Milton's Case for a Free Commonwealth
Author(s): Frank Lovett
Source: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Jul., 2005), pp. 466-478
Published by: Midwest Political Science Association
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Milton's
Case
FrankLovett
for
a
Free
Commonwealth
WashingtonUniversityin St. Louis
Thisarticlewill examine the developmentof ohn Milton's argumentsfor democracyas against monarchyand othersortsof
autocraticrule. Theseargumentsare interestingboth in their own right and insofaras they shed light on historiographical
debatesconcerningthe classicalrepublicantradition.Milton is shown to hold a negativeconceptionof liberty,as opposedto a
positive orparticipatoryconception,which lendssupportto the neo-roman interpretationof that tradition, associatedwith
Quentin SkinnerandPhilipPettit. However,itisfurthershown that Sinnerand Pettitmisunderstandthe classicalrepublicans'
casefor democracy,attributingto thema conceptualargumentinplace ofan empiricalone.A betterunderstandingofMilton's
political theorycontributesto a betterunderstandingof this dilemma, and perhaps suggestsa solution.
his article will examine the development of
John Milton's arguments for a "self-governing
democratie or Commonwealth" (VII, 427)1 as
againstmonarchy and other sorts of autocraticrule. These
arguments are interestingboth in their own right (Milton
is often underestimated as a political thinker),2 and also
insofar as they shed light on continuing historiographical
debates concerning the classical republican tradition to
which he belongs.
Sometime between publishing the SecondDefense of
the PeopleofEnglandin 1654 and penning the first edition
of the Readie and Easie Wayto Establisha Free Commonwealth six years later,Milton changed his mind regarding
monarchy in a subtle but significant respect. In earlier
tracts, he had carefully evaded the question of whether a
properly constituted monarchy might not be a legitimate
form of government. Only in the Readie and Easie Way
does he at last flatly rejectmonarchy in no uncertain terms
as "unnecessarie,burdensom and dangerous," and thus
"justlyand magnanimouslyabolished"(VII,409).3 This
shiftis particularly
strikinggiventhe obviousinevitability
of restorationwhen the lattertractwas written,and the
possibilitythatpublishingsucha vehementlyantimonarchical tract might thereforeexpose Milton to personal
danger.Wouldnot a more suitabletime to expresssuch
sentimentshave been duringhis tenureas Secretaryof
ForeignTonguesfor the Commonwealthgovernmentin
the early1650s?Nor can his comparativerestraintat that
time be attributedentirelyto his employers'strategicinterests(the Commonwealthgovernmentmight not have
wantedto projectsuch a radicalpublicposture),for an
equalequivocationwithrespectto monarchycanbe found
in Milton'swritingsof the 1640s.
Some commentatorshave accordinglybeen led to
doubtthe consistencyof Milton'spoliticaldoctrines."The
developmentof Milton'srepublicanismis not easy to
chart,"writesWorden;"onlyin early1660... did his republicanismbecome uninhibited"(1991, 456).4 I will
FrankLovettis assistantprofessorof politicalscience,WashingtonUniversityin St. Louis,One BrookingsDrive, St. Louis,MO 63130.
The authorwould liketo JulianFranklinandthe anonymousAmericanJournalofPoliticalSciencereviewersfor theirmanyhelpfulcomments
on earlierdraftsof this article.
'All citations to Milton's writings other than ParadiseLost are to the volume and page number in the CompleteProse Works(Milton
1953-82).
2Manystill agreewith Sabinethat "therepublicanismof JohnMilton ... was less originaland less importantthan that of Harrington,"and
that "Milton'stractsarechieflymemorablefor the magnificenceof the literaryform in which he clothed ideas alreadyknown to everyone"
(1950, 508). Accordingto Zagorin, "asa political theorist and systematicthinker"Milton "wasnot of the first order.... There is little
Milton said in his politicalwriting that was not spokenby contemporaries"(1954, 106). Likewise,Wordenholds that "Milton'sclaims as a
politicalthinkerarelimited. His politicalprosewould havereceivedfar less attentionfrom posteritybut for the immortalityof his poetry"
(1994, 560).
3Asdiscussedin Knoppers(2001), there are some indicationsof the shift a bit earlier,in his unpublishedwritings of 1659, but this does
not detractfrom the main point.
4Zagorin(1954), Sanderson(1989), and Corns (1995) similarlydoubt the consistencyof Milton'srepublicanism.Dzelzainis(2001, 294-96)
discussesthis standardview.
AmericanJournal of Political Science,Vol. 49, No. 3, July2005, Pp. 466-478
?2005 by the MidwestPoliticalScienceAssociation
466
ISSN0092-5853
467
MILTON'SCASEFORA FREECOMMONWEALTH
argue to the contrary that Milton's republicanism did not
emerge late, and indeed that his writings demonstrate
considerable consistency of principle-not just across the
1650s, but both before and after this as well. The change
in his assessment of monarchy is best understood as resulting from a change in his assessment of certain political
realities and not from any revision in his underlying normative commitments.
The picture of Milton that emerges here does not fit
well with a long-dominant understanding of the classical republican tradition, which we might call the "civic
humanist" interpretation. As explained later, civic humanists attribute to the classical republicans a positive
conception of political liberty and, corresponding to this,
a belief in the intrinsic value of political participation
and civic virtue. It is thus perhaps not surprising that
Milton hardly registersat all in the two monumental treatises of this school-Pocock's TheMachiavellianMoment
(1975) and Rahe'sRepublicsAncientand Modern(1992)each of which mentions Milton only two or three times
in passing. Milton is more at home in a newer but still
disputed interpretation of the classical republican tradition, associated chiefly with Skinner and Pettit. On this
"civicrepublican"interpretation,the classicalrepublicans
held a negative conception of political liberty as nondomination, together with the belief that political participation and civic virtue are instrumentally valuable in securing liberty so-understood. A better understanding of
Milton's reasons for (eventually) rejecting monarchy will
lend some support to this latter camp, but the civic republicans do not quite get things right either. In particular,
they misunderstand the nature of the classical republican argument for democracy in a subtle but important
respect.
Of course, more than a minor historiographicalquestion is ultimately at stake. For both civic humanists and
civic republicans, the deeper issue is what we mean by
democracy and why it is important. The neo-republican
revivalhas in largepartbeen drivenby dissatisfactionwith
mainstream political liberalism'slong-deficient appreciation of the value of democratic participation, and by hope
for its recovery. It is thus particularlyimportant that we
get the argument for democracy in the classicalrepublican
tradition exactly right, and in my view an examination of
Milton's tracts will contribute to this goal.5
5Unfortunately,I can give only scantattentionto the significantdebatesbetweeneitherrepublicancampon the one hand, and liberals
on the other.Butliberalismhad not yet emergedas a clearlydistinct
politicaldoctrine in the seventeenthcentury,so it is unlikelythat a
study of Milton would contributemuch to such debates.
Milton's Earlier Position
on Monarchy
Soon after Charles I was finally defeated on the field of
battle, long-apparent divisions within the Parliamentarian ranks came to a head. Moderate Presbyteriansseemed
willing to reach a settlement with the King, but Pride's
Purge of December 1648 cleared the way for the remaining Rump Parliament to try and execute him in January
1649.
