care and economic integration in
the Stockholm metropolitan area.
7RVRPHH[WHQWWKH(8LVRSHUDWLQJZLWKDIRXUWK³UHJLRQDOORJLF´WKH NUTS2-regions used
for statistical purposes and for the structural funds. These are generally not seen as regions at
all, but over time the partnerships created for the structural funds may produce loyalties and
open up for new possible alliances. When everything else is messy they may provide a focal
point for Swedish decision-makers.
In sociological institutionalism, national and regional actors are not necessarily motivated by
self-interest, but also by new ideas and what others regard as legitimate. To some extent it is
UDWLRQDOWRGRZKDWRWKHUVGR³JRZLWKWKHIORZ´LQVWHDGRIPDNLQJDFRPSOH[FDOFXOXVRI
LQWHUHVWV7KLVFDQH[SODLQZK\FRQFHSWVVXFKDV³QHZUHJLRQDOLVP´DUHDGRSWHGUDSLGO\LQ
many different countries. It points to the importance of first-movers among the regions, the
trend-setters which others follow. If one region takes a new course of action, it will be easier
16
for others to follow. This is often how new policy tools spread across the country, but we haYHQ¶WVHHQDQ\REYLRXVOHDGHrs in how to handle the negotiations among the regions.
This type of analysis can also explain some of the actions in the past, such as why regional
governments moved into the area of regional development at all. One reason may be that a
diversification of tasks could reestablish the legitimacy/status of the regional governments
when health care was (is) under attack. Their interest in regional development may have
helped in adopting the ³QHZUHJLRQDOLVP´, as well as the reverse, that the new paradigm gave
increased support for the role of regional actors. The new paradigm itself may be a result of
the rise of economic geographers into DQHZ³HSLVWHPLFFRPPXQLW\´ with a set of ideas in
opposition to the epistemic community of macroeconomists.19 Furthermore, there was inspiration from the German case, when membership of the EU made German states a role-model for
Swedish regions.20
The point, according to sociological institutionalism, is that policy learning in this fashion can
mean that certain details are picked up while differences in context are ignored. Such picking
up of international concepts may in worst cases lead to the adoption of easy elements of these
concepts while retaining contradictory policies in other areas. ³1HZUHJLRQDOLVP´PD\ in
practice mean different things in different countries. Such a situation is in contrast to a more
rationalistic conception of politics, where actors are expected to be rational and take the context into careful consideration, adapting the new paradigm to the particulars of the individual
country or region.
The regional issue itself is an example of changing expectations. In growth policy, regions are
now seen as the natural arena. International economic geographers preach that economic development has a regional logic, that the best scale to handle business development is above
the local level but below the national level (no matter how large or small the nation is). In
more elaborate versions, there is an acknowledgement that some issues are better decided at
the national level, such as how many biotech-clusters the public sector should invest in.21
A final area where sociological institutionalism can be helpful is in the analysis of norms,
especially the conceptions of democracy involved. It seems that actors have different views of
what democracy is or should be, and that the vague discussion of democracy in the regions
would benefit from making these conceptions explicit.
Devolution is partly driven by a desire to have self-rule at the regional level, which is very
different from the conception of democracy which was dominant in Sweden after WWII, and
probably still is. That YLHZIRFXVHGRQWKHUROHRIWKHGRPLQDQWSDUW\LQSDUOLDPHQW³WKHVRYeUHLJQZLOORIWKHSHRSOH´WRWDNHDFWLRQDQGEHKHOGUHVSRQVible. In this view, only the ruling
elite can guarantee coherence and capacity for action. Other levels and agencies can have
some room to adapt implementation to the specific context, but not more.
Many agree that a change of leadership from appointed prefects to elected politicians makes
sense, but there is less agreement on how far to go. The regional development agendas tend to
19
An epistemic community is a group of actors who think alike, usually based on some scientific school of
thought.
20
The German states are envied for their broad mandate. The regional governments in Sweden are more restricted in scope than the German states, but have easier access to funding by raising their own taxes.
21
In a parallel debate, some are saying that the national government should not have funded a university in each
county, i.e. that national politicians can also be weak in prioritizing limited funds.
17
be agreed by all parties; can there be more politics at the regional level and should there?
Would it be better if more legislative powers were devolved or would that lead to careless
spending by the regions? Would amalgamated regions have more interesting political debates? What happens if voters ignore the regional level? Here Sweden may benefit from comparisons with federal countries with more pluralistic conceptions of democracy.
Similar debates take place on the future development of the EU, whether more politics is better or not. Simon Hix argues that the EU would benefit from a more open discussion of majorities and minorities, which are in fact already present in the European parliament, commission
and council (Hix 2008). Opponents answer that people will not be interested in another set of
politicVVRWKHLGHDZRXOGQ¶WZRUNThis is not exactly the situation of the Swedish regions,
but there is a similarity in the search for a better working democracy at several levels simultaneously.