Milton's Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, probably
composed during the trial, was published only weeks after
the execution, in February.I begin with a discussion of this
tract both because it is representativeof his earlier views
on monarchy and democracy and also because it will clarify in some respects the arguments in his later Readieand
Easie Way.Milton sets narrow goals for the Tenure:"who
in particularis a Tyrantcannot be determin'din a general
discours," he cautions, for this can only be established
by "sufficient proof' under "the Law of nature and right
reason,"as judged by upright and impartial authorities or
the people themselves. Instead, he concentrates on showing that any ruler, "be he King, or Tyrant,or Emperour,"
nevertheless "the Swordof Justiceis above him," and thus
that "turningto Tyrannythey may bee ... lawfullydepos'd
and punish'd" (III, 197-98). In other words, he seeks to
demolish a strictly ideological obstacle preventing many
people from supporting Charles's trial and executionnamely, the idea that kings are politically sacrosanct, beyond the reach of human law.6 He does this by arguing
that because political authority derives ultimately from
the people, magistrates can be held to account by their
subjects under the laws of natural justice.
That the origin of legitimate political authority stands
in need of explanation follows from the fact that "allmen
naturallywere borne free... and were by privilege above
all the creatures, born to command and not obey" (III,
198-99). Or, as he put it much later in ParadiseLost:
He gave us only over beast, fish, fowl
Dominion absolute; that right we hold
By his donation; but man over men
He made not lord; such title to himself
Reserving, human left from human free.
(1993, 285)
6Miltonmay specificallyhavehad in mind the Parliamentarytrack
writersof the early 1640ssuch as HenryParkeror WilliamPrynne,
who defendedconstitutionalresistancealongmonarchomachlines,
but who shiedawayfrom deposingCharles.See Franklin(1978, 2233) for a discussionof these authors.
468
In other words,no one has by naturethe right to rule
over others. Unfortunately,this natural equality cannot persist, for "from the root of Adams transgression"men havefallen"amongthemselvesto doe wrong
and violence."In orderto avoidinsecurityand danger,
people band togetherin politicalcommunity,and thus
"ordainesom authority,thatmightrestrainby forceand
punishmentwhatwasviolatedagainstpeaceandcommon
right."This is accomplishedby transferringthe "autoritie and powerof self-defenseand preservation"
that was
in
"orginallyand naturally everyone of them"to some
designatedpublicmagistrate"forease,fororder,andleast
eachman shouldbe his own partialJudge"(III, 199).
In arguingthat governmenthas its origin directly
in the people, Milton follows Henry Parkerand other
tractwritersof the early1640s.ParkerParliamentary
who Milton practicallyquotes-similarly argued that
"Menbeing depravedby the fall of Adam grew so untameanduncivilla creature,thatthe Lawof Godwritten
in his brestwasnot sufficientto restraynehim frommischeife,"and thus "withoutsome magistracyto provide
new orders,andto judgeof old, andto executeaccording
to justice,no societycouldbe upheld"(Parker1642, 13).
MiltonlikewiseagreeswithParkerthatpoliticalauthority
"isoriginallyinherentin thepeople,andis nothingelsebut
thatmightandvigourwhichsuchor sucha societyof men
containesin itself"(Parker1642,1).Butwe cannotfindin
theseParliamentary
tractwritersanythinglikeMilton'sassertionthanmenarebynaturebornfree,eachindividually
possessingthe rightto executethe lawof nature.Indeed,
it hasbeenobservedthathis argumenthere,thoughconforeshadowsthatof
siderablymorecompact,remarkably
Lockea generationlater(seeDzelzainis1991,xvi-ii). The
idea of an individuallyheld, naturalrightto executethe
law of naturemight derivefrom Hugo Grotius,though
on his accountthe executiverightis permanentlyalienatedto a sovereign,whereasMiltonbelievesthatit is only
provisionallydelegatedandcanalwaysbe reclaimedby its
originalpossessors.7
At firstno explicitlimitswereplacedon government,
Miltonspeculates,butgradually"thedangerandinconveniences of committing arbitrarypower to any"magistrate
was discovered, and attempts were made to restrain political authority. In order to deprive their magistrates of
arbitrarypower, communities "inventLawseither fram'd,
or consented to by all, that should confine and limit the
authority of whom they chose to govern them." This is
7Cf. Grotius (1925, 138-40, 465-78). Milton clearly had some
knowledgeof Grotius:his SecondDefensereportsthat he was "very
desirous of seeing"the "learnedHugo Grotius"on his travels(IV,
615), and his divorcetractscite Grotiusseveraltimes, though never
the De iure.
FRANKLOVETT
done so that"man,of whosefailingtheyhadproof,might
no more rule over them, but law and reasonabstracted
as much as mightbe from personalerrorsand frailties."
In otherwords,just "asthe Magistratewas set abovethe
Addipeople,so the Lawwas set abovethe Magistrate."
tionalmeasures,suchas oathsof office,the institutionof
parliaments,and so on, were addedto give forceto the
ruleof law (III,199-201).8 In lightof this,Miltonclaims,
it is evidentthat:
... the powerof KingsandMagistratesis nothing
else, but what is only derivative,transferr'dand
committedto them in trustfrom the People,to
the Commongoodof themall,in whomthepower
yet remainesfundamentally,and cannotbe tak'n
from them, without a violation of thir natural
birthright.... (III,202, emphasisadded)
This is about as cleara statementof the doctrineof inalienablepopularsovereigntyas one mighthope to find,
though of coursehe does not workout the technicaldetails as Lockewould laterdo. It is not clearfrom whom
exactlyMiltondrewhisinspirationhere,butin effecthe is
followingto its logicalconclusionthe constitutionaldoctrineof the Monarchomach
theoristsof the latesixteenth
he
had
at
of
which
least
somepassingfamiliarity.9
century,
much
he
further:
Indeed, goes
... sincetheKingor Magistrateholdshis autoritie
of the people, both originalyand naturallyfor
theirgoodin the firstplace,andnot his own,then
maythe peopleas oft as they shalljudgeit for the
best,eitherchoosehim or rejecthim, retainehim
or depose him thoughno Tyrant,meerlyby the
libertyandrightof freebornMen,to be govern'd
asseemsto thembest.(III,206,emphasisadded)10
8Milton offers a similar historical sketch in the Readieand Easie
Way(VII, 448-49). Again,the similarityto Parker(1642, 13-16) is
striking.
9Thequestionof his sourcesis discussedin Hughes (1962, 110-25)
without clear resolution. Milton cites FrangoisHotman'sFrancogallia in severalworks and seems also to have read the Vindiciae
contratyrannos,which he falselybelievedwas writtenby Theodore
Beza. On the monarchomachsin general,see Franklin(1969); on
Milton'sview of who may engagein activeresistance-an issue left
aside here-see Dzelzainis(1991).
1'Miltonreiteratesthese points later:"thepowerof kings and magistrates... was and is originallythe peoples, and by them conferr'd
in trust onely to bee imployd to the common peace and benefit;
with liberty thereforeand right remainingin them to reassumeit
to themselves,if by kings and magistratesit be abus'd;or to dispose of it by any alteration,as they shalljudge most conducing to
the public good" (III, 211-12). Note that by fully embracingthe
MILTON'SCASEFORA FREECOMMONWEALTH
This is a version of the doctrine of popular sovereignty
considerablymore radicalin some respects even than that
of Locke, for the threshold of rebellion is much lower:
on Locke'sview, the people cannot depose their rulers at
will, but only when certain conditions of the social contract have been violated; on Milton's view, while tyranny
provides an excellent reason for doing so, the right of the
people to exercisetheir sovereign authority is by no means
limited to such cases.
According to Milton, "the power to remove, or to
abolish any governour supreme, or subordinat" is precisely "that power, which is the root and sourse of all
liberty." It is the "natural and essential power of a free
Nation," without which a people "can in due esteem be
thought no better then slaves and vassals born, in the
tenure and occupation of another inheriting Lord" (III,
236-37). But can a people, consistently with the continued enjoyment of their naturalrights and liberties, choose
monarchy?The position Milton takes in the Tenureseems
to be yes-though subject to two important conditions.
The first is that the monarchy not be hereditary: "to say,
as is usual, the King hath as good right to his Crown and
dignitie, as any man to his inheritance," Milton writes,
"is to make the Subject no better then the Kings slave,
his chattell, or his possession that may be bought and
The second is that the king be subject to the law,
sould.""11
and not above it. If the king is above the law, "we hold
then our lives and estates, by the tenure of his meer grace
and mercy,"and absolute or unlimited monarchy "is the
worst sort of Tyranny;and least of all to be endur'd by
free born men" (III, 203-04). Subjectto these conditions,
however, Milton concedes that monarchy is an acceptable
form of government, and by implication that democracy
is not necessary for the enjoyment of political liberty.
Milton reiterates his position in other tracts of the
same period.12 For example, in the Eikonoklastes(published in October of 1649), he writes that "It were a folly
beyond ridiculous to count our selves a free Nation, if the
King not in Parlament,but in his own Person and against
implications of popular sovereignty,Milton eliminates a tension
found both in the Monarchomachs,and also in Parker,Prynne,
and other earlyParliamentarytractwriters,who upheld constitutional resistancewhile remainingcommitted to a constitutionally
independentmonarchy.Fordiscussionof thisproblem,see Franklin
(1969) and (1978).
11Notethat Milton eschewsthe solution offeredby Hotmann and
others-namely, glossing the law of successionas a custom tacitly
consentedto by the people.
120f course I ignore here the various shifts and inconsistencies
among these tracks,carefullydocumented by Sirluck(1964). The
point is only that Milton's position on the relationshipbetween
monarchyand politicallibertyremainsmore or less consistentduring this period.
469
them, might appropriateto himself the strengthof a whole
Nation as his proper goods" and somewhat later, that "if
our highest consultations and purpos'd lawes must be terminated by the Kings will [i.e., veto], then is the will of
one man our Law,and no suttletie of dispute can redeem
the Parlament, and Nation from being Slaves" (III, 451,
462). The equivocation in these and other passages is evident: they suggest that a monarch properly restrainedunder the law of the land-here embodied in Parliamentary
supremacy-would not necessarily conflict with political freedom. The incompatibility of hereditarymonarchy
with liberty is reiterated in the Defense of the People of
England, published 1651: "Surelythose nations must be
slavish and born to serve who admit that without their
own consent they have become the inheritance of such
masters [kings]. They certainly cannot be considered citizens or free born or even free" (IV, 472). This implies,
however, that an elective monarchy might be acceptable.
His clearest statement to the effect that monarchy might
under certain conditions be acceptableappearsin the Second Defense,published 1654:acknowledging that whereas
his previous works "seemed to attack the whole right of
kings," Milton claims that in truth he "had uttered no
word against kings, but only against tyrants" (IV, 604).
Thus down to 1654 at least, Milton did not hold there was
any necessaryincompatibility between monarchy and political liberty.
Miltonand the Classical
RepublicanTradition
Milton's equivocation on the question ofmonarchybefore
1660 has been commented on many times before.13It has
even led some to wonder just how well he fits with the
"classicalrepublican" tradition to which he is generally
supposed to belong. Of course, how best to characterize
that tradition is hotly debated.
Leastcontroversially,we might saythe classicalrepublicans were simply a loose family of writers, running from
Machiavelliand his fifteenth-century Italianpredecessors
to the English republicansHarrington, Sidney,and others;
passing from thence through the eighteenth-century commonwealthsmen and Montesquieu to Madison, Jefferson,
and the defenders of the American Revolution in England;
and coming to an end perhaps with Tocqueville. These
theorists share at minimum a set of common themes
and concerns, including for example the importance of
civic virtue and political participation, the dangers of
'3Forexample,see Zagorin (1954), Worden(1990), Corns (1995),
Dzelzainis(2001), or Knoppers(2001).
470
corruption,and the benefitsof a mixedconstitutionand
the ruleof law;and it is characteristic
of theirrhetorical
draw
to
on
classical
style
heavily
examples-from Cicero
and the Latinhistoriansespecially-in makingtheir arguments.If thereis one overridingcommitmentshared
by all the classicalrepublicans,however,surelyit is their
commitmentto theparamountvalueof politicallibertyor
freedom.Itis noteworthy,in thisrespect,thatin the Second
DefenseMilton describeshis own projectas preciselyto
"inanywayadvancethe causeof trueandsubstantialliberty"(IV,624). Of course,it hasbeenquestionedwhether
thisis rathertoo neaton his part-a disingenuousex post
facto effortto greaterdignifywhatwerein fact merelya
seriesof timelypoliticaltracts.Butwhynot takeMiltonat
his word?It wouldindeedbe difficultto renderanybetter
accountof thoseearlierwritings,in whichan enthusiasm
for politicallibertyclearlytakescenterstage.Miltonaddressesthe Areopagitica,
for example,to "theLibertyof
Unlicenc'dPrinting"and quotes Euripidesto the effect
that "Thisis trueliberty,when free-bornmen/Havingto
advisethe public, may speakfree"on its title page (II,
he explainsthatthis
485). In the prefaceto Eikonoklastes,
trackwill "takeup this Gauntlet... in behalfof Libertie,
and the Commonwealth"
(III,338). And again,the First
Defenseaimed"withgood successand in verytruth [to]
refute"Salmasius'sattackon the "famousmen who led
us to liberty"(IV,306). Theseand manyotherinstances
couldbe citedto the effectthathis claimin 1654to have
been motivatedall alongby the causeof "trueand substantialliberty"is no mereretrospectivegloss.
Few contemporaryhistorians would dispute this
of the classicalrepublicantradition,nor
characterization
Milton'sinclusionin it, so farasit goes.Beyondthis,however,consensusquicklycomesto an end. Broadlyspeaking, thereare two camps:on the one hand a "civichumanist"camp,associatedespeciallywith HannahArendt,
GordonWood, J. G. A. Pocock,and others;and on the
othera "civicrepublican"
camp,associatedespeciallywith
QuentinSkinner,Philip Pettit,and others.14 These two
campsdifferconsiderablyin their respectiveinterpretations of the classicalrepublicantradition.