In practice there is a third conception of democracy already in place, a model where bargaining behind closed doors, for example in partnerships, is preferred over public debates. This is
a very pragmatic (American?) way of looking at the operation of the public sector. Organized
interests in the Swedish regions are invited to summits where they can contribute to the agenda. Also, many partners in the partnerships are agencies acting through civil servants on behalf of the national governmentJLYLQJULVHWRDFDVHRI³Solitics without politicians´LQWKH
partnerships. The coordination of the partnerships seems to work better (IURPWKHDJHQFLHV¶
point of view) if elected politicians provide leadership rather than the prefect who is himself a
civil servant (Statskontoret 2004b, Niklasson 2005).
One implication of the variety of perspectives on democracy is that these norms may support
particular solutions or block them, for example with the partnership model of integration,
ZKLFKLVRIWHQVHHQDVHIILFLHQWEXW³XQGHPRFUDWLF´XQVZHGLVKThe traditional view of the
central role of the dominating party is challenged, but no new consensus has emerged. It is a
meta-debate on a level above the daily issues and something that many actors are excluded
IURPSDUWLFLSDWLQJLQ³'HPRFUDF\´ is a topic for the parties and independent thinkers, perhaps for the national government and only partly for the regional governments. Agencies have
very little legitimacy in voicing opinions on conceptions of democracy.
To summarize, sociological institutionalism helps us pay attention to the complexity of the
FRPSHWLQJ³ORJLFV´DQGKRZWKH³JDPHV´PD\EHSHUFHLYHGGLIIHUHQWOy. This is very relevant
when the design of the structure is delegated to 21 individual regions. The perspective also
helps us see the impact of trends and paradigms, that sometimes new ideas are accepted very
quickly and sometimes refused for very long. Finally, norms about democracy are potentially
very important and the complexity seems to increase, perhaps in something like contradictions
to a dominant paradigm which is still holding on.
6. T he third interpretation: paths determine outcomes
Finally, historical institutionalism directs our attention to paths. One path-creating event is the
JRYHUQPHQW¶VGHFLVLRQWRWXUQWKHLVVXHRYHUWRWKHUHJLRQDODFWRUVZKLFKPD\OHDGWRRXtcomes the national government GRHVQ¶W like. Appointing first a coordinator and then a commissioner indicates a desire to have an impact on the regional processes, while letting the regions take full responsibility for the outcomes and any public outcries they may result in.
Bargaining in the regions varies because of differences in the background conditions, which is
another case of paths determining outcomes. As mentioned, some regions have large hospitals
18
and need patients from other regions. Other regions may want to turn elsewhere or even free
ride on larger regions. Some regions have large metropolitan areas which provide regional
centers. Other regions lack such centers and find it much harder to place themselves under the
influence of a particular center. In one case, two cities are marketing themselves as the fourth
metropolitan region, which is a way to create a new metropolitan region. To some extent,
these identities have been formed over long periods of time, starting when business was more
local and the population more rural. A point of historical institutionalism would be to say that
Sweden is stuck in an old-fashioned regional structure, unfit to meet the demands on state
capacity made by increasing globalization. This could be used for, as well as against, a larger
role for the regions.
A more recent choice of path is in the experiments in devolution. A majority of the regions
have opted for the indirectly elected regional government, which was the only option available to them. Hence, the situation now is not the same as in 1995 or 2002, when local governments became involved on a large scale. This may have an impact on the regional bargaining
processes where a continued influence will be demanded by the local governments, implying
that amalgamated regions need to have a stronger link between local and regional levels than
the informal links in the two regions where the regional government has devolved powers,
designed in the 1990s.
A very interesting case of path dependence is the decision by the regional government in
Värmland to merge with its counterpart in the much bigger region of Västra Götaland. One
driving force may be the desire to merge with a regional government which already has devolved powers and thereby take a fast track to devolved powers in Värmland too. The govHUQPHQWGLGQ¶WDSSURYHRIWKLVproposed amalgamated region, but the story of how the decision was made is very interesting. Basically, successive events led to the elimination of all
alternative strategies for Värmland, giving the regional government only one option if it
wanted to apply to the government before the end of 2008. It is not obvious that this option
was the best; hence, the procedure rather than the contents determined the outcome (von
Zedtwitz-Liebenstein 2009).
Coming back to the national level, the government is on a slow path to devolution. Driving
forces are the EU, the new regionalism, regional politicians and, not least, the perception of
success in the devolved regions. The speed is slowed down by other coalitions pushing in
other directions, favoring conformity and national control. The new government chose a high
profile strategy against unemployment , after an innovation in the parliamentary arena. In
business terminology, a challenger exploited a weak spot of the previous government, which
gave politics a new direction. This could be labeled a formative event, though of a negative
kind for devolution. The question for the future is if there will be counteracting events or if
the friends of the regions will be able to restate their case and be part of the new dominant
perspective.