14Forexamples of the former see: Arendt (1990, 1993, chapter
4); Wood (1969); Pocock (1975); Worden (1990, 1994);and Rahe
(1992). For examplesof the lattersee: Skinner(1984, 1998,2000);
Viroli (2002);Pettit(1989, 1997, 1999);and Dzelzainis(2001). The
terms "civichumanist"and "civicrepublican"I draw from Rawls
(1993, 205-06), though they are now common. This division ignores of course some alternativeinterpretationsof republicanism.
There is for example a popular Europeantradition that regards
Spinoza and Rousseau as the canonical republicans;for reasons
that should become clear, I am not at all sympatheticwith this
view. There is also an American (now largely defunct) tradition
that regardsthe idea of a 'mixed constitution'as the core republican doctrine:see for exampleFink (1962) or Berns (1987).
FRANKLOVETT
On the civichumanistview,the classicalrepublicans
held whatwouldnow be describedas a perfectionistpoliticalphilosophy-that is, a politicalphilosophycentered
on the promotionof a specificconceptionof the goodlife
as consistingin activecitizenshipandhealthycivicvirtue
on theonehand,whilecombatinganysortof "corruption"
thatwouldunderminethesevalueson the other.Thisdistinctivevisionof the good life is rootedin the experience
of the ancientGreekpolis,as expressedin the writingsof
Aristotle.On the civichumanistinterpretation,
the goods
of activepoliticalparticipation,civicvirtue,andso on, are
valuable,and thus the centralimportanceof
intrinsically
politicallibertyin the classicalrepublicanliteraturemust
be understoodin a distinctivemanner.Specifically,
to emConstant's
famous
the
distinction, classiploy Benjamin
cal republicansmust not be seen as holding a negative
"libertyof the moderns"view that freedom consists
but rathera
merelyin the lackof restraintor interference,
of
the
ancients"
view
that
freedom
conpositive"liberty
sists in an activeparticipationin the politicalprocesses
of collectiveself-determination(Constant1988). In the
languageof Arendt,the Greekpoliswas"akindof theater
where freedomcould appear,"and the politicalsphere
"is the realmwherefreedomis a worldlyreality"(1993,
154).15 In other words,to enjoy politicalfreedomis to
sharein the good life, understoodas activecitizenship
and civicvirtue.
If we expectto find somethinglikethese sentiments
in Milton, however,we might be in for a surprise.As
we haveseen, in his earliertractsMiltondid not see any
fundamentalinconsistencybetweenmonarchyand the
enjoymentof politicalliberty,and thus he could hardly
have regardedfreedom as consistingin activepolitical
thesewritings,andlookparticipation.Evendisregarding
ing ahead to what is supposedthe most republicanof
all his tracts-the Readieand Easie Way-we find that
he rejectsin ratherstrong terms the standardinstitutional devicesfor encouragingactivepoliticalparticipation:namely,largepopularassemblies,frequentelections,
andtherotationof officeholding.It is true,of course,that
he proposesa vague system of local assemblies,which
would provide greater opportunities for widespread active participation, but this is only to communicate "the
natural heat of government and culture more distributively to all extreme parts"(VII, 460). In other words, one
gets the distinct impression that active popular participation is something in Milton's view to be contained and
'5It is a telling moment when Pocock describes the story of his
monumentalMachiavellianMomentas havingbeen told "in terms
borrowedfrom or suggestedby the languageof Hannah Arendt"
(1975, 550).
MILTON'SCASEFORA FREECOMMONWEALTH
moderated,not encouraged.Clearly,his writingsarenot
in accordwith the civichumanistpicture.
Contemporarycivic republicanslike Skinner and
Pettit interpretthe traditionquite differently.They do
not generallyfind the classicalrepublicanscommittedto
a positive "libertyof the ancients"conceptionof freedom. On the contrary,theirconceptionof freedomwas
decidedlynegative,rootednot in an Aristotelianvisionof
the ancient Greekpolis, but ratherin Romanjurisprudence (hence Skinner'srecent preferencefor the term
"neo-roman"instead of "civicrepublican").Given the
centralityof politicallibertyin the classicalrepublican
tradition,however,it followsfrom theirholdinga negativeconceptionof freedomthattheycannothavebeenadvancingaperfectionistpoliticalphilosophy.Thisof course
is not to denythe importanceforthe classicalrepublicans
of activepoliticalparticipation,civic virtue, combating
corruption,and so on. But ratherthan havingregarded
themas intrinsicallyvaluablecomponentsof a particular
vision of the good life, the classicalrepublicansregarded
themas instrumentally
valuablefor securingandpreserving politicalliberty.On this interpretation,what distinguishesclassicalrepublicansfrom classicalliberalsis not
thatthe formerareperfectionistandthe latterantiperfectionist,but ratherthat the former'sneo-romanconception of freedom-while clearlya "negative"
conception-differs importantly from the latter's conception of
freedomas merelythe absenceof interferenceor constraint(see especiallyPettit1997and Skinner1998).
Doesthisinterpretation
betterfitwithwhatwefindin
Milton?"[T]hereare,in all,"he saysin the SecondDefense,
"threevarietiesof libertywithout which civilizedlife is
scarcelypossible,namelyecclesiastical
liberty,domesticor
personalliberty,and civilliberty"(IV,624).16 Whilethis
roughlist or schematizationdoes not exactlyconstitutea
definition,it is aboutas closeashe comesto offeringone,
andit is worthreflectingon its threeelementsin relation
to his politicalwritings.
Miltonaddressedthe first-ecclesiasticalliberty-in
a seriesof pamphletson churchreformthat advocated
the abolitionof episcopacy.Althoughtherewas nothing
particularly original about these pamphlets (his contribution was lost in a flood of antiepiscopal writings of the
early 1640s), it is relevant that Milton believed they contributed to a movement that was "following the true path
to liberty," and "from these beginnings" leading to "the
'6Butin the Readieand EasieWayhe saysthat "thewhole freedom
of man consists eitherin spiritualor civil libertie"(VII,456). Since
he includesthe libertyof conscienceunder the former,a charitable
readingwould be that he means "spiritual"in the latter schematization to cover both "ecclesiastical"and "domesticor personal"
libertyof the first.
471
liberation of all human life from slavery"(IV, 622). This
movement was responding to the authoritarian and conformist direction the Church of England had taken since
the appointment in 1633 of William Laud as Archbishop
of Canterbury;the general feeling among reformers was
that the established church-if there had to be one at
all-ought to decentralized and democratic, not centralized and hierarchical.But if Milton believed reforming the
church in this manner could be understood as advancing
the cause of liberty, then it must be that his underlying
conception of liberty is negative and not positive: ecclesiastical liberty, it seems, consists in the opportunity of
a people to worship God in a manner after their own
choosing, free from an autocratic order of bishops. Or,
as Milton would later write, "who can be at rest.., .who
hath not libertie to serve God and to save his own soul,
according to the best light which God hath planted in him
to that purpose" (VII, 456)?
Next consider what Milton calls domestic or personal
liberty. Under this head he includes both his writings on
marriage and divorce and also on the freedom of speech
and press." With respect to the former, a series of tracts
published between 1643 and 1645 arguefor the right of divorce on grounds of incompatibility,without the need for
an outside authoritativejudgment as to this fact. With respect to the latter,his famous Areopageticaof 1644 argues
against any system of prior restraint on publishing that
would place "the judgment of truth and falsehood, what
should be printed and what suppressed ... in the hands of
a few men" (IV, 626). Thus, "when complaints are freely
heard, deeply consider'd, and speedily reform'd, then is
the utmost bound of civill liberty attain'd"(II, 487). As in
the case of religious freedom, these arguments can only
be seen as advancing the cause of a negative conception
of liberty. To argue for the right of divorce or free speech
and press is not to argue for a perfectionist vision of the
good life-as consisting in civic virtue and active political
participation, say, or anything else for that matter.
Since the third category-civil or political libertyhas received sufficient attention already,we may take it as
fairly settled that Milton's underlying conception of liberty is a negative one. It is no surprise then that Milton
receives scant attention in the works of the civic humanists, for his political outlook is fundamentally at odds with
their interpretation of the classical republican tradition.
'7Curiously,he alsoincludeshis essayon educationunderthisheading. How is education a part of liberty?Milton defines education
as "thatwhich fits a man to performjustly,skilfullyand magnanimouslyallthe officesboth privateand publikeof peaceandwar"(II,
378-79). In other words, education is that which fits a person for
manydifferentpathsof life;thus, the idea seems to be thatwithout
a good education,one does not havethe capacityto enjoyfreedom.
FRANKLOVETT
472
Of coursethis does not demonstratethat Milton holds
the neo-romanconceptionof libertya civic republican
wouldrequire,but fortunatelysomeexcelinterpretation
lentrecenthistoricalscholarshiphasdonepreciselythis.A
carefulexaminationof Milton'snoteson the Institutesin
his CommonplaceBook,andhis choiceof languagein the
earlypoliticaltracts,conclusivelydemonstratesthe operation of a neo-romanconceptionof libertyas nondomination,derivedultimatelyfromthe distinctiondrawnin
Romanlawbetweenfreemenandslaves(Dzelzainis2001;
Skinner2000). On this view,freedomconsistsneitherin
the activeparticipationin the politicalprocessesof collectiveself-determination(the civichumanistview), nor
in the mereabilityto do whatone likeswithoutinterference (the classicalliberalview), but ratherin being inIt is this
dependentfromthe arbitraryruleof a master.18
conceptionof libertythatis ultimatelyatworkin Milton's
eventualrejectionof monarchyin favorof democracy,to
whichI now turn.
Debatingthe Constitution
of Democracy
Much happenedbetweenthe publicationof the earlier
tractsdiscussedso far,and the publicationof the Readie
andEasieWay.Penruddock's
risingin 1655and the conof
tinuingdanger royalistconspiraciesled to the imposition of an unpopularmilitaryProtectorate,
heldtogether
by the personalityof Cromwellalone.With his deathin
1558,the Protectorate's
dayswerenumbered.In Mayof
the followingyear,Cromwell's
sonandsuccessorhadbeen
forcedto resign,andthe RumpParliamentrecalled.In the
monthsthatfollowed,theRumpwastwiceexpelled,twice
restored,andfinallycompelledbyGeneralMonckto readmit itspurgedmembers.BythetimeMiltonpublishedthe
first edition of the Readieand EasieWayin Februaryof
1660,it wasbecomingclearthatno lastingsettlementof a
freecommonwealthwouldbe possible.Despitethis,after
the LongParliamenthad dissolveditself,and with electionsfora new(andinevitablyprorestoration)
Parliament
underway,Milton published a revised and much enlarged
second edition in April, at no inconsequential danger to
himself. 19
'sThis conception of libertyas nondomination is most extensively
developedin Pettit (1997). On the concept of domination at work
here, see Lovett(2001).
19Milton went into hiding after Charles II was proclaimed King
in May,was arrestedin June,and eventuallymanagedto secure a
pardon (Woolrych 1980, 219-23). Though interesting,I will not
discuss the differencesbetween the two editions of the Readieand
EasieWay,as they do not affectthe argumenthere.All citationsare
to the second edition.
This tractis repletewith some of Milton'sstrongest
and most eloquentrhetoric."[J]udgingkingshipby long
experiencea governmentunnecessarie,burdensomand
dangerous,"he writes,the peopleof Englandhave"justly
and magnanimouslyabolishdit; turningregalbondage
into a free Commonwealth"in a legitimateexerciseof
popularsovereignty,bound "bythe law of natureonly,
which is the only law of laws truly and properlyto all
mankindefundamental;the beginningand the end of all
Government"(VII,409, 412-13). Havingdone allthis,to
now "fallbackor ratherto creepbackso poorly"to the
recently"abjur'dand detestedthraldomof Kingship,to
be our selvesthe slanderersof our ownjust and religious
deeds"and to "forsake,or ratherto betraya just a noble
cause"byabandoningthefreecommonwealth
wouldonly
"verifieall the bitterpredictionsof our triumphingenemies, who will now thinktheywiselydiscerndandjustly
censur'dboth us and all our actionsas rash,rebellious,
hypocriticaland impious"(VII,422).20 Miltonemphaticallycondemnswhatcanno longerbeprevented-finding
his courage,one mightsay,in bold words.
TheReadieandEasieWaycontainstwomainthemes,
relatedbut separable,and unfortunatelysomewhatconfoundedtogether.Theymightbe distinguishedasfollows:
supposethatweacceptthedoctrineof popularconstituent
sovereignty,as laid out in the Tenureand his other earlier writings.Naturally,the questionbecomes:what sort
of governmentshouldthe people establish?Miltondoes
not offer a generalsurveyof the possibilities,takingit
for grantedthat the relevantalternativesare monarchy
and what he calls a "freecommonwealth."By the term
"commonwealth"
Milton means"a societiesufficientof
it self, in all things conducibleto well being and commodious life,"or in other wordswhat Aristotledefines
as a polis-an independentand self-sufficientpolitical
community(III,458). A free commonwealth,he says,is
a "self-governing
democratie"(VII,427). Of course,we
must understandMilton'suse of this termbroadly:like
most otherpoliticalwritersof histime,Miltonshiedaway
fromthe term"democracy,"
andhe did not havea particularly demanding notion of what it entailed. Based on
his many uses of the concept in the Readie and Easie
Way, we may safely conclude that any people governed
by magistrates they have chosen for themselves count as
a "free commonwealth," even if the magistrates are few
and elections rare.21The first main theme of this tract,
then, concerns the advantagesof establishing a free commonwealth rather than a monarchy (and, as I previously
20Milton'slanguage here is strongly reminiscent of a passage in
Nedham (1767, xiii-xiv).
21Examplescan be found at Milton VII, 407-08, 426-27, 430-31,
449, and so on. For furtherdiscussion, see Dzelzainis(1995a).
MILTON'SCASEFORA FREECOMMONWEALTH
473
remarked,thisrepresentssomethingof a shiftin hisview).