The policies of the present government have tended to have negative side-effects for the regions. The focus on the labor market board was not based on hostility towards regional integration, but rather on a desire to control the instruments that are important from an econoPLVW¶VSHUVSHFWLYH2QWKHRWKHUKDQGGHYROXWLRQVHHPVWREHDIULJKWHQLQJWRSLFWRWKH
present government, mainly due to the potential conflict it may let loose (assuming that regional and local politicians will not create conflicts). Centralization is generally desired by the
government as a means for reform of various policies such as introducing private providers
for welfare services, forcing local governments to open up for competition. Furthermore, the
19
government has also desired to separate more clearly the roles of politicians and civil servants, criticizing agencies for telling politicians what to do. If there is a general pattern in this,
it is of reducing complexity to make the public sector more governable from the center. This
is a rational strategy in a majoritarian parliamentary system, where a government may not sit
very long.22 Hence, the logic of a top-down type of democracy reinforces itself.
To summarize, historical institutionalism highlights what has been mentioned before, that the
individual regions are to some extent in very different situations. Their experiences have the
effect of opening and closing doors, just as they do on the national arena. An implication is
perhaps that it is best for the sake of regional integration of policies to adjust strategies and
build on whatever building blocks there are. This is one part of the strategy of triangulation,
applied by many successful politicians, i.e. to avoid grand visions and focus on the short-term
tactics.
7. W here will the contradictory policies lead?
The perspectives help us see what goes on at the national and the regional levels. Rational
choice institutionalism helps us see the games that are going on. A number of conflicts are
present at the national level, often biased against regional solutions. Regional games are
nested with the national games and vary across the country. Sociological institutionalism
KHOSVXVSD\DWWHQWLRQWRWKHFRPSOH[LW\RIWKHFRPSHWLQJ³ORJLFV´DQGKRZWKH³JDPHV´PD\
be perceived differently. The last point means that games are not everything. Norms and
³JRLQJZLWKWKHIORZ´RIRWKHUHYHQWVPD\KDYH a great impact on how the situations unfold.
Historical institutionalism creates a bridge between the other institutionalisms, pointing to the
sequence of events, how one event has an impact on the next. Only in rare circumstances do
these paths change direction.
A paradox is that the parliamentary commission suggested solutions to the organizational dilemmas that would have moved in a pro-regional direction, while the prime ministers before
and after seem to have preferred the opposite. Both indicate a desire, but not necessarily an
ability, to restructure an ongoing process of political developments. With the previous prime
minister it was a desire not known to many others. With the present prime minister it is part of
the strategy for reform by a new government. None of the institutionalisms direct their attention to such forces of change. Historical institutionalism comes closest by acknowledging that
there are formative events, but it has no elaborate theory to predict these or to catch the role of
strong and innovative leaders. Hence, the three institutionalisms are better at explaining continuity than change.
To speculate on the future, the choice of government in September is important but still difficult to see the implications of. So far, the left of center opposition seems more interested in
policy integration than the present government. The social democrats have a new leader
which may mean that there is more support for the regional governments. A new leader could
also be an opportunity to take radical action, in whatever direction.
If the present government is reelected the most important thing is how the conservatives
perceive the issues. Now it is dominated by macroeconomic thinking, but there is a minority
opinion in favor of decentralization, at least to local governments. It is unlikely that the alliance will change its rhetoric, but it depends on what the Center party gets in a package deal.
22
This implies that more complex patterns of governance are the product of longer lasting governments and/or a
greater influence by the civil servants over time (i.e. the bureaucracy suggesting policies to the government
rather than the other way around).
20
Most likely, the government will continue to use its energy on jobs and breaking social exclusion by means of changing incentives (not by expanding and/or integrating programs). Other
issues are likely to change only in small steps, perhaps creating a new region or two but not
changing very much else.
For the long-term future, one may wonder if the EU will have a further impact. Are we perhaps witnessing the last battle by a national government before it is reduced to a level in a
European system of multilevel governance? Or will such a European system conserve whatever governance structure is in place in the member states?
From a pro-regional perspective one may wonder what it takes to change from a top-down
conception of democracy to a bottom-up conception. Decentralization has previously been
driven to some extent by a problem of overload at the top, i.e. as a pragmatic solution. A more
principled case would be that self-rule is better than rule by elites, or that variety and experiments are better than conformism. Such values were accepted around 1990, but later rhetoric
has emphasized conformity, mainly to make cutbacks and reforms acceptable. A stronger
economy may open for new strategies and rhetoric, whoever wins the upcoming election.
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