The second,layeredhaphazardlyoverthe first,concerns
the optimalconstitutionaldesignfor a settledfree commonwealthin England.
Scholarlyattentionhas for the most partfocusedon
the secondtheme.Thisis unfortunatein a way,sincethis
aspectof the tractis both less originaland politicallybelated.Likeothersatthetime,Miltonregardedthe collapse
of the Protectorateandthe returnof the Rumpin Mayof
1659as an opportunityfor the permanentsettlementof
a free commonwealth.Broadlyspeaking,the debatewas
joinedbetweentwofactions(seeWoolrych1980):the first
was led by HenryNeville and drewits inspirationfrom
Harrington.In orderto makehis views more accessible,
Harringtonpublishedin Februaryor Marchof 1659 The
Art of Lawgiving,restatingthe basic ideas from Oceana
withouttheelaborateutopiantrappingsthatmayhaveobscuredits message.He advocateda bicamerallegislature,
both housescomposedof representatives
electedto nonrenewableand staggeredthree-yearterms;togetherwith
laws"to preventthe excessiveaccumulationof
"agrarian
into
the handsof a smallaristocracy.
The other
property
factionwas lead by HenryVanewho, followingup on a
plan he first laid out in A HealingQuestionPropounded
(1656), repliedto Harringtondirectlyin A NeedfulCorrectiveorBallancein PopularGovernment
(1659).Rather
than two electedhouses subjectto periodicrotation,he
proposedthata perpetualRulingSenateor Bodyof Elders
be selectedby an electoraterestrictedto those "who,by
their tryed good affectionand faithfulnessto common
rightand publickfreedome,havedeservedto be trusted
with the keepingor bearingtheirown Armesin the publickdefence"(Vane1659,8). TheRulingSenate'sauthority
wouldbe temperedby a "secondorderof men, ordained
and constitutedby the Peoplessufferage,"who meeting
togetherwith the former"fromtime to time"wouldsupply "the consent of the Peopleto all Acts and Decrees
thatareLegislativeandbindingto the Common-wealth"
(Vane1659,5).
When writing the Ready and Easie Way, Milton
was familiarwith both proposals.The centralfeatures
(VII,434-35).22 MiltoninsteadsupportsVane'sproposal
for a small RulingSenateor "GrandCouncel"elected
from a restrictedfranchise.A largepopularassembly,he
writes,"cannotbutbe troublesomandchargeable[expensive]... to the wholeland;unweildiewith thirown bulk,
unablein so greata numberto maturethirconsultations
astheyought"(VII,441).Milton'sonlyoriginalcontributionherewashis earlier-mentioned
proposalto substitute
a systemof localassembliesforVane'soccasionalpopular
assembly.But in any case, probablyby the time Milton
publishedthe first edition in February,and certainlyby
the time he publishedthe secondin April,it wasobvious
that any realisticopportunityfor the permanentsettlementof a freecommonwealthhadpassed,andanydebate
concerningits formirrelevant.
Scholarlyfixation on this aspectof the Readieand
Easie Waymay be due to the apparentlyelitist or aristocratic cast of his proposals,for which he has been
roundly taken to task.23But the political situation
Milton,Vane,andothersfacedmustbe understood.Even
before the readmissionof the expelledmembersof the
LongParliamentin February,it was clearthat the mood
of the countrywas swingingawayfrom the "goodold
cause"towardsrestoration,and that no remotelydemocraticelectionwouldreturna Parliamentfavorableto preservingreligioustolerationand self-government.Hence
their insistenceon a restrictedelectorateand a perpetual senate(and even Harrington'sprogramcalledfor an
elaboratelyindirectelectoralprocedure).Supportersof a
commonwealthwereclearlyin a difficultandtenuousposition, for advocatesof restoration,as Milton concedes,
could point out that "agreaterpartby far of the Nation
will haveit so."Towhichhe replies:
of Harrington's program-triennial rotation and agrarian laws-are clearly attacked. Although Milton might
agree to a "partial rotation," he "could wish that this
wheel or partial wheel in state, if possible, might be
avoided." On the contrary, he would prefer indefinite
reelection for three- to- nine-year terms (or better yet,
life terms subject to good behavior), for, as he puts it, the
"succcessive and transitorie parlaments" favored by the
Harringtonian faction "are much likelier contintually
to unsettle rather then to settle a free government; to
breed commotions, changes, novelties and uncertainties"
compell a greaterto retain,which can be no wrong
to them, thir libertie .... (VII, 455)
Supposethey be; yet of freedomthey partakeall
alike,one main end of government:whichif the
greaterpartvaluenot,butwilldegeneratlyforgoe,
is it just or reasonable,that most voices against
the main end of governmentshould enslavethe
less numberthat would be free?Morejust it is
doubtless,if it com to force,that a less number
We must carefullyattend to his language here. If it comes
to force one way or the other, can one fault Milton for
being willing to sacrifice some democracy in order to
22Miltonconsiders indefinite reelection in a later aside (VII, 461)
and also criticizesagrarianlaws explicitly(VII, 445-46).
23Seefor example Zagorin (1954, chapter 9); Sanderson (1989,
chapter6); Tuck(1993, 252-53).
FRANKLOVETT
474
preserve the whole of liberty, rather than the reverse?At
any rate, it is unfair to accuse Milton of being deeply committed to an aristocracy of the wise and virtuous merely
on the basis of a difficult choice made on the brink of an
inevitable restoration.24
The Case for Democracy
Considerably more interesting and original is the other,
comparatively neglected aspect of the Readie and Easie
Way:namely, Milton's emphatic arguments on behalf of
a free commonwealth or democracy as against monarchy.
This is the dominant theme of the tract, and yet similar reflections are hard to find in the debates of the later 1650s.
Harrington'scentralcase for popular government is in fact
merely an appeal to historical necessity-namely, that the
balance of property in England having passed from the
nobility to the people, no other durable constitutional
settlement is possible (1977, 163-76, 604-09). But this
claim obviously carries no weight in the face of events,
for if true, then a restoration would be impossible, and
if a restoration is possible, it cannot be true. Harrington
goes on to suggest that only under popular government
is an "empire of laws and not of men" attainable, and
"by that means comes to be the liberty of the commonwealth" (1977, 170-71), but this is presented as a (happy)
consequence of, and not an argument for, popular government.25 His only remaining positive argument on behalf
of popular government in Oceanais an opaque deduction
to the effect that if "the interest of the whole... is more
excellent.., .then the right or interest of the parts only,"
and "if the interest of popular government the nearest
unto the interest of mankind, then the reason of popular
government come the nearest unto right reason" (1977,
171-72). This argument does not appearin TheArtofLawgiving. Vane's case for a free commonwealth is even less
developed; moreover, it is strictly negative, merely from
the failure of monarchy to respect the rights and liberties
of the people (1656, 4-5). An emphasis on the problem
of constitutional design in the writings of the late 1650s is
perhaps understandable, given the political situation. In
this context, Milton's arguments for democracy are even
more interesting.
To find a writer devoting comparable energy to the
case for a free commonwealth, we must look back to
of Corns (1995),
24I am moreinclinedto agreewith theassessment
which finds radicalideas inherentin Milton'swritingsthroughout
his political career.
25Thisargumentreappearsin condensedform in the ArtofLawgiving (Harrington1977, 603).
Marchamont Nedham's The Excellencieof a Free State,
published 1656. This book presentsin revisedform a series
of editorials Nedham had published in the official Commonwealth newspaper, MercuriusPoliticus,under the supervision of Milton himself (who was therefore certainly
familiarwith their content). The first quarterof Nedham's
work, more than 40 pages, is devoted to a methodical series of arguments- 14,by his reckoning-tending to show
that "afree-state or government by the people, settled in a
due and orderly succession" of representativeassemblies
"is much more excellent than any other form" (1767, 42).
In reality,these are mostly variations on a theme familiar
from Machiavelli,namely, that since "they never think of
usurping over other mens rights, but mind which way to
preservetheir own," it follows "thatthe people ... are the
best keepers of their own liberties" (Nedham 1767, 2).
Reflecting on the experience of the ancient Romans,
Nedham remarks that having expelled the kings, "the
right of liberty, together with the government, was retained within the hands and bounds of the Patricians or
Senatorian order of nobility," and only later was some
share of government extended to the people. Before this
second development, "the nation was accounted free, because not subjected to the will of any single person: But
afterwardsthey were free indeed, when no laws could be
imposed upon them without a consent first had in the
people's assemblies" (Nedham 1767, xxii). Commenting
on this and similar passages,Skinner suggests that according to the English republicans,
... if a state or commonwealth is to count as free,
the laws that govern it-the rules that regulate
its bodily movements-must be enacted with the
consent of all its citizens, the members of the body
politic as a whole. For to the extent that this does
not happen, the body politic will be moved to act
by a will other than its own, and will to that degree
be deprived of its liberty. (Skinner 1998, 27)
From this he concludes that "free states, like free persons, are thus definedby theircapacityfor self-government.
A free state is a community in which the actions of the
body politic are determined by the will of the members
as a whole" (Skinner 1998, 26, emphasis added). In other
words, living under a democratic constitution (partly)
constitutes what it means to be free. Pettit provides a more
detailed treatment of the conceptual logic underlying this
view. First, suppose we define domination as follows:
One person is dominated by another ... to the extent that the other person has the capacity to interferein their affairs,in particularthe capacityto
MILTON'SCASEFORA FREECOMMONWEALTH
475
counselof manyindustriousequals,then underthe singledominationof one imperiousLord"(VII,427).Thisis
becausethe upshotof a freeandpublicdeliberationnatucapacity to interfere in a person's life without rerallytendstowardsthe commongood:asMiltonwritesin
gardto theirperceivedinterests.(Pettit1999,165)
theAreopagitica,
"thoughallthewindesof doctrinwerelet
to
loose
that
interference
with
playupontheearth,so Truthbe in the field,we do
Liberty,therefore,requires any
people'saffairspaydue regardto theirinterestsas they per- injuriouslyby licencingand prohibitingto misdoubther
ceivethem-or, as Pettitputs it in an earlierwork,they strength."Truthhas a competitiveadvantage,one might
must be "forcedto trackthe interestsand ideas of the
say, in the marketplaceof ideas:"let her and Falshood
grapple;who everknew Truthput to the wors,in a free
person sufferingthe interference"(1997, 55). Now on
this conceptionof what constituteslibertyas nondom- and open encounter"(II, 561)?It followsthat the "hapination, it is obviousthat only democracy"holdsout a
piness of a nation must needs be firmestand certainest
in a full and freeCouncelof thir own electing,whereno
of
to
the
comtrack
good prospect forcinggovernment
mon, perceivedinterestsof the populace"(Pettit 1999, singleperson,but reasononly swaies."By contrast,decision makingin a monarchyis not the upshotof a freeand
173). The argumentfrom libertyas nondominationto
open debate,but ratherthe capriciouswhim of a single
democracyis thus allbut an analytictruth.
Now it is indeed the case that Nedham repeatedly individual,advisedonly by courtiers,appointedby himassertsa peoplecannothopeto enjoytheirrightsandlibself,who haveno reasonto be interestedin the common
ertiesexceptundera democraticconstitution,but this is
good. Thus a people "mustneeds be madd or strangely
not equivalentto the assertionthatlivingundera demo- infatuated,thatbuildthe chiefhopeof thircommonhapcraticconstitutionis partof whatit meansto enjoyliberty. piness or safetieon a single person"(VII, 427). MoreThelatterclaimis necessaryandanalytic,whereasthe for- over,whateversafeguardsthe peopleerectto defendthe
meris empiricaland contingent.Skinnerand Pettitglide commongood, a monarchwill attemptto subvert:in the
overthissubtle,butsignificantdistinctionin theiraccount caseof England,for example,kingshaveavoidedcalling
of classicalrepublicanism.
Nevertheless,oncethe distinc- Parliamentasmuchaspossible,theyhavefilledpublicofficeswithroyalfavorites,andso on. Thus,while"thermay
tion has been pointedout, it is clearNedhamintendsto
arguethe formerand not the latter.His 14 reasons"that be sucha king,who mayregardthe commongoodbefore
the people... arethe best keepersof theirown liberties" his own,"nevertheless"it behovesnot a wise nation to
(Nedham1767,2) areclearlydirectedat demonstrating, committthe summ of thirwelbeing... to fortune"(VII,
on a wide varietyof empiricalgrounds,the contingent 447-48).
The second argumentwe might call an argument
factthat the securityof libertyis greatestundera demofrom moralequality.The generalmoralequalityof percraticconstitution(for example,becauseelectionsdiscouragecorruption,becauseofficeswillbe distributedby sons Miltonestablishesdirectlyon the groundsof scripmerit and not favoritism,becausethe people have less ture.CitingLuke22: 25-26 ("thekingsof the gentiles...
exerciselordshipoverthem;... but ye shallnot be so:but
interestin dominationthan the nobility,and so on). If
he that is greatestamongyou, let him be as the younger,
living undera democraticconstitutiona partof what it
andhe thatis chief,ashe thatserveth"),he goeson to ask,
meansto enjoyliberty,anysuchdemonstrationwouldbe
unnecessary.
... whatgovernmentcoms neererto this precept
Let'snow returnto the Readieand EasieWay.Like
of
for
free
it
is
that
Milton
believes
reasons
Christ,then a free Commonwealth;wherin
Nedham,
good
commonwealths are "held by wisest men in all ages the
theywho aregreatest,areperpetualservantsand
interferein theiraffairson an arbitrarybasis.The
capacityto interfereon anarbitrarybasisis ... the
noblest, the manliest, the equallest, the justest government, the most agreeable to all due libertie and proportiond equalitie, both human and civil" (VII, 424). Unlike
Nedham, he does not present these reasons in an orderly
manner, as perhaps is to be expected from the hurried
circumstances of his composing the tract. Nevertheless,
it is possible to identify and bring together the scattered
strands of three focal arguments.
The first is an argument from the common good.
Roughly, the idea is to show that a free commonwealth
is "safer and more thriving in the joint providence and
drudges to the public at thir own cost... ; yet are
not elevated above thir brethren; live soberly in
thir families, walk the streets as other men, may
be spoken to freely, familiarly, friendly, without
adoration. Wheras a king must be ador'd like a
Demigod, with a dissolute and haughtie court
about him, of vast expence and luxurie.... (VII,
424-25)
To put it another way, the courtier spirit encouraged in a
monarchy stands as an affront to the true moral equality
476
of human beings. "[H]ow a people.., .who have fought
so gloriously for liberty," Milton wonders, "can change
thir noble words and actions, heretofore so becoming the
majesty of a free people, into the base necessitie of court
flatteries and protestations, is not only strange and admirable, but lamentable to think on." Likewise, it is a
wonder "how any man who hath the true principles of
justice and religion in him, can presume or take upon him
to be a kind and lord over his brethren...: how he can
display with such vanitie and ostentation his regal splendor so supereminently above other mortal men" (VII,
428-29).26
Now, while interesting in their own right, neither of
these first two arguments connect the value of democracy
to the value of liberty. The first is merely an instrumental argument that monarchy is less likely to secure the
common interests of the community than elected magistrates. Indeed, Milton suggests this argument would not
touch on elective monarchy, where the king might have
incentives to look after the common good after all (VII,
427, 448).27 The second applies to hereditary and elective monarchies equally well, and it cannot be construed
as a merely instrumental argument. But the principle on
which it relies is not liberty,but moral equality.The equality Milton has in mind might be the fact that no one is by
nature born with the privilege to rule, in which case this
second argument can be seen as an extension of his views
in the Tenure.
It is only in the main third argument-and the one
that receives the most attention in the Readie and Easie
Way-that the value of liberty takes center stage. The argument proceeds as follows. As we have seen from the
Tenure,men are naturallyborn free and establish government only so as to protect their liberties under the natural
law from the insecurities and dangers of the state of nature. Moreover,since government holds its authority only
at the sufferance of the people, the latter remain free to
alter the former on any grounds, at any time. In the later
1650s, republicanslike Henry Vane and EdwardSexbybecame disillusioned with the Protectorate, and despite his
ratherforced public profession of confidence in Cromwell
in 1654 (IV,666 ff.), it is naturalto suppose that Milton too
became persuaded that all governments have an inherent
26InParadiseLostMilton similarlywrites, "... To bow and sue for
grace/Withsuppliantknee, and deify his power/Whofrom the terror of this arm so late/Doubtedhis empire,that were low indeed"
(1993, 12).
27Butwhat are these incentives?Milton does not say. Perhaps
monarchswill be motivatedbythe desireto seetheirchildrenelected
in succession.
FRANKLOVETT
tendency to encroach on political freedom.28He does not
take this as a reason for returning to monarchy, however:
on the contrary, it is precisely this fact that now provides
the strongest possible grounds for remaining committed
to a free commonwealth. The rationale is as follows: "if
we returne to Kingship,"it follows inevitably that we will
"begin to finde the old encroachments coming on by little and little"-this just by the nature of government in
general, and monarchy at least as much as democracy in
particular. But then "we may be forc'd perhaps to fight
over again all that we have fought, and spend over again
all that we have spent"vindicating political liberty against
the tyranny of Charles I in the first place (VII, 423). This
of course is the people's right under the law of nature, but
monarchs are "not to be remov'd, not to be controul'd,
much less accus'dor brought to punishment, without the
danger of common ruin, without the shaking and almost
subversion of the whole land," as the Civil Warhad clearly
demonstrated (VII, 426). To make matters worse, having
succeeded at great effort and cost to remove one tyrannical monarch, future kings, "never forgetting thir former
ejection, will be sure to fortifie and arm themselves sufficiently for the future against all such attempts hereafter
from the people" (VII, 449).
Now by contrast, "in a free Commonwealth, any governor or chief counselor offending, may be remov'd and
punishd without the least commotion," and thus the people's liberties can easily be defended against any threatened encroachments (VII, 426-27). Milton here follows
the observation of Nedham that "allpowers are accountable for misdemeanors" in a democracy, and this "hath
ever been the only bank against inundations of arbitrary
power and tyranny" (Nedham 1767, 42-43). Thus, even
on the assumption that a free commonwealth is no less
likely to encroach on political liberty, the comparative
ease and directness with which the people can exercise
their right to choose their rulers under that form of government constitutes a powerful argument for it advantage over monarchy.And of course that assumption itself
is probably unwarranted, for surely a king is "far easier
corruptible by the excess of his singular power and exaltation" and not "equallydispos'd to make us happie in
the enjoyment of our libertie under him" than are elected
magistratesin a free commonwealth (VII, 449). This is because "kingship,though looking big, [is] yet indeed most
pusillanimous, full of fears, full of jealousies," whereas a
28Zagorinwritesthatdespitethisnotoriouspassage,"itis impossible
to avoid the conclusion that the events of the protectoratedisillusioned" Milton (1954, 117). See also Woolrych(1980, 85-87) and
Dzelzainis (1995b) for discussion.
477
MILTON'SCASEFORA FREECOMMONWEALTH
free commonwealth is "most magnanimous, most fearless
and confident of its own fair proceedings" (VII, 456-57).
Monarchyis more likely to encroach on the political liberties of the people, even as it is more difficult for the people
in turn to resist those encroachments.
This third argument clearly follows the spirit of the
case laid out by Nedham (or, for that matter,Machiavelli)
for the Excellencieof a Free State. That is,
that the people.., .are the best keepers of their
own liberties... because they never think of
usurping over other mens rights, but mind which
way to preservetheir own: whereas, the case is far
otherwise among kings and grandees ... ; for they
naturally move within the circle of domination,
as in their proper center; and count it no less security than wisdom and policy to brave it over the
people. (Nedham 1767, 2)
Similarly,Milton's most important and most compelling
argument for a free commonwealth or democracy is based
on the greater security it is likely to secure for liberty as
nondomination. But also like Nedham, he does not hinge
his case on defining liberty as nondomination in such
a way as to render the argument a mere analytic truth.
On the contrary, the fact that Milton lays out the contingent, empirical connection between democracy on the
one hand, and the security of liberty on the other, clearly
demonstrates that he believed showing this connection
a necessary step in the argument. This would not be the
case if the argument were merely definitional.
Conclusion
Civic republicanslike Skinnerand Pettit have tried to find
in the classical tradition an argument that is not there.
The appeal of such an argument is perhaps understandable: no case for democracy, it might seem, can be more
rigorous than one showing it to be a logically necessary
deduction from the value of liberty as nondomination.
On the other hand, the view of Nedham and Milton (and
Machiavelli)has its own advantages.The price of analytic
rigor is substantiveweight:only if we keep our conceptions
of liberty as nondomination and democracy clearlyseparate does the former provide an independent justification
for the latter.Thus a carefulexamination of Milton'spolitical writings lends further weight to the civic republicans'
growing case against civic humanism, only to reveal new
difficulties. The challenge now is to develop a rigorous
and coherent argument for democracy based on the value
of liberty as nondomination that, like Milton's, does not
dissolve into definitional tautology.
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